ORDER: 1. In these batch of writ petitions, the constitutional validity of Karnataka Land Grabbing Prohibition Act, 2011, which has come into force with effect from 20.10.2014 by Karnataka 38/2014 (for short ‘KLGP Act 2011’) has been challenged. ADVOCATES FOR PETITIONERS: 2. We have heard Sriyuths Ashok Harnahalli for P.N. Manmohan, G. Krishnamurthy for Aparna N., K. Chandrakanth Patil and R. Purushotham, D.N. Nanjunda Reddy for Prakash T. Hebbar, N. Devhadass for M. Veerabhadraiah, Uday Holla for Mohumed Sadiqh B.A., M.B. Anirudh, B. M.Mohan Kumar, K. Shashikiran Shetty for Latha S. Shetty, P.S. Rajagopal for R. Badrinath, Jayakumar S. Patil for Shahul Hameed and Vikar Ahmed, Ian Issidore Prakash Lewis, Dayanand S. Patil, Hashmath Pasha for Nasir Ali, K.G. Raghavan for Dua Associates, learned Senior Advocates appearing for petitioners; Sriyuths S. Ajesh kumar, J.M. Rajanna Setty, D.R. Ravishankar. B. Amarnath, M.R. Rajagopal, Sunil Rao for T. Sheshagiri Rao, Siddharth B. Muchandi, Prakash T. Hebbar, B.R. Krishna, Sreeshail Navalgund, R. Bhadrinath. B. Amarnath, M.R. Rajagopal, Sunil Rao for T. Sheshagiri Rao, Siddharth B. Muchandi, Prakash T. Hebbar, B.R. Krishna, Sreeshail Navalgund, R. Bhadrinath. S.G. Bhagavan, Narayana Swamy P.M. Harish H.V., Kumar J.C., M. Shivaparaksh, Ajith P.B., B.S. Radhanandan, Suresh Desai K., Badri Vishal, H. Srinivas Rao, Ganapathy Bhat Vajralli, Dhananjay Kumar, V. Vishwanath Shetty, Sahul Hameed, N. Ravindranath Kamath, B.V. Mallareddy, C.M. Poonacha, Ajith Kalyan, N. Shankara Narayana Bhat, P.N. Manmohan, V. Vinod Reddy, K.G. Shivanna, Chandrakanth R. Goulay, S. Sudarsan, Shanmukhappa, A. Keshava Bhat, Rajendra Kumar Sungai, Rahul S. Reddy, D.R. Ravishankar for N. Shivakumar, S. Shaker Shetty, R. Badrinath, B.S. Sachin, T.N. Raghupathy, Rameshchandra, D. Hemanth Kumar, Nayanatara for G.L. Vishwanath, V.B. Siddaramaiah, D.C. Srinivasa, K. Jeevan, G.R. Mohan, V. Sanjay Krishna, S. Basavaraj, A. Abhinav Ramanand, Akki Manjunatha Gowda, Y.T. Abhinay a/w Byregowda, M.V. Hiremath, Pundikai Ishwar Bhat, K. Chandan, P.H. Virupakashaiah, K. Ranajan Kumar, Venugopal M.S., Aruna Shyam M., a/w Suyog, S.V. Prakash, P.B. Appaiah, K. Srihari, Sammit S. for S. Shivananda, N.V. Srikanth, Naveed Ahmed, Vigneshwar S. Shsastri, V.R. Prasanna, C.R. Gopalaswamy, H.R. Anantha Krishna Murthy, S.K. Acharya, Sampat Bapat, K.N. Puttegowda, P.M. Siddamallappa, Sharath S. Gowda, K.R. Srinivasa Patavardhan, T.A. Karumbiah, Lokesh S.G., B.K. Chandrashekar, Nitish for K.V. Narasimhan, D.J. Rakshitha, C.M. Nagabhushana, A.R. Goutham, C.R. Subramanya, B.S. Prasad, V.N. Rakshitha and V. Vidya for K. Raghavendra Rao, C. Parameshwarappa, H.C. Shivaramu for B. Keshavamurthy, G.S. Chidambara, Pruthvi Wodeyar, H.S. Prashanth, Harsha D. Joshi, V. Srenivas, S. Rajendra, H.S. Prashanth, H.S. Dwarakanath, A. Madhusudhana Rao, Kaleemullah Sheriff, A.G. Shivanna, Sreepada H.R. and B.R. Prasanna, Lohitaswa Banakar, M.D. Basavanna, G. Harish, B. Keshava Murthy and G.R. Prasanna, K.R. Ramesh, Yathish J. Nadiga, B.S. Jeevan Kumar, K.J. Bhojanna, N. Sukumar Jain, S.V. Shastri, Halesha R.G., Ravikumar N.R., B.H. Shamanna, K.R. Bharadwaj, K. Pradeep Naik, B.N. Sunil Kumar, M.S. Harish Kumar, Nagiah, S. Rajashekar, V.D. Raviraj, H.S. Kalyan Kumar, P.P. Hegde, G.S. Praveen Kumar, Mahaveer K. Jain a/w Nandish Patil, K.R. Rajendra, George Joseph for Dua Assts, A. Vijay Kumar Bhat, Patil Dayananda Subraya Gouda, B.Ranga Swamy B., M.L. Jagadeesh, M.S Raghavendra Prasad, K.R. Krishnamurthy, Aditya Kumar H.R. for Dayananda S. Patil, learned Advocates appearing for petitioners. ADVOCATES FOR RESPONDENTS: 3. ADVOCATES FOR RESPONDENTS: 3. We have heard Sriyuths Prabhuling K. Navadgi, learned Advocate General a/w V. Sreenidhi, Additional Government Advocate and H.C. Kavitha, HCGP M.V. Thanuja, Vivek Yavagal, N.R. Jagadeeswara, Kempanna, B.S. Manjunath, H. Shanthi Bhushan, H. Sridhara, B.R. Satish, N. Subba Shastry, Pradeep J.S., D. Mallikarjuna Swamy, K. Hanumantharayappa, Manu Kulkarni A/W. Srushti Widge for Poovayya and Co. Chokka Reddy, Vivek Holla, Chethan Kumar, J. Anil Kumar, B.R. Viswanath, Punith, B.S. Anil Kumar, M.S. Parthasarathi, R.S. Prasanna Kumar, B.S. Basavaraju, K. Suresh Desai, P. Mahadevaswamy and S. Krishnamurthy, K.M. Somashekar, H. Jayakar Shetty, Ashwin S. Halady, K.B.S. Manian, R. Kothwal, L. Sreekanta Rao and B.S. Krishna, Rajesh Shetty, V. Raghunath, C.R. Krishnappa, P. Srinath, A.V. Gangadharappa, Ravi Shankar S., T.P. Mali Patil, R. Ramachandran, S.N. Prashanth Chandra, Showri H.R., Jayaprakash, N.R. Jagadeeswara, Sandesh A.S., Ashwini B.N., I.G. Gachchinamath, M. Aswathnarayana Reddy, Chennamma, K.N. Putte Gowda, K. Sheela Anish, Gowthamdev C. Ullal, K.A. Prakash, S.N. Bhat, R.B. Sadasivappa, K. Sheelavathi, R.P. Somashekaraiah, Tejaswini S. and Praveen Kumar N.K., M.C. Nagashree, B.N. Puttalingaiah, S. Chandrashekaraiah, N.V. Prakash and B.V. Sudhindra, Bipin Hegde, T.R. Ananda party-in-person, S. Nagaraja, Hanumanthappa B. Haravigoudar, A. Nagarajappa, B.S. Nagaraja, R. Madhusudan Reddy, S. Padmini and Vijaya Raghavan, B.M. Halaswamy, P.B. Raju, M. Vijayakrishna Bhat, learned Advocates appearing for respondents. Sri. Chandrashekar V., party-in-person. CONTENTIONS RAISED BY LEARNED ADVOCATES APPEARING FOR THE PETITIONERS: 4. The learned Senior Advocates along with other Advocates appearing for petitioners have made elaborate submissions on the constitutional validity of the KLGP Act 2011. The sum and substance of the arguments canvassed by them can be condensed as under: 4.1 It is contended that the offence created under the Act namely, Section 3 declares land grabbing or any activity connected with or arising out of land grabbing unlawful; Section 4(1) prohibits land grabbing; section 4(2) holds a person who “on or after the commencement of this Act continues to be in occupation of the grabbed land”; and Section 5 criminalises offences in connection with land grabbing. It is contended that land grabbing as defined under section 2(f) consists of several activities and it is committed once for all and therefore, it is not a continuing offence. It is contended that land grabbing as defined under section 2(f) consists of several activities and it is committed once for all and therefore, it is not a continuing offence. It is further contended that the activities relating to land grabbing are illegally taking possession, entering into and creating tenancies, leases, licences, constructing unauthorised structures for sale or hire, giving grabbed land to any person for rent, lease, licence, for construction, use, occupation of unauthorised structures. It is contended that land grabber is one who commits or committed the offence land grabbing prior to Act and Section 9(1) and Section 2(e) makes the offence under Section 4(1) retrospective operation and Article 21 of the Constitution of India prohibits any person to be convicted of any offence if the same is not in violation of a law which was not in force at the time of commission of the offence. Hence, it is contended that Sections 2(e), 3, 4(1) and 9(1) operate retrospectively and not being continuing offences, it is in clear violation of Article 21 of the Constitution of India. It is also contended that Section 5 ought to be construed as operating prospectively, whereas, Section 9(1) empowers the Special Court to take cognizance of all offences under the Act whether or before the commencement of the Act, thereby making Section 5 retrospective in operation which violates Article 21 of the Constitution of India. 4.2 It is also contended that the Hon’ble Apex Court in Shreya Singhal vs. Union of India, (2015) 5 SCC 1 has held that a section which creates an offence and which is vague must be struck down as arbitrary and unreasonable. Applying the said principle, petitioners are contending that Section 3 does not define or indicate the activities connected with or arising out of land grabbing and Section 3 being in precise, for sheer vagueness, it is to be struck down. 4.3 It is also contended that the Special procedure contemplated under the Act lays down substantially different procedure for trial of offences than that is laid down in general law namely, Code of Criminal Procedure (for short Cr.P.C.) and on account of said departure, Section 9 is liable to be struck down as it violates Article 14. 4.3 It is also contended that the Special procedure contemplated under the Act lays down substantially different procedure for trial of offences than that is laid down in general law namely, Code of Criminal Procedure (for short Cr.P.C.) and on account of said departure, Section 9 is liable to be struck down as it violates Article 14. It is contended that right of revision provide under Section 397 Cr.P.C. and right of appeal provide under Section 374 Cr.P.C. is taken away by virtue of Section 9(3) as the orders of the Special Court are final. Hence, it is contended that right of appeal in a criminal case being a fundamental right, same cannot be taken away. 4.4 Further contention with regard to procedure as prescribed under Section 9 of KLGP Act 2011 is attacked on the ground that same provides for summary trial and under Section 262 of Cr.P.C. no sentence of imprisonment exceeding three months shall be passed in case of conviction under Chapter XX of Cr.P.C. Whereas, Section 10 of the KLGP Act 2011 prescribes that Cr.P.C. will apply to act so long as it is not inconsistent with the Act. Hence, it is contended that on account of KLGP Act 2011 provides for only summary trial, the Act prevails over the Code. It is contended that for offences under the KLGP Act, it ought to be tried as warrant case as otherwise, the accused would be deprived of procedure for discharge; liberty to summon witnesses in support of defence is curtailed; and compensation for accusation without a reasonable cause as prescribed under Section 250 Cr.P.C. would be lost. 4.5 It is also contended that the procedure prescribed under the KLGP Act 2011 is manifestly arbitrary as Section 9(5)(b) of the Act provides that offences would be tried summarily and procedure for criminal trial is not set out. It is also contended that complex question of title cannot be tried summarily and therefore, Act is manifestly arbitrary. 4.6 By referring to Section 9(4) it is contended that civil and criminal proceedings in respect of same facts and between same person will be heard in the same forum and Special Court having unguided discretion to determine the order in which civil and criminal liability will be decided and as such, it is liable to be struck down. 4.6 By referring to Section 9(4) it is contended that civil and criminal proceedings in respect of same facts and between same person will be heard in the same forum and Special Court having unguided discretion to determine the order in which civil and criminal liability will be decided and as such, it is liable to be struck down. 4.7 It is further contended that Section 9(1) of the KLGP Act 2011 empowers the Special Court to take cognizance even when a private person initiates the same and this unguided discretion is manifestly arbitrary. It is contended that innocent persons would be roped in and definition prescribed under Section 2(e) criminalises actions of successors in interest of grabbed land and such innocent persons lacking requisite mens rea and they can only be held responsible for civil consequences flowing from such acts and they cannot be held criminally liable. 4.8 Learned Advocates have drawn the attention of the Court to Section 11 of the Act to contend that reverse onus clause has been passed namely, evidentiary burden on the accused to establish that he/she is not guilty of the offence of land grabbing. It is contended that reverse onus clause as it stands applies only to class of offenders under the Act, inasmuch as, Section 11 only prescribes its application to land owned by the Government by excluding the land belonging to other authorities as prescribed under Section 2(d)(i). It is also contended that reverse onus clause under the Act violates the right of the accused who is presumed to be innocent. It is contended that the reverse onus clause as formulated in Shaikh Zahid Mukhtar vs. State and Others, (2017) 2 ABR 40 prescribes four fold tests to determine the constitutional validity of a reverse onus clause and the Act does not satisfy the said four fold tests and as such, it is to be struck down as violative of Article 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India. 4.9 Further submission relates to wrongful exclusion of mens rea. It is contended that a crime is said to be committed only when criminalized actus reus is accompanied by mens rea. Contending that members of the general public are not directly affected by the offence of land grabbing and as such, it cannot be construed as having deleterious consequences on public welfare. It is contended that a crime is said to be committed only when criminalized actus reus is accompanied by mens rea. Contending that members of the general public are not directly affected by the offence of land grabbing and as such, it cannot be construed as having deleterious consequences on public welfare. Hence, contending that exclusion of mens rea affects liberty of the accused guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. 4.10 It is also contended that Section 16 violates the doctrine of separation of powers, by usurping judicial function and the well settled law that legislation can be invalidated on the ground that it violates the basic structure of the constitution. 4.11 It is further contended that land grabbing does not fall under Article 323B(2) of the Constitution of India and as such, for lack of legislative competence to constitute Special Court, the KLGP Act 2011 is liable to be struck down. It is also contended that there is no classification found and nexus between object of the Act to be achieved and there is no intelligible differentia. It is contended that impugned Act makes certain class of persons a distinct class and affords them with inordinate protection, whilst cleaning out protection to private person and therefore there is unjust classification making ordinary private title suits amenable to the jurisdiction of civil courts. 4.12 Referring to Section 9 as being manifestly error and contending that State has abdicated its power to make an application to Special Court being delegated to any person or suo motu without any limitations is liable to be struck down. 4.13 It is also contended that there is no statutory responsibility to pass a reasoned prima-facie order before taking cognizance which affects the right of a party and Section 20 also does not deal with order of transfer requiring reasoned order. Elaborating on the sequencing of procedure as arbitrary and discriminatory, it is contended that Section 9(4) allows for sequencing at the whims and fancies of the Chairman of the Special Court and as such, said provision is liable to be struck down. Elaborating on the sequencing of procedure as arbitrary and discriminatory, it is contended that Section 9(4) allows for sequencing at the whims and fancies of the Chairman of the Special Court and as such, said provision is liable to be struck down. 4.14 It is argued that Section 7(10) provides a blanket protection even if there is defect in the constitution of the Special Court and Section 7(9) does not compulsorily state that a quorum to be valid, there should be presence of one Judicial member and one Revenue member and therefore, between Section 7(8) and 7(9) there is inherent contradiction. 4.15 Right to fair trial being an important facet of Article 21 and resting their oars on this Article, it is contended that Section 8 of the impugned Act authorises an officer to initiate legal action without defining legal action and therefore, on the basis of purely subjective opinion of the officer, Special Court may take cognizance without regard to due process being followed by the officer. Expressing that there may be unconscious bias on the part of the Chairman on account of discretion granted to him under Section 9(4), 9(5) and 8(c) and (d), petitioners are seeking for said provisions being struck down as violative of Article 21 of the Constitution of India. 4.16 It is also contended that Section 9 of the Act by virtue of Doctrine of Reference has virtually incorporated the offence envisaged under Section 192-A of the Karnataka Land Revenue Act, 1964 (for short KLR Act) and Section 9 cannot have overriding effect vis-a-vis Section 192-A. 4.17 It is the submission of petitioners that Section 9(4) of the Act is inconsistent with Sections 40 and 43 of the Indian Evidence Act and same has been engrafted in total violation of standard of proofs required in a civil and criminal trial. 4.18 It is also contended by the learned Advocates appearing for the petitioners in some of the writ petitions are in possession of the lands as morefully described in the petition from long number of years and have filed applications under the KLR Act, Scheduled Tribes and other Traditional Forest Dwellers (Recognition of Forest Rights) Act, 2006 seeking regularization and during the pendency of the said applications they cannot be prosecuted for the offence prescribed under the KLGP Act 2011. It is also contended that in some of the cases petitioners have been in continuous and uninterrupted possession of government land beyond 30 years and being in possession of the land would not amount to land grabbing, particularly when the revenue authorities have themselves recognized the possession of petitioners over such lands, it cannot be construed that it is an act of land grabbing. 4.19 It is also contended that in respect of the grants made in favour of the petitioners or their predecessor in title, are being reopened after long number of years when the applicants seek for mutating the revenue records in the changed circumstances like seeking entry on the death of the grantee, holder or owner of the land and in such circumstances the revenue entries which have been in existence from time immemorial is sought to be doubted and under that pretext the proceedings under the KLGP Act 2011 is being initiated by terming the applicants as land grabbers. Hence, the settled issues cannot be unsettled after long number of years and on the ground of impugned Act being onerous, it is liable to be struck down. 4.20 It is also contended that the provisions of the KLGP Act 2011 are inconsistent with the provisions of Limitation Act, 1963 and as such the Act as whole is liable to be struck down as unconstitutional. 4.21 It is contended that the provisions of KLGP Act 2011/2014 is inconsistent with existing laws like Karnataka Land Revenue Act or Karnataka Land Reforms Act or Transfer of Property Act, since Section 2(d) of the impugned enactment is pre-fixed with the name of the title holder Government/Wakf/Hindu religious and religious institutions and charitable endowments, local authorities or other statutory or non-statutory bodies owned or controlled or managed by the Government. Hence, it is contended that prior to commencement of proceedings under the impugned Act, two conditions ought to have been included under the impugned enactment namely, a court or tribunal or authority of competent jurisdiction should have determined that the subject land is owned by such authority and in other words, there should be no determination by a court or tribunal or other authority that subject land is in the ownership of a private party. It is also contended that under Section 4(2) of the impugned Act, the proceedings can be commenced before the Special Court overlooking the limitation and contrary to Section 27 of the Limitation Act, 1963, where the right to a property gets extinguished if a suit for possession is not instituted within the time stipulated. The attention of the Court is drawn to Article 64, 65 and 111 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963 which provide for the period of limitation by which, a suit has to be filed. 4.22 It is further contended that even in case where a final determination either under Section 67 of the Karnataka Land Revenue Act or Section 48-A of Karnataka Land Reforms Act or there being a judgment/decree determining title pursuant to proceedings initiated before competent jurisdiction, even then, by virtue of Section 16 of the impugned Act, same can be ignored and this amounts to usurpation of the judicial power. In support of their submissions, they have relied upon the following judgments: 1. Union of India vs. R. Gandhi, President, Madras Bar Association, (2010) 11 SCC 1 2. State of Karnataka vs. Holeyappa and Others, ILR 2007 Kar. 259 3. State of Karnataka and Others vs. I.S. Nirvane Gowda and Others, (2007) 15 SCC 744 4. 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Hameed Alias Ameersav (Dead) by Legal Representatives and Another, (2016) 1 SCC 762 63. State vs. Shrimati Jamuna Baruah Konwar, Special Land Grabbing Case No. 15 of 2015 64. Konda Lakshmana Bapuji vs. Govt. of A.P. and Others, (2002) 3 SCC 258 65. Greater Bombay Coop. Bank Ltd. vs. United Yarn Tex (P) Ltd. and Others, (2007) 6 SCC 236 66. Smt. Lalitha Sastry vs. State of Karnataka, W.P. No. 3969 of 2007 67. Sri. Ramu vs. State of Karnataka, Criminal Petition No. 3141/2012 68. Smt. T.S. Vani vs. Sri. Vishwabrahmachar, Criminal Petition No. 1479/2013 69. Pundlika vs. The Tahasildar, W.P. No. 107303/2019 70. Rao Shiv Bahadur Singh and Another vs. State of Vindhya Pradesh, AIR 1953 SC 394 71. Olga Tellis and Others vs. Bombay Municipal Corporation and Others, (1985) 3 SCC 545 72. Hindustan Construction Company Limited and Others vs. Union of India and Others, W.P. (Civil) Nos. 1074, 1276, 1310 of 2019 73. Pepsi Foods Ltd. and Another vs. Special Judicial Magistrate and Others, (1998) 5 SCC 749 : 1998 SCC (Cri) 1400 74. K.T. Plantation Pvt. Ltd. and Others vs. State of Karnataka, Civil Appeal Nos. 6520, 6521-6537 and 6538 of 2003 75. Joint Collector Ranga Reddy District and Another vs. D. Narsing Rao and Others, (2015) 3 SCC 695 76. Sri. Aravinda Kumar vs. State of Karnataka, W.P. No. 50704/2019 77. Kaiser-Ihind Pvt. Ltd. and Another vs. National Textile Corporation (Maharashtra North) Ltd. and Others, (2002) 8 SCC 182 78. Grand Kakatiya Sheration Hotel and Towers Employees and Workers Union vs. Srinivasa Resorts Limited and Others, (2009) 5 SCC 342 79. Ravinder Kaur Grewal and Others vs. Manjit Kaur and Others, (2019) 8 SCC 729 80. D.K. Abdul Khader and Others vs. Union of India and Others, Writ Petition Nos. 36354 to 36357 of 1999 81. Union of India vs. R. Gandhi and Others, Civil Appeal Nos. 3067 of 2004 and 3717 of 2005 82. Ravinder Kaur Grewal and Others vs. Manjit Kaur and Others, (2019) 8 SCC 729 80. D.K. Abdul Khader and Others vs. Union of India and Others, Writ Petition Nos. 36354 to 36357 of 1999 81. Union of India vs. R. Gandhi and Others, Civil Appeal Nos. 3067 of 2004 and 3717 of 2005 82. Rajiv Kumar and Others vs. State of U.P. and Others, Criminal Appeal Nos. 251 and 252 of 2017 83. Subramanian Swamy and Others vs. Director, Central Bureau of Investigation and Others, Writ Petition (Civil) Nos. 38 of 1997 and 21 of 2004 84. Competition Commission of India vs. Steel Authority of India Limited and Another, (2010) 10 SCC 744 85. Kishnan Singh (D) through LRs. vs. Gurpal Singh and Others, Criminal Appeal No. 1500 of 2010 86. Blaze and Central (P) Ltd. vs. Union of India and Others, Writ Petition No. 6889 of 1979 87. Rojer Mathew vs. South Indian Bank Ltd. and Others, Civil Appeal No. 8588 of 2019 88. Rattiram and Others vs. State of M.P. Criminal Appeal Nos. 223 and 458 of 2008 89. Kalyani Baskar vs. M.S. Sampornam, Criminal Appeal No. 1293 of 2006 90. Garikapati Veeraya vs. N. Subbiah Choudhry and Others, AIR 1957 SC 540 91. In the Matter of: Cauvery Water Disputes Tribunal, 1993 Supp. (1) SCC 96 92. Medical Council of India vs. State of Kerala and Others, (2019) 13 SCC 185 93. Mrs. Maneka Gandhi vs. Union of India and Another, (1978) 1 SCC 248 94. Anitha Kushwaha vs. Pushap Sudan, (2016) 8 SCC 509 95. Mohd. Hussain Alias Zulfikar Ali vs. State (Government NCT of Delhi), (2012) 2 SCC 584 96. In Re: Ramlila Maidan Incident, (2012) 5 SCC 1 (W.P. (Crl.) No. 122 of 2011), dated 23.02.2012 97. Shreya Singhal vs. Union of India, (2015) 5 SCC 1 98. Olga Tellis and Others vs. Bombay Municipal Corporation and Others, AIR 1986 SC 180 99. Nikesh Tarachand Shah vs. Union of India and Another, AIR 2017 SC 5500 CONTENTIONS RAISED BY LEARNED ADVOCATE GENERAL: 5. Shreya Singhal vs. Union of India, (2015) 5 SCC 1 98. Olga Tellis and Others vs. Bombay Municipal Corporation and Others, AIR 1986 SC 180 99. Nikesh Tarachand Shah vs. Union of India and Another, AIR 2017 SC 5500 CONTENTIONS RAISED BY LEARNED ADVOCATE GENERAL: 5. By reiterating what has been urged in the statement of objections, the learned Advocate General has contended that there is a presumption in favour of constitutionality of a statute and judicial review of legislation being struck down as ultra-vires of constitution can be under three (3) circumstances namely, (1) if the legislation is ultra-vires on account of legislative competence; (2) if the impugned legistation is ultra-vires on account of violation of any of the fundamental rights specified in Part-III of the Constitution; and (3) if there is manifest arbitrariness: 5.1 He would contend that impugned Act provides for measures to curb organized attempts to grab lands, whether belonging to the Government, Wakf or the Hindu Religious Institutions and Charitable Endowments, local authorities or other statutory and non statutory bodies owned or controlled or managed by the Government. 5.2 He would contend that several persons, group of person are indulging in large scale, unprecedented and fraudulent sale of lands which had been grabbed resulting in large accumulation of unaccounted wealth and quick money to land grabbers and thereby adversely affecting public order. Hence, the appropriate Government found that it was necessary and expedient to curb such unlawful activity of land grabbing immediately and the impugned Act came into being after a joint legislature committee submitted its report identifying large and vast tracts of government land having been usurped by unscrupulous persons. It is also contended that said enactment has been duly passed by the legislature inter-alia under Entry 18 and 64 of List II of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution of India and for implementation and enforcement of the impugned Act the Special Courts have been constituted, which has resulted in recovery of 952.32 acres as on date. It is also contended that said enactment has been duly passed by the legislature inter-alia under Entry 18 and 64 of List II of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution of India and for implementation and enforcement of the impugned Act the Special Courts have been constituted, which has resulted in recovery of 952.32 acres as on date. 5.3 Elaborating his submission he would contend that during the pendency of the present writ petitions, the State felt the need of amendment to be brought in to allay the apprehensions expressed by the petitioners and in view of the said amendment having been brought by Act 30 of 2020, issue relating to trial of cases as warrant cases if felt necessary would clearly indicate that apprehensions are illfounded. He would contend that amended Act 30 of 2020 has provided sufficient safeguard for dismissal of complaint at preliminary stage and if deemed fit the Special Court can try a complaint as warrant cases instead of summons cases. He would contend that once the chapter of summons case is accepted, the gravity of the case does not matter. It is not a matter of summary trial and the provisions of Cr.P.C. would be applicable. 5.4 He would further elaborate his contentions by contending that initial burden is upon the Government to prove that lands belongs to the Government and then the Special Court presumes that person who is alleged is a land grabber. He would contend that in modern trend of legislations, the burden of proof would be on the accused and the impugned legislation having been enacted to protect the public properties, the reverse onus cast on the accused cannot be held as unconstitutional. He would draw the attention of the Court to the expression “prima-facie” found in Section 11 of the impugned Act to contend that initial burden is upon the State and only on discharge of the said burden, it shifts on the accused. 5.5 He would contend that contention of the petitioners that provisions under Section 4(2), 9(1) and Section 20 of the KLGP Act 2011 being retrospective in nature, renders them unconstitutional is erroneous as offences sought to be punished under the impugned Act is continuous in nature or in other words, a continuing offence and as such, contention of the petitioners are untenable. 5.6 He would submit that insofar as the issue of limitation raised, would not be a substantive right and there is no limitation to be followed and draws the attention of the Court to Section 10 of the Limitation Act, 1963 to contend that the issue of limitation cannot be raised in respect of property having been vested in a Trust comprising of religious or charitable endowment. 5.7 Insofar as contention regarding unbridled power being vested with the Special Court under Section 9(1), he would contend that the said provision is not unregulated and a procedure has been prescribed under Regulation 29 of the Karnataka Land Grabbing Prohibition (Special Court) Regulations, 2017, whereunder, procedure has been prescribed for taking suo motu cognizance. Hence, he contends that it cannot be canvassed that the power vested under Section 9(1) of the Act is without any procedure. He would further submit that Special Court is headed for the present by a retired Judge of this Hon’ble Court and as such, it cannot be said that power of taking suo motu cognizance would not be exercised cautiously. 5.8 He would contend that in order to remedy/curb the grabbing of the Government lands and the general public may be sceptical and hesitant to lodge complaints being fearful of any repercussions against them by a powerful land grabbers, if there were publicly seen as whistle blowers or informants, the suo motu cognizance power has been given to the Special Court. He would also contend that lands involved being public lands, it was deemed fit to introduce the provision regarding taking suo motu cognizance in view of the “public wrong” against an indeterminate number of people. He would submit that the Act in question being a penal legislation, the kind of provisions mentioned therein are very much necessary for effective implementation of the Act. 5.9 He would also contend that contention of wrongful exclusion of mens rea under the KLGP Act 2011 is not a valid contention and draws the attention of this Court to NDPS Act, whereunder possessing of contraband articles is to be read as “possession” with culpable state of mind, in view of the object and intent of the said Act. 5.9 He would also contend that contention of wrongful exclusion of mens rea under the KLGP Act 2011 is not a valid contention and draws the attention of this Court to NDPS Act, whereunder possessing of contraband articles is to be read as “possession” with culpable state of mind, in view of the object and intent of the said Act. Drawing analogy from the said Act, he would contend that the intent of the present Act is to reclaim and recover public lands and the occupation/act of grabbing by the alleged land grabber is to be read as “conscious possession” of the act of land grabbing. 5.10 He would also submit that the legislation in question being a penal legislation, Section 16 has been incorporated as individual hardship caused due to the enactment of the statute has to give way to the larger public interest which is intended to be protected by this legislation. Hence, he has prayed for dismissal of the writ petitions. 5.11 He would also hasten to add that in the event of this Court were to arrive at the conclusion that any of the provisions are unworkable or loosely worded, this court is empowered to read down such of the provisions by ironing out the creases, if any, in the legislation and it would not warrant striking down the legislation. In support of his submissions, he has relied upon the following judgments: 1. Harla vs. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1951 SC 467 2. State of Bihar and Others vs. Bihar Distillery Ltd. and Others, (1997) 2 SCC 453 3. Bhanumati and Others vs. State of Uttar Pradesh through its Principal Secretary and Others, (2010) 12 SCC 1 4. State of A.P. and Others vs. Mcdowell and Co. and Others, (1996) 3 SCC 709 5. Shri Ram Krishna Dalmia and Others vs. Shri Justice S.R. Tendolkar and Others, (1959) SCR 279 : AIR 1958 SC 538 6. Mohd. Hanif Quareshi and Others vs. State of Bihar and Others, 1959 SCR 629 : AIR 1958 SC 731 7. State of Madhya Pradesh vs. Rekesh Kohli and Another, (2012) 6 SCC 312 8. V.C. Shukla and Others vs. State (Delhi Administration) and Others, (1980) 2 SCC 665 9. Kathi Raning Rawat vs. State of Saurashtra, 1952 SCR 435 : AIR 1952 SC 123 : 1952 Cri. L.J. 805 10. State of Madhya Pradesh vs. Rekesh Kohli and Another, (2012) 6 SCC 312 8. V.C. Shukla and Others vs. State (Delhi Administration) and Others, (1980) 2 SCC 665 9. Kathi Raning Rawat vs. State of Saurashtra, 1952 SCR 435 : AIR 1952 SC 123 : 1952 Cri. L.J. 805 10. In Re the Special Courts Bill, (1979) 1 SCC 380 11. Mohan Lal vs. State of Rajasthan, (2015) 6 SCC 222 12. Shiv Shakti Cooperative Housing Society, Nagpur vs. M/s Swaraj Developers and Others, S.L.P. (C) No. 19030/2002 13. Bar Council of India vs. Union of India, (2012) 8 SCC 243 14. P.N. Krishna Lal and Others vs. Govt. of Kerala and Another, 1995 SUPP (2) SCC 187 15. Sanjay Dutt vs. State through C.B.I. Bombay, (1994) 5 SCC 410 16. Namit Sharma vs. Union of India, (2013) 1 SCC 745 17. Bhandarkars Arts and Science College and Another vs. The State and Others, W.P. No. 52972-52973/2017 18. State of A.P. and Others vs. Mcdowell and Co. and Others, (1996) 3 SCC 709 19. Mahe Beach Trading Co. and Others vs. Union Territory of Pondicherry and Others, (1996) 3 SCC 741 20. Government of Andhra Pradesh and Others vs. P. Laxmi Devi, (2008) 4 SCC 720 21. M. Rathinaswami and Others vs. State of Tamil Nadu and Others, 2009 AIR SCW 3930 22. Udai Singh Dagar and Others vs. Union of India and Others, AIR 2007 SC 2599 23. Raghunath Rai Bareja and Another vs. Punjab National Bank and Others, 2006 AIR SCW 6446 24. Konda Lakshmana Bapuji vs. Govt. of A.P. and Others, (2002) 3 SCC 258 25. Sri. G.H. Nagaraj and Others vs. State of Karnataka and Others, Writ Petition Nos. 32134-32371/2017 26. Mohan Lal vs. Kartar Singh and Others, 1995 Supp. (4) SCC 684 27. Employee’s State Insurance Corporation vs. S.K. Aggarwal and Others, (1998) 6 SCC 288 28. Zahira Habibulla H. Sheikh and Another vs. State of Gujarat and Others, (2004) 4 SCC 158 29. Shri A.G. Sawant vs. Shri Sanjay D. Berde, 2013 SCC Bom. 833 30. Rao Shiv Bahadur Singh and Another vs. State of Vindhya Pradesh, AIR 1953 SC 394 31. Kartar Singh vs. State of Punjab, (1994) 3 SCC 569 32. Connally, Commissioner of Labor of Oklahoma vs. General Const. Co. 1926 SCC Online US SC 9 : 269 US 385 (1926) : 46 S.C.T. 126: 70 L.ED. 32 33. 833 30. Rao Shiv Bahadur Singh and Another vs. State of Vindhya Pradesh, AIR 1953 SC 394 31. Kartar Singh vs. State of Punjab, (1994) 3 SCC 569 32. Connally, Commissioner of Labor of Oklahoma vs. General Const. Co. 1926 SCC Online US SC 9 : 269 US 385 (1926) : 46 S.C.T. 126: 70 L.ED. 32 33. Collector of Customs, Madras vs. Nathella Sampathu Chetty and Another, AIR 1962 SC 316 34. Vikram Singh alias Vicky and Another vs. Union of India and Others, (2015) 9 SCC 502 35. Michael Esty Ferguson vs. Her Majesy The Queen, (2008) 1 SCR 96 36. V. Laxminarasamma vs. A. Yadaiah (Dead) and Others, (2009) 5 SCC 478 37. Seema Silk and Sarees and Another vs. Directorate of Enforcement and Others, (2008) 5 SCC 580 38. Gujarat Agro Industries Co. Ltd. vs. Municipal Corporation of the City of Ahmedabad and Others, (1994) 4 SCC 468 39. Madhav Hayawadanrao Hoskot vs. State of Maharashtra, (1978) 3 SCC 544 40. L. Chandra Kumar vs. Union of India and Others, (1997) 3 SCC 261 CONTENTIONS RAISED BY LEARNED ADVOCATES APPEARING FOR RESPONDENTS SUPPORTING THE CONSTITUTIONAL VALIDITY OF THE ENACTMENT. 6. Smt. Chennamma, learned Advocate appearing for respondent No. 4 in W.P. No. 49013/2018 and Smt. Shristi Widge, learned Advocate appearing on behalf of M/s. Poovaiah and company have supported the learned Advocate General and have contended that impugned legislation would clear the test of constitutional validity. Smt. Chennamma, learned Advocate has drawn our attention to the judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of E.P. Rayappa vs. State of Tamil Nadu, AIR 1974 SC 55 to support her contention that impugned Act passes the test of reasonability. She would contend that by the impugned legislation, the public property or the property belonging to the Government which has been usurped or grabbed is sought to be remedied not only by prosecuting such persons who have indulged in such acts but also reclaim or recover such properties. She would contend that unscrupulous persons who have knocked off the property of the State cannot pick loopholes in the procedural law and she has contended that impugned legislation does not suffer from any vice of being discriminatory or arbitrary for being struck down. Hence, she has prayed for dismissal of the writ petitions. She would contend that unscrupulous persons who have knocked off the property of the State cannot pick loopholes in the procedural law and she has contended that impugned legislation does not suffer from any vice of being discriminatory or arbitrary for being struck down. Hence, she has prayed for dismissal of the writ petitions. In support of her submissions, she has relied upon the following judgments: (1) E.P. Royappa vs. State of Tamil Nadu, AIR 1974 SC 555 (2) Sri. Ramakrishna Dalmiya vs. Sri. Justice S.R. Tendolkar, AIR 1958 SC 538 (3) M.C. Mehta vs. Union of India, AIR 1987 SC 1086 (4) Nupur Talwar vs. C.B.I. (2012) 11 SCC 465 7. Having heard the learned Advocates appearing for parties, on perusal of pleadings and on bestowing our careful and anxious consideration to the rival contentions raised at the bar, we are of the considered view that following point would arise for our consideration: “Whether the Karnataka Land Grabbing Prohibition Act, 2011 (Karnataka Act 38 of 2014) and Amendment Act 30 of 2020 or any of its provision requires to be struck down on the ground of same being violative of the Constitution of India?” DISCUSSION AND FINDINGS: 8. The Karnataka Legislature constituted a joint Legislative Committee during 17.06.2006 to examine the issue relating to encroachment of Government land in and around Bengaluru and to submit a report. Said Committee was headed by then member of Legislative Assembly Sri. A.T. Ramaswamy as Chairman, which submitted an interim report on 01.02.2007 depicting large scale of encroachment of Government lands. Another report also came to be submitted by the Joint Legislature Committee during July, 2007. In July, 2009 the Government constituted a Task Force for recovery and protection of public lands with the object of identifying the encroached lands and removal of such encroachment. The said Task Force was headed by Sri. V. Balasubramanyam, IAS (Retd.) who submitted a report stating that thousands of acres of Government land had been encroached across the State by unscrupulous elements: 8.1 Above said two reports had highlighted the urgent need for a comprehensive legislation to tackle the wide spread encroachment of Government lands, perforce the Government of Karnataka to bring in the legislation of KLGP Act 2011, to prevent illegal and unlawful encroachment of Government lands and to proceed against such persons who had encroached Government lands, by initiating civil and criminal proceedings. 8.2 The statement of reasons and the object of said enactment would indicate that large scale of land grabbing have been going on in and around Bangalore and also in the State of Karnataka and thousands of acres of Government lands were being encroached and usurped by unscrupulous persons and there was an urgent need to bring in a legislation. 8.3 The said enactment has been passed by the Legislature under Entry 18 and 64 of List II of the VII Schedule of the Constitution of India and had received the assent of the President on 09.10.2014 and as already observed herein above, it has been brought into effect from 20.10.2014. 8.4 The object sought to be achieved by the said enactment and reasons for said enactment being brought into force have been elaborated in the Statement of Objects and Reasons. It reads: “It has come to the notice of the Government that there are organised attempts on the part of certain lawless persons operating individually and in groups to grab either by force or by deceit or otherwise lands belonging to the Government, a local authority, a religious or charitable institution or endowment, including a wakf. The land grabbers are forming bogus cooperative housing societies or setting up fictitious claims and indulging in large scale and unprecedented and fradulent sales of land through unscrupulous real estate dealers or otherwise in favour of certain sections of people, resulting in large scale accumulation of the unaccounted wealth. As public order is adversely affected by such lawful activities of land grabbers in the State, particularly in respect of urban and urbanisable lands, the State Government has felt that it is necessary to curb such unlawful activities immediately by enacting a special law in this regard. Hence, the State Government of Karnataka with a view to prohibit the activities of land grabbing and to provide for matters connected therewith has proposed to bring the Karnataka Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act into force. Apart from declaring land grabbing as unlawful, the State Government desires to prohibit land grabbing. Hence, the State Government of Karnataka with a view to prohibit the activities of land grabbing and to provide for matters connected therewith has proposed to bring the Karnataka Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act into force. Apart from declaring land grabbing as unlawful, the State Government desires to prohibit land grabbing. Therefore, it is proposed to provide for penalty for offences in connection with land grabbing to effectively implement this Act and for the purpose of providing speedy enquiry into an alleged act of land grabbing and trial of cases in respect of the ownership and title to, or lawful possession of the land grabbed by Notification constitute a Special Court. It is felt that the State Government will be able to curb the illegal land grabbing by enforcing the proposed legislation. Accordingly, the Karnataka Bhu Kabalike (Nishedha) Vidheyaka, 2007 as passed by both the houses the Stat Legislature was sent to Government of India to obtain the assent of the President. The Government of India in its letter No. 17/20/2007-Judl and PP dated 16/20.8.2007, on the suggestion made by the Ministry of Corporate Affairs had suggested modification to the Karnataka Bhu kabalike (Nisheda) Vidyeyaka 2007. Accordingly clause 6 of the Bill has been modified by incorporating Explanation for the word Company and Director. The Government of India vide letter No. 17/20/2007-Judl. and PP dated 18-06-2010, had suggested modifications to sub-clause (2) of clause 2 of the Bill on the suggestions made by the Ministry of Minority Affairs and also to the sub-clause (2) of clause 1 of the Bill on the suggestion made by the Department of Legal Affairs. Accordingly the State Government vide its letter No. DPAL 22 SHASHANA 2007, dated 7.9.2020 Communicated its acceptance to make the said modification by amending the Bill, by extending the provisions to the lands belonging to the Wakfs, Hindu Religious Institutions and Charitable Endowments and requested the Government of India to obtain the assent of the President to the said Bill and also to obtain previous instructions to the modifications to be issued in the form of an Ordinance. The Government of India vide its letter No. 17/20/2007-Judl. and PP dated 03-03-2010/2011 has directed the State Government to consider withdrawing the present Bill (LA Bill No. 27 of 2007) and submit a modified Bill instead of concurrent promulgation of any amendment Ordinance. The Government of India vide its letter No. 17/20/2007-Judl. and PP dated 03-03-2010/2011 has directed the State Government to consider withdrawing the present Bill (LA Bill No. 27 of 2007) and submit a modified Bill instead of concurrent promulgation of any amendment Ordinance. Hence the Bill.” RE: CONSTITUTIONALITY OF A STATUTE - ANALYSIS 9. The courts strongly lean against the construction, which reduces the statute to a futility. A statute or a provision in the statute would be read to make it effective and operative on the principle expressed in the maxim ut res magis valeat quam pereat viz. that the thing may avail rather than perish; that the transaction may be valid rather than invalid. While pronouncing upon the constitutionality of a statute the courts would start with a presumption in favour of constitutionality and prefer the construction which keep the statute within the competence of legislature. 10. A statute is designed to be workable, and the interpretation thereof by a court should be to secure that object, unless crucial omission or clear direction makes that end unattainable. In the matter of Fawcett Properties Ltd. vs. Buckingham County Council, (1960) 3 All ER 503, Lord Denning approving Farewell J stated the principle thus: “But when a statute has some meaning even though it obscure, or several meanings, even though it is little to choose between them, the courts have to say what meaning the statute is to bear, rather than reject it as a nullity.” 11. The Courts would therefore reject that construction which will defeat the plain intention of the legislature even though there may be some inexactitude in the language used. 12. The doctrine of purposive interpretation may be taken recourse for the purpose of giving full effect to the statutory provisions, and the courts would state what meaning the statute should bear rather than rendering the statute a nullity. 13. When the words of a statute are clear, plain or unambiguous i.e. they are reasonably susceptible to only one meaning, the courts would give effect to that meaning irrespective of consequences. 14. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Uttar Pradesh vs. Vijay Anand Maharaj, AIR 1963 SC 946 has held, when a language is plain and unambiguous and admits of only one meaning, no question of construction of statute arises, for the act speaks for itself. 14. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Uttar Pradesh vs. Vijay Anand Maharaj, AIR 1963 SC 946 has held, when a language is plain and unambiguous and admits of only one meaning, no question of construction of statute arises, for the act speaks for itself. In Kanai Lal Sur vs. Paramnidhi Sadhukhan, AIR 1957 SC 907 Apex Court has held that “if the words used or capable of one construction only then it would not be open to the courts to adopt any other hypothetical construction on the ground that such construction is more consistent with the alleged object and policy of the act.” 15. If one interpretation leads to conflict and another leads for harmonious construction, latter should prevail as held by the Apex Court in the case P.S. Sathappan (Dead) by LRs. vs. Andhra Bank Limited, AIR 2004 SC 5152 . 16. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of State of Bihar and Others vs. Bihar Distillery Ltd. and Others, (1997) 2 SCC 453 has held that courts should strike down an enactment only when it is not possible to sustain it and courts would not approach in examining the enactment with a view to pick holes or to search for defects of drafting and any defects of drafting should be ironed out as part of the attempt to sustain the validity of the enactment. It has been further held: “17. Now coming to the reasoning in the impugned judgment, we must say with all respect that we have not been able to appreciate it. The approach of the Court, while examining the challenge to the constitutionality of an enactment, is to start with the presumption of constitutionality. The Court should try to sustain its validity to the extent possible. It should strike down the enactment only when it is not possible to sustain it. The Court should not approach the enactment with a view to pick holes or to search for defects of drafting, much less inexactitude of language employed. Indeed, any such defects of drafting should be ironed out as part of the attempt to sustain the validity/constitutionality of the enactment. After all, an Act made by the Legislature represents the will of the people and that cannot be lightly interfered with. The unconstitutionality must be plainly and clearly established before an enactment is declared as void. Indeed, any such defects of drafting should be ironed out as part of the attempt to sustain the validity/constitutionality of the enactment. After all, an Act made by the Legislature represents the will of the people and that cannot be lightly interfered with. The unconstitutionality must be plainly and clearly established before an enactment is declared as void. The same approach holds good while ascertaining the intent and purpose of an enactment or its scope and application. Now, the result of the impugned judgment is that the Amending Act has become an exercise in futility -a purposeless piece of Legislation. And this result has been arrived at by pointing out some drafting errors and some imperfection in the language employed. If only the High Court had looked into the minutes of the meeting dated 15-12-1989 and the two letters of the Commissioner aforementioned, it would have become clear that the Amending Act was doing no more than repeating contents of the said letters and placing the legislative imprimatur on them. As the impugned judgment itself suggests, part of the imperfection of language is perhaps attributable to translation from Hindi to English. Indeed, it is surprising that the Court has not even referred to the long preamble to the Act which clearly sets out the context and purpose of the said enactment. It was put in at such length only with a view to aid the interpretation of its provisions. It was not done without a purpose. To call the entire exercise a mere waste is, to say the least, most unwarranted besides being uncharitable. The Court must recognize the fundamental nature and importance of legislative process and accord due regard and deference to it, just as the Legislature and the Executive are expected to show due regard and deference to the judiciary. It cannot also be forgotten that our Constitution recognizes and gives effect to the concept of equality between the three wings of the State and the concept of `checks and balances’ inherent in such scheme.” 17. It is a trite law that while deciding the validity of a statute, the endeavour of the court is to find out the intention of the legislature, upon considering the various reasons, which gave rise to its birth and the mischief which the enactment is sought to remedy. It is a trite law that while deciding the validity of a statute, the endeavour of the court is to find out the intention of the legislature, upon considering the various reasons, which gave rise to its birth and the mischief which the enactment is sought to remedy. Apex Court in the matter of Bhanumati and Others vs. State of Uttar Pradesh, through its Principal Secretary and Others, (2010) 12 SCC 1 has held: “82. In State of Bihar vs. Bihar Distillery Ltd. this Court in SCC Para 17 at p. 466: JT Para 18 at pp. 865-866 of the Report laid down certain principles on how to judge the constitutionality of an enactment. This Court held that in this exercise the Court should: (a) try to sustain validity of the impugned law to the extent possible. It can strike down the enactment only when it is impossible to sustain it. (b) the Court should not approach the enactment with a view to pick holes or to search for defects of drafting or for the language employed. (c) the Court should consider that the Act made by the legislature represents the will of the people and that cannot be lightly interfered with. (d) the Court should strike down the Act only when the unconstitutionality is plainly and clearly established. (e) the Court must recognize the fundamental nature and importance of legislative process and accord due regard and deference to it. This Court abstracted those principles from various judgments of this Court. 