JUDGMENT : NIRAL R. MEHTA, J. 1. Feeling aggrieved by the judgment and order dated 11.9.2007/11.9.2007 passed by a learned Single Judge of this Court in the Special Civil Application No. 408 of 1993, the appellants-original petitioners have preferred this Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. 2. By way of the impugned judgment, the learned Single Judge while dismissing the writ petition, affirmed the order dated 17.6.1983 passed by the competent authority as well as the order dated 3.3.1989 passed by the learned Urban Land Ceiling Tribunal. 3. Brief facts as can be gathered from the record are as under: 3.1 A parcel of agricultural land bearing Survey No. 208/1 was originally owned by one Manibhai Shivabhai Patel, who, during his life-time, gifted the said land to his wife-Kashiben Bhailalbhai Patel (Maiden name) on 13.10.1961. The said land admeasuring 2 Acres and 8 Gunthas is situated at the village Narol. Prior to coming into the force of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act (for short ‘the Act’) there was a dispute between the erstwhile owner and one Ishwarbhai Somabhai, who was claiming to be the tenant of a portion of land in question. The settlement took place and thereby, 28 Gunthas of land was given to said Ishwarbhai Somabhai and heirs and the balance 1 Acre and 20 Gunthas of lands was retained by the erstwhile owner. Kashiben Bhailalbhai Patel made a Will before the Act coming into the force and by virtue of the said Will, the appellants’ name came to be mutated in the Village Form No. 6 by way of Entry No. 1890. As per the City Survey map prepared by the City Survey Officer on 14.5.1962, the land is bounded on the north by Survey No. 210/1 and on south by Survey Nos. 108 and 209, on the east by Survey No. 210/2 and on the west by Survey No. 208/2. As per the said map, there is a cans (canal) passing through the land. The portion of land to the west of the said canal and bounded by land bearing Survey No. 208/2 is of Ishwarbhai Somabhai which is admeasuring 28 Gunthas and the land to the east of the canal which is admeasuring 1 Acre and 20 Gunthas (6070 sq. mtrs.) belongs to the appellants herein-original petitioners. The portion of land to the west of the said canal and bounded by land bearing Survey No. 208/2 is of Ishwarbhai Somabhai which is admeasuring 28 Gunthas and the land to the east of the canal which is admeasuring 1 Acre and 20 Gunthas (6070 sq. mtrs.) belongs to the appellants herein-original petitioners. 3.2 It appears that upon coming into the force of the Act, under Section 6, Form-1 came to be submitted by the appellants herein jointly. The application of the appellants for exemption under Section 20 of the Act came to be rejected by the competent authority and vide order dated 6.9.1983 passed under Section 8(4) of the Act, it was held that as per the master plan, the land was situated within the industrial zone, therefore, it was vacant land and thereby, on their total holding of 6070 sq. mtrs. the appellants were entitled to retain 1000 sq. mtrs. of land. Thus, the remaining 5070 sq. mtrs. of land was declared as the excess vacant land. 3.3 Feeling aggrieved by the aforesaid, the appellants herein approached the Urban Land Ceiling Tribunal by way of Ceiling Appeal No. 217 of 1983 under Section 33 of the Act. However, the same came to be dismissed by way of an order dated 3.3.1989. 3.4 As per the order of the Tribunal, the final statement was drawn and sent to the appellants on 27.3.1989 as envisaged by Section 9 of the Act. Further, the action for acquisition of the excess vacant land was undertaken by the State Government vide the Notification as envisaged by Section 10(1) of the Act dated 27.3.1990 and the same was published in the official gazette on 19.4.1990. By way of another Notification dated 30.4.1992 issued under Section 10(3) of the Act and published in the official gazette on 14.5.1992, the excess vacant land came to be vested in the State Government. Thus, on 27.11.1992 the holders were given notice to hand over possession of the excess vacant land as envisaged by Section 10(5) of the Act. Since the holders failed to hand over the possession of the excess vacant land, the possession is said to have been taken over by the State Government by drawing a panchnama dated 4.1.1993 of the land admeasuring 5070 sq. mtrs. which was ordered to be declared as excess vacant land by the competent authority. Since the holders failed to hand over the possession of the excess vacant land, the possession is said to have been taken over by the State Government by drawing a panchnama dated 4.1.1993 of the land admeasuring 5070 sq. mtrs. which was ordered to be declared as excess vacant land by the competent authority. 