JUDGMENT 1. This writ petition has been filed challenging the order dated 17.09.2020 passed by the respondent-RIICO whereby, the allotment of land made in favour of the petitioner has been withdrawn. The order is under challenge on two grounds, i.e., on its merit as well as the rate of interest on the refund amount. 2. The facts in brief are that the petitioner being the highest bidder in an open auction, was allotted an industrial plot measuring 15.90 acres by the RIICO vide allotment letter dated 03.01.2006 for construction of an amusement park/resort at Industrial Area, Jirota. The petitioner deposited the entire sale consideration of Rs.2,42,84,228/- within the stipulated time. Vide its possession letter dated 05.05.2007, the respondent handed over its physical possession to the petitioner. On 10.03.2008, lease agreement was executed between the parties and was submitted for registration with the Sub-Registrar, Dausa on 15.03.2008; but, could not be registered because of an ad-interim order dated 18.05.2007 passed by the learned District Judge, Dausa in civil suit filed by one Babu Lal against the respondent-RIICO and other parties which was confirmed on 12.02.2008. In the civil suit, it was pleaded by Shri Babu Lal that through the land of khasra No.298, out of which the land in question was allotted, a 30 feet wide public way exists through which he has right of way to approach his field. It was alleged that the defendants were trying to obstruct his right of way by raising construction therein; whereupon, the learned trial Court, vide its interim order, restrained the defendants therein from obstructing the right of way of the plaintiff, from raising construction on the land of public way, from selling it and from handing over its possession. Since the petitioner was already in possession of the entire land allotted to it including the 30 feet wide alleged way, it was impleaded as a party in the suit on its application under order of this Court dated 13.11.2017 passed in SB Civil Writ Petition No.2409/2008. Since the petitioner was already in possession of the entire land allotted to it including the 30 feet wide alleged way, it was impleaded as a party in the suit on its application under order of this Court dated 13.11.2017 passed in SB Civil Writ Petition No.2409/2008. During pendency of the suit, the allotment made in favour of the petitioner has been withdrawn by the respondent-RIICO vide order impugned dated 17.09.2020 on the premise that on account of stay order dated 18.05.2007 regarding 30 feet wide road, the petitioner could not be handed over peaceful possession of the entire allotted land nor lease deed could be registered by the Sub-Registrar, Dausa and proceeded to refund the amount deposited by the petitioner alongwith interest at the rate of 6% per annum after deducting income tax at the rate of 7.50% per annum through the cheque dated 17.09.2020 which has not been encashed till date by the petitioner. 3. Assailing the order dated 17.09.2020, the learned Senior Counsel submitted that it is based on totally misconceived notion that the petitioner could not be handed over peaceful possession of the allotted land on account of various Court cases and stay order dated 18.05.2007. He contended that the litigation is post handing over physical possession on 05.05.2007 as is evident from possession letter dated even (Annexure-8) and the petitioner is still in actual and physical possession of the entire allotted land. Drawing attention of this Court towards the preliminary objections raised in reply by the respondents No.1 to 3, as well as para-wise reply, learned Senior Counsel submitted that the order impugned dated 17.09.2020 has sought to been justified on the grounds foreign to the reasoning assigned in the impugned order. He submitted that while, in the order impugned, the intervening factors beyond the control of petitioner have been made cause of the withdrawal of the allotment letter; whereas, in reply, the order has sought to been justified putting the entire blame on the petitioner, i.e., for not raising construction within a period of two years and also for not starting production activities within three years from the date of possession as well. He submitted that in view of the stay order passed by the learned Civil Court, the petitioner could not have been blamed for not raising construction within the stipulated time. He submitted that in view of the stay order passed by the learned Civil Court, the petitioner could not have been blamed for not raising construction within the stipulated time. Learned Senior Counsel submitted that even otherwise also, in response to the letter of the respondent dated 02.03.2012 (Annexure-17) requiring the petitioner to submit an undertaking to install the project on the allotted land barring disputed part, it has, vide affidavit dated 04.06.2012 of Satish Tambi, its authorized Director (Annexure-19), expressed its willingness to raise construction of the amusement park/resort on the land in question leaving 30 feet wide road. Referring to its letter dated 30.03.2012 (Annexure-18), learned Senior Counsel submitted that showing its readiness and willingness to go ahead with the project, it has proposed a joint meeting with RIICO officials to resolve the problem and to come out with some solution; but, the letter was never