JUDGMENT Raghvendra Singh Chauhan, J. - Aggrieved by the acquittal of Mohal Lal (A-1), Ranjeet Lal (A-2) and Hukami Lal (A-3), by judgment dated 29.03.2013, passed by the learned Sessions Judge, Chamoli, in Session Trial No. 02 of 2009, the State has preferred the present appeal before this Court. 2. Briefly stated the facts of the case are that on 03.08.2008, Netri Lal (P.W. 1) lodged a written report (Ex. Ka. 1) before the Naib Tehsildar, Ghat, District Chamoli, wherein he claimed that his minor daughter (name withheld) was enticed by Makli Lal on 02.08.2008 at around 08:00 P.M, and was taken away by him. He further claimed that two persons from his village, namely Ranjeet Lal, and Hukami Lal (A-2 and A-3 respectively), were equally involved in taking away his daughter. He further claimed that Makli Lal had also taken away a few pieces of jewellery and cash. According to him, the accused are staying in Village Ustoli, District Chamoli. 3. Similarly on 18.08.2008, Netri Lal (P.W. 1) submitted another report before the District Magistrate, Chamoli, wherein he claimed that his minor daughter is studying in Class-VIIIth. According to him, Mohan Lal, Ranjeet Lal and Hukami Lal have enticed his daughter and taken her away. According to him, Mohan Lal is keeping his minor daughter in his house located in Village Ustoli. Furthermore, according to him, these three accused persons have taken away certain pieces of jewellery such as Gulband (made of gold), one gold nose, ring and one silver anklet. They also took away Rs. 50,000. Furthermore, according to the complainant, Mohan Lal is already married and has two children. According to him, Mohan Lal is keeping his minor daughter, and is treating her like a wife. He is thereby ruining her life. Furthermore, according to him, these three persons are threatening him and his family. Despite the fact that he had filed a written report before the Naib Tehsildar, Ghat on 03.08.2008, no action has been taken on his complaint. 4. Since neither of the two complaints elicited any response, on 26.08.2008, Netri Lal (P.W. 1.) filed a complaint under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. (Ex. Ka. 3.) before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Chamoli, wherein he repeated the same set of allegations against the three accused persons. Upon an order passed by the Chief Judicial Magistrate on 26.08.2008, the Naib Tehsildar eventually registered an F.I.R. (Ex. Ka. Ka. 3.) before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Chamoli, wherein he repeated the same set of allegations against the three accused persons. Upon an order passed by the Chief Judicial Magistrate on 26.08.2008, the Naib Tehsildar eventually registered an F.I.R. (Ex. Ka. 12), namely F.I.R. No. NIL/2008, for offences punishable under Sections 363, 366, 392, 120-B and 506 IPC. Since the complaint related to the jurisdiction of the Police, the F.I.R. was transferred to Police Station, Chamoli, District Chamoli. After a thorough investigation, the Police submitted a charge-sheet against Mohan Lal for offences under Sections 363, 366, 376, 120-B and 506 IPC. The Police also submitted a charge-sheet against Ranjeet Lal and Hukami Lal for offences under Sections 363, 366, 120-B and 506 IPC. 5. In order to establish its case, the prosecution examined eleven witnesses, and submitted twenty-three documents. On the other hand, the defense neither examined any witness, nor submitted any documents. After going through the evidence produced by the prosecution, the learned Trial Court acquitted all the three accused persons by judgment dated 29.03.2013. Hence, the present appeal before this Court. 6. Mr. Jagjit Singh Virk, the learned Deputy Advocate General for the State of Uttarakhand, has raised the following contentions before this Court :- Firstly, the learned Trial Court has failed to appreciate the evidence in a proper perspective. Secondly, according to Dr. G.S. Joshi (P.W. 8), he had examined the prosecutrix in order to determine her age. According to the Medical Report contained in the X-Ray Form (Ex. Ka. 9), issued by the said witness, the prosecutrix was of the age between fifteen years and eighteen years. Therefore, according to the medical evidence, the prosecutix was minor. Hence, the learned Trial Court is not justified in acquitting the accused persons for the offences. Thirdly, according to the Police, the prosecutrix was recovered from the house of Mohal Lal. This fact has been proven by Savitri Devi (P.W. 3) and by Inder Lal (P.W. 4), and by the testimony of the prosecutrix herself. Furthermore, according to the prosecutrix (P.W. 2), she was enticed and taken away by Mohan Lal and was kept in his house for forty-five days. During this time, she was subjected to sexual intercourse. 