3.5 It is pertinent to note that the competent authority vide its order dated 6.9.1983 held that the owners i.e. appellants herein are entitled to hold 1000 sq. mtrs. of land as one unit. Further, in the Appeal, the Tribunal has confirmed the order of the competent authority holding that since no specific share has been shown by each of the appellants-original petitioners, they are being rightly considered as association of persons by the competent authority and thus, they are entitled to only one unit. 3.6 Being aggrieved by the aforesaid, the writ petition came to be filed by the appellants. However, the learned Single Judge, after hearing the learned counsel appearing for the parties and after having considered the pleadings on record, by judgment and order dated 11.9.2007/12.9.2007, came to the conclusion that since the appellants did not specify that they were the joint owners or they had a specified share in the land, they were being rightly treated as association of individuals by the competent authority. The learned Single Judge also held that the petition was filed belatedly after a period of 3 years, that too after the State Government took over the possession of excess vacant land. The learned Single Judge further recorded the finding that there is no formal challenge to the action of the State Government taking over the possession of excess vacant land. However, the petition was filed within days of taking over possession of the excess vacant land and thereby, inference was drawn by the learned Single Judge that the holders were aware of the factum of taking over the possession of excess vacant land. The learned Single Judge further observed that the said fact was not disclosed in the writ petition and accordingly, rejected the writ application. 3.7 Being aggrieved by the aforesaid, the present Letters Patent Appeal has been filed by the appellants-original petitioners challenging, inter-alia, the judgment and order dated 11.9.2007/12.9.2007 passed by the learned Single Judge. 4. We have heard Mr. Mihir Thakore, the learned Senior Counsel assisted by Ms. 3.7 Being aggrieved by the aforesaid, the present Letters Patent Appeal has been filed by the appellants-original petitioners challenging, inter-alia, the judgment and order dated 11.9.2007/12.9.2007 passed by the learned Single Judge. 4. We have heard Mr. Mihir Thakore, the learned Senior Counsel assisted by Ms. Nimisha J. Parekh for the appellants and Mr. Ishan Joshi, the learned Assistant Government Pleader for the respondents. 5. Mr. Mihir Thakore, the learned Senior Counsel has fervently submitted that the learned Single Judge has committed a serious error in upholding the orders passed by the competent authority and the Tribunal respectively. Mr. Thakore submitted that the learned Single Judge has not properly appreciated the concept of ‘Association of Persons’ and ‘Co-owner’. Mr. Thakore submitted that the land in question came to the share of the present appellants by virtue of a Will that was executed and given effect to even prior to the coming into force of the Act. Mr. Thakore, therefore, submitted that the land in question came to be inherited by the present appellants and thereby, both the appellants are the co-owners of the land in question. Mr. Thakore, therefore, submitted that since the land inherited by the appellants, both the appellants are said to have equal share in the property in question. Therefore, according to Mr. Thakore, merely because in the revenue record, specific share held by each petitioner has not been stated, it would not be correct to say that the land in question has been held as association of persons. Mr. Thakore, making the above submissions, submitted that the orders of the competent authority, the Tribunal and the judgment and order of the learned Single Judge are thereby contrary to the settled law and thus, in any event, the present appellants are entitled to retain one unit each i.e. 2000 sq. mtrs. 5.1 Mr. Thakore further submitted that the Panchnama dated 4.1.1993 of taking over of the possession of the excess vacant land is not legal. He submitted that demarcation of the land as to which portion of the land admeasuring 5070 sq. mtrs. is taken over, has also not been made. Mr. Thakore submitted that while taking over the alleged possession, the competent authority has not taken into consideration the construction put up on the land in question and, therefore, according to Mr. He submitted that demarcation of the land as to which portion of the land admeasuring 5070 sq. mtrs. is taken over, has also not been made. Mr. Thakore submitted that while taking over the alleged possession, the competent authority has not taken into consideration the construction put up on the land in question and, therefore, according to Mr. Thakore, the possession of the subject land cannot be said to have been lawfully taken over by the State. 