JUDGMENT : Prayer: Writ Petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India praying for issuance of a Writ of Certiorarified Mandamus, to call for the records of the respondent in its Ref.No.TRAO/RGGLV/01, dated, 14.03.2017 and quash the same and consequently direct the respondent to consider and grant the petitioner LPG Dealership in Avalurpet Village, Villupuram District. 1. The case of the petitioner is that he is a post graduate hails from the Village called Avalurpet. His family owns large extent of properties in the said Village. The petitioner's father was working as a Teacher in the Government School and he died while in service in the year 1995. According to the petitioner, he and his two brothers and mother constitute the joint family after the demise of their father. 2. In December 2011, the respondent called for applications from persons interested in LPG Distribution. The notification was issued in pursuance of a scheme called Rajiv Gandhi Gramin LPG Vitrak (RGGLV). The object behind the scheme was to select suitable distributors for LPG connections in rural areas and in terms of the scheme an applicant should have passed 10th standard and must have attained the age of 21 years. It was further stipulated that the applicants should have a minimum amount in savings bank and should also own a plot in the village to the dimension of 20X24 meters. 3. The applicant being eligible for consideration in the combined category in his Village submitted application by enclosing all necessary and relevant certificates, declaration from the Bank, the details of the immovable property for the family etc. Regarding the immovable property that the petitioner has stated in his application that he was in possession of 2.41 acres of land in S.No.5/2A. The petitioner was also hopeful of being granted the distributorship, as he fulfilled all the eligibility criteria and the norms in terms of the advertisement of the respondent. 4. While so, he was surprised to receive a letter dated 17.02.2012 from the respondent stating that he did not own any land for providing the godown facility with a required dimension in his name. The respondent directed the petitioner to clarify his response on or before 31.03.2012. 4. While so, he was surprised to receive a letter dated 17.02.2012 from the respondent stating that he did not own any land for providing the godown facility with a required dimension in his name. The respondent directed the petitioner to clarify his response on or before 31.03.2012. In response to the letter dated 07.03.2012 the petitioner replied on 28.03.2012 with the supportive documents to declare that a settlement deed was executed by his mother on 20.02.2012 in respect of an immovable property, which would be sufficient to be used as a godown with a required dimension. According to the petitioner, all the documents including patta, encumbrance certificates were enclosed in support of his ownership of the property. 5. Ultimately, the petitioner came to understand that he was not selected for the distributorship on the ground that he did not own the land for providing godown facilities in his name nor the family unit in the advertised location. The petitioner being aggrieved by the rejection of his candidature approached this Court in W.P.(MD).No.9878 of 2012, challenging the communication of the respondent dated, 03.07.2012. This Court on 18.03.2015 allowed the Writ Petition by a well considered decision and directed the respondent to call the petitioner for interview and consider his candidature for grant of dealership. 6. The respondent however filed an appeal against the order of the learned Single Judge in W.A.(MD).No.1292 of 2016. A Division Bench of this Court by a detailed order dismissed the Writ Appeal and thereby, confirmed the order of the learned Single Judge. According to the petitioner that this Court in fact relied upon two High Courts decisions and held that if the land in the name of family members would be sufficient to consider the individual applications for allotment of distributorship. After dismissal of the Writ Appeal and detailed reasoning of the learned Single Judge, the petitioner was hoping to be called for interview and eventual grant of allotment. But to the petitioner's surprise and dismay he received an order dated, 14.03.2017 rejecting his candidature once again almost on the same grounds, which were the basis of rejection his candidature vide communication dated 03.07.2012. Challenging the present order dated 14.03.2017, the writ petition is filed. 7. But to the petitioner's surprise and dismay he received an order dated, 14.03.2017 rejecting his candidature once again almost on the same grounds, which were the basis of rejection his candidature vide communication dated 03.07.2012. Challenging the present order dated 14.03.2017, the writ petition is filed. 7. Mr.V.Vijay Shankar, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner at the outset would submit that the rejection of the respondent cannot be countenanced both in law and on facts, as primarily, the second rejection is also on the basis of same grounds, which formed part of the first rejection order. The present rejection by the respondent in fact amounted to committing contempt of the order of this Court and would also constitute grave disobedience to the directions issued by this Court in favour of the petitioner. That apart, the learned counsel would submit that once this Court has held that the reasons behind the first rejection order would not be countenanced, the question of relying on the same ground is per se illegal, arbitrary, un-reasonable and also tantamount to a malafide exercise of power. 