responded to by the respondents. He submitted that yet again, vide its letter dated 16.07.2020 (Annexure-20), the petitioner has expressed its willingness to start the project excluding the 30 feet wide piece of land; but, it also failed to evoke any response. Learned Senior Counsel submitted that in view of the aforesaid, no fault could have been found with the petitioner for not complying with the terms of the allotment. Learned Senior Counsel submitted that the respondents, instead of responding to its letters dated 30.03.2012 or dated 16.07.2020; proceeded to pass the order impugned without issuing any show cause notice or without furnishing it any opportunity of hearing. Learned Senior Counsel, relying on the judgments of the Hon'ble Apex Court in cases of Mohinder Singh Gill & Anr. versus Chief Election Commissioner, New Delhi & Ors., AIR 1978 Supreme Court 851 and Commissioner of Police, Bombay versus Gordhandas Bhanji, AIR (39) 1952 Supreme Court 16, canvassed that an administrative order can be justified only on the reasons specified therein and the same cannot be supplemented by fresh reasons in the shape of affidavits or otherwise. He, therefore, submitted that the reasons assigned by the respondents in their reply to justify the impugned order dated 17.09.2020 cannot be taken into consideration to adjudge its validity. 4. Learned Senior Counsel contended that the respondents are labouring under uncertainty as to the true nature of the impugned order; i.e., whether the same amounts to withdrawal of the allotment dated 03.01.2006 or its cancellation. 4. Learned Senior Counsel contended that the respondents are labouring under uncertainty as to the true nature of the impugned order; i.e., whether the same amounts to withdrawal of the allotment dated 03.01.2006 or its cancellation. He submitted that in para 2 of preliminary objections in reply, they have categorically stated that cancellation of allotment after thirteen years on breach of terms and conditions of allotment letter is a justified and sympathetic act on the part of respondents; whereas, in para-wise reply, they have stated that in spite of petitioner having intentionally failed to fulfill the terms and conditions of the allotment letter, they have withdrawn the allotment instead of cancelling it and forfeiting the amount. Drawing attention of this Court towards the various provisions of RIICO Disposal of Land Rules, 1979 (for brevity, "the Rules of 1979"), learned Senior counsel submitted that the Rules do not stipulate any situtation wherein allotment once made can be withdrawn. Learned Senior Counsel submitted that in view of the stay order by the learned Civil Court, letter by RIICO dated 12.03.2012 (Annexure-17), affidavit of Shri Satish Tambi (Annexure-19), its letters dated 30.03.2012 (Annexure 18) and 16.07.2020 (Annexure-20), by no semblance of reasoning, respondent-RIICO could have held the petitioner guilty of breach of terms and conditions of allotment by not raising construction within the time stipulated and as an afterthought only, this imputation has been levelled by the respondents in their reply which, otherwise, is completely absent in the order impugned. 5. Relying on the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court of India in case of Indore Development Authority vs. Manoharlal (2020) 8 SCC 129 , learned senior counsel submitted that even otherwise also, it is settled law that none should suffer prejudice on account of acts/omissions/orders of the Court and in the present case, the petitioner was prevented on account of stay order passed by a competent Civil Court from implementing the project on the land allotted and hence, it did not lie in the mouth of the respondents to make imputation against the petitioner as to breach of terms and conditions of the allotment letter. 6. 6. Learned senior counsel further submitted that since it was not a concessional allotment by the RIICO and the petitioner came to be allotted the land in question on it standing highest bidder in an open auction for commercial activity, the withdrawal of the allotment on account of interim order passed on behest of third person, cannot be sustained in the eye of law. 7. With regard to his alternative limb of argument qua refund of the amount with interest @ 6% per annum, learned Senior Counsel, drawing attention of this Court towards the demand letter dated 03.02.2006 issued by the respondent-RIICO wherein petitioner has been required to deposit balance 75% of the development amount with 12% interest, submitted that it was also entitled for the interest on the refund amount at that rate, i.e., 12%. Learned Senior Counsel, in the aforesaid circumstances, submitted that the order impugned dated 17.09.2020 deserves to be quashed and set aside. 