ORDER : 1. The above unnumbered criminal appeals against the orders of acquittal passed by the Sessions Court, filed by the State with delay, are placed before us for considering the applications for condonation of delay. The party respondents who appeared in such applications raise a preliminary objection insofar as the Public Prosecutor not having been specifically directed by the State Government to file an appeal as mandated under Section 378(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1978. It is the argument of the learned Counsel that an appeal to the Court of Sessions from an order of acquittal passed by a Magistrate, in respect of cognizable and non-bailable offences can be filed by the Public Prosecutor only if it is so directed by the District Magistrate as is provided in Section 378(1)(a). Similarly as per Section 378(1)(b) the Public Prosecutor can present an appeal to the High Court from an original or appellate order of acquittal passed by any Court other than High Court, not being an order under clause (a), only if the State Government so directs. The Public Prosecutor appointed under Section 24 is so appointed for conducting any prosecution, appeal or other proceedings on behalf of the appropriate Government in the High Court. The power is only to conduct the cases and not to take a decision to file an appeal under Section 378(1) which decision has to be taken by the Government itself. Admittedly there is no such direction issued by the Government to institute the captioned appeals. But the Public Prosecutor who conducted the trial and in some cases the Investigating Officer, has expressed opinion that an appeal should be filed from the order of acquittal on the basis of which the above appeals have been instituted. 2. We heard the learned Public Prosecutor Sri. S.U. Nazer and Sri. Nicholas Joseph, Special Government Pleader (Criminal) for the State and from among the Counsel for the party respondents Sri. Dheerendra Krishnan and Sri. Dinesh Mathew Murikan argued. Sri. Dheerendra Krishnan placed before us the following decisions Mohinder Singh vs. State of Punjab, 1985 (1) SCC 342 , State of Kerala vs. Krishnan, 1982 Cri. L.J. 301, Benny P. Jacob and Another vs. Rajesh Kumar Unnithan, 2019 KHC 737 and Central Bureau of Investigation vs. State of Bihar, 2010 (5) SCC 1 and Sri. Dinesh Mathew Murikan argued. Sri. Dheerendra Krishnan placed before us the following decisions Mohinder Singh vs. State of Punjab, 1985 (1) SCC 342 , State of Kerala vs. Krishnan, 1982 Cri. L.J. 301, Benny P. Jacob and Another vs. Rajesh Kumar Unnithan, 2019 KHC 737 and Central Bureau of Investigation vs. State of Bihar, 2010 (5) SCC 1 and Sri. Dinesh Mathew Murikan relied on Union Territory of Tripura vs. Marfat Ali, 1958 Cri. L.J. 973, Harwari Lal vs. State, AIR 1959 Allahabad 751, State of Rajasthan vs. Pukh Ra, AIR 1965 Rajasthan 196, Superintendent and Remembrancer of Legal Affairs, West Bengal vs. Prafulla Majhi, 1977 Cri. L.J. 853, Mohammed vs. State of Kerala, 1982 Cri. L.J. 1120 and K. Ramachandran vs. N. Rajan, 2009 Cri. L.J. 4413. It is argued that the decision of the Punjab and Haryana High Court reported in State of Punjab vs. Mohinder Singh, 1983 Cri. L.J. 466 was reversed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court. But the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court would also indicate that there is requirement for a direction from the State Government to institute an appeal. The Hon'ble Supreme Court only interfered with the roving enquiry conducted by the High Court to verify whether the direction issued was proper or not. 3. It is pointed out that the principle laid down by a Full Bench of the very same High Court in Lal Singh vs. State of Punjab, 1981 Cri. L.J. 1069 followed in Mohinder Singh by a Division Bench of that Court, stands undisturbed. It is also pointed out that Section 417 of the erstwhile Cr.P.C. as also Section 378 of the 1973 Code, mandated every appeal from an order of acquittal to be instituted only on directions issued by the State Government. Even when the provision stood amended by Cr.P.C. Amendment Act, 2005, those appeals from an original or appellate order of acquittal passed by any Court other than a High Court or an order of acquittal passed by Court of Sessions in revision, has to be filed only if the State Government so directs; leaving the decision to file appeals from orders of acquittal passed by Magistrates in cognizable and non-bailable offences to the District Magistrates. This reinforces the stand of the party respondents who have been acquitted of the charges leveled against them by a competent Court in a properly constituted trial; the appeal from which order is a prerogative right of the State Government and not of the Public Prosecutor appointed in the High Court. The appeals are hence not maintainable, argues Counsel on the basis of the precedents from the various High Courts and the Supreme Court cited herein above. 