5.2 In view of the above submissions, Mr. Thakore urged this Court to allow the present Appeal. 6. Per contra, Mr. Ishan Joshi, learned Assistant Government Pleader, has vehemently opposed the present Appeal and supported the judgment and order passed by the learned Single Judge. Mr. Joshi submitted that the order passed by the learned Single Judge is perfectly justified in the facts and circumstances of the case in hand and, therefore, same may not be interfered with. Mr. Joshi further submitted that Form No. 1 as envisaged by Section 6 of the Act is signed by only one appellant and, therefore, for the purpose of calculating entitlement of unit, the competent authority has rightly allotted one unit. Mr. Joshi submitted that while filling up Form No. 1, specific share in land was not mentioned and thereby, the competent authority has rightly treated them as association of individuals. 6.1 Mr. Joshi submitted that on perusal of Form No. 1, filed under Section 6 of the Act, the appellants have not disclosed in the said Form that there is a construction in the land in question. According to Mr. Joshi, the land was actually a vacant land and the story of construction put-forward by the appellants is nothi0ng but an after-thought. Mr. Joshi submitted that the appellants all throughout remained dormant, more particularly after the order passed by the Tribunal dated 3.3.1989. The appellants have avoided the final statement that was drawn and sent to the appellants on 27.3.1989 as envisaged by Section 9 of the Act after the decision of the Tribunal. Mr. Joshi further submitted that even right from the issuance of Notification under Section 10(1) of the Act dated 27.3.1990 till taking over of possession on 4.1.1993, at all stages, the appellants have not bothered to cooperate. Mr. Joshi further submitted that even right from the issuance of Notification under Section 10(1) of the Act dated 27.3.1990 till taking over of possession on 4.1.1993, at all stages, the appellants have not bothered to cooperate. However, only after the Panchnama under Section 10(6) dated 4.1.1993 of taking over the possession of the land, the appellants have approached this Court by way of writ petition challenging the order of the Tribunal i.e. after a lapse of 3 years. Mr. Joshi, in view of the aforesaid, submitted that the learned Single Judge has rightly considered the aspect of delay and rightly rejected the writ petition. Mr. Joshi lastly submitted that there is no challenge made in the petition about action of the Government taking over possession of the excess vacant land, therefore, Mr. Joshi submitted that legality of the said aspect may not be gone into in absence of any specific challenge and/or prayer. 6.2 In view of the above submissions, Mr. Joshi urged this Court to dismiss the Appeal. 7. Having heard the learned counsel appearing for the respective parties and having gone through the record of the present case, the following questions arise for our consideration: (i) Whether the possession of the excess vacant land is said to have been taken over prior to the Repeal Act coming into force? (ii) Whether the appellants can be said to be ‘association of persons’ merely because no specified share is declared? (iii) Whether the appellants are entitled to hold more than one unit? 8. So as to decide the aforesaid questions, few facts deserve to be taken into consideration: (1) The land admeasuring 6070 sq. mtrs. was bequeathed in favour of the present appellants by way of a Will executed by Kashiben Bhailalbhai Patel. The present appellants are two real brothers. They got their names mutated in the Village Form No. 6 vide Entry No. 1980 dated 28.11.1975. (2) Upon Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 coming into force, the Form No. 1 came to be filled in by both the appellants jointly, however, duly signed by only one appellant. (3) Although many notices were issued to the appellants between 27.9.1982 and 11.6.1983, yet none remained present and thereby, on 6.9.1983 an order came to be passed by the competent authority declaring the appellants as entitled to retain one unit i.e. 1000 sq. mtrs. (3) Although many notices were issued to the appellants between 27.9.1982 and 11.6.1983, yet none remained present and thereby, on 6.9.1983 an order came to be passed by the competent authority declaring the appellants as entitled to retain one unit i.e. 1000 sq. mtrs. of land and the rest of the land admeasuring 5070 sq. mtrs. was declared as excess vacant land. (4) The aforesaid order was carried in appeal being the Appeal No. 217 of 1983 before the Urban Land Tribunal, however, the same was dismissed on 28.2.1989/3.3.1989. (5) Accordingly, the final statement under Section 9 was sent to the appellants by Regd. Post A.D. In addition thereto, the Maintenance Surveyor was also asked to serve the copy of the final statement to the appellants, however, the appellants did not accept. (6) Thereafter, the final statement was sent to the appellants at their place of business by RPAD, however, the same was returned with an endorsement “addressee has refused.” (7) On 27.3.1990, the Notification under Section 10(1) was issued. (8) On 21.3.1992, the Notification under Section 10(3) was issued. (9) On 27.11.1992, the Notice under Section 10(5) was issued to the appellants. (10) On 9.1.1993, the Maintenance Surveyor took over the possession by drawing Panchnama and map in presence of two witnesses. 