7. On the other hand, Mr. Furthermore, according to the prosecutrix (P.W. 2), she was enticed and taken away by Mohan Lal and was kept in his house for forty-five days. During this time, she was subjected to sexual intercourse. 7. On the other hand, Mr. R.P. Nautiyal, the learned Senior Counsel for the respondents-accused, has raised the following counter contentions before this Court:- Firstly, that the scope of interference in an acquittal order is extremely limited one. The High Court, should, ordinarily, not interfere with an acquittal order, unless, it is convinced that the judgment is a perverse one. Secondly, it was the foremost duty of the prosecution to establish the fact that the prosecutrix was minor in order to bring home the charge of offence under Section 376 IPC. However, the prosecution has failed to prove this fact through cogent and convincing evidence. The prosecution has examined four witnesses on this point, namely Netri Lal (P.W. 1), the prosecturix (P.W. 2), Mrs. Bimla (P.W. 6) and Bileshwar Pant (P.W. 9). The prosecution has also produced the Admission Register (Ex. Ka. 6), which the prosecution has tried to prove through Mrs. Bimla (P.W. 6), and the School Leaving Certificate (Ex. Ka. 7). The prosecution has also produced the Family Register (Ex. Ka. 11), which they have tried to prove through Bileshwar Pant (P.W. 9). However, despite producing both oral and documentary evidence, the prosecution has failed to establish the correct age of the prosecutrix. In fact, according to Dr. G.S. Joshi (P.W. 8), and according to the opinion given by him in the X-Ray Form (Ex. Ka. 9), the age of the prosecutrix is between 15 to 18 years. Relying on the case of Om Prakash v. State of Rajasthan and another [ (2012) 5 SCC 201 ], the learned Senior Counsel has pleaded that the age determination is not with a mathematical exactitude. In fact, the age so determined by the medical doctor may differ plus and minus by two years. Moreover, if there are two interpretations of the same evidence, the interpretation in favour of the accused would have to be accepted by the Court. Since, according to the medical evidence, the prosecutrix is said to be of 18 years, the learned Trial Court is justified in concluding that the prosecutrix was major at the time of the incident. Moreover, if there are two interpretations of the same evidence, the interpretation in favour of the accused would have to be accepted by the Court. Since, according to the medical evidence, the prosecutrix is said to be of 18 years, the learned Trial Court is justified in concluding that the prosecutrix was major at the time of the incident. Thirdly, according to the prosecutrix (P.W. 2), on 02.08.2008, while she was at home, Ranjeet Lal and Hukami Lal flashed a torch inside her house to signal her. Having received the signal, she came out of the house and accompanied both these accused persons for some time. Thereafter, they met Mohan Lal, whom the prosecutrix accompanied on road for almost twelve kilometers. Therefore, she accompanied Mohal Lal at night, for a long distance, without a whisper of protest. Moreover, according to her, Mohal Lal kept her at his house for forty-five days. Mohan Lal's wife and two children were also present in the house. Moreover, his house was surrounded by inhabitation. Although the prosecutrix may claim that she was subjected to sexual intercourse, but there is not even a whisper of protest, or even an attempt to flee away from the house of Mohan Lal. Thus, according to the learned Senior Counsel, this clearly proves the fact that the prosecutrix had eloped with Mohan Lal out of her own free will, had voluntarily continued to stay with him at his house, it is only after her recovery after forty-five days that the story of being subjected to rape is fabricated by the prosecutrix and by the complainant in order to save the honour of the family. But there is nothing to establish the fact that she was subjected to sexual intercourse against her will. Hence, the learned Senior Counsel has supported the impugned judgment. 8. Heard the learned counsel for the parties, perused the impugned judgment and critically examined the record. 