4. The Public Prosecutors appearing on behalf of the State maintains that the opinion expressed by the Investigating Officer or the Prosecutor who conducted the trial is also one expressed on behalf of the State. It is argued that the Public Prosecutor and the Investigating Officers have a duty to ensure that those who commit a crime especially of an onerous and grievous nature, some leading to extinguishing life, should not be allowed to escape the clutches of law, merely for reason of the trial Judge having erred in law or on facts. It is pointed out that there are very serious discrepancies in the orders of acquittal which have been challenged by the State and it is only proper that this Court consider the issue on merits especially when it is in the nature of a first appeal from the decision rendered by the Trial Court. The State relies on the following decisions to contend that even an ex post facto sanction would suffice. Punjab University vs. V.N. Tripathi, 2001 (8) SCC 179 , Sathyan Naravoor vs. Union of India, 2017 KHC 162 . Heavy reliane is also placed on Kasimuddin vs. Yunus Ali Mondal, 1983 Cri. L.J. 885 to argue that this Court has the power to convert the appeal into a revision. 5. The High Court of Tripura, in Marfat Ali was concerned with an appeal filed against an order of acquittal under Section 417(1) of the Cr.P.C. which is in pari materia with Section 378(1). An Advocate had filed the appeal on the authority of a letter from the Judicial Secretary of Tripura, a Union Territory wherein the Chief Commissioner was vested with the powers of the State Government. The Government Advocate for the U.T alone was appointed as the Public Prosecutor. An Advocate had filed the appeal on the authority of a letter from the Judicial Secretary of Tripura, a Union Territory wherein the Chief Commissioner was vested with the powers of the State Government. The Government Advocate for the U.T alone was appointed as the Public Prosecutor. It was found that the authority to issue direction to file an appeal in the case of acquittal cannot be left to anybody, since then it could be treated very lightly leading to harassment of the accused who is acquitted after trial. The authority, to so direct filing of an appeal, is conferred on the State Government. This is with the specific object that, in the event of acquittal only if there is a grave miscarriage of justice that alone should induce the Government to file an appeal. It was also held that the Judicial Secretary, not being appointed a Public Prosecutor, cannot file the appeal; which is to be done by the Public Prosecutor appointed. 6. The principle was followed by the Rajasthan High court in Pukh Ra. However, there the appeal was found to be properly instituted since the Legal Remembrancer had instructed the Government Advocate ‘to file an appeal if found fit’ and the Government Advocate had filed the appeal on the instruction of the Advocate General who was also appointed as a Public Prosecutor. The reservation; 'if found fit', does not efface the direction as such and only requires the Government Advocate to form an opinion before the appeal is instituted, was the finding. 7. Prafulla Majhi was a case in which the Legal Remembrancer was appointed as ex officio Public Prosecutor by virtue of which appointment he presented certain appeals by the State, under Section 378(1) of the Cr.P.C. At the stage of granting leave under Section 378(3) a preliminary issue as to the competence of the Legal Remembrancer to be appointed as Public Prosecutor was raised. It was categorically found that after the new Code came into force, sub-section (5) of Section 24 mandated an eligibility of practice as an Advocate, for not less than seven years, for a person to be appointed as Public Prosecutor or Additional Public Prosecutor; which experience the Legal Remembrancer lacked. The Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court found the appeal to be incompetent. The Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court found the appeal to be incompetent. The contention of the State that the defacto doctrine has to be applied stood negatived for reason of the challenge to the maintainability, on the ground of the person instituting the appeal being incompetent, having been raised at the preliminary stage itself and was not in the nature of a collateral challenge. The Court all the same, allowed the appeal to be prosecuted after making appointment of a Public Prosecutor since on facts it was found that the true implication of Section 24(5) was lost sight off not only by the Officers of the Government but also the Registrar of the High Court who communicated approval of the High Court, for the appointment, on consultation made as mandated in the provision. 