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2021 DIGILAW 122 (GAU)

E. E. Pangteang v. Chotisuh Sazo

2021-02-11

SONGKHUPCHUNG SERTO

body2021
JUDGMENT : Songkhupchung Serto, J. 1. I.A. (C) No. 102(K) of 2020 is filed by 7 (seven) MLA's who were elected to the 13th Nagaland Legislative Assembly through Naga People Front ticket (NPF, in short) whose disqualification was sought by the petitioners in the writ petition but rejected by the Hon'ble Speaker of the Nagaland Legislative Assembly vide his judgment & order dated 14.07.2020. 2. By filing this IA the applicants are seeking for dismissal of the writ petition i.e. W.P.(C) No. 95(K) filed by the applicants before Hon'ble Speaker on the ground that the grounds given in the writ petition based on which interference of this Court is sought for are not within the four grounds settled in the case of Kihoto Hollohan Vs. Zachillhu & Ors., reported in 1992 Supp. (2) SCC 651 which was followed in the case of Jagit Singh Vs. State of Haryana & Ors., reported in (2006) 11 SCC 1 ; and in the case of Shri Manth Balasaheb Patil Vs. Speaker, Karnataka Legislative Assembly & Ors., reported in (2020) 2 SCC 595 . 3. The other I.A.(C) No. 11(K) of 2021 is filed by the petitioners in the writ petition praying for restraining the 7(seven) MLA's who are applicants in the other I.A. mentioned above (whose disqualification is under challenge) from entering the Nagaland Legislative Assembly during the forth coming Assembly Sessions which is stated to be starting from 12.02.2021. 4. Heard Mr. D.K. Mishra, learned Sr. counsel assisted by Mr. S.S. Dey, learned Sr. counsel on behalf of the applicants in the I.A. (C) No. 102(K) of 2020/the respondents No. 2 to 8 in the I.A.(C) No. 11(K) of 2021 and in the writ petition. I have also heard Mr. S. Borgohain, learned counsel appearing for the opposite party No. 1 & 2 in the I.A.(C) No. 102 (K) of 2020/the applicants in the I.A.(C) No. 11(K) of 2021 and the petitioners in the writ petition i.e. W.P.(C) No. 95(K) of 2020. Mr. N. Dutta, learned Sr. Advocate appearing for the opposite party No. 1 in the I.A.(C) No. 102(K) of 2020 and the I.A.(C) No. 11 (K) of 2021 and the respondent No. 1 in the writ petition. 5. Mr. D.K. Mishra, learned Sr. Mr. N. Dutta, learned Sr. Advocate appearing for the opposite party No. 1 in the I.A.(C) No. 102(K) of 2020 and the I.A.(C) No. 11 (K) of 2021 and the respondent No. 1 in the writ petition. 5. Mr. D.K. Mishra, learned Sr. counsel by referring to 10th Schedule of the Constitution of India particularly, paragraph-2, 6 & 7 submitted that the question of disqualification has to be decided by the Speaker of the Assembly and it is within his exclusive domain. The learned Sr. counsel also submitted that the Speaker's decision is final and it excludes every institution including the Court from interfering with the decision of the Speaker. However, as it has been held in Kihoto Hollohan's case that judicial review which is basic structure of the Constitution cannot be taken away but, interference of Court would be limited only on four grounds viz.; (a) Whether the action of the Speaker under challenge is ultra-vires the power confer on him under the 10th Schedule of the Constitution of India. (b) If the action/order is vitiated by mala fide or is based on extraneous and irrelevant consideration and; (c) If the action/order of the Speaker is violative of the principle of natural justice. (d) If the decision is perverse. In support of his submission, the learned counsel referred to paragraph-14, 17 & 109 of the judgment passed in the case of Kihoto Hollohan Vs. Zachillhu & Ors., reported in 1992 Supp (2) SCC 651. The same reads as follows; "14. Paragraph 2(1)(b) deals with a slightly different situation i.e. a variant where dissent becomes defection. If a Member while remaining a Member of the political party which had set him up as a candidate at the election, votes or abstains from voting contrary to "any direction" issued by the political party to which he belongs or by any person or authority authorised by it in this behalf he incurs the disqualification. In other words, it deals with a Member who expresses his dissent from the stand of the political party to which he belongs by voting or abstaining from voting in the House contrary to the direction issued by the political party. 17. The challenge to the constitutional validity of the Amendment which introduces the Tenth Schedule is sought to be sustained of many grounds. 17. The challenge to the constitutional validity of the Amendment which introduces the Tenth Schedule is sought to be sustained of many grounds. It is urged that the constitutional Amendment introducing Paragraph 7 of the Tenth Schedule, in terms and in effect, seeks to make a change in Chapter IV of Part V of the Constitution in that it denudes the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under Article 136 of the Constitution of India and in Chapter V of part VI in that it takes away the jurisdiction of the High Courts under Article 226 and that, therefore, the legislative Bill, before presentation to the President for assent, would require to be ratified by the Legislature of not less than one half of the States by resolution to that effect. In view of the admitted position that no such ratification was obtained for the Bill, it is contended, the whole Amending Bill not merely Paragraph 7 fails and the amendment merely remains an abortive attempt to bring about an amendment. It is further contended that the very concept of disqualification for defection is violative of the fundamental values and principles underlying Parliamentary democracy and violates an elected representative's freedom of speech, right to dissent and freedom of conscience and is, therefore, unconstitutional as destructive of a basic feature of the Indian Constitution. It is also urged that the investiture in the Speaker or the Chairman of the power to adjudicate disputed defections would violate an important incident of another basic feature of the Constitution, viz., Parliamentary democracy. It is contended that an independent, fair and impartial machinery for resolution of electoral disputes is an essential and important incident of democracy and that the vesting of the power of adjudication in the Speaker or the Chairman-who, in the India Parliamentary system are nominees of political parties and are not obliged to resign their party affiliations after election-is violative of this requirement. 109. In the light of the decisions referred to above and the nature of function that is exercised by the Speaker/Chairman under paragraph 6, the scope of judicial review under Articles 136, 226 and 227 of the Constitution in respect of an order passed by the Speaker/Chairman under paragraph 6 would be confined to jurisdictional errors only viz., infirmities based on violation of constitutional mandate, mala fides, non-compliance with rules of natural justice and perversity." Mr. Mishra also referred to the paragraph-11 to 14 of the judgment passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Jagit Singh Vs. State of Haryana & Ors., reported in (2006) 11 SCC 1 . The relevant paragraphs of the judgment are reproduced here below; "11. The Speaker, while exercising power to disqualify members, acts as a Tribunal and though validity of the orders, thus, passed can be questioned in the writ jurisdiction of this Court or High Courts, the scope of judicial review is limited as laid down by the Constitution Bench in Kihoto Hollohan v. Zachillhu & Ors. 1992 supp. (2) SCC 651. The orders can be challenged on the ground of ultra vires or mala fides or having been made in colourable exercise of power based on extraneous and irrelevant considerations. The order would be a nullity if rules of natural justice are violated. 12. The requirement to comply with the principles of natural justice is also recognized in rules made by the Speaker in exercise of powers conferred by paragraph 8 of the Tenth Schedule. The Speaker, Haryana Legislative Assembly, made the Haryana Legislative Assembly (Disqualification of Members on ground of Defection) Rules, 1986 in exercise of power conferred by paragraph 8 of the Tenth Schedule. Rule 7(7), inter alia, provides that neither the Speaker nor the Committee shall come to any finding that a Member has become subject to disqualification under the Tenth Schedule without affording a reasonable opportunity to such member to represent his case and to be heard in person. 