8. The learned counsel would draw the attention of this Court to the decision rendered by a learned Single Judge, wherein, in Paragraph Nos.10 and 11, the learned Judge has reasoned and allowed the writ petition, which are extracted hereunder:- “10. The respondent by the impugned order dated 07.03.2012 has rejected the petitioner's candidature, on the ground that the petitioner does not have land for godown with required dimension in the advertised location in his name or family unit and was communicated to the petitioner on 11.07.2012 which was received by the petitioner on 16.07.2012. Tow judgments relied on by the counsel for the respondent referred to above are not applicable to the facts of the present case. 11. In view of the fact that the respondent did not take into consideration the settlement deed dated 20.02.2012 and representation dated 28.03.2012 submitted by the petitioner, the impugned order passed by the respondent is set aside. The respondent is directed to call for the petitioner for interview and consider the application of the petitioner for dealership on merits, if he is otherwise eligible and pass orders in accordance with law.” 9. The respondent is directed to call for the petitioner for interview and consider the application of the petitioner for dealership on merits, if he is otherwise eligible and pass orders in accordance with law.” 9. As against that, W.A.(MD).No.1292 of 2016 was filed and the Division Bench of this Court vide judgment dated, 03.02.2017 dismissed the appeal by a very detailed order and while dismissing the Writ Appeal, the Division Bench has also strongly observed and referred to another decision in favour of the petitioner herein, in particular, Paragraph No.8 of the order extracted hereunder:- “8. Keeping the submissions made on either side, we have carefully gone through the entire materials available on record. As contended by the learned counsel for the respondent, the appellant has rejected the candidature of the respondent for grant of LPG dealership mainly on the ground that the respondent does not have a land for godown with required dimensions in the advertised location. But the settlement deed produced by the respondent dated 20.12.2012 would show that he is owning a land in the advertised location in Survey No.5/2A. In fact, the learned Single Judge, by perusing the said settlement deed dated 20.12.2012, directed the appellant herein to call the respondent for an interview and consider his application for dealership on merits, if he is otherwise eligible. The learned Single Judge has not given any positive direction, but, on the other hand, he has given only a direction to consider his candidature based on the settlement deed dated 20.12.2012. At this juncture, it is appropriate to refer to the judgment relied upon by the respondent in Simran Gheer vs. Union of India and Others in L.P.A.No.1520 of 2011, wherein, the issue was relating to the allotment of petrol pump site. In the said judgment, the Punjab-Haryana High Court has held that in case the land is owned by the applicant or members of family unit jointly with third person is required to qualify for marks. In the said judgment, the Punjab-Haryana High Court has held that in case the land is owned by the applicant or members of family unit jointly with third person is required to qualify for marks. In Deva Nand Singh vs. The Union of India & Ors in L.P.A.No.884 of 2011, the Patna High Court has held that there is no illegality in selecting the private respondent therein based on the affidavit executed by the father and brother of the private respondent that they will have no objection in allotting the land in question exclusively to the share of the private respondent, in case he was selected for dealership. Therefore, absolutely, we do not find any infirmity in the order of the learned Single Judge, giving a direction to the appellant to call the respondent for an interview, based on the settlement deed executed by the mother of the respondent. Hence, the same needs no interference at the hands of this Court.” 10. The final conclusion in paragraph No.12 which is extracted hereunder: 12. Looking at any angle, we find that the proceedings of the Corporation dated 07.03.2012, is not legally sustainable and the same is liable to be set aside. Therefore, the learned Single Judge has correctly dealt with the issue and the direction given in this regard is a well considered one and the same needs no interference by this Court for the reasons as observed above. 11. In the face of the above orders, both by learned Single Judge as well as the Division Bench, the present rejection order cannot be sustained by the respondent. The learned counsel would take this Court through the contention of the rejection letter dated 14.03.2017. According to the learned counsel, the only objection for rejecting the candidature once again is that the applicant on the date of application had not owned a suitable plot of minimum 20X24 meters in dimension at the advertised location for construction of LPG storage godown. In fact, in the impugned order itself, it is clarified that the ownership of title in the name of applicant or family member of the 'family unit'. 12. In fact, in the impugned order itself, it is clarified that the ownership of title in the name of applicant or family member of the 'family unit'. 