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2021 DIGILAW 1182 (GUJ)

RAVIRAJ BHUPATBHAI PATGIR (KATHI) v. STATE OF GUJARAT

2021-12-13

ASHOKKUMAR C.JOSHI

body2021
ORDER : 1. By way of the present application under Section 438 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, the applicant - accused has prayed for anticipatory bail in connection with the FIR being C. R. No. 11199016210564 of 2021, registered with Dahej Police Station, District: Bharuch for the offences punishable under Sections 413, 407, 285, 286, and 120-B of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC). 2. Heard learned advocate Mr. P. M. Lakhani for the applicant and learned APP Ms. Moxa Thakkar for the respondent – State. 3. The learned advocate for the applicant has submitted that the applicant is apprehending arrest in connection with the aforesaid FIR. It is submitted that the learned Sessions Judge has rejected the application filed by the present applicant for grant of anticipatory bail. The learned advocate for the applicant further submitted that the applicant is charged with the aforesaid offences, however, the ingredients of the said offences are not satisfied. 3.1 It is further submitted that the applicant is an innocent person and is falsely implicated in the offence in question. It is submitted by the learned advocate for the applicant that there is no material to connect even remotely to the applicant with the crime. It is further submitted that out of total 19 accused, 6 accused persons have been granted anticipatory bail whereas, 8 accused persons have been granted regular bail before charge sheet by the learned Court below and accordingly, on the ground of parity and equality, the applicant is required to be granted anticipatory bail. 3.2 It is submitted that the only allegation against the present applicant is that he is the prime investor in the alleged theft of chemical, however, there is no evidence/material to substantiate the said aspect. Further, the incriminating material against the applicant is the statement of the co-accused, which is not admissible in the evidence. 3.3 The learned advocate submitted that even otherwise it is improbable to commit such theft inasmuch as, seal used to be applied in the tankers, which are equipped with GPS system and are duly measured and accordingly, it is not possible to commit such a crime. 3.4 It is further submitted that the applicant is neither the owner of place of incident nor the owner of tankers and was not present at the place of offence. 3.4 It is further submitted that the applicant is neither the owner of place of incident nor the owner of tankers and was not present at the place of offence. 3.5 Last but not the least, the learned advocate submitted that merely because the applicant has antecedents, the same cannot be the sole ground for rejection of bail. It is submitted that out of the total implications, the applicant is already acquitted/FIRs have been quashed by the Court in 8 cases. Further, for the proposition that antecedents cannot be a bar to grant bail, the learned advocate has relied upon following decisions: i) Maulana Mohd Amir Rashadi v. State of U.P., AIR 2012 SC 469; ii) Visa Singh v. State (Central Bureau of Investigation), 1991 (1) Crimes 758 Delhi = 1991 CJ (Del) 684; iii) Jaichand v. State of Rajashthan, 1991 (3) Crimes 63 = 1991 CJ (Raj) 181; iv) Nanha S/o. Nabhan Kha v. State of UP, 1993 CriLJ 938; v) Sanjay Chandra v. CBI, 2012 (1) GLH 93 SC. 3.6 Accordingly, in the facts and circumstances of the case, it is urged that present application may kindly be allowed and the applicant may be granted anticipatory bail. 3.7 The learned advocate for the applicant has further submitted that the applicant will keep himself available during the course of investigation as well as during trial and will not flee from justice. 3.8 The learned advocate for the applicant, on instructions, states that the applicant is ready and willing to abide by all the conditions including imposition of conditions with regard to powers of Investigating Agency to file an application before the competent Court for remand. It is further submitted that upon filing of such application by the Investigating Agency, the right of applicant - accused to oppose such application on merits may be kept open. The learned advocate, therefore, submitted that considering the above facts, the applicant may be granted anticipatory bail. 4. Per contra, the learned APP appearing on behalf of the respondent – State has, with all vehemence at her command, opposed the grant of anticipatory bail looking to the nature and gravity of the offence. It is submitted that from the investigation carried out so far, prima facie case has been made out against the present applicant – accused. 