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2021 DIGILAW 1181 (GUJ)

VALIBEN JETHABHAI MAKWANA v. BHALABHAI JETHABHAI MAKWANA

2021-12-13

VAIBHAVI D.NANAVATI

body2021
ORDER : 1. This appeal from order is filed under Order 43 Rule 1(r) of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908 at the instance of the appellants (original plaintiffs) being aggrieved and dissatisfied by the order dated 3.5.2018 passed by the 4th Additional Senior Civil Judge, Rajkot below application Ex.5 in the Special Civil Suit No.42 of 2016, whereby the said application for temporary injunction came to be rejected. 2. The facts giving rise to this appeal from order may be summarized as under :- 2.1 The appellants – original plaintiffs instituted a suit being Special Civil Suit No.42 of 2016 in the Court of Principal Senior Civil Judge (S. D.) Rajkot against the defendants No.1 to 12 inter alia praying for a decree in favour of the appellants to the extent that the appellant No.1 (wife of the deceased) holds 33.33% and the appellant No.2 (daughter of the deceased) holds 9.52% share in the suit land situated in Survey No.180 Paiki 2 admeasuring 2-02-34 Hec. Are Sq.Mtrs. The appellants have prayed for cancellation of the registered sale deed dated 10.3.2014 being Entry No.1326 and sale deed dated 7.8.2014 being Entry No.1904. It is further prayed for a injunction restraining the defendants from alienating the suit property in any manner. 2.2 It is the case of the appellant – original plaintiffs that they are the co-owners of the suit property being Part-2 of Revenue Survey No.180 of Motamahuva of Rajkot (hereinafter referred to as ‘the suit property’ for short). The suit property was originally in the name of the deceased Jethabhai Gorabhai Makwana. The appellant No.1 is the second wife of deceased Jethabhai. It is stated that the first wife of Jethabhai Gorabhai Makwana passed away and the Jethabhai Gorabhai Makwana then got married to appellant No.1. It is also stated that in view of accidental death of Jethabhai in the year 2009 the appellant No.1 and the defendants received amount and the appellant No.1 received the amount as widow of deceased Jethabhai. 2.3 It is further stated that the defendants No.1 to 4 in connivance with each other sold the suit property to the defendants No.5 to 12 by way of registered sale deed dated 10.3.2014 vide Serial No.1326. The appellants – original plaintiffs are claiming to be legal heirs and co-owners of the suit property. 2.3 It is further stated that the defendants No.1 to 4 in connivance with each other sold the suit property to the defendants No.5 to 12 by way of registered sale deed dated 10.3.2014 vide Serial No.1326. The appellants – original plaintiffs are claiming to be legal heirs and co-owners of the suit property. The title of the said property therefore could not be passed to the other defendants as the plaintiffs never consented to the sale deed of the suit property and hence it is prayed in the suit proceedings that the sale deed dated 10.3.2014 and 7.8.2014 be cancelled and mandatory injunction restraining the defendants from alienating the suit property in any manner is sought for. The appellants preferred application below Ex.5 which came to be dismissed by the Court below by order dated 3.5.2018. 3. Heard Mr. Sandeep R. Limbani, the learned counsel appearing for the appellants and Mr. Pratik Y. Jasani, the learned counsel appearing for the respondent No.9. 4. Mr. Sandeep R. Limbani, the learned counsel appearing for the appellants submitted that the appellant No.1 is a second wife/widow of deceased Jethabhai Gorabhai Makwana and appellant No.2 is the daughter of the deceased Jethabhai through the wedlock of appellant No.1 with Jethabhai. Both the appellants being legal heirs of deceased Jethabhai are entitled to share in the suit property i.e. appellant No.1 33.33% and the appellant No.2 9.52% in the capacity as legal heirs of the deceased Jethabhai. It was submitted that due to accidental death of Jethabhai the appellant No.1 have received amount of claim as widow of Jethabhai. 4.1 Mr. Limbani produced paper-book and relied on the documents produced alongwith the paper-book. He relied on the pe-degree of Jethabhai Gorabhai Makwana., application filed before the Dy. Collector dated 5.2.2011, Aadhar-card, election card issued by the Election Commission of India, ration card and various other documents substantiating the stand that the appellant No.1 is second wife/widow of Jethabhai. 4.2 He placed strong reliance on the photographs duly produced from page-15 to 19. He also relied on the provisions of Section 7A of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. He also relied on the Claim Petition No.1585 of 2009 dated 3.10.2009 whereby the appellant has instituted the claim in the capacity of wife of deceased Jethabhai. 4.2 He placed strong reliance on the photographs duly produced from page-15 to 19. He also relied on the provisions of Section 7A of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. He also relied on the Claim Petition No.1585 of 2009 dated 3.10.2009 whereby the appellant has instituted the claim in the capacity of wife of deceased Jethabhai. He also relied on index of charge-sheet in which the appellant No.1 substantiated that she filed the complaint in the capacity as widow of Jethabhai. Relying on the above referred documents, Mr. Limbani submitted that the order passed by the Court below rejecting the application below Ex.5 is erroneous and that the said order be quashed and set aside. 