12. The learned counsel would submit that the reason set forth in the impugned order is un-sustainable and untenable for the reasons that the petitioner had been part of the joint family which owns large extent of the property in the village and one such property was that the property shown by the petitioner to an extent of 2.41 acres, which was his ancestral property devolved upon his mother. Therefore, on the date, when the application was made, the property was jointly held by the petitioner along with his brothers and mother. 13. Moreover by way of abundant caution, the petitioner had also been settled with the property by a registered settlement deed, dated, 20.02.2012, which was earlier to the last date for submitting explanation fixed by the respondent themselves in their letter, dated, 07.03.2012. By a letter dated, 07.03.2012, the petitioner was given an opportunity to submit his representation until 31.03.2012 and before the said date, the settlement had been effected on 20.02.2012 itself. Therefore, the second rejection order on the basis of the same objection that the petitioner did not have sufficient space for the godown facility was a decision taken with malafide consideration because the petitioner has approached this Court and obtained an interim order of injunction and had the benefit of the interim order all along. 14. The learned counsel would submit that once time was given to the petitioner to give explanation till 31.03.2012 and when the petitioner had by production of the settlement deed dated 20.02.2012 fulfilled all the norms 100%, rejecting his candidature on the same ground is without any justification. According to the learned counsel, the rejection was not for a bonafide consideration but for extraneous consideration and therefore, the impugned order is liable to be set aside. 15. Per contra, Mr.K.Muralidharan, learned counsel appearing for the respondent would vehemently oppose for the grant of distributorship to the petitioner. According to the learned counsel, the rejection was not for a bonafide consideration but for extraneous consideration and therefore, the impugned order is liable to be set aside. 15. Per contra, Mr.K.Muralidharan, learned counsel appearing for the respondent would vehemently oppose for the grant of distributorship to the petitioner. He would submit that when a clarification was sought from the petitioner vide letter dated 07.03.2012 and a reply was sent by the petitioner that the property with required vacant space available and had been settled in his favour vide the settlement deed dated 20.02.2012, was an erroneous appreciation of the condition stipulated by the respondent Corporation. The last date of the application was on 31.01.2012 and admittedly, the registration of the settlement deed was only after the said date on 20.02.2012. Therefore, it is clear that the petitioner did not own the property on the day, when he applied for grant of LPG Distributorship i.e., before 31.01.2012. In the said circumstances, it was immaterial that the petitioner was settled with the property containing sufficient vacant land for the godown purposes, after the last date to submit the application form. 16. According to the learned counsel, when a clarification was sought in March 2012, it did not mean that period for fulfilment of the norms had been extended. The clarification has been sought from the candidate whether the candidate could come up with any alternative site with a required dimension, which he had failed to mention at the time of submission of the application. The petitioner however has mistaken as if the respondent had given him time to make up his shortcoming when he originally applied for consideration of his candidature for the distributorship. 17. The learned counsel would also submit that the instructions given in the brouchure are very clear and unambiguous. He would further refer to the definition of a family unit which is extracted hereunder:- “'Family Unit' in case of married person / applicant, shall consist of individual concerned, his/her Spouse and their unmarried son(s) / daughter(s). In case of unmarried person/ applicant, 'Family Unit' shall consist of individual concerned, his/her parents and his/her unmarried brother(s) and unmarried sister(s). In case of divorcee, 'Family Unit' shall consist of individual concerned, unmarried son(s) / unmarried daughter(s) whose custody is given to him/her. In case of unmarried person/ applicant, 'Family Unit' shall consist of individual concerned, his/her parents and his/her unmarried brother(s) and unmarried sister(s). In case of divorcee, 'Family Unit' shall consist of individual concerned, unmarried son(s) / unmarried daughter(s) whose custody is given to him/her. In case of widow / widower, 'Family Unit' shall consist of individual concerned, unmarried son(s) / unmarried daughter(s).” 18. He would submit that the above definition would answer the petitioner's claim that the subject property was jointly held by the family in terms of the clear definition of the word “Family Unit”. The argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner is fallacious and invalid for the reason that the petitioner being a married person, family unit includes spouse, unmarried sons and daughters and not mother. Therefore, the pleading of ancestral property and claiming joint ownership would not qualify the petitioner to come within the definition of 'Family Unit' in terms of the conditions of the advertisement. 