ORDER : The civil revision petition is filed challenging the order in I.A.No.131 of 2017 in O.S.No.01 of 2013 by the petitioner/plaintiff. Petitioner is a registered partnership firm represented by its Managing Partner seeks specific performance of Agreement dated 03.02.2006 (wrongly typed as 03.02.2010 in paragraph 8 and 9 of the plaint) with respect to suit schedule property admeasuring Ac.4.07 guntas (equivalent to 20273 square yards in Survey No.194/1, G.L.R. Survey No.255 falling under Secunderabad Cantonment Area situated at Ramakrishnapuram (Gandhinagar), Secunderabad Cantonment, Malkajgiri village and mandal, Ranga Reddy District. 2. In the plaint, the detailed description with respect to the entering into a contract for purchase of land in Survey No.194/1 and also in Survey No.211 starting with an MoU in 2016 and subsequent documents alleged to have been executed between the parties was mentioned. For the purpose of resolving the controversy in the present CRP, the details with respect to the same are not necessary except to state that the plaintiffs alleged to have been delivered with the possession of the suit schedule property. 3. Invoking Order I Rule 10(2) read with Section 151 CPC, the plaintiff sought to implead respondents 3 to 5 in the suit as defendants 3 to 5. As per the averments in the affidavit filed in support of the petition, the petitioners found that employees of 5th respondent at the suit are site claiming right over the property and on further enquiry, the petitioners came to learn that the respondents 1 and 2 (Defendants 1 and 2), to create multiplicity of proceedings and in order to avoid the execution of Sale Deed pursuant to agreements entered into with the petitioners in collusion and in connivance with the respondents 3 to 5, created a Deed of Mortgage purporting to mortgage the suit schedule property along with the other properties on behalf of respondent No.3 in favour of respondent No.4 vide Mortgage Deed bearing No.1380/2015 dated 15.12.2015. The 4th respondent alleged to have assigned the debt owed and all its rights by assignment deed dated 28.03.2015 in favour of 5th respondent Asset Reconstruction Company. Petitioner also learnt that 5th respondent had initiated certain proceedings under Securitization and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 (for short, “SARFAESI Act”). The 4th respondent alleged to have assigned the debt owed and all its rights by assignment deed dated 28.03.2015 in favour of 5th respondent Asset Reconstruction Company. Petitioner also learnt that 5th respondent had initiated certain proceedings under Securitization and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 (for short, “SARFAESI Act”). The creation of mortgage in favour of 4th respondent by the respondents 1 and 2 is nonest in law and the same is in violation of status quo orders dated 04.01.2013 in I.A.No.28 of 2013. Petitioner asserts that the mortgage and the assignment deeds executed are illegal, void and not binding on the plaintiff and as the said documents are creating cloud over the petitioner’s right over the suit schedule property and for effectual conveyance of property in their favour pursuant to the Agreement of Sale dated 03.02.2006, petitioner seeks to implead respondents 3 to 5 as defendants 3 to 5 in the suit. Petitioner asserts that respondents 3 to 5 are necessary and proper parties for effective adjudication of the dispute. 4. Respondent No.4 filed counter asserting that the petitioner be put to strict proof of respective averments in the affidavit. It is asserted that the creation of mortgage, assignment of debt and the mortgaged property in favour of the 5th respondent has been done strictly according to the rules; that the suit filed in 2013 with respect to alleged AGPA of the year 2006 and the petition filed after four years of mortgage and the same is collusive with defendants 1 and 2 and the delay is not explained; that they are not necessary or proper parties and hence prays for dismissal of the petition. 5. Respondent No.5 filed a separate counter denying the averments of the affidavit contending that the guarantee documents executed by the 3rd respondent in favour of 4th respondent and subsequent documents executed in favour of 4th and 5th respondents cannot be disputed and further the petitioner would not have better rights over the respondents 4 and 5 with respect to suit schedule property. 6. 6. Learned District Judge having considered the respective submissions dismissed the I.A. holding that the AGPA is not a public document and the proposed parties are not necessary parties as respondents 3 to 5 have no nexus with AGPA, and the petitioner has other remedies against respondents 3 to 5 with respect to violation of status quo orders dated 04.01.2013 in I.A.No.28 of 2013. 7. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the deed of mortgage dated 15.12.2015 is not a bona fide transaction; that the order of status quo dated 04.01.2013 was prior in time than the deed of mortgage executed on 15.12.2015; that the mortgage deed is in respect of property in Survey No.194/1 which is the subject matter of O.S.No.1 of 2013; that respondents 3 to 5 are proper parties to decide whether the transaction is bonafide; that the petitioner is entitled to un-encumbered property as the mortgage is subsequent encumbrance; that respondents 3 to 5 will be affected by the outcome of the suit as the property under mortgage deed and the suit O.S.No.1 of 2013 is the same; that impleadment is necessary to put the prospective auction purchasers on notice; that impleadment does not go against Section 34 of the SARFAESI Act, as the bar is only with respect to matters covered under Debts Recovery Tribunal Act which are specified under SARFAESI Act, and pertain to recovery proceedings initiated by bank under Section 13(2). 8. Learned counsel for the respondent No.5 submits that respondent No.5 is neither necessary nor proper party in deciding the suit claim and in a specific performance suit, the only issue that is required to be decided is whether the plaintiff/petitioner is entitled for specific performance of agreement of sale with respect to the suit schedule property; and the 5th respondent being the assignee with respect to the rights of the 4th respondent under SARFAESI Act would get all the rights in law of the 4th respondent and therefore neither the 4th respondent nor the 5th respondent are necessary or proper parties for deciding the lis in the suit. 9. 9. Having heard both the learned counsels at length and having perused the respective pleadings and the judgments cited, the questions which fall for consideration are: 1) Whether, in the facts and circumstances of the case, the respondents 3 to 5 are required to be impleaded as defendants 3 to 5 in the suit filed by the plaintiff/petitioner seeking specific performance of Agreement of Sale dated 03.02.2006? 2) Whether in the facts and circumstances of the case, the order in I.A. is liable to be interfered with? 10. At the outset, it may be stated that a large number of precedents were placed before this Court by the learned counsel for the petitioner and some of the judgments cited by the learned counsel for the respondent. Having given anxious thought and after critically analyzing the large number of cases cited before this Court, to avoid confusion, the judgments can be divided into two categories; namely (1) allowing Order I Rule 10 applications; and (2) rejecting the Order I Rule 10 applications. As a subcategory, specific cases where issue was decided one way or other with respect to cases falling under specific performance of agreement of sale of property. Category – 1: Citation Relief claimed in the suit Application filed by Plaintiff/Defendant/third parties Reasons for allowing Razia Begum v. Saheb Jagir Anwar Begum and others AIR 1958 SC 886 (3 judges’ bench) 2 in favour, 1 dissenting) Declaring that the plaintiff is the legally wedded wife of the defendant, and is entitled to receive karch-e-pandan @ Rs.2,000/- per month Impleadment was sought by the third parties contending that the declaratory relief would affect their rights Declarations in a suit in respect of disputed status, important rights flow from such judicial declaration and affect not only persons actually parties to the litigation but also persons claiming through them as laid down in Section 43 of the Specific Relief Act, 1877 (Act 1 of 1877). Note: Dissenting judgment of Justice Imam holding that the impleadment of third parties was not contemplated under CPC or Section 42 of Specific Relief Act or permissible under Mohammadan Law. Note: Dissenting judgment of Justice Imam holding that the impleadment of third parties was not contemplated under CPC or Section 42 of Specific Relief Act or permissible under Mohammadan Law. Thomson Press (India) Ltd. V. Nanak Builders and Investors Private Limited and others AIR 2013 SC 2389 (two-judges bench) Suit for specific performance for enforcement of agreement dated 29.05.1986 for sale of 4000 sq.feet of property Third party (Purchaser of the property pending suit from the defendants) The subsequent purchaser has current interest in the property, and hence they are entitled to protect their rights Robin Ramjibhai Patel v. Anandibai Rama @ Rajaram Pawar (2018) 15 SCC 614 (two-judges bench) Suit for specific performance of contract Plaintiff seeking impleadment of respondents 6 to 8 who are alleged to have purchased the