9. Keeping in mind the aforesaid facts, first of all, we would like to deal with the aspect of possession i.e. whether the same was taken over legally or not? As such, the said aspect is not required to be gone into because there is no formal challenge at all by the appellants about having taken over the possession illegally. On the contrary, the entire petition is based on the assertion that the possession is still with the appellants. However, so as to satisfy our conscience, we have considered the aspect of possession. Having carefully considered the facts and materials on record, it has come to our notice that the appellants were lethargic and non-cooperative right from the stage of proceedings about the entitlement of their unit till the taking over of the possession of the excess vacant land. According to us, taking over of possession of excess vacant land was initiated after the dismissal of the Appeal of the appellants by the Tribunal. According to us, taking over of possession of excess vacant land was initiated after the dismissal of the Appeal of the appellants by the Tribunal. From the undisputed materials produced on record, it appears that appellants have not cooperated in the proceedings initiated under Section 9 i.e. preparation of final statement as well as the proceedings under Section 10(1), (3), (5) and (6) respectively. According to us, the Government has rightly followed the procedure as envisaged for taking over the possession. A clear notice of 30 days was also given under the provision of Section 10(5). Thus, in our considered opinion, the possession taken over by the State Government of excess vacant land admeasuring 5070 sq. mtrs. is legal and justified, that too before the Repeal Act having come into force. 10. In the aforesaid context, we may refer to a Division Bench decision of this very High Court in the case of Dalwadi Muljibhai Mathurbhai vs. State of Gujarat and Others, 2021 (4) GLR 2887 . We quote Paragraphs 22 and 23 of the said judgment as under: “22. In these circumstances, if the possession is not handed over within 30 days of service of notice under Section 10(5), it will amount to failure to comply with the order under sub-section (5) and thereafter whenever the possession is taken by the State authorities, even though after 6 years, as it has happened in the present case through Panchnama process in the absence of physical presence of the land owner, it does not vitiate those proceedings which will fall under Section 10(6) of the Act. The taking over of the possession through Panchnama process in the presence of two witnesses is a well recognised process for taking over the possession in law and cannot be said to be void, non est or illegal in any manner. The land owner cannot claim that since such possession was taken over after a belated period after expiry of 30 days as prescribed in Section 10(5) of the Act, he was entitled to again a notice in this regard requiring his presence on the spot giving him option either to voluntarily surrender such possession or obstruct the same. No such notice or opportunity is intended to be given under Section 10(6) of the Act. No such notice or opportunity is intended to be given under Section 10(6) of the Act. Therefore, in the present facts before us, the possession taken over by the State authority on 24.11.1993 was justified and legally undertaken through Panchnama process and in our opinion, no valid exception to the same can be taken by the Appellant. 23. As far as reliance placed on the case of Hari Ram (supra) is concerned, we are of the clear opinion that the learned Single Judge was right in distinguishing the said judgment as it is not a case before us where no notice under Section 10(5) of the Act was issued to the land owner. On the contrary, it is admitted position that such notice was given to the land owner on 4.6.1988. The later judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court fully explained the purport of the decision in the case of Hari Ram (supra) in the case of Bhaskar Jyoti Sarma (supra) where even Section 10(5) notice was not given and still taking over the possession was held as valid, as quoted in extenso by the learned Single Judge and that in our respectful understanding, clinches the issue in favour of the State.” 