JUDGMENT : C.S.Sudha, J. 1. Lack of consensus among the partners, who are not strangers but mother and three children with the mother and two daughters on one side and the only son on the other side, in the matter of sharing profits of their partnership firms, initially constituted by their predecessor-in-interest, P.V. Balakrishnan Nair, led to the arbitration proceedings. Not happy with the award passed by the sole Arbitrator, the son and grandson, the latter subsequently impleaded, moved the District Court, Ernakulam under S.34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (the Act). The District Court set aside the award partly. Aggrieved by the same the mother and son are before this Court in the present appeals. 2. P.V. Balakrishnan Nair and Kamala had three children, namely, Manoharan, Krishna Kumari and Sreelatha. Among the various business concerns started by the patriarch, there were three partnership firms, namely, Raja Rajeswari Weaving Mills (the Mills); Kamala International Tourist Hotel (the Hotel) and Raja Rajeswari City (the City). The patriarch passed away in the year 1999. Kamala and her three children are partners in the aforesaid three firms. Admittedly, the son, Manoharan, the Managing partner of the firms was managing the affairs of the firms. Disputes arose among the partners relating to the running of the Firms and in the matter of sharing of profits. Kamala, the mother, moved three suits before the Sub Court, Thalasseri, for dissolution of the aforesaid three firms and rendition of accounts. The son resisted the suits and invoked Section 8 of Act contending that since there is an arbitration clause in the partnership deeds of the three firms, the matter needs to be referred for arbitration. The Court disposed of the suits by referring the matter for arbitration. The parties were unable to reach a consensus regarding the Arbitrator to be appointed. Hence Kamala moved A.R.No.46/2005, A.R.No.47/2005 and A.R.No.53/2005 before this Court for appointment of an Arbitrator, as Manoharan failed to nominate an Arbitrator within thirty days of the demand made by her in this regard. This Court by order dated 09.12.2005 nominated three retired District Judges as Arbitrators. Manoharan was not happy with the nomination and hence he took up the matter before the Hon'ble Supreme Court by filing SLP No.12890/2006. Vide order dated 15.2.2007, Justice (Retd.) C.S. Rajan was appointed as the sole Arbitrator. 3. This Court by order dated 09.12.2005 nominated three retired District Judges as Arbitrators. Manoharan was not happy with the nomination and hence he took up the matter before the Hon'ble Supreme Court by filing SLP No.12890/2006. Vide order dated 15.2.2007, Justice (Retd.) C.S. Rajan was appointed as the sole Arbitrator. 3. Before the learned Arbitrator, Kamala filed three claim petitions, namely, A.C.No.1/2007, A.C.No.2/2007 and A.C.No.3/2007. A.C.No.1/2006 was for dissolution and rendition of accounts of ‘Raja Rajeswari Mills and other sister concerns like Kamala International, Kamal Chennai, etc.’ ; A.C.No.2/2006 was relating to Kamala International Tourist Hotel, and A.C.No.3/2006 was relating to Raja Rajeswari City. Manoharan, Krishna Kumari and Sreelatha were arrayed as Respondents 1 to 3 respectively in these cases. The daughters, namely, the second and the third respondents supported and sailed along with the mother. The son, namely, the first respondent contested the matter and filed objections. Later, on the request of the claimant- Kamala, Amarjith the son of the first respondent, was impleaded as the additional fourth respondent. Before the learned Arbitrator, parties have adduced oral as well as documentary evidence. After hearing the parties, the learned Arbitrator passed an award dated 30.11.2008. Most of the allegations of the claimant-Kamala were accepted and the award passed, by which dissolution and rendition of accounts of the aforesaid three partnership firms was ordered. Aggrieved by the award, the first respondent Manoharan and the additional fourth respondent, Amarjith moved applications under Section 34 of the Act. O.P.Arb.No.414/2009, O.P.Arb.No.415/2009 and O.P.Arb.No.416/2009 were filed by first respondent, Manoharan and O.P.Arb.No.420/2009, O.P.Arb.No.421/2009 and O.P.Arb.No.422/2009 were filed by the additional fourth respondent, Amarjith. 4. The court below set aside the award as far as it relates to the firm Kamala International and to the extent it affected the rights and interest of Amarjith, the additional fourth respondent in the arbitration proceedings. Aggrieved by the order of the District Court, the present appeals have been filed by the claimant-Kamala and the first respondent, Manoharan, i.e., Appeal No.11/2016 and Appeal No.23/2016 have been filed by Kamala against the order in O.P.Arb.No.414/2009 and O.P.Arb.No.420/2009 respectively and Appeal No.19/2016 and Appeal No.25/2016 by the first respondent, Manoharan against the order in O.P.Arb.No.416/2009 and O.P.Arb.No.415/2009. Parties shall be referred to as described in the proceedings before the Arbitrator. 5. Parties shall be referred to as described in the proceedings before the Arbitrator. 5. We heard the respective learned counsel for the appellants and the respondents, viz., Adv.S.Vinod Bhat for the appellant in Arb.Appeal No.11/2016 and in Arb.Appeal No.23/2016, for the first respondent in Arb. Appeal No.19/2016 and Arb.Appeal No.25/2016; Adv. Kaleeswaran Raj for the appellant in Arb.Appeal No.19/2016 and Arb.Appeal No.25/2016, for the first respondent in Arb.Appeal No.11/2016 and for the second respondent in Arb.Appeal No.23/2016 ; Adv.S.Sreekumar (Sr.) and Adv.Martin Jose for respondents 2 and 3 in Arb.Appeal No.11/2016, Arb.Appeal No.19/2016 and Arb.Appeal No.25/2016, and for respondents 3 and 4 in Arb.Appeal No.23/2016 ; Adv.G.Unnikrishnan and Adv.K.M.Pradeepnath for the additional fourth respondent in Arb.Appeal No.11/2016, Arb.Appeal No.19/2016 and Arb.Appeal No.25/2016 and for first respondent in Arb.Appeal No.23/2016. 6. As referred to earlier, the claimant had filed three claim statements before the Arbitrator seeking dissolution of the aforesaid three partnership firms. We shall first deal with the award relating to Arbitration Case No.1/2006, the subject matter in O.P.No.414/2009 and thereafter in Appeal 11/2016 Prayer (a) in the said case reads- “The partnership Raja Rajeswari Miills and other sister concerns like Kamala International, Kamala Chennai, etc stand dissolved as from 15 June 2004 and may further award that the dissolution thereof as from that day be advertised in a prominent daily newspaper.” The claimant put forward a case that Kamala International and Kamala Chennai are the sister concerns of Raja Rajeswari Weaving Mills (Mills). The allegation of the claimant that Kamala International and Kamala Chennai are the sister concerns of Raja Rajeswari Weaving Mills was partly accepted by the arbitrator who found Kamala International to be so, but not Kamala Chennai. The first respondent -Manoharan contended that Kamala International, which was initially a partnership firm was dissolved in the year 1992 and to establish the same he relied on Ext.B1 dissolution deed dated 29.04.1992 and Ext.B2 extract of Register of firms. According to him, after dissolution of the partnership firm-Kamala International, it became his sole proprietorship concern. Exts.B1 and B2 were produced after the evidence was over and hence, they were marked by the learned Arbitrator subject to the objection raised by the claimant. According to him, after dissolution of the partnership firm-Kamala International, it became his sole proprietorship concern. Exts.B1 and B2 were produced after the evidence was over and hence, they were marked by the learned Arbitrator subject to the objection raised by the claimant. From, the award it is seen that the claimant had objected to the production of these documents by the first respondent at a belated stage and also on the ground that there was no mention of the dissolution deed in the counter statement filed by the first respondent before the Arbitrator. It was also objected on the ground that the first respondent -Manoharan had not given any reasons as to why the said documents had not been produced earlier. The learned Arbitrator after considering Exts.B1 and B2 and also the arguments advanced for and against the same, accepted the case of the claimant and rejected the case put forward by the first respondent. Ext.B1 dissolution deed is dated 29.04.1992. The document says that the partnership business, namely, Kamala International would stand dissolved w.e.f. the date of execution of the deed, namely 01.04.1992. However, Ext.B2 extract of Register of firms show that Kamala International was dissolved w.e.f. 21.08.1991. The first respondent -Manoharan was unable to explain this inconsistency seen in Exts.B1 and B2. Though he put forward a specific contention that Kamala International is his sole proprietorship concern, the first respondent when examined as RW1 stated that when he used to leave town, he used to send documents relating