Mohit Kumar Shah, J.—The present petition has been taken up for consideration through the mode of Video conferencing in view of the prevailing situation on account of COVID 19 Pandemic, requiring social distancing. 2. The present writ petition has been filed to stay the departmental proceeding in question i.e. Bhagalpur District Departmental Inquiry No. 59 of 2020 till disposal of the Vigilance PS Case No. 13 of 2019 dated 25.03.2019 (Special Case No. 12 of 2019) pending before the learned Special Court, Vigilance, Patna. 3. The brief facts of the case, according to the petitioner is that he joined as a Constable on 20.01.1995 in the district of Gaya, whereafter he was transferred to Patna, then to Vaishali and again back to Patna in the Vigilance Department. The petitioner is thereafter, stated to have been transferred to Bhagalpur District where he joined on 31.01.2019 and has been working there since then. It is stated that one Vigilance P.S. Case No. 13 of 2019 dated 25.03.2019 under Section 13(2) read with 13(1)b of the Prevention of Corruption Act and Sections 109/120 of the Indian Penal Code was registered against the petitioner and his wife Nunnu Devi alleging therein that the petitioner, right from 20.01.1995 till 14.03.2018, by misusing his post, has amassed disproportionate property to the tune of Rs. 2,50,92,753/-, over and above his earning from known source of income. A departmental enquiry bearing Bhagalpur District Departmental Inquiry No. 136 of 2019 was initiated against the petitioner on the allegation that though the petitioner had taken a leave of 7 days but he had overstayed for 182 days and cursorily it was stated in the charge sheet that the petitioner has amassed property more than his known source of income for which he has been made an accused in Vigilance PS Case No. 13 of 2019. The Enquiry Officer had found the charge pertaining to the petitioner having overstayed his leave to have been proved, whereafter the disciplinary authority i.e. the Senior Superintendent of Police, Bhagalpur had inflicted punishment of forfeiture of increments for six months, equivalent to one black mark, as also the salary of the petitioner for a period of 182 days was forfeited on the principle of ‘no work no pay’, vide Order dated 31.12.2019. The petitioner had then filed an appeal before the D.I.G., Bhagalpur against the aforesaid order dated 31.12.2019 which is stated to be pending. The petitioner had then filed an appeal before the D.I.G., Bhagalpur against the aforesaid order dated 31.12.2019 which is stated to be pending. It appears that on the basis of the aforesaid Vigilance Case, the disciplinary authority had initiated yet another departmental proceeding vide Bhagalpur District Order No. 2522/2020 dated 10.09.2020, bearing Bhagalpur District Departmental Inquiry No. 59 of 2020, on the allegation of him along with his wife having amassed disproportionate wealth/assets and by misusing his post for corrupt purposes, having amassed disproportionate properties/money unknown to his legitimate source of income which depicts gross negligence and is also indicative of the petitioner being a corrupt police personnel. The learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the departmental proceeding initiated by the respondents vide order dated 10.09.2020 as also the criminal proceeding arising out of Vigilance Case No. 13 of 2019 dated 25.03.2019 are based on the same set of facts and evidence in both the proceedings is common, as such the defence of the petitioner in the criminal case shall be prejudiced in case the disciplinary proceeding is not stayed and moreover the charge/allegation leveled against the petitioner involves complicated question of law and fact. The learned counsel for the petitioner has relied on a judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Kusheshwar Dubey vs. Ms/ Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. & Ors. reported in (1988) 4 SCC 319 . 4. Per contra, the learned counsel for the State has submitted that grave charges have been levelled in the ongoing departmental proceeding against the petitioner of having amassed property more than his known source of income. It is submitted that an enquiry in a departmental proceeding relates to conduct or breach of duty of the delinquent officer to punish him for his misconduct defined under the relevant statutory rules or law. The strict standard of proof or applicability of the Evidence Act stands excluded. It is submitted that an enquiry in a departmental proceeding relates to conduct or breach of duty of the delinquent officer to punish him for his misconduct defined under the relevant statutory rules or law. The strict standard of proof or applicability of the Evidence Act stands excluded. The enquiry in the departmental proceedings relates to the conduct of the delinquent officer and proof in that behalf is not as high as in an offence in criminal charge whereas a criminal prosecution is launched for an offence for violation of a duty, the offender owes to the society or for breach of which law has provided that the offender shall make satisfaction to the public and in a criminal trial strict provisions of Indian Evidence Act are required to be followed, and moreover a departmental proceeding is a quasi judicial proceeding and the mode/manner of conduct of departmental proceeding is quite different from the procedure followed in the conduct of a trial in a criminal case. It is submitted that there is no legal bar for both the departmental proceeding as well as the criminal proceeding being conducted simultaneously as is apparent from the judgment referred to by the learned counsel for the petitioner in the case of Kusheshwar Dubey (supra). 5. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and gone through the materials on record. The issue under consideration in the present case is no longer res integra inasmuch as the law has been well settled by the Hon’ble Apex Court in a catena of judgments, which are being enumerated herein below:— (i) Reported in (1997) 2 SCC 699 (Depot Manager, A.P. SRTC vs. Mohd. Yousuf Miya). (ii) Reported in (1996) 6 SCC 417 (State of Rajasthan vs. B.K. Meena and ors). (iii) Reported in (1999) 3 SCC 679 (Capt. M. Paul Anthony vs. Bharat Gold Mines Ltd. & Another). (iv) Reported in (2014) 3 SCC 636 (Stanzen Toyotetsu India Private Ltd. vs. Girish V. and others). (v) Reported SBI vs. Neelam Nag, (2016) 9 SCC 491 . 6. Without going into the details of all the judgments referred to herein above by me, it would suffice to reproduce paragraph nos. 13 to 18 and 27 of the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Neelam Nag (supra) herein below:— “13. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties at some length. 6. Without going into the details of all the judgments referred to herein above by me, it would suffice to reproduce paragraph nos. 13 to 18 and 27 of the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Neelam Nag (supra) herein below:— “13. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties at some length. The only question that arises for consideration is no more res integra. It is well settled that there is no legal bar to the conduct of the disciplinary proceedings and criminal trial simultaneously. However, no straitjacket formula can be spelt out and the Court has to keep in mind the broad approach to be adopted in such matters on case-to-case basis. The contour of the approach to be adopted by the Court has been delineated in a series of decisions. 14. This Court in Karnataka SRTC vs. M.G. Vittal Rao [Karnataka SRTC vs. M.G. Vittal Rao, (2012) 1 SCC 442 : (2012) 1 SCC (L&S) 171] has summed up the same in the following words: (i) There is no legal bar for both the proceedings to go on simultaneously. (ii) The only valid ground for claiming that the disciplinary proceedings may be stayed would be to ensure that the defence of the employee in the criminal case may not be prejudiced. But even such grounds would be available only in cases involving complex questions of facts or law. (iii) Such defence ought not to be permitted to unnecessarily delay the departmental proceedings. The interest of the delinquent officer as well as the employer clearly lies in a prompt conclusion of the disciplinary proceedings. (iv) Departmental proceedings can go on simultaneously to the criminal trial, except where both the proceedings are based on the same set of facts and the evidence in both the proceedings is common. (emphasis supplied) 15. The recent decision relied on by the appellant in Stanzen [Stanzen Toyotetsu India (P) Ltd. vs. Girish V., (2014) 3 SCC 636 ], has adverted to the relevant decisions [Hindustan Petroleum Corpn. Ltd. vs. Sarvesh Berry, (2005) 10 SCC 471 ; Capt. M. Paul Anthony vs. Bharat Gold Mines Ltd., (1999) 3 SCC 679 ; A.P. SRTC vs. Mohd. Yousuf Miya, (1997) 2 SCC 699 and State of Rajasthan vs. B.K. Meena, (1996) 6 SCC 417 ] including M.G. Vittal Rao [Karnataka SRTC vs. M.G. Vittal Rao, (2012) 1 SCC 442 ]. Ltd. vs. Sarvesh Berry, (2005) 10 SCC 471 ; Capt. M. Paul Anthony vs. Bharat Gold Mines Ltd., (1999) 3 SCC 679 ; A.P. SRTC vs. Mohd. Yousuf Miya, (1997) 2 SCC 699 and State of Rajasthan vs. B.K. Meena, (1996) 6 SCC 417 ] including M.G. Vittal Rao [Karnataka SRTC vs. M.G. Vittal Rao, (2012) 1 SCC 442 ]. After adverting to those decisions, in para 16, this Court opined as under: “16. Suffice it to say that while there is no legal bar to the holding of the disciplinary proceedings and the criminal trial simultaneously, stay of disciplinary proceedings may be an advisable course in cases where the criminal charge against the employee is grave and continuance of the disciplinary proceedings is likely to prejudice their defence before the criminal court. Gravity of the charge is, however, not by itself enough to determine the question unless the charge involves complicated question of law and fact. The court examining the question must also keep in mind that criminal trials get prolonged indefinitely especially where the number of accused arraigned for trial is large as is the case at hand and so are the number of witnesses cited by the prosecution. The court, therefore, has to draw a balance between the need for a fair trial to the accused on the one hand and the competing demand for an expeditious conclusion of the ongoing disciplinary