ORDER : 1. Leave to delete ground 11(E) of the petition. 2. In this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner has prayed for a writ, order or direction for quashing and setting aside the impugned order dated 10.12.2020 passed by the respondent No.1 Deputy Collector and Election Officer and further for a direction that the name of the respondent No.3 be deleted from the final Voters’ List of Dhrol Constituency in the election of the Jamnagar District Co-operative Bank. 3. Facts in brief are as under: 3.1 The petitioner is a member of the Managing Committee of Shree Vakiya Group Seva Sahakari Mandli Ltd., a primary co-operative society registered under the Societies Act. Vakiya Group Seva Sahakari Mandli Ltd., is a member society of the Jamnagar District Co-operative Bank, whose elections are scheduled to be held. Vakiya Society is therefore entitled to delegate a member of its society to vote for the elections of the Managing Committee of the Jamnagar District Cooperative Bank, a specified society. The petitioner as a member of the Vakiya Group Seva Sahakari Mandli Ltd., on 14.07.2020, addressed a letter to the Chairman of its society raising a grievance that no meeting of the Society has been called for a period of six months when the elections were announced for the Jamnagar District Bank, wherein, the respondent No.3 was the authorized delegate on behalf of the Vakiya Society to vote, the petitioner lodged an objection with the election officer on 02.12.2020. 3.2 In addition to reiterating his grievance of the society not calling a meeting for a period of six months, he objected to the respondent No.3 being authorized to delegate the Society to vote at the election, on the ground that the respondent No.3 has taken loans from various financial institutions for which an inquiry is under progress, and therefore, he cannot be authorized to vote on behalf of the society and his name therefore be deleted from the voters’ list. 3.3 Reliance was placed on bye-law 39(8) of the bye-laws of the society concerned. By the impugned order, the election officer has rejected the objection of the petitioner on the ground that on the basis of the resolution forwarded by the member society together with the original minute book, it is apparent that the respondent No.3 is authorized by the society. By the impugned order, the election officer has rejected the objection of the petitioner on the ground that on the basis of the resolution forwarded by the member society together with the original minute book, it is apparent that the respondent No.3 is authorized by the society. 3.4 As far as the allegation that the respondent No.3 has obtained financial assistance from the HDFC Bank, the election officer opined that it was a term loan for which a No Due Certificate has been produced. The election officer further opined that if in the opinion of the petitioner the respondent No.3 was disqualified in accordance with the byelaw, it was the registrar who would appropriately take a decision. Aggrieved by this communication, the petition is filed. 4. Mr.B.T.Rao, learned advocate appearing for the petitioner, would submit that it is apparent from the revenue records (pages 27,28 and 29) that the petitioner has obtained loan on the basis of mortgaging his lands with the HDFC Bank. The date of the revenue records of 27.07.2020 and the revenue entry recording mortgage of the bank of 29.03.2020 would indicate that on the cut off date and when the provisional voters’ list was prepared on 23.11.2020, the respondent No.3 had obtained loans, and therefore, bye-law 39(8) of the Society would come into play disqualifying the respondent No.3 from being eligible to be a delegate to vote for the Jamnagar District Co-operative Bank. 4.1 Mr.B.T.Rao, learned advocate, would further submit that the order of the Election Officer, though a summary inquiry may be warranted, does not reflect reasons as to on what basis has he arrived at a conclusion that the respondent No.3 had a No Due Certificate when a copy thereof was not even furnished to the objector / petitioner. 4.2 Reliance was placed on Rule 23 of the specified rules, 1982, to submit that it is incumbent for a returning officer to reject the nomination of a candidate who is disqualified for being chosen to fill in the seat under the bye-laws. 4.3 Mr.B.T.Rao, learned advocate, would further submit that Section 23 could not have been relied upon by the Election Officer, because it was not the case of the petitioner that the respondent should be disqualified. 4.3 Mr.B.T.Rao, learned advocate, would further submit that Section 23 could not have been relied upon by the Election Officer, because it was not the case of the petitioner that the respondent should be disqualified. In support of his submission that the Election Officer is a quasi judicial authority and is therefore bound to give reasons in passing an order, reliance was placed on a decision of this Court rendered in Special Civil Application No. 14267 with SCA 14268 of 2018 in the case of Jakhora Group Telibiya Utpadak Sahakari Mandali Ltd vs. State of Gujarat. Reliance was placed on para 16 to submit that when proceedings are quasi judicial in nature, the order in absence of reasons would become vulnerable. 