to Kamala International to his mother for signature. He was unable to explain why this practice was adopted if his case of his mother not being a partner of the firm and Kamala International being his sole proprietorship concern was true. All these factors were taken into account to disbelieve his version that Kamala International is a proprietorship concern and the Arbitrator found Kamala International to be a sister concern of the Mills and that the same had not been dissolved as contended by the first respondent and so passed an award in A.C.No.01/2006 which reads – “The assets, liabilities, profit and loss in the above firm must be divided in the proportion of 47.5% to first respondent, 17.5% each to the claimant, respondents 2 and 3. Since no audit was carried out by the first respondent from1998 onwards, audit must be conducted from 1998 to 17.06.2004, the date of notice of dissolution. The division as ordered above must be based on the above audit also. I have already found that Kamala International is a sister concern of Raja Rajeswari Weaving Mills. I also found that the above firm was not dissolved as per Ext.B1. Therefore, the first respondent is directed to produce all the accounts from the date of the partnership deed (Ext.A-32) till 17.06.2004, the date of notice of dissolution. After auditing the accounts first respondent and claimant, respondents 2 and 3 must be given their due share of assets, liabilities, profit and loses in accordance with Ext.A-32 partnership deed. The share of Sri. P.V. Balakrishnan Nair will go to the legal heirs of Sri. Balakrishnan Nair or in accordance with the will if there is provision in the will with regard to the Kamala International. The property purchased by the first respondent covered Exts.A-6 and A7 Sale Deeds will also form the part of the Kamala International and therefore, they are also liable to be divided as detailed above. ” (Emphasis supplied) 7. This award was challenged by the first respondent Manoharan by filing O. P. Arb. N o. 414/ 2009, in which he inter alia contended that the Arbitrator had travelled beyond the terms of reference as dissolution of Kamala International was beyond the terms of reference. The District Court confirmed the finding of the Arbitrator that Kamala International is a sister concern of the Mills, but disagreed with the award of the Arbitrator relating to dissolution of Kamala International, as according to the court below, the learned Arbitrator had exceeded his jurisdiction in passing an award for dissolution of Kamala International as the same was outside the scope of the reference and hence set aside the same under S. 34(1) (a)(iv) of the Act. This finding of the court below is challenged by the claimant in Arb. Appeal No.11/2016. The first respondent supports the finding of the court below on this aspect, but at the same time attacks the refusal of the court below to interfere with the finding of the Arbitrator that Kamala International is a sister concern of the Mills. This finding of the court below is challenged by the claimant in Arb. Appeal No.11/2016. The first respondent supports the finding of the court below on this aspect, but at the same time attacks the refusal of the court below to interfere with the finding of the Arbitrator that Kamala International is a sister concern of the Mills. It was argued by the learned counsel for the first respondent - Manoharan, that a patent illegality has been committed by the Arbitrator in arriving at the conclusion that Kamala International is a partnership firm in the absence of any evidence for the same as well as by ignoring the positive evidence adduced in the form of Exts.B1 and B2 showing otherwise. When the Arbitrator enters into a finding based on no evidence or by ignoring the available evidence on record, the finding would be a patent illegality amounting to perversity and hence liable to be set aside. In support of this argument, reference was made to Delhi Airport Metro Express Pvt. Ltd. vs. Delhi Metro Rail Corporation Pvt. Ltd. [(2021) SCC (ONLINE) (SC) 695 and PSA SICAL Terminals Pvt.Ltd. vs. Board of Trustees of V.O.Chidambranar [(2021) SCC (ONLINE) (SC) 508]. The court below failed to exercise its jurisdiction properly by failing to interfere with this patent illegality which is liable to be set aside, goes the argument. 8. In A.C.No.1/2006, the specific case of the claimant is that the first respondent is trying to convert Kamala International-a partnership firm and a sister concern of the Mills, into his sole proprietorship concern. In order to properly appreciate the contentions of the first respondent in reply to this specific case of the claimant, on our request the copy of the counter statement filed by him before the Arbitrator was furnished to us. The copies handed over are not identical in the sense that the one handed over by the claimant contains 17 paragraphs and is dated 02/05/2006 whereas the copy handed over by the first respondent contains 18 paragraphs and is dated 28/03/2006. However, the contentions contained therein are more or less the same. The copies handed over are not identical in the sense that the one handed over by the claimant contains 17 paragraphs and is dated 02/05/2006 whereas the copy handed over by the first respondent contains 18 paragraphs and is dated 28/03/2006. However, the contentions contained therein are more or less the same. Thereafter a copy of the additional Claim Statement of the claimant was produced on behalf of the first respondent and it was submitted that the counter dated 28/03/2006 is the original counter and that the counter dated 02/05/2006 is the counter filed by the first respondent to the additional Claim Statement filed by the claimant. 9. In the additional claim statement filed by the claimant, it is inter alia contended that the firm-Mills, originally belonged to the husband of the claimant; that he later formed a partnership with his children as partners; that he reconstituted the firm by which the claimant and respondents 1 to 3 were made partners; that the main business of the firm is production and export of handloom clothes and products; that a sister concern, namely, Kamala International was formed and then purchase and export of handlooms were done through the said firm; that the first respondent is deliberately neglecting the business of the firm-Mills and that his attempt is to convert Kamala International into a personal concern; that till 2003 the first respondent used to get the signature of the claimant in the papers of Kamala International also and that the said practice has stopped recently arousing her suspicions; that the first respondent has started a new concern, namely, Kamala Chennai, which is nothing but a benami business, doing the same business as the Mills and Kamala International; that the new business is actually done by the first respondent in the name of his son, the fourth respondent; that several liabilities have been incurred by the first respondent in the name of his son on the basis of which collusive suits are being filed by them against the other partners to defraud them and in which proceedings the property of the firms are sought to be attached, for which they have no right. 10. 10. In the counter statements filed by the first respondent he has no case that Kamala International is not a partnership firm or that it is not a sister concern of the Mills or that Kamala International had been dissolved in the year 1992 or that it is his sole proprietorship concern. On the other hand his only case is that there is no connection between the Mills and Kamala International; that there was no practice of finalizing the accounts of the Mills along with Kamala International as both are different establishments having separate accounts and are different entities; that Kamala International has been unnecessarily included; that the words ‘and other sister concerns’ used in the claim statement is unwanted and so liable to be deleted and that there is no provision of law that enables the claimant to seek the dissolution of the firms in which she has no say or interest at all. He does not specify in which firm(s), the claimant has no interest at all. He also does not deny or give an answer/reply to the allegation of the claimant that she used to sign the papers of Kamala International till the year 2003. 11. The first respondent has only produced Ext.B1 dissolution deed, but quite strangely for reasons best known to him, never produced the partnership deed of Kamala International. Based on Exts.B1 and B2, the argument advanced on behalf of the first respondent is that the same would reveal that the claimant-Kamala was never a partner in Kamala International and therefore she could never have sought for dissolution of a firm in which she was/is never a partner and that the Arbitrator failed to notice even this basic aspect and proceeded to accept the case of the claimant blindly. It was also repeatedly pointed out by Sri. Kaleeswaran Raj, the learned counsel for the first respondent, that a grave error has been committed by the learned Arbitrator in concluding that Kamala International is a partnership based on Ext. A32, which deed is actually the partnership deed of Kamala International Tourist Hotel, a completely different entity and firm. 12. It is true that as per Ext.B1 dissolution deed, the claimant is not a partner in Kamala International. However, Ext.B1 dissolution deed was never believed by the learned Arbitrator. The first respondent was unable to explain the inconsistency seen in Exbts. B1 and B2. 