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2021 DIGILAW 1258 (MAD)

V. Kannaiyan v. District Collector, Salem District

2021-04-01

N.SESHASAYEE

body2021
ORDER : N. Seshasayee, J. 1. The present petition is filed seeking a direction to the respondents viz., (1) to cancel the sub-divisions effected as S. No. 329/2A and 329/2B in respect of Old S. No. 329/2, Yethapur Village, Pethanaickepalayam Village, Salem District; (2) to cancel the registration of S. No. 329/2B as Adi Dravidar Natham in the revenue records; (3) to register the land in the name of the petitioners and to issue patta to the entire extent of the land in S. No. 329/2 as it stood before the sub-division. 2. The short facts of the petitioners' case is that: The first petitioner and his wife Banumathi, who is now dead, have separately purchased an extent of 1.44 acres and 83 cents respectively in S. No. 329/2 in Yethapur village. Be that as it may, the first respondent/the District Collector had notified an extent of 1.44 acres for acquisition under the Tamil Nadu Acquisition of Land for Harijan Welfare Scheme Act, for providing house-sites to the Adi-Dravidar of Yethapur Village. On acquisition, S.No:329/2 was sub-divided into S. No. 329/2A and S. No. 329/2B, and acquired portion came to be assigned S. No. 329/2B, and was classified as Adi-Dravidar Natham. This, according to the petitioners was done without notice to them. This acquisition was challenged by the first petitioner and his wife in W.P. No. 12668 of 1996 and W.P. No. 12669 of 1996, and both the writ petitions came to be allowed, and the acquisition was quashed. This led to the Government preferring appeals in W.A. No. 211 and W.A. No. 212 of 2005. Both the appeals were dismissed by this Court Vide order dated 20.03.2009. The resulting consequence was that all the efforts to acquire the land of the first petitioner and his wife came to a naught. The petitioners herein remain in possession of the said properties and that necessary tax and rates payable to the local body is being paid. While so, sometime in 2016, when the first petitioner and his wife proposed to put up a construction inter alia in S. No. 329/2, that was objected to by the intended beneficiaries of the original acquisition, and hence, a suit for permanent injunction in O.S. No. 189/2016 was filed by the first petitioner and his wife, restraining the respondents from interfering with their possession of the entire 4.43 acres in S. Nos. 329/2, 331/2 and 330/4. In that suit, the plaintiffs (the first petitioner and his wife) had filed I.A. No. 976/2016 for an order of interim injunction and this came to be erroneously dismissed by the learned District Munsif, Attur, on the ground that the land vests with the Government as Adi Dravidar Natham. In these circumstances, the petitioners have submitted various representations on 11.02.2011, 21.09.2016, 22.09.2016, 24.11.2016, 29.12.2016, 05.04.2017, 06.04.2017 to the respondents to cancel the sub-division effected in S. No. 329/2, and to re-classify S. No. 329/2B as the patta lands of the petitioners and to issue patta to the entire extent of the land in S. No. 329/2 in the name of the petitioners. Of them, the representation dated 06.04.2017 was attended by the second respondent, who had directed the fifth respondent/ the Special Tahsildar, Adi Dravidar Welfare, Attur, to take necessary action. But nothing happened thereafter. Hence, the present petition. 3. Heard Mr. P. Jagadeesan, learned counsel for the petitioners and Mr. G. Rajesh, learned Government Advocate for the respondents. 4. The learned Government Advocate appearing for the respondents submitted that the respondents herein are the defendants 1 to 6 in O.S. No. 189/2016. He brought to the notice of the Court the written statement filed by the defendants 1 to 6/respondents herein, wherein it was contended that though the suit is laid for the alleged survey numbers viz., S. No. 329/2, S. No. 330/4, S. No. 331/2, the acquisition concerns only with S. No. 329/2B. The respondents further contends that even prior to the acquisition, S. No. 329/2 was sub-divided into S. No. 329/2A and 329/2B, and that the petitioners/plaintiffs are not found to be in possession of S. No. 329/2B, and the Survey No. 329/2B vests with the Government and it was registered as Adi Dravidar Natham in the village records. That apart, when the petitioners/plaintiffs attempted to raise construction in S. No. 329/2B, the Executive Officer, Yethapur Town Panchayat, the 8th defendant in that suit has issued a notice to the plaintiffs/petitioner on 19.07.2016, objecting to it on the ground that a prior permission is required for the proposed construction from the Panchayat. That apart, when the petitioners/plaintiffs attempted to raise construction in S. No. 329/2B, the Executive Officer, Yethapur Town Panchayat, the 8th defendant in that suit has issued a notice to the plaintiffs/petitioner on 19.07.2016, objecting to it on the ground that a prior permission is required for the proposed construction from the Panchayat. In spite of this, the petitioners proceeded with their construction in S. No. 329/B and 331, based on which, the matter was moved before the Revenue Divisional Officer, Attur, who has convened a Peace Committee Meeting, in which, an order of status quo was passed. And this was suppressed in the suit and even in this petition. 5. There are two parts to the issue: (a) The right of the petitioners to have the property purported to be acquired re-mutated in the name of the petitioners; and (b) The alleged unauthorised construction by the petitioners without the sanction of the concerned Panchayat. This Court, however, is primarily concerned with issue (a) as the other issue is not part of the cause of action raised in this case. 6. This case came up before this Court a few times since 22-01-2021, and on when the matter came up before this Court on 11-03-2021, this Court was informed that the matter awaits some proceedings to be passed by the Principal Secretary. On that day, this Court conveyed to the learned Government Advocate that when once the acquisition was quashed by this Court, that very Order would be sufficient to divest the Government of its title in the property acquired, and that nothing more is required to be done as in the case of re-conveyance of land under Sec. 48-B of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. Hence, re-classifying the land acquired, and re-mutating it in the name of the petitioners is the natural and automatic consequence that ought to spontaneously follow the Order quashing the acquisition. The learned Government Advocate however, reiterated the same stance of the Government. 