8. The defect insofar as the appointment of a Public Prosecutor or the appeal being filed by one who has not been appointed as a Public Prosecutor does not arise in the above case. However, the discussion of the decisions on that aspect assumes relevance. The mandate for an appeal instituted by a properly appointed Public Prosecutor and the requirement for a direction from the Government to so institute an appeal, from an order of acquittal; both arise from Section 378(1)(b) and constitute definite statutory mandates. Apposite would also be a reference to a Division Bench decision of this Court in Krishnan wherein the Advocate General filed the appeal. This Court found that the Advocate General not having been appointed as a Public Prosecutor the appeals were incompetent. The combined effect of Section 378(1), 24 and 2(u) was held to be that “....if the state wants to file an appeal from an order of acquittal, that has to be only done by a Public Prosecutor or a person acting under his direction.....” (sic Para 2). It was also held that Section 378 being a provision affecting the liberty of the citizen it has to be construed strictly and nothing short of its full compliance has to be insisted. 9. Lal Singh, as decided by a Full Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court was a case in which the State Government, elected to office, had taken a decision to prefer an appeal under Section 378(1) against an order of acquittal. 9. Lal Singh, as decided by a Full Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court was a case in which the State Government, elected to office, had taken a decision to prefer an appeal under Section 378(1) against an order of acquittal. However, before its presentation President's Rule was imposed in the State and the Governor in Council took a decision not to file an appeal for reason of the minimal chance of success; as advised by experts. The earlier decision stood reversed and the father of one of the deceased persons approached the High Court seeking a direction to the Public Prosecutor to file the appeal as earlier directed by the elected Government. The question arose as to whether a review was permissible especially since the Cr.P.C. did not provide for that. The learned Judges first emphasized the distinction between decisions of the State Government, which are purely administrative in nature passed under the umbrella of executive powers vested under Article 162 of the Constitution and the power exercised, also administrative in nature, by virtue of that conferred by a specific provision in a Statute. Insofar as the former, the decision was not final and could be reviewed. But, the power exercised under a Statute has to be examined with reference to the provisions in the statute to discern whether there is a degree of finality; which if found would restrict a review unless that power is also conferred under the Statute. The learned Judges were quite definite that the opinion expressed or the right of appeal enforced by the State Government through a direction issued to the Public Prosecutor would not in any event have the color of a quasi judicial order. On the above reasoning it was found that the corner stone of Section 378(1) is the vesting of the right of appeal in the State Government and the presentation of that appeal to the High Court, through the medium of the Public Prosecutor. Section 378(1) was found in essence to have just conferred the right of appeal and also spoke of the mode in which such right has to be enforced; without anything stated about the procedural steps that would culminate in the filing of the appeal itself. Section 378(1) was found in essence to have just conferred the right of appeal and also spoke of the mode in which such right has to be enforced; without anything stated about the procedural steps that would culminate in the filing of the appeal itself. It was held that the formation of opinion or the decision by the State Government, to prefer an appeal against the order of acquittal is purely administrative in nature and derives its source from the general executive power of the State under Article 162 of the Constitution of India. We respectfully accept the above proposition, but that does not resolve the question as to whether the opinion expressed by an Investigating Officer or a Public Prosecutor who conducted the trial on behalf of the State would suffice and also whether there could be an expose facto sanction by the Government itself. 10. We have to pertinently notice that in Mohinder Singh, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the High Court on the compelling fact of there being a direction by the Under Secretary-in-charge to the Government, to file an appeal against all the appellants. The High Court it was held could not have made a roving enquiry into the various stages through which the sanction to file an appeal was canalised. Hence the reversal of the Division Bench judgment of the P&H High Court does not necessarily interfere with the principles broadly stated in the Full Bench decision of the same High Court. In the above circumstances, we have to hold that the specific mandate in Section 378(1)(b) of the Cr.P.C. is that there should be a direction from the State Government to enable institution of an appeal by the Public Prosecutor in the High Court, against an order of acquittal passed by any Court other than a High Court or a Magistrate's Court. 