8. Per contra, learned counsel appearing for the respondents No. 1 to 3 supporting the order under challenge, submitted that allotment of the land in favour of the petitioner was not absolute; but, was conditional whereby, it was required to complete the construction activities within a period of two years and start commercial production activities within a period of three years from the date of possession or execution of lease deed, whichever was earlier. He submitted that the petitioner was handed over possession of the land in question way back in the year 2007; but, for last about thirteen years, under the pretext of an interim order, the petitioner did not carry out any construction activity which frustrated the object of the auction of the plot, i.e., facility of an amusement park/resort for the pepole; but, still, the respondent-RIICO has, instead of cancelling the allotment, taking a lenient view, withdrawn the allotment to enable the petitioner to enjoy the refund of the amount paid by it alongwith interest @ 6% per annum. Learned counsel submitted that the petitioner, when required to furnish an undertaking to raise construction leaving 30 ft. wide piece of land, instead of furnishing such undertaking, put the condition to register the lease deed of the remaining land leaving 30 ft. wide piece of land and hence, the petitioner cannot be permitted to say that it was ready and willing to raise construction leaving 30 ft. wide piece of land. wide piece of land, instead of furnishing such undertaking, put the condition to register the lease deed of the remaining land leaving 30 ft. wide piece of land and hence, the petitioner cannot be permitted to say that it was ready and willing to raise construction leaving 30 ft. wide piece of land. Drawing attention of this Court towards the clauses 16 & 19 of the allotment letter dated 03.01.2006, learned counsel submitted that the allotment was on 'as is where is basis' and in case the construction/production was not started within the period prescribed or in case of breach of any clause, the allotment was bound to be treated to be cancelled automatically with forfeiture of the security amount. Learned counsel submitted that the project could not be initiated and completed by the petitioner for no fault of RIICO and hence, it was well within its right to withdraw the allotment. Lastly, learned counsel submitted that the petitioner has taken self-contradictory plea inasmuch as on the one hand, it is seeking cancellation of the order dated 17.09.2020; on the other hand, refund of the deposited amount towards the allotment alongwith interest @ 12% per annum instead of 6% per annum and hence, the writ petition deserves to be dismissed on this count as well. 9. Shri Rajendra Prasad, learned senior counsel submitted in rejoinder that in absence of registration of lease deed, neither any bank, nor any financial institution was ready to fund the project and the petitioner could not get even electricity connection in absence of title document in their favour and hence, it requested the RIICO for registration of the lease deed leaving 30 ft. wide piece of land. He submitted that construction of an amusement park/resort is a homogeneous activity and with a thoroughfare passing through the land, the petitioner could not have raised construction of an amusement park/resort. 10. He, therefore, reiterating the submissions, prayed that the writ petition be allowed. 11. Shri S.N. Kumawat, learned counsel, drawing attention of this Court towards Clause-20 of the allotment letter, submitted insur-rejoinder that the allotment letter itself was sufficient NOC for taking power/water connection in the allotted plot and hence, it did not lie in the mouth of the petitioner to contend that in absence of title document, it could not have obtained even electricity connection. He submitted that the petitioner was subjected to payment of interest @ 12% inasmuch as it has committed default in payment of 75% of the development fee; otherwise, Clause 18 (h) of the Rules of 1979 provides for refund of deposited amount with interest @ 6% per annum if the period of retention is one year and above. He contended that even the prevailing interest on the Fixed Deposits in nationalized banks is 5.5-6% per annum. Lastly, he submitted that in absence of any prayer in the writ petition for award of interest at the enhanced rate, the same cannot be entertained. 12. Heard learned counsels for the parties and perused the record. 13. The order impugned dated 17.09.2020 has been passed on the premise that peaceful possession of the land allotted in favour of the petitioner could not be handed over or the petitioner could not enjoy peaceful possession of the allotted land. Insofar as handing over possession of the allotted land is concerned, it is admitted position that vide possession letter dated 05.05.2007 (Annexure-8), the respondent-RIICO has handed over physical possession of the allotted plot which was taken over by the petitioner. Even otherwise also, the question of enjoyment of the possession arises only after it is vested with a person. 14. In so far the question of peaceful possession is concerned, the hindrance was caused by an interim order passed by the competent Civil Court on behest of a third person. The question is whether the RIICO was empowered to withdraw the allotment order and if yes, whether it was justified in doing so in the facts and circumstances of the case. 15. In so far the question of withdrawal of the allotment is concerned, Rule 18(g) of the Rules of 1979 provides for surrender/cancellation of plots allotted by the RIICO and does not provide for withdrawal of the allotment; but, Rule 18(h) reads as under: "18(h) The deposited amount shall be refunded alongwith interest as per the prescribed rate with the approval of the Managing Director in those cases where the allotment/possession of the plot could not be