JUDGMENT : This appeal is directed against the judgment and decree dated 6/5/2019 passed by the Addl. District Judge No.1, Hanumangarh, whereby, the suit filed by the plaintiffs against the Municipal Council for permanent injunction was partly decreed. 2. The suit was filed by the plaintiffs, all sons of Mangal Singh, with the averments that by registered sale deed dated 10/4/1957 Shri Karni Singh Bahadur of Bikaner sold his ‘Shikarkhana’ ad measuring 42560 sq. ft.; boundaries of the land were indicated in the plaint. It was claimed that ever since the ‘Shikarkhana’ was purchased by the plaintiffs on 10/4/1957, they were in possession of the same and the possession continued; the plaintiffs have constructed a petrol pump and are residing therein along with their families. The present boundaries of ‘Shikarkhana’ were also indicated. It was alleged that on 4/9/2007, employees of Municipal Council marked the petrol pump and the residence, on inquiry it was indicated that the land in question was part of road and the construction would be demolished and road would be constructed. The said contention of Municipal Council was disputed by the plaintiffs by filing a representation inter alia claiming that they have not trespassed over any road or Government land and, therefore, the construction be not demolished. It was inter alia claimed that the petrol pump and the house is situated on a duly purchased land and the Municipal Council has no legal right to demolish the said construction. Based on the above averments, the following relief was claimed: ^^Áfroknh ds fo:) LFkkbZ O;kns'k bl vk'k; dk tkjh fd;k tkos fd og okn&i= dh pj.k la[;k 1 o 2 esa of.kZr oknhx.k ds Hkw[k.M o fuekZ.k ds mi;ksx o miHkksx esa fdlh rjg ls gLr{ksi ugha djs ,oa oknhx.k ds fuekZ.k dks {kfrxzLr ugha djsa ,oa oknhx.k ds Hkw[k.M o edku esa lM+d dk fuekZ.k ugha djsaA** 3. The defendant filed written statement and disputed the averments contained in the plaint. The boundaries indicated in the plaint were denied. It was claimed that the land in question belongs to Municipal Council and that under the directions of Hon’ble Supreme Court and High Court, the encroachments on the roads and other places were being removed and as the plaintiffs have encroached on the 55 ft. road, the same was being removed. The boundaries indicated in the plaint were denied. It was claimed that the land in question belongs to Municipal Council and that under the directions of Hon’ble Supreme Court and High Court, the encroachments on the roads and other places were being removed and as the plaintiffs have encroached on the 55 ft. road, the same was being removed. The contents of the sale deed were also disputed with the averments that the Power of Attorney given by Maharaja Karni Singh for ‘Shikarkhana’ did not indicate any area and as such the land belonging to Municipal Council could not be transferred and that the measurements indicated in the sale deed were imaginary. Certain additional pleas were also raised. 4. The trial court framed seven issues and after evidence was led, as noticed hereinbefore, the suit was partly decreed with the following relief and observations: ^^vkns'k oknhx.k dk okn fo:) Áfroknh ckcr LFkkbZ fu"ks/kkKk fuEu Ádkj ls fMØh fd;k tkrk gS %& ¼1½ Áfroknh oknh ds f'kdkj[kkuk DokVZj dh 285 oxZ xt Hkwfe esa mlds Hkw[k.M ij fd, x, fuekZ.k ds mi;ksx] miHkksx esa gLr{ksi ugha djsxk] fuekZ.k dks {kfrxzLr ugha djsxk vkSj bl 285 oxZ xt f'kdkj[kkuk DokVZj dh Hkwfe ij cus edku esa ls dksbZ lM+d vkfn fufeZr ugha djsxkA ysfdu ;gka ;g Hkh Li"V fd;k tkrk gS fd oknhx.k us f'kdkj[kkuk DokVZj dh Hkwfe 285 oxZ xt ls ckgj vfrØe.k dj vf/kd fuekZ.k dj j[kk gS] mlds lEcU/k esa oknhx.k }kjk okn&i= esa pkgk x;k LFkkbZ O;kns'k dk vuqrks"k ÁkIr djus ds vf/kdkjh ugha gSa vkSj bl lhek rd oknhx.k dk okn&i= [kkfjt fd;k tkrk gSA [kpkZ eqdnek i{kdkjku viuk&viuk ogu djsaxsA ipkZ fMØh tkjh gksA** 5. Feeling aggrieved, the appellants – all the plaintiffs i.e. five brothers, filed the present first appeal. By order dated 4/11/2009, a coordinate bench of this Court ordered status quo with regard to the land in dispute to be maintained by the parties and the matter was ordered to be listed for hearing in due course. 6. It appears that on 27/3/2019 the respondents filed an application for early hearing of the appeal, copy whereof was served on the counsel for the appellants. 7. On 2/5/2019, an application came to be filed under Order XXII Rule 3 & 9 CPC for taking the legal representatives of appellant nos. 1 and 2 on record and for setting aside the abatement. 