JUDGMENT : This appeal has been preferred by the accused in S.C. No. 1870/2004 on the files of the Additional Sessions Court Fast Track-II, Thiruvananthapuram against the judgment dated 6.12.2007 convicting him under S. 307 of IPC. 2. The accused, an Indian Airlines retired employee, now aged 77 years, faced trial for the offence punishable under S. 307 of IPC. 3. The prosecution case, in short, is that on 17.1.2003 at 4 pm, at the compound of the house of PW1, the accused inflicted stab injury on the deceased CW2 with MO2 knife on his lower abdomen, causing penetrating wound protruding intestine, with omentum and when CW2 resisted the attack by raising both hands, the accused caused stab injuries on various parts of his body, such as, the right armpit, inner side of right hand, left shoulder, left side of nose and left side of the neck. 4. On receipt of summons, the accused appeared at the court below. After hearing both sides, the court below framed charge against the accused under S.307 of IPC. The charge was read over and explained to the accused who pleaded not guilty. On the side of the prosecution, PW1 to PW9 were examined and Exts. P1 to P10 were marked. MO1 and MO2 were identified. After trial, the court below found the accused guilty under S.307 of IPC and convicted him for the said offence. He was sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for five years and to pay a fine of Rs.20,000/-, in default to suffer rigorous imprisonment for a further period of six months. Aggrieved by the conviction and sentence, the accused preferred this appeal. 5. I have heard Sri. Sasthamangalam S. Ajithkumar, the learned counsel for the appellant and Sri. Sanal P. Raj, the learned Public Prosecutor. 6. The learned counsel for the appellant impeached the findings of the court below on appreciation of evidence and the resultant finding as to the guilt. The learned counsel submitted that PW1 to PW3 whose evidence were heavily relied on by the court below are interested witnesses being the wife, employee and nephew of CW2 and no independent witness was examined. The learned counsel further submitted that the prosecution failed to explain the injuries found on the body of the accused. The accused is entitled to the protection of private defence, added the counsel. The learned counsel further submitted that the prosecution failed to explain the injuries found on the body of the accused. The accused is entitled to the protection of private defence, added the counsel. Lastly, the counsel submitted that, at any rate, the conviction under S.307 of IPC is not sustainable. 7. The learned Public Prosecutor on the other hand supported the findings and verdict handed down by the court below and argued that necessary ingredients of S.307 of IPC had been established and the prosecution has succeeded in proving the case beyond reasonable doubt. 8. The prosecution mainly relied on the oral testimony of PW1 to PW3, the evidence of recovery of knife (MO2) and the medical evidence, oral testimony of PW8 and Ext. P6 wound certificate, to prove the incident and to fix the culpability on the accused. PW1 is the wife of the injured (CW2). After the incident, the injured sustained natural death. Therefore, he was not available at the time of trial to give evidence. 9. The accused and CW2 were neighbours. The house of CW2 is situated on the southern side of the house of the accused. In fact, the said house was sold by CW2 to the accused. CW2 has a plot in front of the house of the accused. On the date of the incident, cleaning and ground levelling work was going on in the property of CW2. PW2 and one Vinod (CW4) were the coolie workers engaged by CW2 for the said work. PW1 deposed that at 4 pm her husband was standing at the place of occurrence along with her watching the demolition of wall by the labourers, PW2 and CW4. At that time the accused opened the door of the window of his room and scolded CW2 who retaliated by telling him to close the door and to go to bed. Then, the accused suddenly rushed towards her husband uttering that he would finish him and stabbed on the lower part of the abdomen at right side with MO2 knife hidden in his hand causing him serious injuries. She further deposed that consequent to the stab injury inflicted on the abdomen of her husband, blood oozed out and intestine protruded. Then, the accused suddenly rushed towards her husband uttering that he would finish him and stabbed on the lower part of the abdomen at right side with MO2 knife hidden in his hand causing him serious injuries. She further deposed that consequent to the stab injury inflicted on the abdomen of her husband, blood oozed out and intestine protruded. She further stated that when her husband suddenly raised his hands to catch the accused, he moved away and again stabbed CW2 in quick succession inflicting injuries on upper arm, neck and left lower part of nose. She further deposed that seeing this, PW2, PW3, the nephew of PW1's husband residing nearby, and CW4 rushed to the spot. They intercepted the accused, caught hold of him and asked him to put down his knife keeping him pressing against the grill of the compound wall. But he wriggled out and went to his house. She also deposed that thereafter, PWs1 to 3 and CW4 brought her husband to the house of a neighbour, namely, one Appukuttan, and the wound of the abdomen was tied with a towel and thereafter, he was taken to the Medical College Hospital, Thiruvananthapuram. PW1 has identified MO2 at the court. 