12. It is true that as per Ext.B1 dissolution deed, the claimant is not a partner in Kamala International. However, Ext.B1 dissolution deed was never believed by the learned Arbitrator. The first respondent was unable to explain the inconsistency seen in Exbts. B1 and B2. He was also unable to explain why in his absence, he used to make arrangements to get his mother, the claimant’s signature in the papers relating to Kamala International. Though he took up a case in the evidence that Kamala International is his sole proprietorship concern, absolutely no evidence was adduced to substantiate the same. It is true that Ext. A 32 referred to by the Arbitrator is not the partnership deed of Kamala International, but it is the deed of Kamala International Tourist Hotel. It is not based on Ext. A32 that the learned Arbitrator has concluded that Kamala International is the sister concern of the Mills. We have already referred to the reasons for the Arbitrator to conclude so. This finding based on the pleadings and evidence adduced before the Arbitrator could not have been re-appreciated by the court below in a proceeding under Section 34, which it rightly did not do as the scope of S.34 of the Act is very limited. The Court while exercising jurisdiction under S.34 does not sit as a Court of appeal. It is settled law that the Arbitral Tribunal is the final adjudicator of facts and evidence adduced before it. The Court is not permitted to re-appreciate the evidence placed before the Arbitrator as the Arbitrator is the best judge of the quality as well as quantity of evidence and it will not be for the Court to take upon itself the task of being a judge of the evidence before the Arbitrator. If the view taken by the Arbitral Tribunal is a plausible view and just because the Court may have a different view, the arbitral award should not and cannot be interfered with under S.34. The court is not expected to substitute its evaluation of the conclusion of law or fact arrived at by the Arbitrator. Neither can that be done by this court in the present appeal before us under Section 37 of the Act. 13. The court is not expected to substitute its evaluation of the conclusion of law or fact arrived at by the Arbitrator. Neither can that be done by this court in the present appeal before us under Section 37 of the Act. 13. After affirming the conclusion of the learned Arbitrator that Kamala International is a sister concern of the Mills, the court below found that the Arbitrator had travelled beyond the scope of the reference, that is, he decided on a matter that was not referred for arbitration and hence that part of the award which allowed dissolution of Kamala International, was set aside. According to the learned District Judge, Kamala International was never the subject matter of reference. In A.R.No.46/2005 filed under Section 11 of the Act by the claimant-Kamala, no reference has been made to Kamala International. On the other hand, there is only specific reference to the partnership firm-the Mills and there is no reference whatsoever to the sister concern, namely, Kamala International. Therefore, when the issue regarding dissolution of Kamala International was never referred for arbitration, the Arbitrator could not have decided on the dissolution of the same and hence proceeded to set aside that part of the award under Section 34(2)(a)(iv) of the Act. The claimant -Kamala challenges this finding in Arb.Appeal No.11/2016. It was pointed out on behalf of the claimant that, all along the claimant had sought for dissolution of the Mills along with its sister concerns, namely, Kamala International and Kamala Chennai, which have been specifically referred to in the claim statement filed by the claimant in A.C.No.1/2006. It is immaterial that reference to the sister concerns have not been made in A.R.No.46/2005 filed under Section 11 of the Act. The first respondent-Manoharan, on the other hand, defended the finding of the court below setting aside the portion of the award which allowed dissolution and rendition of accounts of Kamala International and submitted that there is no infirmity whatsoever in the finding of the court below relating to the same. 14. Section 11 of the Act deals with appointment of Arbitrators. In a proceeding under Section 11, the Chief Justice or his designate is not expected to go into the merits of the claim or examine the tenability of the claim. 14. Section 11 of the Act deals with appointment of Arbitrators. In a proceeding under Section 11, the Chief Justice or his designate is not expected to go into the merits of the claim or examine the tenability of the claim. The issues that can be raised and considered in an application under Section 11 of the Act was considered by the Apex Court in Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. v. M/s. SPS Engineering Ltd. (2011 KHC 4110) and it was held thus- “10.ThisCourt, in National Insurance Co.Ltd.v. Boghata Polyfab Private Limited, 2009 KHC 4264: 2009(1) SCC 267 : AIR 2009 SC 170 : 2008(71) AIC 182 : 2008(12) SCALE 654 following the decision in SBP & Co. v. Patel Engineering Ltd., 2005 KHC 1909: 2005(8) SCC 618 : AIR 2006 SC 450 : 2005(128) Comp Cas 465, identified and segregated the issues that may be raised in an application under S.11 of the Act into three categories, as under: “22.1. The issues (first category) which the Chief Justice/his designate will have to decide are: (a) Whether the party making the application has approached the appropriate High Court? (b) Whether there is an arbitration agreement and whether the party who has applied under S.11 of the Act, is a party to such an agreement? 22.2. The issues (second category) which the Chief Justice/his designate may choose to decide (or leave them to the decision of the Arbitral Tribunal) are: (a) Whether the claim is dead (long – barred) claim or a live claim? (b) Whether the parties have concluded the contract/transaction by recording satisfaction of their mutual rights and obligation or by receiving the final payment without objection? 22.3. The issues (third category) which the Chief Justice/ his designate should leave exclusively to the Arbitral Tribunal are: Whether a claim made falls within the arbitration clause (as for example, a matter which is reserved for final decision of a departmental authority and expected or excluded from arbitration)? Merits or any claim involved in the arbitration.” xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 12. An application under S.11 of the Act is expected to contain pleadings about the existence of a dispute and the existence of an arbitration agreement to decide such dispute. The applicant is not expected to justify the claim or plead exhaustively in regard to limitation or produce documents to demonstrate that the claim is within time in a proceedings under S.11 of the Act. The applicant is not expected to justify the claim or plead exhaustively in regard to limitation or produce documents to demonstrate that the claim is within time in a proceedings under S.11 of the Act. That issue should normally be left to the Arbitral Tribunal. If the Chief Justice or his designate is of the view that in addition to examining whether there is an arbitration agreement between the parties, he should consider the issue whether the claim is a dead one (long time barred) or whether there has been satisfaction of mutual rights and obligation under the contract, he should record his intention to do so and give an opportunity to the parties to place their materials on such issue. Unless parties are put on notice that such an issue will be examined, they will be under the impression that only questions of jurisdiction and existence of arbitration agreement between the parties will be considered in such proceedings.” (Emphasis supplied) 15. Therefore, what is to be decided in an application under Section 11 is whether there is an arbitration agreement between the parties. The court is not expected to go into the merits of the claim or examine the tenability of the claim in an application under Section 11. The claimant is also not expected to plead exhaustively regarding the matters to be referred for arbitration. In the instant case, in the Claim Statement filed in A.C.No.1/2006, there are very clear pleadings relating to the sister concern of the firm- Mills, namely, Kamala International. We have already referred to prayer(a) in the Claim Statement. The Arbitrator had also raised an issue regarding this, that is issue no.(vi) in A.C.01/2006 which reads - “Whether Kamala International and Kamala Chennai are sister concerns of Raja Rajeswari Weaving Mills?”