11. We also perused the rules framed by the Government to better perceive how the executive Government, the rule making authority, understood the provision for appeal. The Kerala Government Law Officers Appointment and Condition of Service and Conduct of Case Rules, 1978 refers to ‘Criminal Matters’ in Chapter VIII. Rule 69(1) provides that Government Law Officers in courts other than the High Court shall deal with the Collector of the District concerned in regard to criminal cases. The Kerala Government Law Officers Appointment and Condition of Service and Conduct of Case Rules, 1978 refers to ‘Criminal Matters’ in Chapter VIII. Rule 69(1) provides that Government Law Officers in courts other than the High Court shall deal with the Collector of the District concerned in regard to criminal cases. The various sub-rules deal with judgments in every case and the interactions between the Government Law officers, the Collector, the District Superintendent of Police, the Advocate General and eventually the Government. Sub-Rule (6) refers to cases of acquittal in murder cases the forum for an appeal from which, is definitely the High Court. Sub-Rule (3) and (6) of Rule 69 reads as here under and the concerned Government Law Officer, spoken of there, is obviously the one who conducted the trial. He has to transmit the records of the case to the Advocate General along with his opinion and with opinion of the District Superintendent of Police: “R.69(3) In cases of acquittal, if the concerned Government Law Officer and the District Superintendent of Police concerned agree that an appeal should be filed, either of them may make a report to the Advocate General direct with connected records. A copy of the report shall also be sent to the District Collector concerned by the reporting officer. The Advocate General shall thereupon send his opinion to the Government in the Home Department and await their instructions in the matter. Whenever Government consider it necessary to file an appeal in any case instituted otherwise than on Police report, a Government order as contemplated under Section 377(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 shall also be sent to the Advocate General along with the request to file an appeal so that any possible objections of in competency may be avoided.” xxx xxx xxx “R.69(6) In all cases of acquittal in murder cases, the concerned Government Law Officer shall sent to the Advocate General as expeditiously as possible complete records of the case with certified copies of judgments and depositions of witnesses, his opinion and the opinion of the District Superintendent of Police regarding the advisability or otherwise of filing appeals.” 12. The first limb of sub-rule (3) extracted herein above, speaks of cases of acquittal when either the Government Law Officer or the District Superintendent of Police can make a report to the Advocate General if they are of the opinion that an appeal has to be filed. Advocate General has to then send his opinion to the Government in the Home Department and await their instructions in the matter. The second limb of sub-rule (3) speaks of the Advocate General sending his opinion to the Government in the Home Department on receipt of report from the Government Law Officer and the District Superintendent of Police, in cases instituted otherwise than on Police report. On perusal of the reports and opinion, if the Government considers it necessary to file an appeal then a request should be sent to the Advocate General, who shall entrust it to a Public Prosecutor, as contemplated under Section 377(1). Section 377(1) and 378(1) are identical insofar as the right conferred on the Government to file an appeal, which has to be enforced by taking a decision or forming an opinion as to the necessity to file an appeal; either against an inadequate sentence or an order of acquittal. Even under sub-rule (6) extracted herein above the very same procedure has to be followed with the complete records of the case being transmitted to the Advocate General. This is for the purpose of apprising the Government of the opinion of the Advocate General who has to await the direction of the Government to file an appeal as provided in Section 378(1). The Rules cannot deviate from the requirement of the provision in the Code and the absence of a specific rule requiring the Government to issue a direction to file an appeal in cases of acquittal, inter-alia in murder cases, is inconsequential especially considering the mandate in the Code. 13. The Public Prosecutors had, from