JUDGMENT : This litigation commenced more than one decade and two years ago or in other words more than 12 years ago. To be precise vide a plaint presented on 10.12.2008 in the 'First Additional District Munsif's Court, Bhavani' [hereinafter 'Trial Court'] which was taken on file as OS.No.376 of 2008 by the Trial Court. 2. Suit property is a cart track, which is access to the plaintiff's property and going by the plaintiff's pleadings this cart track runs west to south. The suit property is described in the following manner : 3. Prayer in the plaint is for an injunction restraining the defendants from interfering with the plaintiff's use and enjoyment of the suit cart track, besides further injunction restraining the defendant from ploughing and removing earth/sand etc. There is also a prayer for removal of encroachment made by the defendants in a suit cart track. 4. Parties to the lis are blood relatives. Plaintiff, defendants 1, 4 and 5 are siblings, defendants 2 and 3 are sons of first defendant. Defendants entered appearance in the trial Court through two separate sets of lawyers and they completed pleadings. Trial Court framed two issues and two additional issues, which read as follows : 5. After full contest, Trial Court decreed the suit vide judgment and decree dated 03.03.2014. Full Contest in the trial Court includes five exhibits i.e., Exs.A1 to A5 marked on behalf of the plaintiffs. To be noted, no exhibits were marked on the side of the defendants. In other words, no documentary evidence was filed/marked before the trial Court by the defendants. In terms of oral evidence, the lone plaintiff examined himself as PW1 and there were three witnesses on the side of the defendants namely DWs 1 to 3 and one of the three witnesses is the grandfather of the plaintiff, who was the original owner of a larger extent of property. 6. There is no disputation or disagreement that the plaintiff is entitled to the suit cart track. The crux and gravamen of the lis is while plaintiff contends that the suit cart track was 12 feet wide, the defendants contend that it is only 7 feet wide. The difference is 5 feet width qua a cart track and as already alluded to supra, parties are blood relatives. The crux and gravamen of the lis is while plaintiff contends that the suit cart track was 12 feet wide, the defendants contend that it is only 7 feet wide. The difference is 5 feet width qua a cart track and as already alluded to supra, parties are blood relatives. On the side lines, it is deemed appropriate to mention here that the age old adage 'blood is thicker than water' is not without exceptions, but, this is only mentioned incidentally and this is not the basis on which the second appeal is being decided. However, it is not necessary to dilate any further on this aspect of the matter as we are on a Section 100 CPC legal drill. Reverting to the case on hand, besides the aforementioned exhibits i.e., documentary evidence, an Advocate Commissioner was appointed, a report and a sketch filed by Advocate Commissioner (18.07.2012) have been marked as Exs.C1 and C2, but the Advocate Commissioner was not examined. 7. In the aforesaid backdrop, the point on which the entire lis turns heavily is, the title documents of the plaintiff namely Exs.A1 and A2 being partition deeds dated 11.07.1976 and 07.03.1986 which merely talk about the 'Mamool Vandi Pathai' (Other Language), without mentioning the width. The trial Court on the basis of documentary evidence and oral evidence before it, came to the conclusion that normally a cart track is 9 to 12 feet wide and therefore, this Mamool Vandi Pathai (Other Language) can be construed in this manner. This is articulated in paragraph 14 of the trial Court judgment and the relevant portion of paragraph 14 reads as follows : 8. Thereafter, the Trial Court has also adverted to the report and sketch of Advocate Commissioner and this is captured in paragraph 15 of the judgment of the Trial Court, which reads as follows : 9. To be noted, report of an Advocate Commissioner is evidence in a suit. This is vide Order XXVI Rule 10 Sub Rule 2 of 'The Code of Civil Procedure, 1908' [hereinafter 'CPC' for brevity in other words Order XXVI(10)(2) of CPC] is learned counsel's sheet anchor say. 10. To be noted, report of an Advocate Commissioner is evidence in a suit. This is vide Order XXVI Rule 10 Sub Rule 2 of 'The Code of Civil Procedure, 1908' [hereinafter 'CPC' for brevity in other words Order XXVI(10)(2) of CPC] is learned counsel's sheet anchor say. 10. Defendants 1 to 3 carried the judgment of trial Court in appeal to the 'Sub Court, Bhavani' ['First Appellate Court'] vide a regular First Appeal under Section 96 of CPC and this regular First Appeal on the file of First Appellate Court is AS.No.29 of 2019. In this regular First Appeal before the First Appellate Court, the lone plaintiff was arrayed as first respondent and defendants 4/5 were arrayed as respondents 2/3 respectively. After full contest, i.e., contest by one set of advocates on behalf of the appellants, one set of advocates on behalf of first respondent and another set of advocates on behalf of respondents 2 and 3, the First Appellate Court, vide judgment and decree dated 17.10.2019 dismissed the appeal confirming the judgment and decree of the Trial Court. The two points for determination framed by the First Appellate Court are captured in paragraph 14 of the judgement of the First Appellate Court, which reads as