5. Mr. Pratik Y. Jasani, the learned counsel appearing for the respondent No.9 submitted that the order passed by the Court below rejecting the application Ex.5 is just and proper in view of the fact that the pleadings as pleaded in the are vague in nature. He further submitted that the application is devoid of merit in view of the fact that Jethabhai expired in the year 2009 and the present suit came to be instituted in the year 2016 and, therefore, the suit is barred by delay and latches. He further submitted that the appellant No.1 on volition has not produced marriage certificate and has refrained from stating the date of marriage with deceased Jethabhai in the entire proceedings. The revenue entry in the name of heirs of Jethabhai was mutated as back as on 10.2.2012. In the year 2014 the respondents No.1 to 4 entered into the sale deed with respondents No.7 and 8 qua one parcel of suit land bearing Revenue Survey No.180 Paiki 2 admeasuring 1-21-41 Hec. Are Sq.Mtrs by sale deed dated 10.3.2014 being Entry No.1326 and the respondent No.1 to 3 entered into the the sale deed with respondent No.9 qua second parcel of suit land i.e. Revenue Survey No.180 Paiki 2 / Paiki 1 admeasuring 0- 80-93 Hec. Are Sq.Mtrs by sale deed dated 7.8.2014 being Entry No.1904. 5.1 Lastly he submitted that this Court may not interfere in the findings arrived at by the Court below mainly in view of the fact that they are findings of fact and findings are just and proper with respect to the present controversy and, therefore, this Court may not reappreciate the said findings arrived at by the Court below. 6. 5.1 Lastly he submitted that this Court may not interfere in the findings arrived at by the Court below mainly in view of the fact that they are findings of fact and findings are just and proper with respect to the present controversy and, therefore, this Court may not reappreciate the said findings arrived at by the Court below. 6. The Court below while dismissing the application below Ex.5 after considering the case of both the sides held in paragraphs 6.3 and 6.4 thus :- “6.3 As far as balance of convenience is concerned, it is to be weighed with the case of the other side. In such circumstances. court has to consider one parties case if stronger than that of the other. Balance of convenience is to be examined in caf comparative loss caused to the plaintiff and the defs in case of not granting the injunction. When the need of protection of plaintiffs right is compared with the need of protection of the defs rights, balance of convenience should tilt in favour of the plaintiffs. The documents placed on record by the plaintiff do reflect that the current status of the suit property which is sold to the other defs. Thus, even the def nos. 1 to 4 have parted with the possession of the suit property and the same is transferred to the other defs. Registered sale deeds are executed in the names of new purchasers. Now, the plaint has not placed any to show that she is the wife and widow of the deceased Jethabhai, Even for the sake of arguments we believe that she lived with deceased Jethabhai, this does not give me the status of a wife. It is also not the case that she will loose her bread and butter if the injunction is not granted. Whether she has any right in the same or not is also an issue which can be decided only after recording evidence to that extent. Here, the case of the plaintiff if weighed with that of the def, it does not tilt in favour of the plaintiffs. Thus, plaintiffs do not have balance of convenience in their favour. 6.4 Looking to the irreparable loss, here, the plaintiff, came with a case that they are the legal heirs of deceased Jethabhai and have fight in the suit property. Loss occurs when there is an established right. Thus, plaintiffs do not have balance of convenience in their favour. 6.4 Looking to the irreparable loss, here, the plaintiff, came with a case that they are the legal heirs of deceased Jethabhai and have fight in the suit property. Loss occurs when there is an established right. At present there is nothing placed on record to show that this plaintiffs will be on roads if they are not protected. If the injunction is not granted, they will nor loose such right which cannot be compensated in terms of money. Even in case, they establishe at the end of the trial that they have a specific right as legal heirs of the deceased, then also it can be compensated in tems of money. Moreover, in case of an the end of trial, the court comes to a conclusion that the plaintiffs have undefeated right in the suit property, they can always have their share with the direction, but this is not such a case where the discretion can be extended. Hence, my answer to the above issues in Negative. I pass the following order in the interest of justice: ORDER The application vide ex.5 is rejected. Cost will follow final order of the suit. Dictated and Pronounced in Open Court on this 3rd day of May, 2018.” 