13. The question whether reasonable opportunity has been provided or not cannot be put in a strait-jacket and would depend on the fact situation of each case. 14. At the outset, we may mention that while considering the plea of violation of principles of natural justice, it is necessary to bear in mind that the proceedings, under the Tenth Schedule, are not comparable to either a trial in a court of law or departmental proceedings for disciplinary action against an employee. But the proceedings here are against an elected representative of the people and the judge holds the independent high office of a Speaker. The scope of judicial review in respect of proceedings before such Tribunal is limited. But the proceedings here are against an elected representative of the people and the judge holds the independent high office of a Speaker. The scope of judicial review in respect of proceedings before such Tribunal is limited. We may hasten to add that howsoever limited may be the field of judicial review, the principles of natural justice have to be complied with and in their absence, the orders would stand vitiated. The yardstick to judge the grievance that reasonable opportunity has not been afforded would, however, be different. Further, if the view taken by the Tribunal is a reasonable one, the Court would decline to strike down an order on the ground that another view is more reasonable. The Tribunal can draw an inference from the conduct of a member, of course, depending upon the facts of the case and totality of the circumstances". Further, Mr. Mishra also referred to the paragraph-63 & 64 of the judgment passed in the case of Shri Manth Balasaheb Patil Vs. Speaker, Karnataka Legislative Assembly & Ors., reported in (2020) 2 SCC 595 . The relevant paragraph of the judgment are reproduced here below; "63. In the context of disqualification orders, this Court has exercised its writ jurisdiction under Article 32. A three Judge Bench of this Court in Jagjit Singh v. State of Haryana, (2006) 11 SCC 1 , has explicitly held that a challenge to an order of disqualification under the Tenth Schedule is available under the writ jurisdiction of this Court. This Court held as under: "11. The Speaker, while exercising power to disqualify Members, acts as a Tribunal and though validity of the orders thus passed can be questioned in the writ jurisdiction of this Court or High Courts, the scope of judicial review is limited as laid down by the Constitution Bench in Kihoto Hollohan v. Zachillhu, 1992 Supp (2) SCC 651. The orders can be challenged on the ground of ultra vires or mala fides or having been made in colourable exercise of power based on extraneous and irrelevant considerations. The order would be a nullity if rules of natural justice are violated." (emphasis supplied) 64. Reliance can be placed on the constitutional provisions and debates thereupon which show that this Court can inquire into the legitimacy of the exercise of the power. Dr. The order would be a nullity if rules of natural justice are violated." (emphasis supplied) 64. Reliance can be placed on the constitutional provisions and debates thereupon which show that this Court can inquire into the legitimacy of the exercise of the power. Dr. B.R. Ambedkar has described Article 32 as the very soul of the Constitution very heart of it most important Article. Moreover, the jurisdiction conferred on this Court by Article 32 is an important and integral part of the basic structure of the Constitution of India and no act of Parliament can abrogate it or take it away except by way of impermissible erosion of fundamental principles of the constitutional scheme are settled propositions of Indian jurisprudence." After having referred to the above paragraphs of the three judgments passed in the three cases mentioned, Mr. Mishra submitted that the ground taken in the writ petition cannot be urged to assail the order of the Hon'ble Speaker, dated 14.07.2020, inasmuch as none of the grounds questioned the order of the Hon'ble Speaker on the ground that the same is ultra-vires, the power confer on him and that the impugned order is vitiated by mala fide or based on irrelevant consideration etc. The learned Sr. counsel went on further and submitted that even with most generous interpretation, the ground set forth in the writ petition i.e. from paragraph-A to Y do not disclose even to the remotest the ingredients of any of the grounds settled by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the cases cited above to be the only grounds of judicial review on a Speaker's order passed under 10th Schedule of the Constitution of India. 6. Mr. Mishra then took up the grounds given in the writ petition one after the other and continued his submission as follows; (i) On the ground-(A), Mr. Mishra submitted that the ground-(A) given in the writ petition depicts the words of Andre Betille, Professor, Emeritus of Sociology and the same in no way indicates any of the grounds under which the impugned judgment & order of the Hon'ble Speaker can be interfered with. (ii) On ground-(B), Mr. Mishra submitted that the same contents the words and meaning of the Permeable of the Constitution of India as per the understanding of the writ petitioners only and no further. (ii) On ground-(B), Mr. Mishra submitted that the same contents the words and meaning of the Permeable of the Constitution of India as per the understanding of the writ petitioners only and no further. Therefore, it does not constitute any of the grounds under which the Hon'ble Speaker's decision can be examined and interfere it. (iii) On ground-(C), the learned Sr. counsel submitted that these are merely the words said to have been rendered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in reference to the role of the Speaker but they neither constitute any of the grounds nor provide the ingredients for any of the ground under which the impugned judgment & order of the Hon'ble Speaker can be interfered with. (iv) On ground-(D), the learned Sr. counsel submitted that this is only a conclusion drawn by the writ petitioners in their wisdom that, the impugned judgment & order passed by the Hon'ble Speaker is devoid on any merit, wrong both in facts and law and also wrong in his appreciation of evidence. Therefore, on the face of it, it does not constitute either a factual basis of any act or omission of any or legal parameter emanating there from which would render the decision of the Speaker fit for a judicial review. The learned Sr. counsel once again referred to the four grounds mentioned above and concluded by submitting that they are mere cosmetic in character-without clothing the petition with any ground whatsoever, even prima facie, to render the decision of the Hon'ble Speaker open for any judicial scrutiny. (v) On the ground-(E), the learned Sr. counsel submitted that the ground contents the issues said to have been framed by the Hon'ble Speaker for the purpose of determination of the dispute raised before him while the grounds-(F) and (G) referred to the decision rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Balachandra L. Jarkiholi Vs. B.S. Yeddyurappa, reported in 2011 7 SCC 1 seeking thereby to draw an analogy in the present case and alleging that the Hon'ble Speaker failed to appreciate the facts pleaded by the parties before him. The learned Sr. B.S. Yeddyurappa, reported in 2011 7 SCC 1 seeking thereby to draw an analogy in the present case and alleging that the Hon'ble Speaker failed to appreciate the facts pleaded by the parties before him. The learned Sr. counsel, thereafter, submitted that the judgment rendered in that case has no settled law to suggest a proposition that the Speaker's way of interpreting or reading evidences or appreciating evidences in a given particular set of facts and circumstances is the one and the only way which should be followed by all other Speaker dealing with disqualification cases. (vi) On the ground-(H), it is submitted by the learned Sr. counsel that though it has been alleged by the writ petitioner that, it has been revealed by the act of the respondents that they have voluntarily given up membership of the NPF but there is no fact pleaded anywhere in the writ petition which would show that the applicants in this I.A. (the respondents in the writ petition) had ever voluntarily or in-voluntarily given up membership of NPF. As such, this ground also does not constitute any of the ground for judicial intervention on the judgment passed by the Hon'ble Speaker. (vii) On grounds-(I), (K), (L), (M), (N) & (O), the learned Sr. counsel submitted that reference have been made to various pleadings of the parties and other materials on record to support the contention of the writ petition that such alleged acts of commission or omission on the part of the answering respondents (the applicants in this I.A.) amounts to their having indulged in anti-party activities because of which their active and primary membership of NPF were kept under suspension which in turn goes to proof that the respondents therein (the applicants in this I.A.) have given up their membership of NPF voluntarily. The learned Sr. counsel thereafter submitted that wrong appreciation of evidence even if there is any, on its own cannot be a ground for judicial review of the Speaker's order passed under 10th Schedule of the Constitution of India. (viii) On grounds-(P) & (Q), the learned Sr. counsel submitted that these are mere attempts of the writ petitioners to define various phrases and words which does not content any substance that can give rise to any of the grounds through which the Speaker's decision can be interfered with under judicial review. (viii) On grounds-(P) & (Q), the learned Sr. counsel submitted that these are mere attempts of the writ petitioners to define various phrases and words which does not content any substance that can give rise to any of the grounds through which the Speaker's decision can be interfered with under judicial review. (ix) On grounds-(R), (S), (T) & (U), the learned Sr. counsel submitted that these are also attempts of the writ petitioners to project the role of the Speaker's as they emerged from various judicial pronouncements and treatise of juries and eminent persons but none of them constitute any of the grounds through which the decision of the Hon'ble Speaker can be interfered with under the judicial review. (x) On ground-(V), the learned Sr. counsel submitted that this is attempt of the writ petitioners to make out a case of failure to exercise jurisdiction vested on the Speaker within reasonable time on the part of the Hon'ble Speaker. Therefore, it is a ground essentially touching conduct of a particular person holding the post of Speaker on the ground of malice and lacks of fairness. Therefore, as per the established legal principle, the Speaker should have been impleaded in person but since that has not been done this ground cannot be adjudicated upon. (xi) On grounds-(W), (X) & (Y), the learned Sr. counsel submitted that these are no grounds contemplated under law permitting to challenge a Speaker's decision under the 10th Schedule of the Constitution, therefore, they are absolutely without any force. In conclusion, the learned Sr. counsel submitted that the grounds given at paragraph-A to Y of the writ petition either read singly or conjointly does not disclose any cause of action in the form of any grounds permissible under law which would open the way for judicial review of the Hon'ble Speaker judgment. Therefore, the writ petition may be dismissed on that ground alone. 