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2021 DIGILAW 1181 (PAT)

Md Salauddin v. State Of Bihar

2021-12-19

MOHIT KUMAR SHAH

body2021
JUDGMENT/ORDER : Mohit Kumar Shah, J. The present writ petition was initially filed for quashing the order dated 01.06.2018, whereby and whereunder the pending departmental inquiry against the petitioner had been converted into a proceeding under Rule 43(b) of the Bihar Pension Rules, 1950, pursuant to the petitioner's superannuation and for payment of the retiral dues including arrears of pension to the petitioner. However, during the interregnum period, i.e. during the pendency of the present case, the final order of punishment dated 03.08.2019 has been passed, whereby and whereunder the petitioner has been inflicted with the punishment of reduction of 10% pension for a period of 03 years. In such view of the matter, the petitioner had filed an interlocutory application bearing I.A. no. 03 of 2020 for amendment of the writ petition, which was allowed by this Court by an order dated 12.06.2020. It is needless to state here that the retiral dues including the arrears of pension, as admissible to the petitioner, has already stood paid during the pendency of the present petition. 2. The brief facts of the case are that a show cause notice dated 17.10.2016 was issued to the petitioner when he was posted as an Assistant in the Office of the Commissioner, Saran Division, Chapra as also, was holding the additional charge of Assistant in the Office of the Road Transport Authority and the petitioner was directed to explain as to why permanent permit regarding departure time of a bus from Siwan, was allowed without considering the earlier time table of other buses. The petitioner had then submitted his reply to the said show cause notice dated 17.10.2016, however the respondent-authorities initiated a departmental proceeding against the petitioner and an Inquiry Officer was appointed vide letter dated 23.12.2016. In the meantime, the petitioner had superannuated from the services of the respondents on 31.01.2018, whereafter the disciplinary authority, by an order dated 01.06.2018, had converted the on-going disciplinary proceeding into one under Rule 43(b) of the Bihar Pension Rules, 1950. The Inquiry Officer had then submitted his inquiry report dated 15.01.2019, wherein the charges levelled against the petitioner were found to have been proved. The Inquiry Officer had then submitted his inquiry report dated 15.01.2019, wherein the charges levelled against the petitioner were found to have been proved. The disciplinary authority had, thereafter issued a second show cause notice dated 13.02.2019 to the petitioner, to which the petitioner had submitted his reply and then the impugned order of punishment dated 03.08.2019 has been passed, whereby and whereunder the petitioner has been inflicted with the punishment of deduction of 10% pension for 03 years. 3. The learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the charge framed against the petitioner is regarding the petitioner having fixed the timing of the bus in question, departing from Siwan, as 7:00:01 AM, which in any view of the matter is insignificant. In this connection, the learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that firstly, the petitioner had not fixed the timing of the bus in question since he has got no authority to do so under the law, inasmuch as Section 68 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 defines a Transport Authority and Clause 2 thereof, stipulates that a Transport Authority or a Regional Transport Authority shall consist of a Chairman who has had judicial experience or has had experience as an Appellate Authority or a Revisional Authority and such other persons, not being more than four. It is submitted that Section 70 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 provides that an application for Stage Carriage Permit shall contain minimum and maximum number of daily trips proposed to be provided and the time table of the normal trips, whereas Section 71 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 provides the procedure to be followed by the Regional Transport Authority while considering the application for Stage Carriage Permit. Section 72 of the Act, 1988 provides for grant of Stage Carriage Permits and Section 72(2)(iv) of the Act, 1988 obliges the Regional Transport Authority to approve the time table of the Stage Carriage. Section 72 of the Act, 1988 provides for grant of Stage Carriage Permits and Section 72(2)(iv) of the Act, 1988 obliges the Regional Transport Authority to approve the time table of the Stage Carriage. Thus, it is submitted that the petitioner had got no authority to fix the time table of a Stage Carriage and it is the Regional Transport Authority which is authorized to approve the time table of the Stage Carriage and in fact, in terms thereof, the Regional Transport Authority, Saran Division, Chapra, in its meeting held on 24.04.2015, had approved the time table in favour of one Rakesh Kumar, Owner of the vehicle in question and a decision was taken to change the earlier departure time of 7:00 am to 7:00:01 am. It is submitted that the said resolution bears the signature of three Members, hence apparently, the petitioner had no role to play in the fixing of departure time of the bus in question, thus the allegation levelled against the petitioner is out-rightly false and concocted. It is also submitted that though objections were invited on the application of the owner of the vehicle in question, issued under the signature of the Secretary of the Road Transport Authority, however no objection was filed against the proposed time table, by any other vehicle owner. 