given by the Corporation due to court case or other unavoidable circumstances. However, the present rate of interest (w.e.f. 1.11.2003) is as following: Table-4 1. If amount remains with the Corporation for a period less than 1 year @5.50% p.a. 2. However, the present rate of interest (w.e.f. 1.11.2003) is as following: Table-4 1. If amount remains with the Corporation for a period less than 1 year @5.50% p.a. 2. If amount remains with the Corporation for a period of 1 year and above @6.00% p.a. (Inserted as per IDC decisions taken vide item 28 on 20.9.1997, item 6 on 21.2.1998 and office order No.IPI/F-1(9)2/82 dated 29th October, 2003)" 16. Thus, Rule 18(h) provides for refund of the full amount deposited by an allottee with interest; which, otherwise is not payable in cases of cancellation or surrender, in case where possession of the plot could not be given due to court case or other unavoidable circumstances. In the present case, as is admitted position, physical possession of the allotted plot was handed over to the petitioner; but, it could not enjoy the same on account of a stay order passed by a competent civil court. In these circumstances, this Court is of the view that peaceful possession or peaceful enjoyment is an integral part of possession and if after handing over physical possession, an allottee could not put the plot to the use for which it was allotted for the reasons as mentioned in Rule 18 (h) or any reason beyond his control, it cannot be said that the RIICO is not empowered to withdraw the allotment. 17. Now, the issue remains as to whether the respondent-RIICO has been able to justify its order impugned dated 17.9.2020. Undisputedly, the land allotted to the petitioner could not be put to use on account of stay order passed by a civil court. During pendency of the interim order, the RIICO has required the petitioner to submit an undertaking to carry out the project on the land allotted to it honouring the stay order with respect to 30 feet wide land. The petitioner has, in response, submitted affidavit of Shri Satish Tambi, its Authorized Director, the letter dated 30.03.2012 as well as the letter dated 16.07.2020 agreeing with proposal of the RIICO to raise construction on the allotted land excluding the disputed land. These letters were never responded to by the RIICO; rather, in the order impugned, request of the petitioner to allow construction on the land allotted leaving 30 feet wide road has been rejected stating that "whole chunk of land measuring 15.90 acres land was allotted by the Government of Rajasthan/Corporation". 18. These letters were never responded to by the RIICO; rather, in the order impugned, request of the petitioner to allow construction on the land allotted leaving 30 feet wide road has been rejected stating that "whole chunk of land measuring 15.90 acres land was allotted by the Government of Rajasthan/Corporation". 18. Once the RIICO itself has required the petitioner to furnish an undertaking to install the project, which was promptly responded positively by the petitioner way back in the year 2012, it was not open for the RIICO to have resiled from its earlier stand and to reject the prayer after eight years vide order impugned dated 17.9.2020 on the premise that the petitioner was allotted whole chunk of land measuring 15.90 acres that too in absence of considered decision that construction of amusement park/resort was not possible leaving aside disputed part of land. Although, the learned counsel for the respondent-RIICO has tried to justify rejection of the request of the petitioner to permit it to raise construction on the land allotted leaving 30 feet wide land as required by the RIICO itself on the premise that the undertaking so furnished by the petitioner was conditional, i.e., subject to registration of the lease deed of the land allotted barring 30 feet disputed land; however, this Court is not persuaded to countenance the submission in as much as no such reason is contained in the order impugned dated 17.9.2020 or in the reply by the RIICO. Even otherwise also, the petitioner requested for registration of the lease deed to enable it to avail loan facility to install the project and it is a matter of common knowledge that in absence of title document i.e., registered lease deed, neither any bank nor any financial institution extends credit facility. It has not been disputed by the RIICO that for establishment of an amusment park/resort, the petitioner would have required financial assistance from bank/financial institution. It is a well established principle of law that no party can be permitted to approbate and reprobate at the same time or to blow hot and cold in the same breath. The Hon'ble Apex Court has, in the case of Rajasthan State Industrial Development & Investment Corporation & Anr. vs. Diamond & Gem Development Corporation Ltd. & Anr.- (2013) 5 SCC 470 has, held as under: "I. Approbate and Reprobate 15. The Hon'ble Apex Court has, in the case of Rajasthan State Industrial Development & Investment Corporation & Anr. vs. Diamond & Gem Development Corporation Ltd. & Anr.