19. Therefore, with reference to the definition of the 'family unit', the claim of the petitioner that even otherwise the property shown by him could be considered as his property by treating the property belonging to the family unit cannot be sustained both in law and on facts, as demonstrated above. 20. As regards the settlement of the property in petitioner's favour on 20.02.2012, the impugned order clearly stated that as per the selection guidelines on the date of application, the applicant should have owned the property with certain required dimensions. Therefore, the settlement deed dated, 20.02.2012 would not make the claim of the petitioner any better and therefore, the respondent Corporation has rightly rejected the application. 21. According to the learned counsel for the respondent, earlier, when this petitioner approached this Court before the learned Single Judge and then by the Corporation before the learned Division Bench Judge and a direction was issued to consider the claim of the petitioner and there was no positive direction to grant him distributorship regardless of the fact whether he fulfilled the eligibility criteria or not. Therefore, the petitioner having failed to fulfil the mandatory norms in terms of the explicit specification of the respondent Corporation, his application has been rightly rejected for distributorship. 22. The learned counsel would also rely on a decision reported in 2018 1 CWC 136 in the case of K.Gowtham Vs. Therefore, the petitioner having failed to fulfil the mandatory norms in terms of the explicit specification of the respondent Corporation, his application has been rightly rejected for distributorship. 22. The learned counsel would also rely on a decision reported in 2018 1 CWC 136 in the case of K.Gowtham Vs. Senior Area Manager, Indian Oil Corporation, Indane Area Office, 8/1079, Avinasi Road, Coimbatore-18. He would rely on paragraph Nos.19 and 20 of the judgment which are extracted hereunder:- “19. Further, the decisions relied on by the counsel for the petitioner do not strengthen his case, as the petitioner failed to satisfy the requisite condition prescribed for allotment of LPG Distributorship. Furthermore, in the decisions relied on by the counsel for the petitioner, Courts have not considered the term “Family” as per the “Family Unit” mentioned in the guidelines. At this juncture, it is worth referring to the observation made by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Padma Sundara Rao Vs. State of Tamil Nadu 2002 (3) SCC 533 , which is reiterated hereunder: 9. Courts should not place reliance on decisions without discussing as to how the factual situation fits in with the fact situation of the decision on which reliance is placed. There is always peril in treating the words of a speech or judgment as though they are words in a legislative enactment, and it is to be remembered that judicial utterances are made in the setting of the facts of a particular case, said Lord Morris in Herrington Vs. British Railways Board. Circumstantial flexibility, one additional or different fact may make a world of difference between conclusions in two cases.” 20. I find much force in the contention of the counsel for the respondent, which is supported by the decision rendered in Shiv Kant Yadav's case (Cited supra). Thus, when the condition requisite for holding LPG Distributorship is not satisfied by the petitioner, this Court finds no error in the impugned orders passed by the respondent / IOC.” 23. In the above decision of the learned Single Judge finding that the petitioner therein did not fulfil the conditions prescribed for grant of LPG distributorship refused to interfere in the rejection order. The learned counsel also relied on a decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court reported in 2003 (10) SCC-681 in the case of K.Vinod Kumar Vs. In the above decision of the learned Single Judge finding that the petitioner therein did not fulfil the conditions prescribed for grant of LPG distributorship refused to interfere in the rejection order. The learned counsel also relied on a decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court reported in 2003 (10) SCC-681 in the case of K.Vinod Kumar Vs. S.Palanisamy and Others, whereas, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that the judicial review in matters of distributorship is limited to the decision making process and does not extend to the merits of the decision taken. When no malafide is alleged, the decision taken by the respondent cannot be assailed successfully. 24. The learned counsel would sum up that the decision of the respondent corporation is perfectly in tune with the mandatory requirements and the guidelines and hence, no interference is called for from this Court. 25. In reply to the above submissions, Mr.V.Vijay Shankar, learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that the decision relied on by the learned counsel appearing for the respondent, namely, 2003 (10) SCC 681 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court has categorically held that the requirement of providing godown facility though mandatory, but, satisfying requirement at the stage of making the application is only directory. He would particularly rely upon paragraph No.8 of the judgment, which is extracted hereunder: “8. So far as the requirement of Instruction (g) as stated above is concerned, it does not appear to be mandatory. The purpose of furnishing particulars of land in the application is to enable a determination as to whether the specified place would accommodate the godown facilities and distributorship arrangement from a commercial angle. This requirement is mandatory but satisfying the requirement at the stage of making the application is only directory. The particulars of such land can be made available even subsequent to the filing of the application, and may even be subsequent to the selection. The consequence of failure to make the suitable land available within a period of two months from the date of selection is that the selection of such candidate would be liable to be cancelled.” 