4. The learned counsel for the petitioner has further submitted that Section 72 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 provides for grant of Stage Carriage Permits, Section 72 (2) (iv) obliges the Regional transport Authority to approve the time table of the Stage Carriage and there is a remedy of revision under Section 90 of the Act, 1988, before the State Transport Appellate Tribunal. In this connection the Ld. Counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the Hon'ble Apex Court, in its Judgments, rendered in the case of Mithilesh Garg Vs. Union of India, 1992 (1) SCC 168 and in the case of Pancham Chand and Ors. Vs. The State of Himachal Pradesh and Ors., 2008 (7) SCC 117 , has held that the aforesaid function of the Regional Transport Authority is a quasi-judicial function. Union of India, 1992 (1) SCC 168 and in the case of Pancham Chand and Ors. Vs. The State of Himachal Pradesh and Ors., 2008 (7) SCC 117 , has held that the aforesaid function of the Regional Transport Authority is a quasi-judicial function. It is submitted that in view of the afore-said, the owner of the vehicle in question had filed an application for revision under Section 90 of the Act, 1988 before the State Transport Appellate Tribunal, Bihar, Patna, which was allowed by the learned Tribunal vide order dated 08.09.2017. 5. It is thus submitted that it is apparent from the aforesaid facts that neither the petitioner was competent to allot the time table nor the petitioner had any role to play in approving the time table of the bus in question and in fact following the provisions contained in the Motor Vehicles Act, it was approved by the Regional Transport Authority but on account of malafide intention, the Chairman and Secretary of the Regional Transport Authority, to cover their own lapses, if any, had initiated disciplinary proceeding against the writ petitioner, who had only forwarded the application of the vehicle owner Rakesh Kumar and since quasi judicial power was required to be exercised by the Regional Transport Authority, the petitioner being an Assistant, could not have ever thought of giving a file noting containing his opinion. 6. It is submitted that even otherwise Rule 43(b) of the aforesaid Rules, 1950 confers power on the government to withhold pension or part of it only if the pensioner has been found guilty of grave misconduct or of causing pecuniary loss to the government. In the present case, there is no allegation of the petitioner having caused any pecuniary loss. Therefore, the question is whether charges would constitute grave misconduct or not. The charge levelled against the petitioner merely states that the time table so issued is impracticable. It is stated that the time table in question was not found impracticable even by the Appellate Tribunal which had set aside the order, by which the time table was reversed by the Regional Transport Authority. In view of the fact that the petitioner was only an Assistant in the Regional Transport Authority and was not a member of the quasi-judicial authority deciding the time table, no charge against the petitioner is made out. In view of the fact that the petitioner was only an Assistant in the Regional Transport Authority and was not a member of the quasi-judicial authority deciding the time table, no charge against the petitioner is made out. It is also submitted that even if any lapse is attributable to the petitioner (though it is not conceded), it can be said to be a mere error of judgment and would not constitute misconduct. Moreover, the petitioner has all throughout had an unblemished career and has always served the respondents diligently and satisfactorily. It is submitted that this Hon'ble Court as well as the Hon'ble Supreme Court, in a catena of decisions, has been held that a single act of omission or error of judgment would ordinarily not constitute misconduct though if such error or omission results in serious or atrocious consequences, the same may amount to misconduct. It is thus submitted that the charges levelled against the petitioner do not constitute misconduct, much less a grave misconduct, hence the proceeding initiated against the petitioner under Rule 43(b) of the Bihar Pension Rules, 1950 stands vitiated. 7. The learned counsel for the petitioner has referred to certain judgments, which are being referred to herein below along with their relevant paragraphs:- (I) Judgment dated 26.07.2016, passed in C.W.J.C. No. 296 of 2011 (Gangeshwar Prasad Sharma v. The State of Bihar and ors.), paragraph Nos. 12 to 14 and 18 to 21 whereof, are reproduced herein below:- "12. A plain reading of 'the rule' in question would reflect that though a right is reserved in the State Government to continue a proceedings post retirement of a delinquent but the area is also clearly demarcated and it is only where the delinquent is charged for grave misconduct or has been charged with causing pecuniary loss to the Government by his misconduct and negligence that any decision to continue the proceedings for forfeiture of pension, can be continued. 