7. Mr. S. Borgohain, learned counsel appearing for the respondent Nos. 2 to 8 in I.A. (Civil) No. 102/2020 and the applicants in I.A. (Civil) No. 11/2021 submitted as follows:- Under Article 191 of the Constitution of India it is provided that a person can be disqualified from being a member of Legislative Assembly of a State if he is so disqualified under any law made by Parliament. 2 to 8 in I.A. (Civil) No. 102/2020 and the applicants in I.A. (Civil) No. 11/2021 submitted as follows:- Under Article 191 of the Constitution of India it is provided that a person can be disqualified from being a member of Legislative Assembly of a State if he is so disqualified under any law made by Parliament. Therefore, the Tenth Schedule of the Constitution which provides for disqualification from being a member of a Legislative Assembly, being a law made by the Parliament, any member of a Legislative Assembly can be disqualified on any of the grounds given therein. The learned counsel then referred to paragraph 2 clause A of the schedule and submitted that a member of a house belonging to any political party shall be disqualified from being a member of the house if he has voluntarily given up his membership of such political party. As such, in this case also the applicants in I.A. (Civil) No. 102/2020n who are the respondents in the writ petition since they had voluntarily given up their membership of NPF party through whose ticket they were elected to the 13th Nagaland Legislative Assembly they can be disqualified from being members of the same legislative Assembly. Mr. Borgohain submitted also that the exclusion of power of judicial review on the decision of a Speaker of a house on the question of disqualification of a member of that house as given in paragraph 7 of the Tenth Schedule has been effectively removed in Hollohon's case, reported in 1992 Supple 2 SCC 651. The learned counsel referred to paragraph 97 of the judgment and submitted that the judgment in the Hollohon's case did not limit High Court's jurisdiction under Article 226 to interfere with the judgment of a Speaker of a house on the question of disqualification only on 4 grounds as submitted by learned senior counsel Mr. D.K. Mishra. In continuation, the learned counsel submitted that High Court can also interfere in the judgment of a Speaker if a judgment passed by a Speaker is not reasonable. In support of his submission, the learned counsel referred to the case of Tata Cellular Vs. Union of India reported in (1994) 6 SCC 651 particularly paragraphs 73 to 77 of the judgment. In support of his submission, the learned counsel referred to the case of Tata Cellular Vs. Union of India reported in (1994) 6 SCC 651 particularly paragraphs 73 to 77 of the judgment. After referring to the said judgment the learned counsel submitted that decision of a public authority has to be informed with reasons but when it is not, Court can always interfere with the same. The paragraphs of the judgment mentioned above are reproduced here below:- "73. Observance of judicial restraint is currently the mood in England. The judicial power of review is exercised to rein in any unbridled executive functioning. The restraint has two contemporary manifestations. One is the ambit of judicial intervention; the other covers the scope of the court's ability to quash an administrative decision on its merits. These restraints bear the hallmarks of judicial control over administrative action. 74. Judicial review is concerned with reviewing not the merits of the decision in support of which the application for judicial review is made, but the decision-making process itself. 75. In Chief Constable of the North Wales Police v. Evans, [(1982) 3 All ER 141, 154] Lord Brightman said: "Judicial review, as the words imply, is not an appeal from a decision, but a review of the manner in which the decision was made. Judicial review is concerned, not with the decision, but with the decision-making process. Unless that restriction on the power of the court is observed, the court will in my view, under the guise of preventing the abuse of power, be itself guilty of usurping power." In the same case Lord Hailsham commented on the purpose of the remedy by way of judicial review under RSC, Ord. 53 in the following terms: "This remedy, vastly increased in extent, and rendered, over a long period in recent years, of infinitely more convenient access than that provided by the old prerogative writs and actions for a declaration, is intended to protect the individual against the abuse of power by a wide range of authorities, judicial, quasi-judicial, and, as would originally have been thought when I first practiced at the Bar, administrative. It is not intended to take away from those authorities the powers and 22 1986 AC 240 , 251 : (1986) 1 All ER 199 discretions properly vested in them by law and to substitute the courts as the bodies making the decisions. It is not intended to take away from those authorities the powers and 22 1986 AC 240 , 251 : (1986) 1 All ER 199 discretions properly vested in them by law and to substitute the courts as the bodies making the decisions. It is intended to see that the relevant authorities use their powers in a proper manner (p. 1160)." In R. v. Panel on Takeovers and Mergers, exp. Datafin plc [(1987) 1 All ER 564], Sir John Donaldson, M.R. commented: "An application for judicial review is not an appeal." In Lonrho plc v. Secretary of State for Trade and Industry, [(1989) 2 All ER 609], Lord Keith said: "Judicial review is a protection and not a weapon." It is thus different from an appeal. When hearing an appeal the Court is concerned with the merits of the decision under appeal. In Amin, Re, [Amin v. Entry Clearance Officer, (1983) 2 All ER 864], Lord Fraser observed that: "Judicial review is concerned not with the merits of a decision but with the manner in which the decision was made.... Judicial review is entirely different from an ordinary appeal. It is made effective by the court quashing the administrative decision without substituting its own decision, and is to be contrasted with an appeal where the appellate tribunal substitutes its own decision on the merits for that of the administrative officer." 76. In R. v. Panel on Take-overs and Mergers, exp. in Guinness plc, [ (1990) 1 QB 146 : (1989) 1 All ER 509] Lord Donaldson, M.R. referred to the judicial review jurisdiction as being supervisory or 'longstop' jurisdiction. Unless that restriction on the power of the court is observed, the court will, under the guise of preventing the abuse of power, be itself guilty of usurping power. 77. The duty of the court is to confine itself to the question of legality. Its concern should be: 1. Whether a decision-making authority exceeded its powers? 