ORDER : P. Naveen Rao, J. 1. Heard learned counsel for the petitioners and learned Assistant Government Pleader for Revenue appearing for the respondents 1 to 4. 2. According to petitioners, family of late Rajmohammed was assigned land to an extent of Ac. 5.26 guntas in Sy. No. 330, Sankireddypalli Village, Kothakota Mandal, Wanaparthy District. As late Rajmohammed was the eldest of four brothers, the land revenue records reflected his name. There was family partition and Ac. 5.26 guntas of land was divided equally among the four brothers. It was accordingly, implemented in the revenue records and the pattadar pass books and title deeds were also granted. According to petitioners, on 11.07.1960, late Rajmohammed executed private sale document selling his share to his remaining brothers and he left the village to live in Wanaparthy. Based on the said document, the land falling to the share of late Rajmohammed within the family was reallocated to other three brothers and accordingly, the same was implemented in the revenue records. Petitioners claim to be successors of the brothers of late Rajmohammed. Rajmohammed died in the year 1967. 3. The respondents 5 to 7, who are children of late Rajmohammed, submitted appeal before the Sub-Collector, Gadwal challenging the ROR entries reflecting the name of three brothers for the entire extent of land, including the land belonging to late Rajmohammed from the year 1978-79 onwards. On due consideration, the Sub-Collector dismissed the appeal vide his order dated 20.03.1997. The respondents 5 to 7 filed Revision under Section 9 of the Telangana Rights in Land and Pattadar Passbooks Act, 1971 without disclosing the rejection of appeal, raising the very same contentions. Late Moulana Saheb died on 16.04.1994 and he was succeeded by petitioners 3 and 4. In the Revision, neither Moulana Saheb nor his children were impleaded as respondents. The fathers of other petitioners also could not contest the Revision because of their health and the Revision was allowed by the Revisional Authority on 05.03.2005 and issued consequential directions. Petitioners were not aware of the orders passed by the Revisional Authority on 05.03.2005. They were surprised to know about said order when they made application requesting to issue new pattadar pass books. Thus, the present writ petition is filed challenging the order of Revisional Authority dated 05.03.2005. 4. Petitioners were not aware of the orders passed by the Revisional Authority on 05.03.2005. They were surprised to know about said order when they made application requesting to issue new pattadar pass books. Thus, the present writ petition is filed challenging the order of Revisional Authority dated 05.03.2005. 4. The learned counsel for the petitioners contended that the Revisional order passed behind the back of petitioners and the order is not sustainable in law. He also contended that late Moulana Saheb was holding land from out of the share originally belonged to late Rajmohammed, whereas, Moulana Saheb was not a party before the Revisional Authority nor his successors were impleaded and on that ground alone the order gets vitiated. He further submitted that no order can be passed against a dead person. In support of this contention, learned counsel placed reliance on the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Gurnam Singh (dead) through Legal representatives and others Vs. Gurbachan Kaur (dead) by legal Representatives, (2017) 13 SCC 414 and the decision of Division Bench in J. Veeraiah and Others Vs. Indian Overseas Bank and Others, 2017 (4) ALT 507 . 5. The issues for consideration are: 1. Whether the order of Revisional Authority is vitiated on the ground that the order was made against a dead person? 2. Whether writ petition is liable to be dismissed on the ground of delay and laches? Issue No. 1: 6. It is vehemently contended by learned counsel for petitioner that the Joint Collector allowed the revision preferred by respondents 5 to 7 and another affecting dead person and his legal heirs and said order is a nullity. 7. First of all this principle is not attracted. Even otherwise, the LRs can waive the principle of nullity by their conduct. 