the records available with them, showed us the opinion of the Public Prosecutor who conducted the trial and also that of the Investigating Officer. Both of which were in favour of filing an appeal from the order of acquittal. The contention raised is that they have formed such opinion as Officers of the Government, in public interest and it would be akin to a direction issued by the Government. Both of which were in favour of filing an appeal from the order of acquittal. The contention raised is that they have formed such opinion as Officers of the Government, in public interest and it would be akin to a direction issued by the Government. We are unable to accept the above contention especially looking at the Rules of Business of the Government of Kerala. We specifically refer to Part I Rules of Business and Rules 11 and 12, which are extracted here under: “11. All orders or instruments made or executed by or on behalf of the Government of the State shall be expressed to be made or executed in the name of the Governor. 12. Every order or instruments of the Government of the State shall be signed by a Secretary, an Additional Secretary, a Joint Secretary, a Deputy Secretary, an Under Secretary or by such other Officer as may be specifically empowered in that behalf and such signature shall be deemed to be the proper authentication of such order or instrument.” Hence any order or instrument executed by or on behalf of the Government has to be in the name of the Governor and the same shall be signed by the Officers specifically referred to in Rule 12 or such other Officer specially empowered. The opinion of the Public Prosecutor or that of the Investigating Officer fails to satisfy the requirement of a direction by the Government as contemplated in Section 378(1) Cr.P.C. We have also been shown an order where sanction was accorded by the Government to file an appeal in a Sessions Case; which is signed by an Under Secretary in the name of the Governor; which is the correct procedure. 14. In this context we also notice the historical background of the provision to file an appeal from an order of acquittal, as narrated by the Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court in Prafulla Majhi in paragraphs 12 and 13: “12. To appreciate the true implication of such a provision it would be necessary to bear in mind the historical background which was considered by the Supreme Court though in another context in the case U.J.S. Chopra vs. State of Bombay, AIR 1955 SC 633 : 1955 Cri. L.J. 1410. To appreciate the true implication of such a provision it would be necessary to bear in mind the historical background which was considered by the Supreme Court though in another context in the case U.J.S. Chopra vs. State of Bombay, AIR 1955 SC 633 : 1955 Cri. L.J. 1410. In England there is no provision for an appeal by the Crown against an order of acquittal though the person convicted has such a right. The Code of 1861 followed the English procedure and prohibited any appeal from an order of acquittal. Departure was made from this position by the Code of 1872, S.272 whereof provided for an appeal by the Government from an order of acquittal. That provision was re-enacted in S.417 of the Code of 1882 and 1889. Those provisions incorporated a similar requirement as in the present provision under consideration, viz. that an appeal against an order of acquittal is to be presented through the Public Prosecutor. In our opinion, it was not a mere procedural requirement that such appeals are to be presented through the Public Prosecutor. An appeal against an acquittal which was not favoured at one time was provided for but clearly the intention of the legislature was that such a right should be exercised very cautiously and in imperative cases and not in the same manner as the appeals by the persons convicted. To ensure this, the law associated the Public Prosecutor with the presentation of the appeal as a statutory requirement. Section 377 and 378 of the Code when it provides that the State Government shall direct the Public Prosecutor to present the appeal, it does not mean that the Public Prosecutor would act as a mechanical agent to carry out the direction of the State Government. Had that been the intention of the legislature it would have left it to the choice of the State Government to determine the authority for presentation of such appeals. That, however, was not done and the authority determined by the legislature itself was the Public Prosecutor. 13.....Leave of the Court is an additional safeguard introduced by the new Code which was not there in parallel provisions of the old Code(in case of appeals by the State) and that too in case of appeals under S.378(1) and (2) and not in case of appeals under S.377. 