2. Committed an error of law, 3. Committed a breach of the rules of natural justice, 4. reached a decision which no reasonable tribunal would have reached or, 5. abused its powers. Therefore, it is not for the court to determine whether a particular policy or particular decision taken in the fulfillment of that policy is fair. It is only concerned with the manner in which those decisions have been taken. reached a decision which no reasonable tribunal would have reached or, 5. abused its powers. Therefore, it is not for the court to determine whether a particular policy or particular decision taken in the fulfillment of that policy is fair. It is only concerned with the manner in which those decisions have been taken. The extent of the duty to act fairly will vary from case to case. Shortly put, the grounds upon which an administrative action is subject to control by judicial review can be classified as under: (i) Illegality : This means the decision-maker must understand correctly the law that regulates his decision-making power and must give effect to it. (ii) Irrationality, namely, Wednesday unreasonableness. (iii) Procedural impropriety. The above are only the broad grounds but it does not rule out addition of further grounds in course of time. As a matter of fact, in R. v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex Brind, Lord Diplock refers specifically to one development, namely, the possible recognition of the principle of proportionality. In all these cases the test to be adopted is that the court should, "consider whether something has gone wrong of a nature and degree which requires its intervention". Mr. Borgohain also submitted that judgment of a Tribunal should be based solely on the pleadings of the parties and no inference can be drawn by it on its own out of the record. But in this case the Speaker has gone out of the pleadings of the parties and came to the conclusion thereafter, therefore, the judgment of the Hon'ble Speaker can be interfered with. After having submitted as stated above, the learned counsel submitted also that the main ground on which the petitioners in the writ petition are challenging the decision of the Hon'ble Speaker is that the decision of the Hon'ble Speaker is perverse since it is not based on evidence on record. Therefore, the plea that there is no ground pleaded in the writ petition which falls within the 4 grounds of interference given in the Hollohon's case is not correct, and that the writ petition is not maintainable is also baseless. Thereafter, Mr. Borgohain embarked on explaining the meaning of perversity by referring to the judgment passed in the case of Arulvelu & Anr. Vs. State represented by Public Prosecutor & Anr. Thereafter, Mr. Borgohain embarked on explaining the meaning of perversity by referring to the judgment passed in the case of Arulvelu & Anr. Vs. State represented by Public Prosecutor & Anr. reported in (2009) 10 SCC 206 particularly, paragraphs 25, 26, 27, 29 and 30. After referring to the paragraphs of the judgment stated, the learned counsel submitted that judgment of a subordinate Court or Tribunal would be perverse if the findings of such Court or Tribunal are not based on or supported by evidence brought on record or and if such judgment is against law or suffers from the vice of procedural irregularity. The learned counsel went on to submit that a perverse finding would also mean finding which is not only against the weight of evidence but is altogether against the evidence itself. Lastly, the learned counsel submitted that if a finding on fact is arrived at by a Tribunal or a Court by ignoring or excluding relevant material or by taking into consideration irrelevant materials or if the finding so outrageously defies logic as to suffer from the vice of irrationality incurring blame of being perverse, then the finding is rendered infirm in law. The contents of the paragraphs of the judgment referred to are reproduced here below:- "25. In Parry's (Calcutta) Employees' Union v. Parry & Co. Ltd. & Others, AIR 1966 Cal. 31 , the Court observed that 'perverse finding' means a finding which is not only against the weight of evidence but is altogether against the evidence itself. In Triveni Rubber & Plastics v. Collector of Central Excise, Cochin, AIR 1994 SC 1341 , the Court observed that this is not a case where it can be said that the findings of the authorities are based on no evidence or that they are so perverse that no reasonable person would have arrived at those findings. 26. In M.S. Narayanagouda v. Girijamma & Another, AIR 1977 Kar. 58 , the Court observed that any order made in conscious violation of pleading and law is a perverse order. In Moffett v. Gough, 1 L.R. Ir. 371, the Court observed that a perverse verdict may probably be defined as one that is not only against the weight of evidence but is altogether against the evidence. 58 , the Court observed that any order made in conscious violation of pleading and law is a perverse order. In Moffett v. Gough, 1 L.R. Ir. 371, the Court observed that a perverse verdict may probably be defined as one that is not only against the weight of evidence but is altogether against the evidence. In Godfrey v. Godfrey 106 NW 814, the Court defined 'perverse' as turned the wrong way, not right; distorted from the right; turned away or deviating from what is right, proper, correct etc. 27. The expression "perverse" has been defined by various dictionaries in the following manner: 1. Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary of Current English Sixth Edition PERVERSE: Showing deliberate determination to behave in a way that most people think is wrong, unacceptable or unreasonable. 2. Longman Dictionary of Contemporary English - International Edition PERVERSE: Deliberately departing from what is normal and reasonable. 3. The New Oxford Dictionary of English-1998 Edition PERVERSE: Law (of a verdict) against the weight of evidence or the direction of the judge on a point of law. 4. New Webster's Dictionary of the English Language (Deluxe Encyclopedic Edition) PERVERSE: Purposely deviating from accepted or expected behavior or opinion; wicked or wayward; stubborn; cross or petulant. 5. Stroud's Judicial Dictionary of Words & Phrases, Fourth Edition PERVERSE: A perverse verdict may probably be defined as one that is not only against the weight of evidence but is altogether against the evidence. 29. In Kuldeep Singh v. The Commissioner of Police & Others, (1999) 2 SCC 10 , the Court while dealing with the scope of Articles 32 and 226 of the Constitution observed as under: "9. Normally the High Court and this Court would not interfere with the findings of fact recorded at the domestic enquiry but if the finding of "guilt" is based on no evidence, it would be a perverse finding and would be amenable to judicial scrutiny. 10. Abroad distinction has, therefore, to be maintained between the decisions which are perverse and those which are not. If a decision is arrived at on no evidence or evidence which is thoroughly unreliable and no reasonable person would act upon it, the order would be perverse. 10. Abroad distinction has, therefore, to be maintained between the decisions which are perverse and those which are not. If a decision is arrived at on no evidence or evidence which is thoroughly unreliable and no reasonable person would act upon it, the order would be perverse. But if there is some evidence on record which is acceptable and which could be relied upon, howsoever compendious it may be, the conclusions would not be treated as perverse and the findings would not be interfered with." 30. The meaning of 'perverse' has been examined in H.B. Gandhi, Excise and Taxation Officer-cum-Assessing Authority, Karnal & Others v. Gopi Nath & Sons & Others 1992 Supp (2) SCC 312, this Court observed as under: "7. In the present case, the stage at and the points on which the challenge to the assessment in judicial review was raised and entertained was not appropriate. In our opinion, the High Court was in error in constituting itself into a court of appeal against the assessment. While it was open to the respondent to have raised and for the High Court to have considered whether the denial of relief under the proviso to Section 39(5) was proper or not, it was not open to the High Court re-appreciate the primary or perceptive facts which were otherwise within the domain of the fact-finding authority under the statute. The question whether the transactions were or were not sales exigible to sales tax constituted an exercise in recording secondary or inferential facts based on primary facts found by the statutory authorities. But what was assailed in review was, in substance, the correctness - as distinguished from the legal permissibility - of the primary or perceptive facts themselves. It is, no doubt, true that if a finding of fact is arrived at by ignoring or excluding relevant material or by taking into consideration irrelevant material or if the finding so outrageously defies logic as to suffer from the vice of irrationality incurring the blame of being perverse, then, the finding is rendered infirm in law." 8. After having explained or submitted on the meaning of perverse or perversity, Mr. After having explained or submitted on the meaning of perverse or perversity, Mr. Borgohain referred to the grounds given at paragraphs G-P of the writ petition and submitted that though the word perverse may not have been mentioned what is stated in these paragraphs is that the Hon'ble Speaker while recording the findings given in his judgment have not considered the evidence on record. Therefore, what the writ petitioner is trying to convey to the Court is that the findings of the Hon'ble Speaker being not based on evidence on record are perverse, as such, it calls for interference. Mr. Borgohain went on to submit that the Hon'ble Speaker without looking into the evidence on record accepted the plea of the respondents that they did not give the press statement that they are supporting PDA candidate in the Parliamentary election. Therefore, the finding arrived at by the Hon'ble Speaker which is not base on the evidence on record is perverse. The learned counsel further submitted that the applicants in I.A. (Civil) No. 102/2020 who are respondents in the writ petition did not deny the fact that they attended the meetings called by the party and received show cause notice and in their answer to the show cause notice they did not deny that they issued the press release but rather justified the same. However, this evidence has been totally ignored by the Hon'ble Speaker while deciding the case, therefore, the judgment of the Hon'ble Speaker can be interfered with on the ground of perversity. 