9. There are certain established principles with regard to the jurisdiction of the High Court while dealing with an acquittal order. In the case of Sampat Babso Kale v. State of Maharashtra [ (2019) 4 SCC 739 ], the Hon'ble Supreme Court has laid down the principles with regard to the powers of an appellate Court in an appeal against an acquittal order. The Hon'ble Supreme Court observed as under:- 8. In the case of Sampat Babso Kale v. State of Maharashtra [ (2019) 4 SCC 739 ], the Hon'ble Supreme Court has laid down the principles with regard to the powers of an appellate Court in an appeal against an acquittal order. The Hon'ble Supreme Court observed as under:- 8. With regard to the powers of an appellate court in an appeal against acquittal, the law is well established that the presumption of innocence which is attached to every accused person gets strengthened when such an accused is acquitted by the trial court and the High Court should not lightly interfere with the decision of the trial court which has recorded the evidence and observed the demeanour of witnesses. This Court in Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka [ (2007) 4 SCC 415 , laid down the following principles: (SCC p. 432, para 42) "42. From the above decisions, in our considered view, the following general principles regarding powers of the appellate court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal emerge: (1) An appellate court has full power to review, reappreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded. (2) The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 puts no limitation, restriction or condition on exercise of such power and an appellate court on the evidence before it may reach its own conclusion, both on questions of fact and of law. (3) Various expressions, such as, "substantial and compelling reasons", "good and sufficient grounds", "very strong circumstances", "distorted conclusions", "glaring mistakes", etc. are not intended to curtail extensive powers of an appellate court in an appeal against acquittal. Such phraseologies are more in the nature of "flourishes of language" to emphasise the reluctance of an appellate court to interfere with acquittal than to curtail the power of the court to review the evidence and to come to its own conclusion. (4) An appellate court, however, must bear in mind that in case of acquittal, there is double presumption infavour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court. (5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court." 10. In the case of State of Rajasthan v. Naresh [ (2009) 9 SCC 368 ], the Hon'ble Supreme Court opined that "an order of acquittal should not be lightly interfered with even if the court believes that there are some evidence pointing out the finger towards the accused". 11. These principles have recently been reiterated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Anwar Ali & another v. State of Himachal Pradesh [ (2020) 10 SCC 166 ]. Therefore, these settled principles of criminal jurisprudence would have to be kept in mind while examining the legality or illegality of the impugned judgment. 12. Firstly, to establish the fact that the prosecutrix was indeed a minor at the time of the occurrence, as noted hereinabove, the prosecution had produced four witnesses, namely Netri Lal (P.W. 1), the prosecutrix (P.W. 2), Mrs. Bimla (P.W. 6) and Bileshwar Pant (P.W. 9). The prosecution has also relied upon the Admission Register (Ex. Ka. 6), School Leaving Certificate (Ex. Ka. 7) and the Medical Report contained in the X-Ray Form (Ex. Ka. 9). 13. Netri Lal (P.W. 1) admits in his examination-in- chief that he has six ,children out of whom the prosecutrix is the eldest. He further admits that he was married about twenty-five years ago, and the prosecutrix was born two years after his marriage. Thus, according to him, the prosecutrix is about twenty-three years old. 14. Mrs. Bimla, (P.W. 6) has clearly admitted in her testimony that she is not the one who had recorded the date of birth of the prosecutrix in the Admission Register (Ex. Ka. 6). She further admits that the date of birth has been interpolated, as there are changes made in the date of birth. 14. Mrs. Bimla, (P.W. 6) has clearly admitted in her testimony that she is not the one who had recorded the date of birth of the prosecutrix in the Admission Register (Ex. Ka. 6). She further admits that the date of birth has been interpolated, as there are changes made in the date of birth. She has further admitted that the ink used, while cutting the date and in changing the numerical dates and the words, is different from the ink used for making other entries in the Admission Register. Moreover, wherever the numbers have been cut, there are no initials of any person. Thus, the learned Trial Court was justified in holding that the date of birth shown in the Admission Register is an unreliable piece of evidence. 