10. PW2 is the labourer who was engaged to clean and level the property situated opposite to the house of the accused. He deposed that at about 4 pm on 17.1.2003, while he and CW4 were demolishing the wall on the front side of the property of CW2, the accused abused CW2 through the window of his house and when CW2 questioned, the accused closed down the window and came to the sit-out of his house and abused CW2. PW2 further deposed that thereafter, the accused opened the gate, came out of his residential compound and stabbed on the abdomen of CW2 with MO2 knife carried by him. He further deposed that when CW2 lifted his hand to catch the accused, the accused stabbed him 3 to 4 times in succession inflicting injuries on various parts of his body. 11. PW3 deposed that while he was sitting in the sit-out of his house, he heard a quarrel between his uncle, CW2, and the accused on 17.1.2003 at 4 pm and he rushed to the spot where he found PW2 and CW4 intercepting the accused. 11. PW3 deposed that while he was sitting in the sit-out of his house, he heard a quarrel between his uncle, CW2, and the accused on 17.1.2003 at 4 pm and he rushed to the spot where he found PW2 and CW4 intercepting the accused. He further deposed that at that time blood was oozing out from the abdomen of CW2 and the accused was standing near to him. He also deposed that when he reached there, CW2 was trying to resist the attack of the accused, but the accused again attacked CW2 and he along with PW2 and CW4 intervened and caught hold of him and kept him pressing against the compound wall and asked him to put down his knife. He also deposed that CW2 sustained deep injuries on his abdomen, lower part of nose, armpit and upper arms. 12. PW1 to PW3 were cross examined in length by the learned counsel for the accused. But nothing tangible has been extracted from their evidence to create any shadow of doubt that they are not truthful witnesses. PW1 and PW2 clearly deposed that the accused attacked CW2 and stabbed him with MO2 knife on his abdomen and various parts of his body. PW3 in clear terms deposed that he saw the accused stabbing CW2 on various other parts of the body. PW1 to PW3 gave reliable, consistent and credible version of the crime and their evidence inspires confidence. In fact, the defence has admitted the presence of PWs2 and 3 at the scene of occurrence. The learned counsel for the appellants pointed out certain contradictions and omissions in their evidence. Marginal variations, slight contradictions and insignificant omissions are bound to occur when witnesses give evidence after a lapse of time. I could not find any vital contradictions or material omissions in their evidence affecting the fabric of the prosecution case. They clearly deposed about the manner in which the accused attacked CW2 and the nature of weapon used by him and the parts of the body of the injured whereupon the injuries were inflicted by the accused. They have also identified MO2. Therefore, I hold that the evidence of PWs1 to 3 could be safely relied on to prove the incident and to fix the culpability on the accused. 13. They have also identified MO2. Therefore, I hold that the evidence of PWs1 to 3 could be safely relied on to prove the incident and to fix the culpability on the accused. 13. The evidence of PW9 investigating officer coupled with Ext.P3 would prove that MO2 knife used for the commission of offence was seized pursuant to Ext.P3(a) disclosure statement given by the accused while in police custody. The sequence of events with regard to the recovery have been clearly spoken to by PW9. The evidence would show that MO2 was kept in a box placed in the car shed of the house of the accused. PW9 went to the car shed as led by the accused and seized it when it was shown to him by the accused. PW5 is the attestor to Ext. P3 mahazar. He also gave evidence in support of the recovery. The evidence with regard to the recovery is one falls under S.27 of the Indian Evidence Act. The said evidence corroborates the oral testimony of PW1 to PW3. 14. The oral evidence of PW1 to PW3 as well as the evidence regarding the recovery mentioned above gets corroboration from the medical evidence on record. PW8 is the doctor who examined CW2 after the incident and issued Ext.P6 wound certificate. The injuries sustained by CW2 are stated in the wound certificate. He deposed that the injuries noted in Ext.P6 are possible with MO2. Thus, the medical evidence supports the oral evidence adduced by the prosecution. 