. The issues were raised as agreed to by both sides. From the award which refers to the contentions of the first respondent relating to Kamala International, it did not appear that he had ever raised a contention that the said dispute is outside the scope of reference. This was one another reason which prompted us to peruse the Counter Statements of the first respondent to understand his actual stand before the Arbitrator. 16. This was one another reason which prompted us to peruse the Counter Statements of the first respondent to understand his actual stand before the Arbitrator. 16. Sub-section (2) to S.16 of the Act says that a plea that the Arbitral Tribunal does not have jurisdiction shall be raised not later than the submission of the statement of defence; however, a party would not be precluded from raising such a plea merely because he appointed or participated in the process of appointment of the arbitrator. Sub-section (3) says that a plea that the Arbitral Tribunal is exceeding the scope of its authority is to be raised as soon as the matter alleged to be beyond the scope of its authority is raised during the arbitral proceedings. Of course, sub-section (4) to Section 16 says that the Arbitral Tribunal may admit a plea under sub sections (2) or (3) at a later point of time also if it considers the delay to be justified. In MSP Infrastructure Ltd. (M/s.) vs. M.P.Road Devl.Corp.Ltd. (2014 KHC 4774) a two-judge bench of the Apex Court held that on a plain reading of S.16(2), it mandates that a plea that the Tribunal does not have jurisdiction, shall not be raised later than the submission of the statement of defence. A party is bound, by virtue of sub-section (2) of S.16, to raise any objection it may have to the jurisdiction of the Tribunal before or at the time of submission of its statement of defence, and at any time thereafter it is expressly prohibited. However, in Lion Engineering Consultants (M/s.) vs. State of M.P. (2018 KHC 6219) a three-judge bench of the Apex court held that MSP Infrastructure (Supra) is not good law and held that there is no bar to the plea of jurisdiction being raised by way of an objection under S.34 of the Act, even if no such objection was raised under S.16. 17. It is true that as per the present position, the first respondent even without raising a plea under S.16(3) before the Arbitrator, can raise it for the first time in a proceeding under S.34. However, in the instant case the position seems to be slightly different. 17. It is true that as per the present position, the first respondent even without raising a plea under S.16(3) before the Arbitrator, can raise it for the first time in a proceeding under S.34. However, in the instant case the position seems to be slightly different. The first respondent seems to have voluntarily agreed to the adjudication of the said issue by the Arbitrator, which is clear from issue no.(vi) framed by the Arbitrator, which is seen framed as agreed to by the rival contestants. At that point he does not seem to have had a case that the said issue is beyond the scope of reference or that the Arbitrator was travelling beyond jurisdiction. It appears that this contention under S.16(3) has been taken up in the proceedings before the court below only as an afterthought in the light of the adverse finding of the Arbitrator. It is true that consent will also not confer jurisdiction. The court below has found this plea under S.16(3) in favour of the first respondent only because the application under S.11 of the Act in A.R. 46/2005 does not refer to Kamala International. This we find is immaterial in the light of the scope of S. 11 as explained in Indian Oil Corporation (Supra). As noticed earlier the Claim Statement specifically refers to Kamala International and there is also a prayer for dissolution of the same along with the partnership firm- the Mills. 18. Further, Sri. Vinod Bhat, the learned counsel for the claimant pointed out that even otherwise Kamala International can be brought within the scope of the arbitration proceedings by applying the ‘Group of Companies Doctrine’. In support of the argument, reference was made to Ameet Lalchand Shah v. Rishabh Enterprises (2018 KHC 6393) and Mahanagar Telephone Nigam Ltd. v. Canara Bank (2019 KHC 6775). In Ameet Lalchand Shah relying on the aforesaid doctrine it was found : “21.In a case like the present one, though there are different agreements involving several parties, as discussed above, it is a single commercial project namely operating a 2 MWP Photovoltaic Solar Plant at Dongri, Raksa, District Jhansi, Uttar Pradesh. Commissioning of the Solar Plant, which is the commercial understanding between the parties and it has been effected through several agreements. The agreement -Equipment Lease Agreement (14.03.2012) for commissioning of the Solar Plant is the principal/main agreement. Commissioning of the Solar Plant, which is the commercial understanding between the parties and it has been effected through several agreements. The agreement -Equipment Lease Agreement (14.03.2012) for commissioning of the Solar Plant is the principal/main agreement. The two agreements of Rishabh with Juwi India:-(i) Equipment and Material Supply Contract (01.02.2012); and (ii) Engineering, Installation and Commissioning Contract (01.02.2012) and the Rishabh's Sale and Purchase Agreement with Aston field (05.03.2012) are ancillary agreements which led to the main purpose of commissioning the Photovoltaic Solar Plant at Dongri, Raksa, District Jhansi, Uttar Pradesh by Dante Energy (Lessee). Even though, the Sale and Purchase Agreement (05.03.2012) between Rishabh and Astonfield does not contain arbitration clause, it is integrally connected with the commissioning of the Solar Plant at Dongri, Raksa, District Jhansi, U.P. by Dante Energy. Juwi India, even though, not a party to the suit and even though, Astonfield and appellant No.1-Ameet Lalchand Shah are not signatories to the main agreement viz. Equipment Lease Agreement (14.03.2012), it is a commercial transaction integrally connected with commissioning of Photovoltaic Solar Plant at Dongri, Raksa, District Jhansi, U.P. Be it noted, as per clause(v) of Art.4, parties have agreed that the entire risk, cost of the delivery and installation shall be at the cost of the Rishabh (Lessor). Here again, we may recapitulate that engineering and installation is to be done by Juwi India. What is evident from the facts and intention of the parties is to facilitate procurement of equipments, sale and purchase of equipments, installation and leasing out the equipments to Dante Energy. The dispute between the parties to various agreements could be resolved only by referring all the four agreements and the parties thereon to arbitration. 22. Parties to the agreements namely Rishabh and Juwi India :- (i) Equipment and Material Supply Agreement; and (ii) Engineering, Installation and Commissioning Contract and the parties to Sale and Purchase Agreement between Rishabh and Aston field are one and the same as that of the parties in the main agreement namely Equipment Lease Agreement (14.03.2012). All the four agreements are interconnected. This is a case where sever al parties are involved in a single commercial project (Solar Plant at Dongri) executed through several agreements/contracts. In such a case, all the parties can be covered by the arbitration clause in the main agreement i.e. Equipment Lease Agreement (14.03.2012).” 19. All the four agreements are interconnected. This is a case where sever al parties are involved in a single commercial project (Solar Plant at Dongri) executed through several agreements/contracts. In such a case, all the parties can be covered by the arbitration clause in the main agreement i.e. Equipment Lease Agreement (14.03.2012).” 