9. In the I.A.(Civil) No. 11/2021, Mr. S. Borgohain, learned counsel for the applicant at the very outset submitted that a mistake has been committed in the prayer portion of the application by mentioning or including the Speaker also. In fact the prayer should be or is concerning only the respondent Nos. 2 to 8 in the application. Mr. Borgohain thereafter, submitted that in the case of Keisham Meghachandra Singh Vs. The Hon'ble Speaker Manipur Legislative Assembly & Ors. in Civil Appeal No. 547/2020, the Hon'ble Supreme Court fixed a period of 3 months from the date on which the petition for disqualification is filed as the outer limit within which the Speaker of an Assembly should decide the matter if the constitutional objective of disqualifying persons who have infracted the Tenth Schedule is to be achieved. in Civil Appeal No. 547/2020, the Hon'ble Supreme Court fixed a period of 3 months from the date on which the petition for disqualification is filed as the outer limit within which the Speaker of an Assembly should decide the matter if the constitutional objective of disqualifying persons who have infracted the Tenth Schedule is to be achieved. Therefore, by drawing inference therefrom the disqualification case of the respondents in the writ petition ought to have been decided within 3 months from the date the petition was filed. That having not been done, this Court may restrain the respondent MLAs from attending the ensuing budget session of the Nagaland Legislative Assembly beginning from 12th February, 2021. The contents of the paragraphs referred to by the learned counsel are reproduced here below:-(paragraphs 29, 32) "29. A reading of the aforesaid decisions, therefore, shows that what was meant to be outside the pale of judicial review in paragraph 110 of Kihoto Hollohan (supra) are quia timet actions in the sense of injunctions to prevent the Speaker from making a decision on the ground of imminent apprehended danger which will be irreparable in the sense that if the Speaker proceeds to decide that the person be disqualified, he would incur the penalty of forfeiting his membership of the House for a long period. Paragraphs 110 and 111 of Kihoto Hollohan (supra) do not, therefore, in any manner, interdict judicial review in aid of the Speaker arriving at a prompt decision as to disqualification under the provisions of the Tenth Schedule. Indeed, the Speaker, in acting as a Tribunal under the Tenth Schedule is bound to decide disqualification petitions within a reasonable period. What is reasonable will depend on the facts of each case, but absent exceptional circumstances for which there is good reason, a period of three months from the date on which the petition is filed is the outer limit within which disqualification petitions filed before the Speaker must be decided if the constitutional objective of disqualifying persons who have infracted the Tenth Schedule is to be adhered to. This period has been fixed keeping in mind the fact that ordinarily the life of the Lok Sabha and the Legislative Assembly of the States is 5 years and the fact that persons who have incurred such disqualification do not deserve to be MPs/MLAs even for a single day, as found in Rajendra Singh Rana (supra), if they have infracted the provisions of the Tenth Schedule. 32. It is not possible to accede to Shri Sibal's submission that this Court issue a writ of quo warranto quashing the appointment of the Respondent No. 3 as a minister of a cabinet led by a BJP government. Mrs. Madhavi Divan is right in stating that a disqualification under the Tenth Schedule from being an MLA and consequently minister must first be decided by the exclusive authority in this behalf, namely, the Speaker of the Manipur Legislative Assembly. It is also not possible to accede to the argument of Shri Sibal that the disqualification petition be decided by this Court in these appeals given the inaction of the Speaker. It cannot be said that the facts in the present case are similar to the facts in Rajinder Singh Rana (supra). In the present case, the life of the legislative assembly comes to an end only in March, 2022 unlike in Rajinder Singh Rana (supra) where, but for this Court deciding the disqualification petition in effect, no relief could have been given to the petitioner in that case as the life of the legislative assembly was about to come to an end. The only relief that can be given in these appeals is that the Speaker of the Manipur Legislative Assembly be directed to decide the disqualification petitions pending before him within a period of four weeks from the date on which this judgment is intimated to him. In case no decision is forthcoming even after a period of four weeks, it will be open to any party to the proceedings to apply to this Court for further directions/reliefs in the matter." 10. Mr. D.K. Mishra, learned senior counsel in reply to the submission of Mr. Borgohain, submitted that the paragraphs of the writ petition referred to by Mr. Mr. D.K. Mishra, learned senior counsel in reply to the submission of Mr. Borgohain, submitted that the paragraphs of the writ petition referred to by Mr. Borgohain are by and large statements on the merit of the case but there is no mention or a plea that the impugned judgment of the Hon'ble Speaker is perverse, and therefore, it needs to be interfered with. Mr. Mishra went on to submit that non appreciation or non consideration of evidence by the Hon'ble Speaker in the way the writ petitioners desires would not render the impugned judgment of the Hon'ble Speaker perverse. Perversity would mean ignoring what is on record but the way how evidence is appreciated cannot be questioned under the garb of perversity. Mr. Mishra, thereafter also submitted that on 18.3.2019 the legislative party of NPF decided that no NPF candidate would be set up but will extend support to the candidate of INC in the upcoming Lok Sabha election but the final decision to that effect will be taken in the meeting to be held on 23.3.2019 at Dimapur and, on 23.3.2019, the NPF legislature party in their meeting agreed not to set up NPF candidate for the upcoming Lok Sabha election but to extend issue based support to INC candidate Shri K.L. Chishi. However, since the final decision has to be taken by the party, the matter was forwarded to NPF President. All these facts and issues of press statement by the respondents in the writ petition have been taken into account and discussed by the Hon'ble Speaker in his judgment. Therefore, the submission of the learned counsel in the writ petition that relevant facts which are on record have not been considered while passing the judgment is unfounded and baseless. Mr. Mishra by referring to paragraph 10 of the judgment passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Kuldeep Singh Vs. Commissioner of Police & Ors. reported in (1999) 2 SCC 10 submitted also that a distinction has to be maintained between the decision which are perverse and those which are not. Mr. Mishra by referring to paragraph 10 of the judgment passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Kuldeep Singh Vs. Commissioner of Police & Ors. reported in (1999) 2 SCC 10 submitted also that a distinction has to be maintained between the decision which are perverse and those which are not. If a decision is arrived at on no evidence or evidence which is thoroughly unreliable and no reasonable person would act upon it, the order would be perverse, but if there is some evidence on record which is acceptable and which could be relied upon, howsoever compendious it may be, the conclusions would not be treated as perverse and the findings would not be interfered with. After having submitted as such, Mr. Mishra submitted further that there is no plea or ground taken by the writ petitioners that the decision of the Speaker is not supported by evidence therefore, it is perverse, as such, the writ petition which has no ground to proceed with as per the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Hollohon's case deserves outright dismissal for lack of maintainability. 