13. In so far as the case of the petitioner is concerned, a plain reading of the charge nos. 2,4 and 6 which are subject matter of penalty, would demonstrate that the petitioner is held responsible for not having discharged his duties diligently and was found wanting on his supervisory role in the execution of the contracts in question. 13. In so far as the case of the petitioner is concerned, a plain reading of the charge nos. 2,4 and 6 which are subject matter of penalty, would demonstrate that the petitioner is held responsible for not having discharged his duties diligently and was found wanting on his supervisory role in the execution of the contracts in question. The issue would be whether an inefficient approach by the petitioner in supervising over the work in question, would ipso facto amount to a 'misconduct' and whether in absence of any charge on the petitioner of having made payment in a situation where it was not required to be made resulting in pecuniary loss to the Government, would the proceedings yet required a continuation after superannuation. 14. Although misconduct has not been defined in the service rules but then it does not require a deep rooted discussion to hold that the charges levelled against the petitioner would certainly not fall within the ambit of a misconduct even if the petitioner was found wanting in a strict adherence to his supervisory role. That every act of negligence would not constitute a 'misconduct' finds discussed in the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India Vs. J. Ahmad, 1979 2 SCC 286 . 18. A similar view was taken by the Supreme Court in a judgment reported in (State of Punjab v. Ram Singh, 1992 AIR(SC) 2188), Para 4 and 5 of the judgment reads thus:- "4. Misconduct has been defined in Black's Law dictionary, Sixth Edition at page 999 thus: 'A transgression of some established and definite rule of action, a forbidden act, a dereliction from duty, unlawful behaviour, willful in character, improper or wrong behaviour, its synonyms are misdemeanour, misdeed, misbehaviour, delinquency, impropriety mismanagement, offence, but not negligence or carelessness.' Misconduct in office has been defined as: 'Any unlawful behaviour by a public officer in relation to the duties of his office, willful in character. The term embraces acts which the officer-holder had no right to perform, acts performed improperly, and failure to act in the face of an affirmative duty to act.' In P. Ramanatha Aiyar's the Law Lexicon, Reprint Edition 1987 at The learned counsel for the petitioner. 821, 'misconduct' defines thus : "The term misconduct implies a wrongful intention, and not a mere error of judgment. 821, 'misconduct' defines thus : "The term misconduct implies a wrongful intention, and not a mere error of judgment. Misconduct is not necessarily the same thing as conduct involving moral turpitude. The word misconduct is a relative term, and has to be construed with reference to the subject-matter and the context wherein the term occurs, having regard to the scope of the Act or statute which is being construed. Misconduct literally means wrong conduct or improper conduct. In usual parlance, misconduct means a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, where no discretion if left, except what necessity may demand and carelessness, negligence and unskillfulness are transgressions of some established, but indefinite, rule of action, where some discretion is necessarily left to the actor. Misconduct is a violation of definite law; carelessness or abuse of discretion under an indefinite law. Misconduct is a forbidden act; carelessness, a forbidden quality of an act, and is necessarily indefinite. Misconduct in office may be defined as unlawful behaviour or neglect by a public officer, by which the rights of a party have been affected. " 5. Thus it could be seen that the word 'misconduct' though not capable of precise definition, its reflection receive its connotation from the context, the delinquency in its performance and its effect on the discipline and the nature of the duty. It may involve moral turpitude, it must be improper or wrong behaviour; unlawful behaviour, wilful in character; forbidden act, a transgression of established and definite rule of action or code of conduct but not mere error of judgment, carelessness or negligence in performance of the duty; the act complained of bears forbidden quality or character. Its ambit has to be construed with reference to the subject-matter and the context wherein the occurs, regard being had to the scope of the statute and the public purpose it seeks to serve " 19. Considering the case of the petitioner in the backdrop of the clear enunciation of law on the issue of 'misconduct' it is clear beyond any shadow of doubt that the charges upheld, which are the foundation for the impugned punishment, neither would constitute a 'misconduct' nor does it reflect that any financial loss was caused to the State, by the acts of the petitioner in question. 20. 20. In my opinion, in the circumstances discussed, there was no occasion for the continuation of the proceedings post retirement of the petitioner, which was unwarranted and the impugned punishment is only a perpetuation of the illegality. 