19. In Mahanagar Telephone Nigam Ltd. (Supra) it was held that a non-signatory can be bound by an arbitration agreement on the basis of the ‘Group of Companies Doctrine’, where the conduct of the parties evidence a clear intention of the parties to bind both the signatory as well as the non -signatory parties. Courts and tribunals have invoked this doctrine to join a non -signatory member of the group, if they are satisfied that the non -signatory company was by reference to the common intention of the parties, a necessary party to the contract. The ‘Group of Companies Doctrine’ has been invoked by courts and tribunals in arbitrations, where an arbitration agreement is entered into by one of the companies in the group; and the non -signatory affiliate, or sister, or parent concern, is held to be bound by the arbitration agreement, if the facts and circumstances of the case demonstrate that it was the mutual intention of all parties to bind both the signatories and the non -signatory affiliates in the group. The doctrine provides that a non -signatory may be bound by an arbitration agreement where the parent or holding company, or a member of the group of companies is a signatory to the arbitration agreement and the non -signatory entity on the group has been engaged in the negotiation or performance of the commercial contract, or made statements indicating its intention to be bound by the contract, the non -signatory will also be bound and benefitted by the relevant contracts. The circumstances in which the ‘Group of Companies Doctrine’ could be invoked to bind the non -signatory affiliate of a parent company, or inclusion of a third party to an arbitration, if there is a direct relationship between the party which is a signatory to the arbitration agreement; the direct commonality of the subject matter; the composite nature of the transaction between the parties. A 'composite transaction' refers to a transaction which is inter -linked in nature; or, where the performance of the agreement may not be feasible without the aid, execution, and performance of the supplementary or the ancillary agreement, for achieving the common object, and collectively having a bearing on the dispute. The Group of Companies Doctrine has also been invoked in cases where there is a tight group structure with strong organizational and financial links, so as to constitute a single economic unit, or a single economic reality. In such a situation, signatory and non signatories have been bound together under the arbitration agreement. This will apply in particular when the funds of one company are used to financially support or re- structure other members of the group. 20. If the aforesaid doctrine can be applied to Companies, we do not see why it cannot be applied to partnerships, provided the aforesaid conditions are satisfied. Kamala International has been found to be a sister concern of the firm the Mills. The partners in both are the same, namely, the claimant and respondents, who are none other than mother and children. The fact that Kamala International was doing business similar to that of the main firm and that it was mainly engaged in the export of handloom items manufactured by the firm-the Mills is admitted. From the conclusions seen made in the award, the Firms appear to be more of a family business, where profits from one was being used for the other; there appears to have been a tight group structure with strong organizational and financial links. That being the position Kamala International, even if a non-signatory can be brought within the purview of this arbitration proceedings, as canvassed by the claimant. Therefore, the arbitrator was well within his jurisdiction to have decided the said dispute and so the finding of the court below to the contrary, is liable to be set aside. 21. Now coming to Arbitration Appeal No.23/2016 filed by the claimant aggrieved by the order of the court below in O.P.No.420/2009 interfering with the award passed by the Arbitrator to the effect that it is binding on Amarjith, the additional fourth respondent. O.P.No.420/2009 was filed by Amarjith, the additional fourth respondent against the award in A.C.No.3/2006, which was for dissolution and rendition of accounts relating to the partnership firm-Raja Rajeswari City (the City). O.P.No.420/2009 was filed by Amarjith, the additional fourth respondent against the award in A.C.No.3/2006, which was for dissolution and rendition of accounts relating to the partnership firm-Raja Rajeswari City (the City). In this firm also the claimants and respondents 1 to 3 are admittedly partners. In the Claim Statement it is alleged that the claimant and the respondents had formed the firm-the City, with the intention to start a shopping complex. The purpose of the Firm was to construct and let out or sell and carry on the business of shops, management of hotels, restaurants, boarding and lodging houses, cafes, etc. and also, to engage in the construction of both commercial and residential buildings. The first respondent being the only male member, was managing the Firm being the Managing partner. Further, it is interalia alleged that though a mutistoried building has been constructed, the same is not being properly utilised ; that most of the rooms are kept locked deliberately, in spite of the fact that there is high demand for the rooms ; that the first respondent is not managing the business properly, that the accounts of the firm are not being properly finalised or audited ; that the lion's share of the profits of the firm is being misappropriated and diverted by the first respondent for his personal use ; that the first respondent is not showing the accounts of the firm to the other partners ; that the first respondent has been carrying on business other than that of the firm for his personal benefits and for the benefit of his wife and children and that he is willfully neglecting the conduct and business of the firm. The first respondent filed objections denying the allegations of the claimant regarding mismanagement and non-sharing of profits of the firm. Though the claimant and the other respondents had agreed to transfer their share of the profits of the firm-the Mills, for the construction activities of the City, they failed to keep their promise. After their initial contribution for the construction of the shopping complex, they failed to contribute any further amounts. The first respondent spent an amount of Rs.3.77 crores from his personal funds in addition to the amount transferred from the Mills for the construction of the shopping complex. He also availed a loan of Rs.1.85 Crores from SBI, Kannur Branch for the construction. The first respondent spent an amount of Rs.3.77 crores from his personal funds in addition to the amount transferred from the Mills for the construction of the shopping complex. He also availed a loan of Rs.1.85 Crores from SBI, Kannur Branch for the construction. The loan was obtained with the consent and knowledge of other partners also. The partnership deed of the firm -the City, empowers the respondent to receive deposits and sell or lease the shopping complex to others. Hence, he received an amount of Rs.2.57 Crores from Amarjith and leased out the entire shopping complex to him for a monthly rent of Rs.50,000/-. The entire amount received from the lessee has been utilised for completing the construction of the complex. A total amount of Rs.10.12 Crores has been spent for the construction of the shopping complex. The allegation that he is conducting personal business similar to that of the business of the partnership firm and that he has been diverting the funds of the partnership firm to his own account was denied. 22. In the light of the contentions of the first respondent, Amarjith was sought to be impleaded as the additional fourth respondent in the arbitration proceedings. Amarjith objected to the request of the claimant to bring him on record contending that he was/is not a partner of any of the three firms relating to which the arbitration had been initiated and therefore his impleadment is unnecessary. Amarjith also requested the Arbitrator to decide on the legality of his impleadment as a preliminary issue. This request of Amarjith was rejected by the Arbitrator by order dated 21.5.2009. He was brought on record as the additional fourth respondent and it was held that the issue regarding impleadment could be decided only after taking evidence. Amarjith challenged this order by filing W.P.(C)No.1745/2007. Amarjith not happy with the order of the single Judge, filed W.A.No.2256/2007. In the said judgment, the order of impleadment was not disturbed. However, liberty was reserved to Amarjith to question the final order that may be passed by the Arbitrator in case it went against him. After the impleadment, the additional fourth respondent filed counter contending he is not a signatory to any of the partnership deeds of the three firms, namely, the Mills, the Hotel and the City and so he is not a party to the arbitration agreement. After the impleadment, the additional fourth respondent filed counter contending he is not a signatory to any of the partnership deeds of the three firms, namely, the Mills, the Hotel and the City and so he is not a party to the arbitration agreement. As he is not a party to the arbitration agreement, he is an unnecessary party to the proceeding and the Arbitrator cannot pass an award that would bind him in any way. 23. The Arbitrator found that the additional fourth respondent was doing business closely linked with the business of the Mills, the Hotel and the City, which are the subject matter of the arbitration cases. He was also found to have acquired considerable financial interest in the firm-the City. The first respondent had incurred huge liability on behalf of the Firm, namely, the City, by borrowing considerable amounts from the additional fourth respondent. A lease deed was executed by the first respondent in favour of the additional fourth respondent. According to the claimant, this lease deed is an illegal, sham and unauthorised document, which was executed by the first respondent in favour of his son-the additional fourth respondent without the junction of the other partners. The claimant contended that all these dealings are sham transactions and that it cannot bind the claimant or respondents 2 and 3. The Arbitrator found that