7. On 2/5/2019, an application came to be filed under Order XXII Rule 3 & 9 CPC for taking the legal representatives of appellant nos. 1 and 2 on record and for setting aside the abatement. It is inter alia indicated in the application that appellant no.1 Salam Singh died on 13/10/2016 and appellant no. 2 Ridmal Singh died on 26/7/2011, who were survived by legal representatives, names whereof were indicated in the application. It is claimed that after death of appellant nos. 1 and 2 cause of action still survives. It was further claimed that as the respondent Municipal Council gave a notice in the name of appellants to remove encroachment from the land in question, the applicants approached their family counsel at Jodhpur to take legal steps against the notice given to them. Whereafter, it was claimed that the said counsel intimated the applicants that the present appeal is pending before this Court, which was filed by Salam Singh & others and on counsel intimating the applicants, they came to know about the present appeal and after getting the information regarding the said appeal, the applicants filed reply to the notice. It was claimed that the applicants came to know about the present appeal in the month of April, 2019 only and as soon as they came to know about the said appeal, they supplied the details of legal representatives and that the application is being filed without any delay and that delay caused is bonafide and inadvertent and, therefore, the abatement deserves to be set aside. It was prayed that the application be allowed and legal representatives of appellant no.1 -Salam Singh and appellant no.2 – Ridmal Singh be taken on record. Both the applications i.e. application under Order XXII Rule 3 & 9 CPC and the application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act seeking condonation of delay, were supported by affidavit of Dharmendra Singh Bhati s/o Ridmal Singh Bhati. 8. The respondents filed reply to the application under Order XXII Rule 3 & 9 CPC as well as application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. It was inter alia submitted that it is not indicated in the application as to whether the same has been made on behalf of remaining appellants or by the legal representatives of deceased appellants. The respondents filed reply to the application under Order XXII Rule 3 & 9 CPC as well as application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. It was inter alia submitted that it is not indicated in the application as to whether the same has been made on behalf of remaining appellants or by the legal representatives of deceased appellants. It was submitted that the contention raised in the application regarding the applicants coming to know of pendency of appeal in the month of April, 2019 is factually incorrect and concocted. It was submitted that in June, 2014 notice for removal of encroachment was given by the Municipal Council and reply to the notice was given by the owners through their counsel, wherein, fact of pendency of the appeal was indicated. Further, another notice was given in February, 2019 for removal of encroachment, to which a reply was given on 27/2/2019, wherein, also it was specifically indicated that the matter was pending before the High Court. Along with the reply, copies of notice and replies filed in this regard have been placed on record. It was further submitted that the application has been filed with false and incorrect statement and on account of such conduct of the applicants, the applications deserve to be dismissed. 9. Learned counsel for the appellants submitted that the delay in filing the application under Order XXII Rule 3 & 9 CPC is bonafide inasmuch as the legal representatives of the deceased appellants were unaware of pendency of appeal and as soon as they became aware of pendency of appeal in the month of April, 2019, they have taken steps for bringing on record the legal representatives of deceased appellants and as such the applications deserve acceptance. 10. Submissions have been made that appellants Devi Singh, Narayan Singh and Kishan Singh are still on record and, therefore, in any case the appeal would not abate as a whole and, therefore, also the applicants be taken on record. 11. Learned counsel for the respondent vehemently opposed the submissions. It was submitted that a bare look at the documents annexed with the reply would indicate that the notice given by the respondent dated 16/5/2014 was received by Dharmendra on 19/5/2014, the same person has sworn the affidavit in support of both the applications. 11. Learned counsel for the respondent vehemently opposed the submissions. It was submitted that a bare look at the documents annexed with the reply would indicate that the notice given by the respondent dated 16/5/2014 was received by Dharmendra on 19/5/2014, the same person has sworn the affidavit in support of both the applications. The response to the notice given, refers to the pendency of appeal before this Court and another reply pursuant to another notice was given on 27/2/2019, wherein, also a specific reference was made to the pendency of appeal before the High Court and interim order having been granted by this Court, the second reply was signed by Narayan Singh, appellant no.4, as such the plea raised in the application that legal representatives were unaware of pendency of the appeal and became aware only in the month of April, 2019 are ex facie false, incorrect and baseless. 12. Submissions were made that the appeal was filed by five appellants and two of them have died, while the application indicates that the legal representatives were unaware of pendency of appeal, one of whom has filed reply dated 27/2/2019 cannot deny the knowledge about pendency of appeal and as the application has been filed after 08 years of death of appellant no.2 and about 2½ years after the death of appellant no.1, the application being ex facie barred by limitation, the plea raised seeking condonation of delay being false, incorrect and baseless, the applications deserve to be dismissed. 