83. In State of Bihar, this Court also considered the observations of Lord Denning in Seaford Court Estates Ltd. vs. Asher and highlighted that the job of a judge in construing a statute must proceed on the constructive task of finding the intention of Parliament and this must be done (a) not only from the language of the statute but also (b) upon consideration of the social conditions which gave rise to it (c) and also of the mischief to remedy which the statute was passed and if necessary (d) the judge must supplement the written word so as to give “force and life” to the intention of the legislature. According to Lord Denning these are the principles laid down in Heydon case and is considered one of the safest guides today. This Court also accepted those principles. According to Lord Denning these are the principles laid down in Heydon case and is considered one of the safest guides today. This Court also accepted those principles. (See Bihar Distillery Ltd. case, SCC Para 20 at p. 468: JT Para 21 at p. 867 of the Report) 84. Reliance was also placed on another decision of this Court in Dharam Dutt vs. Union of India. This judgment is relevant in order to deal with the argument of the learned counsel for the appellants that in reducing the period for bringing the no-confidence motion from “two years” to “one year” and then in reducing the required majority from 2/3rd to simple majority, the legislature was guided by the sinister motive of some influential Ministers to get rid of a local leader who, as a Pradhan of Panchayat, may have become very powerful and competitor of the Minister in the State. 85. In Dharam Dutt this Court held that if the legislature is competent to pass a particular law, the motives which impelled it to act are really irrelevant. If the legislature has competence, the question of motive does not arise at all and any inquiry into the motive which persuaded Parliament into passing the Act would be of no use at all. (See SCC p.730, para 16 of the Report). 86. Reliance was also placed on the Constitution Bench judgment of this Court in State of Gujarat vs. Mirzapur Moti Kureshi Kassab Jamat. Lahoti, C.J. speaking for the Bench laid down in SC p. 562, Para 39 of the Report that the legislature is in the best position to understand and appreciate the needs of the people as enjoined in the Constitution. The Court will interfere in legislative process only when the statute is clearly violative of the right conferred on a citizen under Part III or when the Act is beyond the legislative competence of the legislature. Of course the Court must always recognize the presumption in favour of the constitutionality of the statutes and the onus to prove its invalidity lies heavily on the party which assails it. 87. Lahoti, C.J. also laid down several parameters in considering the constitutional validity of a statute at pp. 562-563 of the Report. Of course the Court must always recognize the presumption in favour of the constitutionality of the statutes and the onus to prove its invalidity lies heavily on the party which assails it. 87. Lahoti, C.J. also laid down several parameters in considering the constitutional validity of a statute at pp. 562-563 of the Report. One of the parameters which is relevant in this case is, however important the right of citizen or an individual may be, it has to yield to the larger interests of the country or the community. 88. Considering all these aspects, this Court sees no reason to take a view different from the one taken by the Hon’ble High Court.” 18. Any law made by legislature can be struck down on two grounds namely, (a) lack of legislative competence; and (b) violation of any of the fundamental rights guaranteed under the constitution or any other constitutional provision. 19. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Shreya Singhal vs. Union of India, (2015) 2 SCC (Crl.) 449 has held that a statutory provision can also be invalidated on the ground of vagueness, too, which is once again traceable to arbitrariness resulting in violation of Article 14 or Article 20 of the Constitution. It has been further held: “55. The U.S. Supreme Court has repeatedly held in a series of judgments that where no reasonable standards are laid down to define guilt in a Section which creates an offence, and where no clear guidance is given to either law abiding citizens or to authorities and courts, a Section which creates an offence and which is vague must be struck down as being arbitrary and unreasonable. Thus, in Musser vs. Utah a Utah statute which outlawed conspiracy to commit acts injurious to public morals was struck down. 56. In Winters vs. New York, a New York Penal Law read as follows: (L Ed p. 846) “1141. Obscene prints and articles: (1) A person......who. (2) Prints, utters, publishes, sells, lends, gives away, distributes or shows, or has in his possession with intent to sell, lend, give away, distribute or show, or otherwise offers for sale, loan, gift or distribution, any book, pamphlet, magazine, newspaper or other printed paper devoted to the publication, and principally made up of criminal news, police reports, or accounts of criminal deeds, or pictures, or stories of deeds of bloodshed, lust or crime. Is guilty of a misdemeanor.......” The court in striking down the said statute held: (L Ed. pp. 851-852) “The impossibility of defining the precise line between permissible uncertainty in statutes caused by describing crimes by words well understood through long use in the criminal law -obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, indecent or disgusting-and the unconstitutional vagueness that leaves a person uncertain as to the kind of prohibited conduct-massing stories to incite crime-has resulted in three arguments of this case in this Court. The legislative bodies in draftsmanship obviously have the same difficulty as do the judicial in interpretation. Nevertheless despite the difficulties, courts must do their best to determine whether or not the vagueness is of such a character that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning. Connally vs. General Construction Co. U.S. p.391; S.Ct. p.127. The entire text of the statute or the subjects dealt with may furnish an adequate standard. The present case as to a vague statute abridging free speech involves the circulation of only vulgar magazines. The next may call for decision as to free expression of political views in the light of a statute intended to punish subversive activities. The Sub-Section of the New York Penal Law, as now interpreted by the Court of Appeals prohibits distribution of a magazine principally made up of criminal news or stories of deeds of bloodshed, or lust, so massed as to become vehicles for inciting violent and depraved crimes against the person. But even considering the gloss put upon the literal meaning by the Court of Appeals’ restriction of the statute to collections of stories ‘so massed as to become vehicles for inciting violent and depraved crimes against the person.......not necessarily.......sexual passion’ we find the specification of publications, prohibited from distribution, too uncertain and indefinite to justify the conviction of this petitioner. Even though all detective tales and treatises on criminology are not forbidden, and though publications made up of criminal deeds not characterized by bloodshed or lust are omitted from the interpretation of the Court of Appeals, we think fair use of collections of pictures and stories would be interdicted because of the utter impossibility of the actor or the trier to know where this new standard of guilt would draw the line between the allowable and the forbidden publications. No intent or purpose is required-no indecency or obscenity in any sense heretofore known to the law. So massed as to incite to crime can become meaningful only by concrete instances. This one example is not enough. The clause proposes to punish the printing and circulation of publications that courts or juries may think influence generally persons to commit crime of violence against the person. No conspiracy to commit a crime is required. See Musser v. State of Utah, this Term. It is not an effective notice of new crime. The clause has no technical or common law meaning. Nor can light as to the meaning be gained from the section as a whole or the Article of the Penal Law under which it appears. As said in the Cohen Grocery Co. case, (US at p. 89: S.Ct at p. 300): (L.Ed p.520) “.......It leaves open, therefore, the widest conceivable inquiry, the scope of which no one can foresee and the result of which no one can foreshadow or adequately guard against.” The statute as construed by the Court of Appeals does not limit punishment to the indecent and obscene, as formerly understood. When stories of deeds of bloodshed, such as many in the accused magazines, are massed so as to incite to violent crimes, the statute is violated. It does not seem to us that an honest distributor of publications could know when he might be held to have ignored such a prohibition. Collections of tales of war horrors, otherwise unexceptionable, might well be found to be ‘massed’ so as to become ‘vehicles for inciting violent and depraved crimes’. Where a statute is so vague as to make criminal an innocent act, a conviction under it cannot be sustained. Herndon vs. Lowry, US p. 259: S Ct p.739.” 57. In Burstyn vs. Wilson, sacrilegious writings and utterances were outlawed. Here again, the US Supreme Court stepped in to strike down the offending Section stating: (L Ed p.1121) “......It is not a sufficient answer to say that ‘sacrilegious’ is definite, because all subjects that in any way might be interpreted as offending the religious beliefs of any one of the 300 sects of the United States are banned in New York. To allow such vague, undefinable powers of censorship to be exercised is bound to have stultifying consequences on the creative process of literature and art-for the films are derived largely from literature. History does not encourage reliance on the wisdom and moderation of the censor as a safeguard in the exercise of such drastic power over the minds of men. We not only do not know but cannot know what is condemnable by ‘sacrilegious.’ And if we cannot tell, how are those to be governed by the statute to tell?” 58. In of Chicago v. Morales, a Chicago Gang Congregation Ordinance prohibited criminal street gang members from loitering with one another or with other persons in any public place for no apparent purpose. The Court referred to an earlier judgment in United States v. Reese, US at p. 221 in which it was stated that the Constitution does not permit a legislature to set a net large enough to catch all possible offenders and leave it to the Court to step in and say who could be rightfully detained and who should be set at liberty. It was held that the broad sweep of the Ordinance violated the requirement that a legislature needs to meet: to establish minimum guidelines to govern law enforcement. As the impugned Ordinance did not have any such guidelines, a substantial amount of innocent conduct would also be brought within its net, leading to its unconstitutionality. 59. It was further held that a penal law is void for vagueness if it fails to define the criminal offence with sufficient definiteness. Ordinary people should be able to understand what conduct is prohibited and what is permitted. Also, those who administer the law must know what offence has been committed so that arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement of the law does not take place. 60. Ordinary people should be able to understand what conduct is prohibited and what is permitted. Also, those who administer the law must know what offence has been committed so that arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement of the law does not take place. 60. Similarly, in Grayned vs. Rockford, the State of Illinois provided in an anti-noise Ordinance as follows: “No person, while on public or private grounds adjacent to any building in which a school or any class thereof is in session, shall willfully make or assist in the making of any noise or diversion which disturbs or tends to disturb the peace or good order of such school session or class thereof.......” Code of Ordinances, c 28, 19.2(a).” The law on the subject of vagueness was clearly stated thus: (Grained case, L Ed pp.227-228) “It is a basic principle of due process that an enactment is void for vagueness if its prohibitions are not clearly defined. Vague laws offend several important values. First, because we assume that man is free to steer between lawful and unlawful conduct, we insist that laws give the person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited, so that he may act accordingly. Vague laws may trap the innocent by not providing fair warning. Second, if arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement is to be prevented, laws must provide explicit standards for those who apply them. A vague law impermissibly delegates basic policy matters to policemen, judges and juries for resolution on an ad hoc and subjective basis, with the attendant dangers of arbitrary and discriminatory application. Third, but related, where a vague statute ‘abuts upon sensitive areas of basic First Amendment freedoms, it operates to inhibit the exercise of (those) freedoms. Uncertain meanings inevitably lead citizens to ‘“steer far wider of the unlawful zone”....than if the boundaries of the forbidden areas were clearly marked.’“ 61. The anti-noise ordinance was upheld on facts in that case because it fixed the time at which noise disrupts school activity -while the school is in session -and at a fixed place “adjacent” to the school. 62. Secondly, there had to be demonstrated a causality between disturbance that occurs and the noise or diversion. Thirdly, acts have to be wilfully done. It is important to notice that the Supreme Court specifically held that “undesirables” or their “annoying conduct” may not be punished. 62. Secondly, there had to be demonstrated a causality between disturbance that occurs and the noise or diversion. Thirdly, acts have to be wilfully done. It is important to notice that the Supreme Court specifically held that “undesirables” or their “annoying conduct” may not be punished. It is only on these limited grounds that the said Ordinance was considered not to be impermissibly vague. 63. In Reno, vs. American Civil Liberties Union, two provisions of the Communications Decency Act, 1996 which sought to protect minors from harmful material on the internet were adjudged unconstitutional. This judgment is a little important for two basic reasons -that it deals with a penal offence created for persons who use the internet as also for the reason that the statute which was adjudged unconstitutional uses the expression “patently offensive” which comes extremely close to the expression “grossly offensive” used by the impugned Section 66-A. Section 223(d), which was adjudged unconstitutional, is set out herein-below: (US p.860) “223 (d) Whoever: “(1) in interstate or foreign communications knowingly: (A) uses an interactive computer service to send to a specific person or persons under 18 years of age. (B) uses any interactive computer service to display in a manner available to a person under 18 years of age, ‘any comment, request, suggestion, proposal, image, or other communication that, in context, depicts or describes, in terms patently offensive as measured by contemporary community standards, sexual or excretory activities or organs, regardless of whether the user of such service placed the call or initiated the communication. (2) knowingly permits any telecommunications facility under such person’s control to be used for an activity prohibited by paragraph (1) with the intent that it be used for such activity, shall be fined under Title 18, or imprisoned not more than two years, or both.” Interestingly, the District Court Judge writing of the internet said: “It is no exaggeration to conclude that the Internet has achieved, and continues to achieve, the most participatory marketplace of mass speech that this country and indeed the world -as yet seen. The plaintiffs in these actions correctly describe the ‘democratizing’ effects of Internet communication: individual citizens of limited means can speak to a worldwide audience on issues of concern to them. Federalists and Anti-federalists may debate the structure of their government nightly, but these debates occur in newsgroups or chat rooms rather than in pamphlets. The plaintiffs in these actions correctly describe the ‘democratizing’ effects of Internet communication: individual citizens of limited means can speak to a worldwide audience on issues of concern to them. Federalists and Anti-federalists may debate the structure of their government nightly, but these debates occur in newsgroups or chat rooms rather than in pamphlets. Modern-day Luthers still post their theses, but to electronic bulletins boards rather than the door of the Wittenberg Schlosskirche. More mundane (but from a constitutional perspective, equally important) dialogue occurs between aspiring artists, or French cooks, or dog lovers, or fly fishermen.” American Civil Liberties Union v. Reno, F Supp at p.881. (at p.425). 64. The Supreme Court held that the impugned statute lacked the precision that the first amendment required when a statute regulates the content of speech. In order to deny minors access to potentially harmful speech, the impugned Act effectively suppresses a large amount of speech that adults have a constitutional right to receive and to address to one another. 65. Such a burden on adult speech is unacceptable if less restrictive alternatives would be as effective in achieving the legitimate purpose that the statute was enacted to serve. It was held that the general undefined term “patently offensive” covers large amounts of non-pornographic material with serious educational or other value and was both vague and over broad. It was, thus, held that the impugned statute was not narrowly tailored and would fall foul of the first amendment. 66. In Federal Communications Commission v. Fox Television Stations Inc. it was held: (S Ct p.2317) “A fundamental principle in our legal system is that laws which regulate persons or entities must give fair notice of conduct that is forbidden or required. See Connally vs. General Construction Co. US 391 “[A] statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application, violates the first essential of due process of law”); Papachristou v. Jacksonville, US. 162 (“Living under a rule of law entails various suppositions, one of which is that [all persons] are entitled to be informed as to what the State commands or forbids (quoting Lanzetta vs. New Jersey, US 453 (alteration in original). 162 (“Living under a rule of law entails various suppositions, one of which is that [all persons] are entitled to be informed as to what the State commands or forbids (quoting Lanzetta vs. New Jersey, US 453 (alteration in original). This requirement of clarity in regulation is essential to the protections provided by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. See United States v. Williams, US 304. It requires the invalidation of laws that are impermissibly vague. A conviction or punishment fails to comply with due process if the statute or regulation under which it is obtained “fails to provide a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice of what is prohibited, or is so standardless that it authorizes or encourages seriously discriminatory enforcement.” Ibid. As this Court has explained, a regulation is not vague because it may at times be difficult to prove an incriminating fact but rather because it is unclear as to what fact must be proved. See id. at 306. Even when speech is not at issue, the void for vagueness doctrine addresses at least two connected but discrete due process concerns: first, that regulated parties should know what is required of them so they may act accordingly; second, precision and guidance are necessary so that those enforcing the law do not act in an arbitrary or discriminatory way. See Grayned v. Rockford, US 108-109. When speech is involved, rigorous adherence to those requirements is necessary to ensure that ambiguity does not chill protected speech.” 67. Coming to this Court’s judgments, in State of M.P. vs. Baldeo Prasad, an inclusive definition of the word “goonda” was held to be vague and the offence created by Section 4-A of the Goondas Act was, therefore, violative of Article 19(1)(d) and (e) of the Constitution. It was stated: (SCR pp. 979-80: AIR pp. 297-298, paras 9-10) “Incidentally it would also be relevant to point out that the definition of the word “goonda” affords no assistance in deciding which citizen can be put under that category. It is an inclusive definition and it does not indicate which tests have to be applied in deciding whether a person falls in the first part of the definition. Recourse to the dictionary meaning of the word would hardly be of any assistance in this matter. It is an inclusive definition and it does not indicate which tests have to be applied in deciding whether a person falls in the first part of the definition. Recourse to the dictionary meaning of the word would hardly be of any assistance in this matter. After all it must be borne in mind that the Act authorises the District Magistrate to deprive a citizen of his fundamental right under Articles 19(1)(d) and (e), and though the object of the Act and its purpose would undoubtedly attract the provisions of Article 19(5) care must always be taken in passing such Acts that they provide sufficient safeguards against casual, capricious or even malicious exercise of the powers conferred by them. It is well known that the relevant provisions of the Act are initially put in motion against a person at a lower level than the District magistrate, and so it is always necessary that sufficient safeguards should be provided by the Act to protect the fundamental rights of innocent citizens and to save them from unnecessary harassment. That is why we think the definition of the word ‘goonda’ should have given necessary assistance to the District Magistrate in deciding whether a particular citizen falls under the category of goonda or not; that is another infirmity in the Act. As we have already pointed out s. 4-A suffers from the same infirmities as s. 4. Having regard to the two infirmities in Sections 4, 4-A respectively we do not think it would be possible to accede to the argument of the Learned Advocate-General that the operative portion of the Act can fall under Article 19(5) of the Constitution. The person against whom action can be taken under the Act is not entitled to know the source of the information received by the District Magistrate; he is only told about his prejudicial activities on which the satisfaction of the District Magistrate is based that action should be taken against him under s.4 or s. 4-A. In such a case it is absolutely essential that the Act must clearly indicate by a proper definition or otherwise when and under what circumstances a person can be called a goonda, and it must impose an obligation on the District Magistrate to apply his mind to the question as to whether the person against whom complaints are received is such a goonda or not. It has been urged before us that such an obligation is implicit in Sections 4 and 4-A. We are, however, not impressed by this argument. Where a statute empowers the specified authorities to take preventive action against the citizens it is essential that it should expressly make it a part of the duty of the said authorities to satisfy themselves about the existence of what the statute regards as conditions precedent to the exercise of the said authority. If the statute is silent in respect of one of such conditions precedent it undoubtedly constitutes a serious infirmity which would inevitably take it out of the provisions of Article 19(5). The result of this infirmity is that it has left to the unguided and unfettered discretion of the authority concerned to treat any citizen as a goonda. In other words, the restrictions which it allows to be imposed on the exercise of the fundamental right of a citizen guaranteed by Article 19(1)(d) and (e) must in the circumstances be held to be unreasonable. That is the view taken by the High court and we see no reason to differ from it.” 68. At one time this Court seemed to suggest that the doctrine of vagueness was no part of the Constitutional Law of India. That was dispelled in no uncertain terms in K.A. Abbas vs. Union of India: (SCC pp.798-799 paras 44-46: SCR pp. 469-71) “44. This brings us to the manner of the exercise of control and restriction by the directions. Here the argument is that most of the regulations are vague and further that they leave no scope for the exercise of creative genius in the field of art. This poses the first question before us whether the ‘void for vagueness’ doctrine is applicable. Reliance in this connection is placed on Municipal Committee, Amritsar vs. State of Punjab. In that case a Division Bench of this Court lays down that an Indian Act cannot be declared invalid on the ground that it violates the due process clause or that it is vague......” “These observations which are clearly obiter are apt to be too generally applied and need to be explained. In that case a Division Bench of this Court lays down that an Indian Act cannot be declared invalid on the ground that it violates the due process clause or that it is vague......” “These observations which are clearly obiter are apt to be too generally applied and need to be explained. While it is true that the principles evolved by the Supreme Court of the United States of America in the application of the Fourteenth Amendment were eschewed in our Constitution and instead the limits of restrictions on each fundamental right were indicated in the clauses that follow the first clause of the nineteenth article, it cannot be said as an absolute principle that no law will be considered bad for sheer vagueness. There is ample authority for the proposition that a law affecting fundamental rights may be so considered. A very pertinent example is to be found in State of M.P. vs. Baldeo Prasad, where the Central Provinces and Berar Goondas Act, 1946 was declared void for uncertainty. The condition for the application of Sections 4 and 4-A was that the person sought to be proceeded against must be a goonda but the definition of goonda in the Act indicated no tests for deciding which person fell within the definition. The provisions were therefore held to be uncertain and vague. The real rule is that if a law is vague or appears to be so, the court must try to construe it, as far as may be and language permitting, the construction sought to be placed on it, must be in accordance with the intention of the legislature. Thus if the law is open to diverse construction, that construction which accords best with the intention of the legislature and advances the purpose of legislation, is to be preferred. Where however the law admits of no such construction and the persons applying it are in a boundless sea of uncertainty and the law prima facie takes away a guaranteed freedom, the law must be held to offend the Constitution as was done in the case of the Goonda Act. This is not application of the doctrine of due process. The invalidity arises from the probability of the misuse of the law to the detriment of the individual. This is not application of the doctrine of due process. The invalidity arises from the probability of the misuse of the law to the detriment of the individual. If possible, the Court instead of striking down the law may itself draw the line of demarcation where possible but this effort should be sparingly made and only in the clearest of cases.” 20. Essentially, in all these petitions, as already noted herein above, the constitutional validity of KLGP Act 2011 has been challenged. During the pendency of these writ petitions, the State amended the Act by Act 30 of 2020 whereunder, certain provisions of the KLGP Act 2011 came to be amended. An interlocutory application for amendment of the pleadings and additional prayer seeking the amended provisions also being struck down has been raised in W.P. No. 11975/2018. 21. It would be necessary to have a look at the provisions of KLGP Act 2011/2014 in order to appreciate and adjudicate upon the points canvassed by the learned Advocates appearing for parties whereunder they have sought for striking down the Act both on the ground of same being violative of Articles 14, 21 of the Constitution of India and arbitrariness being writ large in the said enactment. 22. For the purposes of convenience, this court has broadly categorised these writ petitions under the following heads for the purposes of convenience and they are illustrative only and not exhaustive. 22. For the purposes of convenience, this court has broadly categorised these writ petitions under the following heads for the purposes of convenience and they are illustrative only and not exhaustive. (I) The land claimed to be owned or purchased or converted from agricultural to non-agricultural purposes: S. No. Writ Petitions 1 W.P. No. 47747 of 2017 2 W.P. No. 433 of 2017 3 W.P. No. 10728 of 2017 4 W.P. No. 15532 of 2017 5 W.P. No. 32134 of 2017 6 W.P. No. 34202 of 2017 7 W.P. No. 36760 of 2017 8 W.P. No. 37713 of 2017 9 W.P. No. 235 of 2018 10 W.P. No. 777 of 2018 11 W.P. No. 1348 of 2018 12 W.P. No. 1395 of 2018 13 W.P. No. 5704 of 2018 14 W.P. No. 6330 of 2018 15 W.P. No. 6376 of 2018 16 W.P. No. 6583 of 2018 17 W.P. No. 7868 of 2018 18 W.P. No. 11029 of 2018 19 W.P. No. 14390 of 2018 20 W.P. No. 15257 of 2018 21 W.P. No. 18646 of 2018 22 W.P. No. 23435 of 2018 23 W.P. No. 23437 of 2018 24 W.P. No. 23819 of 2018 25 W.P. No. 50668 of 2018 26 W.P. No. 52106 of 2018 27 W.P. No. 55214 of 2018 28 W.P. No. 56168 of 2018 29 W.P. No. 56539 of 2018 30 W.P. No. 56542 of 2018 31 W.P. No. 57174 of 2018 32 W.P. No. 8852 of 2019 33 W.P. No. 11090 of 2019 34 W.P. No. 11091 of 2019 35 W.P. No. 13029 of 2019 36 W.P. No. 13737 of 2019 37 W.P. No. 22667 of 2019 38 W.P. No. 23573 of 2019 39 W.P. No. 27597 of 2019 40 W.P. No. 27625 of 2019 41 W.P. No. 29604 of 2019 42 W.P. No. 33249 of 2019 43 W.P. No. 35277 of 2019 44 W.P. No. 38895 of 2019 45 W.P. No. 50828 of 2019 46 W.P. No. 51944 of 2019 47 W.P. No. 51945 of 2019 48 W.P. No. 11767 of 2019 49 W.P. No. 50244 of 2019 50 W.P. No. 52609 of 2018 51 W.P. No. 3190 of 2020 (II) The lands which has been granted under the provisions of Karnataka Land Reforms Act, 1961, Karnataka Land Revenue Act, 1964, Karnataka Land Grant Rules and/or other Act, Rule or Regulation, etc. S. No. Writ Petitions 1 W.P. No. 16281 of 2017 2 W.P. No. 25219 of 2017 3 W.P. No. 45114 of 2017 4 W.P. No. 52972 of 2017 5 W.P. No. 54081 of 2017 6 W.P. No. 54082 of 2017 7 W.P. No. 55683 of 2017 8 W.P. No. 4729 of 2018 9 W.P. No. 6061 of 2018 10 W.P. No. 6960 of 2018 11 W.P. No. 8585 of 2018 12 W.P. No. 9116 of 2018 13 W.P. No. 9117 of 2018 14 W.P. No. 14215 of 2018 15 W.P. No. 22817 of 2018 16 W.P. No. 25761 of 2018 17 W.P. No. 25768 of 2018 18 W.P. No. 27912 of 2018 19 W.P. No. 32121 of 2018 20 W.P. No. 36539 of 2018 21 W.P. No. 47841 of 2018 22 W.P. No. 49013 of 2018 23 W.P. No. 51638 of 2019 24 W.P. No. 53049 of 2018 25 W.P. No. 53534 of 2018 26 W.P. No. 56545 of 2018 27 W.P. No. 9158 of 2019 28 W.P. No. 13029 of 2019 29 W.P. No. 18151 of 2019 30 W.P. No. 23515 of 2019 31 W.P. No. 28421 of 2019 32 W.P. No. 29668 of 2019 33 W.P. No. 52134 of 2019 34 W.P. No. 51926 of 2019 (III) Where the land encroached is said to be Government land/Gomal land/Forest land by the authorities: S. No. Writ Petitions 1 W.P. No. 17180 of 2017 2 W.P. No. 21279 of 2017 3 W.P. No. 23095 of 2017 4 W.P. No. 23800 of 2017 5 W.P. No. 27573 of 2017 6 W.P. No. 32849 of 2017 7 W.P. No. 51160 of 2017 8 W.P. No. 463 of 2018 9 W.P. No. 3032 of 2018 10 W.P. No. 3641 of 2018 11 W.P. No. 5389 of 2018 12 W.P. No. 5390 of 2018 13 W.P. No. 5391 of 2018 14 W.P. No. 8210 of 2018 15 W.P. No. 11306 of 2018 16 W.P. No. 18327 of 2018 17 W.P. No. 18329 of 2018 18 W.P. No. 26481 of 2018 19 W.P. No. 28214 of 2018 20 W.P. No. 28215 of 2018 21 W.P. No. 28637 of 2018 22 W.P. No. 33741 of 2018 23 W.P. No. 34292 of 2018 24 W.P. No. 35489 of 2018 25 W.P. No. 36459 of 2018 26 W.P. No. 36863 of 2018 27 W.P. No. 40311 of 2018 28 W.P. No. 41277 of 2018 29 W.P. No. 43275 of 2018 30 W.P. No. 47540 of 2018 31 W.P. No. 47543 of 2018 32 W.P. No. 47827 of 2018 33 W.P. No. 53025 of 2018 34 W.P. No. 53204 of 2018 35 W.P. No. 54914 of 2018 36 W.P. No. 56187 of 2018 37 W.P. No. 56410 of 2018 38 W.P. No. 56630 of 2018 39 W.P. No. 56631 of 2018 40 W.P. No. 56731 of 2018 41 W.P. No. 56988 of 2018 42 W.P. No. 1680 of 2019 43 W.P. No. 2960 of 2019 44 W.P. No. 7448 of 2019 45 W.P. No. 7844 of 2019 46 W.P. No. 10906 of 2019 47 W.P. No. 12900 of 2019 48 W.P. No. 12975 of 2019 49 W.P. No. 13405 of 2019 50 W.P. No. 20311 of 2019 51 W.P. No. 20312 of 2019 52 W.P. No. 20313 of 2019 53 W.P. No. 20314 of 2019 54 W.P. No. 20315 of 2019 55 W.P. No. 20316 of 2019 56 W.P. No. 22678 of 2019 57 W.P. No. 27680 of 2019 58 W.P. No. 27730 of 2019 59 W.P. No. 30187 of 2019 60 W.P. No. 31106 of 2019 61 W.P. No. 31107 of 209 62 W.P. No. 31322 of 2019 63 W.P. No. 31349 of 2019 64 W.P. No. 31350 of 2019 65 W.P. No. 32184 of 2019 66 W.P. No. 33262 of 2019 67 W.P. No. 34572 of 2019 68 W.P. No. 36127 of 2019 69 W.P. No. 38110 of 2019 70 W.P. No. 38701 of 2019 71 W.P. No. 40447 of 2019 72 W.P. No. 40448 of 2019 73 W.P. No. 40450 of 2019 74 W.P. No. 41715 of 2019 75 W.P. No. 41716 of 2019 76 W.P. No. 50781 of 2019 77 W.P. No. 50955 of 2019 78 W.P. No. 50956 of 2019 79 W.P. No. 51043 of 2019 80 W.P. No. 51101 of 2019 81 W.P. No. 51710 of 2019 82 W.P. No. 51830 of 2019 83 W.P. No. 51941 of 2019 84 W.P. No. 51961 of 2019 85 W.P. No. 45660 of 2018 86 W.P. No. 13737 of 2019 87 W.P. No. 52032 of 2019 88 W.P. No. 9647 of 2020 89 W.P. No. 12647 of 2020 (IV) Where applications have been filed by the applicants for regularisation of land under different enactments and same is pending before the revenue authorities: S. No. Writ Petitions 1 W.P. No. 27437 of 2017 2 W.P. No. 56296 of 2017 3 W.P. No. 9194 of 2018 4 W.P. No. 22025 of 2018 5 W.P. No. 26054 of 2018 6 W.P. No. 26545 of 2018 7 W.P. No. 26546 of 2018 8 W.P. No. 29281 of 2018 9 W.P. No. 33339 of 2018 10 W.P. No. 36737 of 2018 11 W.P. No. 39179 of 2018 12 W.P. No. 43352 of 2018 13 W.P. No. 49786 of 2018 14 W.P. No. 51528 of 2018 15 W.P. No. 55172 of 2018 16 W.P. No. 302 of 2019 17 W.P. No. 3463 of 2019 18 W.P. No. 3484 of 2019 19 W.P. No. 5393 of 2019 20 W.P. No. 8821 of 2019 21 W.P. No. 12974 of 2019 22 W.P. No. 22988 of 2019 23 W.P. No. 27336 of 2019 24 W.P. No. 27921 of 2019 25 W.P. No. 28900 of 2019 26 W.P. No. 29471 of 2019 27 W.P. No. 35575 of 2019 28 W.P. No. 35579 of 2019 29 W.P. No. 42273 of 2019 30 W.P. No. 51878 of 2019 31 W.P. No. 51879 of 2019 32 W.P. No. 52011 of 2019 33 W.P. No. 52566 of 2019 34 W.P. No. 45583 of 2019 35 W.P. No. 220 of 2020 (V) Where the applicants are claiming the lands having been granted to them or to their ancestors/predecessors in title (tenancy lands): S. No. Writ Petitions 1 W.P. No. 33085 of 2017 2 W.P. No. 12264 of 2018 3 W.P. No. 12614 of 2018 4 W.P. No. 15270 of 2018 5 W.P. No. 19761 of 2018 (VI) Suo motu proceedings having been initiated on the ground of encroachment of Government lands: S. No. Writ Petitions 1 W.P. No. 35384 of 2017 2 W.P. No. 36324 of 2017 3 W.P. No. 36610 of 2017 4 W.P. No. 36640 of 2017 5 W.P. No. 36690 of 2017 6 W.P. No. 40597 of 2017 7 W.P. No. 41593 of 2017 8 W.P. No. 42959 of 2017 9 W.P. No. 43059 of 2017 10 W.P. No. 43227 of 2017 11 W.P. No. 44273 of 2017 12 W.P. No. 44687 of 2017 13 W.P. No. 47887 of 2017 14 W.P. No. 50674 of 2017 15 W.P. No. 53008 of 2017 16 W.P. No. 54035 of 2017 17 W.P. No. 8035 of 2018 18 W.P. No. 8186 of 2018 19 W.P. No. 8187 of 2018 20 W.P. No. 8189 of 2018 21 W.P. No. 8190 of 2018 22 W.P. No. 8191 of 2018 23 W.P. No. 11973 of 2018 24 W.P. No. 11975 of 2018 25 W.P. No. 13112 of 2018 26 W.P. No. 19751 of 2018 27 W.P. No. 22837 of 2018 28 W.P. No. 34675 of 2018 29 W.P. No. 47066 of 2018 30 W.P. No. 52017 of 2018 31 W.P. No. 53830 of 2018 32 W.P. No. 1660 of 2019 33 W.P. No. 5576 of 2019 34 W.P. No. 7844 of 2019 35 W.P. No. 8298 of 2019 36 W.P. No. 22935 of 2019 37 W.P. No. 30073 of 2019 23. The main thrust of the argument of the learned Advocates appearing for the parties as noticed herein above, can be sub-divided under the following heads namely, the impugned legislation is bad, since: (1) it is made applicable retrospectively. (2) arbitrariness is writ large. (3) right of appeal and revision not being available, takes away the right of an aggrieved person. (4) reverse onus clause or burden of proof is erroneous and opposed to cannons of criminal jurisprudence. (5) KLGP ACT 2011 provides for criminal trial before the Special Court to be summary trial, whereas punishment to be imposed under Section 4 of the Act being not less than one year and which may extend to three years would be contrary to Section 262 of Cr.P.C. (6) Section 9 of KLGP Act 2011 is hit by Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India as procedure prescribed is unworkable. (7) vicarious liability is fixed on a Director of company. (8) absence of mens rea. (9) transfer of cases from Civil Court to Special Court under Section 20 takes away jurisdiction of Civil Court. (10) though Section 7 mandates constitution of Additional Benches across the State, same have not been constituted. (11) amendment Act provided for abatement of proceedings only in respect of two enactments and it is discriminatory. 24. Before embarking upon the journey of discussion on the above points, it would be necessary to analyse the provisions of the Act 38 of 2014 and Act 30 of 2020. The definition of certain expression as found in KLGP Act 2011 would be relevant for the purposes of our discussion and to record finding on the aforesaid points, it would be necessary to take note of the provisions of the KLGP Act 2011 which has bearing on our discussion. Hence, the relevant provisions are extracted herein-below: “2. Definitions: In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires: (a) xxx (b) xxx (c) xxx (d) “Land” includes: (i) land belonging to the Government, Wakf or the Hindu Religious Institutions and Charitable Endowments, a local authority, a statutory or non statutory body owned, controlled or managed by the Government. (ii) rights in or over land, benefits to arise out of land, and buildings, structures and other things attached to the earth or permanently fastened to anything attached to the earth. (ii) rights in or over land, benefits to arise out of land, and buildings, structures and other things attached to the earth or permanently fastened to anything attached to the earth. (e) “land grabber” means a person or group of persons or a Society, who commits or has committed land grabbing and includes any person who gives financial aid to any person for taking illegal possession of lands or for construction of unauthorised structures thereon, or who collects or attempts to collect from any occupiers of such lands rent, compensation and other charges by criminal intimidation, or who abets the doing of any of the above mentioned acts; and also includes the successors in interest. (f) “land grabbing” means every activity of grabbing of any land, without any lawful entitlement and with a view to illegally taking possession of such land, or enter into or create illegal tenancies or lease and licences agreements construct unauthorised structures thereon for sale or hire, or give such lands to any person on rental or lease and license basis for construction, or use and occupation of unauthorised structures and the term “to grab land” shall be construed accordingly. 3. Land grabbing to be unlawful - Land grabbing in any form is hereby prohibited and declared unlawful and any activity connected with or arising out of land grabbing shall be an offence punishable under this Act. 4. Prohibition of land grabbing: (1) No person shall commit or cause to be committed land grabbing, by himself or through any other person. (2) Any person who, on or after the commencement of this Act, continue to be in occupation, otherwise than as a lawful tenant, of a grabbed land belonging to the Government, Wakf, Hindu Religious Institution and Charitable Endowments, local authority, statutory or non-statutory body owned, controlled or managed by the State Government shall be guilty of an offence under this Act. (3) Whoever contravenes the provisions of Sub-Section (1) or Sub-Section (2) shall on conviction, be punished with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than one year but which may extend to three years, and with fine which may extend to twenty five thousand rupees. 5. (3) Whoever contravenes the provisions of Sub-Section (1) or Sub-Section (2) shall on conviction, be punished with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than one year but which may extend to three years, and with fine which may extend to twenty five thousand rupees. 5. Penalty for other offences in connection with land grabbing -Whoever, with a view to grabbing land in contravention of the provisions of this Act or in connection with any such land grabbing: (a) sells or allots, or offers or advertises for sale or allotment, or has in is possession for the purpose of sale or allotment any land grabbed. (b) instigates or incites any person to commit land grabbing. (c) uses any land grabbed or causes or permits knowingly to be used for purposes, connected with sale or allotment. (d) enters into an agreement for construction of any structure or buildings on such land. (e) causes or procures or attempts to procure any person to do any of above mentioned acts; shall, on conviction, be punished with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than one year but which may extend to three years and with fine which may extend to twenty five thousand rupees. 6. Offences by companies - (1) Where an offence against any of the provisions of this Act or any rule made thereunder has been committed by a company, every person who at the time of the offence was committed, was in charge of and was responsible to the company for the conduct of business of the company, as well as the company, shall be deemed to be guilty of the offence and shall be liable to be proceeded against and punished accordingly: Provided that nothing contained in this Sub-Section shall render any such person liable to any punishment if he proves that the offence was committed without his knowledge or that he has exercised all due diligence to prevent the commission of the such offence. (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in Sub-Section (1), where any such offence has been committed by a company and it is proved that the offence has been committed with the consent or connivance of or is attributable to any neglect on the part of any director, manager, secretary or other officer of the company, such director, manager, secretary or other officer shall be deemed to be guilty of that offence and shall be liable to be proceeded against and punished accordingly. Explanation - For the purposes of this section:- (a) “company, trust, firm, society” means respectively a company defined under the Companies Act, 1956 (Act No. 1 of 1956), trust defined under the Indian Trust Act, 1882 (Act No. 2 of 1882), firm defined in the Indian Partnership Act, 1932 (Act No. 9 of 1932), Society defined in the Karnataka Societies Registration Act, 1960 (Karnataka Act 17 of 1960) or other association of individuals. (b) “director” in relation to:- (i) a company means the director as defined in Sub-Section (13) of section 2 of the Companies Act, 1956 and partner means a partner in the firm. (ii) a society, a trust or other association of individuals, means the person who is entrusted under the relevant provisions of the Act or rules of the society, trust or other association with management of the affairs of the society, trust or other association, as the case may be. 7. Constitution of Special Courts - (1) The Government may, for the purpose of providing speedy enquiry into any alleged act of land grabbing, and trial of cases in respect of the ownership and title to, or lawful possession of, the land grabbed and those offences specified in Chapter XIV-A of the Karnataka Land Revenue Act, 1964, by notification, constitute a Special Court. (2) A Special Court shall initially consist of a Chairman and four other members, to be appointed by the Government. (2) A Special Court shall initially consist of a Chairman and four other members, to be appointed by the Government. (3) The Chairman shall be a person who is or was a judge of a High Court and of the other four members, two shall be persons who are or were District Judges (hereinafter referred to as Judicial Members) and the other two members shall be persons who hold or have held a post not below the rank of a Deputy Commissioner of the District (hereinafter referred to as Revenue Members): Provided that the appointment of a person who was a Judge of a High Court as the Chairman of the Special Court shall be made after consultation with the Chief Justice of the High Court. (4) The Government, if, it is of the opinion that Additional Bench of the Special Court is necessary for trial of such cases, may likewise constitute Additional Bench of Special Court, by notification, in respect of such area, as may be specified therein. (5) Such Additional Bench shall consist of one Judicial member and one Revenue member with a qualification specified in Sub-Section (3). (6) The Government from time to time likewise, by notification, reconstitute the Special Court constituted under Sub-Section (1). (7) The Chairman or other member shall hold office as such for a term of three years from the date on which he enters upon his office, or until the Special Court is reconstituted whichever is later. (8) (a) Subject to the other provisions of this Act, the jurisdiction, powers and authority of the Special Court may be exercised by benches thereof one comprising of the Chairman, a judicial member and a Revenue member and the other comprising of a Judicial Member and a Revenue member. (b) Where the bench comprises of the Chairman, he shall be the Presiding Officer of such a bench and where the bench consists of two members, the Judicial Member shall be the Presiding Officer. (c) It shall be competent for the Chairman either suo-moto or on a reference made to him to withdraw any case pending before the bench comprising of two members and dispose of the same or to transfer any case from one bench to another bench. (c) It shall be competent for the Chairman either suo-moto or on a reference made to him to withdraw any case pending before the bench comprising of two members and dispose of the same or to transfer any case from one bench to another bench. (d) Where it is reasonably apprehended that the trial of Civil liability of a person accused of an offence under this Act, is likely to take considerable time, it shall be competent for the Chairman to entrust the trial of the criminal liability of such offender to another bench in the interest of speedy disposal of the case. (e) Where a case under this Act is heard by a bench consisting of two members and the members thereof are divided in opinion, the case with their opinions shall be laid before another judicial member or the Chairman and that member or Chairman, as the case may be after such hearing as he thinks fit, shall deliver his opinion and the decision or order shall follow that opinion. (9) The quorum to constitute a meeting of any bench of the Special Court shall be two. (10) No act or proceeding of the Special Court shall be deemed to be invalid by reason only of the existence of any vacancy among its members or any defect in the constitution or reconstitution thereof. 9. Procedure and powers of the Special Courts - (1) The Special Court may, either suo-moto or on application made by any person, officer or authority take cognizance of and try every case arising out of any alleged act of land grabbing or with respect to the ownership and title to, or lawful possession of, the land grabbed or offences specified in Chapter XIV-A of the Karnataka Land Revenue Act, 1964 whether before or after the commencement of this Act, and pass such orders including orders by way of interim directions as it deems fit. (2) The Special Court shall for the purpose of taking cognizance of the case, consider the location, or extent or value of the land alleged to have been grabbed or of the substantial nature of the evil involved or in the interest of justice required or any other relevant matter. (2) The Special Court shall for the purpose of taking cognizance of the case, consider the location, or extent or value of the land alleged to have been grabbed or of the substantial nature of the evil involved or in the interest of justice required or any other relevant matter. (3) In respect of an alleged act of land grabbing or the determination of questions of title and ownership to, or lawful possession of any land grabbed under this Act and offences specified in Chapter XIV-A of the Karnataka Land Revenue Act, 1964, shall be tried only in a Special Court constituted for the area in which the land grabbed is situated; and the decision of the Special Court shall be final: Provided that if, in the opinion of the Special Court, any application filed before it, is prima facie frivolous or vexatious, it shall reject the same without any further enquiry. (4) The Special Court shall determine the order in which the civil and criminal liability against a land grabber be initiated. It shall be within the discretion of the Special Court whether or not to deliver its decision or order until both civil and criminal proceedings are completed. The evidence admitted during the criminal proceeding may be made use of while trying the civil liability. But additional evidence, if any adduced in the civil proceedings shall not be considered by the Special Court while determining the criminal liability. Any person accused of land grabbing or the abetment thereof before the Special Court shall be a competent witness for the defence and may give evidence on oath in disproof of the charge made against him or any person charged together with him in the criminal proceeding: Provided that he shall not be called as a witness except on his own request in writing or his failure to give evidence shall be made the subject of any comment by any of the parties or the Special Court or give rise to any presumption against himself or any person charged together with him at the same proceeding. (5)(a) The Special Court shall, while deciding the civil liability of a person shall follow its own procedure which is not inconsistent with the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. (b) Every offence punishable under this Act shall be tried summarily. (5)(a) The Special Court shall, while deciding the civil liability of a person shall follow its own procedure which is not inconsistent with the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. (b) Every offence punishable under this Act shall be tried summarily. (c) When a person is convicted of an offence of land grabbing attended by criminal force or show of force or by Criminal intimidation, and it appears to the Special Court that, by such force or show of force or intimidation, the land has been grabbed, the Special Court may if it thinks fit, order that possession of the same be restored after evicting by force, if necessary. (6) Every case under Sub-Section (1) shall be disposed of finally by the Special Court, as far as possible, within a period of six months from the date of institution of the case before it. (7) Every finding of the Special Court with regard to any alleged act of land grabbing shall be conclusive proof of the fact of land grabbing and of the persons who committed such land grabbing, and every judgment of the Special Court with regard to the determination of title and ownership to, or lawful possession of; any land grabbed shall be binding on all persons having interest in such land: Provided that the Special Court shall, by notification specify the fact of taking cognizance of the case under this Act. Such notification shall state that any objection which may be received by the Special Court from any person including the custodian of evacuee property within the period specified therein shall be considered by it: Provided further that where the custodian of evacuee property objects to the Special Court taking cognizance of the case, the Special Court shall not proceed further with the case in regard to such property: Provided also that the Special Court shall cause a notice of taking cognizance of the case under the Act, served on any person known or believed to be interested in the land, after a summary enquiry to satisfy itself about the persons likely to be interested in the land. (8) It shall be lawful for the Special Court to pass such order as it may deem fit to advance the cause of justice. (8) It shall be lawful for the Special Court to pass such order as it may deem fit to advance the cause of justice. It may award compensation in terms of money for wrongful possession of the land grabbed which shall not be less than the amount equivalent to the market value of the land grabbed as on the date of the order and profits accrued from the land payable by the land gabber to the owner of the grabbed land and may direct redelivery of the grabbed land to its rightful owner. The amount of compensation and profits, so awarded and costs of re-delivery, if any, shall be recovered as an arrear of land revenue in case the Government is the owner, or as a decree of a Civil Court, in any case to be executed by the Special Court: Provided that, the Special Court shall, before passing an order under this Sub-Section, give to the land grabber an opportunity of making his representation or of adducing evidence, if any, in this regard, and consider every such representation and evidence. 