11. We may also refer to one more judgment rendered by the Division Bench of this very High Court in the case of Heirs of Deceased Jethabhai Ishwarbhai vs. State of Gujarat and Others, rendered in Letters Patent Appeal No. 405 of 2017, dated 22.1.2021. We quote the relevant observations as under: “18. Sub-Section (5) of Section 10 after vesting of the surplus land with the State Government provides that the Competent Authority may, by notice in writing, order any person who may be in possession of it, to surrender or give the possession thereof to the State Government or any person duly authorised by the State Government within 30 days of service of notice. The plain language of sub-section (5) of Section 10 means and envisages a notice in writing in the form of an order to surrender or make over the possession to the State. Sub-Section (5) notice is not in the form of a show cause notice but in the form of an order apparently because the process of hearing the objections to such declaration of surplus land is already taken care in sub-sections (1) and (2) of Section10. Sub-Section (5) notice is not in the form of a show cause notice but in the form of an order apparently because the process of hearing the objections to such declaration of surplus land is already taken care in sub-sections (1) and (2) of Section10. Once the land is vested, after dealing with such objections, in the State Government, the only activity remaining to be done is to complete the process and achieve the object of this Act, was to take over the physical possession of such declared excess land. Therefore, a notice in the form of an order was prescribed in sub-section (5) to deliver the possession within 30 days of service of the notice. 19. There is no question of any voluntary handing over of possession on the part of the land owner. Whatever is done under sub-section (5) is done in pursuance of the notice-cum-order of the Competent Authority under Section 10(5) of the Act. 20. The argument based on the premise of voluntary handing over of the possession within 30 days of the said notice-cum-order under Section 10(5) of the Act is, therefore, a misnomer. If the possession is handed over in compliance with the notice-cum-order under Section 10(5) of the Act to the State authorities or person nominated by the State, the proceedings under the ULC Act get concluded under Section 10(5) of the Act. If that is not done by the land owner in pursuance of notice-cum-order under Section 10(5) of the Act, whatever thereafter is done to take over the physical possession of the excess land in question, that can only fall under Section 10(6) of the Act, which says that if any person refuses or fails to comply the order made under sub-section (5), then the Competent Authority may take possession of vacant land and may use such force as may be necessary for that purpose. Sub-Section (6) does not require any other notice or order once again to be passed by the Competent Authority. It only envisages act of taking over the physical possession in the manner known to law including Panchnama process and presence of the owner of the land is not a condition precedent for such taking over of the possession. Sub-Section (6) does not require any other notice or order once again to be passed by the Competent Authority. It only envisages act of taking over the physical possession in the manner known to law including Panchnama process and presence of the owner of the land is not a condition precedent for such taking over of the possession. The last part of sub-section (6) is only enabling and empowering provision for the Competent Authority who may use the force for taking over the physical possession, if there is any obstruction or hindrance created by anybody including the land owner in that process. Otherwise use of force is not necessary. Sub-Section (6), therefore, is not of an adjudicatory nature, but it only provides for a physical process to take de facto possession with or without the use of force. Then the proceedings under ULC Act get concluded under Section 10(6) of the Act. Both these sub-sections are not necessary to be operated and invoked in each and every case. The proceedings under ULC Act can get concluded either under Section 10(5) or 10(6) of the Act as indicated above. 