follows : 11. The entire crux and gravamen of the lis and the reason for dismissing the appeal and confirming the judgment and decree of the Trial Court is captured in paragraph 17 of the First Appellate Court judgment. Considering that this is the crux and gravamen of the lis, this Court deems it appropriate to extract/reproduce entire paragraph 17 of the judgement of the First Appellate Court and the same reads as follows : 12. Learned counsel for appellants, notwithstanding very many grounds(7 grounds) in the Memorandum of grounds of Appeal in the captioned second appeal, drew the attention of this Court to three questions which according to him are three substantial questions of law and the same read as follows : '1. Whether the Courts below are right in deciding the suit based on presumption in absence of oral and documentary evidence in support of such presumption. 2. Whether the courts below are right in fixing the width of the suit property as 12 feet based on present circumstances, when the cart track was mentioned on those prevailing circumstance of the year 1976 and 1986. 3. 2. Whether the courts below are right in fixing the width of the suit property as 12 feet based on present circumstances, when the cart track was mentioned on those prevailing circumstance of the year 1976 and 1986. 3. Whether the courts below are right in shifting the burden of proof on the defendants to prove their defence, when the plaintiff has failed in proving his case.' 13. The first question is clearly generic and it certainly does not fall within the contours and confines of Section 100 of CPC. There is no difficulty in excluding it from a Section 100 CPC drill owing to its generic nature. With regard to the second question that has been proposed, a mere reading of second question makes it clear that it is merely a question of fact. The First Appellate Court is also a court of fact and this Court is unable to persuade itself to believe that the second question will qualify as a substantial question of law. This takes us to the third question that has been proposed. A careful perusal of question no.3, leaves this Court with the considered view that it does not arise in the case on hand as at best, it can only be said that the onus of proof has been shifted if at all and if that be so. There is nothing in the trial Court judgment and judgment of First Appellate Court to demonstrate that the burden of proof has been shifted. The law is well settled that while burden of proof does not shift, the onus of proof swings like a pendulum from one end of lis to other end of lis. When the defendants took the plea that the breadth of cart track is only 7 feet, in the light of the reference in the documents i.e., Exs.A1 and A2-partition deeds being only to that of Mamool Vandi Pathai (Other Language), certainly the onus shifted. Therefore, third proposed question neither arises in the case on hand nor qualifies as a substantial question of law. This Court reminds itself that principles/tests qua substantial questions of law as laid down by Constitution Bench of Hon'ble Supreme Court in Chunilal case rendered way back in 1962 i.e., Sir Chunilal V. Mehta and Sons Ltd. Vs. Century Spinning and Manufacturing Co. Ltd., holds the field. This Court reminds itself that principles/tests qua substantial questions of law as laid down by Constitution Bench of Hon'ble Supreme Court in Chunilal case rendered way back in 1962 i.e., Sir Chunilal V. Mehta and Sons Ltd. Vs. Century Spinning and Manufacturing Co. Ltd., holds the field. This has been captured in Santosh Hazari case [Santosh Hazari Vs. Purushottam Tiwari (deceased) by Lrs. reported in (2001) 3 SCC 179 ], relevant paragraph is paragraph 12 and the same reads as follows : '12. The phrase “substantial question of law”, as occurring in the amended Section 100 is not defined in the Code. The word substantial, as qualifying “question of law”, means — of having substance, essential, real, of sound worth, important or considerable. It is to be understood as something in contradistinction with — technical, of no substance or consequence, or academic merely. However, it is clear that the legislature has chosen not to qualify the scope of “substantial question of law” by suffixing the words “of general importance” as has been done in many other provisions such as Section 109 of the Code or Article 133(1)(a) of the Constitution. The substantial question of law on which a second appeal shall be heard need not necessarily be a substantial question of law of general importance. In Guran Ditta v. T. Ram Ditta [ AIR 1928 PC 172 : 55 IA 235], the phrase “substantial question of law” as it was employed in the last clause of the then existing Section 110 CPC (since omitted by the Amendment Act, 1973) came up for consideration and their Lordships held that it did not mean a substantial question of general importance but a substantial question of law which was involved in the case as between the parties. In Sir Chunilal V. Mehta & Sons Ltd. v. Century Spg. and Mfg. Co. In Sir Chunilal V. Mehta & Sons Ltd. v. Century Spg. and Mfg. Co. Ltd. [ AIR 1962 SC 1314 : 1962 Supp (3) SCR 549] the Constitution Bench expressed agreement with the following view taken by a Full Bench of the Madras High Court in Rimmalapudi Subba Rao v. Noony Veeraju [ILR 1952 Mad 264 : AIR 1951 Mad 969 ] : “[W]hen a question of law is fairly arguable, where there is room for difference of opinion on it or where the Court