JUDGMENT : SANJAY K. AGRAWAL, J. 1. The substantial question of law involved, formulated and to be answered in this second appeal preferred by the appellant/plaintiff is as under: “Whether both the Courts below are justified in granting counter claim and thereby decreeing the counter claim in favour of the defendants even after holding that the plaintiff is not the title holder of the suit land by recording a finding perverse to the record?” For the sake of convenience, the parties would be referred hereinafter as per their status shown and ranking given in the suit before the trial Court. 2. Sole plaintiff-Kameshwar Pathak filed a suit for permanent injunction and for possession of the suit land in respect of Khasra No. 271 area 0.18 Are. and Khasra No. 508 area 0.19 Are. total area 0.37 Are. situated at village Sarhari, Post Kewra Tahsil Pratappur, District Surguja (Now District-Surajpur) on the basis that he has purchased the suit land by two sale-deeds dated 25.8.86 and 10.12.79 from one Kusmi and claimed decree as mentioned above. 3. Resisting the suit, defendants No. 1 to 5 filed their written statement and denied the averments made in the plaint and in addition to filing of written statement they also laid counterclaim claiming that the suit property was originally held by Ramprasad and Dukhi Yadav and they never objected to defendants No. 1 to 5 to remain in possession and they are in settled possession over the suit land for last 60 to 70 years and as such, they have perfected their title by way of adverse possession, therefore, decree declaring two sale deeds dated 25.8.86 and 10.12.79 as null and void be granted in their favour and decree for adverse possession on the basis of long possession also be granted in their favour. 4. 4. The trial Court upon appreciation of oral and documentary evidence available on record, by its judgment and decree dated 29.11.2008, held that the suit property was originally held by Ramprasad and Dukhi Yadav and the plaintiff has not proved that he has title over the suit land or his vendor Sukmi had title over the suit land from which he has purchased and held that the plaintiff is not titleholder of the suit land and further held that defendants No. 1 to 5 have perfected their title by way of adverse possession and sale deeds dated 25.8.86 and 10.12.79 are null and void. Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the judgment and decree of the trial Court, the plaintiff has preferred first appeal before the first appellate Court, but remained unsuccessful as the first appellate Court affirmed the judgment and decree of the trial Court, against which, the plaintiff has preferred this second appeal under Section 100 of the CPC, in which one substantial question of law has been formulated, which has been setout in the opening paragraph of this judgment for sake of completeness. 5. Mr. Manoj Paranjape, learned counsel for the appellant/plaintiff, would submit that both the Courts below have concurrently erred in holding that the plaintiff is not titleholder of the suit land. Defendants No. 1 to 5 have never admitted the plaintiff to be titleholder, rather questioned the sale deeds executed by Sukmi in his favour by way of counterclaim as held by two Courts below and since defendants No. 1 to 5 have never admitted the title of the plaintiff, therefore, three requirements of adverse possession are absolutely lacking and therefore, two Courts below have committed an error in holding that defendants No. 1 to 5 have perfected their title by way of adverse possession, as such, the judgment and decree both the Courts below to that extent deserve to be set-aside. 6. On the other hand, Mr. 6. On the other hand, Mr. D.N. Prajapati, learned counsel for legal representatives of respondents No. 1 and 2 and respondents No. 3 to 5/defendants, would submit that both the Courts below are absolutely justified in dismissing the suit of the plaintiff and granting counterclaim of defendants No. 1 to 5 as the defendants are in possession for last 60 to 70 years and erstwhile owners Ramprasad and Dukhi Yadav during their lifetime never questioned title/possession of the defendants and therefore, in view of long possession of the defendants, both the Courts below are absolutely justified in granting decree of title based on adverse possession in their favour, which cannot be taken exception to. He would rely upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in the matter of Ravinder Kaur Grewal and Others vs. Manjit Kaur and Others, (2019) 8 SCC 729 . 