21. Therefore, in our opinion, the arguments raised before us that sub-section (5) envisages voluntary handing over of possession and sub-section (6) talks of forcible taking over possession, both are incomplete and misleading arguments. The scheme of this two sub-sections as explained above does not put these two provisions in silos or water-tight compartments. They, on the other hand, provide for a smooth and barrierless process of taking over of the possession under the 1976 Act. 22. In these circumstances, if the possession is not handed over within 30 days of service of notice under Section 10(5), it will amount to failure to comply with the order under sub-section (5) and thereafter whenever the possession is taken by the State authorities, even though after 6 years, as it has happened in the present case through Panchnama process in the absence of physical presence of the land owner, it does not vitiate those proceedings which will fall under Section 10(6) of the Act. The taking over of the possession through Panchnama process in the presence of two witnesses is a well recognised process for taking over the possession in law and cannot be said to be void, non est or illegal in any manner. The taking over of the possession through Panchnama process in the presence of two witnesses is a well recognised process for taking over the possession in law and cannot be said to be void, non est or illegal in any manner. The land owner cannot claim that since such possession was taken over after a belated period after expiry of 30 days as prescribed in Section 10(5) of the Act, he was entitled to again a notice in this regard requiring his presence on the spot giving him option either to voluntarily surrender such possession or obstruct the same. No such notice or opportunity is intended to be given under Section 10(6) of the Act. Therefore, in the present facts before us, the possession taken over by the State authority on 24.11.1993 was justified and legally undertaken through Panchnama process and in our opinion, no valid exception to the same can be taken by the Appellant. 23. As far as reliance placed on the case of Hari Ram (supra) is concerned, we are of the clear opinion that the learned Single Judge was right in distinguishing the said judgment as it is not a case before us where no notice under Section 10(5) of the Act was issued to the land owner. On the contrary, it is admitted position that such notice was given to the land owner on 4.6.1988. The later judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court fully explained the purport of the decision in the case of Hari Ram (supra) in the case of Bhaskar Jyoti Sarma (supra) where even Section 10(5) notice was not given and still taking over the possession was held as valid, as quoted in extenso by the learned Single Judge and that in our respectful understanding, clinches the issue in favour of the State. 24. As far as the question of exemption under Section 21 as sought by the Appellant land owner is concerned, we are of the opinion that it was the just an excuse or ruse to save the land in the hands of the land owners themselves as neither any concrete scheme for development of dwelling units for weaker sections was ever placed by the land owner before the Competent Authority or before this Court, nor the said application appears to have been pursued by the Appellant in an appropriate manner. Mere filing of the application could not have led the authorities to grant exemption to such excess or surplus land under Section 21 of the Act and save the said land from the rigour and scheme of the 1976 Act of taking over of excess land in the larger public interest and therefore, the learned Single Judge was right in rejecting the said contention as well. 25. Thus, on the overall analysis of the facts and legal position as discussed above, we do not find any merit in the present appeal filed by the Appellant and the same is liable to be dismissed. The appeal is accordingly dismissed. No order as to costs. 26. Consequently, the Civil Application stands also dismissed.” Thus, we answer Question No. 1 accordingly. 12. Now, so far as whether the appellants can be said to be ‘association of persons’ and further entitlement of one unit is concerned, it would be apt to notice that the Form No. 1 as envisaged under Section 6 was filled up by the appellants in the joint name because both the appellants have inherited the land by way of Will. Therefore, the present appellants are said to be co-owners. In our view, the competent authority, Tribunal as well as the learned Single Judge committed an error in treating the present appellants as ‘association of persons’, merely because no specific share was shown. In our view, when two real brothers have inherited the property by way of a Will, the share of each of the appellants could have been safely considered as one half each unless otherwise prescribed for the purpose of calculating the unit. Thus, if in a Will, nothing is specified about the share, in that event, it can safely be inferred that the appellants being real brothers have equal share in the land in question. 