4. Per contra, the learned APP appearing on behalf of the respondent – State has, with all vehemence at her command, opposed the grant of anticipatory bail looking to the nature and gravity of the offence. It is submitted that from the investigation carried out so far, prima facie case has been made out against the present applicant – accused. It is submitted that the applicant is the investor and is a prime accused in the crime in question. The learned APP submitted that it may be that the coaccused have been released by the learned Court below either on anticipatory bail or the regular bail, however, the fact remains that the application of the present applicant for grant of anticipatory bail is rejected by the learned Court below only considering the role of the accused and accordingly, the role having played by the present applicant being more serious than the other co-accused, the applicant cannot seek equality and parity. 4.1 The learned APP further submitted that the applicant has not less than 13 antecedents and is a habitual offender and under the circumstances, there are all chances of committing such type of offences in future also. Further, the co-accused may not have such a number of antecedents and therefore also, no parity can be applied. Further, on the aspect of the decisions relied upon by the learned advocate for the applicant is concerned, the learned APP submitted that it may be that antecedents may not be a bar in granting bail, however, it is also a settled position that each case is required to be considered on its own facts and merits. 4.2 Making above submissions, the learned APP urged that this being an anticipatory bail application, considering the gravity of offence, the same may not be entertained and it is requested to be rejected. 5. The Court has heard the arguments advanced by the learned advocates for the parties and also perused the material placed on record and also gone through the decisions relied upon by the learned advocate for the applicant. The applicant herein is charged with the offences punishable under Sections 413, 407, 285, 286, and 120-B IPC. The learned advocate for the applicant has much emphasized on two aspect i.e. i) grant of bail to the co-accused and ii) antecedents may not be a sole ground to reject the bail. The applicant herein is charged with the offences punishable under Sections 413, 407, 285, 286, and 120-B IPC. The learned advocate for the applicant has much emphasized on two aspect i.e. i) grant of bail to the co-accused and ii) antecedents may not be a sole ground to reject the bail. If the case of the prosecution is seen, the applicant is the prime accused in the commission of offence of theft of chemicals, who, in connivance with other accused persons, has committed such crime. In the said backdrop and considering the above, following aspects have been weighed with the Court: i) the applicant, prima facie, appears to be the kingpin in the crime in question and main investor at whose instance, others were acting and accordingly, custodial interrogation is necessary; ii) the applicant has as many as 13 antecedents and appears to be the habitual offender and also appears to be active in commission of such offences; iii) role played by the other co-accused, more particularly, who have been enlarged on bail, cannot be equated with that of the present applicant inasmuch as all the such activities prima facie appears to be made in the exclusive knowledge and guidance of the applicant; iv) the learned Court below has though granted bail to the other co-accused persons, considering the role attributed to the present applicant, has denied bail to the applicant; v) from the investigation papers, made available for perusal as well as the material on record, prima facie case appears to have been made out against the applicant. 5.1 Thus, considering the overall facts and circumstances of the case on hand, this Court is of the considered opinion that this is not a fit case to exercise the discretion vested in the Court under Section 438 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 and to grant anticipatory bail to the applicant. 6. The Court has gone through the decisions relied upon by the learned advocate for the applicant. In Maulana Mohd Amir Rashadi (supra), It is observed in the said decision that, “Merely on the basis of criminal antecedents, bail cannot be denied. While considering the application for grant of bail, it is duty of the Court to find out the role of the accused in the case in which he has been charged and other circumstances”. In Maulana Mohd Amir Rashadi (supra), It is observed in the said decision that, “Merely on the basis of criminal antecedents, bail cannot be denied. While considering the application for grant of bail, it is duty of the Court to find out the role of the accused in the case in which he has been charged and other circumstances”. This decision would not be of any help to the applicant inasmuch as, it is observed therein that while considering the application for grant of bail, it is duty of the Court to find out the role of the accused in the case in which he has been charged and other circumstances and considering the role of the applicant in the case on hand, this Court has come to such a conclusion. 