13. Further submissions have been made that looking to the nature of the suit and the decree passed by the trial court, with the dismissal of the above application, the appeal also would abate as a whole and same cannot be continued by the remaining appellants. It is submitted that the suit was filed by co-owners and each co-owner has right over the entire land and once the appeal abates qua two appellants and if the same is not dismissed as a whole, the same may result in two conflicting decrees for the same subject matter and as such the appeal deserves to be dismissed as a whole. 14. Reliance was placed on the judgments in Budh Ram & Ors. vs. Bansi & Ors. : (2010) 11 SCC 476 , Teju & Ors. vs. Board of Revenue & Ors. : AIR 1978 Rajasthan 16, Lala Srimandar Das Jain & Ors. 14. Reliance was placed on the judgments in Budh Ram & Ors. vs. Bansi & Ors. : (2010) 11 SCC 476 , Teju & Ors. vs. Board of Revenue & Ors. : AIR 1978 Rajasthan 16, Lala Srimandar Das Jain & Ors. vs. Addl. Civil Judge, Dehradun & Ors. : AIR 2012 Uttarakhand 21 and Arigela Laxmi vs. Boodireddy Chandraiah : 2003 (1) ALT 565 . 15. Learned counsel for the appellants made vehement submissions that the plea raised regarding the appeal liable to be dismissed as a whole if the application under Order XXII Rule 3 & 9 CPC qua the appellant nos. 1 and 2 is not accepted, is totally baseless. It was submitted that the plaintiffs-appellants are co-owners of the suit property and under Section 45 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (‘the Act, 1882’) they are equally interested in the property and, therefore, even if the appeal abates qua the appellant nos. 1 and 2, the same would survive and cannot be dismissed as a whole. 16. Submissions were made that the plaintiffs have individual rights in the land in question and on that count even if the application under Order XXII Rule 3 & 9 CPC is not accepted, the same cannot abate as a whole. 17. Reliance was placed on the judgments in Sardar Amarjit Singh Kalra vs. Pramod Gupta : (2003) 3 SCC 272 , N.Khosla vs. Rajlakshmi & Ors. : (2006) 3 SCC 605 . 18. It was prayed that the applications be allowed or the prayer made by the respondents regarding abatement of appeal as a whole be rejected. 19. I have considered the submissions made by learned counsel for the parties and have perused the material available on record. 20. The facts are not in dispute, wherein, the suit for permanent injunction was filed by five plaintiffs inter alia claiming themselves as co-owners based on the sale deed dated 10/4/1957 seeking injunction against the respondent in demolishing the construction and from constructing road over the land in question. 21. As quoted hereinbefore, the trial court partly accepted the suit i.e. to the extent of 285 sq. yds. of land and made a specific clarification that the plaintiffs were not entitled to any relief beyond the land ad measuring 285 sq. yds. on which they have encroached and raised construction. 21. As quoted hereinbefore, the trial court partly accepted the suit i.e. to the extent of 285 sq. yds. of land and made a specific clarification that the plaintiffs were not entitled to any relief beyond the land ad measuring 285 sq. yds. on which they have encroached and raised construction. The trial court under issue no.1 came to a categorical conclusion regarding the plaintiffs being in legal possession of land ad measuring 285 sq. yds only and on rest of the land they were in possession as trespassers. 22. Against the said judgment & decree, the present appeal was filed, wherein, interim order was granted by the court on 4/11/2009. The appellant no.2 died in the year 2011 and appellant no.1 died in the year 2016, however, no steps were taken. Whereafter, the present application under Order XXII Rule 3 & 9 CPC along with an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act came to be filed on 2/5/2019 with the submissions that the legal representatives were unaware of the pendency of the appeal and as such they may be impleaded as legal representatives and delay in filing the application may be condoned. 23. The contentions raised in the application regarding the applicants being unaware of pendency of the appeal appears to be wholly incorrect and baseless. The respondents in their reply have annexed a notice issued on 16/5/2014, which was received by one of the legal representatives of appellant no.2, who has sworn the affidavit in support of the applications. Reply to the said notice was given by the counsel relying on the proceedings pending before the High Court which clearly reflects knowledge of the deponent of the affidavits regarding the pendency of proceedings before this Court. 