- (2013) 5 SCC 470 has, held as under: "I. Approbate and Reprobate 15. A party cannot be permitted to 'blow hot-blow cold1, 'fast and loose' or 'approbate and reprobate'. Where one knowingly accepts the benefits of a contract, or conveyance, or of an order, he is estopped from denying the validity of, or the binding effect of such contract, or conveyance, or order upon himself. This rule is applied to ensure equity, however, it must not be applied in such a manner, so as to violate the principles of, what is right and, of good conscience. (Vide: Nagubai Ammal & Ors. v. B. Shama Rao & Ors., AIR 1956 SC 593 ; C.I.T. Madras v. Mr. P. Firm Muar, AIR 1965 SC 1216 ; Ramesh Chandra Sankla etc. v. Vikram Cement etc., AIR 2009 SC 713 ; Pradeep Oil Corporation v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi & Anr., AIR 2011 SC 1869 ; Cauvery Coffee Traders, Mangalore v. Hornor Resources (International) Company Limited, (2011) 10 SCC 420 ; and V. Chandrasekaran & Anr. v. The Administrative Officer & Ors., JT2012 (9) SC 260)." 19. Even otherwise also, in Para-16 of its reply, the RIICO has stated candidly that the petitioner could have utilized the remaining large chunk of land for the amusement park leaving the meagre disputed land unutilized subject to decision of the pending suit; but, the petitioner never intended to do so. Thus, the conflicting stand adopted by the respondent-RIICO shows the most arbitrary and unjust manner in which the request has been rejected and the order impugned has been passed. 20. RIICO, perhaps, could have been justified in withdrawing the allotment made in favour of the petitioner had the efflux of time or intervening circumstances, frustrated the object of allotment, i.e., construction of amusement park/resort for the public use. Although, learned counsel for the RIICO canvassed that the order dated 17.9.2020 came to be passed inasmuch as unutilized possession of the land by the petitioner for about 13 years, frustrated the object, there is no material on record to support the contention. Although, learned counsel for the RIICO canvassed that the order dated 17.9.2020 came to be passed inasmuch as unutilized possession of the land by the petitioner for about 13 years, frustrated the object, there is no material on record to support the contention. Neither the impugned order dated 17.9.2020 reveals that this ground weighed in the mind of the respondent-RIICO while passing it, nor the RIICO has placed on record any material to show that either the requirement of having amusement park/resort has come to an end by efflux of time or that this requirement has been made/satisfied by construction of any other amusement park/resort. 21. It is a well established principle of law that every State action has to be just, fair, reasonable and in conformity with the mandate of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. As is revealed from the aforesaid analysis of the material on record, the order impugned dated 17.09.2020 fails to meet any of such criteria and hence, cannot be sustained in the eye of law. 22. Now, if this Court considers the reason assigned by the RIICO in its reply for passing the order impugned, the same is in total contradiction with the reasoning contained in the order dated 17.09.2020. As per the impugned order, the allotment in favour of the petitioner was withdrawn as it could not be handed over peaceful possession of the allotted land; whereas, taking a complete somersault, the respondent-RIICO has, in its reply, submitted that the order impugned dated 17.09.2020 came to be passed in as much as the petitioner failed to have the construction activities completed within two years from the date of possession and to start production activities within three years therefrom. Referring the various provisions of the allotment letter, the RIICO has tried to justify the order impugned on the premise that the petitioner was required to carry out actual construction on the ground with 5% coverage; but, the petitioner, instead of raising construction or even making any attempt to do so, taking shelter of the interim order of the Civil Court, was enjoying the property for last about 13 years and hence, it has committed no error in passing the order impugned which is based on breach of terms and conditions of the allotment letter. In its entire reply, the respondent-RIICO has nowhere tried to justify the order impugned dated 17.09.2020 for the reasons enumerated therein. 23. The Hon'ble Apex Court has, in case of Mohinder Singh Gill (supra), held as under:- "8. The second equally relevant matter is that when a statutory functionary makes an order based on certain grounds, its validity must be judged by the reasons so mentioned and cannot be supplemented by fresh reasons in the shape of affidavit or otherwise. Otherwise, an order bad in the beginning may, by the time it comes to court on account of a challenge, get validated by additional grounds later brought, out. We may here draw attention to the observations of Bose J. in Gordhandas Bhanji ( AIR 1952 SC 16 ) "Public orders, publicly made, in exercise of a statutory authority cannot be construed in the light of explanations subsequently given by the officer making the order of what he meant, or of what was in his mind, or what he intended to do. Public orders made by public authorities are meant to have public effect and are intended to affect the acting and conduct of those to whom they are addressed and must be construed objectively with reference to the language used in the order itself." Orders are not like old wine becoming better as they grow older." 