6.1 Next is the decision in Visa Singh (supra), wherein the Court was considering the regular bail application in a case wherein, even charge was not framed and the applicant was in custody since long and accordingly, in the said set of circumstances, the bail was granted vis-a-vis other circumstances. Further, this is an application for anticipatory bail. Accordingly, this decision also, would not be of any help to the applicant. 6.2 In the another decision in Jaichand (supra), the Court has observed that the Court has considered the aspect, while considering the regular bail application, that if other cases were pending against the petitioner (applicant), in that case, the bail application should not have been rejected. In the present case, as said earlier, the applicant, prima facie, appears to be the kingpin in the offence and in the facts and circumstances of the case, it appears that custodial interrogation is required so also the fact that this Court is travelling through the anticipatory bail application, this decision also would be of no avail to the applicant. 6.3 In Nanha S/o. Nabhan Kha (supra), which is on the aspect of parity and equality, in paragraph 59 of the said decision, the Court has observed that, “None the less the principle of grant of bail on parity cannot be allowed to be carried to an absurd or illogical conclusion so as to put a judge in a tight and straight jacket to grant bail automatically. There may be case which may require an exception; where a judge may not simply take a different view from the judge who granted bail earlier to a co-accused but where the conscience of the judge revolts in granting bail. In such a situation, the judge may choose to depart from the rule recording his reasons. However, such cases would be very few”. Thus, grant of bail on the ground of parity cannot be allowed to be carried to an absurd or illogical conclusion so as to put a judge in a tight and straight jacket to grant bail automatically and if facts and circumstances so demand, the Court concern can depart from the said rule. Accordingly, this decision would not apply to the facts of the case on hand. 6.4 Lastly, in Sanjay Chandra (supra), the Court was considering the regular bail applications and wherein, it is laid down that, "Right to Bail is not to be denied merely because of the sentiments of the community against the accused. The primary purposes of bail in a criminal case are to relieve the accused of imprisonment, to relieve the State of the burden of keeping him, pending the trial, and at the same time, to keep the accused constructively in the custody of the Court, whether before or after conviction, to assure that he will submit to the jurisdiction of the Court and be in attendance thereon whenever his presence is required." Further, it is observed that, “In the instant case both the Courts had refused the request for grant of bail on two grounds namely, that offence alleged against the accused persons is very serious involving deep rooted planning in which, huge financial loss is caused to the State exchequer and secondly the possibility of the accused persons tempering with the witnesses. The punishment of the offence is punishment for a term which may extend to seven years. It is, no doubt, true that the nature of the charge may be relevant, but at the same time, the punishment to which the party may be liable, if convicted, also bears upon the issue. Therefore, in determining whether to grant bail, both the seriousness of the charge and the severity of the punishment should be taken into consideration. The grant or refusal to grant bail lies within the discretion of the Court. Therefore, in determining whether to grant bail, both the seriousness of the charge and the severity of the punishment should be taken into consideration. The grant or refusal to grant bail lies within the discretion of the Court. The grant or denial is regulated, to a large extent, by the facts and circumstances of each particular case. But at the same time, right to bail is not to be denied merely because of the sentiments of the community against the accused. The primary purposes of bail in a criminal case are to relieve the accused of imprisonment, to relieve the State of the burden of keeping him, pending the trial, and at the same time, to keep the accused constructively in the custody of the Court, whether before or after conviction, to assure that he will submit to the jurisdiction of the Court and be in attendance thereon whenever his presence is required. The two paramount considerations, while considering petition for grant of bail in nonbailable offence, apart from the seriousness of the offence, are the likelihood of the accused fleeing from justice and his tampering with the prosecution witnesses. Both of them relate to ensure of the fair trial of the case. Though, this aspect was dealt by the High Court in its impugned order, but the same was held as not convincing”. It is reiterated that while considering the regular bail application, such guideline have been issued, however, the fact remains that each and every case is required to be considered on its own facts and circumstances and the circumstances, in the case on hand, are averse to grant the prayer in favour of the applicant herein. 