26. The particulars of such land can be made available even subsequent to the filing of the application, and may even be subsequent to the selection. The consequence of failure to make the suitable land available within a period of two months from the date of selection is that the selection of such candidate would be liable to be cancelled.” 26. If the above ruling is applied then the rejection of the petitioner's candidature would have go lock stock and barrel, as admittedly the vacant land has been shown by the petitioner by virtue of the settlement deed in his favour dated 20.02.2012 and the respondent Corporation had not disputed regarding the extent of the property shown by him for providing godown facility. The objection being only that it was settled after the last date of application i.e., on 31.01.2012. In view of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court such objection would have to be held as invalid and not in consonance with the law declared by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India. 27. Considered the submissions made by Mr.V.Vijay Shankar, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr.K.Muralidharan, learned counsel appearing for the respondent. Perused the pleadings, citations and materials placed on record. 28. The point in issue for consideration before this Court is to whether in the light of the settlement deed conveying property, dated, 20.02.2012 could be considered as a fulfilment of the requirement in terms of the guidelines issued by the respondent Corporation for grant of LPG distributorship or not? This Court is of the view that when a clarification was sought by the respondent Corporation on 07.03.2012 and in response to the communication, a reply was sent by the petitioner on 28.03.2012 bringing out the fact of the settlement deed executed in his favour by his mother conveying a piece of land to an extent of 2.47 acres, the objection of the respondent Corporation appears to be that the property devolved on the petitioner only on the date of settlement i.e., 20.02.2012 and therefore, the clarification of the petitioner was not acceptable. This Court is unable to appreciate such a stand of the respondent Corporation for more than one reason. 29. Firstly, after perusing the guidelines and Brochure, nowhere, it is mentioned that the required land must be owned at the time of submission of application or the last date of application. This Court is unable to appreciate such a stand of the respondent Corporation for more than one reason. 29. Firstly, after perusing the guidelines and Brochure, nowhere, it is mentioned that the required land must be owned at the time of submission of application or the last date of application. In fact, as could be seen in the guidelines, certain requirements were mentioned like having minimum total amount of Rs.2,00,000/- from savings accounts, which requirement was specifically mentioned as on the date of application. But, in respect of owning of suitable land, such stipulation was not there. Therefore, objection of the Corporation that the petitioner did not own the land as on the date of application or before the last date of submission of the application is not supported by guidelines or instructions. 30. Secondly, even assuming there was any prescription on this aspect in the guidelines, as rightly contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner by drawing the attention of this Court to the crucial observations of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Paragraph No.8 of the decision reported in 2003 (10) SCC 681 , the requirement of the land for providing godown purposes was no doubt mandatory, but, was held to be directory at the time of submission of the application. 31. As far as the case on hand is concerned, even assuming that the petitioner did not have any sufficient land for the purpose of providing godown facilities at the time he applied, nevertheless, when a clarification was sought on 07.03.2012 by then, the petitioner had already got a property settled in his favour, thus, fulfilling the entire norms as required by the respondent Corporation. Therefore, the petitioner cannot be faulted for not fulfilling the norms in terms of the guidelines issued by the Corporation in this regard. 32. The respondent has also failed to appreciate the spirit of the order passed by the learned Single Judge in favour of the petitioner in the first round of litigation. The learned Judge has considered the fact of settlement of the property in the name of the petitioner on 20.02.2012 and only on such consideration, a direction was issued to call the petitioner for interview and consider his application for grant of distributorship. The learned Judge has considered the fact of settlement of the property in the name of the petitioner on 20.02.2012 and only on such consideration, a direction was issued to call the petitioner for interview and consider his application for grant of distributorship. In fact, it can be safely deduced from the order passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court, the objection of the respondent Corporation had been discountenanced by this Court even in the earlier writ petition. 