24. Again on another notice issued, a reply was filed by the appellant no. 4 on 27/2/2009, wherein also reference was made to the pendency of the appeal before this Court. Despite specific assertions made by the respondents in reply to the application under Order XXII Rule 3 & 9 CPC and under Section 5 of the Limitation Act regarding the applicants being aware of the pendency of appeal, filing documents in support and the assertion about their coming to know of pending appeal in April, 2019 being false, no rejoinder to the said reply has been filed so as to contradict the submissions made in this regard. 25. 25. Besides the above, it is not even the case in the application under Order XXII Rule 3 & 9 CPC that other three appellants were not aware of the pendency of the present appeal, it is another aspect that the reply dated 27/2/2019 has been signed by appellant no. 4 and as such even if such a plea was taken that would be equally incorrect. 26. As noticed hereinbefore, the respondents have filed an application on 27/3/2019, copy whereof was served on the counsel for the appellants seeking early hearing of the appeal, however, no reference of the receipt of said application has been made and the application thereafter also has been filed on 2/5/2019. 27. In view of the above glaring fact situation, wherein the applicants/appellants were well aware of the pendency of present appeal and two of the appellants have died in the year 2011 and 2016, for over 8 years / 2 ½ years steps were not taken to bring on record the legal representatives and as the plea raised for not bringing on record the legal representatives in time having been found incorrect, the application seeking condonation of delay for setting aside the abatement as well as for bringing on record the legal representatives, which otherwise also suffers from unexplained laches cannot be accepted and the same are, therefore, dismissed. 28. The dismissal of the applications leads to second aspect of the matter as to whether the appeal would abate qua the appellant nos. 1 and 2 or same would abate as a whole. 29. As noticed hereinbefore, the suit was filed by five plaintiffs as co-owners of the land jointly purchased by them on 10/4/1957. The trial court accepted the case qua a part of the land i.e. 285 sq. yds. and rejected the same for rest of the land and held the plaintiffs as trespassers. The consequence of appeal having abated qua appellant nos. 1 and 2 on account of dismissal of application hereinbefore is that the decree passed by the trial court stands affirmed qua the two plaintiffs i.e. Salam Singh and Ridmal Singh i.e. they are trespassers on the land other than land ad measuring 285 sq. yds. 30. The consequence of appeal having abated qua appellant nos. 1 and 2 on account of dismissal of application hereinbefore is that the decree passed by the trial court stands affirmed qua the two plaintiffs i.e. Salam Singh and Ridmal Singh i.e. they are trespassers on the land other than land ad measuring 285 sq. yds. 30. Once the cause is based on common sale deed and the appellants are co-owners and findings recorded in the suit qua two appellants has become final, the appeal, if permitted to be continued by the remaining three appellants, which appeal if allowed in future, the same would essentially lead to two conflicting decrees i.e. qua appellant nos. 1 and 2 being trespassers and qua appellant nos. 3, 4 and 5, being owners of the same property. 31. Reliance placed by counsel for the appellants on the provisions of Section 45 of the Act is apparently misplaced. Section 45 of the Act reads as under: “45. Joint transfer for consideration.—Where immoveable property is transferred for consideration to two or more persons and such consideration is paid out of a fund belonging to them in common, they are, in the absence of a contract to the contrary, respectively entitled to interests in such property identical, as nearly as may be, with the interests to which they were respectively entitled in the fund; and, where such consideration is paid out of separate funds belonging to them respectively, they are, in the absence of a contract to the contrary, respectively entitled to interests in such property in proportion to the shares of the consideration which they respectively advanced. In the absence of evidence as to the interests in the fund to which they were respectively entitled, or as to the shares which they respectively advanced, such persons shall be presumed to be equally interested in the property.” (emphasis added) 32. A perusal of the above provision would reveal that wherever there is joint transfer for consideration, in absence of evidence as to the interest in the fund of transferees or as to shares which the transferees respectively advanced, transferees shall be presumed to be equally interested in the property. Once a presumption has been created under law regarding the transferees being equally interested in the property, it cannot be said that they would be interested in any specific portion of the property. 33. Once a presumption has been created under law regarding the transferees being equally interested in the property, it cannot be said that they would be interested in any specific portion of the property. 