13.....Leave of the Court is an additional safeguard introduced by the new Code which was not there in parallel provisions of the old Code(in case of appeals by the State) and that too in case of appeals under S.378(1) and (2) and not in case of appeals under S.377. Associating the Public Prosecutor, therefore, is a safeguard which was introduced when conferring a right of appeal against an acquittal to ensure that such appeals are not lightly filed or are not filed only on the decision of the departmental authorities prosecuting the accused who had been acquitted.” 15. The definite and precise object in conferring the power, to decide whether an appeal has to be filed against an order of acquittal, on an authority not less than the State Government as held by the Judicial Commissioner in Marfat Ali is a protective mantle over the accused, who has been acquitted in a trial, with an appeal being filed only in instances of grave miscarriage of justice. The accused, who has been saved from incarceration by the order of acquittal cannot be forced to contest an appeal, which is filed at the mere whim expressed by any officer of the Government and not even on the studied opinion of the Public Prosecutor who conducted the trial or the conviction of the Investigating Officer. The decision has to come from the Government itself as mandated in Section 378(1) Cr.P.C. and it cannot be merely wished away as a procedural requirement or ignored as one directory in nature. On the above reasoning it has to be found that without a direction from the Government it will not be competent for the Public Prosecutor to institute an appeal under Section 378(1)(b) against an order of acquittal passed by the Sessions Court; which is the imperative statutory mandate. 16. The next contention raised by the Public Prosecutors is of the efficacy of a later ratification of the institution of appeal, by the Government, which in any event is not available in any of the unnumbered appeals before us. We are hence not called upon to answer the said contention. Now we come to the final submission of the Public Prosecutors to number the appeal as a revision as has been done by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Assistant Commissioner of Central Excise Hyderabad vs. Sabnife Power Systems Ltd. 2002 (9) SCC 389. We are hence not called upon to answer the said contention. Now we come to the final submission of the Public Prosecutors to number the appeal as a revision as has been done by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Assistant Commissioner of Central Excise Hyderabad vs. Sabnife Power Systems Ltd. 2002 (9) SCC 389. The learned Counsel appearing for the respondents oppose the prayer on the ground that the Government cannot seek its appeal to be converted as a revision; particularly on a reading of Section 401(4) of the Cr.P.C. Sub-Section (4) of Section 401 bars any revision at the instance of a party who has the right of appeal under the Code, who does not choose to avail the said remedy. This would squarely apply in the case of an incompetent appeal filed, which in the eye of law is no appeal at all. It is also argued that while Section 401(5) enables the High court to convert into an appeal; a revision filed without knowledge of the right to appeal, there is no corresponding provision enabling conversion of an appeal to a revision. Be that as it may, the jurisdiction conferred on the High Court, to exercise the power of revision under Section 401 is two fold. It could either be exercised after calling for the records of any proceeding by itself or which otherwise comes to its knowledge. The High Court's power is not curtailed or shackled by sub-section (4) and the power can be invoked to avoid a grave miscarriage of justice. The revisional jurisdiction it is trite; is also a much narrower jurisdiction than that of an appellate one. 17. Apposite here would be reference to a Division Bench decision of the Calcutta High Court in Kasimuddin paragraph 9 of which is extracted here under: “9. This apart the scope of a revisional application is evidently narrower than the scope of an appeal. In this connection learned Advocates for the respondents drew our attention to the amended provisions of S.401 as contained in sub-section (5) thereof. This apart the scope of a revisional application is evidently narrower than the scope of an appeal. In this connection learned Advocates for the respondents drew our attention to the amended provisions of S.401 as contained in sub-section (5) thereof. This sub-section provides that where under this Code an appeal lies but an application for revision has been made and the High Court is satisfied that such application was made under the erroneous belief that no appeal lies thereto and that it is necessary in the interest of justice so to do, the High Court may treat the application for revision as a petition of appeal and deal with the same accordingly. It was argued that the legislature having specifically made provisions for treating an application for revision as an appeal and not having made a converse