11. In the I.A. (Civil) 11/2021, Mr. Mishra submitted that the submission that disqualification case should be completed within 3 months by drawing inference from the case of Keisham Meghachandra Singh is highly objectionable because it amounts to dictating the Court to decide the case within 3 months. The learned senior counsel further submitted that the facts and circumstances of Meghachandra's case and this case are different and in fact the order of the Hon'ble Supreme Court restraining the respondent No. 3 in that case from entering the Legislative Assembly till further order of the Court was passed in exercise of the powers under Article 142 of the Constitution of India which is available only to the Supreme Court of India and not to the High Courts. The order was passed under pedicular facts and circumstances which are not even similar to the facts and circumstances in this case. In this case, the Hon'ble Speaker in his judgment has upheld the case of the respondents in the writ petition and disposed the case in time therefore, the question of restraining the respondents in the writ petition from entering the Legislative Assembly in the forthcoming sitting does not arise. In support of his case, Mr. In this case, the Hon'ble Speaker in his judgment has upheld the case of the respondents in the writ petition and disposed the case in time therefore, the question of restraining the respondents in the writ petition from entering the Legislative Assembly in the forthcoming sitting does not arise. In support of his case, Mr. Mishra laid a copy of the order of the Hon'ble Supreme Court passed in the case of Keisham Meghachandra Singh Vs. Hon'ble Speaker, Manipur Legislative Assembly. Mr. Mishra also submitted that an order passed under Article 142 cannot be a precedent. In support of his submission, the learned senior counsel referred to paragraph 23 of the judgment passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Ram Pravesh Singh & Ors. Vs. State of Bihar & Ors. reported in (2006) 8 SCC 381 . The contents of the paragraph is given here below:- "23. The appellant next submitted that this Court, in some cases, has directed absorption in similar circumstances. Reliance is placed on the decision in G. Govinda Rajulu v. Andhra Pradesh State Construction Corporation Ltd., 1986 (Supp) SCC 651. We extract below the entire judgment: "We have carefully considered the matter and after bearing learned counsel for the parties, we direct that the employees of the Andhra Pradesh State Construction Corporation Limited whose services were sought to be terminated on account of the closure of the Corporation shall be continued in service on the same terms and conditions either in the government departments or in the government corporations. The writ petition is disposed of accordingly. There is no order as to costs." The tenor of the said order, which is not preceded by any reasons or consideration of any principle, demonstrates that it was an order made under Article 142 of the Constitution on the peculiar facts of that case. Law declared by this Court is binding under Article 141. Any direction given on special facts, in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 142, is not a binding precedent. Therefore, the decision in Govindarajulu cannot be the basis for claiming relief similar to what was granted in that case. A similar contention was negatived by the Constitution Bench in Umadevi (supra): "The fact that in certain cases, the Court directed regularization of the employees involved in those cases cannot be made use of to found a claim based on legitimate expectation." 12. Mr. A similar contention was negatived by the Constitution Bench in Umadevi (supra): "The fact that in certain cases, the Court directed regularization of the employees involved in those cases cannot be made use of to found a claim based on legitimate expectation." 12. Mr. Niloy Dutta, learned senior counsel appearing for the Hon'ble Speaker in both the I.As. and in the writ petition submitted that as far as maintainability of the writ petition is concerned, he supports the submission of Mr. Mishra, learned senior counsel. Thereafter, the learned senior counsel submitted on the I.A. (Civil) 11/2021 that there is no law which requires that a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India has to be disposed of within 3 months. Mr. Dutta also submitted that the prayer in the I.A. (Civil) 11/2021 to restrain the respondents in the writ petition from entering the Legislative Assembly in the forthcoming sitting is in essence a prayer for injunction. Therefore, the petitioner must fulfill the 3 conditions for granting such prayer; (1) that they should show that they have a strong prima facie case (2) that they should show that unless such an order is passed in their favour they are going to suffer irreparable loss and (3) that balance of convenience is on their side. However, none of these have been pleaded by the petitioners. Therefore, the petition deserves no consideration. Mr. Dutta further submitted that in Keisham Meghachandra's case, the Speaker sat over the case and delayed taking a decision but in this case the Speaker has rejected the prayer for disqualification of the respondents MLAs in the writ petition therefore, the facts and circumstances of the 2 cases are entirely different The learned senior counsel thereafter went on to submit that the order of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Keisham Meghachandra Singh was passed in exercise of the power under Article 142 of the Constitution which does not devolve to the High Courts. It is exclusive power of the Hon'ble Supreme Court therefore, this Court cannot pass such an order restraining the respondent MLAs in the writ petition pending disposal of the case. It is exclusive power of the Hon'ble Supreme Court therefore, this Court cannot pass such an order restraining the respondent MLAs in the writ petition pending disposal of the case. The learned senior counsel also submitted that to suspend or expel member of a legislature is within the exclusive domain of the legislature concern and every legislature is empowered to make its own rules to regulate or control the proceedings of its house and that is the privilege of every house which cannot be questioned in any Court of law. The power of the Hon'ble Supreme Court to pass any order under Article 142 is, however, an exception but such power is not available to the High Courts. Mr. Dutta, also submitted that the Nagaland Legislative Assembly under the power given in Article 208 of the Constitution also has framed a rule of its own and under Rule 297 of the same power to suspend any member or members of the house and that is the prerogative of the house. Such power is exclusive to the Legislative Assembly. In support of his submission, the learned senior counsel referred to paragraph 48 of the judgment passed in the case of Raja Ram Pal Vs. Hon'ble Speaker, Lok Sabha & Ors. reported in (2007) 3 SCC 184 only in regard to the observation made by Lord Coleridge, C.J. The same is reproduced here below:- "Alongside, however, of these propositions, for the soundness of which I should be prepared most earnestly to contend, there is another proposition equally true, equally well established, which seems to me decisive of the case before us. What is said or done within the walls of Parliament cannot be inquired into in a Court of law. On this point all the judges in the two great cases which exhaust the learning on the subjects are agreed and are emphatic. The jurisdiction of the House over their own Members, their right to impose discipline within their walls, is absolute and exclusive. On this point all the judges in the two great cases which exhaust the learning on the subjects are agreed and are emphatic. The jurisdiction of the House over their own Members, their right to impose discipline within their walls, is absolute and exclusive. To use the word of Lord Ellenborough, "They would sink into utter contempt and inefficiency without it." The learned counsel lastly submitted that the prayer of the petitioner in I.A. (Civil) 11/2021 is unfounded because they have neither stated the grounds on which an injunction of such nature can be passed nor have they stated anything which would show that they have those grounds in their favour, therefore, the petition deserves to be dismissed with cost which would go to the High Court Legal Services Authority. 13. Mr. S. Borgohain, in response to the submissions of the learned counsels submitted that as to whether a judgment is perverse or not records has to be looked into. Thereafter, he also submitted that it is settled principle of law of pleadings that every averments made by the appellant or petitioner should be denied by the replying party and if there is no specific denial then such averments should be deemed to have been admitted by the respondents. The learned counsel further submitted that in the case of the respondents in the writ petition no specific denials were made by them in the averments made before the Speaker, therefore, the averments made by the petitioners before the Speaker should have been accepted as true. In support of his submission the learned counsel referred to paragraph 17 of the judgment passed in the case of Asha Vs. Pt. B.D. Sharma University of Health Sciences & Ors. reported in (2012) 7 SCC 389 . The contents of the paragraph is reproduced here below:- "17. It is a settled principle of the law of pleadings that an averment made by the appellant is expected to be specifically denied by the replying party. If there is no specific denial, then such averment is deemed to have been admitted by the respondent. In the present case, it is evident that the above-noted averments in the writ petition were relevant and material to the case. In fact, the entire case of the appellant hinged on these three paragraphs of the writ petition. If there is no specific denial, then such averment is deemed to have been admitted by the respondent. In the present case, it is evident that the above-noted averments in the writ petition were relevant and material to the case. In fact, the entire case of the appellant hinged on these three paragraphs of the writ petition. It was thus, expected of the respondents to reply these averments specifically, in fact to make a proper reference to the records relevant to these paragraphs. In view of the omission on part of the respondents to refer to any relevant records and failure to specifically deny the averments made by the appellant, we are of the considered view that the appellant has been able to make out a case for interference." The learned counsel also referred to paragraph 12 and 14 of the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court passed in the case of M. Venkataraman Hebbar Vs. M. Rajagopal Hebbar & Ors. reported in (2007) 6 SCC 401 . The contents of the paragraphs are reproduced here below:- "12. The contract between the parties, moreover was a contingent contract. It was to have its effect only on payment of the said sum of Rs. 15,000/- by the plaintiff and other respondents by the defendant Nos. 1 to 3. It has been noticed hereinbefore by us that as of fact, it was found that no such payment had been made. Even there had been no denial of the assertions made by the appellant in their written statement in that behalf. The said averments would, therefore, be deemed to be admitted. Order VIII Rule 3 and Order VIII Rule 5 of the Civil Procedure Code read thus:- "3. Denial to be specific. It shall not be sufficient for a defendant in his written statement to deny generally the grounds alleged by the plaintiff, but the defendant must deal specifically with each allegation of fact of which he does not admit the truth, except damages. 