7. At this juncture, it would be worthwhile to refer to the observations made by the Apex Court in Prashant Singh Rajput vs. The State of Madhya Pradesh and Ors. (08.10.2021 - SC) : MANU/SC/0828/2021, which are as under: “25. In another decision in Dr. Naresh Kumar Mangla v. Anita Agarwal and Ors. a three Judge Bench of this Court cancelled the anticipatory bail granted to the Accused, following the unnatural death of his wife. The Court surveyed the authorities on the grant of anticipatory bail and held: 19. (08.10.2021 - SC) : MANU/SC/0828/2021, which are as under: “25. In another decision in Dr. Naresh Kumar Mangla v. Anita Agarwal and Ors. a three Judge Bench of this Court cancelled the anticipatory bail granted to the Accused, following the unnatural death of his wife. The Court surveyed the authorities on the grant of anticipatory bail and held: 19. In the recent decision of the Constitution Bench in Sushila Aggarwal v. State (NCT of Delhi) [MANU/SC/1538/2019 : (2020) 5 SCC 1 ], the considerations which ought to weigh with the Court in deciding an application for the grant of anticipatory bail have been reiterated. The final conclusions of the Court indicate that: ....92.3...While considering an application (for grant of anticipatory bail) the court has to consider the nature of the offence, the role of the person, the likelihood of his influencing the course of investigation, or tampering with evidence (including intimidating witnesses), likelihood of fleeing justice (such as leaving the country), etc. 92.4 Courts ought to be generally guided by considerations such as the nature and gravity of the offences, the role attributed to the applicant, and the facts of the case, while considering whether to grant anticipatory bail, or refuse it. Whether to grant or not is a matter of discretion; equally whether and if so, what kind of special conditions are to be imposed (or not imposed) are dependent on facts of the case, and subject to the discretion of the court. 20. The Constitution Bench has reiterated that the correctness of an order granting bail is subject to assessment by an appellate or superior court and it may be set aside on the ground that the Court granting bail did not consider material facts or crucial circumstances... [...] 22. It is apposite to mention here the distinction between the considerations which guide the grant of anticipatory bail and regular bail. [...] 22. It is apposite to mention here the distinction between the considerations which guide the grant of anticipatory bail and regular bail. In Pokar Ram v. State of Rajasthan [MANU/SC/0088/1985 : (1985) 2 SCC 597 ], while setting aside an order granting anticipatory bail, this Court observed: ...Says the learned Chief Justice that in regard to anticipatory bail, if the proposed accusation appears to stem not from motives of furthering the ends of justice but from some ulterior motive, the object being to injure and humiliate the Applicant by having him arrested, a direction for the release of the Applicant on bail in the event of his arrest would generally be made. It was observed that "it cannot be laid down as an inexorable Rule that anticipatory bail cannot be granted unless the proposed accusation appears to be actuated by mala fides; and, equally, that anticipatory bail must be granted if there is no fear that the Applicant will abscond". Some of the relevant considerations which govern the discretion, noticed therein are "the nature and seriousness of the proposed charges, the context of the events likely to lead to the making of the charges, a reasonable possibility of the Applicant's presence not being secured at the trial, a reasonable apprehension that witnesses will be tampered with and 'the larger interests of the public or the State', are some of the considerations which the court has to keep in mind while deciding an application for anticipatory bail". A caution was voiced that "in the evaluation of the consideration whether the Applicant is likely to abscond, there can be no presumption that the wealthy and the mighty will submit themselves to trial and that the humble and the poor will run away from the course of justice, any more than there can be a presumption that the former are not likely to commit a crime and the latter are more likely to commit it.” 8. Thus, in view of the aforesaid discussion and observations, the application, fails and is rejected accordingly. Rule is discharged. 8.1 It goes without saying that at the trial, the concerned trial Court shall not be influenced by the prima facie observations made by this Court in the present order.