11. Burden of proof - Where in any proceedings under this Act prima facie proved to be the land owned by the Government, the Special Court shall presume that the person who is alleged to have grabbed the land is a land-grabber and the burden of proving that the land has not been grabbed by him shall be of such person. 18. Power to make rules - (1) The Government may, by notification, after previous publication make rules for carrying out the purposes of this Act. 18. Power to make rules - (1) The Government may, by notification, after previous publication make rules for carrying out the purposes of this Act. (2) Every rule made under this section shall, immediately after it is made, be laid before each House of the State Legislature if it is in session and if it is not in session in the session immediately following, for a total period of fourteen days which may be comprised in one session, or in two successive sessions and if before the expiration of the session in which it is so laid or the session immediately following both Houses agree in making any modification in the rule or in the annulment of the rule, the rule shall, from the date on which the modification or annulment is notified, have effect only in such modified form or shall stand annulled, as the case may be; so however, that any such modification or annulment shall be without prejudice to the validity of anything previously done under that rule. 19. Power to make regulations - (1) The Special Court may, by notification, with the concurrence of the Government, make regulations not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act or the rules made thereunder relating to the procedure to be followed for the conduct of the cases and for regulating the manner of taking decisions. (2) The Special Court may cause a public notice of the substance of such regulations for the information of the general public. (3) Every regulation made under this section shall, immediately after it is made, be laid before such House of the Legislature of the Sate if it is in session, and if it is not in session in the session immediately following for a total period of fourteen days which may be comprised in one session or in two successive sessions and if before the expiration of the session in which it is so laid or the session immediately following the State Legislature agrees in making any modifications in the regulation or in the annulment of the regulation, the regulation shall, from the date on which the modification or annulment is notified, have effect only in such modified form or shall stand annulled, as the case may be; so however, that any such modification or annulments shall be without prejudice to the validity of anything previously done under that regulation.” 25. In the light of amendment having been brought about to the KLGP Act 2011 by KLGP Act 38/2014, as noticed hereinabove, it would be useful to have a comparative statement of these two enactments insofar as the provisions which came to be amended and it reads: S. No. Act No. 38/2014 Act No. 30/2020 1. 2(d) “Land” includes: In Section 2 of the Act 38/2014 after Clause (d) following proviso is inserted: (i) Land belonging to the Government, Wakf or the Hindu Religious Institutions and Charitable Endowments, a local authority, a statutory or non statutory body owned, controlled or managed by the Government. “Provided that ‘land’ shall not include lands in respect of which applications for grant are pending on the date of commencement of this Act: (ii) rights in or over land, benefits to arise out of land and buildings, structures and other things attached to the earth or permanently fast-ended to anything attached to the earth. (a) under Section 94A, 94B, 94C and 94CC of the Karnataka Land Revenue Act, 1964 (Karnataka Ac t12 of 1964). (b) under the Schedule Tribes and other Traditional Forest Dwellers (Recognition of Forest Rights) Act, 2006 (Central Act 2 of 2007). 3 Section 9(3): In respect of an alleged act of land grabbing or the determination of questions of title and ownership to, or lawful possession of any land grabbed under this Act and offences specified in Chapter XIV-A of the Karnataka Land Revenue Act, 1964, shall be tried only in a Special Court constituted for the area in which the land gabbed is situated and the decision of the Special Court shall be final: In Section 9 of Act 38/2014: Provided that if, in the opinion of the Special Court, any application filed before it, is prima facie frivolous or vexations, it shall reject the same without any further enquiry. (i) for Sub-Section (3), the following shall be substituted, namely: (3) All alleged acts of land grabbing shall be tried only by the Special Court constituted for the area in which the land is situated, or where there are more Special Courts than one for such area, by such one of them as may be specified in this behalf by the Government.” 3. Section 9(5) clause (b): The following shall be substituted in sub-section (5), for clause (b): Every offence punishable under this Act shall be tried summarily. Section 9(5) clause (b): The following shall be substituted in sub-section (5), for clause (b): Every offence punishable under this Act shall be tried summarily. (b) the Special Court may, if it thinks fit, try in a summary manner any offence under this Act: Provided that, if the Special Court in of the opinion that there are no sufficient grounds for proceedings, the Court shall dismiss the complaint or drop further proceedings and in every such case it shall briefly records reasons. Provided further that, the course of the trial of summons case relating to an offence under this Act, it appears to the Special Court that in the interests of justice, the offence shall be tried in accordance with the procedure for trial of warrant cases, the Special Court may proceed to re-hear the case in the manner provided by the code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Central Act 2 of 1974) for the trial of warrant-cases and may recall any witness who may have been examined. 3 Nil Insertion of New Section 10-A and 10-B. After Section 10 of the Principal Act, the following and give its decision in writing to each of the parties to the dispute. 5. Nil Insertion of new Section 17-A: After Section 17 of the principal Act, the following is inserted, namely:- “17-A. Appeals - (1) An appeal against any final order by the Special Court determining the civil liability of the parties shall lie to the High Court, if the High Court is satisfied that the case involved a substantial question of law: (i) in an appeal under this sub section the memorandum of appeal shall precisely state the substantial question of law involved in the appeal. (ii) the appeal shall be heard on the question so formulated and the respondent shall, at the hearing of the appeal be allowed to argue that the case does not involve any such question: Provided that, appeal shall be filed before the High court within thirty days from the dated of the order. Provided further that, if the appeal is appeal is filed beyond the period of thirty days, the High Court shall condone the same, on sufficient cause being shown, but not beyond a period of sixty days. (2) Any appeal against order of acquittal or conviction determining any criminal liability under this Act shall lie to the High Court. Provided further that, if the appeal is appeal is filed beyond the period of thirty days, the High Court shall condone the same, on sufficient cause being shown, but not beyond a period of sixty days. (2) Any appeal against order of acquittal or conviction determining any criminal liability under this Act shall lie to the High Court. The High Court may exercise, so far as may be applicable, all the powers conferred by the chapters XXIX and XXX of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Central Act 2 of 1974) on a High Court as if, the Special Court were a Court of sessions trying cases within the local limits of the jurisdictions of the High Court.” 6. Nil Insertion of new Section 22: After Section 21 of the Principal Act, the following is inserted, namely:- “22. Abatement - All proceedings pending and contemplated with respect to land as excluded under the proviso to sub-clause (d) of Section 2 of this Act, on the date of commencement of the Karnataka Land Grabbing Prohibition (Amendment) Act, 2020 shall stand abated.” 7. Nil 7. Repeal and Savings: (1) The Karnataka Land Grabbing Prohibition (Amendment) Ordinance, 2020 (Karnataka Ordinance No. 6 of 2020) is hereby repealed. (2) Notwithstanding such repeal anything done or any action taken under the Principal Act, as amended by the said Ordinance, shall be deemed to have been done or taken under Principal Act, as amended by this Act. ANALYSIS OF THE PROVISIONS OF KLGP ACT 2011/2020: 26. Section 2 of KLGP Act 2011 has 13 definitions. The words “Land” and “Land grabber” and “Land grabbing” and “Local authority” and “Special Court” etc. have been defined under Section 2. Definition of “Land” as found in Section 2(d) of the Act is an inclusive definition. 27. A plain reading of Section 2(d) would clearly indicate that such of the ‘land’ belonging to the Government, WAKF or Hindu Religious Institutions and Charitable Endowments, local authority, statutory or non statutory body owned, controlled or managed by the Government has been included within the definition of the land. 27. A plain reading of Section 2(d) would clearly indicate that such of the ‘land’ belonging to the Government, WAKF or Hindu Religious Institutions and Charitable Endowments, local authority, statutory or non statutory body owned, controlled or managed by the Government has been included within the definition of the land. It also includes rights in and over such land, benefits arising out of such land, and buildings, structures and other things attached to the earth or permanently fastened to anything attached to the earth would also include within the definition of the expression land: 27.1 A ‘land grabber’ as defined under Section 2(e) would include a person, group of persons or a Society, who commits or has committed the land grabbing and includes any person who gives financial aid to such person for taking illegal possession of lands or for construction of unauthorised structures thereon, or who collects or attempts to collect from any occupiers of such lands rent, compensation and other charges by criminal intimidation, or who abets the doing of any of these acts and it would also include the successors in interest. Section 2(f) defines “ land grabbing” as Every activity of grabbing of any land without any lawful entitlement and with a view to illegally take possession of such land or enter into or create illegal tenancies or lease and licence agreements, would fall within the mischief of land grabbing. Allowing construction of unauthorised structures on such land as defined under Section 2(d) or allow use and occupation of such land or permit unauthorised structures would also fall within the definition of the term ‘to grab land’. 27.2 Sections 2(e) and 2(f) are similar to Sections 2(d) and 2(e) as defined under Andhra Pradesh Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act, 1982 (Act 12 of 1982). Said provisions of Andhra Pradesh Act, 1982 had come up for consideration before Hon’ble Apex Court in the matter of Konda Lakshmana Bapuji vs. Government of Andhra Pradesh and Others, (2002) 3 SCC 258 and same has been interpreted as: “30. Said provisions of Andhra Pradesh Act, 1982 had come up for consideration before Hon’ble Apex Court in the matter of Konda Lakshmana Bapuji vs. Government of Andhra Pradesh and Others, (2002) 3 SCC 258 and same has been interpreted as: “30. A perusal of clause (d) shows that the expression “land grabber” takes in its fold: (1) a person or a group of persons who commits land grabbing; (2) a person who gives financial aid to any person for (a) taking illegal possession of the lands, or (b) construction of unauthorised structures thereon; (3) a person who collects or attempts to collect from any occupiers of such lands rent, compensation and other charges by criminal intimidation; (4) a person who abets the doing of any of the above mentioned acts and (5) the successors-in-interest of such a person. Among these five categories, the first category is relevant for the present discussion - a person or a group of persons who commits land grabbing. 31. Clause (e) of Section 2, quoted above, defines the expression “land grabbing” to mean: (1) every activity of grabbing of any land (whether belonging to the Government, a local authority, a religious or charitable institution or endowment, including a wakf, or any other private person) by a person or group of persons; (2) such grabbing must be: (i) without any lawful entitlement and (ii) with a view to: (a) illegally taking possession of such lands; or (b) to enter into or create illegal tenancies, lease and licences agreements or any other illegal agreements in respect of such lands; or (c) to construct unauthorised structures thereon for sale or hire; or (d) to give such lands to any person on (i) rental or (ii) lease and licence basis for construction, or (iii) use and occupation of unauthorised structures. 32. Inasmuch as the aforementioned expressions are defined employing the term “grabbing” it is necessary to ascertain the import of that term. It is not defined in the Act. It is not a technical term or a term of art so it has to be understood in its ordinary common meaning. 33. The meaning of the term “grab” in the New International Webster’s Comprehensive Dictionary of the English Language, is given as follows: “To grasp or seize forcibly or suddenly; to take possession of violently or dishonestly; to make a sudden grasp. 33. The meaning of the term “grab” in the New International Webster’s Comprehensive Dictionary of the English Language, is given as follows: “To grasp or seize forcibly or suddenly; to take possession of violently or dishonestly; to make a sudden grasp. See synonyms under grasp: (i) The act of grabbing, or that which is grabbed. (ii) A dishonest or unlawful taking possession or acquisition. (iii) An apparatus for grappling.” 34. In Words and Phrases, permanent edition, Vol.18, the meaning of “grab” is noted as under: “The word “grab” means an act or practice of appropriating unscrupulously, as in politics. Smith vs. Pure Oil Co. 128 S.W. 2d 931, 933, 278 Ky.430. The word “grab” means a seizure or acquisition by violent or unscrupulous means. Smith vs. Pure Oil Co. 128 S.W.2d 931, 933, 278 Ky.430. The word “grab” means to seize, grasp, or snatch forcibly or suddenly with the hand, hence to take possession of suddenly, violently, or dishonestly. Smith vs. Pure Oil Co. 128 S.W. 2d 931, 933, 278 Ky.430.” 35. Corpus Juris Secundum, Volume 38, records the meaning of the term “grab” thus: “As a verb, to seize, grasp or snatch forcibly or suddenly with the hand, hence to take possession of suddenly, violently, or dishonestly.” 36. In Concise Oxford Dictionary, the following meanings of the word “grab” are noted: “A seize suddenly; capture, arrest; take greedily or unfairly; attract the attention of, impress; make a sudden snatch at; intr. (of the brakes of a motor vehicle) act harshly or jerkily: (i) a sudden clutch or attempt to seize; (ii) a mechanical device for clutching.” 38. In Concise Oxford Dictionary, the following meanings of the word “grab” are noted: “A seize suddenly; capture, arrest; take greedily or unfairly; attract the attention of, impress; make a sudden snatch at; intr. (of the brakes of a motor vehicle) act harshly or jerkily: (i) a sudden clutch or attempt to seize; (ii) a mechanical device for clutching.” 38. A combined reading of clauses (d) and (e) would suggest that to bring a person within the meaning of the expression “land grabber” it must be shown that: (i) (a) he has taken unauthorisedly, unfairly, greedily, snatched forcibly, violently or unscrupulously any land belonging to government or a local authority, a religious or charitable institution or endowment, including a wakf, or any other private person; (b) without any lawful entitlement and (c) with a view to illegally taking possession of such lands, or enter or create illegal tenancies or lease and licences agreements or any other illegal agreements in respect of such lands or to construct unauthorised structures thereon for sale or hire, or give such lands to any person on rental or lease and licence basis for construction, or use and occupation of unauthorised structures; or (ii) he has given financial aid to any person for taking illegal possession of lands or for construction of unauthorised structures thereon; or (iii) he is collecting or attempting to collect from any occupiers of such lands rent, compensation and other charges by criminal intimation; or (iv) he is abetting the doing of any of the above-mentioned acts; or (v) that he is the successor-ininterest of any such persons. 39. It must be borne in mind that for purposes of taking cognizance of a case under the Act existence of an allegation of any act of land grabbing is the sine qua non and not the truth or otherwise of such an allegation. But to hold that a person is a land grabber it is necessary to find that the allegations satisfying the requirements of land grabbing are proved. 40. But to hold that a person is a land grabber it is necessary to find that the allegations satisfying the requirements of land grabbing are proved. 40. To make out a case in a civil case that the appellant is a land grabber the first respondent must aver and prove both the ingredients - the factum as well as the intention - that the appellant falls in the categories of the persons, mentioned above (clause (d) of Section 2 of the Act), has occupied the land in dispute, which belonged to the first respondent, without any lawful entitlement and with a view to or with the intention of illegally taking possession of such land or entering into the land for any of the purposes mentioned in clause (e) of Section 2 of the Act, summarised above.” 27.3 Section 3 of KLGP Act 2011 states that ‘land grabbing’ in any form is prohibited and is declared unlawful and any activity connected with or arising out of land grabbing to be an offence, which would be punishable under the Act. 27.4 Section 4 of KLGP Act 2011 states that land grabbing by any person would be unlawful and Sub-Section (2) of Section 4 would also take within its sweep that a person who after commencement of the Act, continue to be in occupation of such grabbed land otherwise than a lawful tenant to fall within the definition of “prohibition of land grabbing.” Sub-Section (3) of Section 4 provides for punishment with imprisonment for a term of not less than one (1) year and which may extend upto 3 years and with fine upto Rs. 25,000/-for contravention of Sub-Section (1) or Sub-Section (2) of Section 4. 27.5 Section 5 of the KLGP Act 2011 specifically contemplates for levy of penalty for other offences in connection with land grabbing and clauses (a) to (e) would indicate that on conviction of such person for contravention of the provisions of the Act or in connection with any such land grabbing, same would be punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than one year but which may extend to three years and with fine which may extend to Rs. 25,000/-. 27.6 Section 6 speaks about offences by the Companies. 25,000/-. 27.6 Section 6 speaks about offences by the Companies. Sub-Section (1) would indicate that where an offence under the Act or Rule made thereunder have been committed by the Company, every such person who at the time of the offence was committed, was in-charge of and was responsible to the company for the conduct of business of the company, as well as the company, would be deemed to be guilty of the offence and can be proceeded accordingly. However, if such person proves that offence was committed without his knowledge or that he had exercised all due diligence to prevent the commission of such offence, Sub-Section (1) would not be attracted in such circumstances. Sub-Section (2) would indicate that where any such offence has been committed by a company and it has been proved that the offence has been committed with consent or connivance of or is attributable to any neglect on the part of any Director, Manager, Secretary or other officer of the company, then such person would be deemed to be guilty of that offence and shall be proceeded accordingly. 27.7 Section 7 of the KLGP Act 2011 is an exhaustive section which speaks about the constitution of Special Courts not only to enquire into alleged act of land grabbing and speedy enquiry into any alleged act of land grabbing, trial of cases in respect of the ownership and title to or lawful possession of the land grabbed but also about offences specified in Chapter XIV-A of the Karnataka Land Revenue Act, 1964. It also enables the Government to constitute a Special Court and sub-section (2) indicates that it would consist of a Chairman and four other members to be appointed by the Government. The Chairman shall be a person who is or was a Judge of the High Court and out of four other members, two persons would be District Judges either sitting or retired to act as “Judicial Members” the other two members would be not below the rank of Deputy Commissioner of a District. A holistic reading of Section 7 would indicate the manner in which the Special Courts are to be constituted including the additional Benches of the Special Court and the composition of Benches, the powers of the Chairman, quorum for constitution of any Bench and the like matters. 27.8 Section 9 speaks about procedure and power of the Special Courts. A holistic reading of Section 7 would indicate the manner in which the Special Courts are to be constituted including the additional Benches of the Special Court and the composition of Benches, the powers of the Chairman, quorum for constitution of any Bench and the like matters. 27.8 Section 9 speaks about procedure and power of the Special Courts. It has eight (8) sub-sections. A plain reading of Sub-Section (1) of Section 9 would indicate that Special Court either suo motu or on an application can take cognizance of and try every case arising out of an alleged act of land grabbing or with respect to the ownership and title to, or lawful possession of the land grabbed or offences specified in Chapter XIV -A of the Karnataka Land Grabbing Act either before or after the commencement of the Act and pass such orders as it deems fit. Sub-Section (2) has vested the Special Court to take note of the location or the value of the land alleged to have been grabbed or the substantial nature of the evil involved for the purposes of taking cognizance. Pre-amendment Sub-Section (3) states that only the Special Court constituted for the area in which the land grabbed situated alone is competent to take cognizance in respect of the offence of land grabbing or determination of questions of title and ownership or lawful possession of any land grabbed under this Act and offences specified in Chapter XIVA of the Karnataka Land Revenue Act, 1964. It further mandates that the decision of Special Court shall be final. The Special Court also has power to reject any case instituted before it, if, in the opinion of the Special Court, any application filed before it is prima-facie frivolous or vexatious. 27.9 Sub-Section (4) of Section 9 empowers the Special Court to determine the order in which the civil and criminal liability is to be tried. It also enables the said court whether or not to deliver its decision or order until both the proceedings are completed. It further states the manner in which the evidence in either of the proceedings can be admitted or rejected. It also enables the said court whether or not to deliver its decision or order until both the proceedings are completed. It further states the manner in which the evidence in either of the proceedings can be admitted or rejected. It further provides that a person accused of land grabbing or abetment thereof to be a competent witness for the defence to disprove the charges made against him or any person charged with him of the offence of land grabbing in criminal proceedings. Proviso thereto enables such person alleged of land grabbing not to be called as a witness except on his own request in writing and failure to give evidence should not be made the subject of any comment by any of the parties and it would not give rise to any presumptions against himself or any person charged together with him at the same proceedings. 27.10 Sub-Section (5)(a) to (c) of Section 9 mandates that Special Court while deciding the civil liability of a person shall follow its own procedure which is not inconsistent with the provisions of Code of Civil Procedure; to try the offence summarily if necessary; and to take possession of such grabbed land. Sub-Section (6) stipulates the time limit of six months within which the case initiated before it under Sub-Section (1) of Section 9 is to be disposed of. Plain reading of Sub-Section (7) of Section 9 would indicate that finding recorded by the Special Court shall be conclusive proof of the fact of land grabbing and the persons who had committed the same and the binding effect of said judgment with regard to the determination of title and ownership to, or lawful possession of any land grabbed shall be binding on all persons having interest in such land. The three provisos thereto provides for the manner in which possession of the land grabbed being taken. 27.11 Sub-Section (8) of Section 9 enables the Special Court to award compensation in terms of money for wrongful possession of land grabbed and said compensation should not be less than the amount equivalent to the market value of the land grabbed as on the date of the order along with profits accrued from the land payable by the land grabber to the owner of the grabbed land and it can direct redelivery of possession to its rightful owner. The amount of compensation and profits so awarded and costs of re-delivery could be recovered as arrears of land revenue in case the Government is the owner. Of course, the Special Court has to give an opportunity to the land grabber of being heard and to make his representation or to adduce evidence if any, in this regard and such representation will have to be considered before passing an order under Sub-Section (8). 27.12 Section 10 states that the Special Court has the powers of Civil Court and Court of Sessions as it deals with determination of title to the land grabbed and also the offence with regard to land grabbing. Therefore, the Special Court is deemed to be a Civil Court insofar as it relates to determination of title and Court of Sessions insofar as it relates to offence of land grabbing. The person conducting a prosecution before the Special Court is deemed to be a Public Prosecutor. 27.13 Section 11 speaks about burden of proof. If in any proceedings under this Act, prima-facie, it is proved to be the land owned by the Government, the Special Court would presume that the person who is alleged to have grabbed the land is a land grabber and the burden of proving that land has not been grabbed by him would be on such person. 27.14 Section 16 of the KLGP Act 2011 would indicate the provisions of the said Act would have overriding effect, not withstanding anything inconsistent contained in any other law which is in force or custom, usage or agreement or decree or order of a court or any other tribunal or authority. 27.15 Section 17 of the Act enables the Special Court to review its judgment or order passed under Section 9 to prevent miscarriage of justice. However, such review power is not required to be exercised or prayer sought for should be entertained, except where such order which is sought to be reviewed had been passed under mistake of fact, ignorance of any material fact or error apparent on the face of the record. First proviso thereto enables the Special Court to admit or reject review petition by circulation even without hearing the petitioner. However, where review is to be made, then, necessarily the parties affected are required to be heard to meet the principles of natural justice. First proviso thereto enables the Special Court to admit or reject review petition by circulation even without hearing the petitioner. However, where review is to be made, then, necessarily the parties affected are required to be heard to meet the principles of natural justice. 27.16 Section 20 of the KLGP Act 2011 speaks that where any proceeding before any court or authority, immediately before the constitution of a Special Court is pending, same is to be transferred to the Special Court and the deeming provision of cause of action on which such suit or proceeding is based is deemed to have been arisen as if the cause of action had arisen before the Special Court. 28. When these writ petitions were pending before this court for consideration and the arguments were being advanced, State brought about amendment to the KLGP Act 2011 (Karnataka Act 38/2014) by Karnataka Act 30/2020, whereunder amendment to Sections 2 and 9 was brought about. Sections 10-A, 10-B, 17-A and 22 were inserted. Hence, it would be necessary and appropriate to analyse these amended provisions also. 29. After clause (d) of Section 2, a proviso has been inserted whereunder, claims relating to the land made by persons which are pending before said authorities on the date of commencement of the Act, would be excluded from the purview of the Act, namely, where applications have been filed under Section 94A, 94B, 94C and 94CC of the Karnataka Land Revenue Act, 1964 as well as the applications filed under Scheduled Tribes and other Traditional Forest Dwellers (Recognition of Forest Rights) Act, 2006 are pending, proceedings if already initiated before the Special Court, such proceedings stands abated. 30. Sub-Section (3) of Section 9 has been substituted by Act 30/2020. A plain reading of the amended provision, would indicate that all alleged acts of land grabbing should be tried by the Special Court constituted for the area in which the land is situated or where there are more than one Special Courts than one for such area, by such one of them as may be specified in that behalf. Proviso which was existing prior to Act 30 of 2014 has been deleted. 31. Under the Principal Act i.e. KLGP Act 2011, the offence punishable under the Act was required to be tried summarily. Proviso which was existing prior to Act 30 of 2014 has been deleted. 31. Under the Principal Act i.e. KLGP Act 2011, the offence punishable under the Act was required to be tried summarily. However, under the amended Act namely, clause (b) of Sub-Section (5) of Section 9 having been substituted, it has now empowered the Special Court to try an offence under the Act in a summary manner only if it thinks fit. First proviso thereunder would indicate that offence under the Act can also be tried as a warrant case if in the opinion of the Special Court it requires to be tried as a warrant case. Two provisos have been incorporated to clause (b) by Act 30 of 2020 and same would clearly indicate that the Special Court is empowered to dismiss the complaint or drop further proceedings by recording the reasons in brief, in the event Special Court forming an opinion that there are no sufficient grounds to proceed further. Whereas, second proviso would indicate that Special Court is empowered to adopt the procedure adopted for a trial of a warrant case for the offence under the Act and the Special Court is empowered to recall any witness who have been examined. 32. A perusal of Sections 10-A and 10-B which have been incorporated would indicate that jurisdiction of civil court is barred to try a suit or other legal proceedings relating to any Government land and which is required to be determined by the Special Court under the KLGP Act, 2011. Section 10-B mandates the proceedings initiated under the Act is to be completed within six months and give its decision in writing to each of the parties to the dispute. 33. Section 17-A(1) which has been newly incorporated would provide for an appeal to be filed against any order passed by the Special Court determining the civil liability of the parties and the High Court would be empowered to entertain such appeal on being satisfied that the case involves the substantial question of law. The proviso thereto stipulates the time limit for filing an appeal as well as power to condone the delay by the appellate court for sufficient cause, where the appeal is filed beyond the period of 30 days. The proviso thereto stipulates the time limit for filing an appeal as well as power to condone the delay by the appellate court for sufficient cause, where the appeal is filed beyond the period of 30 days. Sub-Section (2) of Section 17-A enables the aggrieved person to file an appeal against an order of acquittal or conviction as the case may be. It also provides for the powers to be exercised by the High Court would be the powers conferred by Chapter XXIX and XXX of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1903. 34. By amendment Act 30/2020, Section 22-A has been incorporated, by which applications filed under Sections 94A, 94B, 94C and 94CC of the Karnataka Land Revenue Act, 1964 are pending on the date of the commencement of the Act would stand abated. 35. Though a valiant attempt has been made by some of the learned Advocates appearing for the petitioners to contend that State lack legislative competence to enact the impugned Act, we are of the considered view that said contention ought to fail for the simple reason that State Legislature is empowered to enact the impugned legislation in view of Entry 18 and 64 of List-II of the VII Schedule of Constitution of India, which clearly empowers the State to enact laws with respect to any of the matters found in the said list. Entry 64 and also Entry 18 enables the State to bring in legislation relating to land. It would be useful to refer to the judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court in the matter of State of A.P and Others vs. K. Mohanlal and Another, (1998) 5 SCC 468 whereunder Hon’ble Apex Court has affirmed the judgment of High Court of Judicature of Andhra Pradesh reported in (1997) 4 ALT 220 (DB) which had upheld the constitutional validity of Andhra Pradesh Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act, 1982. It has been held by the Hon’ble Apex Court as under: “7. Article 323-B of the Constitution of India provides that the appropriate legislature may, by law, provide for the adjudication or trial by tribunal any dispute, complaint or offences in respect to all or any of the matters specified in clause (2) with respect to which such legislature has a power to make the laws. Clause (2)(d) refers, inter-alia to any rights in land or the extinguishment or modification of any such rights. Clause (2)(d) refers, inter-alia to any rights in land or the extinguishment or modification of any such rights. The Andhra Pradesh High Court has, therefore rightly held that the Act which sets up a Special Court for land grabbing cases, is within the legislative competence of the State Government.” Hence, we do not propose to further delve upon said issue and the faint attempt made to contend that the KLGP Act 2011 is liable to be struck down on the ground of legislative competence would fail and all contentions raised in that regard stands rejected. 36. In the light of rival contentions raised, we deem it proper to deal with the above contentions by delving upon the above aspects in seriatim. (1) RE: RETROSPECTIVE OPERATION: 37. It has been contended that even if land grabbing is deemed to be a continuing offence, and on the date of purchase of land by a bona-fide purchasers, the KLGP Act 2011 being non-existent, it is only the relevant law which was in force which would be applicable. It is also contended that if the Government sits in acquiescence and thereafter post KLGP Act 2011 initiates action, such action acquires the character of retrospective operation and therefore such act cannot be said to be a continuing offence as the State had acquiesced to the fact at the time of commission of the alleged offence when the impugned legislation was not in existence. 38. What is prohibited under Article 20 of the Constitution of India is conviction of a person or his subjection to a penalty under ‘ex post facto’ laws. The Hon’ble Apex Court in Rao Shiv Bahadur Singh and Another vs. State of Vindhya Pradesh, AIR 1953 SC 394 has held: “9. In this context it is necessary to notice that what is prohibited under Article 20 is only conviction or sentence under an ex post facto law and not the trial thereof. Such trial under a procedure different from what obtained at the time of the commission of the offence or by a court different from that which had competence at the time cannot ipso facto be held to be unconstitutional. Such trial under a procedure different from what obtained at the time of the commission of the offence or by a court different from that which had competence at the time cannot ipso facto be held to be unconstitutional. A person accused of the commission of an offence has no fundamental right to trial by a particular court or by a particular procedure, except in so far as any constitutional objection by way of discrimination or the violation of any other fundamental right may be involved. 10. In this connection our attention has been drawn to the fact that the Vindhya Pradesh Ordinance 48 of 1949, though enacted on 11th September, 1949 i.e. after the alleged offences were committed, was in terms made retrospective by Section 2 of the said Ordinance which says that the Act “shall be deemed to have been in force in Vindhya Pradesh from the 9th day of August, 1948” a date long prior to the date of the commission of the offences. It was accordingly suggested that since such a law at the time when it was passed was a valid law and since this law had the effect of bringing this Ordinance into force from 9th August, 1949, it cannot be said that the convictions are not in respect of “a law in force” at the time when the offences were committed. This, however, would be to, import a somewhat technical meaning into the phrase “law in force” as used in Article 20. “ Law in force” referred to therein must be taken to relate not to a law “deemed” to be in force and thus brought into force but the law factually in operation at the time or what may be called the then existing law. Otherwise, it is clear that the whole purpose of Article 20 would be completely defeated in its application even to ex post facto laws passed after the Constitution. Every such ex post facto law can be made retrospective, as it must be, if it is to regulate acts committed before the actual passing of the Act, and it can well be urged that by such retrospective operation it becomes the law in force at the time of the commencement of the Act. It is obvious that such a construction which nullifies Article 20 cannot possibly be adopted. It is obvious that such a construction which nullifies Article 20 cannot possibly be adopted. It cannot therefore be doubted that the phrase “law in force” as used in Article 20 must be understood in its natural sense as being the law in fact in existence and in operation at the time of the commission of the offence as distinct from the law “deemed” to have become operative by virtue of the power of legislature to pass retrospective laws. It follows that if the appellants are able to substantiate their contention that the acts charged as offences in this case have become such only by virtue of Ordinance No. 48 of 1949 which has admittedly been passed subsequent to the commission thereof, then they would be entitled to the benefit of Article 20 of the Constitution and to have their convictions set aside. This leads to an examination of the relevant preexisting law.” 39. A new offence cannot be created with retrospective effect. It has been held by Hon’ble Apex Court in G.P. Nayyar vs. State (Delhi Administration), AIR 1979 SC 602 to the following effect: “7. Mr. R.K. Garg the learned counsel submitted that the provisions of Act 16 of 1967 by virtue of which the rule of evidence enacted in section 5(3) is deemed to have always been in existence is violative of Art. 20(1) of the Constitution. Article 20(1) of the Constitution is as follows:- “No person shall be convicted of any offence except for violation of a law in force at the time of the commission of the act charged as an offence, nor be subjected to a penalty greater than that which might have been inflicted under the law in force at the time of the commission of the offence.” Article 20(1) deals with ex post facto laws though that expression has not been used in the Article. Usually, a law prescribes a rule of conduct by which persons ought to be governed in respect of their civil rights. Certain penalties are also imposed under the criminal law for breach of any law. Though a sovereign legislature has power to legislate retrospectively creation of an offence for an act which at the time of its commission was not an offence or imposition of a penalty greater than that which was under the law provided violates Art. 20(1). Certain penalties are also imposed under the criminal law for breach of any law. Though a sovereign legislature has power to legislate retrospectively creation of an offence for an act which at the time of its commission was not an offence or imposition of a penalty greater than that which was under the law provided violates Art. 20(1). In the well known case of Phillips vs. Eyre (1870) 6 QBD 1 at pp.23 and 25 and also in the American case of Calder vs. Bull (1780 to 1806) 3. Dall 386:1 L ed 648 at p.649 the principle underlying the provision has been fully discussed. All that Art. 20(1) prohibits is ex post facto laws and is designed to prevent a person being punished for an act or omission which was considered innocent when done. It only prohibits the conviction of a person or his being subjected to a penalty under ex post facto laws. In Rao Shiv Bahadur Singh and Another vs. State of Vindhya Pradesh, 1953 SCR 1188 : AIR 1953 SC 394 the Court pointed out that “what is prohibited under Art. 20(1) is only conviction or sentence under an ex post facto law and not the trial thereof. Such trial under a procedure different from what obtained at the time of the commission of the offence or by a Court different from that which had competence at the time cannot ipso facto be held to be unconstitutional. A person accused of the commission of an offence has no fundamental right to trial by a particular Court or by a particular procedure, except in so far as any constitutional objection by way of discrimination or the violation of any other fundamental right may be involved.” Thus the appellant cannot object to a procedure different from what obtained at the time of the commission of the offence. The offence that was committed was when section 5(3) was in force and by Act 16 of 1967 the procedure is revived. It is not as if the procedure is brought into force for the first time. “Where an Act is repealed and the repealing enactment is then repealed by another, which manifests no intention that the original Act shall continue repealed, the common law rule was that the repeal of the second Act revived the first ab initio.” (Maxwell on the Interpretation of Statutes, 12th Ed. p.19). “Where an Act is repealed and the repealing enactment is then repealed by another, which manifests no intention that the original Act shall continue repealed, the common law rule was that the repeal of the second Act revived the first ab initio.” (Maxwell on the Interpretation of Statutes, 12th Ed. p.19). There can be no objection in law to the revival of the procedure which was in force at the time when the offence was committed. The effect of the amendment is that Sub-Section (3) of section 5 as it stood before the commencement of 1964 Act shall apply and shall be deemed to have always applied in relation to trial of offences. It may be if by this deeming provision a new offence was created then the prohibition under Article 20(1) may come into operation. But in this case, as already pointed out, what is done is no more than reiterating the effect of section 6(1) of the General Clauses Act. Mr. Garg, the learned counsel, submitted that by amending procedure drastically and giving it retrospective effect a new offence may be created retrospectively. It was contended that by shifting the burden of proof as provided for in section 5(3) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947, a new offence is created. It is unnecessary for us to consider the larger question as to whether in certain circumstances giving retrospective effect to the procedure may amount to creation of an offence retrospectively. In the present case the old procedure is revived and no new procedure is given retrospective effect. The procedure given effect to is not of such a nature as to result in creation of a new offence.” 40. In this background, it would be appropriate to notice the definition of a “land grabber” as defined under Section 2(e). A land grabber would be a person or group of persons or a society, who commits or has committed land grabbing and includes any person who gives financial aid to any person for taking illegal possession of lands or for construction of unauthorised structures thereon, or who collects or who attempts to collect from any occupier of such lands rent, compensation and other charges by criminal intimidation, or who abets the doing of any of the above mentioned acts and also includes successors in interest. Section 4(1) prohibits person from committing or cause to be committed land grabbing by himself or through any other person and Sub-Section (2) would indicate who on or after the commencement of this Act continued to be in occupation, otherwise than as a lawful tenant, of a grabbed land belonging to the Government and other authorities as specified thereunder would be guilty of the offence under the Act. 41. It requires to be noticed that for Section 3, 4 and 5 being attracted, there should be the act of “land grabbing” by a “land grabber.” To fall within the definition of Section 2(e) - “land grabber” as already noticed hereinabove the person/s defined thereunder ought to have committed the land grabbing and any person who after the commencement of the Act continues to be in occupation of the grabbed land, would be liable to be punished. In other words, if a person is able to demonstrate or establish that the land in his occupation is not a land belonging to the Government, WAKF or Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments, a local authority, a statutory or non-statutory body owned, controlled or managed by the Government, such person would be outside the purview of the Act. The definition clause of ‘land grabber’ also takes within its fold the successors in interest. Thus, when an offence of land grabbing has continued as on the date of the commencement of the KLGP Act 2011, it would clearly part-take the character of a continuing offence. 42. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of State of Bihar vs. Deokaran Nenshi, (1972) 2 SCC 890 has held: “5. A continuing offence is one which is susceptible of continuance and is distinguishable from the one which is committed once and for all. It is one of those offences which arises out of a failure to obey or comply with a rule or its requirement and which involves a penalty, the liability for which continues until the rule or its requirement is obeyed or complied with. On every occasion that such disobedience or non-compliance, occurs and recurs, there is the offence committed. The distinction between the two kinds of offences is between an act or omission which constitutes an offence once and for all and an act or omission which continues and therefore constitutes a fresh offence every time or occasion on which it continues. On every occasion that such disobedience or non-compliance, occurs and recurs, there is the offence committed. The distinction between the two kinds of offences is between an act or omission which constitutes an offence once and for all and an act or omission which continues and therefore constitutes a fresh offence every time or occasion on which it continues. In the case of a continuing offence, there is thus the ingredient of continuance of the offence which is absent in the case of an offence which takes place when an act or omission is committed once and for all.” 43. In the matter of Mohanlal vs. State of Rajasthan, (2015) 6 SCC 222 contention came to be raised by the accused who was tried for the offence punishable under Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 contending that as per the case of the prosecution the incident of theft had occurred between 12.11.1985/13.11.1985 and an FIR came to be lodged for an offence under Section 457 IPC and during preparation of an inventory, it was found that 10 kg 420 grams of Opium and some other articles which had been stolen from the court premises was stored in several packets. The appellant (Mohan Lal) was charge sheeted for the offence under Section 18 of NDPS Act and Section 457 and 380 IPC after investigation, since he had lead to the recovery of stolen Opium from the court premises. A plea was raised that NDPS Act came into force on 14.11.1985 and the offence was punishable under the Opium Act, 1878 and the alleged recovery was made on 16.11.1985 while the appellant was in custody. Hence, it was contended that on the date of the incident i.e. 12.11.1985/13.11.1985 the NDPS Act was not in force and it had come into force only on 14.11.1985. Repelling or rejecting the said contention, it came to be held that the appellant had the requisite degree of control of the prohibited narcotic substance. It also came to be held that appellant-accused was in possession of the prohibited or contraband substance, which was an offence when NDPS Act came into force. It has been further held that Article 20(1) of the Constitution of India would have no application and the actus of possession is not punishable with retrospective effect. It also came to be held that appellant-accused was in possession of the prohibited or contraband substance, which was an offence when NDPS Act came into force. It has been further held that Article 20(1) of the Constitution of India would have no application and the actus of possession is not punishable with retrospective effect. It is further held that no offence was created under Section 18 of the NDPS Act with retrospective effect. What is punishable is possession of the prohibited article on or after a particular date when the statute was enacted, creating the offence or enhancing the punishment. It has been further held: “22. In the case at hand, the appellant, we hold, had the requisite degree of control when, even if the said narcotic substance was not within his physical control at that moment. To give an example, a person can conceal prohibited narcotic substance in a property and move out thereafter. The said person because of necessary animus would be in possession of the said substance even if he is not, at the moment, in physical control. The situation cannot be viewed differently when a person conceals and hides the prohibited narcotic substance in a public space. In the second category of cases, the person would be in possession because he has the necessary animus and the intention to retain control and dominion. As the factual matrix would exposit, the accused-appellant was in possession of the prohibited or contraband substance which was an offence when the NDPS Act came into force. Hence, he remained in possession of the prohibited substance and as such offence under Section 18 of the NDPS Act is made out. The possessory right would continue unless there is something to show that he had been divested of it. On the contrary, as we find, he led to discovery of the substance which was within his special knowledge, and, therefore, there can be no scintilla of doubt that he was in possession of the contraband article when the NDPS Act came into force. To clarify the situation, we may give an example. A person had stored 100 bags of opium prior to the NDPS Act coming into force and after coming into force, the recovery of the possessed article takes place. Certainly, on the date of recovery, he is in possession of the contraband article and possession itself is an offence. To clarify the situation, we may give an example. A person had stored 100 bags of opium prior to the NDPS Act coming into force and after coming into force, the recovery of the possessed article takes place. Certainly, on the date of recovery, he is in possession of the contraband article and possession itself is an offence. In such a situation, the accused-appellant cannot take the plea that he had committed an offence under Section 9 of the Opium Act and not under Section 18 of the NDPS Act. 23. After dealing with the concept of possession, we think it apt to address the issue raised by the learned counsel for the appellant that he could have convicted and sentenced under the Opium Act, as that was the law in force at the time of commission of an offence and if he is convicted under Section 18 of the NDPS Act, it would tantamount to retrospective operation of law imposing penalty which is prohibited under Article 20(1) of the Constitution of India. Article 20(1) gets attracted only when any penal law penalises with retrospective effect i.e. when an act was not an offence when it was committed and additionally the persons cannot be subjected to penalty greater than that which might have been inflicted under the law in force at the time of commission of the offence. The Article prohibits application of ex post facto law. In Rao Shiv Bahadur Singh and Another vs. State of Vindhya Pradesh, while dealing with the import under Article 20(1) of the Constitution of India, the Court stated what has been prohibited under the said Article is the conviction and sentence in a criminal proceeding under ex post facto law and not the trial thereof. The Constitution Bench has held that: (AIR p.398, Para 9) “9.....what is prohibited under Article 20 is only conviction or sentence under an ‘ex post facto’ law and not the trial thereof. Such trial under a procedure different from what obtained at the time of the commission of the offence or by a Court different from that which had competence at the time cannot ‘ipso facto’ be held to be unconstitutional. Such trial under a procedure different from what obtained at the time of the commission of the offence or by a Court different from that which had competence at the time cannot ‘ipso facto’ be held to be unconstitutional. A person accused of the commission of a particular Court or by a particular procedure, except in so far as any constitutional objection by way of discrimination or the violation of any other fundamental right may be involved.” 24. In the instant case, Article 20(1) would have no application. The actus of possession is not punishable with retrospective affect. No offence is created under Section 18 of the NDPS Act with retrospective effect. What is punishable is possession of the prohibited article on or after a particular date when the statute was enacted, creating the offence or enhancing the punishment. Therefore, if a person is in possession of the banned substance on the date when the NDPS Act was enforced, he would commit the offence, for on the said date he would have both the ‘corpus’ and ‘animus’ necessary in law. 25. We would be failing in our duty, if we do not analyse the decision in Harjit Singh (supra). In the said case the Court was dealing with the Notification dated 18.11.2009 that has replaced the part of the Notification dated 19.10.2001. Dealing with the said aspect, the Court held:- “13. Notification dated 18-11-2009 has replaced the part of the Notification dated 19-10-2001 and reads as under: “In the Table at the end after Note 3, the following Note shall be inserted, namely: (4) The quantities shown in Column 5 and Column 6 of the Table relating to the respective drugs shown in Column 2 shall apply to the entire mixture or any solution or any one or more narcotic drugs or psychotropic substances of that particular drug in dosage form or isomers, esters, ethers and salts of these drugs, including salts of esters, ethers and isomers, wherever existence of such substance is possible and not just its pure drug content.” 14. Thus, it is evident that under the aforesaid notification, the whole quantity of material recovered in the form of mixture is to be considered for the purpose of imposition of punishment. However, the submission is not acceptable as it is a settled legal proposition that a penal provision providing for enhancing the sentence does not operate retrospectively. Thus, it is evident that under the aforesaid notification, the whole quantity of material recovered in the form of mixture is to be considered for the purpose of imposition of punishment. However, the submission is not acceptable as it is a settled legal proposition that a penal provision providing for enhancing the sentence does not operate retrospectively. This amendment, in fact, provides for a procedure which may enhance the sentence. Thus, its application would be violative of restrictions imposed by Article 20 of the Constitution of India. We are of the view that the said Notification dated 18-11-2009 cannot be applied retrospectively and therefore, has no application so far as the instant case is concerned.” The present fact situation is absolutely different and, therefore, the said decision has no applicability to the case at hand. 26. Learned counsel for the State has contended that the offence in question is a continuing offence, for the offence is basically a possession of the contraband articles. He has commended us to the authority in State of Bihar vs. Deokaran Nenshi and Another (supra) wherein it has been held that: “5. A continuing offence is one which is susceptible of continuance and is distinguishable from the one which is committed once and for all. It is one of those offences which arises out of a failure to obey or comply with a rule or its requirement and which involves a penalty, the liability for which continues until the rule or its requirement is obeyed or complied with. On every occasion that such disobedience or noncompliance occurs and reoccurs, there is the offence committed. The distinction between the two kinds of offences is between an act or omission which constitutes an offence once and for all and an act or omission which continues, and therefore, constitutes a fresh offence every time or occasion on which it continues. In the case of a continuing offence, there is thus the ingredient of continuance of the offence which is absent in the case of an offence which takes place when an act or omission is committed once and for all.” 44. In the case of a continuing offence, there is thus the ingredient of continuance of the offence which is absent in the case of an offence which takes place when an act or omission is committed once and for all.” 44. Even in the instant case it can be clearly noticed that it is not only the act of “land grabbing” by a “land grabber” would be punishable under Section 5 but also a person who after the commencement of the Act continues to be in occupation of a grabbed land belonging to the authorities specified under Section 2(d) would be punishable under Section 5 inasmuch as, the actus of possession of the land grabbed continues on the date of commencement of the KLGP Act 2011. That apart, the act of land grabbing is punishable under the Land Revenue Act and the provisions of the KLGP Act 2011 having an overriding effect, notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in any other law for the time being in force or custom, usage or agreement or decree or order of a court or any other tribunal or authority, the provisions of KLGP Act 2011 as amended from timeto-time would prevail and the offence of land grabbing committed would continue. In other words, the act of land grabbing has been specified under the Karnataka Land Revenue Act, 1964 as an offence. Thus, irresistible conclusion which has to be drawn is that the offence of land grabbing is an offence which is continuous in nature or in other words, a continuing offence. In that view of the matter, we are not inclined to accept the contention raised by the learned Advocates appearing for the petitioners that it would be violative of Article 20 of the Constitution of India. It cannot be gainsaid by the petitioners that even in respect of an offence under Section 4(1) being distinct would attract Article 20(1) of the Constitution of India or in other words, the offence under KLGP Act 2011 is made retrospective in operation. Said argument is fallacious, inasmuch as, the language employed in Sub-Section (1) of Section 4 is in presenti. Said argument is fallacious, inasmuch as, the language employed in Sub-Section (1) of Section 4 is in presenti. In other words, it would indicate that no person should commit or cause to be committed land grabbing by himself or through any other person and having committed, if continues with the possession of the grabbed land or if it is sold or possession is parted with, the successors in interest would also be liable. The language found in Sub-Section (1) of Section 4 is clear and unambiguous namely, if a person were to commit the act of land grabbing or causes to be committed through any other person, which is prohibited would be liable to penal consequences specified thereunder. Hence, it cannot be contended that Section 4(1) would be retrospective in operation. (2) RE: ARBITRARINESS IN THE ENACTMENT: 45. The sum and substance of the arguments canvassed on behalf of the petitioners is that sequencing of procedure under Section 9 is arbitrary and discriminatory and as such Section 9 of KLGP Act 2011 is to be struck down and consequently entire Act is to be struck down as it is violative of Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India. It is submitted that there is abdication of power by the State to make an application and that too, without any limitation, complaint can be made before the Special Court alleging land grabbing and therefore, Section 9(1) is liable to be struck down. It is further contended that under Section 9(1) r/w Section 9(2) and 9(3) there is no statutory responsibility to pass a reasoned prima facie order before taking cognizance and this affects the right of a party immensely. It is also contended that Section 20 dealing with transfer does not require any speaking order to be passed and as such Section 20 requires to be struck down. 46. It is also contended that Section 20 dealing with transfer does not require any speaking order to be passed and as such Section 20 requires to be struck down. 46. It is also contended that there is no definition of the expression “an arrear of land revenue” recoverable under Section 9(8) and thereby it implies that recourse has to be taken to the definition found under Section 60(b) of the Karnataka Land Revenue Act and thereby it implies that the person becomes a legal owner of the land and thereby by creation of a statute, a person cannot be presumed to be the owner of land on the one hand for purposes of land revenue and as a criminal or land grabber on the other hand. 47. It is well settled principle of law there is a presumption in favour of constitutionality of a statute. While deciding the validity of a statute, it would be the endeavour of the court to find out the intention of the legislature, which gave rise to the birth of enactment under challenge and the purpose which is sought to be achieved through the enactment or in other words the mischief which is sought to be remedied. However, any law made by the legislature can be struck down on three (3) grounds i.e. (a) lack of legislative competence; (b) violation of any of the fundamental rights guaranteed under the Constitution or any other constitutional provision and (c) arbitrariness. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Shreya Singhal vs. Union of India (supra) has held that the statutory provision can be invalidated on the ground of vagueness too. 48. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of State of Bihar vs. Bihar Distillery Ltd. (supra) has held that the courts should strike down an enactment only when it is not possible to sustain it. 49. Hon’ble Apex Court in Shayara Bano vs. Union of India, (2017) 9 SCC 1 has held that doctrine of arbitrariness which follows from rule of law contained in Article 14 is of significance in its application to State’s action. It has been further held: “67. We now come to the development of the doctrine of arbitrariness and its application to State action as a distinct doctrine on which State action may be struck down as being violative of the rule of law contained in Article 14. It has been further held: “67. We now come to the development of the doctrine of arbitrariness and its application to State action as a distinct doctrine on which State action may be struck down as being violative of the rule of law contained in Article 14. In a significant passage, Bhagwati, J. in E.P. Royappa vs. State of Tamil Nadu, (1974) 4 SCC 3 stated (at page 38): “85. The last two grounds of challenge may be taken up together for consideration. Though we have formulated the third ground of challenge as a distinct and separate ground, it is really in substance and effect merely an aspect of the second ground based on violation of Articles 14 and 16. Article 16 embodies the fundamental guarantee that there shall be equality of opportunity for all citizens in matters relating to employment or appointment to any office under the State. Though enacted as a distinct and independent fundamental right because of its great importance as a principle ensuring equality of opportunity in public employment which is so vital to the building up of the new classless egalitarian society envisaged in the Constitution, Article 16 is only an instance of the application of the concept of equality enshrined in Article 14. In other words, Article 14 is the genus while Article 16 is a species. Article 16 gives effect to the doctrine of equality in all matters relating to public employment. The basic principle which, therefore, informs both Articles 14 and 16 is equality and inhibition against discrimination. Now, what is the content and reach of this great equalising principle? It is a founding faith, to use the words of Bose. J., “a way of life”, and it must not be subjected to a narrow pedantic or lexicographic approach. We cannot countenance any attempt to truncate its all-embracing scope and meaning, for to do so would be to violate its activist magnitude. Equality is a dynamic concept with many aspects and dimensions and it cannot be “cribbed, cabined and confined” within traditional and doctrinaire limits. From a positivistic point of view, equality is antithetic to arbitrariness. In fact equality and arbitrariness are sworn enemies; one belongs to the rule of law in a republic while the other, to the whim and caprice of an absolute monarch. From a positivistic point of view, equality is antithetic to arbitrariness. In fact equality and arbitrariness are sworn enemies; one belongs to the rule of law in a republic while the other, to the whim and caprice of an absolute monarch. Where an act is arbitrary, it is implicit in it that it is unequal both according to political logic and constitutional law and is therefore violative of Article 14, and if it effects any matter relating to public employment, it is also violative of Article 16. Articles 14 and 16 strike at arbitrariness in State action and ensure fairness and equality of treatment. They require that State action must be based on valid relevant principles applicable alike to all similarly situate and it must not be guided by any extraneous or irrelevant considerations because that would be denial of equality. Where the operative reason for State action, as distinguished from motive inducing from the antechamber of the mind, is not legitimate and relevant but is extraneous and outside the area of permissible considerations, it would amount to mala fide exercise of power and that is hit by Articles 14 and 16. Mala fide exercise of power and arbitrariness are different lethal radiations emanating from the same vice: in fact the latter comprehends the former. Both are inhibited by Articles 14 and 16.” (Emphasis Supplied) 82. It is, therefore, clear from a reading of even the aforesaid two Constitution Bench judgments in Mithu vs. State of Punjab, (1983) 2 SCC 277 and Sunil Batra vs. Delhi Administration, (1978) 4 SCC 494 , case that Article 14 has been referred to in the context of the constitutional invalidity of statutory law to show that such statutory law will be struck down if it is found to be “arbitrary.” 100. To complete the picture, it is important to note that subordinate legislation can be struck down on the ground that it is arbitrary and, therefore, violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. In Cellular Operators Association of India vs. Telecom Regulatory Authority of India, (2016) 7 SCC 703 , this Court referred to earlier precedents, and held: “Violation of fundamental rights: 42. We have already seen that one of the tests for challenging the constitutionality of subordinate legislation is that subordinate legislation should not be manifestly arbitrary. In Cellular Operators Association of India vs. Telecom Regulatory Authority of India, (2016) 7 SCC 703 , this Court referred to earlier precedents, and held: “Violation of fundamental rights: 42. We have already seen that one of the tests for challenging the constitutionality of subordinate legislation is that subordinate legislation should not be manifestly arbitrary. Also, it is settled law that subordinate legislation can be challenged on any of the grounds available for challenge against plenary legislation. (See Indian Express Newspapers (Bombay) (P) Ltd. vs. Union of India, (1985) 1 SCC 641 : 1985 SCC (Tax) 121, SCC at p. 689, Para 75) 43. The test of “manifest arbitrariness” is well explained in two judgments of this Court. In Khoday Distilleries Ltd. vs. State of Karnataka, (1996) 10 SCC 304 , this Court held: (SCC p. 314, Para 13) “13. It is next submitted before us that the amended Rules are arbitrary, unreasonable and cause undue hardship and, therefore, violate Article 14 of the Constitution. Although the protection of Article 19(1)(g) may not be available to the appellants, the Rules must, undoubtedly, satisfy the test of Article 14, which is a guarantee against arbitrary action. However, one must bear in mind that what is being challenged here under Article 14 is not executive action but delegated legislation. The tests of arbitrary action which apply to executive actions do not necessarily apply to delegated legislation. In order that delegated legislation can be struck down, such legislation must be manifestly arbitrary; a law which could not be reasonably expected to emanate from an authority delegated with the lawmaking power. In Indian Express Newspapers (Bombay) (P) Ltd. vs. Union of India, (1985) 1 SCC 641 : 1985 SCC (Tax) 121, this Court said that a piece of subordinate legislation does not carry the same degree of immunity which is enjoyed by a statute passed by a competent legislature. A subordinate legislation may be questioned under Article 14 on the ground that it is unreasonable “unreasonable not in the sense of not being reasonable, but in the sense that it is manifestly arbitrary.” Drawing a comparison between the law in England and in India, the Court further observed that in England the Judges would say, Parliament never intended the authority to make such Rules; they are unreasonable and ultra-vires. In India, arbitrariness is not a separate ground since it will come within the embargo of Article 14 of the Constitution. But subordinate legislation must be so arbitrary that it could not be said to be in conformity with the statute or that it offends Article 14 of the Constitution.” 44. Also, in Sharma Transport vs. State of A.P. (2002) 2 SCC 188 , this Court held: (SCC pp. 203-204, Para 25) “25......The tests of arbitrary action applicable to executive action do not necessarily apply to delegated legislation. In order to strike down a delegated legislation as arbitrary it has to be established that there is manifest arbitrariness. In order to be described as arbitrary, it must be shown that it was not reasonable and manifestly arbitrary. The expression “arbitrarily” means: in an unreasonable manner, as fixed or done capriciously or at pleasure, without adequate determining principle, not founded in the nature of things, non-rational, not done or acting according to reason or judgment, depending on the will alone.” 50. A plain reading of Sub-Section (1) of Section 9 would indicate that Special Court constituted under the Act is empowered to take cognizance either suo motu or on an application. This power vested to the Special Court cannot be construed either as having vested the said Special Court with unbridled power or there being abdication of power by the State. The object of such power being vested with the Special Court can be traced from the statement of objects and reasons assigned for bringing in the impugned legislation. There might be instances where the officials of the State being hand in glove with the perpetrators of crime and thereby deprive the State of its valuable property, and the fact of either records being suppressed or no action being taken against the erring persons, cannot be ruled out. There might be varied circumstances under which the factum of the land grabbing is being brought to limelight. For instance, public spirited person may unearth the misdeeds or misgivings of the acts of land grabbing or the fourth pillar of the democracy namely, the Press (both print and electronic media) may highlight the factum of Government land having been grabbed or usurped by unscrupulous persons for personal gain. The instances of Government land abutting the private land having been usurped either under the garb of ignorance or otherwise, also cannot be ruled out. The instances of Government land abutting the private land having been usurped either under the garb of ignorance or otherwise, also cannot be ruled out. The instances of such incidents as indicated in the A.T.Ramaswamy’s Report, is also one of the reasons for which the impugned enactment having come into force. It is for these myriad reasons, the Special Court has been vested with the power to take cognizance of and try case arising out of any alleged act of land grabbing either suo motu or on an application. The said power cannot be construed as State having abdicated of its power. In fact, it is extending its arm of power to the citizens to bring to the notice of the Special Court of any act of land grabbing in any form whatsoever, which sub-serves the larger public interest. It would not be out of context to refer to Regulation 29 of the Karnataka Land Grabbing Prohibition (Special Court) Regulation, 2017, which prescribes the procedure for taking suo motu cognizance and Regulation 29 reads: “29. Procedure for suo motu action - Where the Chairman or any member of the Special Court desires that any case shall be taken cognizance of suo motu, he may record a statement of facts within his knowledge and place it before the Special Court.” 51. It will always be presumed that the said power of taking suo motu cognizance would be exercised cautiously depending upon the facts obtained in that particular matter. It would also be of benefit to note that object of impugned legislation is to remedy or curb the acts of grabbing of Government lands and in many a circumstances or instances the general public may also be loath or hesitant to lodge complaints fearing backlash from the mighty and powerful persons who indulge in land grabbing, if they were to be seen as complainants. In such circumstances, the print and electronic media also play a pivotal role in highlighting the instances of land grabbing. If the legislature has in its wisdom thought fit to cloth the Special Court the power of taking “suo motu cognizance” to prevent the “public wrong”, it cannot be gainsaid that it is an unbridled power vested to the Special Court. 52. If the legislature has in its wisdom thought fit to cloth the Special Court the power of taking “suo motu cognizance” to prevent the “public wrong”, it cannot be gainsaid that it is an unbridled power vested to the Special Court. 52. It is trite law that cognizance would be taken with due application of mind by the Special Court as otherwise it would find foul of there being no due application of mind and thereby amenable for interference either under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. or under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India as the case may be. 53. It would be of benefit to note that Sections 190, 200 to 203 found in Chapter XIV and XV of the Cr.P.C. which deals with the mode of taking cognizance, postponement of issue of process to the accused, dismissal of the complaint. They are akin to Sub-Section (1) of Section 9 of the impugned Act and Regulation 29. Hence, we are of the considered view the analysis of the provisions as found in Cr.P.C. requires to be noticed. A Magistrate taking cognizance of an offence on a complaint, is required to examine the complainant on oath and witnesses present, if any. Section 202 of Cr.P.C. provides that a Magistrate taking cognizance of a case upon complaint, may, if he thinks fit, postpone the issue of process against the accused, and either inquire into the case himself or direct an investigation to be made by a police officer or by such other person, as he thinks fit, for the purposes of deciding, whether or not there is sufficient ground for proceeding. Section 203 of Cr.P.C. empowers the Magistrate to dismiss the complaint, if, after considering the statements on oath (if any) of the complainant and of the witnesses and the result of enquiry or investigation (if any) under Section 202, if he is of the opinion that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding. In fact, this provision is akin to proviso to clause (b) of Sub-Section (5) of Section 9 of KLGP Act 2011: 53.1 Chapter XVI deals with ‘commencement of proceedings before Magistrates’ and Section 204 of Cr.P.C. enables a Magistrate to issue summons or a warrant, as the case may be, to secure the attendance of the accused, if in the opinion of the Magistrate taking cognizance of the offence there is sufficient grounds for proceeding. 53.2 Thus, Magistrate on receipt of a complaint has several courses open to him. Section 190(1)(a)(b) and (c) of Cr.P.C. empowers the Magistrate to take cognizance of an offence under three circumstances. Under Section 190(1)(a) the Magistrate is empowered to take cognizance where the complaint which satisfies the definition of Section 2(d) of Cr.P.C. and containing the allegations which are sufficient to constitute such offence under any penal law for the time being in force. Under Section 190(1)(b) upon a police report of such facts namely, if an aggrieved person has directly approached the police by filing FIR under Section 154 Cr.P.C. and after due investigation, if the police files a report to the Court and if the said report contains the allegations, which are sufficient to constitute offence, even then Magistrate would be empowered to take cognizance on the basis of such police report. However, the Magistrate would not be bound by the opinion of the police but such opinion would be formed on the basis of materials furnished by the police in the report and if the Magistrate is of the opinion that there are sufficient grounds to proceed against the accused and said report would disclose that it would constitute an offence, then also Magistrate can take cognizance and issue summons. Lastly, under Section 190(1)(c) of Cr.P.C. upon information received from any person other than a police officer, or upon his own knowledge, that such offence has been committed, he may take cognizance of the offence and proceed to record the statements of the complainant and witnesses present under section 200 Cr.P.C. Thereafter, if in his opinion there is no sufficient ground for proceeding, he may dismiss the complaint under Section 203 Cr.P.C or if in his opinion there is sufficient ground for proceeding, he may issue process under Section 204 Cr.P.C. However, if he thinks fit, he may postpone the issue of process and either enquire into the case himself or direct an investigation to be made by a police officer or such other person, as he thinks fit for the purpose of deciding whether or not there is sufficient ground for proceeding. He may also issue process, if in his opinion there is sufficient ground for proceeding. He may also issue process, if in his opinion there is sufficient ground for proceeding. 53.3 At the first instance, on receipt of a complaint, Magistrate instead of taking cognizance of an offence he may order an investigation under Section 156(3) of Cr.P.C. The police will then investigate and submit a report under Section 173(1) Cr.P.C. On receiving the police report the Magistrate may take cognizance of the offence under Section 190(1)(b) Cr.P.C. and straight away issue process. This he may do irrespective of the view expressed by the police in their report. 54. The Hon’ble Apex Court in GHCL Employees Stock Option Trust vs. India Infoline Limited and Others, (2013) 4 SCC 505 has held that Magistrate who issued summons by not recording the satisfaction about prima-facie case against the respondents was illegal and amounted to abuse of process of law as summoning of accused in a criminal case is a serious matter and as a matter of course, the criminal law cannot be set into motion. It has been further held: “14. Be that as it may, as held by this Court, summoning of accused in a criminal case is a serious matter. Hence, criminal law cannot be set into motion as a matter of course. The order of Magistrate summoning the accused must reflect that he has applied his mind to the facts of the case and the law applicable thereto. The Magistrate has to record his satisfaction with regard to the existence of a prima facie case on the basis of specific allegations made in the complaint supported by satisfactory evidence and other material on record. 15. In the case of Madhavrao Jiwaji Rao Scindia and Another vs. Sambhajirao Chandrojirao Angre and Others, AIR 1988 SC 709 , this Court held as under: “7. The legal position is well-settled that when a prosecution at the initial stage is asked to be quashed, the test to be applied by the court is as to whether the uncontroverted allegations as made prima facie establish the offence. It is also for the court to take into consideration any special features which appear in a particular case to consider whether it is expedient and in the interest of justice to permit a prosecution to continue. It is also for the court to take into consideration any special features which appear in a particular case to consider whether it is expedient and in the interest of justice to permit a prosecution to continue. This is so on the basis that the court cannot be utilised for any oblique purpose and where in the opinion of the court chances of an ultimate conviction is bleak and, therefore, no useful purpose is likely to be served by allowing a criminal prosecution to continue, the court may while taking into consideration the special facts of a case also quash the proceeding even though it may be at a preliminary stage.” 16. In the case of Punjab National Bank and Others vs. Surendra Prasad Sinha, AIR 1992 SC 1815 , a complaint was lodged by the complainant for prosecution under Sections 409, 109 and 114, IPC against the Chairman, the Managing Director of the Bank and a host of officers alleging, inter-alia, that as against the loan granted to one Sriman Narain Dubey the complainant and his wife stood as guarantors and executed Security Bond and handed over Fixed Deposit Receipt. Since the principal debtor defaulted in payment of debt, the Branch Manager of the Bank on maturity of the said fixed deposit adjusted a part of the amount against the said loan. The complainant alleged that the debt became barred by limitation and, therefore, the liability of the guarantors also stood extinguished. It was, therefore, alleged that the officers of the Bank criminally embezzled the said amount with dishonest intention to save themselves from financial obligation. The Magistrate without adverting whether the allegations in the complaint prime facie make out an offence charged for, in a mechanical manner, issued the process against all the accused persons. The High Court refused to quash the complaint and the matter finally came to this Court. Allowing the appeal and quashing the complaint, this Court held as under: “5. It is also salutary to note that judicial process should not be an instrument of oppression or needless harassment. The complaint was laid impleading the Chairman, the Managing Director of the Bank by name and a host of officers. There lies responsibility and duty on the Magistracy to find whether the concerned accused should be legally responsible for the offence charged for. The complaint was laid impleading the Chairman, the Managing Director of the Bank by name and a host of officers. There lies responsibility and duty on the Magistracy to find whether the concerned accused should be legally responsible for the offence charged for. Only on satisfying that the law casts liability or creates offence against the juristic person or the persons impleaded then only process would be issued. At that stage the court would be circumspect and judicious in exercising discretion and should take all the relevant facts and circumstances into consideration before issuing process lest it would be an instrument in the hands of the private complainant as vendetta to harass the persons needlessly. Vindication of majesty of justice and maintenance of law and order in the society are the prime objects of criminal justice but it would not be the means to wreak personal vengeance. Considered from any angle we find that the respondent had abused the process and laid complaint against all the appellants without any prima facie case to harass them for vendetta.” 17. In the case of Maksud Saiyed vs. State of Gujarat and Others, (2008) 5 SCC 668 , this Court while discussing vicarious liability observed as under:- “13. Where a jurisdiction is exercised on a complaint petition filed in terms of Section 156(3) or Section 200 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the Magistrate is required to apply his mind. The Penal Code does not contain any provision for attaching vicarious liability on the part of the Managing Director or the Directors of the Company when the accused is the Company. The learned Magistrate failed to pose unto himself the correct question viz. as to whether the complaint petition, even if given face value and taken to be correct in its entirety, would lead to the conclusion that the respondents herein were personally liable for any offence. The Bank is a body corporate. Vicarious liability of the Managing Director and Director would arise provided any provision exists in that behalf in the statute. Statutes indisputably must contain provision fixing such vicarious liabilities. Even for the said purpose, it is obligatory on the part of the complainant to make requisite allegations which would attract the provisions constituting vicarious liability.” 55. Vicarious liability of the Managing Director and Director would arise provided any provision exists in that behalf in the statute. Statutes indisputably must contain provision fixing such vicarious liabilities. Even for the said purpose, it is obligatory on the part of the complainant to make requisite allegations which would attract the provisions constituting vicarious liability.” 55. Thus, from the above analysis, when the impugned legislation is examined, it would clearly emerge therefrom that Special Court under sub-section (1) of Section 9 is empowered to either suo motu or on an application made by any person, Officer or authority, to take cognizance of and try every case arising out of any alleged act of land grabbing and if it is relating to civil dispute, it would be empowered to adjudicate the ownership and title or lawful possession of the land alleged to have been grabbed and also try for the offences specified in Chapter XIV-A of the Karnataka Land Revenue Act, 1964. 56. As noticed herein above, the Chairman of the Special Court would be a person who is or was Judge of a High Court and of the other four members, two would be of the rank of District Judges and remaining two would be not below the rank of a Deputy Commissioner. It is presumed that Court presided by the respective Judges would take cognizance of the offence under the Act only after due application of mind. Even assuming for a moment, if there were to be instances of any infraction in the manner, mode and method of taking cognizance, it would always be amenable to judicial scrutiny by the higher forum i.e. before the High Court in a petition filed under Article 227 of the Constitution of India or under Section 482 Cr.P.C. as the case may be. 57. Thus, while ordering issuance of summons, the Special Court has to necessarily record its satisfaction about the prima-facie case against accused, which is sine qua non for initiating criminal action against an accused. 57. Thus, while ordering issuance of summons, the Special Court has to necessarily record its satisfaction about the prima-facie case against accused, which is sine qua non for initiating criminal action against an accused. Thus, when sub-section (1) is read along with Sub-Section (2) of Section 9, it would clearly indicate that it is not only due application of mind with regard to the allegation made in the complaint or the material available before the Special Court which would be the prime factor for taking cognizance of the offence, but also the location of the land alleged to have been grabbed, or extent or value of the land or the substantial nature of evil involved or any other relevant matter in the interest of justice i.e. to protect the public property, the Special Court will have to arrive at a conclusion for taking cognizance by objective assessment of all the material and by recording subjective satisfaction. In that view of the matter, we are of the considered view that contention raised by learned Advocates appearing for the petitioners that Section 9(1) and Section 9(2) is vice of arbitrariness cannot be accepted and it stands rejected. 58. Sub-Section (3) of Section 9, pre-amendment enabled the Special Court to try the offences of land grabbing or the determination of question of title and ownership to, or lawful possession of any land grabbed under the Act and offences specified in Chapter - XIVA of Karnataka Land Revenue Act and its decision thereof was held to be final. The proviso thereto enabled the Special Court to reject an application filed before it, if it was of prima facie opinion that it was frivolous and vexatious. Sub-Section (3) came to be substituted by Act 30 of 2020, under which all acts of land grabbing is required to be tried only by the Special Court constituted for the area in which land is situated, or where there are more Special Courts than one for such area, by such one of them as may be specified in this behalf by the Government. Thus, Special Court constituted under Section 7 of the KLGP Act 2011 empowers the Special Court to try all acts of land grabbing including those offences specified in Chapter XIV-A of the Karnataka Land Revenue Act, 1964. Said provision is neither arbitrary nor lacks any clarity. Thus, Special Court constituted under Section 7 of the KLGP Act 2011 empowers the Special Court to try all acts of land grabbing including those offences specified in Chapter XIV-A of the Karnataka Land Revenue Act, 1964. Said provision is neither arbitrary nor lacks any clarity. Hence, we are not inclined to accept the contention raised by the learned Advocates appearing for the petitioners and all contentions raised in that regard is rejected. 59. Section 9(4) confers a discretion on the Special Court to determine the order or sequence in which civil and criminal liability against a land grabber be initiated. It has been contended by the petitioners that such unguided discretion on the Special Court is arbitrary and unconstitutional. It can be noticed with benefit that Chairman of the Special Court would be a person who is or was a Judge of a High Court and such person who has held a high constitutional post, would definitely exercise the discretion while exercising the powers under sub-section (4) of Section 9 and necessarily after due application of mind. 60. It has also been contended that procedure prescribed under the impugned enactment is harsher and therefore arbitrary. The mere availability of two (2) procedures would not vitiate one of the procedure so prescribed, as held by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Maganlal Chhaganlal (P) Ltd. vs. Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay and Another, (1974) 2 SCC 402 . It has been held: “14. To summarise: Where a statute providing for a more drastic procedure different from the ordinary procedure covers the whole field covered by the ordinary procedure, as in Anwar Ali Sarkar’s case and Suraj Mall Mehta’s case without any guidelines as to the class of cases in which either procedure is to be resorted to, the statute will be hit by Article 14. Even there, as mentioned in Suraj Mall Mehta’s case, a provision for appeal may cure the defect. Further, in such cases if from the preamble and surrounding circumstances, as well as the provisions of the statute themselves explained and amplified by affidavits, necessary guidelines could be inferred as in Saurashtra case (supra) and Jyoti Pershad’s case (supra) the statute will not be hit by Art. 14. Then again where tile statute itself covers only a class of cases as in Haldar’s case (supra) and Bajoria’s case (supra) the statute will not be bad. Then again where tile statute itself covers only a class of cases as in Haldar’s case (supra) and Bajoria’s case (supra) the statute will not be bad. The fact that in such cases the executive will choose which cases are to be tried under the special procedure will not affect the validity of the statute. Therefore, the contention that the mere availability of two procedures will vitiate one of them, that is the special procedure, is not supported by reason or authority. 15. The statute itself in the two classes of cases before us clearly lays down the purpose behind them, that is premises belonging to the Corporation and the Government should be subject to speedy procedure in the matter of evicting unauthorized persons occupying them. This is a sufficient guidance for the authorities on whom the power has been conferred. With such an indication clearly given in the statutes one expects the officers concerned to avail themselves of the procedures prescribed by the Acts and not resort to the dilatory procedure of the ordinary Civil Court. Even normally one cannot imagine an officer having the choice of two procedures, one which enables him to get possession of the property quickly and the other which would be a prolonged one, to resort to the latter. Administrative officers, no less than the courts, do not function in a vacuum. It would be extremely unreal to hold that an administrative officer would in taking proceedings for eviction of unauthorised occupants of Government property or Municipal property resort to the procedure prescribed by the two Acts. in one case and to the ordinary Civil Court in the other. The provisions of these two Acts cannot be struck down on the fanciful theory that power would be exercised in such an unrealistic fashion. In considering whether the officers would be discriminating between one set of persons and another, one has got to take into account normal human behaviour and not behaviour which is abnormal. It is not every fancied possibility of discrimination but the real risk of discrimination that we must take into account. This is not one of those cases where discrimination is writ large on the face of the statute. Discrimination may be possible but is very improbable. And if there is discrimination in actual practice this Court is not powerless. It is not every fancied possibility of discrimination but the real risk of discrimination that we must take into account. This is not one of those cases where discrimination is writ large on the face of the statute. Discrimination may be possible but is very improbable. And if there is discrimination in actual practice this Court is not powerless. Furthermore, the fact that the Legislature considered that the ordinary procedure is insufficient or ineffective in evicting unauthorised occupants of Government and Corporation property and provided a special speedy procedure therefore is a clear guidance for the authorities charged with the duty of evicting unauthorised occupants. We, therefore, find ourselves unable to agree with the majority in the Northern India Caterers’ case (supra).” 61. It is well settled law that mere possibility of abuse of a provision does not affect its constitutionality. Therefore, the mere fact that the discretion conferred upon on the court may possibly be misused, cannot be a ground to strike down the validity of a provision. For this proposition the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Sanjay Dutt vs. State through CBI, (1994) 5 SCC 410 can be looked up. A Special Court under the KLGP Act is headed by a retired Judge and there cannot be any doubt or apprehension about a person who held a high constitutional post would not exercise discretion under Section 9(4) with due application of mind. It is presumed that the provisions of the statute would be applied in fair and reasonable manner to achieve the avowed object of the Act. 62. It has also been contended that Section 9(4) of the Act is to be declared as violative of Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India, as it prescribes evidence admitted during criminal proceedings may be used while trying civil liability, but additional evidence if any adduced, in the civil proceedings shall not be considered by the Special Court while determining the criminal liability. 63. In other words, portion of Sub-Section (4) of Section 9 is called in question before this Court on the ground that additional evidence adduced in a civil proceeding before the Special Court cannot be considered by the Special Court while determining the criminal liability of land grabbing. 63. In other words, portion of Sub-Section (4) of Section 9 is called in question before this Court on the ground that additional evidence adduced in a civil proceeding before the Special Court cannot be considered by the Special Court while determining the criminal liability of land grabbing. At the cost of repetition, Sub-Section (4) of Section 9 is being extracted herein-below: “9(4) The Special Court shall determine the order in which the civil and criminal liability against a land grabber be initiated. It shall be within the discretion of the Special Court whether or not to deliver its decision or order until both civil and criminal proceedings are completed. The evidence admitted during the criminal proceeding may be made use of while trying the civil liability. But additional evidence, if any adduced in the civil proceedings shall not be considered by the Special Court while determining the criminal liability. Any person accused of land grabbing or the abetment thereof before the Special Court shall be a competent witness for the defence and may give evidence on oath in disproof of the charge made against him or any person charged together with him in the criminal proceeding: Provided that he shall not be called as a witness except on his own request in writing or his failure to give evidence shall be made the subject of any comment by any of the parties or the Special Court or give rise to any presumption against himself or any person charged together with him at the same proceeding.” 64. A plain reading of the language employed in Sub-Section (4) in general and in particular, two sentences on which emphasis has been laid as indicated herein above would reveal that evidence admitted during the criminal proceedings against the land grabber may be made use of while trying the civil liability. But the converse would be inapplicable. In the sense that additional evidence, if any, adduced in the civil proceedings initiated against the land grabber before the Special Court, shall not be considered by the said court while determining the criminal liability. If the evidence admitted during criminal proceedings can be admitted while trying the civil liability before the Special Court, it is highly ununderstandable as to how additional evidence if any adduced in the civil proceedings against the same person before the Special Court would become inadmissible in determining the criminal liability. If the evidence admitted during criminal proceedings can be admitted while trying the civil liability before the Special Court, it is highly ununderstandable as to how additional evidence if any adduced in the civil proceedings against the same person before the Special Court would become inadmissible in determining the criminal liability. The expression of these emphasized sentences in Sub-Section (4) does not seem to be happily worded. A plain meaning which can be attached to the said sentence, would make it clear that main evidence recorded in the civil proceedings can be considered by the Special Court while determining the criminal liability but not additional evidence. This inhibition is nothing but an inhibition against rule of best evidence. 