7. I have heard learned counsel for the parties, considered their rival submissions made hereinabove and also went through the records with utmost circumspection. 8. It is correct to say that the plaintiff claimed title on the basis of two sale deeds dated 25.8.86 and 10.12.79 allegedly executed by Sukmi in his favour, but those sale deeds were not brought on record and the trial Court held that the suit property was originally held by Ramprasad and Dukhi Yadav and the plaintiff has not established relationship between original owners and Sukmi and he has also not established his title over the suit land and Ramprasad and Dukhi Yadav were titleholders of the suit land and dismissed the suit. However, the trial Court granted decree for declaration of title in favour of defendants No. 1 to 5 on the basis of adverse possession holding that the defendants are in settled possession for last 60 to 70 years over the suit land and Ramprasad and Dukhi Yadav were titleholders of the suit land. 9. In Para-18, the defendants in their written statement have pleaded that Ramprasad and Dukhi Yadav were titleholders of the suit land. 9. In Para-18, the defendants in their written statement have pleaded that Ramprasad and Dukhi Yadav were titleholders of the suit land. Para-18 of written statement states as under: ^^18- ;g fd okn Hkwfe [kŒuaŒ 271 ,oa 508 jdck Øe'k% 0-18 o 0-19 dqy jdck 0-37 vkjs Hkwfe jkeÁlkn o nq[kh vghj dh Hkwfe Fkh vkSj mUgksaus vius thoudky esa gh mDr Hkwfe dks edku ckMh cukdj fuokl o dkLr djus gsrq Áfroknhx.k Øekad 1 o 2 ds firk dks fn;k x;k Fkk rc ls vFkkZr vkt ls yxHkx 60&70 o"kZ iwoZ ls Áfroknhx.k dk muds firk ds le; ls vkt rd fufoZjks/k dCtk pyk vk jgk gS rFkk jkeÁlkn o nq[kh fu%larku Fks ftuds fu%larku e`R;q ds ckn dksbZ mRrjkf/kdkjh okfjl ugha Fks rFkk dqleh csok cStq dk muls fdlh Hkh Ádkj dk o'k laca/k ugha jgk gS u gh dqleh dk okn Hkwfe ij dksbZ LoRo ;k vkf/kiR; gh jgk gS ,slh fLFkfr esa ;fn oknh }kjk mls okn Hkwfe dk uktk;t okfjl cukdj jktLo vfHkys[kksa esa mlds uke dh Áfof"V djkdj vius uke ls okn Hkwfe dk fnukad 10-12-1979 ,oa 25-8-1986 dks ;fn dksbZ foØ; i= vius i{k esa fu"ikfnr djk Hkh fy;k x;k gksxk rks og voS/k gS ,oa mlds vk/kkj ij oknh dks okn Hkwfe dk dksbZ LoRo fof/kd :i ls ÁkIr ugha gksxkA** Thereafter, in Para-19 of written statement, the defendants claimed decree for declaration of title based on adverse possession by pleading as under: ^^19- ;g fd mDr okn Hkwfe ij Áfroknhx.k dk vkt ls 60&70 o"kZ iwoZ ls [kqysvke dCtk pyk vk jgk gS rFkk okn Hkwfe ij cus edkuksa es Áfroknhx.k fufoZokn :i ls vkt rd dCts esa pys vk jgs gS ftls okn Hkwfe ds ewy Hkwfe Lokfe;ksa jkeÁlkn o nq[kh }kjk Hkh dHkh dksbZ pqukSrh ugha fn;k x;k Fkk u gh muds rFkk dfFkr voS/k okfjl mRrjkf/kdkjh dqleh csok cStq }kjk dHkh pqukSrh fn;k x;k ,slh fLFkfr esa tc oknh tks lu~ 1975&76 esa fcgkj Ákar ls vkdj xzke&ljgjh esa fuokl dj jgk gS ds Hkh tkudkjh esa okn Hkwfe ij Áfroknhx.k dk ÁR;{k o [kqysvke :i ls dCtk okn Hkwfe ij pyk vk jgk gS dks dHkh pqukSrh ugha fn;k x;k gS cfYd pqids ls okn Hkwfe dk voS/k varj.k foys[k rS;kj djkdj jktLo vfHkys[kksa esa viuk uke ntZ djkdj o"kZ 2002 esa Áfroknhx.k ds fo:) ÁFke ckj uk;c rglhynkj Árkiiqj ds le{k >wBk vkosnu ÁLrqr dj Áfroknhx.k dks okn Hkwfe ds edku ls voS/k :i ls csn[ky djus dk Á;kl fd;k x;k fdUrq mlesa mls lQyrk ÁkIr ugha gksus ij og ekuuh; O;ogkj U;k;ky; dk lgkjk ysdj Áfroknhx.k ds fo:) ;g >wBk okn i= ÁLRkqr fd;k x;k gS rFkk ml Ádkj.k ls Áfroknhx.k ls okn Hkwfe fNuus dh /kedh ns jgk gS rFkk dCtk djus dh /kedh ns jgk gSA mijksDr ifjfLFkfr;ksa es ;fn okn Hkwfe ij dqleh csok cStq dk dHkh LoRo vorfjr gqvk Hkh jgk gksxk rks Hkh vkt ls 60&70 o"kZ iwoZ ls vkt rd [kqysvke Áfroknhx.k okn Hkwfe dk edku ckMh cukdj dkfct gS ,slh fLFkfr esa Áfroknhx.k dk dCtk dqleh csok cStq ,oa oknh ds fo:) Áfrdwy gks x;k vkSj mDr dCts ds vk/kkj ij okn