JUDGMENT : M.A.C.A.No.2221 of 2012 is an appeal at the instance of the 3rd respondent insurance company in O.P(MV).No.3623 of 2003 on the file of the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Thrissur challenging award dated 24.05.2012. The original claimant, who is the 1st respondent in this appeal, filed Cross Objection No.40 of 2014, seeking enhancement of compensation. 2. I would like to refer the parties in this appeal as `petitioner' and `insurer'. 3. Summary of the petition averments, shown off unnecessary details, for determination of this case is as follows: 4. The petitioner approached the Tribunal and filed petition under Section 163A of the Motor Vehicles Act, contending that he sustained serious injuries in an occurrence arising out of the use of an Ambassador car bearing Reg.No.KL-8/P 3211. According to the petitioner, while he was travelling in the above car from Puthur to Coimbatore and when the car reached near Yakkara bridge at Palakkad, a Maruti Esteem Car overtook the Ambassador car and obstructed the car. Thereafter, the petitioner and his friends were attacked by using weapons including a chopper and gun. The petitioner underwent treatment and accordingly he canvassed compensation to the tune of Rs.7,13,350/-. 5. The 3rd respondent, who is the insurer, filed written statement and zealously opposed the contentions raised by the petitioner. The 3rd respondent raised a contention that this petition filed under Section 163A of the Motor Vehicles Act cannot be sustained as the occurrence is not as a result of use of a motor vehicle. At the same time, policy to the vehicle during the period of accident was admitted. But quantum of compensation under various heads was opposed. 6. 1st respondent filed written statement opposing the contentions of the petitioner, mainly disputing the quantum. 7. The Tribunal went on trial. PW1 examined and Exts.A1 to A4 marked on the side of the petitioner. Ext.B1 marked on the side of the 3rd respondent. 8. After appraising the evidence, the learned Tribunal held that the petition under Section 163A of the Motor Vehicles Act is maintainable. Thus award for Rs.4,34,550/-was passed along with 8% interest per annum. 9. PW1 examined and Exts.A1 to A4 marked on the side of the petitioner. Ext.B1 marked on the side of the 3rd respondent. 8. After appraising the evidence, the learned Tribunal held that the petition under Section 163A of the Motor Vehicles Act is maintainable. Thus award for Rs.4,34,550/-was passed along with 8% interest per annum. 9. While assailing the award of the Tribunal on the finding that the occurrence alleged by the petitioner is one arising out of the use of a motor vehicle, it is vehemently argued by the learned counsel for the insurer that though the special provision under Section 163A envisages grant of compensation on structured formula basis in the case of death or permanent disablement due to accident arising out of the use of the motor vehicle, when persons travelling in a car, if attacked by some rivalries, the same cannot be treated as an occurrence arising out of the use of motor vehicles. In this connection, the learned counsel for the insurance company placed decision reported in [ 2004 (2) KLT 395 ], Deepal Girishbhai Soni v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd. Para.40 of the above judgment has been highlighted in this regard. 10. However, it is vehemently argued by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the term `arising out of the use of the motor vehicle' to be understood in a liberal magnitude. According to him, if it is established by the claimant that the disablement was caused due to an accident arising out of the use of the motor vehicle, then the claimant would be entitled to for payment of compensation under Section 163A of the Act. The learned counsel placed decision reported in [ 2000 (2) KLT 526 (SC)], Rita Devi v. New India Assurance Co. Ltd., in support of this contention. On reading this decision, the Honourable Supreme Court considered the case of one Dasarath Singh, driver of an autorickshaw, owned by one Lalit Singh. The said autorickshaw was hired by some unknown passengers and thereafter they attempted to steal the same. When such attempt was obstructed, the unknown persons murdered the autorickshaw driver. Ltd., in support of this contention. On reading this decision, the Honourable Supreme Court considered the case of one Dasarath Singh, driver of an autorickshaw, owned by one Lalit Singh. The said autorickshaw was hired by some unknown passengers and thereafter they attempted to steal the same. When such attempt was obstructed, the unknown persons murdered the autorickshaw driver. The legal-heirs of Dasarath Singh when moved an application under Section 163A of the Motor Vehicles Act, the Apex Court held that such