21. In result, the imposition of penalty on the petition in the form of forfeiture of pension @ 10% vide notification bearing No. 9610 dated 30.06.2010 of the State Government cannot be upheld and is accordingly set aside." (II) Judgment dated 05.12.2018, passed in L.P.A. no. 1279 of 2017 (The State of Bihar & Ors. v. Gangeshwar Prasad Sharma & Ors.), paragraphs no. 9 to 12 whereof, are reproduced herein below:- "9. Having perused the enquiry report, it appears that the contract had been subsisting since the year 1997-98 and request for extension of time had been put in before the department, but not specifically extended by it, yet the work had been continuing. It further appears that on the recommendation of the Assistant Engineer, who had made the measurement, the payments were recommended by the petitioner and approved by the Superintending Engineer. Nevertheless the charges against the writ petitioner show that he had made payment beyond the time without imposing fine, and taking this to be the act of misconduct, the Enquiry Officer has indicted the writ petitioner. 10. In the wake of such facts and circumstances and in our considered opinion, it would not necessarily be enough to indicate that the petitioner was guilty of misconduct, as the learned Single Judge has clearly distinguished grave misconduct from lack of efficiency. In doing so, learned Single Judge has referred to P. Ramanatha Aiyar's Law Lexicon, where misconduct has been defined as thus:-"The term misconduct implies a wrongful intention, and not a mere error of judgment. Misconduct is not necessarily the same thing as conduct involving moral turpitude. The word misconduct is a relative term, and has to be construed with reference to the subject-matter and the context wherein the term occurs, having regard to the scope of the Act or statue which is being construed." 11. In view of such facts and circumstances, the learned Single Judge has rightly inferred that the writ petitioner could not be said to have been guilty of misconduct, leave alone grave misconduct nor had he been willfully negligent so as to cause financial loss to the State Government. In view of such facts and circumstances, the learned Single Judge has rightly inferred that the writ petitioner could not be said to have been guilty of misconduct, leave alone grave misconduct nor had he been willfully negligent so as to cause financial loss to the State Government. After perusal of the enquiry report, we are of the considered opinion that the gravity of charge is not such as to attract the rigours of Rule 43(b) and thus, the punishment order saddling the petitioner with forfeiture of 10 percent is uncalled for and excessive. 12. Moreover, the enquiry report also did not reflect the extent of loss caused to the State and, therefore, for this reason also the imposition of the penalty on the petitioner in the form of forfeiture of pension @ 10 percent, cannot by any stretch of imagination, be substantiated. As such, we find and hold that the learned Single Judge has in conformity with the settled principles of law and has found the imposition of penalty on the petitioner in the form of forfeiture of pension after continuation of the proceedings, post retirement, to be wholly unwarranted and unsustainable." (III) Judgment dated 20.06.2018, passed in L.P.A. no. 435 of 2016 (The state of Bihar and Ors. v. Jitendra Kumar Singh and Anr.), paragraphs no. 15 to 20 whereof, are reproduced herein below :- "15. Mr. Giri, learned Senior Counsel, in our view, appears to be correct in his submission that even if the allegations in charge-sheet are taken to be true, no case of misconduct is made out. The Supreme Court in case of Union of India Vs. J. Ahmad, 1979 2 SCC 286 had proceeded to ascertain as to what generally constitutes misconduct, especially in the context of disciplinary proceedings entailing penalty. The Supreme Court observed that Code of conduct as set out in the Conduct Rules clearly indicates the conduct expected of a member of the service. It would follow that the conduct which is blameworthy for the Government servant in the context of Conduct Rules would be misconduct. The Court specifically held that a single act of omission or "error of judgment" would ordinarily not constitute misconduct. In a subsequent decision in case of State of Punjab Vs. It would follow that the conduct which is blameworthy for the Government servant in the context of Conduct Rules would be misconduct. The Court specifically held that a single act of omission or "error of judgment" would ordinarily not constitute misconduct. In a subsequent decision in case of State of Punjab Vs. Ram Singh Ex Constable, 1992 (4) SCC 54 the Supreme Court explained misconduct of a Government servant for the purpose of departmental proceeding and held that misconduct is delinquency in its performance and its effect on the discipline and the nature of the duty. The court clearly held that "mere error of judgment, carelessness or negligence in performance of duty" will not constitute misconduct. Paragraph 6 of the said decision is relevant which reads as under:- "6. Thus it could be seen that the word 'misconduct' though not capable of precise definition, on reflection receives its connotation from the context, the delinquency in its performance and its effect on the discipline and the nature of the duty. It may involve moral turpitude, if must be improper or wrong behaviour, unlawful behaviour, willful in character; forbidden act, a transgression of establish and definite rule of action or code of conduct but not mere error of judgment, carelessness or negligence in performance of the duty; the act complained of bears forbidden quality or character. Its ambit has to be construed with reference to the subject matter and the context wherein the term occurs, regard being had to the scope of the statute and the public purpose it seeks to serve. The police service is a disciplined service and it requires to maintain strict discipline. Laxity in this behalf erodes discipline in the service causing serious effect in the maintenance of law and order." 