15. The learned counsel for the appellant vehemently argued that there are several circumstances pointing to the innocence of the accused. First of all, the learned counsel argued that the prosecution failed to examine the independent witnesses and instead they chose to examine PWs 1 to 3, the wife, labourer and close relative of the deceased. The question is not whether the prosecution examined so many numbers of witnesses. The question is whether the prosecution had succeeded to prove the case through the examined witnesses. I have already found that prosecution has succeeded in proving the incident through the evidence of Pws 1 to 3. In Ambika Prasad and Another v. State (Delhi Administration) [ (2000) 2 SCC 646 ], the Apex Court has held that non examination of the independent witnesses cannot be ground for rejecting evidence of occurrence witnesses. I have already found that prosecution has succeeded in proving the incident through the evidence of Pws 1 to 3. In Ambika Prasad and Another v. State (Delhi Administration) [ (2000) 2 SCC 646 ], the Apex Court has held that non examination of the independent witnesses cannot be ground for rejecting evidence of occurrence witnesses. The learned counsel, next, submitted that the evidence on record would show that the accused had sustained injuries in the same transaction and the prosecution failed to explain the said injuries and non explanation of the same is very important circumstance to cast doubt on the prosecution case, the benefit of which should go to the accused. The learned counsel brought my attention to the remand report of the accused. In the remand report, PW9 has noted abrasion on the upper part and lower part of elbow of the accused. It is a minor injury. When the injury sustained by the victim is grievous in nature and the injury sustained by the accused is minor in nature, the failure, if any, on the part of the prosecution to explain the injury of the accused is not fatal. The Apex Court in Chandrappa and Others v. State of Karnataka ( AIR 2008 SC 2323 ) and in Ramdeo Kahar and Others v. State of Bihar ( AIR 2009 SC 1803 ) has held that non explanation of insignificant injury on the person of the accused would not dislodge the prosecution case. In Gurudev Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh [ (2011) 5 SCC 721 ], the Apex Court took the view that when the injuries received by the accused were very simple in nature, whereas the injuries inflicted on the deceased were very serious in nature, and were inflicted on the vital parts of the body of the deceased, the accused cannot take a plea that the prosecution has to explain the minor injuries sustained by the accused. The facts of this case is also similar. CW2 sustained grievous injuries on vital parts of his body, whereas the accused only sustained minor injuries. That apart, PW9 in evidence has explained that the accused sustained injury in the scuffle at the alleged incident. The facts of this case is also similar. CW2 sustained grievous injuries on vital parts of his body, whereas the accused only sustained minor injuries. That apart, PW9 in evidence has explained that the accused sustained injury in the scuffle at the alleged incident. When cross examined by the learned defence counsel, PW9 specifically deposed that the abrasion on the right hand of the accused above and below the elbow was caused by the contact with the grill on the compound wall of the residential property of the accused when the witnesses (PWs2, 3 and CW4) pressed him against the compound wall. PW1 to PW3 also stated that they brought the accused near the compound wall by force, pressed him against the compound wall and the grill in order to prevent further attack on CW2. Thus, the minor injuries sustained by the accused have been well explained. 16. The appellant has also in the alternative, took the plea of private defence. The learned counsel for the appellant argued that the evidence on record would show that the incident took place in front of the house of the accused and that there was altercation between the accused on the one hand and CW2, PW2 and PW3 on the other hand and the accused was also assaulted by three of them and on the apprehension of further assault, he, in the process of protecting his life has made an assault with MO2, even if the prosecution version is accepted in its entirety. The learned counsel further submitted that there is evidence on record which suggests that CW2 and his men were aggressors. Per contra, the learned Public Prosecutor submitted that this is not a case where the plea of right of private defence can be pressed into service at all. 17. The right of self defence is a very valuable right u/s 96 of IPC. It provides that nothing is an offence which is done in the exercise of the right of private defence. The section does not define the expression “right of private defence”. It merely indicates that nothing is an offence which is done in the exercise of such right. Whether in a particular set of circumstances, a person legitimately acted in the exercise of the right of private defence is a question of fact to be determined on the facts and circumstances of each case. It merely indicates that nothing is an offence which is done in the exercise of such right. Whether in a particular set of circumstances, a person legitimately acted in the exercise of the right of private defence is a question of fact to be determined on the facts and circumstances of each case. No test in the abstract for determining such a question can be laid down. In determining this question of fact, the court must consider all the surrounding circumstances. Sections 100 to 106 of IPC define the extent of the right of private defence of body. If a person has a right of private defence of the body u/s 97, that right extends u/s 100 to causing death if there is reasonable apprehension that death or grievous hurt would be the consequence of assault. Sections 102 and 105 of IPC deal with commencement and continuance of the right of private defence of the body and of property respectively. The right commences as soon as a reasonable apprehension of danger to the body arises from an attempt, or threat to commit the offence, though the offences may not have been committed. The right lasts as long as reasonable apprehension of the danger to the body continues. 