Hkwfe ij LoRo ÁkIr dj pqds gSA** 10. Reading of the aforesaid pleading made on behalf of the defendants along with prayer made in counterclaim, it appears that that defendants No. 1 to 5 at no point of time admitted the plaintiff to be titleholder and claimed title in favour of Ramprasad and Dukhi Yadav in which, eventually, the trial Court has accepted that Ramprasad and Dukhi Yadav were titleholders of the suit land. The first appellate Court while affirming the judgment and decree of the trial Court held as under: ^^10- oknh ,oa Áfroknhx.k ds nLrkostksa ,oa lk{; ls ;g Li"V gS fd fookfnr Hkwfe iwoZ ls jkeÁlkn ,oa nq[kh ;kno dh FkhA oknh us jftLVMZ foØ; i= U;k;ky; esa is'k ugha fd;k gSA mlus dqleh ls oknHkwfe Ø; djuk crk;k gSA ijUrq dqleh dks fookfnr Hkwfe dk LoRo jkeÁlkn ,oa nq[kh ;kno ls dSls ÁkIr gqvk bl laca/k esa dksbZ nLrkost ;k lk{; oknh }kjk ÁLrqr ugha fd;k x;k gSA fopkj.k U;k;ky; us bu lHkh fcUnqvksa dks vius fu.kZ; dh dafMdk 7 ls 17 esa foLr`r :i ls nsrs gq;s fu"d"kZ fn;k gSA oknh }kjk ÁLrqr lk{; ,oa nLrkostksa ;s ;g Hkh Li"V gqvk gS fd oknh ds Ø; djus ds iwoZ ls gh okn Hkwfe ij Áfroknhx.k edku cukdj fuokljr jgdj dkfct FksA jkeÁlkn ,oa nq[kh ;kno ;k vU; fdlh us vkt fnukad rd muls dCtk gVkdj dCtk ÁkIr fd;k gks] ;g nf'kZr ugha gSA oknh us [kljk ikap'kkyk o"kZ 2002&03 dk ÁŒihŒ ,oa o"kZ 2001&02 dk ch&1 ÁŒihŒ 2 is'k fd;k gS] ds vk/kkj ij viuk dCtk crk;k gSA ijarq dHkh Hkh dCts esa jgk gks ,slk dksbZ lk{; is'k ugha fd;k gS vkSj u gh Lo;a dks vkf/kiR; ls csn[ky fd;s tkus ds laca/k esa lk{; is'k fd;k gSA ;gka rd fof/kor LoRo vftZr fd;s tkus dks Hkh Áekf.kr ugha dj ldk gSA ,slh n'kk esa foØ; cSukek ds vk/kkj ij gh jktLo vfHkys[kksa esa ntZ oknh ds uke ls oknh dks dksbZ ykHk ÁkIr ugha gksrkA ,slh n`f"V esa Áfrdwy dCts ds vk/kkj ij fopkj.k U;k;ky; }kjk tks fu"d"kZ fn;k x;k gS] og fof/k vuqdwy gSA vihykFkhZ }kjk U;k; n`"Vkar 2007 jktLOk fu.kZ; 85 ds'koÁlkn foŒ c`tHkw"k.k ,oa 2007 ¼2½ ,lŒlhŒlhŒMhŒ 1034 ¼,lŒlhŒ½ ihŒVhŒ eqfufpDdoUuk jsM~Mh ,oa vU; dk ykHk ugha feyrk D;ksafd bl Ádj.k esa Áfroknhx.k 60&70 o"kksZ ls oknh rFkk vU; lHkh ds gd ds foijhr okn Hkwfe ij dkfct pys vk jgs FksA dHkh Hkh oknh us Hkwfe Ø; djus ds rRdky ckn Áfroknhx.k dks dCts ls gVk;s tkus dk Á;kl ugha fd;k gS vkSj u gh fof/kor~ LoRo vftZr fd;s tkus dks Áekf.kr dj ldk gSA vr% fopkj.kh; U;k;ky; }kjk LoRo ,oa dCts ds laca/k esa okn Á'u Øekad 1] 2] 3] 4 ,oa 9 ds laca/k esa tks fu"d"kZ fn;k gS] og fof/k vuqdwy gksuk ik;k x;k gSA bl Ádkj fopkj.kh; fcUnq Øekad 1] 2 ,oa 3 lkfcr ugha gqvkA** As such, the defendants version that the suit land was held by Ramprasad and Dukhi Yadav was accepted by two Courts below and the plaintiff in the instant second appeal has not challenged those finding and those findings have attained finality and as such, Ramprasad and Dukhi Yadav are title-holders of the suit land and the plaintiff is not titleholder of the suit land as on date. 11. Now, the question for consideration would be whether defendants No. 1 to 5 could have maintained the counterclaim against the plaintiff who is actually not true owner as according to defendants No. 1 to 5 and by two Courts below and Ramprasad and Dukhi Yadav are original titleholders of the suit land. 12. In that view of the matter, the decree for declaration of title based on adverse possession granted in favour of defendants No. 1 to 5 has to be examined. Admittedly, in this case, true owners Ramprasad and Dukhi Yadav are not party in the suit. The Supreme Court in the matter of T. Anjanappa and Others vs. Somalingappa and Another, (2006) 7 SCC 570 has held that a person who bases his title on adverse possession must show by clear and unequivocal evidence that his possession was hostile to the real owner and amounted to denial of his title to the property claimed. It was observed as under: “12. The concept of adverse possession contemplates a hostile possession i.e. a possession which is expressly or impliedly in denial of the title of the true owner. Possession to be adverse must be possession by a person who does not acknowledge the other's rights but denies them. The principle of law is firmly established that a person who bases his title on adverse possession must show by clear and unequivocal evidence that his possession was hostile to the real owner and amounted to denial of his title to the property claimed. For deciding whether the alleged acts of a person constituted adverse possession, the animus of the person doing those acts is the most crucial factor. Adverse possession is commenced in wrong and is aimed against right. A person is said to hold the property adversely to the real owner when that person in denial of the owner's right excluded him from the enjoyment of his property. 