5. Specific denial. [(1)] Every allegation of fact in the plaint, if not denied specifically or by necessary implication, or stated to be not admitted in the pleading of the defendant, shall be taken to be admitted except as against person under disability. 14. 5. Specific denial. [(1)] Every allegation of fact in the plaint, if not denied specifically or by necessary implication, or stated to be not admitted in the pleading of the defendant, shall be taken to be admitted except as against person under disability. 14. Even otherwise, the Court had framed an issue and arrived at a positive finding that the appellant herein did not pay the said sum of Rs. 15,000/- in favour of the plaintiff Nos. 1 to 3. The High Court has also affirmed the said finding." 14. Lastly, Mr. S. Borgohain, submitted in respect of I.A. (Civil) No. 11/2021 that, the ratio in Keisham Meghachandra Singh's case is binding. To elaborate his point, the learned counsel submitted that a member of a Legislative Assembly who has violated the provisions of schedule tenth of the Constitution of India do not deserve to continue as a member of such Legislative Assembly even for a day. Therefore, cases concerning disqualification ought to be decided and disposed of at the earliest. But when such early disposal is not possible then the question of restraining such a member from entering the Legislative Assembly has to be decided. 15. Mr. A. Zho, learned counsel who also appears on behalf of the respondent MLAs in the writ petition and the petitioners in I.A. (Civil) 102/2020 in supplementing to what has been submitted by his senior counsel Mr. Mishra submitted that earlier also the applicants in the I.A.(Civil) 11/2021 had filed a similar I.A. which was registered as I.A. (Civil) 53/2020 but the same was withdrawn without any liberty to file afresh, therefore, the applicants in the I.A. are barred from filing a similar I.A. The learned counsel further submitted also that the fact that such an I.A. was filed earlier and disposed of in the manner as stated above has not been disclosed by the applicants, therefore, this amounts to suppression of facts. As such, the same can be dismissed only on that ground. In support of his submission, Mr. A. Zho, placed a copy of the order dated 23/7/2020 passed in I.A.(Civil) 53/2020 wherein it is stated that Mr. Borgohain, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner submits that he is not pressing the I.A. and accordingly, the I.A. is disposed of as not pressed. 16. In support of his submission, Mr. A. Zho, placed a copy of the order dated 23/7/2020 passed in I.A.(Civil) 53/2020 wherein it is stated that Mr. Borgohain, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner submits that he is not pressing the I.A. and accordingly, the I.A. is disposed of as not pressed. 16. I have considered the submissions of the learned counsels appearing for the parties and I have also gone through the record and the relevant laws and judgments referred to by them. 17. On perusal of the judgment passed in the case of Kihoto Hollohon, Jagjit Singh and Manth Balasaheb Patil referred to by the learned senior counsel Mr. D.K. Mishra and also the other learned counsels the relevant portion of which have been already reproduced at paragraph 5 of this judgment one can now conclude without any hesitation or doubt that the decision of a Speaker of any Legislative Assembly on the question of disqualification of a member or members of that house would attract judicial review but only on 4 limited grounds one of which is, if the decision of the Speaker is perverse. 18. It has been submitted by Mr. Mishra, learned senior counsel that none of the grounds given in the writ petition either singly or conjointly has made out a ground of perversity which will have the way for examining the judgment of the Hon'ble Speaker impugned in the writ petition under judicial review. The learned senior counsel also had submitted that perversity has not even been pleaded in any of the grounds therefore, there is no way one can come to the conclusion that there is a cause of action in the writ petition which would enable this Court to (exercise the power of judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution. In reply, Mr. Borgohain, learned counsel had pleaded that though the word perversity or perverse may not have been used in the grounds given in the writ petition, by conjoint reading on the grounds G-P of the writ petition one can easily make out that perversity has been taken as a ground of challenge. 19. In order to arrive at the conclusion as to whether perversity has been one of the grounds taken in the writ petition or not one has to go through the grounds given in the writ petition. 19. In order to arrive at the conclusion as to whether perversity has been one of the grounds taken in the writ petition or not one has to go through the grounds given in the writ petition. The grounds given in the writ petition and particularly referred to are reproduced here below:- G. It is the settled principle of law that, a judgment of a Superior Courts acts as a precedent with ratio laid in the present case but the facts of the case in light of the same if we read this judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court delivering in Balachandra case (supra), it reveals that the facts of that case does not relates with the facts of the present case. The reason for the same is that in Balachandra case (supra) the 13 members of the Karnataka Legislative Assembly dated 06.10.2010 addressing to Governor stated that there were disillusion with the functioning of the government Shri B.S. Yeddyurappa, according to them, there was wide spread corruption, nepotism, abuse of power and misuse of Government machinery in the functioning of the Government held by Shri B.S. Yeddyurappa and that situation has arisen when the governance of the constitution. Accordingly, they withdraw their support from the government headed by Shri B.S. Yeddyurappa with the request to the Governor to intervene and to institute the constitutional process and the Hon'ble Supreme Court on perusal of the said facts and more particularly the stand taken by the 13 respondents and held that the Act of those respondents is primarily decent as they were against the then Chief Minister of Karnataka heading the Government but they are ready to support any other individual from the party to be elected as the Chief Minister of Karnataka. In the present case, the NPF party was deliberating by following the process of inner party system with respect to the issue whether the NPF should nominated a candidate or the NPF as a party or should give a one time issue based support to the Congress candidate in the Lok Sabha election. It is a matter of record that prior to the decision taken by the NPF party, the 7(seven) respondents had issued press statement supporting to the PDA candidate and the PDA government. It is a matter of record that prior to the decision taken by the NPF party, the 7(seven) respondents had issued press statement supporting to the PDA candidate and the PDA government. The said fact was never disputed in the written statement and also in the show cause reply but surprisingly the court of Hon'ble Speaker failed to appreciate the same. H. On perusal of the evidences record, it is crystal clear that respondents have not disputed the issuance of the pre-statement rather they have corroborated the said facts. It is also a fact, that the respondents have issued the pre-statement prior to the decision taken by the NPF party with respect to giving one time issue base support to the Congress candidate which prima facie reveals that the respondents have by their act have voluntarily given up their membership of the NPF party. I. That it is an established fact and which is not denied by the respondents in their written statements and reiterated during their depositions, the respondents in PFD No. 1(a)/2019 to PFD No. 1(f)/2019, Shri Kejong Chang, MLA 54 Tuensang Sadar-II A/C., Shri E.E. Pangteang, MLA 48 Moka A/C, Shri Eshak Konyak, MLA 47 Aboi A/C, Shri B.S. Nganlang, MLA 49 Tamlu A/C, Shri N. Thongwang Konyak, MLA 46 Mon Town A/C, Shri Toyang Chang, MLA 