property By placing reliance on the judgment of Supreme Court in Kasturi v. Iyyamperumal ( 2005 (6) SCC 733 ) and further the purchasers may be adversely affected by the outcome of the suit. 2018 3 ALD 513 2018 3 ALT 608 Manepalli Mohan Rao v. Jakkam Sunitha and others Suit for specific performance of agreement of sale performance of agreement of sale Plaintiff to implead respondent No.3 who had equitable mortgage of the suit schedule property By placing reliance on Kasturi v. Iyyamperumal holding that mortgagee is not claiming independent right to the vendor and further the mortgagee himself was not contesting Category – 2: Citation Relief claimed in the suit Application filed by Plaintiff/Defendant/ third parties Reasons for dismissal of claim (1992) 2 SCC 524 (two-judges bench) Ramesh Hirachand Kundanmal v. Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay and others Suit challenging a notice issued by the Municipal Corporation and seeking injunction restraining the Municipal Corporation from demolishing the structures Third party (the lessee seeking impleadment as defendant) The Lessee (HPCL) intervener has no cause of action against plaintiff. The questions involved in the suit the presence of intervener is not necessary. He has no direct interest in the subject matter of litigation and addition would result in causing serious prejudice to the plaintiff creating a new cause of action, widening the issue which is required to be adjudicated and settled. The object of Order I Rule 10 is not prevention of multiplicity of actions, though it may incidentally have that effect. He has no direct interest in the subject matter of litigation and addition would result in causing serious prejudice to the plaintiff creating a new cause of action, widening the issue which is required to be adjudicated and settled. The object of Order I Rule 10 is not prevention of multiplicity of actions, though it may incidentally have that effect. Anil Kumar Singh v. Shiv Nath Mishra and Gadasa Guru 1995 (3) SCC 147 (two-judges bench) Suit for specific performance of agreement for selling the land Legal representative of Plaintiff under Order VI Rule 17 CPC seeking to amend the plaint by impleading respondent as a party defendant on the ground that the implead party had obtained a collusive decree and thus became a co-sharer. The I.A. was dismissed by the trial Court and the CRP was dismissed by the High Court. Supreme Court confirmed the rejection of claim holding that under Section 15 of Specific Relief Act, 1963, the Court is required to mould the relief under Section 16 based on the fact situation and therefore proposed respondent is neither a necessary nor proper party to adjudicate the dispute arising in the suit. Kasturi v. Iyyamperumal 2005 (6) SCC 733 (three-judges bench) Suit filed for specific performance of contract of sale Third party filed seeking impleadment by setting up a claim of independent title and possession over the contract property) High Court allowed, but Supreme Court reversed the claim. The twin test for seeking addition in a pending suit for specific performance of the contract for sale were not satisfied. Mumbai International Airport Private Limited v. Regency Convention Centre and Hotels Private Limited (2010) 7 SCC 417 Respondent suit is in relation to property of airport authority under a contract where the proposed implead petitioner is not a party. Third party (their claim is that the property is deemed to have been included under the MoU with defendant and the same is needed for future expansion in public interest) The application was rejected on the ground that they are not necessary parties and their claim is only as a proper party and their claim is not based on Spes succession is, thus they are not proper parties. Vidur Impex and Traders pvt. Vidur Impex and Traders pvt. Ltd v. Tosh Apartment Pvt. Ltd (two-judges bench) AIR 2012 SC 2925 Specific performance of agreement of sale dated 13.09.1988 Third party (seeking impleadment was dismissed) The application was dismissed on the ground that they are strangers to the agreement, and further the subsequent agreements entered by the defendant No.1 and the sales made were in violation of the orders and they have not approached the Court with clean hands. In other words, the case turned on its own facts except that in paragraph 36 of the judgment the broad principles governing disposal of an application for impleadment were summarized. Gurmit Singh Bhatia v. Kiran Kant Rao AIR 2019 SC 3577 (two-judges bench) 2019 (5) ALD 166 (SC) Suit for specific performance of agreement dated 03.05.2005 Third party (purchaser) Dismissed on the ground that the purchaser is a third party to the proceedings and further the plaintiff is the dominus litis and he cannot be forced to add parties against his wish and against whom he does not want to fight unless it is compulsion of law. Kasturi case was relied on and Sri Robin Ramji bai patel and sri Swastik developers were distinguished. 