13. Possession to be adverse must be possession by a person who does not acknowledge the others rights but denies them: “24. It is a matter of fundamental principle of law that where possession can be referred to a lawful title, it will not be considered to be adverse. 13. Possession to be adverse must be possession by a person who does not acknowledge the others rights but denies them: “24. It is a matter of fundamental principle of law that where possession can be referred to a lawful title, it will not be considered to be adverse. It is on the basis of this principle that it has been laid down that since the possession of one co-owner can be referred to his status as co-owner, it cannot be considered adverse to other co-owners.” [See Vidya Devi vs. Prem Prakash, (1995) 4 SCC 496 , SCC p. 504, Para 24] 14. Adverse possession is that form of possession or occupancy of land which is inconsistent with the title of the rightful owner and tends to extinguish that person's title. Possession is not held to be adverse if it can be referred to a lawful title. The person setting up adverse possession may have been holding under the rightful owner's title e.g. trustees, guardians, bailiffs or agents. Such persons cannot set up adverse possession: “14........“Adverse Possession” means a hostile possession which is expressly or impliedly in denial of title of the true owner. Under Article 65 of the Limitation Act, burden is on the defendants to prove affirmatively. A person who bases his title on adverse possession must show by clear and unequivocal evidence i.e. possession was hostile to the real owner and amounted to a denial of his title to the property claimed. In deciding whether the acts, alleged by a person, constitute adverse possession, regard must be had to the animus of the person doing those acts which must be ascertained from the facts and circumstances of each case. The person who bases his title on adverse possession, therefore, must show by clear and unequivocal evidence i.e. possession was hostile to the real owner and amounted to a denial of his title to the property claimed... 15. Where possession could be referred to a lawful title, it will not be considered to be adverse. The reason being that a person whose possession can be referred to a lawful title will not be permitted to show that his possession was hostile to another's title. One who holds possession on behalf of another, does not by mere denial of that other's title make his possession adverse so as to give himself the benefit of the statute of limitation. One who holds possession on behalf of another, does not by mere denial of that other's title make his possession adverse so as to give himself the benefit of the statute of limitation. Therefore, a person who enters into possession having a lawful title, cannot divest another of that title by pretending that he had no title at all. [See Annasaheb Bapusaheb Patil vs. Balwant, (1995) 2 SCC 343, SCC p. 554 Paras 14-15].” 13. In Ravinder Kaur Grewal (supra), the Supreme Court has laid down three classic requirements for pleading and proving adverse possession as under: “60. The adverse possession requires all the three classic requirements to coexist at the same time, namely, nec vi i.e. adequate in continuity, nec clam i.e. adequate in publicity and nec precario i.e. adverse to a competitor, in denial of title and his knowledge. Visible, notorious and peaceful so that if the owner does not take care to know notorious facts, knowledge is attributed to him on the basis that but for due diligence he would have known it. Adverse possession cannot be decreed on a title which is not pleaded. Animus possidendi under hostile colour of title is required. Trespasser’s long possession is not synonympus with adverse possession. Trespasser’s possession is construed to be on behalf of the owner, the casual user does not constitute adverse possession. The owner can take possession from a trespasser at any point in time. Possessor looks after the property, protects it and in case of agricultural property by and the large concept is that actual tiller should own the land who works by dint of his hard labour and makes the land cultivable. The legislature in various States confers rights based on possession.” 