15. Moreover, in the School Leaving Certificate (Ex. Ka. 7) since the date of birth is based on the Admission Register (Ex. Ka. 6), which is proven to be interpolated, even the date of birth shown in the School Leaving Certificate (Ex. Ka. 7) is unreliable. Therefore, the learned Trial Court is certainly justified in doubting the authenticity of the date of birth shown in the Admission Register (Ex. Ka. 6) and the School Leaving Certificate (Ex. Ka. 7), and in not relying on the documentary evidence. 16. Needless to say when the documents produced from the school are unreliable, the Court has no other option but to rely on the medical evidence produced in the case. Dr. G.S. Joshi (P.W. 8) has proven the Medical Report (Ex. Ka. 4 and 5) and the X-Ray Form containing the medical opinion (Ex. Ka. 9). According to his medical opinion, the prosecutrix was between the age of fifteen to eighteen years on the date of the occurrence. It is, indeed, a settled principle that the age determination by a medical Doctor is not with mathematical exactitude. It is approximation of the age of the person. In the case of Om Prakash (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court has opined that the age is subject to a variation of two years on either side. Moreover it is a settled principle of law that in case the same evidence can be interpreted in two different manners, the interpretation in favour of the accused shall be accepted by the Court. Moreover it is a settled principle of law that in case the same evidence can be interpreted in two different manners, the interpretation in favour of the accused shall be accepted by the Court. Since the age of the prosecutrix is shown to be 18 years in the X-Ray Form report (Ex. Ka. 9), the learned Trial Court was justified in concluding that the prosecutrix was certainly major at the time of the occurrence. 17. The prosecutrix (P.W. 2) clearly admits that Ranjeet Lal and Hukami Lal (A1 and A2 respectively) had flashed a torch into her house. Thereupon, she came out of the house and accompanied them till all three of them met Mohan Lal. Having met Mohan Lal, she accompanied Mohan Lal to his house, which was twelve kilometers away from her house. Admittedly, she walked with Mohan Lal on the streets, in the early hours of the night, without any protest. Therefore, the prosecution has failed to establish the fact that she was kidnapped by the accused persons. After all, she has accompanied the accused persons of her own free will. 18. Moreover, in her cross-examination, the prosecutrix admits that in Mohan Lal's house, his wife and two children were residing. The said house was surrounded by other houses of the village. Yet she neither protests, nor complains to Mohan Lal's wife, while she is allegedly confined in the house for forty-five days, and is allegedly subjected to sexual intercourse. The conduct of the prosecutrix is certainly unnatural. For a woman, who is repeatedly subjected to sexual intercourse against her will, would instinctively protest, would shout for help, or would try to run away from the clutches of the alleged rapist. Despite the fact that the prosecutrix had some mobility within the house, she has neither shouted for help, nor protested, or tried to run away from Mohan Lal's control. There is no indication that she even communicated her difficulties to Mohan Lal's wife, or to any other neighbour. Such a conduct clearly proves that she stayed in Mohan Lal's house out of her own free will. Moreover, her physical relationship with Mohan Lal was also of her own free will. Hence, the learned Trial Court is certainly justified in concluding that the prosecution has miserably failed to establish the offence under Section 376 IPC. 19. Such a conduct clearly proves that she stayed in Mohan Lal's house out of her own free will. Moreover, her physical relationship with Mohan Lal was also of her own free will. Hence, the learned Trial Court is certainly justified in concluding that the prosecution has miserably failed to establish the offence under Section 376 IPC. 19. For the reasons stated above, this Court does not find any illegality or perversity in the impugned judgment. This appeal, being devoid of any merit, is hereby dismissed.