occurrence would come within the ambit of the accident arising out of the use of motor vehicles within the purview of Section 163A of the Motor Vehicles Act. 11. It is not in dispute that Section 163A of the Motor Vehicles Act got incorporated in the statute book with a view to grant compensation on the basis of a structured formula basis in the case of death or permanent disablement due to accidents arising out of the use of motor vehicles. In such cases, proof of negligence is not necessary and the petitioner or the legal-heirs could claim compensation under the provision, if their yearly income is Rs.40,000/- or less. 12. To be on the facts of this case, the specific case put up by the petitioner is that when he was travelling from Puthur to Coimbatore and when he reached near Yakkara bridge at Palakkad, some unknown persons travelled in a Maruti Esteem car overtook the Ambassador car in which the petitioner and his friends were travelling and thereafter the unknown persons attacked them. It is admitted by the learned counsel for the insurer that the driver of the car filed an application before the Workmen's Compensation Commission and he was granted compensation. 13. The vital question requires answer is; what would be the nature of accident to treat the same as one arising out of the use of the motor vehicle?. While analysing an accident within ambit of Section 163A of the Motor Vehicles Act with a view to find whether the same is arising out of the use of motor vehicle, in fact, such an accident is not expressly defined in the Act. Some debate in the context of the facts and circumstances encompassed in a particular case, is decisive in this regard. Some debate in the context of the facts and circumstances encompassed in a particular case, is decisive in this regard. To put it otherwise, the nexus between accidental injuries and the use of vehicle is the plank on which occurrence to be reckoned to include the same under the category of an accident arising out of the use of the motor vehicle. While having a liberal and prudent approach, the cardinal principle to be borne in mind while answering the query as to whether a particular accident is one resulted while using a motor vehicle, a very pertinent aspect is, impossibility or improbability of the victims'/injureds' presence at the place of occurrence without junction of the vehicle. To be more vivid, when the nexus between the vehicle and the occurrence which resulted in causing the injuries to the petitioner is evaluated, one could see that the accident would not have happened if the vehicle was not used to reach the place of occurrence or the occurrence, either expressly or impliedly, is the proximate outcome of the use of the motor vehicle. Here, the petitioner travelled from Puthur to Coimbatore and during this course, he was attacked by some unknown persons. If he would not have travelled in the vehicle and not reached the place of occurrence, the accident could not have happened. In such a case, it is not safe to say that the occurrence is an independent one eschewing any nexus arising out of the use of motor vehicle. To the contrary, it has to be held that use of the motor vehicle ultimately led to the accident. Therefore, I have no hesitation to hold that the occurrence narrated by the petitioner is one arising out of the use of the motor vehicle. Contra argument urged by the learned counsel for the insurer cannot be countenanced. Thus the said contention stands rejected. 13. The next contention raised by the learned counsel for the insurer in the matter of grant of compensation in excess of what has been specifically mentioned in the schedule appended to Section 163A of the M.V Act required to be addressed. At this juncture, the learned counsel for the petitioner attempted to justify the award on the assertion that reasonable compensation was granted and therefore, no reduction is permissible. 14. At this juncture, the learned counsel for the petitioner attempted to justify the award on the assertion that reasonable compensation was granted and therefore, no reduction is permissible. 14. While allaying the dispute in the matter of amount entitled in a claim under Section 163A of the Motor Vehicles Act, I have no hesitation to hold that the compensation fixed as per the schedule alone can be granted under this special provision and anything more is impermissible. 