proceedings on the other. An early conclusion of the disciplinary proceedings has itself been seen by this Court to be in the interest of the employees.” (emphasis supplied) 16. The Court then went on to examine the facts of that case and observed in para 18 as follows: “18. … The charge-sheet, it is evident from the record, was filed on 20-8-2011. The charges were framed on 20-12-2011. The trial court has ever since then examined only three witnesses so far out of a total of 23 witnesses cited in the charge-sheet. Going by the pace at which the trial court is examining the witnesses, it would take another five years before the trial may be concluded. The High Court has in the judgment [Stanzen Toyotetsu India (P) Ltd. vs. Girish V., 2012 SCC OnLine Kar 8817] under appeal given five months to the trial court to conclude the trial. Going by the pace at which the trial court is examining the witnesses, it would take another five years before the trial may be concluded. The High Court has in the judgment [Stanzen Toyotetsu India (P) Ltd. vs. Girish V., 2012 SCC OnLine Kar 8817] under appeal given five months to the trial court to conclude the trial. More than fifteen months has rolled by ever since that order, without the trial going anywhere near completion. The disciplinary proceedings cannot remain stayed for an indefinitely long period. Such inordinate delay is neither in the interest of the appellant Company nor the respondents who are under suspension and surviving on subsistence allowance.” (emphasis supplied) In para 19, the Court proceeded to conclude thus: (SCC p. 644) “19. In the circumstances and taking into consideration all aspects mentioned above as also keeping in view the fact that all the three courts below have exercised their discretion in favour of staying the ongoing disciplinary proceedings, we do not consider it fit to vacate the said order straightaway. Interests of justice would, in our opinion, be sufficiently served if we direct the court dealing with the criminal charges against the respondents to conclude the proceedings as expeditiously as possible but in any case within a period of one year from the date of this order. We hope and trust that the trial court will take effective steps to ensure that the witnesses are served, appear and are examined. The court may for that purpose adjourn the case for no more than a fortnight every time an adjournment is necessary. We also expect the accused in the criminal case to cooperate with the trial court for an early completion of the proceedings. We say so because experience has shown that the trials often linger on for a long time on account of non-availability of the defence lawyers to cross-examine the witnesses or on account of adjournments sought by them on the flimsiest of the grounds. All that needs to be avoided. In case, however, the trial is not completed within the period of one year from the date of this order, despite the steps which the trial court has been directed to take the disciplinary proceedings initiated against the respondents shall be resumed and concluded by the inquiry officer concerned. All that needs to be avoided. In case, however, the trial is not completed within the period of one year from the date of this order, despite the steps which the trial court has been directed to take the disciplinary proceedings initiated against the respondents shall be resumed and concluded by the inquiry officer concerned. The impugned orders shall in that case stand vacated upon expiry of the period of one year from the date of the order.” 17 [Ed.: Paras 17 and 18 corrected vide Order dated 9-11-2016.]. Reverting to the facts of the present case, indisputably, the alleged misconduct has been committed as far back as May 2006. The FIR was registered on 5-12-2006 and the charge-sheet was filed in the said criminal case on 6.2.2007. The contents of the charge-sheet are indicative of involvement of Respondent 1 in the alleged offence. Resultantly, the criminal court has framed charges against Respondent 1 as far back as 12.6.2007. The trial of that case, however, has not made any effective progress. Only 3 witnesses have been examined by the prosecution, out of 18 witnesses cited in the charge-sheet filed before the criminal court. Indeed, listing of criminal case on 133 different dates after framing of charges is not solely attributable to Respondent 1. From the information made available by the Additional Superintendent of Police on affidavit, it does indicate that at least 26 adjournments are directly attributable to the accused in the criminal case. That is not an insignificant fact. This is in spite of the direction given by the Division Bench on 28.6.2010, to the criminal court concerned to proceed with the trial on day-to-day basis. The progress of the criminal case since then, by no means, can be said to be satisfactory. The fact that the prosecution has named 18 witnesses does not mean that all the witnesses are material witness for substantiating the factum of involvement of Respondent 1 in introducing the co-accused for opening a new bank account, to misplace the clearing instruments relating to various customers or for the payment released to the undeserving customer causing huge financial loss to the Bank. The charge in the criminal case is for the offences under Sections 409 and 34 IPC, one of criminal breach of trust by a public servant. 