the additional fourth respondent was not entitled to proceed against the assets of the three firms, which are the subject matter of the dispute. It was found that the role of the additional fourth respondent needed to be gone into in the arbitration proceedings for the purpose of deciding the rights and liabilities of the claimant and the other partners, namely, respondents 1 to 3. According to the Arbitrator, this could not be done or adjudicated without the additional fourth respondent in the party array and as the award in the matter would certainly affect the rights and interests of the additional fourth respondent, he was found to be a necessary party in the proceeding. According to the Arbitrator, this could not be done or adjudicated without the additional fourth respondent in the party array and as the award in the matter would certainly affect the rights and interests of the additional fourth respondent, he was found to be a necessary party in the proceeding. The Arbitrator interalia also found that the lease deed executed by the first respondent in favour of the additional fourth respondent is a sham document and proceeded to pass an award which reads thus-“The assets and liabilities of the firm are to be divided among the parties in the following order :- 40% to the first respondent, 20% each to claimant, respondents 2 and 3. As far as the profit and losses are concerned, the parties are entitled to the amounts in the following manner :-First respondent 50%, Claimant 20%, 15% each respondents 2 and 3.The claimant and respondents 2 and 3 are not liable for the loans taken by the first respondent without their consent. Since there is no evidence for the loans taken by the first respondent from the additional 4threspondent, the above amount also cannot be fastened as a liability on the firm. The alleged lease in favour of the 4th respondent being a sham document cannot be given effect to. Raja Rajeswari City is a commercial complex. There are rooms and auditorium. Therefore, it cannot be divided by metes and bounds. The division of Raja Rajeswari City can be effected only by negotiations and mutual agreement. In view of my findings as detailed above, it has become absolutely necessary to have a full pledged [SIC] audit of these firms by reputed Auditors like Varma & Varma or T.K.Menon & Co., who were conducting the audit of these firms as admitted by first respondent. For the above purpose, the first respondent is directed to take immediate steps to see that the audit is conducted as early as possible at least within one month from the date of this Award. The auditors also must be requested to complete the auditing at least within 6 months from the date of receipt of the records. The costs of the audit must be shared equally among the parties except the 4th respondent.”(Emphasis supplied) 24. The additional fourth respondent challenged this award by filing O.P.No.420/2009. The auditors also must be requested to complete the auditing at least within 6 months from the date of receipt of the records. The costs of the audit must be shared equally among the parties except the 4th respondent.”(Emphasis supplied) 24. The additional fourth respondent challenged this award by filing O.P.No.420/2009. The court below relying on various decisions of the Apex court found that there can be a reference to arbitration only if there is an arbitration agreement between the parties; that the Act makes it clear that an Arbitrator can be appointed at the instance of a party to an arbitration agreement only in respect of disputes with another party to the arbitration agreement; that what confers jurisdiction on the Arbitrator to hear and decide a dispute is an arbitration agreement and where there is no such agreement, there is initial want of jurisdiction which cannot be cured by acquiescence; that the Arbitrator has no power to unilaterally enlarge the reference and adjudicate the claims and that merely because the additional fourth respondent participated in the proceedings on his impleadment, he is not estopped from contending in the S.34 proceeding that the award is not binding on him. The additional fourth respondent had all along contended that he is not a party to the arbitration agreements and that he had not given any consent for the appointment of the Arbitrator and that it was without prejudice to his contention that he had participated in the proceedings and hence it was found that the award does not bind the additional fourth respondent and the award so far as it affected his rights and interest was set aside. 25. This finding of the court below is challenged by the claimant who contends that the court after affirming the finding of the Arbitrator that the additional fourth respondent is a necessary party, completely misdirected itself by holding that the award will not bind him. Sri.S.Sreekumar, the learned senior counsel appearing for respondents two and three submitted that even if the additional fourth respondent is not a signatory in the partnership deeds, he can also be roped into the arbitration proceeding by applying the ‘Group of Companies Doctrine’. Sri.S.Sreekumar, the learned senior counsel appearing for respondents two and three submitted that even if the additional fourth respondent is not a signatory in the partnership deeds, he can also be roped into the arbitration proceeding by applying the ‘Group of Companies Doctrine’. Reference was made to the following decisions -Indowind Energy Ltd. v. Wescare (India) Ltd. [ (2010) 5 SCC 306 ]; Chloro Controls (I) Pvt. Ltd. v. Seven Trent Water Purification Inc., (2013) 1 SCC 641 ; Cheran Properties Ltd. v. Kasturi & Sons Ltd. [ (2018)16 SCC 413 ]; Mahanagar Telephone Nigam Ltd. v. Canara Bank (2019 KHC 6775) and Shapoorji Pallonji and Co. Pvt. Ltd. v. Rattan India Power Ltd. (MANU/DE/0645/2021). Specific reference was made to the following paragraphs in Chloro Controls (Supra) which reads- “66. Though the scope of an arbitration agreement is limited to the parties who entered into it and those claiming under or through them, the Courts under the English Law have, in certain cases, also applied the 'Group of Companies Doctrine'. This doctrine has developed in the international context, whereby an arbitration agreement entered in to by a company, being one within a group of companies, can bind its non signatory affiliates or sister or parent concerns, if the circumstances demonstrate that the mutual intention of all the parties was to bind both the signatories and the non-signatory affiliates. This theory has been applied in a number of arbitrations so as to justify atribunal taking jurisdiction over a party who is not a signatory to the contract containing the arbitration agreement. ['Russell on Arbitration' (Twenty Third Edition)]. 67. This evolves the principle that a non-signatory party could be subjected to arbitration provided these transactions were with group of companies and there was a clear intention of the parties to bind both, the signatory as well as the non -signatory parties. In other words, 'intention of the parties' is a very significant feature which must be established before the scope of arbitration can be said to include the signatory as well as the non -signatory parties. 68. A non-signatory or third party could be subjected to arbitration without their prior consent, but this would only be in exceptional cases. In other words, 'intention of the parties' is a very significant feature which must be established before the scope of arbitration can be said to include the signatory as well as the non -signatory parties. 68. A non-signatory or third party could be subjected to arbitration without their prior consent, but this would only be in exceptional cases. The Court will examine these exceptions from the touchstone of direct relationship to the party signatory to the arbitration agreement, direct commonality of the subject matter and the agreement between the parties being a composite transaction. The transaction should be of a composite nature where performance of mother agreement may not be feasible without aid, execution and performance of the supplementary or ancillary agreements, for achieving the common object and collectively having bearing on the dispute. Besides all this, the Court would have to examine whether a composite reference of such parties would serve the ends of justice. Once this exercise is completed and the Court answers the same in the affirmative, the reference of even non-signatory parties would fall within the exception afore discussed.” 