11. It may be noted that the in the first judgment of the Supreme Court in Ramesh Hirachand Kundanmal v. Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay, (1992) 2 SCC 524 , it was categorically held after referring to the judgment of Supreme Court in Razia Begum v. Anwar Begum, [1959] SCR 1111 has held that the court is empowered to join a person whose presence is necessary for the prescribed purpose and cannot under Sub Rule 2 of Order 10 direct the addition of a person whose presence is not necessary for the purpose of effectually and completely adjudicating upon and settling all the questions involved in the suit. Paragraph 8 of Ramesh Hirachand reads as under: “8. The case really turns on the true construction of the rule in particular the meaning of the words “whose presence before the Court may be necessary in order to enable the Court effectually and completely to adjudicate upon and settle all the questions involved in the suit”. The Court is empowered to join a person whose presence is necessary for the prescribed purpose and cannot under the rule direct the addition of a person whose presence is not necessary for that purpose. The Court is empowered to join a person whose presence is necessary for the prescribed purpose and cannot under the rule direct the addition of a person whose presence is not necessary for that purpose. If the intervener has a cause of action against the plaintiff relating to the subject matter of the existing action, the Court has power to join the intervener so as to give effect to the primary object of the order which is to avoid multiplicity of actions.” 12. It was further held that in relation to disputes relating to properties in order that a person may be added as a party, he should have a direct interest as distinguished from a commercial interest in the subject matter of litigation. In para 11, it was held that the object of Order I Rule 10 may incidentally have the effect of avoiding multiplicity of actions, the same is not the determinative factor. In paragraph 14, it was held as under: “14. It cannot be said that the main object of the rule is to present multiplicity of actions though it may incidentally have that effect. But that appears to be a desirable consequence of the rule rather than its main objective. The person to be joined must be one whose presence is necessary as a party. What makes a person a necessary party is not merely that he has relevant evidence to give on some of the questions involved; that would only make him a necessary witness. It is not merely that he has an interest in the correct solution of some question involved and has thought of relevant arguments to advance. The only reason which makes it necessary to make a person a party to an action is so that he should be bound by the result of the action and the question to be settled, therefore, must be a question in the action which cannot be effectually and completely settled unless he is a party. The line has been drawn on a wider construction of the rule between the direct interest or the legal interest and commercial interest. It is, therefore, necessary that the person must be directly or legally interested in the action in the answer, i.e., he can say that the litigation may lead to a result which will affect him legally that is by curtailing his legal rights. It is, therefore, necessary that the person must be directly or legally interested in the action in the answer, i.e., he can say that the litigation may lead to a result which will affect him legally that is by curtailing his legal rights. It is difficult to say that the rule contemplates joining as a defendant a person whose only object is to prosecute his own cause of action. Similar provision was considered in Amon v. Raphael Tuck & Sons Ltd {(1956) 1 All ER 273}, wherein after quoting the observations of Wynn-Parry, J. in Dollfus Mieg et Compagnie S.A. v. Bank of England {(1950) 2 All ER 605, 611}, that their true test lies not so much in an analysis of what are the constituents of the applicants’ rights, but rather in what would be the result on the subject matter of the action if those rights could be established. Delvin, J. has stated: “The test is ‘May the order for which the plaintiff is asking directly affect the intervener in the enjoyment of his legal rights’.” 