24. The Hon'ble Apex Court has, in case of Commissioner of Police, Bombay (supra), held as under:- "9. An attempt was made by referring to the Commissioner's affidavit to show that this was really an order of cancellation made by him and that the order was his order and not that of Government. We are clear that public orders, publicly made, in exercise of a statutory authority cannot be construed in the light of explanations subsequently given by the officer making the order of what he meant, or of what was in his mind, or what he intended to do. Public orders made by public authorities are meant to have public effect and are intended to affect the actings and conduct of those to whom they are addressed and must be construed objectively with reference to the language used in the order itself." 25. Recently, in case of State of Punjab Vs. Bandeep Singh and Ors. with Punjab State Leather Development Corporation and Ors. Vs. Bandeep Singh and Ors. Recently, in case of State of Punjab Vs. Bandeep Singh and Ors. with Punjab State Leather Development Corporation and Ors. Vs. Bandeep Singh and Ors. (2016) 1 Supreme Court Cases 724, the Hon'ble Apex Court, relying on the judgment of the Constitution Bench of the Hon'ble Apex Court in case of Mohinder Singh Gill (supra) held as under:- "4. There can be no gainsaying that every decision of an administrative or executive nature must be a composite and self-sustaining one, in that it should contain all the reasons which prevailed on the official taking the decision to arrive at his conclusion. It is beyond cavil that any Authority cannot be permitted to travel beyond the stand adopted and expressed by it in the impugned action ". 26. Thus, the respondent-RIICO has adopted self-contradictory and rather mutually destructive stand to support its decision of withdrawal of the allotment. While, as per the order dated 17.09.2020, the withdrawal was made for the reasons having no concern whatsoever with the action/conduct of the petitioner i.e. the project could not be carried out on account of interim order passed in a civil suit filed by a third person; whereas, as per the averments in the reply, failure on the part of the petitioner to abide by the terms and conditions of the allotment letter and to raise construction and complete the project within the stipulated period, was the sole reason for withdrawal. Although, in the light of law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in cases of Mohinder Singh Gill (supra), Commissioner of Police, Bombay (supra) and State of Punjab (supra), the reasons assigned by the respondent-RIICO in its reply to justify the order dated 17.09.2020, cannot be considered to adjudge validity of the order impugned; still, if the reasons are considered objectively in the light of material on record, the same are not sustainable in as much as the petitioner was prevented from carrying out the project in terms of allotment letter on account of an interim order passed by a competent Civil Court as also for the reason that its acceptance of the proposal made by the RIICO to raise construction and complete the project on the land allotted leaving the disputed land aside, was not given go ahead by the respondent-RIICO for no good reason. It is a well established principle of law that the law does not compel a man to perform act which is not possible. The Hon'ble Apex Court has, in the case of Mohd. Gazi vs. State of M.P.- (2000) 4 SCC 342 has, held as under: "7. In the facts and circumstances of the case, the maxim of equity, namely, actus curiae neminem gravabit - an act of the Court shall prejudice no man, shall be applicable. This maxim is founded upon justice and good sense which serves a safe and certain guide for the administration of law. The other maxim is, lex non cogit ad impossibilia - the law does not compel a man to do what he cannot possibly perform. The law itself and its administration is understood to disclaim as it does in its general aphorisms, all intention of compelling impossibilities, and the administration of law must adopt that general exception in the consideration of particular cases. The applicability of the aforesaid maxims has been approved by this Court in Raj Kumar Dey vs. Tarapada Dey & Ors.- 1987 (4) SCC 398 and Gurusharan Singh vs. New Delhi Municipal Committee- 1996 (2) SCC 459 ." 27. Thus, the order dated 17.09.2020 is not sustainable for either of the reasons, i.e., as mentioned therein or as contained in the reply. 28. The impugned order also deserves to be quashed and set aside for violation of cardinal principles of natural justice in as much as, undisputedly, neither any show cause notice, nor any opportunity of hearing was afforded to the petitioner before it came to be passed. 29. In view of the fact that the order dated 17.09.2020 is held to be unsustainable, this Court does not venture into alternative limb of argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner as to refund of amount deposited with interest @ 12% per annum. 30. The offshoot of the aforesaid discussions is that the order impugned dated 17.09.2020 passed by the respondent-RIICO is not sustainable in law and deserves to be quashed and set aside. 31. Resultantly, the writ petition is allowed and the order dated 17.09.2020 passed by the respondent-RIICO is quashed and set aside.