15. Keeping the above principle in mind, I have perused the award. It could be noticed that though Rs.15,000/-alone is the maximum amount permissible under the head medical expenses, the Tribunal granted Rs.2,94,389/-. Therefore, Rs.2,79,389/-[294389 - 15000] granted by the Tribunal under the head medical expenses is reduced. Similarly, under the head pain and suffering, Rs.14,000/-was granted by the Tribunal though the said amount also is limited to Rs.5,000/-in the case of grievous injuries. Therefore, Rs.9,000/-granted under this head is liable to be reduced. The Tribunal granted Rs.1,00,800/-under the head disability income. Further the Tribunal granted Rs.10,000/-under the head loss of disfigurement and loss of amenities. The said amount also would not come within the ambit of Section 163A of the Motor Vehicles Act. Therefore, the same also is liable to be reduced. The argument at the instance of the learned counsel for the petitioner in the matter of disability income granted by reducing the disability to 20% is to be addressed next. It is argued that though as per Ext.A9 proved through PW1, its author, showed 45% disability, the Tribunal is not justified in fixing 20% as the disability. It is vehemently argued by the learned counsel for the petitioner that considering the serious nature of injuries sustained by the petitioner and the consequential treatment, 45% disability as such would have been fixed by the Tribunal. 16. Going by the treatment records, the petitioner sustained compound fracture left collar bone, post traumatic, post ganglionic brachial plexus, injury left side involving C5, C6, C7 left brachial plexipathy, lacerated wound 3 c.m X 2 c.m, over left upper chest, pain and swelling deformity of left clavicle, multiple bodily injuries. The Tribunal while evaluating the evidence given by PW1 to support Ext.A9, physically examined the petitioner and came to the conclusion that the petitioner's physical appearance did not suggest the disability to the extent of 45%. The Tribunal while evaluating the evidence given by PW1 to support Ext.A9, physically examined the petitioner and came to the conclusion that the petitioner's physical appearance did not suggest the disability to the extent of 45%. I have perused Ext.A9 at par with the deposition of PW1, Dr.K.Balagopal, who authored Ext.A9. The injuries narrated above have been dealt in the disability certificate to fix 45% whole body disability. During cross examination, PW1 given categoric evidence that brachial plexipathy injury is a nerve injury. Although PW1 had given evidence that he was competent to assess disability on account of nerve injury; PW1 is, in fact, a Professor in Orthopaedic at Medical College Hospital, Thrissur. So his competence to assess disability on account of nerve disorder is in doubt, as rightly argued by the learned counsel for the insurer. However, it appears that the injuries are very serious. Therefore, the disability can be fixed at 30%. The multiplier 14 fixed by the Tribunal is also on the lower side as the proper multiplier is 17 following the ratio in [ 2010 (2) KLT 802 ], Sarla Verma v. Delhi Transport Corporation. Accordingly, the disability income can be re-calculated fixing the monthly income claimed by the petitioner at Rs.3,300/-though the Tribunal fixed the same at Rs.3,000/-. Thus the disability income is recalculated as : 3300 X 12 X 17 X 30/100 = Rs.2,01,960/-, out of which Rs.1,00,800/-was granted by the Tribunal and the balance Rs.1,01,160/-is granted as enhanced compensation under the head disability income. 17. It is submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the Tribunal granted loss of earnings only for a period of 3 months, though the petitioner underwent prolonged treatment. Schedule to Section 163A of the Motor Vehicles Act provides grant of loss of income for the actual period of disablement, not exceeding 52 weeks. Considering the nature of serious injuries sustained, I am inclined to grant loss of earnings for a period of 10 months @ Rs.3,300/-per month, as claimed by the petitioner. Thus Rs.24,000/-[3300X10 - 9000] more is granted under the head loss of earnings. 18. Considering the nature of serious injuries sustained, I am inclined to grant loss of earnings for a period of 10 months @ Rs.3,300/-per month, as claimed by the petitioner. Thus Rs.24,000/-[3300X10 - 9000] more is granted under the head loss of earnings. 18. In the result, (i) M.A.C.A.No.2221 of 2012 filed by the insurance company is allowed in part, thereby the compensation granted in excess of the scheduled formula is reduced as above; (ii) C.O.No.40 of 2014 also is allowed in part by granting increase under the head loss of disability and loss of earnings. Consequently, it is held that the petitioner is entitled to get total compensation to the tune of Rs.2,61,321/-(Rupees Two lakh sixty one thousand three hundred twenty one only) only and the award impugned is modified as above with the same rate of interest granted by the Tribunal from the date of petition till the date of deposit or realisation. The insurer/insurance company is directed to deposit the same in the name of the petitioner within two months from today and the petitioner is at liberty to release the same, on deposit.