33. Further, when an appeal was preferred by the Corporation, the Division Bench of this Court vide order dated 03.02.2017 in W.A.(MD).No.1292 of 2016 has also in detailed consideration of the objections of the Corporation, agreed with the views of the learned Single Judge and also with the submissions made on behalf of the petitioner herein in Paragraph No.5 of the order which is extracted hereunder:- “5. Countering the submission made by the learned counsel for the appellant, the learned counsel for the respondent submits that the reasons assigned by the Corporation for rejecting the candidature of the respondent for grant of LPG Dealership are totally erroneous. One of the reasons assigned by the appellant is that the respondent does not have land for godown with required dimensions in the advertised location. The said reason assigned by the appellant is factually incorrect. In this regard, the learned counsel has invited the attention of this Court to the settlement deed executed by the mother of the respondent to show that the respondent is owning a land in Survey No.5/2A in Avalurpet Village i.e., in the advertised location. In fact, the learned Single Judge, by considering the settlement deed executed by the mother of the respondent in his favour, has only directed the appellant to call the respondent for an interview. Thus, no infirmity could be found with the said finding. In this regard, the learned counsel for the respondent, by relying upon an unreported judgment of Punjab-Haryana High Court in Simran Gheer vs. Union of India and Others in L.P.A.No.1520 of 2011 and another judgment of Patna High Court in Deva Nand Singh vs. The Union of India & Ors in L.P.A.No.884 of 2011, contended that the land offered by the member of the family can be taken into consideration.” 34. From the above, it could be seen that what discretion left to the respondent Corporation was only to see whether the petitioner herein was otherwise eligible for grant of the distributorship. But, certainly the discretion was not given in respect of the validity or offer of the petitioner's land, which came into ownership under the settlement deed dated 30.02.2012. Therefore, as initially and rightly contended by the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner that the present impugned order is a result of contumacious application of mind, on this ground alone, in the opinion of this Court, the impugned order is liable to be set aside. 35. That apart leaving the core bone of contention, this Court is unable to appreciate the pedantic stand of the respondent Corporation and the needless obduracy in rigidly resisting the claim of the petitioner. Ultimately, the public interest has been undermined as no distributorship could be allotted for serving in the area to be covered through the same. 36. This is not to hold that the respondent Corporation is under any compulsion to extend distributorship to candidates who did not measure up to the eligibility criteria. At the same time, when the petitioner herein has fulfilled all the criteria and the only point of objection was in relation to the provision of godown facility, which provision has also been made by the petitioner within few days from the date of his application and well before the decision was taken by the Corporation to allot the distributorship, this Court does not think that the Corporation has been fair and acting in good faith in considering the claim of the petitioner. 37. As rightly contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner, it appears that the order has been passed by the respondent Corporation almost on the similar lines as that of the first rejection order. In the said circumstances, the rejection by the Corporation would have to be held as illegal being a product of mala fide and colourable exercise of power. The Courts have also held that the judicial review in such matters is very restricted and limited and such review could be only with regard to the decision making process and not a decision per se. The Courts have also held that the judicial review in such matters is very restricted and limited and such review could be only with regard to the decision making process and not a decision per se. But in the facts and circumstances of the case this Court could safely come to a conclusion that the decision making process culminated in the rejection of the petitioner's candidature is tainted with malice in law. Holding as such, this Court has no hesitation to allow this Writ Petition. 38. For the above stated reasons, the order of the respondent in Ref.No.TRAO/RGGLV/01, dated, 14.03.2017 is hereby quashed and the respondent is consequently directed to consider and grant LPG Distributorship in Avalurpet, Gingee Taluk, Villupuram District, to the petitioner in pursuance of the application made originally in response to the advertisement of the Corporation in December, 2011. 39. The respondent is directed to pass appropriate orders in this regard within a period of four weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. 40. The Writ Petition stands allowed accordingly. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petitions are closed.