65. There cannot be any dispute to the fact that the procedure to be adopted for determination of title to the land would be a detailed procedure namely, as it is adopted by the regular civil court of competent jurisdiction and not a court or tribunal dealing with summary jurisdiction. Similarly, the Special Court dealing with an offence under the Act, will have to apply the procedure contemplated for a warrant case. If the witnesses who have deposed before the Special Court with regard to civil liability is favourable to the accused in the Special Court, the same could be used in terms of Section 145 of the Evidence Act, 1872. It reads: “145. Cross examination as to previous statements in writing - A witness may be cross examined as to previous statements made by him in writing or reduced into writing, and relevant to matters in question, without such writing being shown to him, or being proved; but, if it is intended to contradict him by the writing, his attention must, before the writing can be proved, be called to those parts of it which are to be used for the purpose of contradicting him.” 66. On plain reading of aforesaid Section, it would indicate, it has two parts namely: (a) A witness may be cross examined as to previous statement made by him in writing or reduced to writing and relevant to the matters in question, without such writing being shown to him or being proved. (b) To contradict him by the writing, his attention must be drawn to the relevant parts of it, before proving the writing. (b) To contradict him by the writing, his attention must be drawn to the relevant parts of it, before proving the writing. By adopting the method prescribed under Section 146(3), it can be held that one of the method of impeaching the credit worthiness of the witness is by proof of inconsistency of previous statement. Of course, other relevant Sections for impeaching the credit worthiness of the witnesses can be traced to Sections 138, 140, 146 and 154 of the Evidence Act. 67. If the evidence admitted during criminal proceedings could be admitted while trying the civil liability, the converse must also be applicable with equal force. Hence, in the light of improper framing of particular sentence mentioned above and gravity of civil or criminal cases is to be tried by the Special Court and the serious consequences flowing for violation of the provisions of KLGP Act 2011, the inhibition above referred to has to be necessarily held as onerous. The discrimination found in Sub-Section (4) about the admissibility of the evidence does not appeal to logic and it also does not have any rationale or nexus to the rule of best evidence. Hence, this aspect is being clarified by us as indicated herein-below. 68. If the language in Sub-Section (4) of Section 9 was clear and unambiguous, there could not have been any quarrel in that regard namely, if the said provision only provided for or it was prescribed “that only evidence admitted during civil proceedings may be used while trying the criminal liability, but not vice versa”, since it would have appealed to logic and protected from being attacked on the vice of being arbitrary. It would also have ensured that criminal proceedings are tried independently and no evidence admitted during civil proceedings can be used to convict a person. This would have been a protective provision to ensure the sanctity of the criminal proceedings and insulated the accused of being convicted on the basis of evidence admitted during the civil proceedings or the evidence admitted during civil proceedings being used against a person who is charged with criminal liability. It is needless to state that the nature of evidence adduced in a civil proceedings is different from that adduced from criminal proceedings. 69. It is needless to state that the nature of evidence adduced in a civil proceedings is different from that adduced from criminal proceedings. 69. The fundamental tenet of administrative law being the evidence and findings used in a criminal trial cannot be used as a evidence in civil case, on the contrary the evidence and findings in a civil trial can be used as a evidence in a criminal case. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Vishnu Dutt Sharma vs. Daya Sapra, (2009) 13 SCC 729 has held: “23. It brings us to the question as to whether previous judgment of a criminal proceeding would be relevant in a suit. Section 40 of the Evidence Act reads as under: “40. Previous judgments relevant to bar a second suit or trial -The existence of any judgment, order or decree which by law prevents any Courts from taking Cognizance of a suit or holding a trial is a relevant fact when the question is whether such Court ought to take cognizance of such suit or to hold such trial.” This principle would, therefore, be applicable, inter-alia, if the suit is found to be barred by the principle of res judicata or by reason of the provisions of any other statute. It does not lay down that a judgment of the criminal court would be admissible in the civil court for its relevance is limited. (See Seth Ramdayal Jat vs. Laxmi Prasad). The judgment of a criminal court in a civil proceeding will only have limited application, viz. inter-alia, for the purpose as to who was the accused and what was the result of the criminal proceedings. Any finding in a criminal proceeding by no stretch of imagination would be binding in a civil proceeding.” “28. If judgment of a civil court is not binding on a criminal court, it is incomprehensible that a judgment of a criminal court will be binding on a civil court. We have noticed hereinbefore that Section 43 of the Evidence Act categorically states that judgments, orders or decrees, other than those mentioned in sections 40, 41 and 42 are irrelevant, unless the existence of such judgment, order or decree, is a fact in issue, or is relevant in some other provisions of the Act, no other provisions of the Evidence Act or for that matter any other statute had been brought to our notice.” 70. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Shreya Singhal vs. Union of India, (2015) 5 SCC 1 , it has been held that penal law is void for vagueness if it fails to define criminal offence with sufficient definiteness, the doctrine of ‘void for vagueness’ is discussed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in K.A. Abbas vs. Union of India, (1970) 2 SCC 780 wherein, the judgment in State of Madhya Pradesh and Another vs. Beldeo Prasad, AIR 1961 SC 293 had been referred to under which, the Central Provinces and Berar Goondas Act, 1946 was declared void for uncertainty on the ground the definition of the word “Goonda” occurring in the Act indicating no tests for deciding which person fell within the said definition and the condition for the application of Section 4 and 4A against a person sought to be proceeded must be a Goonda, was lacking. It was held in the ultimate analysis that vagueness and clarity would be a ground for striking down the provision as it would offend the personal liberty guaranteed under Article 21 of Constitution of India. 71. Sub-Section (4) of Section 9 provides for making use of evidence admitted during criminal proceedings while dealing with civil liability. Further, it also says that additional if any adduced in the civil proceedings shall not be considered by the Special Court while determining the criminal liability. When a person accused of land grabbing or abatement thereof, is before the Special Court, he would be a competent witness for the defence to disprove the charges made against him or any person charged with him in the criminal proceedings. Of course, an accused person before Special Court shall not be called as a witness except on his own request in writing and failure to give evidence on his behalf should not be made the subject of any comment by any of the parties and it would not give rise to any presumption against himself or any person charged together with him at the same proceedings. The expression that “additional evidence” if any adduced in the civil proceedings shall not be considered by the Special Court while determining the criminal liability does not synchronise with the established rule of evidence. The expression that “additional evidence” if any adduced in the civil proceedings shall not be considered by the Special Court while determining the criminal liability does not synchronise with the established rule of evidence. It lacks clarity, being vague and it is not possible to gather the intention of the legislature by which, it seeks to achieve the object of the Act, apart from the said expression being arbitrary, it does not appeal to logic and is also against rule of best evidence. Hence, we are of the considered view that the expression found in sub-section (4) of Section 9 namely: “But additional evidence, if any adduced in the civil proceedings shall not be considered by the Special Court while determining the criminal liability” cannot be sustained as it would not only violative of Article 21 of the Constitution of India but also on the ground of same being vague.” 72. Hence, the above expression/sentence found in Sub-Section (4) of Section 9 is liable to be struck down and accordingly, it is struck down for being violative of Article 21 and vagueness. However, we make it expressly clear that evidence admitted during criminal proceedings is being permitted to be made use of while trying civil liability and not vice versa for determining the criminal liability and we are of the considered view that accordingly, Section 9(4) requires to be read down and understood as observed herein above. 73. Where the term has been used in the Act, which per se seems to be without jurisdiction but can be read down in order to make it constitutionally valid by separating and excluding that part which is invalid or by interpreting the word/sentence in such a fashion in order to make it constitutionally valid and is within the jurisdiction of the legislature which passed the said enactment by reading down the provision/s of the Act is not impermissible. In interpreting the provisions of the Act, it is not permissible where the plain language of the provision gives a clear and unambiguous meaning can be interpreted by reading down and presuming certain expressions in order to save it from constitutional invalidity. In interpreting the provisions of the Act, it is not permissible where the plain language of the provision gives a clear and unambiguous meaning can be interpreted by reading down and presuming certain expressions in order to save it from constitutional invalidity. In this background, if the expression with regard to the admissibility of additional evidence adduced in the civil proceedings being prohibited from being considered by the Special Court while determining the criminal liability is examined, it would leave no manner of doubt that the said provision is not only vague, arbitrary but also ambiguous and the object of the Act which the legislature intended to achieve by this provision is to insulate a person from preventing the evidence tendered in civil proceedings being used in criminal proceedings against a person charged for the offence punishable under the Act. Therefore, we are of the view that the said provision is vague, ambiguous and without clarity or substance and cannot be sustained. However, the expression found in the very same Sub-Section (4) of Section 9 namely, “The evidence admitted in criminal proceedings may be made use of while trying the civil liability” is to be understood and same is to be read as: “The evidence admitted in criminal proceedings may be made use of while trying the civil liability and not vice versa.” However, we make it clear that the State would be at liberty to bring in appropriate amendment in this regard to iron out the creases pointed out by us herein above. 74. In support of this proposition, we rely upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court referred to herein-below with benefit: Delhi Transport Corporation vs. D.T.C. Mazdoor Congress, AIR 1991 SC 101 : 1990 SCR Supp. (1) 142: “122. I am conscious that clear intention as indicated in a legislation cannot be permitted to be defeated by means of construction. It has been said that if the legislature has manifested a clear intention to exercise an unlimited power, it is impermissible to read down the amplitude of that power so as to make it limited. I do not agree. Our legislatures are limited by the constitutional inhibitions and it is time, in my opinion, that we should read their Acts and enactments with the attribute that they know their limits and could not have intended to violate the Constitution. I do not agree. Our legislatures are limited by the constitutional inhibitions and it is time, in my opinion, that we should read their Acts and enactments with the attribute that they know their limits and could not have intended to violate the Constitution. It is true that where there are clear, unambiguous and positive terms in a legislation, the Court should be loath to read down. It should proceed with a straight-forward method of striking down such legislations. But where the statute is silent or not expressive or inarticulate, the Court must read down in the silence of the statute and in the inarticulation of its provisions, the constitutional inhibitions and transmute the major inarticulate premise into a reality and read down the statute accordingly. It is true perhaps, as has been said, that in the history of constitutional law, statutes are seldom read down to mean what they say and intend. It is begging the question. If the statutes are seldom read down to mean what they say and intend. It is begging the question. If the statute does not specifically say, in such circumstances, as to how do we find the intention to transgress the constitutional limitations. At least, the relevant provisions of the relevant statutes and the rules, mentioned hereinbefore, are, in my opinion, on these points, not expressive enough to betray an intention (to) transgress constitutional limitations. I am afraid that reference to Elliott Ashton Welsh, II vs. United States, 398 US 333; 26 L.Ed. 2d 308 is inept in the background of the principles we are confronted with. The plain thrust of legislative enactment has to be found out in the inarticulate expressions and in the silence of the legislation. In doing so, to say what the legislature did not specifically say, is not distortion to avert any constitutional collision, In the language of the relevant provisions with which we are confronted, I do not find that intention of the legislature (was) to flout the constitutional limitations. 228. It is thus clear that the doctrine of reading down or of recasting the statute can be applied in limited situations. It is essentially used, firstly, for saving a statute from being struck down on account of its unconstitutionality. 228. It is thus clear that the doctrine of reading down or of recasting the statute can be applied in limited situations. It is essentially used, firstly, for saving a statute from being struck down on account of its unconstitutionality. It is an extension of the principle that when two interpretations are possible - one rendering it constitutional and the other making it constitutional the former should be preferred. The unconstitutionality may sprint from either the incompetence of the legislature to enact the statute or from its violation of any of the provisions of the Constitution. The second situation which summons its aid is where the provisions of the statute are vague and ambiguous and it is possible to gather the intention of the legislature from the object of the statute, the context in which the provision occurs and the purpose for which it is made. However, when the provision is cast in a definite and unambiguous language and its intention is clear, it is not permissible either to mend or bend it even if such recasting is in accord with good reason and conscience. In such circumstances, it is not possible for the Court to remake the statute. Its only duty is to strike it down and leave it to the legislature if it so desires, to amend it. If the remaking of the statute by the courts is to lead to its distortion that course is to be scrupulously avoided one of the situations further where the doctrine can never be called into play where the statute requires extensive additions and deletions. Not only it is no part of the court’s duty to undertake such exercise but it is beyond the jurisdiction to do so. 274. I am, therefore, inclined to hold that the courts, though, have no power to amend the law by process of interpretation, but do have power to mend it so as to be in conformity with the intendment of the legislature. Doctrine of reading down is one of the principles of interpretation of statute in that process. But when the offending language used by the legislature is clear, precise and unambiguous, violating the relevant provisions in the constitution, resort cannot be had to the doctrine of reading down to blow life into the void law to save it from unconstitutionality or to confer jurisdiction on the legislature. But when the offending language used by the legislature is clear, precise and unambiguous, violating the relevant provisions in the constitution, resort cannot be had to the doctrine of reading down to blow life into the void law to save it from unconstitutionality or to confer jurisdiction on the legislature. Similarly, it cannot be taken aid of to emasculate the precise, explicit, clear and unambiguous language to confer xxx for the appellants.” 75. Sub-Section (7) of Section 9 speaks about the binding nature of the finding given by the Special Court with regard to the determination of the title. Section 41 of the Evidence Act speaks about relevancy of certain judgment in probate etc. Section 41 reads as under: “41. Relevancy of certain judgments in probate, etc. jurisdiction - A final judgment, order or decree of a competent Court, in the exercise of probate, matrimonial admiralty or insolvency jurisdiction which confers upon or takes away from any person any legal character, or which declares any person to be entitled to any such character, or to be entitled to any specific thing, not as against any specified person but absolutely, is relevant when the existence of any such legal character, or the title of any such person to any such thing, is relevant. Such judgment, order or decree is conclusive proof: That any legal character, which it confers accrued at the time when such judgment, order or decree came into operation; that any legal character, to which it declares any such person to be entitled, accrued to that person at the time when such judgment, order or decree declares it to have accrued to that person. That any legal character which it takes away from any such person ceased at the time from which such judgment, order or decree declared that it had ceased or should cease. That anything to which it declares any person to be so entitled was the property of that person at the time from which such judgment, order or decree declares that it had been or should be his property.” 76. That anything to which it declares any person to be so entitled was the property of that person at the time from which such judgment, order or decree declares that it had been or should be his property.” 76. The judgments, order or decree of any competent Court in exercise of probate, matrimonial, admiralty or insolvency jurisdiction which confers upon or takes away from any person or legal character, or which declares, any person to be entitled to any such character, or to be entitled to any specific thing, not as against any specified person but absolutely would be relevant and such judgment/order/decree would be conclusive proof. Sub-Section (7) of Section 9 of the KLGP Act 2011 is almost analogous to Section 41 of the Evidence Act. 77. The intention of the legislature is to see that if the finding given by the Special Court under the Act with regard to title of the land would act as a bar in respect of any further litigation between any persons. Such a finding binds against the whole world which means, it would not be judgment in personem but a judgment in rem i.e. binding against the whole world for all practical purposes. Keeping in mind the laudable object of the Act, such a presumption found under Sub-Section (7) of Section 9 of the Act cannot be called as ultra-vires and onerous in any manner. 78. Section 9(5)(a) enables the Special Court to follow its own procedure while deciding the civil liability. However, such procedure cannot be inconsistent with the provisions of the code of Civil Procedure, 1908. Clause (b) of Sub-Section (5) of Section 9 has been substituted whereunder the Special Court has been empowered to try the criminal liability in a summary manner if it thinks fit. However, pre-amendment, the Special Court was required to try the matter as a summary trial. The defect pointed out by the petitioners during the course of the arguments have been rectified by the legislature by amending the Act which enables the Special Court to try offences under the Act as warrant case in the interest of justice. Provisions of Cr.P.C. being applicable, as already noticed hereinabove Section 259 Cr.P.C. would come into play and thereby the Special Court would be empowered to convert a summons case into a warrant case and try the case accordingly. Provisions of Cr.P.C. being applicable, as already noticed hereinabove Section 259 Cr.P.C. would come into play and thereby the Special Court would be empowered to convert a summons case into a warrant case and try the case accordingly. As such the contention raised by the petitioners that procedure prescribed for summary trial is unconstitutional, cannot be accepted. That apart, Section 9 will have to be necessarily read in conjunction with Section 10 and when so read, it leaves no manner of doubt about the applicability of the provisions of Code of Criminal Procedure to a matter being tried by the Special Court, would be a Court of Session for the purposes of conducting prosecution and the person conducting a prosecution is deemed to be a public prosecutor. 79. With regard to the offences under the KLGP Act 2011, the minimum punishment prescribed is one (1) year and maximum punishment can extend upto three (3) years along with the fine, which can extend upto Rs. 25,000/-. Section 13 would indicate that the offences punishable under the Act shall be cognizable and shall be tried by a Magistrate of the First Class specially empowered by the Government in this behalf by notification in the Official Gazette wherever Special Court is not constituted. Thus, the jurisdictional Magistrate if notified by the Government to try the offence under the Act, will have to necessarily try the same as the offence is cognizable. However, if the Special Court is already constituted under Section 7, Section 10 mandates that Special Court would be deemed to be a Court of Session and the person conducting the prosecution to be a public prosecutor for all practical purposes as noticed hereinabove. A Special Court presided over by a judicial officer of the cadre of Sessions Judge has to apply the provisions of a warrant trial, if trial with the offences under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1998 or the offences under the POCSO Act, 2012. 80. However, in the case on hand, Special Court is presided over by a person who is or was a Judge of the High Court and whenever the benches of the Special Court is constituted it would invariably be presided a District Judge (serving or retired). 80. However, in the case on hand, Special Court is presided over by a person who is or was a Judge of the High Court and whenever the benches of the Special Court is constituted it would invariably be presided a District Judge (serving or retired). In the light of provisions of Section 10 and 13 and Section 259 of Cr.P.C. read along with Sections 260, 262 and 264 and the gravity of the offences of land grabbing and consequences flowing from it, it is advisable that the procedure to be adopted to try the offence under the Act should be a warrant trial and only in exceptional circumstances a summary trial. The expression “summarily” used in Section 9(5)(b) of KLGP Act even post-amendment would not be appealing to logic or it would not gel with Section 10 and 13 and other cognate provisions of other penal statutes including the provisions of Code of Criminal Procedure referred to hereinabove. However, on this ground it would not be appropriate to strike down the constitutionality of the provision and the creases, if any, can be ironed out and it can be read down to make the provision effective, workable and to attain the object of the Act. Hon’ble Apex Court in the matter of State of Bihar and Others vs. Bihar Distillery and Others, (1997) 2 SCC 453 has referred to the opinion of Lord Denning rendered in Seaford Court Estates Ltd. vs. Asher, (1949) 2 All. ER 155 wherein it has been held court should not alter the material but should iron out the creases. It has been further held: “20. We may also refer to the following perceptive observations in the decision of Lord Denning is Seaford Court Estates Ltd. vs. Asher: “Whenever a statute comes up for consideration it must be remembered that it is not within human power to foresee the manifold sets of facts which may arise and, even if it were, it is not possible to provide for them in terms free from all ambiguity. The English language is not an instrument of mathematical precision. Our literature would be much the poorer if it were. This is where the draftsmen of Acts of Parliament have often been unfairly criticized. The English language is not an instrument of mathematical precision. Our literature would be much the poorer if it were. This is where the draftsmen of Acts of Parliament have often been unfairly criticized. A judge, believing himself to be fettered by the supposed rule that he must look to the language and nothing else, laments that the draftsman have not provided for this or that, or have been guilty of some or other ambiguity. It would certainly save the judges trouble if Acts of Parliament were drafted with divine prescience and perfect clarity. In the absence of it, when a defect appears a judge cannot simply fold his hands and blame the draftsman. He must set to work on the constructive task of finding the intention of Parliament, and he must do this not only from the language of the statute, but also from a consideration of the social conditions which gave rise to it, and of the mischief which it was passed to remedy, and then he must supplement the written word so as to give `force and life’ to the intention of the legislature. That was clearly laid down by the resolution of the judges in Heydon’s case, and it is the safest guide today. Good practical advice on the subject was given about the same time by Plowden.......Put into homely metaphor it is this: A judge should ask himself the question: If the makers of the Act had themselves come across this ruck in the texture of it, how would they have straightened it out? He must then do as they would have done. A judge must not alter the material of which it is woven, but he can and should iron out the creases.” 81. The Hon’ble Apex court in the case of Namit Sharma vs. Union of India, (2013) 1 SCC 745 has held that the courts would generally adopt an interpretation which is favourable and tilt towards constitutionality of the statute, with the aid of the principles like “reading into” and/or “reading down” the relevant provisions to make the statute workable as opposed to declaring a provision unconstitutional. It is further held declaring a law unconstitutional is one of the last resorts to be taken by the courts and the courts. It has also been further held: “51. It is further held declaring a law unconstitutional is one of the last resorts to be taken by the courts and the courts. It has also been further held: “51. Another most significant canon of determination of constitutionality is that the courts would be reluctant to declare a law invalid or ultra-vires on account of unconstitutionality. The courts would accept an interpretation which would be in favour of the constitutionality, than an approach which would render the law unconstitutional. Declaring the law unconstitutional is one of the last resorts taken by the courts. The courts would preferably put into service the principle of ‘reading down’ or ‘reading into’ the provision to make it effective, workable and ensure the attainment of the object of the Act. These are the principles which clearly emerge from the consistent view taken by this court in its various pronouncements.” “61. It is a settled principle of law, as stated earlier, that courts would generally adopt an interpretation which is favourable to and tilts towards the constitutionality of a statute, with the aid of the principles like ‘reading into’ and/or ‘reading down’ the relevant provisions, as opposed to declaring a provision unconstitutional. The courts can also bridge the gaps that have been left by the legislature inadvertently. We are of the considered view that both these principles have to be applied while interpreting Section 12(5). It is the application of these principles that would render the provision constitutional and not opposed to the doctrine of equality. Rather the application of the provision would become more effective.” 82. As held by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Namit Sharma’s case supra, both these principles will have to be applied while interpreting Section 2(d) r/w Section 22, 9(4) and 9(5)(b) of KLGP Act 2011, as the application of the aforesaid principles would render the provisions constitutional and not being opposed to the doctrine of equality and protection of personal liberty as enshrined in Article 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India. By reading down these provisions in the manner indicated, we are of the considered view that application of the provisions of the KLGP Act 2011 would become more effective. By reading down these provisions in the manner indicated, we are of the considered view that application of the provisions of the KLGP Act 2011 would become more effective. Hence, it would be apt, appropriate and prudent to read down Section 9(5)(b) as under: “The Special Court may try every offence under the Act as if it is a warrant case and only in exceptional circumstances try in a summary manner for reasons to be recorded.” It is needless to state that the legislature would be at liberty to bring in appropriate amendment keeping in mind the observations made hereinabove. (3) RE: RIGHT OF APPEAL AND REVISION NOT BEING AVAILABLE: 83. Though it has been vehemently contended that right of appeal or revision is not found in the KLGP Act 2011, said argument does not hold good, in the light of Act 30/2020 having been enacted and Section 17-A(1) as noticed herein above provides for filing an appeal against final order passed by the Special Court determining the civil liability. The High Court if satisfied that case involves a substantial question of law, it would entertain an appeal and of course subject to limitation as provided thereunder. Section 17-A(2) provides for filing an appeal against an order of acquittal or conviction and same would lie to the High Court and High Court is empowered to exercise all the powers conferred under Chapter XXIX and XXX of Cr.P.C. As such, said contention does not hold water and it contention stands rejected. (4) RE: REVERSE ONUS CLAUSE OR BURDEN OF PROOF: 84. Section 11 of the KLGP Act 2011 would indicate that where any proceedings under the Act is initiated the State has to prima facie prove that such land is owned by the Government. Then Special Court would presume that person who is alleged to have grabbed the land, is a land grabber and the burden of proving that such land is not grabbed by him or it is not the land belonging to Government, said burden would be on such person. 85. It is the contention of the learned Advocates appearing for the petitioners that Special Courts are taking cognizance, despite State having failed to discharge the initial burden. 85. It is the contention of the learned Advocates appearing for the petitioners that Special Courts are taking cognizance, despite State having failed to discharge the initial burden. It is also contended that reverse onus clause as it stands apply only to a class of offenders under the Act and contend that under Section 2(d) the definition of land would also include the land belonging to Wakf or Hindu Religious Institutions and Charitable Endowments and a local authority, a statutory or non-statutory body owned control and managed by the Government, but the reverse onus clause apply only to the land belonging to Government. Thus, the reverse onus clause excluding sub-clauses of offences created under the Act is arbitrary. 86. The extent of right to a fair trial of an accused must be determined keeping in mind the fundamental rights as adumbrated in Article 21 of the Constitution of India as also the International Convention and Convenants chartered in human rights. Justness and fairness of a trial is also implicit in Article 21 of the Constitution of India. A fair trial is again a human right. Every action of the authorities under the Act must be construed having regard to the provisions of the Act as also the right of an accused to have a fair trial. We are not oblivious that decision in Noor Aga vs. State of Punjab, (2008) 16 SCC 417 whereunder, it came to be held that Sections 35 and 54 of NDPS Act, 1985 are not ultra-vires of the Constitution of India. It was held therein to the following effect: “23. Section 35 of the Act provides for presumption of culpable mental state. It also provides that an accused may prove that he had no such mental state with respect to the act charged as an offence under the prosecution. Section 54 of the Act places the burden of proof on the accused as regards possession of the contraband to account for the same satisfactorily. 34. The Act contains draconian provisions. It must, however, be borne in mind that the Act was enacted having regard to the mandate contained in International Conventions on Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances. Only because the burden of proof under certain circumstances is placed on the accused, the same, by itself, in our opinion, would not render the impugned provisions unconstitutional. 35. It must, however, be borne in mind that the Act was enacted having regard to the mandate contained in International Conventions on Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances. Only because the burden of proof under certain circumstances is placed on the accused, the same, by itself, in our opinion, would not render the impugned provisions unconstitutional. 35. A right to be presumed innocent, subject to the establishment of certain foundational facts and burden of proof, to a certain extent, can be placed on an accused. It must be construed having regard to the other international conventions and having regard to the fact that it has been held to be constitutional. Thus, a statute may be constitutional but a prosecution thereunder may not be held to be one. Indisputably, civil liberties and rights of citizens must be upheld. 60. Whether the burden on the accused is a legal burden or an evidentiary burden would depend on the statute in question. The purport and object thereof must also be taken into consideration in determining the said question. It must pass the test of doctrine of proportionality. The difficulties faced by the prosecution in certain cases may be held to be sufficient to arrive at an opinion that the burden on the accused is an evidentiary burden and not merely a legal burden. The trial must be fair. The accused must be provided with opportunities to effectively defend himself. In Sheldrake vs. Director of Public Prosecutions, (2005) 1 All ER 237 in the following terms: “21. From this body of authority certain principles may be derived. The overriding concern is that a trial should be fair, and the presumption of innocence is a fundamental right directed to that end. The convention does not outlaw presumptions of fact or law but requires that these should be kept within reasonable limits and should not be arbitrary. It is open to states to define the constituent elements of a criminal offence, excluding the requirements of mens rea. But the substance and effect of any presumption adverse to a defendant must be examined, and must be reasonable. It is open to states to define the constituent elements of a criminal offence, excluding the requirements of mens rea. But the substance and effect of any presumption adverse to a defendant must be examined, and must be reasonable. Relevant to any judgment on reasonableness or proportionality will be the opportunity given to the defendant to rebut the presumption, maintenance of the rights of the defence, flexibility in application of the presumption, retention by the court of a power to assess the evidence, the importance of what is at stake and the difficulty which a prosecutor may face in the absence of a presumption. Security concerns do not absolve member States from their duty to observe basic standards of fairness. The justifiability of any infringement of the presumption of innocence cannot be resolved by any rule of thumb, but on examination of all the facts and circumstances of the particular provision as applied in the particular case.” (Emphasis added) 61. It is, however, interesting to note the recent comments on Sheldrake (supra) by Richard Glover in an Article titled “Sheldrake Regulatory Offences and Reverse Legal Burdens of Proof” (2006) 4 Web JCLI wherein it was stated: “It is apparent from the records in Hansard (implicitly if not expressly) that the Government was content for a legal onus to be on the defendant when it drafted the Road Traffic Act 1956. An amendment to the Bill was suggested in the Lords “which puts upon the accused the onus of showing that he had no intention of driving or attempting to drive a motor vehicle” (Lord Brabazon 1955, Col 582). Lord Mancroft, for the Government, although critical of the amendment stated: “...the Government want to do exactly what he wants to do. We have, therefore, to try to find some means of getting over this technical difficulty” (Lord Mancroft 1955, Col 586). It is submitted that this tends to suggest that the Government intended a reverse legal burden. The reverse legal burden was certainly in keeping with the tenor of the 1956 Act to “keep death off the road” (Lord Mancroft 1954, Col 637) by increased regulation of road transport, particularly in the light of a sharp increase in reported road casualties in 1954 -there was an 18 per cent increase (Lord Mancroft 1954, Col 637). The reverse legal burden was certainly in keeping with the tenor of the 1956 Act to “keep death off the road” (Lord Mancroft 1954, Col 637) by increased regulation of road transport, particularly in the light of a sharp increase in reported road casualties in 1954 -there was an 18 per cent increase (Lord Mancroft 1954, Col 637). The Times lead article for 4-7-1955 (at 9d) stressed the Bill’s importance for Parliament: “They have the casualty lists -5,000 or more killed on the roads every year, 10 times as many killed and more than 30 times as many slightly hurt.” This was “a national scandal.” The Earl of Selkirk, who introduced the Bill in the Lords, remarked that “we require a higher standard of discipline on the roads” (The Earl of Selkirk 1954, Col 567) and Lord Mancroft commented specifically in relation to `being drunk in charge’ that “...we should be quite right if we erred on the side of strictness” (Lord Mancroft 1955, Col 586). Notwithstanding this historical background it was, of course, open to their Lordships in Sheldrake to interpret section 5(2) as only imposing an evidential burden on the defendant. Lord Bingham referred to the courts’ interpretative obligation under the Human Rights Act 1998 Section 3 as “a very strong and farreaching one, and may require the court to depart from the legislative intention of Parliament” (2004) UKHL 43 (Para 28). However, he must also have had in mind further dicta from the recent judgment in Ghaidan vs. Godin-Mendoza (WLR. P.121, Para 19): “19….Parliament is charged with the primary responsibility for deciding the best way of dealing with social problems. The court’s role is one of review. The court will reach a different conclusion from the legislature only when it is apparent that the legislature has attached insufficient importance to a person’s Convention rights” (Lord Nicholls, (2004) UKHL 30, Para 19. Also see Johnstone (2003) UKHL 28, Para 51). That is, the Courts should generally defer (11) to the Legislature or, at least, allow them a discretionary area of judgment (R. vs. DPP, Ex p Kebilene (1999) UKHL 43; AC pp.380-381). Also see Johnstone (2003) UKHL 28, Para 51). That is, the Courts should generally defer (11) to the Legislature or, at least, allow them a discretionary area of judgment (R. vs. DPP, Ex p Kebilene (1999) UKHL 43; AC pp.380-381). (Lord Hoffman has criticised the use of the term ‘deference’ because of its “overtones of servility, or perhaps gratuitous concession” (R. Pro-Life Alliance vs. BBC, (2003) UKHL 23, Paras 75-762; WLR 1403, 1422) This principle now appears firmly established, as is evident from the decision of an enlarged Privy Council sitting in Attorney-General for Jersey vs. Holley, (2005) UKPC 23. Lord Nicholls, who again delivered the majority judgment (6-3), stated: (WLR p.37, Para 22) “22.......The law of homicide is a highly sensitive and highly controversial area of the criminal law. In 1957 Parliament altered the common law relating to provocation and declared what the law on this subject should thenceforth be. In these circumstances it is not open to judges now to change (`develop’) the common law and thereby depart from the law as declared by Parliament.” Parliament’s intentions also appear to have been of particular importance in the recent case Makuwa (2006) EWCA Crim 175 (CA), which concerned the application of the statutory defence provided by the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999. Section 31(1) to an offence under the Forgery and Counterfeiting Act 1981, Section 3 of using a false instrument. The question was whether there was an onus on a refugee to prove that he (a) presented himself without delay to the authorities; (b) showed good cause for his illegal entry and (c) made an asylum claim as soon as was reasonably practicable. Moore-Bick L.J’s judgment was, with respect, rather confused. He appeared to approve gravamen analysis when he stated that the presumption of innocence was engaged by a reverse burden (Paras 28 and 36). However, he then stated that the statutory defence did not impose on the defendant the burden of disproving an essential ingredient of the offence (Para 32), in which case it is clear that the presumption of innocence was not engaged. Nonetheless, he did, at least, recognise the limits of gravamen analysis, which was clearly inapplicable to sections 3 and 31 as the statutory defence applied to a number of other offences under the same Act and the Immigration Act 1971 (Para 32). Nonetheless, he did, at least, recognise the limits of gravamen analysis, which was clearly inapplicable to sections 3 and 31 as the statutory defence applied to a number of other offences under the same Act and the Immigration Act 1971 (Para 32). His Lordship acknowledged that particular attention should be paid to Parliament’s actual intentions (Para 33), as had been the case in Sheldrake. In light of the above it is submitted that their Lordships in Sheldrake, as in Brown vs. Stott, (2000) UKPC D3 (PC): (2003) 1 AC 681, were entitled to uphold a legal rather than an evidential burden on the defendant and to take into account other Convention rights, namely the right to life of members of the public exposed to the increased danger of accidents from unfit drivers (European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Article 2). That is, there were sound policy reasons for imposing a reverse legal burden, which will be the subject of further discussion in the second part to this article.” 80. The constitutional mandate of equality of law and equal protection of law as adumbrated under Article 14 of the Constitution of India cannot be lost sight of. The courts, it is well settled, would avoid a construction which would attract the wrath of Article 14. It also cannot be oblivious of the law that the Act is complete code in itself and, thus, the provisions of the 1962 Act cannot be applied to seek conviction thereunder. 114. Article 12 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights provides for the right to a fair trial. Such rights are enshrined in our Constitutional Scheme being Article 21 of the Constitution of India. If an accused has a right of fair trial, his case must be examined keeping in view the ordinary law of the land. 115. It is one thing to say that even applying the well-known principles of law, they are found to be guilty of commission of offences for which they are charged but it is another thing to say that although they cannot be held guilty on the basis of the materials on record, they must suffer punishment in view of the past experience or otherwise.” 87. In many special statutes dealing with penal offences, reverse burden is contemplated. In many special statutes dealing with penal offences, reverse burden is contemplated. On a plain reading of Section 11 of KLGP Act 2011 it would clearly indicate that the initial burden is cast upon the applicant and unless said burden is effectively discharged with regard to the title of the land owned by the Government, the onus does not shift to the other side. In other words, the onus will be on the alleged land grabber to prove that he has not grabbed the Government land, only after the applicant prima facie proves that land is owned by the Government. In order to attract the provisions of Section 11, the applicant is expected to initially prove that land is owned by the Government. This is a rebuttable presumption, which is equivalent to the presumption found in Section 118 of the Negotiable Instruments Act r/w Section 138. Therefore, the provisions of Section 11 cannot be construed as onerous. That apart, the applicant will have to introduce evidence both oral as well as documentary, to prima facie prove that the land is owned by the Government. Hence, Section 11 would be a tool available to the Special Court and within the domain of assessment of the evidence. 88. Some of the offences are defined in such a way that presumption is to prove certain facts relatable to the offence and then a defence has to bear the burden of exculpation. The legislative bodies have realised the need of making provisions for statutory presumption in the specific legislations. 88. Some of the offences are defined in such a way that presumption is to prove certain facts relatable to the offence and then a defence has to bear the burden of exculpation. The legislative bodies have realised the need of making provisions for statutory presumption in the specific legislations. The Centre and State Acts have made provisions for “statutory presumption” of the guilt of the accused and some of the legislations which provide for such statutory presumptions are as under: S. No. Name of the Act Sections providing “Statutory Presumptions” under the Act 1 Indian Evidence Act, 1872 S.113 - B, 106, 9 S.113 - A, 114A S.3 (Proved) 2 Indian Penal Code S.101 - 117 S.304 B, 498A S.304 I & II S. 304 A, 304 B S. 306 3 Juvenile Justice Act S. 49 4 Juvenile Justice Care and Protection of Children Rules 2007 R. 12 R.12 (3), (9), (I) - (III) 5 NDPS S.37, 35, 54, 60(3) S.80, 8-10, 2 (XIV) S.25, 35 r/w 54, 53-A 6 Cr.P.C. S.303, 228, 128(1) 7 Prevention of Corruption Act S.20, 7 8 TADA, 1987 S.21 (2) 9 Prevention of Money Laundering S.22, 24, 23 S.3 & 4 10 Unlawful Activities 1967 S.17, 18, 10 11 Negotiable Instruments Act S.118(a), 139 12 General Clauses Act S.27 13 Wildlife Protection Act, 1972 S.69 14 Income Tax Act S.271 (I) C Exp. 1 89. Noticeably, the statutory presumptions incorporated in law or those which deal with offences impacting upon public morality, health, security and discipline. The statutory presumptions have thus been selectively applied depending upon the changing scenario, and the strategy of those crimes, committed either in secrecy or with the aid of sophisticated and advanced scientific and technical devices, denying access to any evidence/clue to the perpetration thereof. Another factor is, impossibility of collecting evidence of said crimes depending on the modus operandi, absence/disinclination of witnesses to depose for variety of reasons, which often result in exoneration from guilt, gross injustice which though apparent, goes unremedied. 90. The object and reasons of two third of such laws which incorporate statutory presumption of culpability would reveal the compulsion of maintenance of a discipline in social order, for this shift from the stand point of presumption of innocence to that of guilt in a limited way. 91. 90. The object and reasons of two third of such laws which incorporate statutory presumption of culpability would reveal the compulsion of maintenance of a discipline in social order, for this shift from the stand point of presumption of innocence to that of guilt in a limited way. 91. Presumption, if taken, is always rebuttable and arises on the proof of certain basic facts relevant to the offence, whereupon the onus shifts to the accused to rebut the presumption of guilt. Thus, this apportionment of the obligation in quest of justice, having regard to the overall demand of an orderly law abiding social set up, governed by the rule of law is an exception to the starting premise of innocence of accused, the otherwise overwhelming and the supervening fundamental precept of criminal jurisprudence. 92. Though it is the cardinal principle of criminal jurisprudence that burden of proof of an offence would always lie on the prosecution, exceptions have also been provided in Sections 105 and 106 of the Evidence Act. Section 105 says that if a person is accused of an offence, the burden of proving the existence of circumstances, bringing the case within all the general exemptions in the Indian Penal Code or within any special exception or proviso contained in any other law defining the offence, is upon him and the Court shall presume the absence of such circumstances. 93. Though law has given sanction of presumption of innocence until guilt is declared by a Court of law in certain cases including the cases say, relating to Preventing of Corruption Act, placing the burden of proof on the accused in reasonable and not unjust, or unfair nor is to be regarded as violative of Article 21 of the Constitution of India as propagated in Veerasami vs. Union of India, (1991) 3 SCC 655. 94. In State vs. Haremza, 213 Kan. 201 (Kan. 1973) this Court has observed: “Statutory presumptions are ordinarily rebuttable. A rebuttable statutory presumption governs only the burden of going forward with the evidence and, even when it operates against the defendant, it does not alter the ultimate burden of proof resting upon the prosecution, nor deprive the defendant of the benefit of the presumption of innocence.” 95. 201 (Kan. 1973) this Court has observed: “Statutory presumptions are ordinarily rebuttable. A rebuttable statutory presumption governs only the burden of going forward with the evidence and, even when it operates against the defendant, it does not alter the ultimate burden of proof resting upon the prosecution, nor deprive the defendant of the benefit of the presumption of innocence.” 