18. The Apex Court has consistently held that the right of private defence extends the killing of the actual potential assailants when there is a reasonable and imminent apprehension of the atrocious crimes enumerated in the sixth clause of S.100 of IPC. Under S.105 of the Indian Evidence Act, the burden of proof is on the accused, who sets up the plea of self defence and in the absence of proof, it is not possible for the court to presume the truth of plea of self defence. However, the accused need not prove the existence of the right of private defence beyond reasonable doubt. It is enough for him to show as in civil case that the preponderance of probabilities is in favour of his plea. It is for the accused to place necessary material on record either by himself by adducing positive evidence or by eliciting necessary facts from the witnesses examined for the prosecution. 19. It is enough for him to show as in civil case that the preponderance of probabilities is in favour of his plea. It is for the accused to place necessary material on record either by himself by adducing positive evidence or by eliciting necessary facts from the witnesses examined for the prosecution. 19. When the above principles of law are applied to the facts of this case, I have no hesitation to come to the conclusion that there is nothing on record at least to probablise the case of the defence that the appellant did the act in exercise of the right of private defence. There is also no evidence to show that CW2 was the aggressor. Admittedly, CW2, or PWs 1 to 3 were not carrying any weapon. Even the defence has no such case. There is also nothing on record to show that the accused was in imminent and reasonable danger of losing his life or limb so as to justify the exercise of the right. No counter case has been registered. There is overwhelming evidence on record to show that the vital injuries are inflicted on the deceased by the accused, even though there is no evidence to prove any premeditation or motive on the part of the accused. Therefore, I hold that the accused is not entitled to the protection of private defence. 20. On a careful examination and appreciation of the entire evidence, I have no hesitation to come to the conclusion that the prosecution evidence successfully established that the accused has assaulted and caused injuries with MO2 weapon on CW2. Next crucial question arises for consideration is whether the act of the accused inflicting injuries on CW2 would attract offence under S.307 of IPC. The learned counsel for the appellant vehemently argued that the evidence on record would not disclose the offence under S.307 of IPC, at best, S. 308 of IPC alone would be attracted. Let me examine whether the act committed by the appellant comes within the scope and orbit of S. 307 or S. 308 of the Penal Code. 21. Sections 307 and 308 of IPC reads as follows: 307. Let me examine whether the act committed by the appellant comes within the scope and orbit of S. 307 or S. 308 of the Penal Code. 21. Sections 307 and 308 of IPC reads as follows: 307. Attempt to murder:-Whoever does any act with such intention or knowledge, and under such circumstances that, if he by that act caused death, he would be guilty of murder, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine; and, if hurt is caused to any person by such act, the offender shall be liable either to (imprisonment for life), or to such punishment as is herein before mentioned. Attempts by life convicts:-when any person offending under this Section is under sentence of imprisonment for life, he may, if hurt is caused, be punished with death). 308. Attempt to commit culpable homicide:-Whoever does any act with such intention or knowledge and under such circumstances that, if he by that act caused death, he would be guilty of culpable homicide not amounting to murder, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three years, or with fine, or with both; and, if hurt is caused to any person by such act, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to seven years, or with fine, or with both. A perusal of the provisions contained in S.307 and S.308 of IPC shows that if an accused does any act with such intention or knowledge, and under such circumstances that, if he, by that act, caused death, he would be guilty of murder, he shall be guilty of committing an offence punishable under S. 307, but if an accused did any act that he