5. Ms.Manisha Lavkumar, learned Government Pleader, with Ms. Aishwarya Gupta, learned AGP appearing for the State, drew the attention of the Court to the relevant provisions of the Gujarat Specified Co-Operative Society Election Rules, 1982, namely, Rules 3 (A), 3 (B), 4, 5 & 6 and submitted that if the scheme of rules, particularly Rule 3(A) & Rule 3(B) are seen, the Jamnagar District Co-operative Bank, the specified society in this case, would invite the member Societies to forward their list of voters from the societies concerned. Such a list would be prepared in accordance with Rule 4 and such list would simultaneously be sent to the Collector with details, including all details of members who are disqualified to vote as per the provisions of the Act, Rules or bye-laws. 5.1 Relying on sub-rule 2 of Rule 5, Ms. Lavkumar, learned Government Pleader, submitted that where a society is a member of the specified society, the specified society shall call for the name of the delegate, duly authorized to vote at an election on behalf of such valid society. In the present case, the respondent No.3 has been delegated, duly authorized to vote on behalf of Vakiya Group Seva Sahakari Mandli. Relying on Rule 6, she would submit that only a member of the Society concerned who is a voter or any delegate authorized to vote on behalf of such society would have locus to file such objections. The petitioner would, therefore, even otherwise would have no locus for filing objections. She would submit that in accordance with the rules, an inquiry of a summary nature has been carried out. The petitioner would, therefore, even otherwise would have no locus for filing objections. She would submit that in accordance with the rules, an inquiry of a summary nature has been carried out. The essential grievance, therefore, according to the learned Government Pleader Ms.Lavkumar of the petitioner vis-a-vis the respondent No.3 was of the Society not calling a meeting and / or having taken a loan and therefore incurring disqualification, which the election officer had rightly held to be within the domain of Section 23 of the Act. On the basis of the information provided, the election officer had taken a decision, and therefore, such a decision cannot be said to have suffered from being an unreasoned order. 6. Mr.Dipen Desai, learned advocate appearing for respondent No.3, would also adopt the submissions of the learned Government Pleader. However, in addition thereto, Mr.Desai, learned advocate, would also reiterate by inviting the attention of the Court to Rule 32 of the Gujarat Co- Operative Societies Rules, 1965, with regard to qualification of the members of the Committee. He would rely on Rule 1(A) submitting that a member of the Committee who incurs any disqualification specified in Rule 1 shall be so removed by the registrar. 6.1 Mr.Desai, learned advocate, challenging the locus of the petitioner would rely on Rule 6. Essentially according to Mr.Dipen Desai, learned advocate, as is reflected from the affidavit-in-reply filed, it was a dispute inter se between two members of the Vakiya Group Mandali, and therefore, if such a dispute was to be raised, it was to be done so in accordance with Section 96 of the Act. In the present case, the Vakiya Society, a member society, had authorized the respondent No.3 as a delegate to vote for the Managing Committee Elections of the Jamnagar Bank and the dispute inter-se was between two members of that society which had delegated. 6.2 Even otherwise, Mr.Desai, learned advocate, would submit that it is a bye-law of the specified society which needs to be seen when a disqualification for the purposes of voting is to be inquired in to. Even otherwise, bye-law 39(8) of the bank was in context of the nature of loan of the kind which the society would advance, and the election officer had rightly opined that in the present case it was a term loan. Even otherwise, bye-law 39(8) of the bank was in context of the nature of loan of the kind which the society would advance, and the election officer had rightly opined that in the present case it was a term loan. He relied on the decision of this Court in the case of Arvindbhai Singhabhai Gamit vs. Election Officer and Deputy Collector and another., reported in 2012 (3) GLH 881 , specially paras 6 and 7 thereof and submitted that scrutiny of an election officer ought to be reflected to make a summary inquiry incurred vis-a-vis disqualification for being nominated, and this being a summary inquiry, the returning officer cannot transgress the limit and enter into an area regarding alleged disqualification in exercise of weighing evidence to decide upon the genuineness or reliabililty of any evidence. 