95. Hon’ble Apex Court in the matter of V. Laxminarasamma vs. A. Yadaiah (Dead) and Others, (2009) 5 SCC 478 has held that only because the burden of proof is on the noticee, the same would not mean that he has been deprived of his right to defend in the proceedings. It is further held: “36. Only because the burden xxx proceedings. Burden of proof is in the realm of procedural law. By reason of such a provision, substantive right of the parties on an immovable property is not taken away. Jurisdiction is exercised by the Tribunal and/or Special Court upon arriving at a satisfaction in regard to existence of jurisdictional fact.” 96. Nevertheless, it has been judicially observed that the presumption of innocence needs effective modifications. A right to keep silent does no more give privilege to tell lies and take up false defence. In Pershadilal vs. State of U.P. AIR 1957 SCC 211 while construing Section 114 of the Evidence Act, 1872, the Supreme Court observed, that where in a murder charge, the accused falsely denied several relevant acts which have been conclusively established, the court would be justified in drawing an adverse inference from this against the accused. The limits on the privilege of an accused person not to open his mouth has further been explained in Deonanadan Mishra vs. State of Bihar, AIR 1955 SC 801 . In this case the appellant accused was charged with murder and was convicted on the basis of only circumstantial evidence which pointed the accused as the assailant with reasonable definiteness as regards time and situation for which the accused did not offer an explanation. The absence of any explanation or false explanations was treated as an additional link in the chain of circumstances which went against the accused. The absence of any explanation or false explanations was treated as an additional link in the chain of circumstances which went against the accused. In M.G. Agarwal vs. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1963 SCC 200, the Apex Court has held that a conviction can be reasonably founded on circumstantial evidence and an inference of guilt can be drawn if the proved facts are wholly inconsistent with the innocence of the accused and are consistent with his guilt. In the case of Andhra Pradesh vs. I.B.S. Prasad Rao, 1970 Crl. L.J. SC 733 the Supreme Court has gone a step further in holding that even if one or more of the circumstances in the chain of circumstantial evidence in inconsistent with the guilt, but the combined effect of the facts is conclusive of the guilt, a conviction will be justified. 97. It has been held by Hon’ble Apex Court in Seema Silk Sarees and Another vs. Directorate of Enforcement and Others, (2008) 5 SCC 580 that a provision in an enactment would not become unconstitutional only because it provides for a reverse burden. It has also been held: “19. A legal provision does not become unconstitutional only because it provides for a reverse burden. The question as regards burden of proof is procedural in nature. [See Hiten P. Dalal vs. Bratindranath Banerjee, (2001) 6 SCC 16 and M.S. Narayana Menon vs. State of Kerala, (2006) 6 SCC 39 ]. 20. The presumption raised against the trader is a rebuttable one. Reverse burden as also statutory presumptions can be raised in several statutes as, for example, the Negotiable Instruments Act, Prevention of Corruption Act, TADA, etc. Presumption is raised only when certain foundational facts are established by the prosecution. The accused in such an event would be entitled to show that he has not violated the provisions of the Act. In a case of this nature, particularly, when an appeal against the order of the Tribunal is pending, we do not think that the appellants are entitled to take the benefit thereof at this stage. Such contentions must be raised before the criminal court.” 98. There is a danger to the excessive devotion to the rule or presumption of innocence and to the soothing sentiment that all acquittals are always good regardless of justice to the victim and the community. Such contentions must be raised before the criminal court.” 98. There is a danger to the excessive devotion to the rule or presumption of innocence and to the soothing sentiment that all acquittals are always good regardless of justice to the victim and the community. In the context of escalating crime, the doctrine that it is better that ten guilty men should escape than one innocent may be convicted is a false dilemma. In this context the following observations of Justice Krishna Iyer, who has been a strong supporter of Human Rights of accused, made in the case of Shivaji Sahebrao Babade vs. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1973 SC 2622 , warn against the excessive reliance on the presumption of innocence. It has been held: “The cherished principle or golden thread of proof beyond reasonable doubt which runs through the web of our law should not be stretched morbidly to enhance every hunch, hesitancy and degree of doubt. The excessive solicitude reflected in the attitude that let a thousand guilty men go out but one innocent martyr shall not suffer, is a false dilemma. Only reasonable doubt belongs to the accused. Otherwise, any practical system of justice will then break down and lose credibility with the community. However, in Kali Ram vs. State of H.P. the Supreme Court reemphasized the importance of the principle of presumption of innocence and observed that “It is no doubt that wrongly acquittals are undesirable and shake the confidence of the people in the judicial system; much worse, is, however, the wrongly conviction of an innocent person. The consequences of the conviction of an innocent person are far more serious and its reverberations cannot but be felt in a civilized society.” 99. While discussing all these issues we, however, should not remain unmindful of the fact that standard of proof to uphold the guilt of the accused in today’s societal structure is often very difficult to achieve in all types of cases since in the current scenario, the unwillingness, non-availability of witnesses to come forward to tell the truth, huge dockets of cases in the courts of law, procedural prolixity leading to procrastination of trial are some of the serious impediments. Therefore, a measure reform in the approach of accepting and using presumptive laws engrafted in the statures is necessary, in a more liberal way, which will not otherwise be an affront to the constitutional guarantee of right to life and liberty. 100. In the light of the clear words found in Section 11 of the Act and in the light of the law enunciated by the Hon’ble Supreme Court with regard to the insertion of reverse burden in certain penal statutes, such a presumption is not violative of Article 20(3) or 21 of the Constitution of India. Hence, it is to be held that Section 11 is intra-vires of Constitution and consequently it is held to be valid. (5) RE: KLGP ACT 2011 PROVIDES FOR CRIMINAL TRIAL BEFORE THE SPECIAL COURT TO BE SUMMARY TRIAL, WHEREAS PUNISHMENT TO BE IMPOSED UNDER SECTION 4 OF THE ACT BEING NOT LESS THAN ONE YEAR AND WHICH MAY EXTEND TO THREE YEARS WOULD BE CONTRARY TO SECTION 262 OF Cr.P.C. 101. Pre-amendment Section 9(5)(b) of the Act prescribed that every offence punishable under this Act is to be tried summarily. 102. The vires of Section 9(5) is also sought to be attacked on the ground of the KLGP Act 2011 provides for offence punishable under the Act to be tried summarily vide clause (b) and Section 260(1)(i) of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides that summary trial is applicable only in respect of offences not punishable with death, life imprisonment or imprisonment for a term exceeding two years. It is contended that Section 4(3) and Section 5 of the Act provides for imprisonment for the offence under the KLGP Act 2011 can be up to three years and therefore, the said provision is manifestly arbitrary. It is further contended that Section 10 of the Act states that provisions of Cr.P.C. will apply to the extent that it is not inconsistent with the Act and there being inconsistency between the Act and the Code regarding applicability of the procedure for summary trial and procedure prescribed under the Code for summary trial would not apply to the trial under the KLGP Act 2011 and therefore, the provision is manifestly arbitrary. 103. 103. The Hon’ble Apex Court in Shayara Bano vs. Union of India, (2017) 9 SCC 1 has held that the test of manifest arbitrariness can be ascertained by examining as to whether the legislature capriciously, irrationally and/or without adequacy has legislated. It has been further held: “101......Manifest arbitrariness, therefore, must be something done by the legislature capriciously, irrationally and/or without adequate determining principle. Also, when something is done which is excessive and disproportionate, such legislation would be manifestly arbitrary. We are, therefore, of the view that arbitrariness in the sense of manifest arbitrariness as pointed out by us above would apply to negate legislation as well under Article 14.” 104. In this background, Section 9(5)(b) of the KLGP Act 2011 when perused, it would indicate that pre-amendment, the only option that was available to the Special Court was to try the offence punishable under the Act summarily. However, post-amendment by Act 30/2020, clause (b) of Sub-Section (5) of Section 9 enables the Special Court to try the proceedings in a summary manner if it thinks fit and if it appears to the Special Court that the offence should be tried in accordance with the procedure for trial of warrant cases, it may proceed to re-hear the case in the manner provided by Code of Civil Procedure for the trial of warrant cases and it is empowered to recall the witness who may have been examined. It would be necessary to extract the substituted provision of Section 9(5)(b) at the cost of repetition and it reads: “(b) the Special Court may, if it thinks fit, try in a summary manner any offence under this Act: Provided that, if the Special Court is of the opinion that there are no sufficient grounds for proceeding, the Court shall dismiss the complaint or drop further proceedings and in every such case it shall briefly record reasons. Provided further that, the course of the trial of summons case relating to an offence under this Act, it appears to the Special Court that in the interests of justice, the offence shall be tried in accordance with the procedure for trial of warrant cases, the Special Court may proceed to rehear the case in the manner provided by the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Central Act 2 of 1974) for the trial of warrant-cases and may recall any witness who may have been examined.” 105. Section 260 in Chapter XXI of Cr.P.C. speaks about the power to try an offence summarily. Since Section 262 and 264 of Cr.P.C. being relevant for the case on hand, same is extracted herein-below: “262. Procedure for summary trials - (1) In trials under this Chapter, the procedure specified in this Code for the trial of summonscase shall be followed except as hereinafter mentioned. (2) No sentence of imprisonment for a term exceeding three months shall be passed in the case of any conviction under this Chapter. 264. Judgment in cases tried summarily - In every case tried summarily in which the accused does not plead guilty, the Magistrate shall record the substance of the evidence and a judgment containing a brief statement of the reasons for the finding.” 106. Sub-Section (2) of Section 260 enables the court trying an offence summarily to convert the case into a warrant case if it appears to the Magistrate that the nature of the case is such that it is undesirable to try the case summarily. Likewise, Section 259 Cr.P.C. enables the Magistrate dealing with the summons case in which the punishment exceeds six months and it appears to the Magistrate, that in the interest of justice, the offence should be tried in accordance with the procedure for trial of warrant case, he may proceed to re-hear the case in the manner provided in Cr.P.C. for the trial of warrant cases. 107. Insofar as the offences punishable under the KLGP Act 2011, the minimum punishment contemplated under Section 4 and 5 is one year and the maximum punishment can extend up to three years along with fine, which may extend up to Rs. 25,000/-. AT this juncture, it would be apt to notice that if the Special Court is not yet constituted to try the offence of land grabbing as per the provisions of the KLGP Act 2011, the Magistrate of the First Class so empowered by the Government in this behalf by notification in the Official Gazette, would be empowered to try the same as the offence is cognizable. However, where the Special Court is already constituted under Section 7, then, Section 10 of the KLGP Act 2011 mandates that Special Court shall be deemed to be the court of Session and the person conducting the prosecution will be a Public Prosecutor for all practical purposes. 108. However, where the Special Court is already constituted under Section 7, then, Section 10 of the KLGP Act 2011 mandates that Special Court shall be deemed to be the court of Session and the person conducting the prosecution will be a Public Prosecutor for all practical purposes. 108. The High Court of Mumbai in the matter of A.G. Sawant vs. Sanjay D. Berde, 2013 SCC Online Bom. 833 has held: “15. We are unable to accept this contention for more than one reason. It is too well settled to require any reiteration that there is no vested right in a procedure. A procedural provision, therefore, confers no right and of such a character as would enable the litigant to insist that his case or trial would be governed by that procedure alone. It is open for the legislature to provide that the entire Code of Criminal Procedure or some of its provisions would not apply to a particular trial. Such a provision does not militate against the constitutional mandate of equality, fairness, reasonableness and non-arbitrariness. Such a provision, therefore, cannot be termed as discriminatory. In this behalf a useful reference can be made to the Judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Union of India vs. Ram Saran, AIR 2004 SC 481 . 16. Once the law is that no one can claim a vested right in matters of procedure, then, the very foundation of the arguments of Mr. Kadam on absence of a provision enabling seeking of a discharge in proceedings under Section 27 must fail. The Act has provided enough safeguards and inbuilt checks. Since the provision enables imposition of penalties in the form of imprisonment and fine and which are termed as punishments by Section 53 of IPC, the legislature has ensured that there would be a trial following which only such penalties can be imposed. Once a trial has to be held and the powers of a Magistrate under the Code of Criminal Procedure to hold such trials, is conferred in the Forums and Commissions, under the Act, then there is no room for any complaint. Further, considering the intent of the legislature and mandate flowing from the Act, the trial is not elaborate or lengthy. Further, considering the intent of the legislature and mandate flowing from the Act, the trial is not elaborate or lengthy. That the trial is of a summary nature by itself and without anything more does not mean that the provision is unconstitutional or ultravires as contended.” We are in complete agreement with above observations made by their Lordships and do not find any good ground to deviate from said proposition, as it is based on sound principles of law as enunciated by Hon’ble Apex Court. 109. A harmonious reading of substituted clause (b) of Sub-Section (5) of Section 9 with Section 10 of the KLGP Act 2011 would clearly indicate that though the word “summary” has been used in clause (b), an overriding effect has been provided under Section 10 empowering the Special Court to be a court of Session and the Code of Civil Procedure being made applicable. In a given case, if the Special Court were to arrive at a conclusion that it would not be a fit case for being tried summarily, it would be empowered to exercise the power vested under Section 259 Cr.P.C. to convert a summons case into a warrant case. Thus, harmonious reading of these two provisions would leave no manner of doubt to negative the contention raised by the petitioners and to hold that the apprehension expressed by the petitioners is without merit and same is liable to be rejected. Hence, the contention raised in that regard stands rejected. (6) RE: SECTION 9 OF KLGP ACT 2011 IS HIT BY ARTICLES 14 AND 21 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA AS PROCEDURE PRESCRIBED IS UNWORKABLE: 110. The procedural powers of the Special Court are contained in Section 9. What is of significance is that the Special Courts unlike the Special Courts established under many enactments not only deals with civil cases, but also criminal cases. In fact, Section 10 of the KLGP Act 2011 specifically says that the provisions of CPC and Cr.P.C. to the extent they are not inconsistent with the provisions of the Act apply to the proceedings under the Act. Section 10 further provides that the Special Court is deemed to be a civil court or a court of session as the case may be and person conducting a prosecution before Special Court to be deemed to be a Public Prosecutor. 111. Section 10 further provides that the Special Court is deemed to be a civil court or a court of session as the case may be and person conducting a prosecution before Special Court to be deemed to be a Public Prosecutor. 111. Yet another argument which has been canvassed is that unguided power would result in misuse or abuse of the provisions of the Act and as such, it would be vice of arbitrariness and hit by Article 14 of the Constitution of India and as such, Sub-Section (1) of Section 9 is liable to be quashed is an attractive argument to be brushed aside, inasmuch as, the said issue being no more res integra in the light of law laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Sanjay Dutt vs. State, (1994) 5 SCC 410 , whereunder it has been held that mere possibility of abuse of a provision would not affect its constitutionality. It has been further held: “15. It is the duty of courts to accept a construction which promotes the object of the legislation and also prevents its possible abuse even though the mere possibility of abuse of a provision does not affect its constitutionality or construction. Abuse has to be checked by constant vigilance and monitoring of individual cases and this can be done by screening of the cases by a suitable machinery at a high level. It is reported that in some States, after the decision of this Court in Kartar Singh, high-powered committees have been constituted for screening all such cases. It is hoped that this action will be taken in all the States throughout the country. Persons aware of instances of abuse, including the National Human Rights Commission, can assist by reporting such instances with particulars to that machinery for prompt and effective cure. However, that is no reason, in law, to doubt its constitutionality or to alter the proper construction when there is a felt need by Parliament for enacting such a law to cope with, and prevent terrorist and disruptive activities threatening the unity and integrity of the country.” Hence, we are of the considered view that mere fact that the discretion conferred upon the court may possibly be misused cannot be a ground to strike down the validity of the provision. It is needless to state that the Special Court is always expected to apply the provisions of the statute in a fair and reasonable manner keeping in mind the object sought to be achieved by the implementation of the enactment. (7) RE: VICARIOUS LIABILITY: 112. Vicarious liability is fixed on the Director of a company under Section 6 of the impugned Act. It describes as to who should be punished in the case of offence having been committed by a company. In other words, it would indicate as to who should be proceeded for the offence against any of the provisions of the impugned Act or any rule made thereunder. Similar provisions are found in several enactments, both Central and State. To state a few, they are, Essential Commodities Act, 1955, Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940 etc. Only for the reasons a person is a Director of the company, he does not vicariously become liable for an offence committed by the company. It must be shown, established and proved that such person against whom the prosecution is initiated was in-charge of the company and also responsible to the company in the conduct of its business. In case of the offence having committed by a partnership firm, a person entrusted with the business of the firm and responsible for conducting of business alone would be liable to be prosecuted and not all the partners. In fact, initial burden lies on the prosecution to prove that the accused was responsible for carrying on business and was during relevant time in-charge of the business. In fact, Section 6 does not provide for vicarious liability. It is trite law that penal provisions are to be strictly construed. In the instances where prosecution initiated against a person alleging that he was the Director of the firm on the day the offence was committed, if he/she is able to establish or demonstrate that on the date of the offence, he/she was not a Director, prosecution has to fail. A mere bald statement that accused is a Director in the complaint or FIR, would not suffice to constitute the offence against such person. In other words, it has to be averred specifically with all material particulars that such person against whom the prosecution has been launched is or was in-charge or is/was responsible for the company to conduct its business. In other words, it has to be averred specifically with all material particulars that such person against whom the prosecution has been launched is or was in-charge or is/was responsible for the company to conduct its business. These proposition get support from the following authoritative pronouncements of the Hon’ble Apex Court: (1) Sham Sunder and Others vs. State of Haryana, (1989) 4 SCC 630 (2) State of Haryana vs. Brij Lal Mittal and Others, (1998) 5 SCC 343 (3) S.K. Alagh vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and Others, (2008) 5 SCC 662 (4) Tamil Nadu Electricity Board vs. Rasipuram Textile Pvt. Ltd. (2008) 17 SCC 285 (5) S.M.S. Pharmaceuticals Ltd. vs. Neeta Bhalla and Another, (2005) 8 SCC 89 (6) Aneeta Hada vs. Godfather Travels and Tours Private Limited, (2012) 5 SCC 661 (7) Pepsico India Holdings Pvt. Ltd. vs. Food Inspector and Another, (2011) 1 SCC 176 (8) Pooja Ravinder Devidasani vs. State of Maharashtra and Another, (2014) 16 SCC 1 (9) In Re: State of Assam, (2018) 2 Gau. L.R. 313 (Crl. Ref. No. 1/2017) (8) RE: MENS REA: 113. It has been the contention of learned Advocate appearing for petitioners that under the impugned Act, there is no requirement of mens rea and therefore impugned Act is unconstitutional. Said contention requires to be considered for the purposes of rejection inasmuch as, Section 2(f) specifically states that every activity of grabbing land is “with a view to “ illegally take possession or enter into or create tenancies and same would amount to land grabbing. Thus, the use of the expression “with a view to “ would clearly indicate the requirement of mens rea is in built or has been incorporated as an ingredient of the offence of land grabbing. Even otherwise, the provisions that create a strict law and dispense with the requirement of mens rea is valid. Even assuming that there is no requirement of proving mens rea per se is not a ground to strike down the Act as unconstitutional. This view also gets fortified by the law laid down by Hon’ble Apex Court in the matter of Konda Lakshmana Bapuji vs. Government of Andhra Pradesh a Others, (2002) 3 SCC 258 whereunder, it has been held: “37. This view also gets fortified by the law laid down by Hon’ble Apex Court in the matter of Konda Lakshmana Bapuji vs. Government of Andhra Pradesh a Others, (2002) 3 SCC 258 whereunder, it has been held: “37. The various meanings, noted above, disclose that the term “grab” has a broad meaning - to take unauthorisedly, greedily or unfairly -and a narrow meaning of snatching forcibly or violently or by unscrupulous means. Having regard to the object of the Act and the various provisions employing that term we are of the view that the term “grab” is used in the Act in both its narrow as well as broad meanings. Thus understood, the ingredients of the expression “land grabbing” would comprise (i) the factum of an activity of taking possession of any land forcibly, violently, unscrupulously, unfairly or greedily without any lawful entitlement and (ii) the mens rea/intention “with the intention of/with a view to” (a) illegally taking possession of such lands or (b) enter into or create illegal tenancies, lease and licence agreements or any other illegal agreements in respect of such lands; or (c) to construct unauthorised structures thereon for sale or hire or (d) to give such lands to any person on (i) rental or (ii) lease and licence basis for construction, or (iii) use and occupation of unauthorised structures.” (9) RE: TRANSFER OF CASES: 114. Section 20 of the Act is also sought to be attacked on the ground of same being arbitrary and on the mere say of the State, the civil suits pending before the various Courts across the State are being transferred and thereby the jurisdiction of the civil court is being taken away. In fact, this court had an occasion to examine as to the circumstances in which the civil suit pending before the court can be transferred to the Special Court. It came to be held in W.P. No. 51187/2019 disposed of on 26.11.2019 as under: “24. From a reading of the above provisions, it is clear that unless an act of land grabbing as defined under Section 2(f) of the Act, extracted above, is committed by a person who can be termed as land grabber in terms of Section 2(e), of land as defined under section 2(d), no proceedings can be initiated. From a reading of the above provisions, it is clear that unless an act of land grabbing as defined under Section 2(f) of the Act, extracted above, is committed by a person who can be termed as land grabber in terms of Section 2(e), of land as defined under section 2(d), no proceedings can be initiated. An action can be brought against a person if only such person satisfies the definition of ‘land grabber’ under Section 2(e) of the Act, namely for committing an act of ‘land grabbing’ as per Section 2(e). 25. An action/suit/proceeding brought about by any person seeking to protect his/her interest would establish that he/she does not come within the four corners of the Act. At the most, the defence that can be taken up by the Authorities if they have been arrayed as defendants in that proceeding is to contend that the land belongs to them and the plaintiff has committed an act of land grabbing, and therefore, the plaintiff is not entitled for any protection or reliefs in the said proceedings. 26. For an action to be initiated under the Act, there has to be a positive action by the Authorities concerned. In that, there has to be positive proceedings which are initiated against a land grabber for an action of land grabbing. It is only those proceedings which are pending before any Authority or Court which are required to be transferred to the Special Court. 27. In the event of cases, where the plaintiff has filed a suit against the Governmental authorities to protect his/her/its right over property either by way of injunction, declaration or otherwise and in that suit, Governmental authorities who are arrayed as defendants take up the contention that the land in question is a Government land and/or that plaintiff had indulged in land grabbing, thereby satisfying the requirements of definition of ‘land grabber’ the Court or Authority before whom such proceeding is pending is: (i) required to record a reasoned finding as to whether the Act is attracted to that fact situation after having arrived at a conclusion that land is Government land. (ii) arrive at a conclusion that Act applies to the land in terms of Section 1(2) of the Act i.e. land as defined under Section 2(d) of the Act. (ii) arrive at a conclusion that Act applies to the land in terms of Section 1(2) of the Act i.e. land as defined under Section 2(d) of the Act. (iii) Plaintiff has committed an act of grabbing the land in term and section 2(b), without lawful entitlement with a view to illegally take possession of such land or enter into or create illegal tenancies or lease and licences agreements construct unauthorized structures thereon for sale or hire, or give such land to any person for rent or lease or licence basis for construction or use and occupation. 28. In other words, Court or authority has to arrive at a conclusion that activity of grabbing of any land is without any lawful entitlement and with a view to illegally take possession of such land. 29. Thus, necessarily if a person is claiming a right by way of a lawful entitlement through any valid document issued or granted in favour of such person, which though disputed by the Authorities concerned on the ground that such a grant, allotment or the like could not have been made in favour of such persons, so long as the said document relied upon by the plaintiff is not countered or negated on the basis of fraud or forgery and the claim of the plaintiff being one of a lawful entitlement, such a proceedings pending before competent Civil Court cannot be transferred under the Act to the Special Court. 30. If any action of land grabbing has not been committed, plaintiff therein cannot be termed to be a land grabber. There is no unlawful act committed. Hence, in terms of Section 7(1) of the Act, Special Court would not have jurisdiction in the matter. Section 7(1) of the Act is reproduced hereunder for easy reference: “7(1) Constitution of Special Courts - (1) The Government may, for the purpose of providing speedy enquiry into any alleged act of land grabbing, and trial of cases in respect of the ownership and title to, or lawful possession of, the land grabbed and those offences specified in Chapter XIV-A of the Karnataka Land Revenue Act, 1964, by notification, constitute a Special Court.” 31. In such circumstances, any such pending action cannot be transferred to the Special Court in terms of Section 20 of the Act. In such circumstances, any such pending action cannot be transferred to the Special Court in terms of Section 20 of the Act. The court before whom the matter is pending would have to proceed with the same in the ordinary course. 32. Under similar circumstances in W.P. No. 50704/2019, disposed of by the bench on 19.11.2019 we have held: “6. Having observed XXXX & JMFC, Mandya. Averments made in the plaint as extracted by the Special Court would disclose that plaintiff had specifically contended that suit schedule property was granted to him by Tahsildar, Mandya by grant order RUOL 674/98-99 on 16.09.2002. It is also contended that by way of such grant he has been in possession and enjoyment of said land and he has also installed I.P. set and has raised coconut, mango and chikkoo trees. In other words, it is the specific case of plaintiff that land in question i.e. suit schedule property was granted to him. For initiating proceedings under the Karnataka Land Grabbing Prohibition Act, 2011, provisions of Sections 2(e), 2(f) or 2(i) would be subject to such person falling within the definition of Section 2(e) and 2(f) of the Act. To put it differently, Court adjudicating the lis has to form an opinion that land which is in question is a government land and plaintiff/defendant, as the case may be, would fall within the definition of Section 2(e) or 2(f) and only on such opinion being formed or finding recorded Civil Court will seize to have jurisdiction and only such matters requires to be transferred to the Special Court constituted under the Act as prescribed under Section 20. In the absence of such opinion or finding recorded by the Civil Court, there cannot be any transfer/simplicitor.” 33. The above being the position of law, the action of Prl. Civil Judge and JMFC, Mandya said to be acting on the proceedings of Principal District and Sessions Judge, Mandya transferring records in O.S. No. 105/2015 to the Special Court for disposal by referring to a Notification issued by the Government of Karnataka dated 10.08.2015 and the circular of this Court dated 22.03.2017 in a perfunctory manner is impermissible. The circular of this Court dated 22.03.2017 does not withdraw and transfer the cases to the Special Court. The circular of this Court dated 22.03.2017 does not withdraw and transfer the cases to the Special Court. The said circular only informs the jurisdictional District and Sessions Judges of the constitution of the Court and instructs such Judges to withdraw and transfer the cases “falling under the Act” to the Special Court at Bengaluru. It is therefore incumbent upon the Presiding Officers where a particular case is pending before said courts to arrive at a conclusion that particular case would satisfy the requirement of Section 20 of the Act. Only after recording such satisfaction, the Presiding Officer of such Court would be empowered to transfer the matter to the Special Court. 34. In the present case, there is no objective satisfaction of the requirement of Section 20 of the Act recorded by the Prl. Civil Judge and JMFC, Mandya and trial Judge has proceeded to transfer the case as if the circular dated 22.03.2017 withdraws all the cases and transfers the same to the Special Court constituted under the Act, when in fact, it does not. The said circular categorically makes it clear that only such of the cases falling under the Act are to be transferred. The determination thereof, has to be made by a judicial order by the Presiding Officer and it cannot mechanically transfer all matters merely because there is an allegation of land grabbing by any of the parties to the lis. 35. Any Court or Authority intending to transfer any proceeding to the Special Court has to satisfy itself and pass an order in terms of what is stated hereinabove. In the absence thereof, there cannot be an administrative order of transfer of a case. In other words, it has to be a judicial order passed after necessary application of mind and law for transferring the matter. 36. In view of the fact that there is no judicial order passed and there is no judicial application of mind to the factual aspects on the part of the Prl. Civil Judge and JMFC, Mandya, in the manner observed by us hereinabove for transferring O.S. No. 105/2015, the order of transfer made to the Special Court is not sustainable. Hence, we are of the considered view that Judgment passed by the Special Court in LGC (T) No. 1627/2018 arising out of O.S. No. 105/2015 is erroneous and same is to be set-aside.” 115. Hence, we are of the considered view that Judgment passed by the Special Court in LGC (T) No. 1627/2018 arising out of O.S. No. 105/2015 is erroneous and same is to be set-aside.” 115. In the light of the law laid down in the aforesaid writ petition, we are of the considered view that wherever the matters/suits which was pending before the authorities or the civil courts, which has since been transferred contrary to the dicta laid down in the aforesaid case would require re-examination or re-consideration by the Special Court. Hence, we direct the Special Court to examine such cases and pass appropriate orders keeping in mind the observations made by this Court in W.P. No. 51187/2019 disposed of on 26.11.2019. The petitioners are also at liberty to move the Special Court for appropriate orders being passed in this regard. (10) RE: THOUGH SECTION 7 MANDATES CONSTITUTION OF ADDITIONAL BENCHES ACROSS THE STATE, SAME HAS NOT BEEN CONSTITUTED: 116. Section 7 of the KLGP Act 2011 empowers the State Government to constitute a Special Court. Sub-Section (4) of Section 7 empowers the State to constitute additional Benches of Special Court by issuance of notification in respect of such area as may be specified therein. Substituted Sub-Section (3) of Section 9 speaks of acts of land grabbing to be tried only by the “Special Courts constituted for the area in which the land is situated, or where there are more Special Courts than one for such area, by such one of them as may be specified in this behalf by the Government.” The Government being conscious of this fact, while sustaining the impugned legislation, has placed on record by way of written submission dated 23.12.2020 (Annexure-R1 to R3) indicating about 7878 cases having been registered for the years 2016-2020 and 3429 cases having been disposed of, leaving the pendency of the cases at 4449. The person alleged or accused of having either encroached or usurped the Government land, in any remote part of the State of Karnataka, would now be required to travel to the capital of the State of Karnataka namely, Bengaluru which would be not only onerous but also financially burdensome. The person alleged or accused of having either encroached or usurped the Government land, in any remote part of the State of Karnataka, would now be required to travel to the capital of the State of Karnataka namely, Bengaluru which would be not only onerous but also financially burdensome. There are many instances where the small holding farmers who either by sheer ignorance due to lack of knowledge would be tilling a piece of land adjacent to the land owned by them or granted by the appropriate Government and in such circumstances when they are visited with the prosecution or civil case is filed, they are required to travel from the remote corners which would not only be difficult but would also cause undue and untold hardship and correspondingly pinch their pocket and they have to travel to the Special Court located in Bengaluru at the cost of their day’s livelihood. Keeping this in mind, the legislature in its wisdom, has foreseen such circumstances and has provided under Section 7 of the impugned Act, vesting the power with the State to constitute such additional Benches as it may deem fit. Hence, we deem it fit and appropriate to issue suitable direction to the State hereunder to constitute Special Courts at the District level by taking into relevant facts like number of cases, feasibility, necessity, etc. (11) RE: ABATEMENT OF PROCEEDINGS. 117. Unamended KLGP Act 2011 did not provide for abatement of certain proceedings. However, under the amended Act 30 of 2020, Section 22 has been introduced and it reads: “22. (11) RE: ABATEMENT OF PROCEEDINGS. 117. Unamended KLGP Act 2011 did not provide for abatement of certain proceedings. However, under the amended Act 30 of 2020, Section 22 has been introduced and it reads: “22. Abatement - All proceedings pending and contemplated with respect to land as excluded under the proviso to sub-clause (d) of Section 2 of this Act, on the date of commencement of the Karnataka Land Grabbing Prohibition (Amendment) Act, 2020 shall stand abated.” In the light of certain proceedings pending and contemplated in respect of land as excluded under sub-clauses (a) and (b) of proviso to clause (d) of Section 2 of the KLGP Act 2011 providing for such proceedings being excluded from the purview of the Act, it would be necessary to extract proviso to clause (d) of Section 2 and sub-clauses (a) and (b) inserted thereunder: (d) “Land” includes: (i) land belonging to the Government, Wakf or the Hindu Religious Institutions and Charitable Endowments, a local authority, a statutory or non statutory body owned, controlled or managed by the Government. (ii) rights in or over land, benefits to arise out of land, and buildings, structures and other things attached to the earth or permanently fastened to anything attached to the earth; Provided that ‘land’ shall not include lands in respect of which applications for grant are pending on the date of commencement of this Act: (a) under sections 94A, 94B, 94C and 94CC of the Karnataka Land Revenue Act, 1964 (Karnataka Act 12 of 1964). (b) under the Scheduled Tribes and other Traditional Forest Dwellers (Recognition of Forest Rights) Act, 2006 (Central Act 2 of 2007).” 118. A plain reading of the above provisions would clearly indicate that all proceedings pending and contemplated with respect to land is excluded from the purview of the Act and the proceedings if any pending before the Special Court in this regard would stand abated. In the following cases, it would clearly indicate that either the applicant has filed application seeking regularisation under the provisions of the Karnataka Land Revenue Act, 1964 or the Karnataka Land Grant Rules or the Scheduled Tribes and other Traditional Forest Dwellers (Recognition of Forest Rights) Act, 2006 etc. In the following cases, it would clearly indicate that either the applicant has filed application seeking regularisation under the provisions of the Karnataka Land Revenue Act, 1964 or the Karnataka Land Grant Rules or the Scheduled Tribes and other Traditional Forest Dwellers (Recognition of Forest Rights) Act, 2006 etc. before various authorities and said applications have been either accepted by the Committees or it is yet to be adjudicated by the appropriate authorities: S. No. Writ Petitions 1 W.P. No. 27437 of 2017 2 W.P. No. 56296 of 2017 3 W.P. No. 9194 of 2018 4 W.P. No. 22025 of 2018 5 W.P. No. 26054 of 2018 6 W.P. No. 26545 of 2018 7 W.P. No. 26546 of 2018 8 W.P. NO. 29281 of 2018 9 W.P. No. 33339 of 2018 10 W.P. No. 36737 of 2018 11 W.P. No. 39179 of 2018 12 W.P. No. 43352 of 2018 13 W.P. No. 49786 of 2018 14 W.P. No. 51528 of 2018 15 W.P. No. 55172 of 2018 16 W.P. No. 302 of 2019 17 W.P. No. 3463 of 2019 18 W.P. No. 3484 of 2019 19 W.P. No. 5393 of 2019 20 W.P. No. 8821 of 2019 21 W.P. No. 12974 of 2019 22 W.P. No. 22988 of 2019 23 W.P. No. 27336 of 2019 24 W.P. No. 27921 of 2019 25 W.P. No. 28900 of 2019 26 W.P. No. 29471 of 2019 27 W.P. No. 35575 of 2019 28 W.P. No. 35579 of 2019 29 W.P. No. 42273 of 2019 30 W.P. No. 51878 of 2019 31 W.P. No. 51879 of 2019 32 W.P. No. 52011 of 2019 33 W.P. No. 52566 of 2019 34 W.P. No. 45583 of 2019 35 W.P. No. 220 of 2020 Hence, aforesaid petitioners are entitled to the relief sought for. SUMMARY OF OUR CONCLUSIONS: 119. In the light of aforestated discussion, we have summarized our conclusion as under: (a) We uphold the constitutional validity of the provisions of the Karnataka Land Grabbing Act, 2011 (Karnataka Act 38 of 2014) as amended by Act 30 of 2020 except to the extent of striking down part of Sub-Section (4) of Section 9 namely: “But additional evidence, if any adduced in the civil proceedings shall not be considered by the Special Court while determining the criminal liability” on the ground of arbitrariness and vagueness. (b) The admissibility of the evidence as prescribed under Section 9(4) is ordered to be read as: “The evidence admitted in civil proceedings may be made use of while determining the criminal liability and not vice versa.” (c) The abatement of proceedings referred to in Section 22 by excluding the proceedings with respect to the lands covered under the proviso to sub-clause (d) of Sub-Section (2) shall also mean and include, ‘the proceedings under the Karnataka Land Reforms Act, 1961, the Karnataka Land Revenue Act, 1964, Land Grant Rules Dharkasth Rules or any other Rules for grant of land, which has attained finality and not pending in appeal or revision before any other authority or forum’ and Section 2(d) proviso together clause (a) and (b) along with Section 22 shall be read as such. (d) The provision of Section 9(5)(b) as amended having been upheld, the expression “summary manner” occurring in Clause (b) and expression “shall be tried in accordance with the procedure for trial of warrant cases” occurring in proviso thereunder is ordered to be read as: “The Special Court may try every offence under the Act as if it is a warrant case and only in exceptional circumstances, try in a summary manner for reasons to be recorded.” (e) We hold that all other Sections which are subject matter of challenge are legal and valid. 120. Having summarised the legal contentions as noted herein above, we now proceed to deal with few of the writ petitions on facts relating to different facets and angles in the light of proposition of law laid down, as discussed herein above. RE: W.P. No. 47747/2017: 121. Petitioner claims to have entered into Joint Development Agreement on 15.03.1995 with Hanumanthaiah and family to develop the property bearing Sy. No. 37 measuring 6 acres 21 guntas which is morefully described in the petition schedule and has sought for quashing of the order dated 08.03.2017 passed by the Special Court on the ground of petitioners having encroached the Storm Water Drain. The issue in this writ petition relates to disputed question of fact, which cannot be gone into by this court under Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India and as such, the petition is liable to be dismissed. The legal issues relating to the constitutional validity urged in the writ petition has already been discussed in detail herein above. The legal issues relating to the constitutional validity urged in the writ petition has already been discussed in detail herein above. Subject to the observations made on the legal issues raised, this petition stands dismissed. Re: W.P. No. 433/2017 122. Petitioner claims to have acquired title to the property bearing Sy. No. 183, Phodi No. 285 of Halagevoderahalli village, Kengeri Hobli, Bangalore South Taluk under registered sale deed and after conversion of the same, the revenue records have been mutated in the name of M/s. Shakthi Hill Resorts. The State is contending that the petitioner has encroached Sy. No. 8 of Vodderapalya and as such, a complaint has been lodged before Subrahmanyanagar Police Station under Section 192A of the Karnataka Land Revenue Act, 1964 in CC No. 4406/2013. When said proceedings were pending, the impugned Act came into force and as such, proceedings came to be transferred to the Special Court. Petitioner is said to have filed a suit in O.S. No. 3595/2007 against respondents-1 to 3 herein and jurisdictional police and the suit came to be decreed by judgment and decree dated 12.09.2014. Whereas, the State is contending that petitioner has encroached the Government land. This is an issue which will have to be examined by the Special Court and the said disputed question of fact cannot be gone into by this court under Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India and as such, the petition is dismissed. 122.1 The judgment and decree passed in O.S. No. 3595/2007 which is said to be enuring to the benefit of petitioner can be made use of by the petitioner in the proceedings pending before the Special Court. The legal issues relating to the constitutional validity urged in the writ petition has already been discussed in detail herein above. Subject to the observations made on the legal issues raised, this petition stands dismissed. RE: W.P. No. 10728/2017 123. Petitioner claims to have purchased the land measuring 3 acres and 19.35 guntas in Sy. No. 95/1 and 95/2 situated at Veerasandra village, Attibele Hobli, Anekal Taluk under registered sale deed dated 26.07.2007. It is also contended that prior to purchase, it had been converted to nonagricultural purposes by the original owners. The dispute in this petition relates to Sy. No. 99 of Veerasandra village, Anekal Taluk. The petitioner is claiming to be not in possession of any part of Sy. It is also contended that prior to purchase, it had been converted to nonagricultural purposes by the original owners. The dispute in this petition relates to Sy. No. 99 of Veerasandra village, Anekal Taluk. The petitioner is claiming to be not in possession of any part of Sy. No. 99 and the State is contending that petitioner has encroached 24.5 guntas in Sy. No. 99 and attempting to demolish the structure. The issue in this writ petition relates to disputed question of fact, which cannot be gone into by this court under Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India and as such, the petition is liable to be dismissed. The legal issues relating to the constitutional validity urged in the writ petition has already been discussed in detail herein above. Subject to the observations made on the legal issues raised, this petition stands dismissed. 123.1 There is an interim order passed in W.P. No. 20892/2016 and 21084/2016 (KLR-RES) restraining the respondents from demolishing the property of the petitioner. The said order is in force as on date. Subject to the final orders passed in the said writ petition, the interim order would enure to the benefit of petitioner notwithstanding the disposal of this writ petition. RE: W.P. No. 15532/2017: 124. Petitioner is a House Building Cooperative Society and had negotiated to purchase 100 acres of land in Adigarakallahalli village and claims to have purchased either by itself or by its representatives upon acquisition proceedings, the plan came to be approved for 87 acres of land and is said to have formed layout and allotted sites. Fifth respondent was allotted site pursuant to order dated 09.01.2015 and he being a member of the society, he is said to have filed a complaint before the Karnataka Land Grabbing Prohibitions Special Court contending that Sy. No. 47 is encroached. Petitioner is said to have filed an application to get itself to have impleaded. The said proceedings is pending before Special Court. As to whether Sy. No. 47 of Adigara Kallahalli village has been encroached or not is a disputed question of fact. In other words, the issue in this writ petition relates to disputed question of fact, which cannot be gone into by this court under Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India and as such, the petition is liable to be dismissed. No. 47 of Adigara Kallahalli village has been encroached or not is a disputed question of fact. In other words, the issue in this writ petition relates to disputed question of fact, which cannot be gone into by this court under Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India and as such, the petition is liable to be dismissed. The legal issues relating to the constitutional validity urged in the writ petition has already been discussed in detail herein above. Subject to the observations made on the legal issues raised, this petition stands dismissed. RE: W.P. No. 16281/2017: 125. The land bearing Sy. No. 7 of Doddabele village, Kengeri Hobli came to be granted in favour of one Sri. Narayani to an extent of 39 acres 18 guntas. He sold an extent of 15 acres in favor of Mrs. Bhima Mosa in the year 1933 as original grantee failed to pay land revenue to Government, it was forfeited and subsequently, the grantee paid the revenue to the Government on 12.07.1937. The purchaser Mrs.Bhima Mosa executed gift deed on 11.03.1938 in favour of Mrs.Elu Stormier and Joseph Stormier. One Mr. Chennaiah and his brother Mr. Tayappa purchased 5 acres out of 15 acres that was sold by the grantee on 25.06.1944, upon which it was renumbered as Sy. No. 7/2. First petitioner’s husband and father of petitioners-2 to 4 purchased an extent of 4 acres 6 guntas under registered sale deed dated 11.12.1992 from Mr. Chennaiah. 