would be guilty of culpable homicide not amounting to murder, he shall be guilty of committing an act punishable under S. 308 of the IPC. While S.307 is linked with murder punishable under S.302 of IPC, S.308 is linked with the offence of culpable homicide punishable under S.304 of IPC. S.307 covers those cases where the act has not resulted in death, but if it had resulted in death, it would have amounted to murder. Similarly S.308 of IPC. While S.307 is linked with murder punishable under S.302 of IPC, S.308 is linked with the offence of culpable homicide punishable under S.304 of IPC. S.307 covers those cases where the act has not resulted in death, but if it had resulted in death, it would have amounted to murder. Similarly S.308 of IPC. covers cases where the act has not resulted in death, but if resulted in death, the offence would have amounted to culpable homicide not amounting to murder. Culpable homicide does not amount to murder (i) if the act is done with the intention or knowledge referred to in S. 300 of IPC, but under circumstances which would bring the case within one of the Exceptions mentioned in that section or (ii) if the act is done with the intention or knowledge referred to in S. 299 but not falling under any of the four clauses of S. 300. Thus, if an accused does not intend to cause death or any bodily injury, which he knows to be likely to cause death or even to cause such bodily injury as is sufficient, in the ordinary course of nature, to cause death, S. 308 of the IPC would apply even if the case is not covered by any of the exceptions mentioned in S. 300 of the IPC. To bring the case under S.307 of IPC, the prosecution has to make out the facts and circumstances envisaged under S. 300 of IPC. If the ingredients of S.300 of IPC are wholly lacking, there can be no conviction under S.307 of IPC. The intention or knowledge could be deduced from the nature of injury sustained by the victim as well as from other attended circumstances. 22. Coming to the evidence on record, it is apparent that there was no enmity between the appellant and CW2. There was also no evidence of premeditation or planning before the act. PW1 in cross examination admitted that prior to the incident the accused never attempted to trespass or assault CW2. She further admitted that prior to the incident the accused never beat CW2. She also admitted that previously CW2 and accused were friends. The incident was taken place in front of the house of the accused. The evidence on record would show that the accused did not straight away go to CW2 to attack him. She further admitted that prior to the incident the accused never beat CW2. She also admitted that previously CW2 and accused were friends. The incident was taken place in front of the house of the accused. The evidence on record would show that the accused did not straight away go to CW2 to attack him. On the other hand, he went to his house and then he was found talking to CW2 through the window and it was thereafter he came out of the house and the incident happened. If the accused had intention to kill CW2 at the inception itself, instead of going to his house, he would have directly gone to the house of CW2 and attacked him. Hence, the circumstances do not warrant a conclusion that the accused intended to cause the death of the deceased or to cause such bodily injury as he knew is likely in the ordinary course to cause the death. As to the nature of injuries sustained by CW2, the medical evidence on record would show that injury No.1 alone in Ext. P6 is grievous one. It is a stab wound. The description of injury No.1 is “Incised wound right side of lower abdomen 4×2×5 cm with omentum and intestine protruding out.” The other injuries are not at all serious one. The doctor, PW8, in cross examination deposed that the location of injury No.1 is in a soft area. He further deposed that probably the tip of the knife would have brushed along the skin. He also deposed that the injury could be accidental also. The doctor did not state in the evidence at all that the injury No.1 or any other injury mentioned in Ext.P6 are sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. 23. The facts proved by the prosecution do not bring the case within the ambit of any of the four clauses of the definition “murder” contained in S.300. Therefore, I hold that the prosecution has failed to make out a case under S.307 of IPC. However, the evidence on record would disclose that the accused inflicted injuries with MO2 on the vital parts of the body of CW2 and thus he must have knowledge that the said injury was likely to cause death and therefore the offence would fall under S. 308 of IPC. However, the evidence on record would disclose that the accused inflicted injuries with MO2 on the vital parts of the body of CW2 and thus he must have knowledge that the said injury was likely to cause death and therefore the offence would fall under S. 308 of IPC. Hence, the conviction of the appellant under S.307 of IPC cannot be sustained. He could be convicted only under S. 308 of IPC. 24. The learned counsel for the appellant next submitted that the accused is now aged 77 years, suffering from serious heart ailment and has no criminal antecedents. It is submitted that during crime, he was in custody for a period of 19 days. Hence, the learned Counsel wanted provisions of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 (for short “PO Act”) to be applied. In support of the submission, the appellant produced Annexure A1 certificate issued by the Cardiologist who treated him. In view of the said submission, a report has been called for from the District Probation Officer, Thiruvananthapuram. A detailed report has been filed. 