7. In the case of Matrix Telecom Pvt. Ltd., vs. Matrix Cellular Services Private Limited, reported in 2011(3) GLR 1951 , the Court in Paragraphs 17 and 18 held as under :- “6.0 Before proceeding further it is required to be noted that the present appeal is against the rejection of interim relief and the main suit is still pending. If this court elaborately deals with the matter on merits it is likely that the same would prejudice the case of either side. Therefore, it is well settled law that this Court is not required to go into the merits of the entire matter at this stage and what is required to be seen is whether the appellant - plaintiff has made out a prima facie case or not for grant of interim injunction. Therefore, it is well settled law that this Court is not required to go into the merits of the entire matter at this stage and what is required to be seen is whether the appellant - plaintiff has made out a prima facie case or not for grant of interim injunction. 6.1 It is required to be noted that it is well settled law that the Appellate Court may not interfere with the exercise of discretion of the court of first instance and substitute its own discretion except where the discretion has been shown to have been exercised arbitrarily, or capriciously or perversely or where the court had ignored the settled principles of law regulating grant or refusal of interlocutory injunctions. An appeal against exercise of discretion is said to be an appeal on principle. The Appellate Court will not reassess the material and seek to reach a conclusion different from the one reached by the court below if the one reached by the court was reasonably possible on the material. The appellate court would normally not be justified in interfering with the exercise of discretion under appeal solely on the ground that if it had considered the matter at the trial stage it would have come to a contrary conclusion.” 7.1 In the case of Mohd. Mehtab Khan vs. Khushnuma Ibrahim, reported in 2013 (9) SCC 221 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court held in para-15 as under :- “15. In a situation where the learned Trial Court on a consideration of the respective cases of the parties and the documents laid before it was of the view that the entitlement of the plaintiffs to an order of interim mandatory injunction was in serious doubt, the Appellate Court could not have interfered with the exercise of discretion by the learned Trial Judge unless such exercise was found to be palpably incorrect or untenable. The reasons that weighed with the learned Trial Judge, as already noticed, according to us, do not indicate that the view taken is not a possible view. The Appellate Court, therefore, should not have substituted its views in the matter merely on the ground that in its opinion the facts of the case call for a different conclusion. Such an exercise is not the correct parameter for exercise of jurisdiction while hearing an appeal against a discretionary order. The Appellate Court, therefore, should not have substituted its views in the matter merely on the ground that in its opinion the facts of the case call for a different conclusion. Such an exercise is not the correct parameter for exercise of jurisdiction while hearing an appeal against a discretionary order. While we must not be understood to have said that the Appellate Court was wrong in its conclusions what is sought to be emphasized is that as long as the view of the Trial Court was a possible view the Appellate Court should not have interfered with the same following the virtually settled principles of law in this regard as laid down by this Court in Wander Ltd. v. Antox India (P) Ltd.[3] Para 14 of the aforesaid judgment which is extracted below would amply sum up the situation: “14. The appeals before the Division Bench were against the exercise of discretion by the Single Judge. In such appeals, the appellate court will not interfere with the exercise of discretion of the court of first instance and substitute its own discretion except where the discretion has been shown to have been exercised arbitrarily, or capriciously or perversely or where the court had ignored the settled principles of law regulating grant or refusal of interlocutory injunctions. An appeal against exercise of discretion is said to be an appeal on principle. Appellate court will not reassess the material and seek to reach a conclusion different from the one reached by the court below if the one reached by that court was reasonably possible on the material. The appellate court would normally not be justified in interfering with the exercise of discretion under appeal solely on the ground that if it had considered the matter at the trial stage it would have come to a contrary conclusion. If the discretion has been exercised by the trial court reasonably and in a judicial manner the fact that the appellate court would have taken a different view may not justify interference with the trial court's exercise of discretion. After referring to these principles Gajendragadkar, J. in Printers (Mysore) Private Ltd. v. Pothan Joseph: (SCR 721) “... These principles are well established, but as has been observed by Viscount Simon in Charles Osenton & Co. After referring to these principles Gajendragadkar, J. in Printers (Mysore) Private Ltd. v. Pothan Joseph: (SCR 721) “... These principles are well established, but as has been observed by Viscount Simon in Charles Osenton & Co. v. Jhanaton ‘...the law as to the reversal by a court of appeal of an order made by a judge below in the exercise of his discretion is well established, and any difficulty that arises is due only to the application of well settled principles in an individual case’.” The appellate judgment does not seem to defer to this principle.” 