125.1 Proceedings in R.A. No. 179/1994-95 was initiated by the Assistant Commissioner to ascertain as to whether Sy. No. 7/5 of Doddabele village is actually a Government land or not. By order dated 26.10.2012 it was held that Sy. No. 7/2 owned by petitioners as a private land and ordered for restoration of revenue entry. The said order challenged in Writ petition by third respondent came to be dismissed on 16.11.2015. In the meanwhile, the land was converted for non-agricultural purposes on 09.07.2013. The appeal filed by the third respondent challenging the mutation entry in favour of the petitioners has been dismissed. Thus, it would emerge from the records that it is a land which was granted in favour of the predecessor in title of the petitioners and the petitioners on facts, are entitled to the relief sought for. Hence, writ petition deserves to be allowed. Accordingly, writ petition is allowed. Thus, it would emerge from the records that it is a land which was granted in favour of the predecessor in title of the petitioners and the petitioners on facts, are entitled to the relief sought for. Hence, writ petition deserves to be allowed. Accordingly, writ petition is allowed. However, the issue of constitutional validity has already been upheld as discussed herein above. RE: W.P. No. 17180/2017 126. The land bearing Sy. No. 29 and 31 of Keeranegere village, Maralavadi Hobli, Kanakapura Taluk measuring 1 acre 5 guntas and 21 guntas was “Sarkari Beelu.” It is so reflected in all the revenue records. An entry has been made by the third respondent by mutating the revenue records of the said land in favour of the father of fourth respondent. It is alleged that the said entry has been made in collusion with the revenue authorities. The appeal filed by the villagers before the appellate authority came to be dismissed and the Deputy Commissioner by order dated 19.08.2002 allowed the revision petition and ordered for restoration of the name of the Government. This order was set aside in W.P. No. 34109/2002 by order dated 05.08.2005. 126.1 The Deputy Commissioner once again initiated action for restoration of the revenue entries and for resumption of the subject lands. Hence, fifth respondent filed W.P. No. 11660-661/2010 challenging the action of the revenue authorities, which writ petition came to be disposed of with an observation that by following the procedure contemplated in law namely, under Section 136(3) of the Karnataka Land Revenue Act, 1964 steps can be taken. Hence, Deputy Commissioner is said to have initiated proceedings, who held that fifth respondent is entitled for his name being entered in the revenue records and as such, dismissed the revision petition. On the advent of the impugned legislation complaint has been filed by the petitioner before the Special Court. The Special Court after appreciation of the entire material, has refused to take cognizance of the offence alleged and held it does not arise at all and accordingly, the complaint is dismissed. 126.2 In view of the fact that proceedings under Section 136(3) having attained finality in favour of fourth respondent, the claim of the petitioner ought to fail and as such, we find there is no infirmity in the order passed by the Special Court calling for our interference. Hence, petition is dismissed. 126.2 In view of the fact that proceedings under Section 136(3) having attained finality in favour of fourth respondent, the claim of the petitioner ought to fail and as such, we find there is no infirmity in the order passed by the Special Court calling for our interference. Hence, petition is dismissed. RE: W.P. No. 21279/2017 127. Petitioner has filed an application in Form No. 50 seeking regularization way back on 19.08.1991. The revenue authorities are seized of the matter and it is under consideration. The said claim of the petitioner falls within the definition of Section 2(d) and on account of said application having not been disposed of, the proceedings before the Special Court abates vide Section 22 of KLGP Act 2011 and petition deserves to be allowed and accordingly, it is allowed. RE: W.P. No. 23095/2017 128. Two acres of land in Sy. No. 98 of Kumbalgodu village came to be allotted by the Deputy Commissioner in favour of 10 persons by O.M. dated 30.05.1953. In the year 1954, Grant certificate came to be issued in favour of Mr. Venkatachalaiah, Mr. Hombarangaiah, Mr. Hanumanthaiah and Mr. Kenchaiah. Phodi proceedings initiated resulted in new Sy. No. being assigned in Sy. Nos. 168 to 171. On 24.08.2006, the Government granted permission to Mr. Muttahanumaiah to sell the land bearing Sy. No. 168. Likewise, permission was granted to Smt. Kempamma, wife of late Mr. Venkatachalaiah, Mr. Hombarangaiah and Smt. Lakkamma, wife of late Kenchaiah to sell the land in Sy. No. 169, 170 and 171 respectively by order dated 17.10.2012, 04.05.2015, and 05.09.2006 respectively. Hence, Smt. Lakkamma and others sold land bearing Sy. No. 171 to Mr. Victor Lobo and he in turn, sold 2 acres in favour of Mr. Prakash Nath @ Shekarappa, petitioner herein. Second respondent has filed a complaint alleging that land in Sy. No. 98 (Old No.) that it was not granted to anybody. The Special Court by order dated 23.01.2017 (Annexure-B) has taken cognizance of the offence whereunder, it has recorded as under: “The averments made in the complaint is that the land in Sy. No. 98 of Kumbalgodu village, Bangalore South Taluk measures 80 acres 06 guntas and it is recorded in the Government records that the same is a Mufath Kaval. This land measuring 80 acres 6 guntas was never granted to anybody and at any point of time. No. 98 of Kumbalgodu village, Bangalore South Taluk measures 80 acres 06 guntas and it is recorded in the Government records that the same is a Mufath Kaval. This land measuring 80 acres 6 guntas was never granted to anybody and at any point of time. It is prima-facie seen that some local persons or outsiders in collusion with the revenue authorities might have fabricated illegal documents and based on the same and after getting phodi and conversion of land, have grabbed the land.” 128.1 This order cannot be held as one without due application of mind. However, this court would not examine the probable defence at this stage and it would be open for the petitioners to establish before the Special Court as to the manner in which they have acquired title and/or predecessors in title having been granted land in question. We have not expressed any opinion with regard to merits of the case. Hence, writ petition stands dismissed. All contentions of both parties are left open. RE: W.P. No. 23800/2017 129. It is the contention of the petitioners that land measuring 6 acres 34 guntas in Sy. No. 58 of Byrathi village, Bidarahalli Hobli, Bangalore East Taluk was sold to one Sri. Chick Anneppa by public auction on 07.05.1985 and on his death, the revenue records were mutated in the name of second petitioner and his family members in the year 2005-06. On 08.03.2007, second petitioner and his family members sold the land in favour of first petitioner and accordingly, revenue records were mutated in the name of first petitioner. On account of an application being filed for survey and fixing the boundaries and though it was recommended by the Tahsildar, the Assistant Commissioner passed an order for mutating the revenue records in the name of the Government. Hence, first petitioner filed an appeal before the Special Deputy Commissioner, who allowed the same by order dated 03.07.2009. This was challenged by the State before Karnataka Appellate Tribunal under Section 50 of the Karnataka Land Revenue Act, which came to be dismissed by order dated 26.02.2015 and undisputedly, there was no challenge to this order or in other words, it has attained finality. 129.1 However, second respondent filed a complaint before the Special Court, upon which the cognizance has been taken. 129.1 However, second respondent filed a complaint before the Special Court, upon which the cognizance has been taken. When the order passed by the Appellate Tribunal has attained finality, there was no justification for the jurisdictional Special Court to have proceeded to initiate proceedings under the impugned enactment. As such, the proceedings pending before the jurisdictional Court cannot be continued. The petitioners succeed and accordingly, the petition is allowed. RE: W.P. No. 25219/2017 130. It is contended by the petitioners that the land bearing Sy. No. 15 measuring 20 acres was granted on 12.11.1981. The Special Court based on a newspaper article has taken cognizance of the offence. The order of the Special Court taking cognizance of the offence cannot be held as one without the application of mind. It is for the petitioners to demonstrate before the Special Court the alleged grant made in their favour and proviso to clause (b) of Sub-Section (5) of Section 9 of KLGP Act 2011 empowers the Special Court to dismiss the complaint or drop the proceedings if it is of the opinion that there are no sufficient grounds for proceeding. As such, it would be open for the petitioners to establish the purported grant and its genuineness, which cannot be gone into in this writ petition. The issue in this writ petition relates to disputed question of fact, which cannot be gone into by this court under Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India and as such, the petition is liable to be dismissed. The legal issues relating to the constitutional validity urged in the writ petition has already been discussed in detail herein above. Subject to the observations made on the legal issues raised, this petition stands dismissed. RE: W.P. No. 27437/2017 131. In this petition, undisputedly, petitioner has filed an application under Section 94A of the Karnataka Land Revenue Act, 1964 for grant of 2 acres of land in Sy. No. 203 of Singena Agrahara village in Form No. 53. In that view of the matter, petitioner would be protected under Section 22 read with Section 2(d) of the KLGP Act 2011 and the proceedings before the Special Court stands abated. In other words, petitioner is entitled to the relief sought for. Hence, writ petition is allowed. RE: W.P. No. 27573/2017 132. The composite land bearing Sy. Nos. In that view of the matter, petitioner would be protected under Section 22 read with Section 2(d) of the KLGP Act 2011 and the proceedings before the Special Court stands abated. In other words, petitioner is entitled to the relief sought for. Hence, writ petition is allowed. RE: W.P. No. 27573/2017 132. The composite land bearing Sy. Nos. 41 and 42 of Kaniminike village, Kengeri Hobli, Bangalore South Taluk measuring around 300 acres are said to have been given to Inamdars and one of the Inamdars by name Sri. Narasimharao executed a sale deed on 28.09.1956 in favour of Sri. Lakshmaiah. The said Sri. Lakshmaiah and one Mr. Venkatappa conveyed the land to petitioner No. 1 and Sri. N.J. Joseph under two separate sale deeds dated 12.08.1965, pursuant to which revenue records were mutated. The said Sri. N.J.Joseph is said to have conveyed half share in his property in favour of petitioner No. 2 by sale deed dated 31.03.1975 and on his demise, his wife and children have executed release deed on 24.03.2010 in favour of the second petitioner and accordingly, revenue records were mutated. Petitioners are claiming to have planted more than 1600 coconut trees which are aged about 35 to 37 years and are carrying on agricultural operation. 132.1 When the things thus stood, petitioners are said to have been visited with an order dated 31.05.2010 passed by second respondent holding that 23 acres 33 guntas is a Government land and the petitioners have encroached the same by violating Section 192A of the Karnataka Land Revenue Act. Writ petition was filed in W.P. No. 59242-243/2016 challenging the said order and same is said to be pending. On the advent of the impugned legislation, the proceedings have been initiated against petitioners. As to whether the land claimed by the petitioners is encroached and/or it is a Government land is a disputed question of fact which cannot be gone into by this court under Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India and as such, the petition is liable to be dismissed. The legal issues relating to the constitutional validity urged in the writ petition has already been discussed in detail herein above. Subject to the observations made on the legal issues raised, this petition stands dismissed. RE: W.P. No. 32134/2017 133. The legal issues relating to the constitutional validity urged in the writ petition has already been discussed in detail herein above. Subject to the observations made on the legal issues raised, this petition stands dismissed. RE: W.P. No. 32134/2017 133. Petitioners are claiming to be the absolute owners of the property bearing Khata No. 1194/1095 situated at Ward No. 29, III Division, Chickballapur Town and claims to have acquired title from Sri. Mallikarjuna Chinnappa Charitable Trust, under a registered sale deed dated 16.03.2003 and having purchased the same for consideration of Rs. 50 lakhs. The khata is also said to have been mutated to the name of petitioners and taxes are said to have been paid. The title is based on the registered partition deed dated 16.12.1923 traceable to the predecessor in title of the petitioners namely, Sri. Chikkabasappa, Sri. Doddachinnappa and Sri. Chikkachinnappa, who are said to have constituted a charitable Trust in the year 1964 and after having filed a petition under Section 92(1) for grant of permission for sale of property in favour of petitioners and in terms of the judgment and decree dated 23.11.2001 whereunder permission was granted, the property has been sold for a valuable consideration of Rs. 50 lakhs. An application was filed by the petitioners to construct a cinema theatre and at that point of time, the Tahsildar is said to have given a negative report behind the back of the petitioners. 133.1 When the matter stood thus, respondents-5 to 7 have filed a complaint against petitioners under Section 9 of the impugned Act and after calling for a detailed report from Deputy Commissioner, which was submitted on 20.05.2017 and 08.06.2017, the Special Court is said to have taken cognizance of the offence. In the reports dated 20.05.2017 and 08.06.2017 (Annexure-D and D1) the Deputy Commissioner and Municipal Commissioner have opined that the property has been sold violating the terms and conditions of the Trust deed. 133.2 It is an undisputed fact that the property which was sold in favour of petitioners was by virtue of the order passed by the competent court in a Scheme suit i.e. O.S. No. 2/2001 and when the said judgment and decree has become final, it is not open for the authorities to unsettle the settled position that too, by invoking impugned legislation. On facts, the petitioners are entitled to the relief sought for. On facts, the petitioners are entitled to the relief sought for. However, it is needless to state that respondents-5 to 7 would be at liberty to proceed/agitate their claim if any before the competent civil court if there has been any violation of the conditions of the Trust deed by the erstwhile Trustees. Hence, petitioners are entitled to the relief sought for. Accordingly, writ petition stands allowed. RE: W.P. NO. 32849/2017 134. Petitioners are claiming to be the lawful co-owners of coffee estate measuring 431 acres 7 guntas spread over 44 distinct Sy. Nos. and are claiming right through inheritance. It is contended that the partnership firm had purchased the lands under registered sale deed dated 03.11.1965 and in the year 1999 the Forest Guard, Sangameshwarpet Branch, Balehonnur is said to have determined that certain lands in Kadavanti village had been unauthorisedly encroached by the father of the petitioners. It was determined that the purported encroachment was to the extent of 165 acres. As to whether there is encroachment, if so, to what extent and when the said encroachment has taken place are all disputed questions of fact, which cannot be gone into by this court under Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India and as such, the petition is liable to be dismissed. The legal issues relating to the constitutional validity urged in the writ petition has already been discussed in detail herein above. Subject to the observations made on the legal issues raised, this petition stands dismissed. RE: W.P. No. 33085/2017 135. It is stated that petitioner’s grandfather Sri. Hanumanthappa was the tenant of certain inam lands including Sy. No. 47 measuring 24 acres 37 guntas of Pantarapalya village, Kengeri Hobli, Bangalore South Taluk and land Tribunal is said to have rejected the claim and affirmed in W.P. Nos. 37145 and 37229/2016 by order dated 05.04.2017. The said order is now said to be pending in W.A. Nos. 2344-2347/2017 and the order of the learned Single Judge is said to have been stayed. Petitioner’s claim for grant of occupancy rights is said to be still pending. 135.1 On the advent of the impugned Act, the proceedings have been initiated. In view of our finding that in respect of matters relating to tenancy pending before the jurisdictional Court, the proceedings before the Special Court cannot be proceeded with. Petitioner’s claim for grant of occupancy rights is said to be still pending. 135.1 On the advent of the impugned Act, the proceedings have been initiated. In view of our finding that in respect of matters relating to tenancy pending before the jurisdictional Court, the proceedings before the Special Court cannot be proceeded with. The outcome of the proceedings before the Special Court could be regulated on the basis of the decision that would be rendered in the pending Writ Appeal Nos. 2344-2347/2017. In the event of appellant not succeeding in the said appeal, the proceedings before the Special Court which has now been initiated in GLC (S) No. 14/2016 (suo motu) would stand revived by itself or the respondent -authorities would be at liberty to seek for revival of said proceedings. Accordingly, proceedings before Special Court stands disposed of with these observations. RE: W.P. No. 34202/2017 136. Petitioner claims to have purchased the land measuring 2 acres 30 guntas and kharab 26 guntas in Madanayakanahalli village, Dasanapura Hobli, Bangalore North Taluk. Second respondent is said to have filed a suit O.S. No. 472/2014 against petitioner and others seeking declaration that plaintiffs are the owners of 1 acre 20 guntas out of 4.02 guntas in Sy. No. 17 including 31 gunas kharab and to declare the sale deed dated 11.03.2002 as not binding. During pendency of the said suit, a petition under Section 9 has been filed by the second respondent before the Special Court against petitioner and 19 others alleging that respondents-1 and 2 before the Special Court have grabbed 6 guntas in Sy. No. 17 and 19 guntas in Sy. No. 16/3 kharab land and after formation of layout, respondents-1 and 2 have sold sites to respondents-3 to 20 who are attempting to put up construction. Based on the order passed by the Tahsildar, Bangalore Taluk dated 08.11.2013 and the revenue sketch produced by the petitioner which supported the allegation made in the petition, the cognizance has been taken by the Special Court. Based on the order passed by the Tahsildar, Bangalore Taluk dated 08.11.2013 and the revenue sketch produced by the petitioner which supported the allegation made in the petition, the cognizance has been taken by the Special Court. As to what is the nature of kharab and whether it is apt and appropriate to proceed further cannot be gone into by this Court, since it is a disputed question of fact requiring scrutiny of evidence and it would be open for the Special Court to examine the same and if it is of the opinion that there are no sufficient grounds for proceeding, it can dismiss the complaint or drop the proceedings as contemplated under proviso to clause (b) of sub-section (5) of Section 9 of KLGP Act 2011. Subject to these observations, petition stands disposed of. RE: W.P. No. 35384/2017 137. The suo motu proceedings came to be initiated against the petitioner and summons was issued as per order dated 07.02.2017. Petitioner who is the Managing Director of the company M/s. Prestige Estates Projects Limited has been issued with the summons. Section 6 of the impugned Act would indicate that where the offence is committed by a company, every person who at the time of offence was committed, was in-charge and was responsible to the company for the conduct or business of the company, as well as the company, would be deemed to be guilty of the offence and shall be liable to be proceeded and punished accordingly. 137.2 It is trite law that the order taking cognizance should be self evident about the complicity of the person who is being arraigned as accused or in other words, it should disclose that the accused was either the person responsible to the company for the conduct of its day to day business or it was committed with his knowledge. In the absence of these ingredients, the order of issuance of summons by taking cognizance of the offence would be illegal and as such, the proceedings cannot be continued. In the absence of these ingredients, the order of issuance of summons by taking cognizance of the offence would be illegal and as such, the proceedings cannot be continued. 137.3 In the instant case, the impugned order dated 27.09.2016 as well as the subsequent orders passed by the Special Court does not disclose either petitioner having committed the offence of land grabbing or the same having been done by the company at the instance of petitioner and petitioner being the Director, was aware of this fact and as such, he was responsible to the company for conduct of its business. Hence, the impugned order dated 27.09.2016 (Annexure-B) and the proceedings pending against petitioner before Special Court cannot be sustained and it is quashed. Accordingly, writ petition is allowed. RE: W.P. No. 36324/2017 138. Petitioner claims to be the owner of the land bearing Sy. No. 38 situated at 15th Cross, 2nd Block, R.T. Nagar, Bangalore. It is stated that the land originally bearing Sy. No. 38/2 measuring 3 acres 14 guntas was acquired by Sri. M.R. Govindaraju on 18.05.1949 under registered partition deed and it was converted on 10.06.1982 from agricultural to non-agricultural purposes and betterment charges were also paid. Petitioner is claiming to be the wife of Sri. Govindaraj. She has contended that the BBMP authorities have mutated the revenue records and has been collecting the taxes. 138.1 Suo motu proceedings have been initiated for removal of encroachment of 6½ gunts of Raja kaluve at R.T. Nagar-Dinnur main road. As to what is the extent of Raja Kaluve and the buffer zone for the said raja Kaluve are all matters of evidence and the said issue cannot be gone into in the writ proceedings under Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India and as such, the petition is liable to be dismissed. The legal issues relating to the constitutional validity urged in the writ petition has already been discussed in detail herein above. Subject to the observations made on the legal issues raised, this petition stands dismissed. RE: W.P. No. 36610/2017 139. Petitioners are the office bearers of the “Bangalore Airport City Lions Services Trust” which is part of Lions Club of Bangalore Airport. It is said to be carrying on welfare camps at various places in Bangalore East Taluk. On a representation made on 16.08.1998 and 31.07.1999 to grant 1 acre 15 guntas in Sy. RE: W.P. No. 36610/2017 139. Petitioners are the office bearers of the “Bangalore Airport City Lions Services Trust” which is part of Lions Club of Bangalore Airport. It is said to be carrying on welfare camps at various places in Bangalore East Taluk. On a representation made on 16.08.1998 and 31.07.1999 to grant 1 acre 15 guntas in Sy. No. 103 of Munnekolalu village, Bangalore East Taluk and to take up the project of running a hospital, it is pending consideration. The revenue authorities have conducted the inspection including the Special Deputy Commissioner and have submitted a report that a hospital has been constructed and petitioners are in possession of said area. In fact, the Special Deputy Commissioner by communication dated 20.11.2000 has directed the Tahsildar to re-submit the file by fixing the market value of the property and a detailed report has been submitted by the Revenue Inspector on 22.12.2000 (Annexure-D2). Several inter-departmental communications have taken place and by communication dated 28.04.2003 (Annexure-K), the Deputy Commissioner has recommended to the Divisional Commissioner for grant of the land in question by levying fine for the hospital building. In fact, by communication dated 30.07.2008 (Annexure-N), the Special Deputy Commissioner has directed the Assistant Commissioner to take steps to mutate the khata in the name of the Trust with respect to the land in question. 139.1 The Tahsildar, by order dated 20.05.2013 (Annexure-R) has initiated proceedings that 33 guntas in Sy. No. 103 has been encroached by the petitioners and the said land is a Government land. Appeal has been filed in No. 100/2017 which is said to be pending. In the meanwhile, on the advent of the impugned Act, the proceedings have been initiated against petitioner. 139.2 The application for grant of the land now pending before the revenue authorities and it is yet to be adjudicated and also the fact that appeal filed against the order dated 20.05.2013 passed by the Tahsildar now pending in Appeal No100/2017 before the appellate tribunal, case of the petitioners would fall under clause (a) of the proviso to Section 2(d) and as such, the petitioners are entitled to succeed in this petition. However, it is made clear that authorities would be at liberty to proceed against petitioners in the event of the application for grant of land sought for by the petitioners being rejected by the revenue authorities and the Appeal No. 100/2017 being dismissed. Hence, the petition is allowed subject to the observations made herein above. RE: W.P. No. 36640/2017 140. It is claimed that father of the petitioner was granted land measuring 2 acres in Tigalachowdanahalli village, Sarjapura on 12.11.1964 and by virtue of the same, revenue records were mutated in the name of the grantee. On 21.02.2013 second respondent submitted a report to the Special Deputy Commissioner, Bangalore District for initiation of proceedings under Section 136(3) of KLR Act, which came to be dropped on 21.03.2013. The Government of Karnataka directed the Deputy Commissioner to re-examine the orders passed by the Deputy Commissioner. Hence, Deputy Commissioner issued notice to the petitioner and an order came to be passed on 06.09.2016 (Annexure-M) holding that the grant in favour of the petitioner is genuine. Petitioner has continued to be in lawful possession of the property. 140.1 However, the proceedings under the impugned Act came to be initiated on 27.11.2016 in the light of the newspaper report. On service of summons, petitioner has appeared before the Special Court and produced the order of the Deputy Commissioner dated 06.09.2016. Yet, on the ground that the learned Advocate has not properly answered the queries of the Special Court, the genuineness of the grant is suspected. In fact, Special Court also records its finding in the order passed by the Deputy Commissioner, the land granted to the father of petitioner was 2 acres. However, the sketch shows that it is an extent of 2.25 acres. On this ground, the Special Court has proceeded to frame the charges. When the grant is not held to be genuine or it is not found to be fabricated, question of proceeding under the impugned Act, on the facts and circumstances of the case is not called for. Hence, we are of the considered view that petitioner is entitled to the relief sought for. Accordingly, petition is allowed. RE: W.P. No. 36690/2017 141. Petitioners-1 and 2 are said to have purchased the property to the extent mentioned in the sale deed dated 11.07.2013 in Sy. Hence, we are of the considered view that petitioner is entitled to the relief sought for. Accordingly, petition is allowed. RE: W.P. No. 36690/2017 141. Petitioners-1 and 2 are said to have purchased the property to the extent mentioned in the sale deed dated 11.07.2013 in Sy. No. 123, 124, 126, 127, 129 & 132 of Narayanaghatta village, Sarjapura Hobli, Anekal Taluk and have converted the said property to residential purposes by the District Commissioner by order dated 30.05.2016 and 19.05.2016. It is also stated that petitioners-3 and 4 have not purchased any land in the said village. 141.1 A suo motu proceedings have been initiated by the Special Court on the basis of newspaper article. Cognizance of the alleged offence has been taken by the Special Court and before taking cognizance, detailed report from the jurisdictional Tahsildar was called for and the report of the Tahsildar indicated that an extent of 2 acres 20 guntas in Sy. No. 128 had been encroached upon and possession has since been taken. However, there is no whisper with regard to the complicity of accused Nos. 3 and 4. As to whether the petitioners-1 and 2 had encroached Sy. No. 128 to the extent of 2 acres 20 guntas as alleged is a matter which requires to be examined and the claim of the petitioners for quashing of the proceedings initiated by the Special Court against them cannot be entertained. The issue in this writ petition relates to disputed question of fact, which cannot be gone into by this court under Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India and as such, the petition is liable to be dismissed. The legal issues relating to the constitutional validity urged in the writ petition has already been discussed in detail herein above. Subject to the observations made on the legal issues raised, this petition stands dismissed insofar as petitioners-1 and 2 are concerned. 141.2 However, the proceedings initiated in LGC No. 125/2016 (Annexure-A) insofar as petitioners - 3 and 4 by the Special Court stands quashed. Hence, petition is allowed in part. RE: W.P. No. 36760/2017 142. Petitioner claims to have acquired title to the property bearing Sy. 141.2 However, the proceedings initiated in LGC No. 125/2016 (Annexure-A) insofar as petitioners - 3 and 4 by the Special Court stands quashed. Hence, petition is allowed in part. RE: W.P. No. 36760/2017 142. Petitioner claims to have acquired title to the property bearing Sy. No. 183, Phodi No. 285 of Halagevoderahalli village, Kengeri Hobli, Bangalore South Taluk under registered sale deed and after conversion of the same, the revenue records have been mutated in the name of M/s. Shakthi Hill Resorts. The State is contending that the petitioner has encroached Sy. No. 8 of Vodderapalya and as such, a complaint has been lodged before Subrahmanyanagar Police Station under Section 192A of the Karnataka Land Revenue Act, 1964 in CC No. 4406/2013. When said proceedings were pending, the impugned Act came into force and as such, proceedings came to be transferred to the Special Court. Petitioner is said to have filed a suit in O.S. No. 3595/2007 against respondents-1 to 3 herein and jurisdictional police and the suit came to be decreed by judgment and decree dated 12.09.2014. Whereas, the State is contending that petitioner has encroached the Government land. This is an issue which will have to be examined by the Special Court and the said disputed question of fact cannot be gone into by this court under Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India and as such, the petition is dismissed. The judgment and decree passed in O.S. No. 3595/2007 which is said to be enuring to the benefit of petitioner can be made use of by the petitioner in the proceedings pending before the Special Court. The legal issues relating to the constitutional validity urged in the writ petition has already been discussed in detail herein above. Subject to the observations made on the legal issues raised, this petition stands dismissed. RE: W.P. No. 37713/2017 143. Petitioner claims to be the owner of land bearing Sy. No. 121 of Vabasandra village, Kasaba Hobli, Gudibande Taluk, Chikballapur District measuring 2 acres 30 guntas having purchased under the sale deed dated 24.01.2007 and Khata is said to have been mutated in the name of the petitioner in the revenue records. 143.1 Proceedings under the impugned Act came to be initiated by 7th respondent before the Special Court and the Special Court after having taken cognizance issued notice to the petitioner herein. 143.1 Proceedings under the impugned Act came to be initiated by 7th respondent before the Special Court and the Special Court after having taken cognizance issued notice to the petitioner herein. The objections filed and the documents produced by the petitioner did not disclose the title of the vendor of the petitioner. In fact, the mutation entry made in favour of the petitioner was cancelled in R.A. (G) 55/2014-15 by the Assistant Commissioner. The revision proceedings pending before Deputy Commissioner came to be transferred to Special Court. In fact, in the civil proceedings, petitioner has been unsuccessful to establish prima-facie possession of the land. That apart, the possession of the land in question was taken from petitioner by the State on 10.03.2017. All these facts have persuaded the Special Court to continue with the proceedings which we find does not suffering from any infirmity calling for our interference. 143.2 The issue in this writ petition relates to disputed question of fact, which cannot be gone into by this court under Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India and as such, the petition is liable to be dismissed. The legal issues relating to the constitutional validity urged in the writ petition has already been discussed in detail herein above. Subject to the observations made on the legal issues raised, this petition stands dismissed. RE: W.P. No. 40597/2017 144. The petitioner is said to be the Managing Trustee of Hanumagiri Private Trust and it is stated that a temple had been in existence in Sy. No. 28 of Arehalli village, Uttarahalli Hobli, Bangalore South Taluk for over 150 years. It is also stated that the devotees have established Sri. Gururaghavendra Swamy Brindavana under the aegis of the Mantralaya Mutt, Raichur. It is stated that the revenue records have been mutated by the BBMP authorities and the said temple and Mutt is catering to the needs of the general public. 144.1 When the matter stood thus, communication dated 06.01.2017 was addressed to the Trust by the Tahsildar - second respondent alleging that the Trust had encroached an extent of 1 acre 5 guntas of Government Gomal land. A reply was submitted on 11.01.2017 either for absolute grant or for grant of lease for minimum period of 30 years. However, even before the ink on the said representation could dry, the proceedings have been initiated under the impugned Act. A reply was submitted on 11.01.2017 either for absolute grant or for grant of lease for minimum period of 30 years. However, even before the ink on the said representation could dry, the proceedings have been initiated under the impugned Act. 144.2 When the representation of the petitioner dated 11.01.2017 (Annexure-F) seeking for grant of the land is pending, we are of the considered view that proceedings under the impugned Act cannot be continued in view of the fact that proceedings abates as provided under Section 22 read with Section 2(d) of KLGP Act 2011 and the said benefit extended to all the applicants where same is pending before the authorities. 144.3 Hence, the petitioner succeeds and proceedings pending before Special Court against petitioner in LGC (S) 13/2017 stands quashed as having abated. However, we make it clear that in the event of application/representation of the petitioner being dismissed or rejected by the authorities, the respondent-authorities would be at liberty to initiate proceedings afresh against petitioner. RE: W.P. No. 41593/2017 145. On the basis of newspaper report dated 18.07.2016 that respondents have taken possession of encroached Government land including the land in Haralur village, Bangalore East Taluk, suo motu proceedings came to be initiated against petitioner and summons was issued to the Manager of M/s. Prestige Group, who in turn, appeared and obtained bail. The Special Court noticed that case against each one of accused is in different Sy. Nos. and at different places, directed the Office to split the case against accused person. The case pertaining to Sy. No. 32 of Haralur village, Bidarahalli Hobli was renumbered as LGC (S) 508/2017. In fact, the Manager who appeared before the Special Court has filed his statement of objections and brought to the notice of the Special Court about the notice issued on 12.01.2016 by the fourth respondent herein alleging encroachment of the Government lake, for which, reply dated 27.01.2016 (Annexure-J) have been submitted by M/s. Prestige Estates Project Limited, whereunder an appointment of the Surveyor was sought for to bifurcate the land owned by the company and the Government lake. However, no such surveyor has been appointed. Yet, the proceedings against the petitioner has been initiated. However, no such surveyor has been appointed. Yet, the proceedings against the petitioner has been initiated. Either in the order dated 27.09.2016 or the subsequent orders passed by the Special Court do not disclose about petitioner having committed the offence of land grabbing or the same having been done by the company at the instance of the petitioner or petitioner being the Director, was aware of this fact and as such, he was responsible to the company for conduct of its business. 145.1 It is trite law that the order taking cognizance should be self evident about the complicity of the person who is being arraigned as accused or in other words, it should disclose that the accused was either the person responsible to the company for the conduct of its day to day business or it was committed with his knowledge. In the absence of these ingredients, the order of issuance of summons by taking cognizance of the offence would be illegal and as such, the proceedings cannot be continued. Hence, the impugned order dated 27.09.2016 (Annexure-C) and the proceedings pending against petitioner before Special Court cannot be sustained and it stands quashed. Accordingly, writ petition is allowed. RE: W.P. No. 42959/2017 146. First petitioner claims to be the absolute owner of the land bearing Sy. No. 86/2 (Sy. No. 86) measuring 20 guntas and Sy. No. 178/1 measuring 17 guntas of Kothanoor village, Uttarahalli Hobli, Bangalore South Taluk. It is stated that said Sy. No. 86 measured in all, 9 acres 8 guntas was purchased by Sri. Dayananda Reddy under sale deed dated 10.07.1969. The said property was phoded and separate hissa number is allotted as 86/1, 86/2 and 86/3 and same not being in accordance with the title deeds, the Joint Director of Land Records set aside the phodi by order dated 22.03.2017. However, during the interregnum, the property which was phoded as 86/2 measuring 1 acre 14 guntas and 4 guntas of kharab was converted from agricultural to non-agricultural residential purposes by order dated 09.03.1993. First petitioner is said to have purchased the property in Sy. No. 86/2 measuring 20 guntas under a sale deed dated 25.11.2011 (Annexure-B). Petitioners claim to have obtained approvals from statutory authorities for the purpose of development and construction of residential apartments and construction was commenced. First petitioner is said to have purchased the property in Sy. No. 86/2 measuring 20 guntas under a sale deed dated 25.11.2011 (Annexure-B). Petitioners claim to have obtained approvals from statutory authorities for the purpose of development and construction of residential apartments and construction was commenced. 146.1 On account of newspaper report dated 05.11.2016 carried in Vijaya Karnataka mentioning about various other projects taken up by other builders and it is built on a lake boundary, a notice dated 19.12.2016 came to be issued to the second petitioner and the Special Court initiated suo motu proceedings against the petitioners. 146.2 The orders passed by the Special Court on 22.02.2017 would disclose that the Deputy Director of Town Planning, Head Office, BBMP has been directed to furnish all the details of the construction made by first petitioner and the jurisdictional Tahsildar has been directed to file survey report. However, the subsequent order does not indicate about such details or reports having been placed before the Special Court. In fact, by order dated 04.07.2017 the Deputy Director (Town Planning), Head Office, BBMP has been directed to produce records regarding constructions made by first petitioner. This also seems to have not placed before the Special Court and on account of notice issued by the Special Court, petitioners are before this court. 146.3 In the light of Section 9 having been amended by Act 30 of 2020 and proviso to clause (b) of Sub-Section (5) of 19 enabling the Special Court to dismiss the complaint or drop further proceedings, if it is of the opinion that there are no sufficient grounds for proceeding, it is open to the Special Court to dismiss or drop the proceedings against petitioners. However, for arriving at such a conclusion, reports which have been called for will have to be necessarily looked into. 146.4 The said issue is a disputed question of fact, which cannot be gone into by this court under Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India and as such, the petition is liable to be disposed of by directing the Special Court to expeditiously secure the records which have been called for from the statutory authorities and on evaluation of the same, proceed to pass appropriate orders as it deems fit. The legal issues relating to the constitutional validity urged in the writ petition has already been discussed in detail herein above. The legal issues relating to the constitutional validity urged in the writ petition has already been discussed in detail herein above. Subject to the observations made on the legal issues raised, this petition stands disposed of. RE: W.P. No. 43059/2017 147. Petitioner is claiming to be in possession of portion of the land in Raghavanapalya Village Jodi/Inamti (Ward No. 194), which village the State took possession through notification dated 13.01.1959. The Special Court has arrived at a conclusion that there was enough material on record to show that the allegation of land grabbing made against respondents-1 to 4 for the offence punishable under the impugned Act being there. Hence, cognizance has been taken and challenging the same, on various grounds, this petition has been filed. 147.1 The issue in this writ petition relates to disputed question of fact, which cannot be gone into by this court under Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India and as such, the petition is liable to be dismissed. The legal issues relating to the constitutional validity urged in the writ petition has already been discussed in detail herein above. Subject to the observations made on the legal issues raised, this petition stands dismissed. RE: W.P. No. 43227/2017 148. Petitioner has entered into a Joint Development Agreement with M/s. D.M. Holdings Private Limited in respect of property bearing BBMP Khata No. 144/36, 39, 40, 41 and 44/144 comprising in Sy. No. 36, 39, 40 and 41 situated at Kalena Agrahara, Begur Hobli, Bangalore South Taluk. It is stated that BBMP has accorded approval for construction. A supplemental agreement is said to have been entered on 18.11.2010 (Annexure-B). 148.1 Based on a newspaper report, suo motu proceedings have been initiated against petitioner alleging land in Sy. No. 43 of Kalena Agrahara lake has been encroached. 148.2 In fact, a complaint was given by Executive Engineer, Byatarayanapura zone on 08.10.2015 stating thereunder that one boy by name Master Prakash, aged 15 years have been drawn in to Raja Kaluve coming under the jurisdiction of Ward No. 6 of BBMP, wherein Raja Kaluve was crossing the property of petitioner and dead body of the boy was found near the Raja Kaluve. It is this incident which is said to have resulted in the proceedings being initiated against petitioner. It is this incident which is said to have resulted in the proceedings being initiated against petitioner. 148.3 The sum and substance of the grievance of the petitioner is on mere surmises the proceedings have been initiated against petitioner and no portion of any Government land has been encroached upon and there is a road between disputed Sy. No. 44 and the Kalena Agrahara lake. Hence, the petitioner has sought for quashing of the proceedings by relying upon several documents along with the petition and also by relying upon the photographs appended thereto. 148.4 As to whether there exists a lake, the extent of it, the area or the land owned by the petitioner and the construction put up thereof by the petitioner is within the said area or by encroaching upon the abutting and adjacent Government land are all disputed questions of fact, which cannot be gone into by this court under Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India and as such, the petition is liable to be dismissed. The legal issues relating to the constitutional validity urged in the writ petition has already been discussed in detail herein above. Subject to the observations made on the legal issues raised, this petition stands dismissed. RE: W.P. No. 44273/2017 149. It is the contention of petitioners that land bearing Sy. No. 249 measuring 7 acres 28 guntas and Sy. No. 35 measuring 35 guntas of Y.N. Hoskote village, Pavagada Taluk originally belonged to Sri. Koteswara devaru and it was an inam land. It is further contended that one Sri. Kare Hanumanthappa was occupier of the land for more than 30 years and he purchased the said land from Sri. Markandeya Shastri, who in turn, purchased the said land from Sri. Ashwath Shastri who is said to be the recognized holder and title deed was issued in his name. 149.1 Proceedings against the petitioners came to be initiated by the Special Court on the basis of the report published in the local newspaper of temple land having been encroached upon. Subsequently, second respondent herein is said to have filed a complaint against petitioners herein and other persons alleging that land belonging to the temple has been usurped. 149.1 Proceedings against the petitioners came to be initiated by the Special Court on the basis of the report published in the local newspaper of temple land having been encroached upon. Subsequently, second respondent herein is said to have filed a complaint against petitioners herein and other persons alleging that land belonging to the temple has been usurped. 149.2 The order taking cognizance as well as the subsequent order dated 25.05.2017 passed by the Special Court would indicate that on the basis of statement made by the members of the Gram Panchayat and Zilla Panchayat about property belonging to the temple have been illegally acquired by the members of the Revenue Department and the temple priests by producing false documents and selling the same, resulted in notices being issued to the petitioners. 149.3 The issue as to whether records relied upon by petitioners are genuine or otherwise is to be examined after full fledged trial and this court in writ jurisdiction would not be in a position to examine the said facts. In other words, the issue involved in this writ petition relates to disputed questions of fact, same cannot be gone into by this court under Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India and as such, the petition is liable to be dismissed. The legal issues relating to the constitutional validity urged in the writ petition has already been discussed in detail herein above. Subject to the observations made on the legal issues raised, this petition stands dismissed. RE: W.P. No. 44687/2017 150. A complaint came to be lodged by the Executive Engineer, Byatarayanapura zone on 08.10.2015 alleging thereunder that one boy by name Master Prakash, aged 15 years have been drawn in to Raja Kaluve coming under the jurisdiction of Ward No. 6 of BBMP, wherein Raja Kaluve was crossing the property of petitioners and dead body of the boy was found near the Raja Kaluve. Hence, an FIR in Crime No. 288/2015 for the offence punishable under Section 447, 304A IPC and 192A of the Karnataka Land Revenue Act, 1964 came to be registered against M/s. Manyata Embassy Business Park, of which petitioners are said to be the Directors. Hence, an FIR in Crime No. 288/2015 for the offence punishable under Section 447, 304A IPC and 192A of the Karnataka Land Revenue Act, 1964 came to be registered against M/s. Manyata Embassy Business Park, of which petitioners are said to be the Directors. 150.1 The sum and substance of the grievance of the petitioners is on mere surmises the proceedings have been initiated against petitioners and no portion of any Government land has been encroached upon and petitioners have not encroached the Raja Kaluve. It is also contended that BBMP contractor in order to protect the pipes, had formed a mud road in the land adjacent to Raja kaluve and petitioners have not been laying any pipes for formation of the road. Hence, petitioners have sought for quashing of the proceedings by relying upon several documents produced along with the petition. 150.2 As to whether petitioners have encroached any portion of the land adjacent to Raja Kaluve or the Raja Kaluve itself is an issue which will have to be examined after evaluating the evidence that may be tendered by the parties before the Special Court. These disputed questions of facts cannot be gone into by this court under Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India and as such, the petition is liable to be dismissed. The legal issues relating to the constitutional validity urged in the writ petition has already been discussed in detail herein above. Subject to the observations made on the legal issues raised, this petition stands dismissed. RE: W.P. No. 45114/2017 151. A complaint has been lodged by fifth respondent that various residents of Kushalnagar were encroaching the Government land and Town Municipal Council officials were supporting the same. Petitioner herein was granted land by the Committee constituted for Akrama Sakrama under Section 94 of the Karnataka Land Revenue Act, 1964 read with Rule 108 of the Karnataka LR Rules. Undisputedly, said order of grant has not been set aside. In view of the fact that the land in question which is alleged to have been grabbed by petitioner not being in illegal possession and by virtue of the grant, he being in possession, proceedings initiated against petitioner cannot be continued. As such, petitioner succeeds and accordingly, writ petition stands allowed. Proceedings initiated against petitioner now pending in LGC (P) 637/2017 before the Special Court (Annexure-A) insofar as petitioner is concerned is quashed. As such, petitioner succeeds and accordingly, writ petition stands allowed. Proceedings initiated against petitioner now pending in LGC (P) 637/2017 before the Special Court (Annexure-A) insofar as petitioner is concerned is quashed. RE: W.P. No. 47887/2017 152. Petitioner is claiming to be the absolute owner of the property bearing Sy. No. 218/1, situated at Badagamijr village, Mangalore Taluk, D.K. District. it is alleged by respondents that petitioner has occupied and taken 100 loads of mud from the Government road from Sy. No. 218/1 to develop the property belonging to her. In this regard, Revenue Inspector, Moodabidre gave a complaint to Moodabidre Police registered in Crime No. 217/2014 for the offence punishable under Section 192A of Karnataka Land Revenue Act, 1964 and it was numbered as CC No. 580/2015. 152.1 On the advent of the impugned Act, same has been transferred to the Special Court. The issue involved in this writ petition relates to illegal occupation of the land by the petitioner, which is a disputed question of fact and same cannot be gone into by this court under Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India and as such, the petition is liable to be dismissed. The legal issues relating to the constitutional validity urged in the writ petition has already been discussed in detail herein above. Subject to the observations made on the legal issues raised, this petition stands dismissed. RE: W.P. No. 50674/2017 153. Petitioner claims to be the absolute owner in possession of vacant site bearing No. 26 of Vasanthapura village having purchased the same from M.L. Ramachandra Gowda under registered sale deed dated 08.07.2003. The said site is said to have been formed in land bearing Sy. No. 54 and not in Sy. No. 55. it is further claimed that vendor had acquired the said property under registered partition deed dated 26.12.1974. It is stated that petitioner has sold the site to one Sri. Krishnamurthy Naidu under registered sale deed dated 23.09.2004 and he in turn, has sold the same in favour of Smt. R Vasantha under sale deed dated 16.05.2006, who is said to have put up construction of a house and residing therein. It is contended that site No. 26 purchased by the petitioner is in no way connected to the land bearing Sy. No. 55. 