14. The Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in the matter of M. Siddiq (Dead) through Legal Representatives (Ram Janmabhumi Temple Case) vs. Mahant Suresh Das and Others, (2020) 1 SCC 1 has held that a plea of adverse possession is founded on the acceptance that ownership of the property vests in another, against whom the claimant asserts possession adverse to the title of the other. It was observed as under: “1142. A plea of adverse possession is founded on the acceptance that ownership of the property vests in another against whom the claimant asserts a possession adverse to the title of the other. It was observed as under: “1142. A plea of adverse possession is founded on the acceptance that ownership of the property vests in another against whom the claimant asserts a possession adverse to the title of the other. Possession is adverse in the sense that it is contrary to the acknowledged title in the other person against whom it is claimed. Evidently, therefore, the plaintiffs in Suit 4 ought to be cognizant of the fact that any claim of adverse possession against the Hindus or the temple would amount to an acceptance of a title in the latter. Dr. Dhavan has submitted that this plea is a subsidiary or alternate plea upon which it is not necessary for the plaintiffs to stand in the event that their main plea on title is held to be established on evidence. It becomes then necessary to assess as to whether the claim of adverse possession has been established. 1143. A person who sets up a plea of adverse possession must establish both possession which is peaceful, open and continuous possession which meets the requirement of being nec vi nec claim and nec precario. To substantiate a plea of adverse possession, the character of the possession must be adequate in continuity and in the public because the possession has to be to the knowledge of the true owner in order for it to be adverse. These requirements have to be duly established first by adequate pleadings and second by leading sufficient evidence. Evidence, it is well settled, can only be adduced with reference to matters which are pleaded in a civil suit and in the absence of an adequate pleading, evidence by itself cannot supply the deficiency of a pleaded case. Reading Parah 11(a), it becomes evident that beyond stating that the Muslims have been in long exclusive and continuous possession beginning from the time when the Mosque was built and until it was desecrated, no factual basis has been furnished. This is not merely a matter of details or evidence. A plea of adverse possession seeks to defeat the rights of the true owner and the law is not readily accepting of such a case unless a clear and cogent basis has been made out in the pleadings and established in the evidence. 1147. In Supt. This is not merely a matter of details or evidence. A plea of adverse possession seeks to defeat the rights of the true owner and the law is not readily accepting of such a case unless a clear and cogent basis has been made out in the pleadings and established in the evidence. 