7.2 In the case of Amarben @ Samarben legal heirs and Wd/o of Dec. Ramjibhai Manekbha vs. Laxmanji Bhikaji Thakor, reported in 2014 JX (Guj.) 1137, the Court held in paragraphs 17 and 18 as under :- “17. So, in light of the limited powers of this Court, the Appellate Court can interfere with the discretionary order passed by the trial Court only in exceptional circumstances and the Appellate Court cannot interfere with the exercise of discretion of the Court of first instance and substitute its own discretion except, where the discretion has been shown to have been exercised arbitrarily, capriciously or perversely or where the Court had ignored the settled principles of law regulating grant or refusal of interlocutory injunctions. In nutshell, an appeal against exercise of discretion is said to be an appeal on principle. To put it differently, the Appellate Court cannot reassess the entire evidence so as to come to its own conclusion contrary to the conclusion arrived at by the trial Court, if two views are possible. 18. While parting with the order, it is clarified that this Court has examined the impugned order passed by the learned trial Judge within the limited scope of provisions of Order 43 Rule 1(r) of the Code, whereas the main controversy involved in the suit is at large before the trial Court to be adjudicated through full-fledge trial. Therefore, the learned trial Judge shall not be influenced by any observations recorded in the impugned order and observations recorded by this Court herein above while deciding the suit at the end of trial. Therefore, the learned trial Judge shall not be influenced by any observations recorded in the impugned order and observations recorded by this Court herein above while deciding the suit at the end of trial. The findings recorded either by the trial Court or by this Court at interlocutory stage of the suit are tentative in its nature and the learned trial Judge shall decide the case on its merit and as per evidence that may be led during the course of trial and decide the suit in accordance with law.” 8. Having heard Mr. Sandeep R. Limbani, the learned counsel appearing for the appellants and Mr. Pratik Y. Jasani, the learned counsel appearing for the respondent No.9 the appellants herein are claiming their right in the suit property in the capacity of second wife and daughter of deceased Jethabhai. The respondents herein are claining to be legal heirs of Jethabhai through the first wife i.e. Kesarben. The Court has gone through the documents produced by the appellants. 8.1 This Court has gone through the documentary evidence produced by the plaintiffs at Mark 4/1 to 4/33. From the averments made by the appellants and the documents relied upon by the appellants, evidence is required to be led before concluding that the appellant No.1 was married to deceased Jethabhai. In absence of documentary evidence produced on the record, there is no proof to substantiate the case of the appellants with regard to the marriage to have taken place between the appellant No.1 and deceased Jethabhai. The appellants have placed reliance on revenue entries, photographs, MACP application seeking compensation, however the same is not produced accompanied by an order passed by the Tribunal granting compensation in favour of the appellant No.1 as the wife of the deceased Jethabhai. On the basis of the above referred documents, no rights can be crystalized. In absence of any proof this Court, at this stage, this Court not inclined to interfere with the findings arrived at by the Court below, more so when they are findings of fact and the same are at interlocutory stage below application Ex.5. It cannot be said that the order passed by the Court below suffers from any illegality. 8.2 Mr. Jasani, the learned counsel appearing for the respondent No.9 also submitted that the trial is at the stage of recording of evidence of the plaintiffs. It cannot be said that the order passed by the Court below suffers from any illegality. 8.2 Mr. Jasani, the learned counsel appearing for the respondent No.9 also submitted that the trial is at the stage of recording of evidence of the plaintiffs. 8.3 In view of above, since the trial Court is also proceeding with the suit, the order passed by the Court below application Ex.5 is not required to be interfered with. The learned trial Judge shall not be influenced by any observations recorded in the impugned order and observations recorded by this Court herein above while deciding the suit on merits. The findings recorded either by the trial Court or by this Court at interlocutory stage of the suit are tentative in its nature and the learned trial Judge shall decide the case on its merits and as per the evidence that may be led during the course of trial and decide the suit in accordance with law. 8.4 In the facts and circumstances of the case, if the appellants file any application seeking expeditious hearing of the suit proceedings, the trial Court is directed to consider the same. 8.5 With the above observations, the present appeal from order stands disposed of. Consequently the civil application, if any, stands disposed of.