33. The status of right of co-owner qua the land and consequence of the suit abating qua one of the co-owners has been dealt with by Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Budh Ram (supra), wherein, the suit was for declaration to the effect that plaintiffs/respondents were co-owners with consequential relief of permanent and prohibitory injunction restraining the defendants from causing ouster, wherein, the trial court decreed the suit in favour of the plaintiffs. During the pendency of the appeal one of the respondents died and after considering the judgment in the case of Sardar Amarjit Singh Kalra (supra), Hon’ble Supreme Court inter alia observed as under: “19. Therefore, the law on the issue stands crystallized to the effect that as to whether non-substitution of LRs of the defendants/respondents would abate the appeal in toto or only qua the deceased defendants/respondents, depend upon the facts and circumstances of an individual case. Where each one of the parties has an independent and distinct right of his own, not inter-dependent upon one or the other, nor the parties have conflicting interests inter se, the appeal may abate only qua the deceased respondent. However, in case, there is a possibility that the Court may pass a decree contradictory to the decree in favour of the deceased party, the appeal would abate in toto for the simple reason that the appeal is a continuity of suit and the law does not permit two contradictory decrees on the same subject matter in the same suit. Thus, whether the judgment/decree passed in the proceedings vis-a-vis remaining parties would suffer the vice of being a contradictory or inconsistent decree is the relevant test. 20. The instant case requires to be examined in view of the aforesaid settled legal propositions. Every co-owner has a right to possession and enjoyment of each and every part of the property equal to that of other co-owners. Therefore, in theory, every co-owner has an interest in every infinitesimal portion of the subject matter, each has a right irrespective of the quantity of its interest, to be in possession of every part and parcel of the property jointly with others. Therefore, in theory, every co-owner has an interest in every infinitesimal portion of the subject matter, each has a right irrespective of the quantity of its interest, to be in possession of every part and parcel of the property jointly with others. A co-owner of a property owns every part of the composite property along with others and he cannot be held to be a fractional owner of the property unless partition takes place……..” (emphasis added) 34. The Hon’ble Court ultimately upheld the conclusion arrived at by the High Court that there was possibility for the appellate court to reverse the judgment of the trial court and in such an eventuality there could have been two contradictory decrees and as such dismissal of the appeal having abated as a whole was upheld. 35. From the above, co-owners are presumed to be interested in the entire property as a whole and as such, the provisions of Section 45 of the Act does not advance the cause of the appellants. 36. So far as the judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Sardar Amarjit Singh Kalra (supra) is concerned, the Hon’ble Court in para 34 of the judgment summarized its finding on the aspect of abatement of suit as a whole or qua the deceased, which reads as under:- “34. In the light of the above discussion, we hold:- (1) Wherever the plaintiffs or appellants or petitioners are found to have distinct, separate and independent rights of their own and for purpose of convenience or otherwise, joined together in a single litigation to vindicate their rights, the decree passed by the Court thereon is to be viewed in substance as the combination of several decrees in favour of one or the other parties and not as a joint and inseverable decree. The same would be the position in the case of defendants or respondents having similar rights contesting the claims against them. The same would be the position in the case of defendants or respondents having similar rights contesting the claims against them. (2) Whenever different and distinct claims of more than one are sought to be vindicated in one single proceedings, as the one now before us, under the Land Acquisition Act or in similar nature of proceedings and/or claims in assertion of individual rights of parties are clubbed, consolidated and dealt with together by the Courts concerned and a single judgment or decree has been passed, it should be treated as a mere combination of several decrees in favour of or against one or more of the parties and not as joint and inseparable decrees. (3) The mere fact that the claims or rights asserted or sought to be vindicated by more than one are similar or identical in nature or by joining together of more than one of such claimants of a particular nature, by itself would not be sufficient in law to treat them as joint claims, so as to render the judgment or decree passed thereon a joint and inseverable one. (4) The question as to whether in a given case the decree is joint and inseverable or joint and severable or separable has to be decided, for the purposes of abatement or dismissal of the entire appeal as not being properly and duly constituted or rendered incompetent for being further proceeded with, requires to be determined only with reference to the fact as to whether the judgment/decree passed in the proceedings vis-a-vis the remaining parties would suffer the vice of contradictory or inconsistent decrees. For that reason, a decree can be said to be contradictory or inconsistent with another decree only when the two decrees are incapable of enforcement or would be mutually self-destructive and that the enforcement of one would negate or render impossible the enforcement of the other.” 