13. In the aforesaid context, we may refer to and rely upon a Division Bench decision of this High Court in the case of Chhaganlal Trikamdas Thakker and Others vs. Competent Authority, Rajkot and Others, 1994 (1) GCD 1 (Guj.) wherein the following has been held: “2. The petitioners jointly purchased or acquired the vacant lands in question. 13. In the aforesaid context, we may refer to and rely upon a Division Bench decision of this High Court in the case of Chhaganlal Trikamdas Thakker and Others vs. Competent Authority, Rajkot and Others, 1994 (1) GCD 1 (Guj.) wherein the following has been held: “2. The petitioners jointly purchased or acquired the vacant lands in question. Each petitioner’s share is defined and specified and in that view, the petitioners can be said to be only “tenants-in-common.” However, on a theory that the petitioners have not got their shares separated by metes and bounds, the authorities proceeded to deal with the petitioners in each case as one unit. The Act defines a “person” under Section 2 (i) thereof as follows: “2. Definitions - In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires: (i) “person” includes an individual, a family, a firm, a company, or an association or body of individuals, whether incorporated or not.” The learned single Judge in Smt. Savitaben W/o Shri Shantilal G. Shroff and Others vs. State of Gujarat and Others, 1991 (1) GLH 186 , dealt with a case arising under the Act, where co-owners held specified shares and after recapitulating the basic proposition “when owners hold definite earmarked shares in a common property, they can be said to be tenants in common” expressed his views as follows: “It is difficult to appreciate how respondent No. 2 persuaded himself to hold that co-owners of well defined shares in a joint property ceased to be individuals holding specified shares of the property on the appointed day. Division by metes and bounds is not the requirement of law for considering holdings of the concerned individuals as per Section 3 of the Act An individual may hold exclusively any vacant land or may hold vacant land in common with other co-owners but in specified shares. Merely because he holds some vacant land in specified shares jointly with other co-owners, he does not cease to be individual qua his holding of vacant land in specified shares. Merely because he holds some vacant land in specified shares jointly with other co-owners, he does not cease to be individual qua his holding of vacant land in specified shares. The emphasis put by second respondent on actual division of land by metes and bounds for the purpose of applicability of Section 3 of the Urban Land Act is patently erroneous in law and cannot be justified.” The learned single Judge referred to the following observations in an unreported judgment of a Bench of the High Court of Bombay in Special Civil Application No. 834 of 1978, decided on 14.7.1981: “It is well settled that where the property is held by tenants in common having a defined share, then the holders could not be treated as joint holders merely on the ground that the property is not divided by metes and bounds. The assumption of the competent authority that as long as the property is not divided by metes and bounds, it is imperative to consider undivided holding as holding of a body individuals is clearly wrong. On the first principle itself, it is impossible to sustain the conclusion recorded by the competent authority. Apart from that fact, the petitioners could not be termed as a person within the definition of that expression contained in Section 2 (i) of the Act. The expression ‘person’ includes an individual, a family, a firm, a company or an association or body of individuals whether incorporated or not. In our judgments, tenants, in common cannot be treated as an association or body of individuals.” 3. The definition of ‘person’ under Section 2 (1) of the Act, is an inclusive one. It includes “an association or body of individuals, whether incorporated or not.” That could only mean that an association or body of individuals as an entity and as an unit could also hold vacant land. In such a case, the individuals, who could go to constitute association or body, do not hold and it is only the association or body, which holds. It is the nature and scope of holding that is decisive on this point If individuals own definite and specified shares, though acquired under or through a single source or transaction or dealing, then, they may not come within the ambit of ‘association’ or ‘body of individuals’ holding the land. It is the nature and scope of holding that is decisive on this point If individuals own definite and specified shares, though acquired under