153.1 As to whether the site purchased by the petitioner is in Sy. It is contended that site No. 26 purchased by the petitioner is in no way connected to the land bearing Sy. No. 55. 153.1 As to whether the site purchased by the petitioner is in Sy. No. 54 or any portion of the sites formed in Sy. No. 54 will have to be examined on the basis of the evidence that may be tendered by the parties. It is for this precise reason, the Special Court while taking cognizance of the offence has opined that petitioner herself is not sure of the exact location of her site. It is needless to state that petitioner were to demonstrate before the Special Court that site purchased by her did not fall within Sy. No. 55 and it is carved out of Sy. No. 54, necessarily the Special Court would drop further proceedings by taking recourse to proviso to clause (b) of Sub-Section (5) of Section 9. 153.2 The issue in this writ petition relates to disputed question of fact, which cannot be gone into by this court under Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India and as such, the petition is liable to be dismissed. The legal issues relating to the constitutional validity urged in the writ petition has already been discussed in detail herein above. Subject to the observations made on the legal issues raised, this petition stands dismissed. RE: W.P. No. 51160/2017 154. Petitioners have been granted 2 acres each to carry out quarrying in Sy. No. 224/P1 at Daddigatta (Bettadahalli), Shravanabelagola Hobli, Chennarayapatna Taluk under Karnataka Minor Mineral Concession Rules. This is borne by the voluminous records produced by the petitioners, which fact is also admitted by the Special Court itself in the order taking cognizance of the alleged offence dated 03.11.2017 (Annexure-Y). The only ground on which the cognizance has been taken is that at that stage allegation made in the complaint cannot be brushed aside. This opinion seems to have been formed on the basis of the petitioners having remitted fine to the Mines and Geology Department for having stored the minor mineral extracted in the adjacent Government land. On this basis, it cannot be construed that there has been encroachment of the Government land by the petitioners. In fact, the report of the Assistant Commissioner dated 25.10.2017 (Annexure-W), it has been clearly held that there is no encroachment of Government land by the petitioners. On this basis, it cannot be construed that there has been encroachment of the Government land by the petitioners. In fact, the report of the Assistant Commissioner dated 25.10.2017 (Annexure-W), it has been clearly held that there is no encroachment of Government land by the petitioners. As such, on the facts obtained in the instant case, it cannot be construed the order taking cognizance of the offence is just and proper. 154.1 For the reasons aforestated, we are of the considered view that petitioner is entitled to the reliefs sought for in the facts obtained in the present case. Hence, writ petition is allowed. Order dated 03.11.2017 (Annexure-Y) passed by the Special Court in LGC (P) No. 635/2017 is hereby quashed. RE: W.P. No. 52972/2017 155. Petitioners claim to have been granted possession of 32 cents of land in Sy. No. 192/1A3C and 192/1A3E of Voderahobli village, Kundapur by the Government vide order dated 04.12.1964. 155.1 Proceedings under the impugned Act has been initiated on the basis of complaint lodged by jurisdictional Tahsildar on the ground that petitioner has encroached upon the Government land. Record on hand would indicate that there were several correspondence between the petitioners and respondent-authorities and on account of personal hearing having not been extended to the petitioner to demonstrate that no portion of Government land was encroached, for reasons best known, same was not extended. Hence, petitioners had approached this Court in W.P. Nos. 62974-62975/2016 which came to be disposed of on 20.06.2017 (Annexure-K) quashing the order impugned therein and directing the respondent-authorities to extend petitioners an opportunity. Thereafter, an order came to be passed on 14.11.2017 by second respondent by arriving at a conclusion that the land bearing Sy. No. 192/1A3A1C measuring 0.32 acres situated at Voderahobli village, Kundapura taluk and the building constructed thereon is by encroaching the land vested to the Government and second respondent has called upon the petitioners to hand over the building to the custody of the Government. It is thereafter, proceedings under the impugned Act has been initiated. 155.2 As to what is the extent of Government land which is abutting the land which has been granted to the petitioners and whether there is any encroachment are all disputed questions of fact. It is thereafter, proceedings under the impugned Act has been initiated. 155.2 As to what is the extent of Government land which is abutting the land which has been granted to the petitioners and whether there is any encroachment are all disputed questions of fact. Said disputed questions of fact, cannot be gone into by this court under Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India and as such, the petition is liable to be dismissed. The legal issues relating to the constitutional validity urged in the writ petition has already been discussed in detail herein above. Subject to the observations made on the legal issues raised, this petition stands dismissed. RE: W.P. No. 53008/2017 156. Petitioner claims to be the owner of the land bearing Sy. No. 218/1 situated at Badagamijar village, Mangalore Taluk, D.K. District. It is alleged by respondents that petitioner has occupied 15 cents of Government land in Sy. No. 218/1 to develop the property belonging to her. In this regard, Tahsildar, Moodabidre gave a complaint to the Special Court for the offence punishable under Section 192A of Karnataka Land Revenue Act, 1964. 156.1 The Special Court is examining the said issue with regard to encroachment. The issue involved in this writ petition relates to illegal occupation of the Government land by the petitioner, which is a disputed question of fact and same cannot be gone into by this court under Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India and as such, the petition is liable to be dismissed. The legal issues relating to the constitutional validity urged in the writ petition has already been discussed in detail herein above. Subject to the observations made on the legal issues raised, this petition stands dismissed. RE: W.P. No. 54035/2017 157. Petitioner entered into a Joint Development Agreement dated 12.06.2015 with the owners of the property bearing Sy. No. 36/1 and 36/2 of Ananthapura village, Yelahanka Hobli, Bangalore North Taluk and it was converted for non-agricultural residential purposes vide order dated 15.12.2011 and 27.04.2010 respectively (Annexure-E and F). subsequently, both properties were merged into one by order dated 17.06.2014 and khata certificate was accordingly issued. 157.1 There was a pond in ‘A’ Kharab land of Sy. No. 36/2, which was abutting the schedule property as the same would make the property unusable. subsequently, both properties were merged into one by order dated 17.06.2014 and khata certificate was accordingly issued. 157.1 There was a pond in ‘A’ Kharab land of Sy. No. 36/2, which was abutting the schedule property as the same would make the property unusable. The owners of the land also requested the Deputy Commissioner to shift the drain to the western side of the property so as to reach the drain made by the BBMP. Subsequently, on matter being referred to jurisdictional Tahsildar, survey was conducted and by report dated 13.10.2014, the drain was allowed to be shifted to south western side. In fact, Tahsildar has also obtained no objection from the villagers. Fourth respondent, after considering the report of the Tahsildar, by order dated 18.02.2015 allowed the shifting of the kharab land which was existing in Sy. No. 36/2 and half gunta in Sy. No. 36/5 towards south western side from North to South in the remaining land of Sy. No. 36/2. On obtaining the sanctioned plan from BBMP, petitioner is said to have commenced construction and at that juncture, the communication dated 27.05.2016 came to be issued by third respondent alleging encroachment, which was challenged by the petitioner in W.P. No. 47296-47297/2016 before this Court and said notice has been stayed. 157.2 On the advent of the impugned Act, proceedings under the KLGP Act, 2011 has been initiated against petitioner. When the communication dated 27.05.2016 has been challenged by petitioner and same being pending in W.P. No. 47296-47297/2016, question of proceeding against petitioners under the KLGP Act 2011 does not arise. In the event of petitioners succeeding in the said writ petitions and simultaneously if the petitioners are made to undergo the ordeal of trial before the Special Court, it would definitely be prejudicial to the interest of the petitioners. Hence, we are of the considered view that till disposal of the proceedings in the aforesaid writ petitions, the present prosecution initiated against petitioner cannot continue. In other words, petitioner is entitled to the relief sought for. However, we make it clear that in the event of petitioners not succeeding in the writ petition Nos. 47296-47297/2016, respondent-authorities would be at liberty to initiate fresh proceedings against petitioner. 157.3 Subject to this observation, writ petition is allowed and the proceedings pending before the Special Court in LGC (S) 30/2017 (Annexure-B) is hereby quashed. RE: W.P. Nos. However, we make it clear that in the event of petitioners not succeeding in the writ petition Nos. 47296-47297/2016, respondent-authorities would be at liberty to initiate fresh proceedings against petitioner. 157.3 Subject to this observation, writ petition is allowed and the proceedings pending before the Special Court in LGC (S) 30/2017 (Annexure-B) is hereby quashed. RE: W.P. Nos. 54081/2017 and 54082/2017 158. Petitioners claim that land bearing Sy. No. 33 measuring 81 acres situated at N.R. Pura Taluk, Chikmagalur District, land bearing Sy. No. 38 measuring 5 acres and land bearing Sy. No. 52 measuring 15 acres in Chikmagalur District, Koppa Taluk of Devagudu village was granted in favour of Sriyuths Abdul Rehman, Babar Pasha, Aurangzeb and T.R.Shankarappa Hegde vide order dated 29.01.1930, 1955, 30.12.1972 and 20.01.1960 respectively. The said property bearing Sy. No. 33 was said to have been settled in favour of two brothers Auragzeb and Babar Pasha under a family settlement deed dated 22.11.1957 and they constituted a partnership firm and treated the said property as the asset of partnership firm. It is stated that said firm developed an estate called as “Halasuru” estate. Under the deed of reconstituted firm, Smt. Malavika Hegde is said to have joined the firm as incoming partner and two brothers referred to supra have retired from the firm. The petitioners are said to have inherited the property bearing Sy. No. 38 and 52 referred to herein supra. 158.1 In respect of aforesaid Sy. Nos. second and third respondent respectively is said to have made a report alleging encroachment and directing the petitioners to hand over possession. Insofar as Sy. No. 38 and 52 are concerned, petitioners are said to have handed over the land to the authorities after survey and this is evident from the Mahazar dated 16.01.2014 (Annexure-J in W.P. No. 54082/2017). However, insofar as Sy. No. 33 is concerned, second respondent by report dated 16.05.2014 (Annexure-F in W.P. No. 54081/2017) has alleged encroachment of 122.17 acres and have directed the petitioner to remove the encroachment. 158.2 Undisputedly, an extent of 64 acres 39 guntas in Sy. No. 38 and 52 of Koppa Taluk, Devagudu village which had been trespassed by the petitioner has been handed over as evident from the mahazar dated 16.01.2014 (Annexure-J). Hence, proceedings initiated against petitioner in W.P. No. 54082/2017 cannot be found fault with. 158.3 Insofar as the land bearing Sy. 158.2 Undisputedly, an extent of 64 acres 39 guntas in Sy. No. 38 and 52 of Koppa Taluk, Devagudu village which had been trespassed by the petitioner has been handed over as evident from the mahazar dated 16.01.2014 (Annexure-J). Hence, proceedings initiated against petitioner in W.P. No. 54082/2017 cannot be found fault with. 158.3 Insofar as the land bearing Sy. No. 33 wherein the authorities are contending the petitioner has encroached to the extent of 122.17 acres is concerned, the same has been denied by relying upon the village map, tippani, grant certificate, GPS sketch, etc. In fact, the fourth respondent by report dated 19.07.2017 has stated that alleged encroached land has been handed over from the possession of the petitioner in W.P. No. 54081/2017. Thus, as on the date of initiation of proceedings, the encroachment has stood proved and as such, the proceedings against the petitioners cannot be found fault with. Accordingly, both the writ petitions stand dismissed. RE: W.P. No. 55683/2017 159. Petitioners are said to have been granted land measuring 20 acres 6 guntas in Sy. No. 26 and 27 of Kasavanahalli village, Varthur Hobli, Bangalore South Taluk and delivered possession of it and as such, petitioners are claiming to be in possession of the said land. When the matter stood thus, the Tahsildar passed an order on 19.06.2014 (Annexure-J) stating that in Sy. No. 27, a cart road of 20 feet wide is encroached by petitioners and called upon the petitioners to remove the encroachment. Challenging the same, appeal was filed in 17/2016-17 before the Assistant Commissioner and the order dated 19.06.2014 has been stayed on 21.10.2017. 159.1 Based on the order dated 19.06.2014, the case was referred to BMTF which has initiated the proceedings under Section 192A of the KLR Act and charge sheet is filed in CC No. 27045/2015, which proceedings came to be transferred to the Special Court on the introduction of the impugned Act and said proceedings has been numbered as LGC (P) 886/2017. On the basis of the complaint filed by the second respondent herein, proceedings in LGC (P) 224/2017 has been initiated against petitioners. 159.2 As to whether petitioners have encroached a cart track or otherwise, will have to be examined by the appellate authority which is adjudicating the Appeal No. 17/2016-17. On the basis of the complaint filed by the second respondent herein, proceedings in LGC (P) 224/2017 has been initiated against petitioners. 159.2 As to whether petitioners have encroached a cart track or otherwise, will have to be examined by the appellate authority which is adjudicating the Appeal No. 17/2016-17. In the event of present proceedings being continued against petitioners and appellant succeeding before the appellate authority, would definitely be onerous to the petitioners to undergo the ordeal of trial. In the fitness of the things, it would be apt and appropriate to reserve liberty to respondents to initiate the proceedings or the Special Court would be at liberty to revive the proceedings initiated against petitioners in the event of Appeal No. 17/2016-17 pending before Assistant Commissioner, Bangalore North Subdivision being dismissed. Thus, for the present, petitioners are entitled to the relief sought for. Accordingly, writ petition is allowed. Proceedings initiated in LGC (P) 224/2017 and LGC (P) 886/2017 stands quashed subject to observations made herein above. RE: W.P. No. 56296/2017 160. In this writ petition, proceedings have been initiated against petitioner for alleged encroachment of the land measuring 1 acre 15 cents in Sy. No. 22/2 situated at Chenankote village, Virajpet Taluk, Kodagu District. The mother of petitioner had made an application on 10.10.1971 in Form No. 1 of the Karnataka Land Revenue (Regularisation of Unauthorised Occupation of Lands) Rules, 1970 for regularization of unauthorized occupation of Government Paisari land and said application is said to have not been disposed of. Petitioner claims to have written to respondents time and again seeking for regularization. 160.1 In the light of proceedings pending and contemplated with respect to lands defined under clause (a) and (b) of proviso to clause (d) of Section 2, we are of the considered view that present proceedings against petitioner cannot be continued. However, we make it clear that in the event of application filed for regularization of unauthorized occupation/ cultivation has already been rejected or on being rejected, respondent-authorities would be at liberty to revive the present proceedings or initiate fresh proceedings. In that view of the matter, petitioner succeeds and writ petition is allowed. Summons dated 17.11.2017 issued to petitioner in proceedings LGC (G) 1923/2017 pending on the file of Special Court is quashed including the proceedings initiated thereunder. In other words, Annexure-A and A1 are quashed. RE: W.P. No. 235/2018 161. In that view of the matter, petitioner succeeds and writ petition is allowed. Summons dated 17.11.2017 issued to petitioner in proceedings LGC (G) 1923/2017 pending on the file of Special Court is quashed including the proceedings initiated thereunder. In other words, Annexure-A and A1 are quashed. RE: W.P. No. 235/2018 161. Petitioner claims to have purchased the land under sale deed dated 22.11.2004 from one Mr. Venkatappa and who is said to have purchased the same under sale deed dated 11.10.1972. As to whether the predecessor in title of the petitioner had title to the said property is an issue which will have to be resolved by the Special Court after evaluating the evidence. 161.1 The issue in this writ petition relates to disputed question of fact, which cannot be gone into by this court under Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India and as such, the petition is liable to be dismissed. The legal issues relating to the constitutional validity urged in the writ petition has already been discussed in detail herein above. Subject to the observations made on the legal issues raised, this petition stands dismissed. RE: W.P. No. 463/2018 162. Petitioner claims that property bearing Sy. No. 52 of Herohalli village measuring 62.25 acres out of which, cultivable land is 28.20 acres and the rest 34.05 acres is ‘A’ kharab land and the said extent was granted in favour of Mr. M. Gopalaswamy Iyer in the year 1924-25 vide Land Grant Rules DC No. 394/24-25 dated 30.04.1924. It is further stated that Sri. A.V. Subramanyam sold 23.20 acres of cultivable land in favour of petitioner and as such, it became owner of the total extent of 54.20 acres, which included cultivable and uncultivable land. Though respondent No. 2 herein has contended that the documents relied upon by petitioner is false and in collusion with revenue officials, records secured by Special Court from the revenue authorities clearly indicated that the Register of Index of Land Form No. 6 at page No. 139 pertain to Sy. No. 52 and subject No. 2 therein indicated that 28.20 acres of land was granted to Sri. Gopalaswamy Iyer namely, predecessor in title of the petitioner. The Special Court also observes that Index of land has reference to No. 415 in the Record of Rights which also reflects the name of Sri. Gopalaswamy Iyer. No. 52 and subject No. 2 therein indicated that 28.20 acres of land was granted to Sri. Gopalaswamy Iyer namely, predecessor in title of the petitioner. The Special Court also observes that Index of land has reference to No. 415 in the Record of Rights which also reflects the name of Sri. Gopalaswamy Iyer. On account of the age of the records that is being more than 90 years old, certain portions have been torn off. 162.1 Apart from the above facts, it would also emerge that proceedings for determination of surplus land beyond the ceiling limit had been initiated before the Land Tribunal, Bangalore North Taluk in LRF CR No. 2099/1974-75 and Tribunal had held that petitioner herein possessed excess land of 265.24 acres including 52.35 acres of land in Sy. No. 52/2 of Herohalli village. Undisputedly, said order of land Tribunal is now the subject matter of adjudication in W.P. No. 41866-70/2015 which is pending consideration. Yet, the Special Court has proceeded to continue the proceedings on the ground that petitioner has failed to prove the ownership and title over Sy. No. 52. In view of the findings recorded by the Special Court itself in paragraph 13, 16 and 17, finding recorded at paragraph No. 18 pales to insignificance. 162.2 In that view of the matter, proceedings initiated against petitioner cannot be continued. Hence, we allow the writ petition and quash the proceedings in LGC (P) 240/2016 pending before the Special Court, Bengaluru. RE: W.P. No. 777/2018 163. Petitioner claims to have acquired title to the property bearing Sy. No. 130/7 measuring 8 guntas situated at Kammasandra village, Attibele Hobli, Anekal Taluk under registered sale deed dated 27.07.2013 and the predecessor in title of the petitioner had acquired the same under registered sale deed dated 19.11.2007, by which time, the land measuring was converted into non-agricultural residential purposes. Petitioner entered into a Joint Development Agreement dated 27.07.2013 with Spectra Infrastructures in respect of Sy. No. 130/6. 163.1 Petitioner is said to have noticed encroachment of Raja Kaluve by the neighbouring land owner and as such, petitioner is said to have submitted representation on 10.08.2016 to the Lake Encroachment Committee. Petitioner entered into a Joint Development Agreement dated 27.07.2013 with Spectra Infrastructures in respect of Sy. No. 130/6. 163.1 Petitioner is said to have noticed encroachment of Raja Kaluve by the neighbouring land owner and as such, petitioner is said to have submitted representation on 10.08.2016 to the Lake Encroachment Committee. On the basis of the news article, second respondent is said to have called upon the jurisdictional Tahsildar to submit a report and a report came to be submitted on 12.12.2016 stating that petitioner and certain other persons have encroached the Nala and same has been removed. 163.2 In view of the fact that report dated 12.12.2016 (Annexure-L) submitted by second respondent clearly disclosing that in respect of Raja Kaluve in Sy. Nos. 9, 11, 12, 13, 129 and 130 had been encroached by the persons named therein, it cannot be gainsaid by petitioner that proceedings initiated against it ought to be quashed, that too, without evaluating the evidence. Prima-facie opinion formed by the Special Court for taking cognizance of the offence cannot be found fault with. We do not find any good ground to entertain the petition and hence, writ petition stands dismissed. RE: W.P. No. 1348/2018 164. On a complaint filed by second respondent alleging that property measuring 1 acre in Sy. No. 83/2 of Byatarayanapura has been a Raja Kaluve/canal and as such, action is to be initiated against petitioner, proceedings under KLGP Act 2011 has been initiated against petitioner. 164.1 As could be seen from the averments made in the petition and the documents relied upon thereon, second respondent having failed in all his attempts to challenge the ownership and possession of the land belonging to the petitioner, has filed the complaint (Annexure-Z9) before the KLGP Special Court which proceedings have been numbered as LGC (P) 309/2017. We say so for the reason that petitioner claim title to the property by virtue of same having been allotted to her under registered partition deed dated 24.01.2002. The survey sought for by her was conducted after notifying second respondent and hissa phodi was made and property belonging to the petitioner assigned the number as 83/2 and the land belonging to the second respondent and others was assigned Sy. No. 83/1. It is thereafter on 17.01.2005 petitioner got the land converted for residential purposes. The survey sought for by her was conducted after notifying second respondent and hissa phodi was made and property belonging to the petitioner assigned the number as 83/2 and the land belonging to the second respondent and others was assigned Sy. No. 83/1. It is thereafter on 17.01.2005 petitioner got the land converted for residential purposes. After 7 years, second respondent questioned the survey conducted in the year 2004 by filing an appeal before the Deputy Director of Survey Settlement, which came to be dismissed on 21.03.2012 (Annexure-J). The revision petition filed before the Deputy Commissioner was dismissed by order dated 12.09.2013 (Annexure-K) and the appeal filed in Appeal No. 604/2014 before the Karnataka Appellate Tribunal was withdrawn on 19.02.2015 by second respondent. However, W.P. No. 15395-98/2015 was filed challenging the order dated 12.09.2013 passed by Deputy Commissioner. Said writ petition was dismissed on 23.01.2017 (Annexure-N). Thereafter petitioner has filed two suits before the Civil Court and in the suit O.S. No. 3596/2015, the claim for grant of temporary injunction was rejected. In fact, after the proceedings before the Special Court was initiated by second respondent, the BDA has submitted a report on 29.05.2017 (Annexure-Z13) clearly stating thereunder that it has not noticed any encroachment of any public road or Raja Kaluve in Sy. No. 83/2. Even the Assistant Executive Engineer, BBMP by report dated 19.07.2017 has clearly reported to the Special Court that there is no existence of any Raja Kaluve in Sy. No. 83/2. In the light of this overwhelming evidence available on record, question of continuation of proceedings would only be an exercise in futility. In other words, petitioner is entitled to the relief sought for. Hence, writ petition is allowed. Proceedings pending in LGC (P) 309/2017 before the KLGP Special Court stands quashed. RE: W.P. No. 1395/2018 165. Petitioner claims to be the owner of converted land bearing Sy. No. 60/2C, 61/C and 62/1C of Hulimavu village. On the basis of an application filed by father of petitioner, the Special Deputy Commissioner, Bangalore District by order dated 12.02.1985 (Annexure-E) has assigned 20 guntas of land in Sy. No. 63 for the purpose of formation of road under Section 71 of the Karnataka Land Revenue Act, 1964. No. 60/2C, 61/C and 62/1C of Hulimavu village. On the basis of an application filed by father of petitioner, the Special Deputy Commissioner, Bangalore District by order dated 12.02.1985 (Annexure-E) has assigned 20 guntas of land in Sy. No. 63 for the purpose of formation of road under Section 71 of the Karnataka Land Revenue Act, 1964. On the ground that petitioner has put up illegal construction on the said road and not removed despite direction issued, a complaint came to be lodged by the Tahsildar before the Special Court. The Special Court by order dated 07.08.2017 (Annexure-L) has opined that petitioner has violated Section 4(1) and 4(2) of the KLGP Act 2011. When the order dated 12.02.1985 would clearly indicate that it is an approach road from Bangalore to Bannerghatta main road to the land belonging to the petitioner, said road cannot be encroached upon either by petitioner or any other person. As to whether petitioner has put up any sheds as alleged by Tahsildar is a matter which will have to be examined after full fledged trial. At this juncture, no opinion can be expressed on the basis of affidavits of the parties. Hence, we are of the considered view that petitioner is not entitled to the relief sought for and petition is liable to be dismissed. Accordingly, it is dismissed. RE: W.P. No. 3032/2018 166. This petition is filed in the public interest for declaring the KLGP Act 2011 contending that it is not applicable to inam land and residential sites within the village boundary, gramthana and to consider the representation dated 09.11.2017 (Annexure-B & C) submitted to respondents-1 and 2 for amending the notification No. RD3-MIN 58 dated 13.01.1959 contending inter-alia that petitioners and similarly placed persons are in possession of certain extent of lands in Raghavanapalya village, J.P. Nagar 9th Phase, Gottigere post, Uttarahalli Hobli by way of inheritance and have been living in the said lands from number of years. 166.1 While adjudicating challenge to the constitutional validity of KLGP Act 2011, we have made several observations, which we do hope the State would be taking note of and remedial steps also being taken. As such, acceding to the request of petitioner to direct respondent to consider representation dated 09.11.2017 would not arise. 166.1 While adjudicating challenge to the constitutional validity of KLGP Act 2011, we have made several observations, which we do hope the State would be taking note of and remedial steps also being taken. As such, acceding to the request of petitioner to direct respondent to consider representation dated 09.11.2017 would not arise. Insofar as constitutional validity of KLGP Act 2011 is concerned, the same has been upheld and provisions of Section 9(4), 9(5)(b) and 20 read with Section 2(d) has been read down and this would suffice for disposing of this writ petition. Accordingly, this writ petition stands disposed of. RE: W.P. No. 3641/2018 167. Petitioner claims to be owner of the lands measuring 15 acres 20 guntas, 30 acres 14 guntas, 28 acres, 20 guntas, 11 acres 27 guntas, 5 acres, 1 acre 24 guntas, 40 acres, 3 acres 35 guntas and 9 acres 14 guntas in Sy. Nos. 21, 56/2, 56/1, 78, 88, 98/2, 153, 74 and 75 respectively situated at Magundi Village, Ennapura Taluk, Chikmangaluru District. On the ground that petitioner has encroached about 51.21 acres of land third respondent initiated proceedings, which resulted in FIR 25/1999 being registered under Section 64-A of Karnataka Forest Act, 1963. Appeal filed challenging the same in Appeal No. 37/2003 was dismissed. Writ petition filed in W.P. No. 3073/2006 yielded result namely, writ petition was allowed and order dated 19.03.2003 passed by the Deputy Conservator of Forests and order dated 27.12.2005 passed by the Conservator of Forests came to be set aside and matter was remitted back to the authorities and it was ordered that before initiating the proceedings under Section 64-A joint survey should be held. It was contended by the petitioner that survey conducted was in his absence and thereafter the Deputy Conservator of Forests is said to have passed order afresh on 15.03.2016 holding that petitioner is liable to be evicted from Sy. No. 21 measuring 19 acres of foret land, 13 acres which is alleged to be deemed forest and 9.37 acres in Sy. No. 56/5 of Magundi Village. The appeal filed by the petitioner is said to be pending before the Conservator of Forests in Appeal No. 2/2016. No. 21 measuring 19 acres of foret land, 13 acres which is alleged to be deemed forest and 9.37 acres in Sy. No. 56/5 of Magundi Village. The appeal filed by the petitioner is said to be pending before the Conservator of Forests in Appeal No. 2/2016. 167.1 In the meanwhile, third respondent filed a complaint before the Special Court alleging encroachment of the lands by the petitioner as indicated in the order dated 15.03.2016 passed by the Deputy Conservator of Forests and cognizance taken by the Special Court has been called in question before this Court. 167.2 When the appeal filed by the petitioner is pending in Appeal No. 2/2016 before the Conservator of Forests, continuation of proceedings before the Special Court would not arise. Only in the event of the appeal being dismissed, the proceedings before the Special Court can be proceeded. Hence, we are of the view that it would be appropriate to reserve liberty to respondents to revive the proceedings before the Special Court on appeal being dismissed. 167.3 Accordingly, writ petition stands allowed. Proceedings before the Special Court at Bengaluru in LGC (G) No. 1879/2017 (Annexure-H) i.e. order dated 14.09.2017 is quashed. W.P. No. 4729/2018: 168. Petitioners claims to be the absolute owners of the property bearing Sy. No. 61(old No. 111) contending inter-alia that same was granted on 29.04.1931 in favour of Sri. Chikkaiah vide Annexure-A and petitioners are successors in interest of the original grantee. It is stated that revenue records stood in the name of petitioners’ predecessors in title and by MR No. 94-95, new Sy. No. 61 was assigned and revenue records were mutated in the name of Sri. Basavanna, first petitioner’s father in law and second petitioner’s father. The name of Sri. Basavanna continue in the revenue records till 2016-17 though he had expired on 02.12.1977. Hence, on the demise of first petitioner’s husband on 14.12.1990, first petitioner as well as brother of her husband as successor of late Sri. Basavanna sought for revenue records being mutated in their names. On the complaint filed by one Sri. Ravikumar against five officials, Tahsildar conducted an enquiry and passed an order on 29.07.2016 for transferring the name of the petitioners in respect of Sy. No. 61 measuring 22 acres 20 guntas. Basavanna sought for revenue records being mutated in their names. On the complaint filed by one Sri. Ravikumar against five officials, Tahsildar conducted an enquiry and passed an order on 29.07.2016 for transferring the name of the petitioners in respect of Sy. No. 61 measuring 22 acres 20 guntas. 168.1 Suo motu proceedings was initiated by the Assistant Commissioner, Tiptur sub-division and passed an order on 08.09.2016 (Annexure-J) whereunder, order passed by Tahsildar for mutating revenue records in the name of petitioners came to be set aside and it was ordered to enter the name of Government in respect of land bearing Sy. No. 61 measuring 24 acres 20 guntas. Being aggrieved by said order, writ petition was filed in W.P. No. 50784-50785/2016, which came to be disposed of by reserving liberty to the petitioners to file revision petition before the Deputy Commissioner. Accordingly, R.P. No. 81/2016-17 was filed assailing the order of Assistant Commissioner and same is said to be pending. In the meanwhile, present proceedings has been initiated against petitioner under KLGP Act 2011. 168.2 It is not in dispute that order passed by the Assistant Commissioner dated 08.09.2016 in R.A. No. 224/16-17 is pending adjudication before Deputy Commissioner, Tiptur in R.P. No. 81/2016-17 and interim order of stay is in operation. If the proceedings before the Special Court were to continue during the pendency of revision petition, it would definitely cause undue hardship to petitioners and they would be required to face the ordeal of trial. In order to protect the interest of the State also, it would be apt and appropriate to grant liberty to the respondents to revive proceedings pending before Special Court in LGC (P) No. 1/2016 on disposal of the revision petition before the Deputy Commissioner and for the present, impugned order dated 28.11.2017 passed in LGC (P) No. 1/2016 (Annexure-N) stands quashed subject to liberty granted to respondents. Accordingly, writ petition stands allowed. RE: W.P. Nos. 5389/2018, 5390/2018 and 5391/2018 169. Petitioners have sought for quashing of the KLGP ACT 2011 and the proceedings initiated against respective petitioners by Special Court constituted under the impugned Act. 169.1 Perusal of the averments made in the petitions do not disclose as to the right claimed by petitioners over the land bearing Sy. Nos. 146. Averments made in the writ petition do not disclose as to how petitioners came in possession of said land. 169.1 Perusal of the averments made in the petitions do not disclose as to the right claimed by petitioners over the land bearing Sy. Nos. 146. Averments made in the writ petition do not disclose as to how petitioners came in possession of said land. On the other hand, in the complaint filed by jurisdictional Tahsildar, it is contended that said lands belong to the appropriate Government. 169.2 The legal issues relating to the constitutional validity urged in these writ petitions have already been discussed in detail herein above. Subject to the observations made on the legal issues raised, these writ petitions stand dismissed. RE: W.P. No. 5704/2018 170. On the strength of a complaint filed by first respondent alleging that lands in Sy. Nos. 7 to 11 measuring about 279 acres of Peddanapalya village had been endowed by Mrs.Dwarakabai Vedantam to Sri. Ranganathaswamy Temple at Srirangapatna, has been usurped by petitioner and 114 persons by creating false records and land endowed to the temple which became the property of temple and the Government thereafter due to the advent of the Mysore (Religious and Charitable) Inams Abolition Act, 1955, proceedings under the KLGP Act 2011 has been initiated after taking cognizance of the alleged offence. 170.1 Report of the Tahsildar dated 30.11.2016 filed before the Special Court which has been taken note of by the Special Court at the time of taking cognizance would indicate that after coming into force of Karnataka Land Reforms Act, 1961 occupancy rights were granted by jurisdictional land Tribunal and subsequently, alienations/sales have taken place. RTC for the year 2016-17 produced by the Tahsildar before Special Court also disclosed the nature of rights acquired by various persons. The Special Court at paragraph 21 of its order dated 08.01.2018 has recorded a finding that there is no dispute that all the inam lands covered under the Inams Abolition Act, 1977 vested with the Government from the appointed date. It is also further noticed that with effect from 01.03.1974, Karnataka Land Reforms Act, 1961 coming into force, all the tenanted lands vested with the Government. It is also further noticed that with effect from 01.03.1974, Karnataka Land Reforms Act, 1961 coming into force, all the tenanted lands vested with the Government. 170.2 As to whether the Deputy Commissioner could have re-granted the lands in favour of the persons who were in occupation of the land has been gone into by the Special Court and without setting aside the order passed by the Special Deputy Commissioner, the settled issues could not be re opened in a collateral proceedings like the KLGP Act 2011. On the ground that there was no record to show when the tenants entered the lands in question and under what authority, contention raised by petitioner and similarly placed persons has been negatived by Special Court. In other words, the Special Court is attempting to sit in judgment over the orders passed by the Special Deputy Commissioner under the Inams Abolition Act and order passed by the jurisdictional land Tribunal under the Karnataka Land Reforms Act by opining that such an order would not have been passed. It has been opined by the Special Court that “perhaps, the revenue authorities have committed the same mistake at the time of making entries in the revenue records. There is no entry in the mutation register at any time in respect of these endowed lands in any other revenue records showing the origin of these so called inam lands.” Hence, it has arrived at a conclusion that it was not an inam land. The filing of applications by the occupiers of the land under the Inams Abolition Act, 1955 has been virtually held as one without jurisdiction. In other words, orders passed by the authorities was held to be as one without jurisdiction, for assuming jurisdiction under the KLGP Act 2011. Hence, we are of the considered view that Special Court committed an error in taking cognizance on the basis of the mere allegations made in the complaint and without there being any basis for the same. Accordingly, we hold that petitioner is entitled to the reliefs sought for. Writ petition stands allowed and the proceedings pending in LGC No. 43/2016 insofar as petitioner is concerned stands quashed. RE: W.P. No. 6061/2018 171. The property bearing old Sy. No. 8 of Peddanapalya village, Tavarekere Hobli, Bangalore South Taluk was under the tenure of Sri. Ranganathaswamy temple, Magadi. One Sri. Writ petition stands allowed and the proceedings pending in LGC No. 43/2016 insofar as petitioner is concerned stands quashed. RE: W.P. No. 6061/2018 171. The property bearing old Sy. No. 8 of Peddanapalya village, Tavarekere Hobli, Bangalore South Taluk was under the tenure of Sri. Ranganathaswamy temple, Magadi. One Sri. Muttaiah claiming to be the tenant and in occupation and possession of the said land had filed an application before the Land Tribunal, Magadi for grant of occupancy rights. Land Tribunal, by order dated 25.05.1992 (Annexure-E1) granted occupancy rights to an extent of 3 acres 5 guntas. On account of said order having not been challenged, it has attained finality. The said person is said to have paid the premium as evidenced from the endorsement dated 10.02.1984 (Annexure-E2). Said property was partitioned between Sri. Muttaiah and his children. Petitioner being one of the sons of Sri. Muttaiah was allotted the land measuring 1 acre 22 ½ guntas vide registered partition dated 28.12.2011, on the basis of which, revenue records came to be mutated. A complaint has been filed by second respondent before the Special Court alleging encroachment of Government land vide complaint dated 04.11.2016. 171.1 In the connected matter i.e. W.P. No. 5074/2018 which arises out of same order passed by the Special Court i.e. dated 08.01.2018, this Court has held: “Hence, we are of the considered view that Special Court committed an error in taking cognizance on the basis of the mere allegations made in the complaint and without there being any basis for the same. Accordingly, we hold that petitioners are entitled to the reliefs sought for. Writ petition stands allowed and the proceedings pending in LGC 43/2016 insofar as petitioner is concerned stands quashed.” 171.2 In view of the above finding and facts in the instant case being identical and similar, the petitioner in the instant case is also entitled to the relief sought for. 171.3 Hence, writ petition is allowed and the proceedings initiated against petitioner in LGC 43/2016 before the Special Court stands quashed. RE: W.P. No. 6330/2018 172. First petitioner’s father claims to have purchased a portion of the property carved out of Sy. No. 43 of Sri. Gandhadakavalu village, Yeshwanthpur Hobli, Bangalore North Taluk under a registered power of attorney dated 18.01.1981 for a valuable consideration of Rs. 15,000/- each. RE: W.P. No. 6330/2018 172. First petitioner’s father claims to have purchased a portion of the property carved out of Sy. No. 43 of Sri. Gandhadakavalu village, Yeshwanthpur Hobli, Bangalore North Taluk under a registered power of attorney dated 18.01.1981 for a valuable consideration of Rs. 15,000/- each. On the death of first petitioner’s father, petitioners claim to have succeeded to the estate and they claim to be in possession and enjoyment of said property. It is necessary to note at this juncture itself that sale deeds have not been produced. Respondent filed a complaint before Special Court alleging that petitioners herein have grabbed 2 acres 14 guntas of land in Sy. No. 43/1 which measures more than 100 acres. Report called for from the jurisdictional Tahsildar from the Special Court and on being filed, it was objected to by the complainant. Assistant Commissioner, Bangalore North Sub-division, as directed by the Special Court made a spot inspection and submitted a detailed report based upon which, the cognizance has been taken. Said report disclosed that Sy. No. 43/1 measures 12 acres 3 guntas, out of which, 32 guntas is comprised of ‘B’ kharab. Said land is said to have been taken over by the Government, in pursuance to the order dated 22.09.2015 passed under Section 67(5) of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act, 1961. 172.1 It is not in dispute that order passed by the land Tribunal has been stayed in W.P. No. 41866/2016 c/w 42201/2016. Petitioners are claiming under an unregistered sale deed title to the property in question. The issue in this writ petition relates to disputed question of fact, which cannot be gone into by this court under Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India and as such, the petition is liable to be dismissed. The legal issues relating to the constitutional validity urged in the writ petition has already been discussed in detail herein above. Subject to the observations made on the legal issues raised, this petition stands dismissed. 173. It is made clear that writ petitions at S. Nos. The legal issues relating to the constitutional validity urged in the writ petition has already been discussed in detail herein above. Subject to the observations made on the legal issues raised, this petition stands dismissed. 173. It is made clear that writ petitions at S. Nos. 1 to 55 have been individually dealt, since it touches upon the various facets discussed by us on the legal issues and we deem it proper to leave it to the Special Court to deal with the remaining cases which has not been dealt by us individually, by taking into consideration the proposition of law settled herein above and also answered in the writ petitions referred to herein above, by adjudicating each of the claim made in the respective individual writ petitions and also in the background of proviso to clause (b) of Sub-Section (5) of Section 9 of KLGP Act 2011 and also in the light of Section 22 having been inserted by Act 30 of 2020. Petitioners are at liberty to file applications for dismissing the complaint or dropping the proceedings pending before the Special Court as they deem fit. 174. It is needless to state that prayers made by the petitioners in the remaining writ petitions wherein, they have sought for dropping of the proceedings would be considered by the Special Court on such applications being filed in an expeditious manner and till adjudication is concluded, the interim orders passed by this court preventing the authorities from demolition of the buildings if any or taking possession of the land and the like coercive steps proposed by the said authorities, shall continue and shall be in operation. 175. We also make it clear that if any orders adverse to the interest of the petitioners being passed by the Special Court, they would be at liberty to approach this court by filing appropriate petitions and urging the grounds on facts only, since the issue regarding constitutionality of the Act having been laid to rest. 176. Hence, we dispose of these writ petitions by passing the following: ORDER: (i) We hereby declare that Karnataka Land Grabbing Prohibition Act, 2011 (Karnataka Act 38 of 2014) as amended by Act 30 of 2020 as constitutional, valid and legal. 176. Hence, we dispose of these writ petitions by passing the following: ORDER: (i) We hereby declare that Karnataka Land Grabbing Prohibition Act, 2011 (Karnataka Act 38 of 2014) as amended by Act 30 of 2020 as constitutional, valid and legal. (ii) The expression and sentence: “But additional evidence if any adduced in the civil proceedings shall not be considered by the Special Court while determining the criminal liability.” Found in Sub-Section (4) of Section 9 is struck down and is to be read as: “The evidence, admitted in civil proceedings may be made use of while determining the criminal liability and not vice-versa.” (iii) Section 9(5)(b) shall read as: “The Special Court may try every offence under the Act as if it is a warrant case and only in exceptional circumstances, try in a summary manner for reasons to be recorded.” (iv) and after sub-clause (a) and (b) to proviso to clause (d) to Section 2 shall be read as: “To include proceedings initiated under the Karnataka Land Reforms Act, 1961, Karnataka Land Revenue Act, 1964, Karnataka Land Grant Rules, Darkhast Rules or any other Land Grant Rules and proceedings relating thereto having attained finality or in other words, where no proceedings in respect of the subject lands are pending before any authority or forum.” (v) The transfer of proceedings under Section 20 of KLGP Act 2011 to the Special Court by any Court or other authority before which proceedings are pending shall be in consonance with the order dated 26.11.2019 passed in W.P. No. 51187/2019. (vi) W.P. Nos. 16281, 21279, 23800, 32134, 35384, 36610, 36640, 41593, 45114, 51160, 54035, 55683, 56296 of 2017 and 463, 1348, 3641, 4729, 5704, 6061 of 2018, are allowed and the proceedings pending against the respective petitioners before the Special Court stands quashed, subject to observations made herein above. (vii) W.P. Nos. 235, 433, 10728, 15532, 17180, 23095, 25219, 27573, 32849, 36324, 36760, 37713, 43059, 43227, 44273, 44687, 47747, 47887, 50674, 52972, 53008, 54081, 54082 of 2017 and 777, 1395, 5389, 5390, 5391, 6330 of 2018, stands dismissed. (viii) W.P. Nos. (vii) W.P. Nos. 235, 433, 10728, 15532, 17180, 23095, 25219, 27573, 32849, 36324, 36760, 37713, 43059, 43227, 44273, 44687, 47747, 47887, 50674, 52972, 53008, 54081, 54082 of 2017 and 777, 1395, 5389, 5390, 5391, 6330 of 2018, stands dismissed. (viii) W.P. Nos. 27437, 40597, 56296 of 2017, 9194, 22025, 26054, 26545, 26546, 29281, 33339, 36737, 39179, 43352, 49786, 51528, 55172 of 2018, 302, 3463, 3484, 5393, 8821, 12974, 22988, 27336, 27921, 28900, 29471, 35575, 35579, 42273, 45583, 51878, 51879, 52011, 52566 of 2019 and 220 of 2020, are hereby allowed and proceedings initiated against petitioners which are pending before the Special Court stands abated. (ix) A writ of mandamus is issued to the State to constitute such additional Benches of the Special Courts preferably in all the Districts in the teeth of Section 7 read with Section 7(4) of the Karnataka Land Grabbing Prohibition Act, 2011 and taking into consideration the necessity and feasibility. (x) We hereby direct the Special Court constituted under the Karnataka Land Grabbing Prohibition Act, 2011 to individually examine the claims of petitioners for dismissing or dropping of the proceedings by examining their claim by considering the grounds urged in the respective applications that may be filed by taking into consideration the legal issues adjudicated herein above and the findings recorded in the writ petitions disposed of herein above. Till such adjudication is completed or concluded, the interim orders passed by this court preventing the authorities from demolishing the buildings, if any or taking possession of the land and the like coercive steps proposed by the authorities, shall continue and shall be in operation till disposal of such applications. (xi) Hence, we direct that the Special Court should examine such cases and pass appropriate orders keeping in mind the observations made by this Court in W.P. No. 51187/2019 disposed of on 26.11.2019. The petitioners are also at liberty to move the Special Court for appropriate orders being passed in this regard. (xii) W.P. No. 33085/2017 stands disposed of in terms of the observations made in paragraph No. 135. (xiii) W.P. No. 34202/2017 stands disposed of, subject to observations made in paragraph No. 136. (xiv) W.P. No. 36690/2017 filed by petitioners-1 and 2 stands dismissed and proceedings initiated in LGC No. 125/2016 (Annexure-A) insofar as petitioners-3 and 4 are concerned, stands quashed and accordingly, writ petition is allowed in part. (xiii) W.P. No. 34202/2017 stands disposed of, subject to observations made in paragraph No. 136. (xiv) W.P. No. 36690/2017 filed by petitioners-1 and 2 stands dismissed and proceedings initiated in LGC No. 125/2016 (Annexure-A) insofar as petitioners-3 and 4 are concerned, stands quashed and accordingly, writ petition is allowed in part. (xv) W.P. No. 42959/2017 stands disposed of subject to observations that the Special Court shall expeditiously secure the records which have been called for by order dated 22.02.2017 and pass orders as to continuation or dropping of proceedings as it deems fit and as observed in paragraph Nos. 146, 146.1, 146.2 and 146.3. (xvi) W.P. No. 3032/2018 stands disposed of subject to observations made in paragraph Nos. 166 and 166.1. (xvii) The different prayers sought for in the writ petitions which are not specifically granted shall be deemed to have been rejected except to the extent excluded herein above. (xviii) The Rule is partly made absolute in above terms. (xix) All pending applications stand consigned to records. (xx) Costs made easy.