25. The PO Act has been enacted in view of the increasing emphasis on the reformation and rehabilitation of the offenders as a useful and self – reliant members of society without subjecting them to deleterious effect of jail life. The PO Act empowers the Court to release on probation, in all suitable cases, an offender found guilty of having committed an offence not punishable with death or imprisonment for life or for the description mentioned in S.3 and S.4 of the said Act. S.3 of the PO Act confers power on the Court to release certain offenders after admonition. S.4 of the PO Act deals with the power of Court to release certain offenders on probation on good conduct. S.5 of the Act empowers the Court to direct payment of compensation and costs in the event of invoking S.3 or S.4 of the Act. S.6 of the PO Act stipulates restrictions on imprisonment of offenders under twenty one years of age. As per S.11 of the Act, powers as provided under S.3, S.4 and S.5 of the Act can be exercised by the Appellate or Revisional Court as well. 26. S.3 for release after due admonition is evidently not applicable in the nature of the offences. The accused being above 21 years of age, S.6 also is not applicable. As per S.11 of the Act, powers as provided under S.3, S.4 and S.5 of the Act can be exercised by the Appellate or Revisional Court as well. 26. S.3 for release after due admonition is evidently not applicable in the nature of the offences. The accused being above 21 years of age, S.6 also is not applicable. S.4 of the Act would demonstrate that if a person is found guilty of having committed an offence not punishable with death or imprisonment for life, in that event, considering the nature of the offence and the character of the offender, the Court instead of sentencing him at once to any punishment may release such person on probation of good conduct, on his entering into a bond, with or without sureties, for a period not exceeding three years. Before releasing the offender, on probation, the Court must satisfy itself that offender or his surety, if any, has a fixed place of abode or regular occupation in the place over which the Court exercises jurisdiction or in which the offender is likely to live during the period for which he enters into the bond. The Court before passing the order of release on probation may also call report of the Probation Officer. The Court while releasing on probation may also direct that accused shall remain under the supervision of Probation Officer for a period not less than one year. 27. In Dalbir Singh vs. State of Haryana and Others ( AIR 2000 SC 1677 ) the Apex Court has held that a convict can be released on probation only if the Court forms the opinion that it is expedient to release him on probation for the good conduct regard being had to the circumstances of the case. It was further held that though the discretion has been vested in the court to decide when and how the court should form such opinion, yet the provision itself provides sufficient indication that releasing the convicted person on probation of good conduct must appear to the Court to be expedient. Explaining the word "expedient", the Court held thus “Here the word ‘expedient’ is used in S.4 of the PO Act in the context of casting a duty on the court to take into account ‘the circumstances of the case including the nature of the offence'. Explaining the word "expedient", the Court held thus “Here the word ‘expedient’ is used in S.4 of the PO Act in the context of casting a duty on the court to take into account ‘the circumstances of the case including the nature of the offence'. This means S.4 can be resorted to when the court considers the circumstances of the case, particularly the nature of the offence, and the court forms its opinion that it is suitable and appropriate for accomplishing a specified object that the offender can be released on probation of good conduct”. In Satyabhan Kishore v. State of Bihar ( AIR 1972 SC 1554 ), the District Probation Officer in his report made no recommendation in favour of the accused and made no adverse remark also. Still the Court expressed the view that in the light of the laudable reformatory object which the legislature was seeking to achieve, the provisions will have to be applied. In Arvind Mohan Sinha v. Amulya Kumar Biswas and Others (1974 SCC (Cri) 391), the offences involved were those under the Customs Act and Gold Control Rules having impact on the economy of the country. Still in the circumstances of that case, the court found that the PO Act is applicable. In Rattan Lal v. State of Punjab ( AIR 1965 SC 444 ), the provisions of the PO Act was applied even in a case where