8. In N. Jayaram Reddy and Another Vs. Revenue Divisional Officer and Land Acquisition Officer, 1979 (3) SCC 578, the Hon'ble Supreme Court considered the issue on effect of a decision made against a dead person. Aggrieved by the decision of Subordinate Judge, on reference under Section 18 of the repealed Land Acquisition Act on the compensation determined by him, the claimants as well as State went in appeal. During pendency of appeal, one of the claimants by name Y. Prabhakar Reddy died. Aggrieved by the decision of Subordinate Judge, on reference under Section 18 of the repealed Land Acquisition Act on the compensation determined by him, the claimants as well as State went in appeal. During pendency of appeal, one of the claimants by name Y. Prabhakar Reddy died. His Legal Representatives (LRs) were brought on record in the Cross-Appeal filed by the claimants but in the appeal preferred by the State, no steps were taken to bring the LRs on record. The High Court allowed the appeal preferred by the State and dismissed the claimants appeal. Before the Hon'ble Supreme Court the decision of High Court was challenged primarily on the ground that after the death of one of the claimants, proceedings before the High Court abated and no decision could have been pronounced against a dead person and it cannot be enforced against the Legal Representatives of the dead person when they were not made parties. This contention was not found favour with the Hon'ble Supreme Court. The Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under: "5. But even if it were assumed that the government appeal deserved to be dismissed as a whole because of its abatement against the deceased respondent, there is no justification for Mr. Sen's further argument that the High Court's decree dated February 4, 1969, was a nullity merely because it was passed against a dead person, namely, Y. Prabhakar Reddy. It has to be appreciated that a decree against a dead person is not necessarily a nullity for all purposes. It will be sufficient to say that such a decree has been held to be a nullity because it cannot be executed against his legal representative for the simple reason that he did not have a full opportunity of being heard in respect of it, and the legal representative cannot be condemned unheard. So if a respondent to an appeal dies, and the appeal abates because of the failure to bring him legal representative on the record within the time limited by law, and the appellate court loses sight of that development or ignores it, it will still be permissible for the court hearing the appeal to bring his legal representative on the record on an application to that effect and to examine any application that may be made for condonation of the delay. It is also permissible, and is in fact the common practice, to remand the case for disposal according to law to the court in which it was pending at the time of the death of the deceased party. The law has therefore provided, and accepted, modes for reopening and hearing the appeal in such cases. 6. The basic fact remains that a decree against a dead person is treated as a nullity because it cannot be allowed to operate against his legal representative when he was never brought on the record to defend the case. Any other view would not be possible or permissible for it would fasten on him a liability for which he did not have any hearing. So while the law treats such a decree as a nullity qua the legal representative of the deceased defendant or respondent, there is nothing to prevent him from deciding that he will not treat the decree as a nullity, but will abide by it as it stands, or as it may be mollified thereafter on appeal. If a legal representative adopts that alternative or course of action, it cannot possibly be said that his option to be governed by the decree is against the law or any concept of public policy or purpose, or the public morality. It is thus a matter entirely at the discretion of the legal representative of a deceased respondent against whom a decree has been passed after his death to decide whether he will raise the question that the decree has become a nullity, at the appropriate time, namely, during the course of the hearing of any appeal that may be filed by the other party, or to abandon that obvious technical objection and fight the appeal on the merits. He may do so either because of his faith in the strength of his case on the merits, or because of incorrect legal advice, or for the reason that he may not like to rely on a mere technical plea, or because in the case of cross-appeals, he may have the impression that bringing the legal representative of the deceased respondent on record in an appeal by a co-appellant will enure for the benefit of or be sufficient for purposes of the cross-appeal. An abandonment of a technical plea of abatement and the consequential dismissal of the appeal, is therefore a matter at the discretion of the legal representative of the deceased respondent and there is no justification for the argument to the contrary. It is equally futile to argue that an appellate court is denuded of its jurisdiction to hear an appeal in which one of the respondents has died and the right to sue does not survive against the surviving defendant or defendants alone merely because no application has been made to bring his legal representative on the record when no objection to that effect is raised by anyone. (emphasis supplied) 9. This issue was considered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Kavarampeta