or through a single source or transaction or dealing, then, they may not come within the ambit of ‘association’ or ‘body of individuals’ holding the land. When individuals hold specified shares, it is only those specified shares with reference to respective individuals that could be the subject matter of assessment and consideration under the Act. Lack of division amongst such individuals by metes and bounds is of no legal consequence at all. In that view, such individuals, being “tenant-in-common” cannot be treated as the ‘association’ or ‘body’ as such, holding the vacant land. That there could be a holding by an association or body of individuals as a separate entity has been taken note of and provision therefore has also been made in the Act, is clear when we refer to sub-section (5) of Section 4 of the Act, which runs as follows: “.........Where any firm or unincorporated association or body of individuals holds vacant land or holds any other land on which there is a building with a dwelling unit therein or holds both vacant land and such other land, then, the right or interest of any person in the vacant land or such other land or both, as the case may be, on the basis of his share in such firm or association or body shall also be taken into account in calculating the extent of vacant land held by such person.” As we could see from the extract made above, when an association or body of individuals as an entity holds land, then, the right or interest of the persons, who go to constitute the association or body, in the vacant land for the purpose of calculating the relevant extent of the vacant land as held by such person, is directed to be determined according to his share in the association or body. The share of the person in the association or body is the determining factor and not the share of the person in the vacant land, because the latter question would not arise at all in such a case. It is the association or body of individuals, which holds the vacant land, and it is not a case of individuals, with specified shares, owning the vacant land. It is the association or body of individuals, which holds the vacant land, and it is not a case of individuals, with specified shares, owning the vacant land. This provision, expressed in sub-section (5) of Section 4 of the Act, is in consonance with the concept that there could be a case of an association or body of individuals, as a separate entity holding vacant land, in contrast to individuals jointly acquiring specified shares and holding them in a vacant land. Apart from point out the contrary position expressed in the Act itself, we have no comment to make over it for the present case. The decision of the learned single Judge in Smt. Savitaben W/o Shri Shantilal G. Shroff and Others vs. State of Gujarat and Others, 1991 (1) GLH 186 , has, in our view, struck the correct note on the proposition arising under the Act and we have not found a warrant to take a different view.” 14. According to us, merely because specific share was not mentioned and the land was not divided by metes and bounds, the appellants cannot be treated as ‘association of persons’. Considering the same, the contention of Mr. Thakore, the learned Senior Counsel, with regard to entitlement of more units deserves to be accepted and thereby, we hold that the present appellants being real brothers and the land in question came to be inherited by them, both have equal share in the land and accordingly, both will get one unit each. The order passed by the competent authority, Tribunal as well as the learned Single Judge allowing the appellants only one unit is thereby not correct. The appellants cannot be said to be ‘association of persons’ for the purpose of deciding their entitlement of unit. Both the appellants are individuals and holding their share in the land in question in their individual capacity, therefore, both will be entitled to retain one unit each. Thus, we answer Question Nos. 2 and 3 accordingly. 15. In view of aforesaid discussion, we hold that the appellants are entitled to retain 2 units i.e. 2000 sq. mtrs. of land out of the total 6070 sq. mtrs. of land. Accordingly, we direct the State Government to allot one more unit i.e. 1000 sq. mtrs. in addition to the order dated 6.9.1983 passed by the competent authority. The appeal stands partly allowed to the aforesaid extent. 16. mtrs. of land out of the total 6070 sq. mtrs. of land. Accordingly, we direct the State Government to allot one more unit i.e. 1000 sq. mtrs. in addition to the order dated 6.9.1983 passed by the competent authority. The appeal stands partly allowed to the aforesaid extent. 16. In view of the order passed in main Appeal, Civil Misc. Application (for review) No. 2 of 2016 would not survive and disposed of accordingly.