7 Having considered the submissions of the learned advocates for the respective parties, what is evident is as under : (i) Reading the scheme of the Rules, particularly Rules 4, 5 and 6 of the Specified Society Election Rules, 1982, though Mr.B.T.Rao, learned advocate for the petitioner, would submit that every person, as per sub-rule 2 of Rule 6 would be entitled to make any claim or raise any objection, what needs to be appreciated is that it has to be read in context of the provisions in entirety. Reading thereof would make it apparent that only that member of the society concerned who is a voter or any delegate authorized to vote on behalf of such society would be entitled to file objections to the list of the voters. (ii) In the case on hand, the spirit of the objections when read in light of the communication of the petitioner dated 14.07.2020 and the objection albeit also additional when the petitioner objected to the respondent No.3 having secured a loan from other financial institutions, therefore committing breach of the societies bye-law 39(8), reading Rule 32 of the 1965 Rules, with that of Section 23 of the Co-operative Societies Act, it was a case where two members inter-se of a member society who were entitled to vote with a specified society had a conflict of interest. Apparently therefore, I would agree with the submissions of the learned Government Pleader supported by Shri Dipen Desai, learned advocate, that such an objection to the provisional voters’ list could not have been filed by the petitioner who was a rank outsider. (iii) On the basis of the scheme of the specified societies rules, what was necessary for the election officer was to see whether the provisional list of voters sent to him was in accordance with the resolution of the society. It was, therefore, in the nature of a summary inquiry which the election officer conducted on those twin aspects of it being forwarded with the resolution and the minute book extract. It was not within the domain of the election officer to decide a private dispute between two members of a voting society whose members inter-se disputed the authority of the society to delegate the respondent No.3, that did not fall within the domain of the election officer as held by this Court in the case of Arvindbhai Singhabhai Gamit (supra), para 6 and 7 thereof reads as under: “6. Perusal of the above relevant provisions clearly reveal an integrated scheme providing for a very limited, restricted and expeditious scrutiny of the nomination papers by the returning officer, leaving for him only the simple task of deciding upon rejection or acceptance of nominations only on the basis of apparent or reliable and authenticated proof of disqualification incurred by a candidate under Section 145F of the Act. He shall have no jurisdiction or legal authority to delve into the right of the nominee to stand for election if he is already on the voters list and not disqualified, as aforesaid, under the provisions of Section 145F of the Act. Of course, there are three other formal grounds enumerated in Rule 23 (2) (b), (c) and (d), on which any nomination could be rejected, after affording to the candidate concerned an opportunity to rebut, latest by the next day from the date of scrutiny, the material appearing against him. The provisions of Section 145Y authorizes the State Government to make Rules generally to provide for and regulate all or any of the other matters relating to various stages of the elections, but such Rules are expressly required to be consistent with the Act. The provisions of Section 145Y authorizes the State Government to make Rules generally to provide for and regulate all or any of the other matters relating to various stages of the elections, but such Rules are expressly required to be consistent with the Act. Therefore, when express provisions of Section 145F prescribe disqualifications for being member of the committee of any specified society, it is questionable whether the State Government can indirectly amend the provisions of Section 145F by prescribing additional grounds of disqualification in the Rules by including disqualifications prescribed in the byelaws of the society. Even as the validity of the Rules and the byelaws is not challenged in the petition, they could be invoked at proper stage when the list of voters is finalized under Rule6, so as to impart full meaning and effect to Rule 23 (7). That leads to the inescapable conclusion that the authority of the returning officer in examining nomination papers and deciding all objections is restricted to only making a summary enquiry, if any, as to whether the candidate has incurred any disqualification for being elected and whether the nomination was in order and complying with the relevant Rules. As the title and language of Rule 23 clearly suggests, it is the scrutiny of nomination papers and, by no stretch, an adjudication of disqualification of the candidate that falls within statutory duty of the returning officer. If he transgresses that limit and enters into the area of accepting or collecting evidence regarding alleged disqualification of a candidate and indulges in exercise of weighing evidence, without any means or power to decide upon genuineness or reliability of any evidence, the minimum requirement of compliance with the principles of natural justice would arise. However, clear operative words in the Rule being ‘summary inquiry’ and not an adjudication, the returning officer would obviously be required to decide the issue of disqualification or rejection or acceptance of the nomination paper only on the basis of material placed before him; and having regard to the provisions of Rule 5, 6 and 23 (7) it would require authentic and genuine documentary evidence about disqualification of the candidate for rejecting his nomination after giving him an opportunity to rebut such evidence. In order to ensure proper, upright and impartial approach of the officers involved in such elections, specific provisions are made in Chapter XIA of the Act, including the provisions as under in Section 145L. “145L Officers etc. at election not to act for candidates or to influence voting. (1) No person who is a Returning Officer or an Assistant Returning Officer or a Presiding or a Polling Officer at an election or an officer or clerk, appointed by the Returning Officer or the Presiding Officer to perform any duty in connection with an election shall in the conduct or the management of the election do any act (other than the giving of vote) for the furtherance of the prospect of the election of a candidate. (2) ............... (3) Any person who contravenes the provisions of sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) shall, on conviction, be punished with imprisonment which may extend to six months or with fine or with both. (4) An offence punishable under sub section (3) shall be cognizable offence.” 