1147. In Supt. and Remembrance of Legal Affairs vs. Anil Kumar Bhunja, (1979) 4 SCC 274 , R.S. Sarkaria J. speaking for a three-Judge Bench of this Court noted that the concept of possession is “polymorphous” embodying both a right (the right to enjoy) and a fact (the real intention). The learned judge held: (SCC p. 278, Para 13) “13......It is impossible to work out a completely logical and precise definition of “possession” uniformly applicable to all situations in the contexts of all statutes. Dias and Hughes in their book on Jurisprudence say that if a topic ever suffered from too much theorizing it is that of “possession.” Much of this difficulty and confusion is (as pointed out in Salmond's Jurisprudence, 12th Edn. 1966) caused by the fact that possession is not purely a legal concept. “Possession” implies a right and a fact; the right to enjoy annexed to the right of property and the fact of the real intention. It involves power of control and intent to control.” (Emphasis in original) These observations were made in the context of possession in Section 29(b) of the Arms Act 1959. 1148. In P. Lakshmi Reddy vs. L. Lakshmi Reddy, AIR 1957 SC 314 , Jagannadhadas, J. speaking for a three-Judge Bench of this Court dwelt on the “classical requirement” of adverse possession: (AIR pp. 317-318, Para 4) “4. Now, the ordinary classical requirement of adverse possession is that it should be nec vi nec clam nec precario. [See Secretary of State for India in Council vs. Debendra Lal Khan, 1933 SCC Online PC 65 IA at p. 82]. 317-318, Para 4) “4. Now, the ordinary classical requirement of adverse possession is that it should be nec vi nec clam nec precario. [See Secretary of State for India in Council vs. Debendra Lal Khan, 1933 SCC Online PC 65 IA at p. 82]. The possession required must be adequate in continuity, in publicity and in extent to show that it is possession adverse to the competitor.” The Court cited the following extract from U.N. Mitra's Tagore Law Lectures on the Law of Limitation and Prescription: (AIR p. 319, Para 7) “7......An adverse holding is an actual and exclusive appropriation of land commenced and continued under a claim of right, either under an openly avowed claim, or under a constructive claim (arising from the acts and circumstances attending the appropriation) to hold the land against him (sic.) who was in possession. (Angell, Sections 390 and 398). It is the intention to claim adversely accompanied by such an invasion of the rights of the opposite party as gives him a cause of action which constitutes adverse possession.” [U.N. Mitra, Tagore Law Lectures on the Law of Limitation and Prescription, 6th Edn. Vol. I Lecture VI at p. 159] This Court held: (AIR p. 319, Para 7) “7.....Consonant with this principle the commencement of adverse possession, in favour of a person implies that the person is in actual possession, at the time, with a notorious hostile claim of exclusive title, to repel which, the true owner would then be in a position to maintain an action. It would follow that whatever may be the animus or intention of a person wanting to acquire title by adverse possession his adverse possession cannot commence until he obtains actual possession with the requisite animus.” 1149. In Karnataka Board of Wakf vs. Union of India, (2004) 10 SCC 779 , S. Rajendra Babu, J. speaking for a two-Judge Bench held that: (SCC p. 785, Para 11) “11....Physical fact of exclusive possession and the animus possidendi to hold as owner in exclusion to the actual owner are the most important factors that are to be accounted in cases of this nature. Plea of adverse possession is not a pure question of law but a blended one of fact and law. Therefore, a person who claims adverse possession should show: (a) on what date he came into possession. (b) what was the nature of his possession. Plea of adverse possession is not a pure question of law but a blended one of fact and law. Therefore, a person who claims adverse possession should show: (a) on what date he came into possession. (b) what was the nature of his possession. (c) whether the factum of possession was known to the other party. (d) how long his possession has continued. (e) his possession was open and undisturbed.” (Emphasis supplied) The ingredients must be set up in the pleadings and proved in evidence. There can be no proof sans pleadings and pleadings without evidence will not establish a case in law. 1150. In Annakili vs. A. Vedanayagam, (2007) 14 SCC 308 , this Court emphasized that mere possession of land would not ripen into a possessory title. The possessor must have animus possidendi and hold the land adverse to the title of the true