Venkataiah and Others Vs. Gayatri Educational Society and Others The Hon'ble Supreme Court followed the opinion expressed in N. Jayaram Reddy's case. 10. In Kavarampeta Venkataiah by the time the Revenue Divisional Officer passed orders affirming the grant of Certificate under Section 38-E of the Telangana Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1950, the original landlords died and no steps were taken to bring the LRs on record. In review application, the Revenue Divisional Officer, affirmed his decision made earlier. The appeal preferred before the Joint Collector was also dismissed. The order of the Joint Collector was challenged before the High Court in a revision and the High Court held that the Revenue Divisional Officer could not have passed orders against a dead person and the same is in nullity. Before the Hon'ble Supreme Court, it was contended that as the LRs of the deceased landlord had chosen to challenge the order of the Revenue Divisional Officer on merits, their action amounts to giving up their claim of nullity on the order passed against a dead person. Relying on the decision in N. Jayaram Reddy's case, the Hon'ble Supreme Court accepted the contention that as challenge was made to the decision of Revenue Divisional Officer on merits, the High Court ought to have considered on merits rather than remitting the matter on a technical plea of nullity. 11. In the case on hand before the Appellate Authority under the Act, 1971 filed by legal heirs of late Rajmohammed they have arrayed Mahammed Moulana, Mohammed Hussain and Khaja Hussain as respondents. The appeal was dismissed. 11. In the case on hand before the Appellate Authority under the Act, 1971 filed by legal heirs of late Rajmohammed they have arrayed Mahammed Moulana, Mohammed Hussain and Khaja Hussain as respondents. The appeal was dismissed. In the revision filed before the Joint Collector only Mohammed Hussain and Khaja Hussain were made respondents. These two persons engaged lawyers to represent them. From the averments in paragraph 4 of the affidavit in the writ petition, it is apparent that those two respondents were alive when revision was pending. Petitioners contend that they have succeeded to the property of their grandfather and they ought to have been made parties along with Mohammed Hussain and Khaja Hussain. From the pleadings, it does not appear to be a case of Revisional Authority deciding the case against a dead person. Not joining other family members and grand sons of Mohammed Moulana as respondents to the revision and whether respondents 5 to 7 did not disclose the dismissal of their appeal by Revenue Divisional Officer are entirely different from plea of nullity. It appears that after the orders of Joint Collector in the year 2005, changes were affected in the revenue records, but petitioners never protested on the changes affected till institution of this writ petition. This also shows that petitioners were having knowledge about the orders passed by the Joint Collector and changes affected in the revenue records. Thus, even otherwise, by their conduct petitioners deemed to have waived off the plea of nullity of the decision made by the Joint Collector. For the above reasons and conduct of petitioners all through after the decision of Revisional Authority, disentitles them to raise the plea of nullity at this stage. Issue No. 2: 12. Moving on to issue of delay and latches, it is to be noted that writ remedy is an extra-ordinary remedy, equitable and discretionary. Article 226 of the Constitution of India does not impose any restrictions to avail the remedy. It is very wide and all encompassing. Whenever, an aggrieved person knocks the doors of the Writ Court, the Court looks into the allegation of infringement of the right of an individual, examines his claim and redresses the grievance wherever injustice is caused. However, Constitutional Courts have imposed self-restraint in exercise of extra-ordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Whenever, an aggrieved person knocks the doors of the Writ Court, the Court looks into the allegation of infringement of the right of an individual, examines his claim and redresses the grievance wherever injustice is caused. However, Constitutional Courts have imposed self-restraint in exercise of extra-ordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. One aspect which Court considers while assessing the grievance is whether petitioner slept over his right to agitate against alleged illegality, allowed other events to take their course and times to avail extraordinary remedy when it suits him, leisurely. Thus, mere assertion against impingement of a right is not sufficient, it must be asserted within a reasonable time of arising of cause of action alleging such impingement and much before the third party acquired his right encompassing the claim of petitioner. 