16. Yet another Supreme Court's decision in case of Inspector Prem Chand Vs. Government of N.C.T. Delhi and others, 2007 (4) SCC 566 , considering the previous decision in case of Union of India Vs. J. Ahamd (supra) lays down held that error of judgment or negligence simpliciter is not of misconduct. 17. It is evident from the facts on record that the only allegation against the writ petitioner is of assessing annual rental value of a holding on the basis of old Rules in place of new Rules, which had come into force in 1994. 17. It is evident from the facts on record that the only allegation against the writ petitioner is of assessing annual rental value of a holding on the basis of old Rules in place of new Rules, which had come into force in 1994. While doing the assessment, he had relied on an earlier decision of the Administrator of PMC in respect of the same holding, which order was passed on 30.11.1994, the assessment in that case, though related to the period prior to coming into force of 1993 Rules. In the absence of any ulterior motive attributed against him, respondent no.1 could not be said to have misconducted himself. His assessment may be an error of judgment or mistake, in the absence of any allegation of ill motive, no misconduct can be said to be made out. 18. The view expressed by us finds support from the opinion expressed by the Supreme Court in a similar matter (Zunjarrao Bhikaji Nagarkar Vs. Union of India and others, 1999 (7) SCC 409 ), (paragraph 40 to 44). 19. Further, we have noticed the comments of the Additional Municipal Commissioner dated 02.01.2014, who has rather blamed the Municipal Commissioner for not having passed any order on the assessment done by the writ petitioner. 20. In the background of the facts noted above, in our considered view, this appeal has no merit since the judgment and order of the learned single Judge does not require any interference." 8. Per contra, the learned counsel for the respondent-State has submitted that due procedure has been followed by the disciplinary authority and there has been no irregularity or illegality in the conduct of departmental proceeding, hence this Court is not required to sit in appeal and re-appreciate the evidence, thus the impugned order dated 03.08.2019 deserves no interference. The learned counsel for the respondent- State has also referred to the Inquiry Report dated 15.01.2019 to submit that the Inquiry Officer has found the charges levelled against the petitioner to have been proved, after holding a detailed inquiry. The learned counsel for the respondent- State has also referred to the Inquiry Report dated 15.01.2019 to submit that the Inquiry Officer has found the charges levelled against the petitioner to have been proved, after holding a detailed inquiry. It is also submitted that the disciplinary authority, after taking into account the Inquiry Report and the reply of the petitioner to the second show cause notice, has inflicted the punishment of deduction of 10% amount of monthly pension of the petitioner for a period of 03 years by the impugned order dated 03.08.2019, which is a well reasoned order and there is no infirmity in the same. 9. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and have gone through the materials on record. At the outset, it would be relevant to refer to a judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Union of India & Ors. Vs. P. Gunasekaran, 2015 (2) SCC 610 , paragraphs no. 12 and 13 whereof, are being reproduced herein below:- "12. ............ In disciplinary proceedings, the High Court is not and cannot act as a second court of first appeal. The High Court, in exercise of its powers under Article 226/227 of Constitution of India, shall not venture into re appreciation of the evidence. The High Court can only see whether: a. the enquiry is held by a competent authority; b. the enquiry is held according to the procedure prescribed in that behalf; c. there is violation of the principles of natural justice in conducting the proceedings; d. the authorities have disabled themselves from reaching a fair conclusion by some considerations extraneous to the evidence and merits of the case; e. the authorities have allowed themselves to be influenced by irrelevant or extraneous considerations; f. the conclusion, on the very face of it, is so wholly arbitrary and capricious that no reasonable person could ever have arrived at such conclusion; g. the disciplinary authority had erroneously failed to admit the admissible and material evidence; h. the disciplinary authority had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which influenced the finding; i the finding of fact is based on no evidence. 13. Under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India, the High Court shall not: (i). re-appreciate the evidence; (ii). interfere with the conclusions in the enquiry, in case the same has been conducted in accordance with law; (iii). 