7. Hence, re-classifying the land acquired, and re-mutating it in the name of the petitioners is the natural and automatic consequence that ought to spontaneously follow the Order quashing the acquisition. The learned Government Advocate however, reiterated the same stance of the Government. 7. Hence this Court was constrained to require the District Collector, Salem, to log in the virtual court, and accordingly, the District Collector, Salem has logged in, and this Court informed him that which is fundamentally the natural consequence of an order quashing the acquisition, there hardly a need for passing any proceedings by the Secretary, for any such insistence on such procedure would run counter the spirit behind Article 261 of the Constitution. The first respondent, submitted that this would be expedited. Since, there was an indication that a long standing prayer of the petitioners would be complied with/ without any need for this court to pass a final Order in this case, this Court posted the matter for reporting compliance today. 8. When the matter was taken up, this Court was given to understand how zealously the respondents are protecting what they considered as the procedure for re-conveyance. It is obvious, the Government and its officials are in no mood to appreciate that the Government had already been divested of its title in the lands acquired, the moment the acquisition was quashed by the Court. 9. As already outlined, when an acquisition is quashed, there is no right in the Government, or any of its officials to retain control over the land acquired in any form. It is inbuilt in every Order quashing an acquisition that the status quo ante prior to the acquisition would be restored, that would be the logical conclusion that ought to follow every Order of this Court quashing of the acquisition. This should necessarily include every classification that have been made consequent to an acquisition is also restored. Re-classifying the land, or re-mutating the revenue records in the name of the land-owners, to repeat, are mere consequences of the Order quashing the acquisition. It does neither require a separate order from the Court, nor does it require the concurrence of the Government or any of its officials. The process must be automatic. To expatiate this idea, when there is no title vested in it, what is the need for authorities to pass separate proceedings? It does neither require a separate order from the Court, nor does it require the concurrence of the Government or any of its officials. The process must be automatic. To expatiate this idea, when there is no title vested in it, what is the need for authorities to pass separate proceedings? Any procedure that requires it is plainly dilatory in character, and is intend to delay the complete restoration of right to property of the citizen. Where, therefore, is the need for the Government through its Secretary to pass some proceedings for the revesting of right to property to take place. 10.1. There is a world of difference between a certain status quo ante which is needed to be restored by the Order of this court, and certain consequences that might beset due to any administrative action of the authority. The procedure required for restoration of status quo ante based on the Order of this Court is the very Order, and it may not require the Government to counter sign the said Order through any separate proceedings. Here it is apposite to refer RSO 31.4(ii). It reads as below: RSO 31. Rules for the transfer of Registry of Holdings: 4. Compulsory transfers of title: (ii) Transfers under declaratory decrees:- In cases where transfer of registry is sought under a declaratory decree on which no execution can be taken out, i.e., where the decree merely declares the title to be vested in a particular person, so as to entitle him to registration, the Collector or other authorized officer may, on production of an authenticated copy of such decree, at once order the transfer of registry." It does not make any difference if the party to suffer a decree or phrasen order is a Government and not a private party. 10.2. When the Government ought to do everything that which it is duty bound to do to give effect to the Order of this Court, there is hardly any space for any independent procedure for restoring such status quo ante, for there is no discretion vested in the Government to do anything contrary to the letter and spirit of the Order of the Court. In other words, where the situation does not require the Government to decide an issue, but only is required to do everything that might flow from the Order of the Court, both directly, or as a necessary consequence, then the order of this Court alone need to be considered. That is the best way to show obedience to the spirit behind Article 261 of the Constitution. Incidentally it would also avoid unnecessary red tapism, besides making the administrative procedure people-friendly. See also the judgment of this Court in Ravindran Vs. The District Collector, Vellore District [W.P. No. 19428 of 2020] and Jayalakshmi & Others Vs. State of Tamil Nadu [W.P. No. 181 of 2021] 11. This writ petition is allowed with the observation that, more than cancelling the sub-division, issuance of patta to Survey No. 329/2B in the name of the petitioners is mandatory for that ultimately with or without sub-division, the entire property belong to the petitioners. No costs. Post the matter for reporting compliance on 21.04.2021.