owner. Moreover, he must continue in that capacity for the period prescribed under the Limitation Act.” 15. Recently, the Supreme Court in the matter of Uttam Chand (Dead) through Legal Representatives vs. Nathu Ram (Dead) through Legal Representatives and Others, (2020) 11 SCC 263 has clearly held that the defendants having never admitted the appellant- plaintiff to be true owner merely on the basis of long possession cannot get decree on the basis of adverse possession. It was observed as under: “16. In the present case, the defendants have not admitted the vesting of the suit property with the Managing Officer and the factum of its transfer in favour of the plaintiff. The defendants have denied the title not only of the Managing Officer but also of the plaintiff. The plea of the defendants is one of continuous possession but there is no plea that such possession was hostile to the true owner of the suit property. The evidence of the defendants is that of continuous possession. Some of the receipts pertain to 1963 but possession since November 1963 till the filing of the suit will not ripe into title as the defendants never admitted the plaintiff-appellant to be owner or that the land ever vested with the Managing Officer. In view of the judgments referred to above, we find that the findings recorded by the High Court that the defendants have perfected their title by adverse possession are not legally sustainable. In view of the judgments referred to above, we find that the findings recorded by the High Court that the defendants have perfected their title by adverse possession are not legally sustainable. Consequently, the judgment and decree passed by the High Court is set aside and the suit is decreed. The appeal is allowed.” 16. Reverting to the facts of the present case in the light of legal proposition laid down by their Lordships the Supreme Court in the abovestated judgments (supra), it is quite vivid that in the instant case, defendants No. 1 to 5 who claimed adverse possession against the plaintiff have never admitted the plaintiff to be titleholder of the suit land. The defendants in their written statement (Para-19) have clearly pleaded that the plaintiff is not titleholder and even they have gone to the extent that Kusmi, widow of Baiju, from whom the plaintiff is said to have purchased the suit land was also not titleholder and Ramprasad and Dukhi Yadav were titleholders of the suit land and they never objected defendants No. 1 to 5 to remain in possession of the suit land, therefore, defendants No. 1 to 5 have perfected their title by way of adverse possession, as such, the plea of the defendants is one of continuous and long possession over the suit land, but there is no plea that such possession was hostile to the true owner of the suit property as the plaintiff who is not titleholder and Ramprasad and Dukhi Yadav who were titleholders of the suit land or their legal representatives are not party either in the capacity of the plaintiff or in the capacity of the defendants, as such, both the Courts below have concurrently erred in granting decree declaring defendants No. 1 to 5 as titleholders on the basis of adverse possession by recording a finding which is absolutely contrary to the well settled legal position in this regard. 17. Consequently, the judgment and decree passed by both the Courts below to the extent of granting decree for declaration of title based on adverse possession is hereby set-aside. However, decree declaring sale deeds dated 25.8.1986 and 10.12.1979 as illegal and decree for permanent injunction in favour of defendants No. 1 to 5 would remain intact. The substantial question of law is answered in favour of the plaintiff and against the defendants. 18. However, decree declaring sale deeds dated 25.8.1986 and 10.12.1979 as illegal and decree for permanent injunction in favour of defendants No. 1 to 5 would remain intact. The substantial question of law is answered in favour of the plaintiff and against the defendants. 18. The second appeal is allowed in part to the extent indicated hereinabove leaving the parties to bear their own costs. 19. Appellate decree be drawn-up accordingly.