13. Under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India, the High Court shall not: (i). re-appreciate the evidence; (ii). interfere with the conclusions in the enquiry, in case the same has been conducted in accordance with law; (iii). go into the adequacy of the evidence; (iv). go into the reliability of the evidence; (v). interfere, if there be some legal evidence on which findings can be based. (vi). correct the error of fact however grave it may appear to be; (vii). go into the proportionality of punishment unless it shocks its conscience." A bare perusal of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the aforementioned case of P. Gunasekaran (supra), would show that the findings of the Enquiry Officer, arrived at in his enquiry report, can be interfered with, provided findings are perverse or it is a case of no evidence, however, if there is some evidence to support the conclusion of the enquiry officer, no interference can be made by the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India inasmuch as adequacy of evidence cannot be subject matter of judicial review. 10. A bare perusal of the Inquiry Report, the impugned order dated 03.08.2019 and the materials available on record, including the minutes of meeting of the Regional Transport Authority, Saran Division Chapra dated 24.04.2015/18.05.2015 as also the order dated 08.09.2017, passed by the learned State Transport Appellate Tribunal, Bihar, Patna would show that the findings of the Inquiry Officer, in his inquiry Report dated 15.01.2019 as also conclusion of the disciplinary authority in its punishment order dated 03.08.2019 are based on no evidence and in fact are contrary to the materials on record and even if the entire evidence considered by the Inquiry Officer is accepted to be true on its face value, then also it cannot be concluded that the charges levelled against the petitioner has stood proved, thus the Inquiry Report dated 15.01.2019, based on no evidence and being perfunctory, is held to be perverse hence is quashed. As a result of quashing of the Inquiry Report dated 15.01.2019, the order of punishment dated 03.08.2019, whereby and whereunder 10% pension of the petitioner has been directed to be deducted for 03 years and which is solely based on the findings arrived at by the Inquiry Officer in the aforesaid Inquiry Report dated 15.01.2019, has got no legs to stand, hence is accordingly set aside. 11. Yet another aspect of the matter is that Rule 43(b) of the Bihar Pension Rules, 1950 provides for withholding or withdrawing of a pension or any part of it, whether permanently or for a specific period and the right of ordering the recovery from the holder of the pension of the whole or part of any pecuniary loss caused to the Government, if the pensioner is found in departmental or judicial proceedings to have been guilty of grave misconduct or to have caused pecuniary loss to the Government by misconduct or negligence during his service period. As far as the present case is concerned, no pecuniary loss has been caused to the Government, hence the question would be as to whether the petitioner is guilty of grave misconduct or not, so as to warrant attraction of the rigours of Rule 43(b) of the Bihar Pension Rules, 1950. In this regard, this Court finds that firstly, the petitioner was merely as Assistant in the Office of the Regional Transport Authority and secondly, he was not a member of the quasi-judicial authority i.e the Regional Transport Authority, Saran Division Chapra, which had decided the time-table in its Meeting dated 24.04.2015/18.05.2015 and thirdly even the learned Appellate Tribunal in its order dated 08.09.2017, had not found the time-table to be impracticable, though the charge levelled against the petitioner is that the time-table in question is impracticable, hence this Court finds that the charges levelled against the petitioner is neither of any worth nor is made out as against the petitioner herein, thus it cannot be said that the petitioner had committed grave misconduct, especially since no prejudice or loss has been caused to anyone. In fact, even if the charge levelled against the petitioner is considered to be of any worth on its face value, it can at best be said to be an error of judgment, hence would not constitute a misconduct, especially in view of the fact that such single act of omission or error of judgment, has been held by this Court as also by the Hon'ble Apex Court to be ordinarily not constituting misconduct except in cases where such error or omission results in serious or atrocious consequences and secondly, the gravity of charge is not such so as to attract the rigours of Rule 43(b) of the Bihar Pension Rules, 1950, therefore in absence of any allegation of ill motive, no misconduct can be said to be made out, thus the impugned order dated 03.08.2019, whereby and whereunder petitioner has been inflicted with the punishment of reduction of 10% pension for a period of 03 years is uncalled for and excessive, especially in view of the fact that Rule 43(b) of the Bihar Pension Rules, 1950, as discussed herein above, would not be attracted in the present case, consequently on this score as well, the entire departmental proceeding right from its conversion into one under Rule 43(b) of the Bihar Pension Rules, 1950, vide order dated 01.06.2018, up to the passing of the punishment order dated 03.08.2019, are held to be non-est and void in the eyes of law, considering the law laid down by this Court in the case of Gangeshwar Prasad Sharma (supra) and Jitendra Kumar Singh (supra). 12. The writ petition stands allowed.