37. The Hon’ble Court laid down that wherever the plaintiffs or appellants or petitioners are found to have distinct, separate and independent rights of their own, the decree passed is to be viewed as the combination of several decrees in favour of one or the other parties and not as a joint and inseverable decree. 38. The Hon’ble Court laid down that wherever the plaintiffs or appellants or petitioners are found to have distinct, separate and independent rights of their own, the decree passed is to be viewed as the combination of several decrees in favour of one or the other parties and not as a joint and inseverable decree. 38. In the above case in para 26, the Hon’ble Court found that even if khata was joint the same was of no relevance as long as each one of them had their own independent, distinct and separate shares in the property as found separately indicated in the jamabandi of shares of each of them distinctly and that as each one of the appellants therein had an independent and distinct share of their own, not interdependent upon one or the other of the appellants, the dismissal of the appeals by the High Court in their entirety was not justified. 39. However, in the present case, as noticed hereinbefore, the appellants-plaintiffs are admittedly co-owners and there is no assertion about their shares being distinct and from Section 45 of the Act it cannot be said that they had any distinct share or had any right on a specific portion of the property, therefore, the judgment in Amarjit Singh Kalra (supra) has no application to the facts of the present case. 40. Similarly, in the case of N. Khosla (supra) also the Court came to the conclusion that each of the daughters had a distinct and separate share by metes and bound and based on which it was found that the decree was separate and severable which aspect is absent in the present case. 41. Reference may also be beneficially made to the judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in Municipal Council, Mandsaur vs. Fakirchand & Ors. : (1997) 3 SCC 500 , wherein, in a similar nature proceedings wherein legal representatives of one of the co-owners were not on record when the appeal was pending, the Hon’ble Supreme Court inter alia observed as under: “6. We are, however, unable to accept such contention of Mr. Gambhir for the reason that from the statement made in the plaint it cannot be definitely held that the property was coparceners property which could be represented by a Karta. We are, however, unable to accept such contention of Mr. Gambhir for the reason that from the statement made in the plaint it cannot be definitely held that the property was coparceners property which could be represented by a Karta. It has been alleged in the plaint that after the death of the father, all the three brothers became owners of the said joint Hindu family property. It may be indicated here that if it was a coparcenery property then the son would have been coparceners even before the death of the father and there was no necessity to wait till the death of the father to get ownership of the property. The averments in the plaint really means that the disputed property was the undivided property of the said three joint owners who had inherited the father's interest after his death. That apart, even it is assumed that it was coparcenery property there is nothing on record to indicate that any one member of the eldest male member of the family was acting as a Karta of the joint family. On the contrary, it appears that all the co-owners filed the said suit for injunction, which on the face of it, only indicates that all of them intend to exercise their right as co-owners of the property and they have not authorised any one of them to represent the property as a karta of the joint Hindu family property. In the aforesaid circumstances, the decision of the High Court cannot be said to be erroneous for which any interference by this Court is called for. The appeal, therefore, fails and is dismissed without any order as to costs.” (emphasis added) 42. From the above observations regarding status of the co-owners and the fact that in the present case appellants are indeed co-owners of the property based on the sale deed dated 10/4/1957 and continuation of appeal by the remaining three appellants, if allowed, would result in passing of a contradictory decree, therefore, the appeal would abate as a whole. 43. In view of the above discussion, the applications filed under Order XXII Rule 3 & 9 CPC and Section 5 of the Limitation Act are dismissed. As a consequence and in view of above discussion, the appeal is also dismissed as having abated as a whole. 44. No order as to costs.