provision for treating an appeal as a revision, the contention of Mr. Ray must have to be rejected. We are unable to agree with this view. Although it was generally accepted as a principle even before the incorporation of sub-section (5) that in appropriate cases a Memorandum of Appeal may be treated as a revision, there was some divergence of opinion as to whether a revision application could be treated as an appeal. To resolve the controversy the legislature in its wisdom thought it fit to engraft sub-section (5). This was necessary because the scope of an appeal is wider than the scope of a revisional application and in order to empower the Court to enlarge its jurisdiction sanction of the legislature was felt necessary. But when the question is not of enlarging the scope of the application but limiting it within a narrower sphere no such sanction was deemed necessary. Therefore the absence of any specific provision to the effect that a Memorandum of Appeal can be converted into a revisional application cannot be construed to mean that such power is wanting in the Court.” 18. We would also look at the scope of the revisonal jurisdiction for which we refer to K. Ramachandran vs. V.N. Rajan, 2009 Cri. L.J. 4413. There, the accused was tried for an offence under Section 302 & 201 of the Indian Penal Code, but acquitted. A revision was filed by the father of the deceased and a delayed appeal by the State. L.J. 4413. There, the accused was tried for an offence under Section 302 & 201 of the Indian Penal Code, but acquitted. A revision was filed by the father of the deceased and a delayed appeal by the State. The Division Bench considering the appeal, without noticing the revision, rejected the application for condonation of delay and as a consequence the appeal too stood dismissed. Later, the Single Judge considering the revision, allowed the same, again without noticing the dismissal of the appeal by the Division Bench. It was against the revisional order that the accused approached the Hon'ble Supreme Court. The Hon'ble Supreme Court found that though the learned Single Judge was not at fault the revision all the same, could not have been considered for reason of the dismissal of the appeal. The Hon'ble Supreme Court also frowned upon the order in revision and dilated upon the principles governing such consideration in paragraph 11, which is extracted here under: 40. This question has been considered in the celebrated judgment of Akalu Ahir vs. Ramdeo Ram, 1973 (2) SCC 583 , where, after considering the judgments of D. Stephens vs. Nosibolla, AIR 1951 SC 196 , Logendranath Jha vs. Polai Lal Biswas, AIR 1951 SC 316 , K. Chinnaswamy Reddy vs. State of A.P. AIR 1962 SC 1788 and Mahendra Pratap Singh vs. Sarju Singh, AIR 1968 SC 707 this Court came out with categories of cases which would justify the High Court in interfering with the finding of acquittal in revision: “(i) where the trial court has no jurisdiction to try the case, but has still acquitted (appellant) accused. (ii) where the trial court has wrongly shut out evidence which the prosecution wished to produce. (iii) where the appellate court has wrongly held the evidence which was admitted by the trial court to be inadmissible. (iv) where the material evidence has been overlooked only (either) by the trial court or by the appellate court. (v) where the acquittal is based on the compounding of the offence which is invalid under the law.” Of course, these categories were declared by this Court to be illustrative and this Court observed that other cases of similar nature could also be properly held to be exceptional in nature where the High Court could justifiably interfere with the order of acquittal. 41. 41. In this very judgment in Akalu Ahir Case 1973 (2) SCC 583 though in para-10, this Court did not generally approve of the appreciation of evidence by the trial court Judge and held it to be not perfect or free from flaw and further observed “the court of appeal may be justified in disagreeing with the conclusion, but it does not follow that on revision by a private complainant, the High Court is not entitled to re-appreciate the evidence for itself as if it is acting as a court of appeal and then order a retrial.” The situation, as we will show further, is identical in the present case. 19. On the above reasoning we find the appeals to be incompetent, but since the appeals have not yet been dismissed, it is only proper that we examine the case to ascertain whether there is a grave and gross miscarriage of justice. We hence keep the unnumbered appeals pending for consideration independently as to whether it can be converted suo-motu as a revision, in which event we would have to call for the records of the proceedings. We direct the Registry to call for the records from the Lower Court, of each of the appeals and place the matters in its unnumbered status itself for consideration, independent of each other.