13. Ordinarily Writ Courts do not encourage stale claims even assuming party makes out a case of infringement of his right. Thus, in considering a grievance brought before the High Court in a writ petition, delay, laches and conduct of the petitioner also plays significant role and determines the course of the litigation. Though, again, there is no hard and fast rule, impact of delay and laches on the course of litigation depends on the facts of the case, nature of grievance and relief prayed. Even though, there is delay in filing writ petition, writ Court may still entertain a writ petition, if it finds grave illegality in the decision affecting a person, no third party rights have accrued in the meantime and petitioner explains reasons for delay in availing legal remedy to the satisfaction of the Court. 14. When writ jurisdiction is invoked, unexplained delay coupled with creation of third party rights in the meantime is an important facet which also weighs with the High Court in deciding whether or not to exercise such jurisdiction [Karnataka Power Corporation Ltd. Vs. K. Thangappan, (2006) 4 SCC 322 (Paragraph No. 9)]. The Constitutional Court has to keep itself alive to the primary principle that when an aggrieved person, without adequate reason, approaches the Court at his own leisure or pleasure, the Court would be under legal obligation to scrutinize whether the lis at a belated stage should be entertained (Chennai Metropolitan Water Supply and Sewerage Board Vs. T.T. Murali Babu, (2014) 4 SCC 108 ). T.T. Murali Babu, (2014) 4 SCC 108 ). However, the real test to determine delay is that the petitioner should come to the Court before a parallel right is created but the test is not the physical running of time (Badruka College of Commerce Vs. State of A.P., Education Department and others). 15. In Dehri Rohtas Light Rly. Co. Ltd. v. District Board, Bhojpur, (1992) 2 SCC 598 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court held: "13. The rule which says that the Court may not enquire into belated and stale claim is not a rule of law but a rule of practice based on sound and proper exercise of discretion. Each case must depend upon its own facts. It will all depend on what the breach of the fundamental right and the remedy claimed are and how delay arose. The principle on which the relief to the party on the grounds of laches or delay is denied is that the rights which have accrued to others by reason of the delay in filing the petition should not be allowed to be disturbed unless there is a reasonable explanation for the delay. The real test to determine delay in such cases is that the petitioner should come to the writ court before a parallel right is created and that the lapse of time is not attributable to any laches or negligence. The test is not as to physical running of time. Where the circumstances justifying the conduct exist, the illegality which is manifest cannot be sustained on the sole ground of laches. The decision in Tilokchand case [ (1969) 1 SCC 110 : (1969) 2 SCR 824 ] relied on is distinguishable on the facts of the present case. The levy if based on the net profits of the railway undertaking was beyond the authority and the illegal nature of the same has been questioned though belatedly in the pending proceedings after the pronouncement of the High Court in the matter relating to the subsequent years. That being the case, the claim of the appellant cannot be turned down on the sole ground of delay......." 16. In Tukaram Kana Joshi Vs. Maharashtra Industrial Development Corporation, (2013) 1 SCC 353 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under: "12. That being the case, the claim of the appellant cannot be turned down on the sole ground of delay......." 16. In Tukaram Kana Joshi Vs. Maharashtra Industrial Development Corporation, (2013) 1 SCC 353 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under: "12. The State, especially a welfare State which is governed by the rule of law, cannot arrogate itself to a status beyond one that is provided by the Constitution. Our Constitution is an organic and flexible one. Delay and laches is adopted as a mode of discretion to decline exercise of jurisdiction to grant relief. There is another facet. The Court is required to exercise judicial discretion. The said discretion is dependent on facts and circumstances of the cases. Delay and laches is one of the facets to deny exercise of discretion. It is not an absolute impediment. There can be mitigating factors, continuity of cause action, etc. That apart, if the whole thing shocks the judicial conscience, then the Court should exercise the discretion more so, when no third-party interest is involved. Thus analysed, the petition is not hit by the doctrine of delay and laches as the same is not a constitutional limitation, the cause of action is continuous