7. As seen earlier, in the facts of the present case, admittedly respondent no.1, the election officer had accepted the objections from respondent no.2 and sent written enquiry to SUMUL and received their response, even before the date of scrutiny of nomination papers. He had also permitted, in clear violation of the provisions of Rule 23 (1), two persons posing as secretary and director of the primary society to attend the scrutiny and allowed production of the alleged original record of that society, for respondent no.2 to substantiate that name of the petitioner did not appear in the monthly payment sheet of the society for the period from 1.6.2011 to 28.2.2012. The monthly payment sheets for a part of the year, even if genuine, may not be conclusive proof of non-supply of milk by the petitioner insofar as payments for milk supplied by him were claimed to have been received on his behalf by his son, whose name was reflected against his code number. The monthly payment sheets for a part of the year, even if genuine, may not be conclusive proof of non-supply of milk by the petitioner insofar as payments for milk supplied by him were claimed to have been received on his behalf by his son, whose name was reflected against his code number. As recorded in the impugned order and the affidavit of respondent no.1, after some time, the petitioner was shown such record to show his name in the payment sheets; and then it is deposed that the petitioner had failed to produce any document to prove that the record produced by respondent no.2 was not original and genuine, due to which he was left with no alternative but to reject nomination of the petitioner. As against that, it is the specific case of the petitioner that copies of written objections submitted by respondent no.2 were never supplied to the petitioner. Even as authentic certificates issued by his society and SUMUL in favour of the petitioner, annexed to the petition as Annexure D, E and F, clearly reveal that he had supplied milk as required and he was not a defaulter in respect of any outstanding amount, those documents were totally ignored by the Returning Officer. It was held by the Constitution Bench of the Apex Court way back in the year 1954 in Durga Shankar Mehta v. Raghuraj Singh and Others [ AIR 1954 SC 520 ], in the context of similar provisions of the Representation of the People Act, as under: “8. ........................... the electoral roll is conclusive as to the qualification of the elector except where a disqualification is expressly alleged or proved. .................. It would have been an improper acceptance, if the want of qualification was apparent on the electoral roll itself or on the face of the nomination paper and the Returning Officer overlooked that defect or if any objection was raised and enquiry made as to the absence of qualification in the candidate and the Returning Officer came to a wrong conclusion on the material placed before him. When neither of these things happened, the acceptance of the nomination by the Returning Officer must be deemed to be a proper acceptance. It is certainly not final and the Election Tribunal may, on evidence placed before it, come to a finding that the candidate was not qualified at all. When neither of these things happened, the acceptance of the nomination by the Returning Officer must be deemed to be a proper acceptance. It is certainly not final and the Election Tribunal may, on evidence placed before it, come to a finding that the candidate was not qualified at all. But the election should be held to be void on the ground of the constitutional disqualification of the candidate and not on the ground that his nomination was improperly accepted by the Returning Officer. ................” It was also observed in a different context in Virindar Kumar Satyawadi v. The State of Punjab [ AIR 1956 SC 153 (1)] that under Section 36 (2) (of the Representation of the People Act), the returning officer has to examine the nomination paper and decide all objections which may be made thereto. This power is undoubtedly judicial in character. But in exercising this power, he is authorized to come to a decision “after such summary enquiry, if any, as he thinks necessary”. That means that the parties have no right to insist on producing evidence which they may desire to adduce in support of their case. There is no machinery provided for summoning of witnesses, or of compelling production of documents in an enquiry under Section 36.” 8. Accordingly, I find no reasons to interfere with the order of the Election Officer and the petition is dismissed, accordingly.