53 Tuensang Sadar I A/C, had issued a signed press statement of the aforesaid respondents were also published in Nagaland Post as well as Morung Express on 26.03.2019, along with their photograph with Hon'ble Chief Minister Shri Neiphu Rio, PDA consensus candidate Shri Tokeho Yepthomi, Shri Chingwang Konyak, PDA Chairman, and President NDPP, and Shri, Noke Konyak, MLA, and Hon'ble Advisor in the present PDA Government. J. It is also humbly submitted that Shri C.L. John, MLA, who was also signatory to the decision on 18.03.2019, and where he had fully accepted and endorsed the decision not to set up an NPF candidate but to give a one-time base support to the INC candidate to the 17th Lok Sabha Election from Nagaland, but Shri C.L. John, who is a senior leader of the NPF Legislature party was fully aware about the NPF Legislature Party on 23.03.2019, and the NPF core committee resolution on 25.03.2019, but in clear violation of the said decision and the NPF party discipline and principles he had issued a signed press statement dated 27th March 2019, declaring his decision to extend cooperation and support to the PDA consensus candidate and the PDA Government. It was published in the local Newspapers including Nagaland Post, the Morung Express and Eastern Mirror on 28.03.2019, he had not denied the issuance of the press statement dated 27.03.2019 in his statement. K. It is also humbly submitted that it is not denied by Shri Toyang Chang, in his written statement as well as the common reply to the show cause dated 01.04.2019 that he had participated in the PDA rally in support of the PDA consensus candidate Shri Tokeho Yepthomi, held at Tuensang, on 01.04.2019, where he shared the dais with Hon'ble Chief Minister Shri Neiphiu Rio Hon'ble Dy. CM Shri Y. Patton, and the PDA consensus candidate Shri Tokeho Yepthomi. He has also addressed the rally on 01.04.2019, in support of the PDA candidate. There is not even a whisper with regard to his participation in the PDA rally at Tuensang on 01.04.2019, in his Examination-in-Chief. L. It is also humbly submitted that the respondents had willfully disobeyed the consensus decision of the NPF Legislature party meeting on 18.03.2019 and 23.03.2019. It is also respectfully submitted that the respondents had boycotted the Consultative Meeting/General Convention of the NPF party held on 30.03.2019, in spite a clear information and knowledge. M. It is also submitted that in their written statements they did not denied the filing of their show cause replies dated 01.04.2019, where they had admitted the issuance of the Press Statements dated 05.03.2019 and 27.03.2019. M. It is also submitted that in their written statements they did not denied the filing of their show cause replies dated 01.04.2019, where they had admitted the issuance of the Press Statements dated 05.03.2019 and 27.03.2019. It is also respectfully submitted that the aforesaid respondents had campaigned in support of the PDA consensus candidate for the Lok Sabha elections 2019, and voted in favour of the PDA consensus candidate along with their supporters and who had resigned subsequently from the NPF party and joined the NDPP party of Tuensang, Mon and Longleng. In view if their anti party activities, they were suspended from active and primary memberships by the Suspension Orders dated 16.04.2019. It is humbly submitted that the respondents in their depositions had admitted that they are suspended from the active and primary membership of the NPF party. N. It is humbly submitted that in view of the above established facts and evidences, and their clear admissions it is proved that the respondents had indulged in anti-party activities to the detriment of the NPF party. Hence, the Issue No. 2 is proved against the respondents. O. That there are clear established facts and evidences that the respondents had willfully disobeyed the consensus decision of the NPF Legislature party meeting on 18.03.2019 and 23.03.2019. It is also respectfully submitted that the respondents had willfully boycotted the consultative Meeting/General convention of the NPF party held on 30.03.2019, in spite of clear information and knowledge. It is further submitted that their signed Press Statement dated 25.03.2019 and 27.03.2019 declaring their co-operation and support to the PDA consensus candidate and the PDA government as published in the local newspaper, their clear admission in the Show Cause Replies dated 01.04.2019, that they had issued the Press Statement dated 25.03.2019, and 27.03.2019, keeping the interest and benefit of the people of Nagaland, which is further proved by their written statements and their depositions during the Cross-Examination, their open campaign and supporters during the last Lok Sabh Elections 2019, along with their supports, their suspensions from active and primary membership of the NPF party for their anti-party activities by the suspension orders dt. 16.4.2019, it clearly proves that the respondents have given up their membership of the NPF party voluntarily. P. That the Hon'ble Supreme Court had explained that the words voluntarily given up his memberships are not synonymous with resignation and had wider connotation. 16.4.2019, it clearly proves that the respondents have given up their membership of the NPF party voluntarily. P. That the Hon'ble Supreme Court had explained that the words voluntarily given up his memberships are not synonymous with resignation and had wider connotation. A person may voluntarily given up his membership of his political of his political party even though he has not tendered his resignation of membership from membership of that party and even in the absence of a formal resignation from membership of apolitical party, an inference can be drawn from the conduct of a member that he had voluntarily given-up his membership of his political party to which he belongs/from which he was elected. The act of voluntarily given-up membership of the political party may be either express or implied. The meaning 'joined' for the purpose of the Tenth Schedule of the Constitution has a wider connotation and would include constitution of a group or various individuals getting together for forming a front. 20. Mr. Borgohain, learned counsel for the opposite parties in the I.A.(Civil) 102/2020 and the petitioners in the writ petition had particularly referred to paragraph G-P of the grounds to show that perversity has been pleaded as a ground in the writ petition. The contents of paragraph-G of the writ petition indicates that the case of the writ petitioners is that the Hon'ble Speaker by having wrongly drawn an inference from the case of Balachandra Jarkiholi vs. B.S. Yeddyurappa has arrived at the perverse conclusion that all Acts and omissions of the respondent MLAs in the writ petition amounts only to dissent and it does not amount to voluntarily giving up their membership of the NPF party therefore, they cannot be disqualified. 21. Further, a conjoint reading of the paragraphs H, I, J, K, L, M, N, O and P indicates that it is also the case of the writ petitioners that inspite of the evidence made available to the Hon'ble Speaker on the charges levelled against the respondent MLAs both by the petitioners and through the admission of the respondent MLAs themselves, the Hon'ble Speaker had come to the conclusion which is not supported by evidence and not tenable in law therefore, the same is perverse. 22. 22. In that view of the matter this Court is of the view that the writ petitioners has made out a cause of action or ground within the limited grounds of judicial review given in the 3 cases namely, Kihoto Hollohon, Jagjit Singh and Manth Balasaheb Patil. In deciding the case in I.A.(Civil) 102/2020 what is required is, to find out from the given facts and circumstances and, nature of the case whether the writ petitioners challenging the Speaker's decision has made out at least any one of the grounds by which judicial review can be invoked under Article 226 of the Constitution and nothing more. The issue as to whether perversity have been committed or not has to be decided in the writ petition itself therefore, the I.A.(civil) 102/2020 is without basis. As such, it is dismissed. 23. Now coming to the I.A.(Civil) 11/2021, the Hon'ble Speaker had disposed of the case of the petitioners in time as directed by this Court therefore, a situation that occurred in the case of Keisham Meghachandra Singh had not occurred in this case. As such the occasion to ask for such drastic order of restraining has not arisen in the first place. Further, the order of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Keisham Meghachandra Singh was passed in exercise of the power under Article 142 of the Constitution which this Court does not have, therefore, the order of the Hon'ble Supreme Court cannot be a precedent to be followed by this Court. Moreover as submitted by Mr. Niloy Dutta, a petition praying for such order in essence is a petition for injunction therefore, unless the petition is clothed with all the ingredients of a petition of such nature it cannot be entertained. The petition herein is devoid of all such ingredients therefore, it cannot be entertained. As such, it is rejected and dismissed. 24. In view of the conclusion arrived and the orders passed, let W.P.(C) 95/2020 be listed after a week for all the parties to complete their pleadings.