13. The judgment in Ramesh Hirachand’s case and Anil Kumar Singh’s case were referred to with approval by three-judge bench judgment in Kasturi’s case and also the judgment of Anil Kumar Singh’s case. It may further be noted that in Anil Kumar Singh’s case, Lala Durga Prasad v. Lala Deep Chand, 31954 AIR 75= 1954 SCR 360 case was referred, however, it may be noted that the issue whether the subsequent purchaser is required to be made as a party respondent did not arise, however, by placing reliance on Section 40 of Transfer of Property Act, Section 3 and Section 27 of Specific Relief Act, 1877, and Section 91 of Indian Trusts Act, 1882, alternatives available for the Court while passing the decree were set out. It may be noted that the Specific Relief Act, 1877, stands repealed with enactment of Specific Relief Act, 1963. Likewise, the Razia Begum’s case also was a case decided in the context of Specific Relief Act, 1877. 14. All the subsequent judgments, taking one view or other, had turned on the fact situation found in the respective cases. It may be noted that the Specific Relief Act, 1877, stands repealed with enactment of Specific Relief Act, 1963. Likewise, the Razia Begum’s case also was a case decided in the context of Specific Relief Act, 1877. 14. All the subsequent judgments, taking one view or other, had turned on the fact situation found in the respective cases. A close reading of para 14 and 15 of Kasturi’s case leave no manner of doubt that the controversy raised between the plaintiff and defendant alone are required to be gone into and not the disputes which may arise between the parties to the suit and third party. As can be seen from the table of judgments referred to, though some of the judgments which are later in point to the three-judge bench judgment in Kasturi’s case, in the facts of those cases had held that subsequent purchaser/the person claiming rights in a property in preference to the plaintiff seeking specific performance may be added as a party, this Court is mandated to follow the judgment of the larger Bench in preference to the judgments of the subsequent smaller Benches following the principle laid down by the Supreme Court in State of U.P. v. Ram Chandra Trivedi, 1976 SC 25475, and in Union of India v. K.S. Subramanian, 1976 AIR 2433. 15. In the present case, the rights that are being claimed by the plaintiff arise on account of Agreement of Sale with the defendants 1 and 2, and the rights which are being claimed by the contesting respondents 4 and 5 in the trial Court and by the 5th respondent before this Court are admittedly based on the amounts lent to respondent No.3, on the strength of guarantees executed by respondent No.3 and other collateral guarantees executed by respondents 1 and 2. Further, it may be noted that a mortgagee has independent rights. Further, it may be noted that a mortgagee has independent rights. Apart from that, respondent No.4 being a ‘banking company’ as defined under Section 2(d) of the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 (for short, “DRT Act”), a ‘financial institution’ as defined under Section 3 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, ‘secured creditor’ as defined under Section 2(zd) of the SARFAESI Act, and respondent No.5 being an Asset Reconstruction Company as defined under Section 2(d)(ia) of the DRT Act and under Section 2(b)(ba) of the SARFAESI Act, have certain independent, statutorily conferred rights with respect to the debts/monies owed by the respondent No.3, and in that view of the matter, they cannot be equated with the parties acquiring rights by way of a judgment and decree in relation to an immovable property in a specific performance suit. 16. So far as the argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the joining of the proposed respondents as defendants would avoid multiplicity of proceedings, binding the successors in interest of defendants 1 and 2 though sounds attractive in the first blush, the same is required to be negatived as, at this stage, the joining of proposed respondents would be virtually denying their rights and the legal defences which they may be entitled to put forth, based on the mortgage obtained by them, and also the legal rights conferred under the Acts referred to in the previous paragraphs whereunder a different fora and procedure is specified. 17. The enquiry with respect to the rights in the present suit would certainly enlarge the scope of the simple specific performance suit. On the other hand, in law, the decree that may be obtained by the plaintiff/petitioners would be binding on the subsequent acquirers of rights whatever they may be, subject to their rights. In that view of the matter, the dismissal of I.A. cannot be found fault. 18. Accordingly, the Civil Revision Petition is dismissed. No costs. Miscellaneous petitions, if any pending, shall also stand dismissed.