thought it necessary to deal with that question at some length and discuss alternative views, then the question would be a substantial question of law. On the other hand if the question was practically covered by the decision of the highest court or if the general principles to be applied in determining the question are well settled and the only question was of applying those principles to the particular facts of the case it would not be a substantial question of law.” and laid down the following test as proper test, for determining whether a question of law raised in the case is substantial : “The proper test for determining whether a question of law raised in the case is substantial would, in our opinion, be whether it is of general public importance or whether it directly and substantially affects the rights of the parties and if so whether it is either an open question in the sense that it is not finally settled by this Court or by the Privy Council or by the Federal Court or is not free from difficulty or calls for discussion of alternative views. If the question is settled by the highest court or the general principles to be applied in determining the question are well settled and there is a mere question of applying those principles or that the plea raised is palpably absurd the question would not be a substantial question of law.”' 14. There is nothing that warrants interference with concurrent findings. In Hero Vinoth case (Hero Vinoth Vs. Seshammal reported in (2006) 5 SCC 545 ) Hon'ble Supreme Court culled out the principles constituting Section 100 of CPC and also culled out three exceptions to the general principle that the High Court will not interfere with the concurrent findings of Courts below. There is nothing that warrants interference with concurrent findings. In Hero Vinoth case (Hero Vinoth Vs. Seshammal reported in (2006) 5 SCC 545 ) Hon'ble Supreme Court culled out the principles constituting Section 100 of CPC and also culled out three exceptions to the general principle that the High Court will not interfere with the concurrent findings of Courts below. This is captured in sub paragraph (iii) in Paragraph No.24 of Hero Vinoth case, which reads as follows : '24. The principles relating to Section 100 CPC, relevant for this case, may be summerised thus:- (i) .................... (ii) .................... (iii) The general rule is that High Court will not interfere with concurrent findings of the Courts below. But it is not an absolute rule. Some of the well recognized exceptions are where (i) the courts below have ignored material evidence or acted on no evidence; (ii) the courts have drawn wrong inferences from proved facts by applying the law erroneously; or (iii) the courts have wrongly cast the burden of proof. When we refer to 'decision based on no evidence', it not only refers to cases where there is a total dearth of evidence, but also refers to any case, where the evidence, taken as a whole, is not reasonably capable of supporting the finding.' 15. Narrative thus far makes it clear that case on hand does not fall under any of the exceptions. It cannot be gainsaid that the Courts have drawn wrong inferences as, barest necessity, however, inconvenient it may be, is the principle qua servient owner in cases of this nature. In this regard, learned counsel made a submission that the partition deeds are of the year 1976 and 1986 [Exs.A1 and 2] when the prevailing circumstances of the nature of agricultural activity were vastly different whereas the First Appellate Court has applied the current scenario. At the end of the day, if plaintiff is to have access to effectively use his property by accessing the same through the cart track, in the light of the barest necessity principle qua servient owner, this Court finds no infirmity much less an infirmity which falls within the four corners of a Section 100 of CPC legal drill. 16. In Kanailal case being Kanailal and others Vs. 16. In Kanailal case being Kanailal and others Vs. Ram Chandra Singh and others reported in (2018) 13 SCC 715 , Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that principles of Order XLI Rule 31 of CPC stand telescoped in a second appeal and in Kirpa Ram case being Kirpa Ram Vs. Surendra Deo Gaur reported in 2020 SCC OnLine SC 935, Hon'ble Supreme Court has laid down the principle that a second appeal can be dismissed at the admission stage without formulating substantial question of law if none arises. On a conjoint reading of Kanailal principle and Kirpa Ram principle being the principle laid down by Hon'ble Supreme Court in Kirpa Ram Vs. Surendra Deo Gaur and others reported in 2020 SCC OnLine SC 935, this Court holds that the sole point for determination that arises in captioned second appeal is whether any substantial question of law arises in the light of the facts, findings, trajectory matters have taken in two courts and arguments. The decision thereon, i.e., decision on this point for determination is an answer in the negative which is set out infra and reasons for this decision have been articulated supra. 17. Owing to the narrative thus far, this Court is left with the considered view that no substantial question of law arises in the captioned Second Appeal and the same is dismissed at the admission stage. In the light of the narrative nature of the matter, the relationship between the parties and the nature of submissions that were made, there shall be no order as to costs.