18 [Ed.: Paras 17 and 18 corrected vide Order dated 9-11-2016.]. The charge in the criminal case is for the offences under Sections 409 and 34 IPC, one of criminal breach of trust by a public servant. 18 [Ed.: Paras 17 and 18 corrected vide Order dated 9-11-2016.]. In the peculiar facts of the present case, therefore, we accede to the contention of the appellants that the pendency of the criminal case against the respondent cannot be the sole basis to suspend the disciplinary proceedings initiated against Respondent 1 for an indefinite period; and in larger public interest, the order as passed in Stanzen case [Stanzen Toyotetsu India (P) Ltd. vs. Girish V., (2014) 3 SCC 636 : (2014) 1 SCC (L&S) 641] be followed even in the fact situation of the present case, to balance the equities. 27 [Ed.: Paras 23, 24, 25 and 27 corrected vide Order dated 9-11-2016.]. Accordingly, we exercise discretion in favour of Respondent 1 of staying the ongoing disciplinary proceedings until the closure of recording of evidence of prosecution witnesses cited in the criminal trial, as directed by the Division Bench of the High Court and do not consider it fit to vacate that arrangement straightaway. Instead, in our opinion, interests of justice would be sufficiently served by directing the criminal case pending against Respondent 1 to be decided expeditiously but not later than one year from the date of this order. The trial court shall take effective steps to ensure that the witnesses are served, appear and are examined on day-to-day basis. In case any adjournment becomes inevitable, it should not be for more than a fortnight, when necessary.” 7. Now coming back to the present case, in order to ascertain as to whether the charges levelled against the petitioner in the criminal case i.e Vigilance Case No. 13 of 2019 are grave or not, as to whether continuance of the disciplinary proceeding would prejudice his defence before the criminal court, whether the criminal case involves complicated question of law and facts and finally as to whether both the departmental proceeding as well as the criminal case are based on same and similar charge/ allegation, it would be relevant to first refer to the complaint filed by the informant i.e. the Inspector of police-cum- Investigating Officer, Vigilance Investigation Bureau, leading to lodging of Vigilance P.S. Case No. 13 of 2019 dated 25.03.2019 against the petitioner and his wife, herein below:— 8. It would also be useful to reproduce the article of charges framed against the petitioner, the statement of allegations in support of the charges and the documents sought to be relied upon by the prosecution for substantiating the charges along with the list of witnesses herein below:— 9. A bare perusal of the written complaint filed by the informant i.e. the Inspector of police-cum-Investigating Officer, Vigilance Investigation Bureau, leading to lodging of the aforesaid FIR bearing Vigilance P.S. Case No. 13 of 2019 dated 25.03.2019 against the petitioner and his wife as also the article of charges framed against the petitioner in the ongoing departmental proceeding including the statement of allegations in support of the charges, the document sought to be produced for substantiating the charges and the list of witnesses pertaining to the departmental proceeding initiated against the petitioner bearing Bhagalpur District Departmental Inquiry No. 59 of 2020, would show that both the departmental proceeding as well as the criminal case are based on same and similar charges/allegations. This Court also finds that the criminal case, as aforesaid, not only involves complicated question of law and facts but the charge levelled against the petitioner in the criminal case is grave as also documents and witnesses sought to be produced i.e. the evidence sought to be led in both the criminal case as also the departmental proceeding are overlapping, hence continuance of disciplinary proceeding is likely to prejudice the defence of the petitioner in the criminal trial, before the criminal court. Thus this Court is of the view that it would be just, legal and in the interest of justice to stay the departmental proceeding till the conclusion of the criminal trial. 10. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, I direct that the further proceedings of the departmental proceeding bearing Bhagalpur District Departmental Inquiry No. 59 of 2020 shall remain stayed till conclusion of the trial of the aforesaid Vigilance P.S. Case No. 13 of 2019 dated 25.03.2019, however, the petitioner is directed to cooperate in the ongoing trial pertaining to the said Vigilance Case and in case the respondents find that the petitioner is creating any impediment in expeditious conclusion of the criminal trial, they would be at liberty to approach this Court for vacation of the stay being granted by this Court qua the departmental proceeding in question. 11. The writ petition stands allowed.