26. Per contra, it was submitted by Sri . Kaleeswaran Raj, the learned counsel for the first respondent -Manoharan, that the said doctrine does not apply to the facts of the present case. The aforesaid doctrine has been applied in the context of strictly commercial transactions, where there is a vertical chain between all the parties to the agreement, facilitated by a mother agreement. The additional fourth respondent cannot be roped into the arbitration, since there is no vertical chain of agreement or transaction between him and the three firms facilitated by a mother agreement. There is no composite transaction between him and all or any of the three firms pursuant to a mother agreement. Additionally, the aforesaid decisions endorsing the roping in of non-signatories through the ‘Group of Companies doctrine', is applicable only to Companies. The additional fourth respondent, Amarjith, is an individual and not a Company. It was also submitted that the dictum in Chloro and Mahanagar (supra), were rendered in the background of Section 45 of the Act which stand on a completely different footing. Section 45 coming under Part II of the Act deals with enforcement of certain foreign awards under the New York Convention Awards. It was also submitted that the dictum in Chloro and Mahanagar (supra), were rendered in the background of Section 45 of the Act which stand on a completely different footing. Section 45 coming under Part II of the Act deals with enforcement of certain foreign awards under the New York Convention Awards. Hence the argument is that the same cannot be equated with Section 7 coming under Chapter II or with Section 16 coming under Chapter IV, both Sections coming under Part I of the Act, which are not parimateria. This argument is endorsed by the learned counsel for the additional fourth respondent also. Therefore, the argument advanced is that the finding of the court below setting aside the finding of the Arbitrator that the award is binding on the additional fourth respondent is perfectly justified. 27. It is true that a valid arbitration agreement constitutes the heart of an arbitration. An arbitration agreement is the written agreement between the parties, to submit their existing, or future disputes or differences, to arbitration. A valid arbitration agreement is the foundation stone on which the entire edifice of the arbitral process is structured. A binding agreement for disputes to be resolved through arbitration is a sine -qua -non for referring the parties to arbitration. The arbitration agreement need not be in any particular form. What is required to be ascertained is the intention of the parties to settle their disputes through arbitration. The essential elements or attributes of an arbitration agreement is the agreement to refer their disputes or differences to arbitration, which is expressly or impliedly spelt out from a clause in an agreement, separate agreement, or documents/correspondence exchanged between the parties. S.7(4)(b) of the Act, states that an arbitration agreement can be derived from exchange of letters, telex, telegram or other means of communication, including through electronic means. If it can prima-facie be shown that parties are adidem, even though the other party may not have signed a formal contract, it cannot absolve him from the liability under the agreement. Arbitration agreements are to be construed according to the general principles of construction of statutes, statutory instruments, and other contractual documents. The intention of the parties must be inferred from the terms of the contract, conduct of the parties, and correspondence exchanged, to ascertain the existence of a binding contract between the parties. Arbitration agreements are to be construed according to the general principles of construction of statutes, statutory instruments, and other contractual documents. The intention of the parties must be inferred from the terms of the contract, conduct of the parties, and correspondence exchanged, to ascertain the existence of a binding contract between the parties. If the documents on record show that the parties were ad idem, and had actually reached an agreement upon all material terms, then it would be construed to be a binding contract. The meaning of a contract must be gathered by adopting a common-sense approach, and must not be allowed to be thwarted by a pedantic and legalistic interpretation. (Mahanagar Telephone Nigam Ltd. v. Canara Bank (2019 KHC 6775). 28. It is true that the decisions, namely, Chloro and Mahanagar (supra) were rendered with reference to Section 45 of the Act. Section 45 deals with the power of judicial authority to refer parties to arbitration. It says that notwithstanding anything contained in Part I or in the Code of Civil Procedure, the judicial authority when seized of an action in a matter in respect of which the parties have made an agreement referred to in Section 44, shall, at the request of one of the parties or any person claiming through or under him, refer the parties to arbitration, unless it is prima-facie found that the said agreement is null and void, inoperative or incapable of being performed. Section 8 of the Act under Chapter II falling under Part I of the Act, deals with the power to refer parties to arbitration where there is an arbitration agreement. Sub-section (1) to Section 8 (sub-section (1) has been substituted with effect from 23.10.2015) says that a judicial authority, before which an action is brought in a matter which is the subject matter of an arbitration agreement shall, if a party to the arbitration agreement or any person claiming through or under him, so applies not later than the date of submitting his first statement on the substance of the dispute, then, notwithstanding any judgment, decree or order of the Supreme Court or any court, refer the parties to arbitration unless it is found that prima facie no valid arbitration agreement exists. It is true that Section 8 and Section 45 fall under two different parts of the Act, one dealing with domestic awards and the other with foreign awards. But what we have borrowed is only the principle that has been made applicable in the aforesaid decisions to Companies who are non-signatories to the agreement. If the ‘Group of Companies doctrine' can be applied to Companies and partnerships, we do not see why the principle cannot be applied to individuals because unlike in the case of Companies where lifting of the corporate veil may be necessary, at least in some cases, to find out whether there was a clear intention of the Companies to bind both the signatory as well as the non -signatory parties or whether there is a tight group structure with strong organizational and financial links, so as to constitute a single economic unit, or a single economic reality, such an exercise would not be required in individual cases. In individual cases it would be all the more easy to find out whether there has been a meeting of minds between the signatory and non signatory to agreement or to ascertain whether the non signatory intended to join the agreement or to ascertain the existence of a binding contract between the parties. 29. Here admittedly the additional fourth respondent is not a signatory to the partnership deeds of the three Firms-the Mills, the Hotel and the City. The deeds of these three Firms contain the arbitration clause. Therefore, the question is, can the additional fourth respondent a non-signatory to the arbitration agreements be roped in for the arbitration proceedings making him also bound by the award passed in the proceedings ? A paragraph from the book 'Russell on Arbitration' (21st edition, page 319) reads thus – “Award not generally binding on third parties. Save where a third party agrees to be bound by it, an award is generally only effective as regards the parties to it and persons claiming through or under them. It cannot generally be relied on in proceedings involving a third party as evidence either of the facts found or of reputation. There have been cases where this principle appears to have been departed from on grounds of acquiescence and ratification. An award may also in some circumstances be relied upon in a claim against a third party for an indemnity. There have been cases where this principle appears to have been departed from on grounds of acquiescence and ratification. An award may also in some circumstances be relied upon in a claim against a third party for an indemnity. The principle would nevertheless appear to be sound in law.” (Emphasis supplied) 30. Were ferto Govett v. Richmond [58 E.R.737] referred to by Russel in which the principle that non-signatory is not bound by the arbitration agreement was departed on grounds of acquiescence and ratification. The judgment a brief one reads thus – “On the 1st of October 1829 the Plaintiff granted to the Defendant Richmond a lease of certain tithes, commencing on the 29th of September in the same year. In 1831 the parties become mutually desirous of putting an end to the lease; but disputes having arisen between them as to the compensation which Richmond was entitled to for surrendering the lease and as to other matters connected with it, they agreed, on the 2nd of September 1881, to refer the matters in difference to arbitration. On the 10th of November 1831, the arbitrators made their award, by which they directed that Richmond should receive all the tithes accrued between the commencement of the lease and the 29th of September 1831, that he should pay to the Plaintiff the sum of £30, being the balance found by the arbitrators to be due from him to the Plaintiff, after