and further the situation certainly shocks judicial conscience. (emphasis supplied) 17. In Shiv Das Vs. Union of India and Others, the Hon'ble Supreme Court approved the view taken by the Privy Council in Lindsay Petroleum Co. Vs. Prosper Armstrong Hurd (1874) 5 PC 221. It reads as under: 7. "What was stated in this regard by Sir Barnes Peacock in Lindsay Petroleum Co., Vs. Prosper Armstrong Hurd, PC at P.239 was approved by this Court in Moon Mills Ltd. Vs. M.R. Meher ( AIR 1967 SC 1450 and Maharashtra SRTC Vs. Balwant Regular Motor Service ( AIR 1969 SC 329 ), Sir Barnes had stated: "Now the doctrine of laches in courts of equity is not an arbitrary or technical doctrine. Prosper Armstrong Hurd, PC at P.239 was approved by this Court in Moon Mills Ltd. Vs. M.R. Meher ( AIR 1967 SC 1450 and Maharashtra SRTC Vs. Balwant Regular Motor Service ( AIR 1969 SC 329 ), Sir Barnes had stated: "Now the doctrine of laches in courts of equity is not an arbitrary or technical doctrine. Where it would be practically unjust to give a remedy either because the party has, by his conduct done that which might fairly be regarded as equivalent to a waiver of it, or where by his conduct and neglect he has though perhaps not waiving that remedy, yet put the other party in a situation in which it would not be reasonable to place him if the remedy were afterwards to be asserted, in either of these cases, lapse of time and delay are most material. But in every case, if an argument against relief, which otherwise would be just, if founded upon mere delay, that delay of course not amounting to a bar by any statute of limitation, the validity of that defence must be tried upon principles substantially equitable. Two circumstances always important in such cases are, the length of the delay and the nature of the acts done during the interval which might affect either party and cause a balance of justice or injustice in taking the one course or the other, so far as relates to the remedy." (emphasis supplied) 18. In the instant case, the decision of Joint Collector was on 05.03.2005. Except the revenue receipts issued up to the year 2000, no material is placed on record to show that before or after the order of Joint Collector dated 5.03.2005, the names of petitioners continued to reflect and there was no occasion to know about the order passed by the Revisional Authority on 05.03.2005. In spite of granting sufficient time petitioners could not bring forth any material to justify their claim. It appears that atleast after the orders of the Joint Collector, changes were affected in the revenue records. It is deemed that they were aware of the changes. Except vague assertion stating that only recently they came to know, no other material is placed on record to show bonafides of their submissions. There is no satisfactory reason assigned why writ petition is instituted after 16 years challenging the decision of Revisional Authority dated 05.03.2005. It is deemed that they were aware of the changes. Except vague assertion stating that only recently they came to know, no other material is placed on record to show bonafides of their submissions. There is no satisfactory reason assigned why writ petition is instituted after 16 years challenging the decision of Revisional Authority dated 05.03.2005. Their burden of song is only on nullity of the decision of Revisional Authority on the ground that it was made against a dead person, which contention is found to be erroneous. 19. In paragraph No. 4 of the affidavit filed in support of the writ petition, it is contended that the Revision was preferred only against Mohammed Hussain and Khaja Hussain. They fell ill and therefore they were not in a position to attend the proceedings before the Joint Collector and later they died. Petitioners contend that they being LRs of their grandfather, they ought to have been impleaded in the Revision. This stand is obviously to justify filing this writ petition. It is not their case that behind the back of their parents, who were made parties, the revision was decided. While petitioners express their ignorance about pending Revision, but have not stated as to what steps they have taken after the revenue records were corrected long ago and why they kept quiet. For the reasons best known to them petitioners allowed the things to drift away from them. By their conduct they have allowed the claims of third parties crystallized in their favour and seek to upset settled issue at this distance of time. 20. Thus, inordinate delay and laches in prosecuting their grievance disentitles them to seek equitable relief under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. However, this order does not come in the way of petitioners availing any other remedy, if available in law. The writ petition is dismissed. Miscellaneous applications, if any pending, stand closed.