the Act was not in force at the time of the commission of offence and in spite of the fact that the trial court and the appellate court did not apply the provisions. In Chhanni v. State of U.P. [(2006) 5 SCC 396], it was held that the scope of S.4 of the PO Act is much wider. It applies to any person found guilty of having committed an offence not punishable with death or imprisonment for life. In Ishar Das v. State of Punjab [ 1973 (2) SCC 65 ], it was held that the provisions of the said Act are beneficial provisions and, therefore, they should receive wide interpretation and should not be read in a restricted sense. In Mohd. In Ishar Das v. State of Punjab [ 1973 (2) SCC 65 ], it was held that the provisions of the said Act are beneficial provisions and, therefore, they should receive wide interpretation and should not be read in a restricted sense. In Mohd. Hashim v. State of UP and Others (2016 KHC 6883), it was held that the Court before exercising the power under S.4 of the PO Act has to keep in view the nature of offence and the conditions incorporated under S.4 of the PO Act. Thus, the law is settled that beneficial provisions of the PO Act have to be extended liberally in all suitable cases taking into consideration the nature of the offence, age, character and antecedents of the convict and the circumstances under which the crime was committed. 28. The report filed by the District Probation Officer would disclose that the accused, now aged 77 years appears to be weak both physically and mentally. He is suffering from systemic hyper tension, diabetes, dyslipidaemia, cerebrovascular disease and he has been undergoing treatment. The report further says that he is not involved in any other crime at all. The Probation Officer recommended to give the accused the benefit of S. 4(1) of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958. Considering the fact that the accused is a first time offender, now aged 77 years, suffering from various ailments and has been undergoing the ordeal of trial all these years, I am of the view that this is a fit case where the benefit of S. 4(1) of the PO Act could be extended to him. 29. S.5 of the Act empowers the Court to direct payment of compensation and costs to the victim in the event of invoking S.3 or S.4 of the Act. S.11(1) of the PO Act empowers the appellate court to pass an order regarding the payment of compensation as mentioned in S.5(1). S.5 is an important provision. While extending the benefit of S.3 or S.4, the court has to exercise the power u/s 5 liberally to compensate the victim for the loss or injury sustained by him/her as well as the cost of the proceedings incurred by him/her and, thus, to meet the ends of justice in a better way. The compensation must, however be reasonable. As already stated, CW2 sustained serious injuries in the incident. The compensation must, however be reasonable. As already stated, CW2 sustained serious injuries in the incident. Hence, I am of the view that it is a fit case to award compensation to his legal heir, PW1. The learned counsel for the appellant submitted that though the appellant has retired from the Indian Airlines, he is not getting any pension. However, the learned counsel fairly submitted that his children are well placed and employed abroad. The counsel also fairly conceded that adequate and reasonable compensation can be awarded to PW1. Considering the facts and circumstances of the case, I am of the view that Rs.2,00,000/-(Rupees two lakhs only) can be fixed as compensation. In the light of the above findings, the conviction and sentence passed by the court below under S. 307 of IPC are set aside. The appellant/accused is found guilty for the offence punishable under S.308 of IPC and he is convicted for the said offence. The appellant/accused shall be released u/s 4(3) of the PO Act, and instead of sentencing him at present, he be released on his entering into a bond for Rs.1,00,000/-(Rupees One lakh only) at the Court below with two solvent sureties to the satisfaction of that Court, to appear and receive the sentence of the said offences, when called upon during the period of three years from the date of release and in the meantime, to keep the peace and be of good behaviour. In addition to the condition for appearance at the Court for receiving sentence, the bond shall contain conditions for observing peace and good behaviour, appearance of the accused before the District Probation Officer, Thiruvananthapuram on the first week of every month, intimation of change of address to the said officer and abstination of the accused from intoxicants. The accused shall appear before the learned Magistrate within 60 days from today. The District Probation Officer shall have supervision over the accused for a period of three years and he shall make report once in every three months to the Court below about the conduct of the offender. The accused is further directed u/s 5 of the PO Act to pay a compensation of Rs.2,00,000/-(Rupees Two lakhs only) to PW1 within two months from today. The Registry is directed to forward a copy of this judgment to the District Probation Officer, Thiruvananthapuram. The appeal is disposed of as above.