giving him credit for his beneficial interest in the lease and for other allowances, and that he should surrender the lease to the Plaintiff. Richmond having refused to perform the award, the bill was filed against him and one Bignold (to whom Richmond, in June 1830, had agreed, in writing, to assign the lease as a security for money lent) paying for a specific performance of the award, and that it might be declared that Bignold was not entitled to any interest in or lien upon the demised premises. It appeared that, in the early part of September 1831, Bignold knew that the Plaintiff and Richmond had agreed to the reference, but did not inform either the Plaintiff or the arbitrators that he had any interest in or lien upon the lease or the demised premises, until sometime after the award was made. It appeared that, in the early part of September 1831, Bignold knew that the Plaintiff and Richmond had agreed to the reference, but did not inform either the Plaintiff or the arbitrators that he had any interest in or lien upon the lease or the demised premises, until sometime after the award was made. He said in his answer that when he was informed of the agreement for the reference, he was resident at a distance in the country, and without any professional assistance or advice, and that he took no notice of the reference, out doubting that, under any circumstances, more would be awarded than would satisfy his demand, and that, at the events, he could not be prejudiced by a proceeding to which he was no party. xxxxxxx The VICE-CHANCELLOR [Sir L.Shadwell] said that, where a person having a claim upon the property which is the subject of a reference, knows that the arbitration is going on, but does not bring forward his claim, he is bound by the award. [3] The decree declared that the Plaintiff was entitled to a specific performance of the award, and that Bignold was not entitled, as against the Plaintiff, to retain or hold any charge or lien upon the demised premises, subsequent to the 29th of September 1831; and ordered the Defendants to execute to the Plaintiff an assignment of the lease.” 31. In the case on hand, the Arbitrator on the basis of the evidence adduced before him concluded that a decision could not be arrived at without the additional fourth respondent in the party array. The additional fourth respondent was found to have obtained substantial interest in the assets of the Firm-the City. Admittedly, the said Firm was constituted for the purpose of constructing a shopping complex as well as for undertaking construction of other buildings also. A multi-storied building belonging to the Firm-City, has admittedly been leased out by the first respondent to the fourth respondent. It was submitted on behalf of the claimant that practically all rights relating to this multi-storied building consisting of several rooms and an auditorium has been leased out (including the right to sub-lease) by the first respondent to the additional fourth respondent for a paltry sum. The main purpose of constituting the Firm-the City, seems to have been to construct a multiplex complex and lease it out. The main purpose of constituting the Firm-the City, seems to have been to construct a multiplex complex and lease it out. Therefore, the lion’s share of the assets of the firm seems to be in the possession and control of the additional fourth respondent herein. The additional fourth respondent seems to have meddled in the assets and finances of the Firm knowing fully well about the clauses in the partnership deed. He has no case that he was unaware of the clauses in the partnership deed and so knowing fully well, he seems to have dealt with the property of the Firm. The Arbitrator found that the additional fourth respondent was doing business closely linked with the business of the three firms and that he had acquired considerable financial interest in the Firm-the City. Therefore, as held in Chloro and Mahanagar (Supra) a non -signatory can be bound by an arbitration agreement on the basis of the ‘Group of Companies Doctrine’, where the conduct of the parties evidence a clear intention of the parties to bind both the signatory as well as the non signatory parties. This doctrine can be invoked if it can be shown that the non -signatory was by reference to the common intention of the parties, a necessary party to the contract. The learned Arbitrator on the basis of the pleadings and evidence adduced by the rival parties found that additional fourth respondent was very much involved in the business of the Firms, which are the subject matter of the arbitration proceedings and that business interests of these three Firms and the business of the additional fourth respondent was so intermingled and inseparable that without him on the party array it would be practically impossible to effectively adjudicate on the disputes and pass an award. This is a factual finding arrived at by the Arbitrator which cannot be interfered with in a proceeding under S.34 as it is not sitting in appeal and so cannot go into the merits of the award or re-appreciate the evidence or substitute the findings of the arbitrator with its own. 32. Further, the additional fourth respondent can claim rights only through the lessor, who is none else than his father, the first respondent herein, who is admittedly a partner in the Firm-the City. 32. Further, the additional fourth respondent can claim rights only through the lessor, who is none else than his father, the first respondent herein, who is admittedly a partner in the Firm-the City. Therefore, even if he had not been made a party, then also the award would have been binding on him in the light of Section 35 of the Act which says that an arbitral award shall be final and binding on the parties as well as on the persons claiming under them. In these circumstances we find that the court below was not justified in holding that the award would not bind the additional fourth respondent. 33. Now coming to the appeals filed by Manoharan, the first respondent, i.e., Arb. Appeal No.19/2016 and Arb. Appeal No.25/2016, which are against the award passed in O.P.No.416/2009 and O.P.No.415/2009, which in turn are against the award in A.C.No.3/2006 and A.C.No.2/2006 respectively. A.C.No.2/2006 was relating to the dissolution of the firm Kamala International Tourist Hotel (the Hotel). Admittedly the claimant and respondents one to three are the partners of the Firm. The Arbitrator found that several loans had been availed by the first respondent without the junction of the other partners. Though the first respondent contended that he had taken the consent of all the other partners also before incurring the liabilities, no evidence whatsoever was produced to substantiate the same. If the first respondent is to be believed, he had taken loans running into crores of rupees from Nationalised Banks as well as from his son, the additional fourth respondent herein. If that be so, there would certainly be documents and bank accounts to establish the same. However not a scrap of paper was produced by the first respondent to establish the said claim and therefore it was found by the Arbitrator that if at all any financial liabilities or loans had been taken by the first respondent in the name of the partnership firms, he alone would be responsible and that the other partners would not be responsible as there is no evidence on record to show that they had consented to the same. The award relating to Kamala International Tourist Hotel reads thus: “The assets, liabilities, profit and loss of the above firm must be shared among the first respondent, claimant and respondents 2 and 3.Claimant, respondents 2 and 3 are not liable for the loans taken by the first respondent since there is no evidence of giving consent by claimant and respondents 2 and 3.The auditor has stated that the audit was carried out only from year 2003-2004. Therefore, the first respondent is directed to produce the accounts and get them audited and make it upto date so as to, make the division.” 34. This finding of the Arbitrator has not been interfered with by the District Court. According to the learned counsel for the first respondent, the court below committed a grave illegality in not interfering with this finding as the loans were availed not for the personal benefit or use of the first respondent, but for and on behalf of the partners and for the benefit of the partnership firms. The finding of the Arbitrator on this point is also on the basis of the evidence adduced before the Arbitrator and therefore a finding of the Arbitrator based on facts and the evidence adduced before him, cannot be interfered with in a proceeding under Section 34 by the District Court. Therefore, the court below was right in not interfering with this finding of the Arbitrator. In the light of the above discussion, Arb. Appeal No.11/2016 and Arb. Appeal No.23/2016 are allowed and the award of the Arbitrator is restored. Arb. Appeal No.19/2016 and Arb. Appeal No.25/2016 are dismissed. All interlocutory applications pending, if any, shall stand disposed of.