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2021 DIGILAW 129 (TS)

Majji Jhansi v. State of Telangana

2021-04-28

A.RAJASEKHAR REDDY, SHAMEEM AKTHER

body2021
JUDGMENT : Shameem Akther, J. 1. This habeas corpus petition, under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, is filed by the petitioners, challenging the detention order Vide No. 01/PD CELL/CCRB/RCKD/2021, dated 02.01.2021, passed by the respondent No. 2/Commissioner of Police, Rachakonda, whereby, the detenue, viz., Majji Rajeshwari @ Madhu @ Tamina Rajeshwari, D/o. Srinivas Rao, aged 27 years, has been preventively detained under Section 3(2) of the Telangana Prevention of Dangerous Activities of Bootleggers, Dacoits, Drug-Offenders, Goondas, Immoral Traffic Offenders, Land Grabbers, Spurious Seed Offenders, Insecticide Offenders, Fertiliser Offenders, Food Adulteration Offenders, Fake Document Offenders, Scheduled Commodities Offenders, Forest Offenders, Gaming Offenders, Sexual Offenders, Explosive Substances Offenders, Arms Offenders, Cyber Crime Offenders and White Collar or Financial Offenders Act, 1986, and the consequential confirmation order vide G.O. Rt. No. 607, General Administration (Spl. (Law & Order)) Department, dated 17.3.2021, passed by respondent No. 1. 2. Heard the submissions of Sri B. Anil, learned Counsel for the petitioners, Sri G. Malla Reddy, learned Assistant Government Pleader for Home appearing on behalf of the learned Additional Advocate General for the respondents and perused the record. 3. The facts of the case, in a nutshell, are that by relying on two cases registered against the detenue in the year 2020, viz., (1) Crime No. 102/2020 of Meerpet Police Station registered for the offences under Sections 3 and 4 of the Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act, 1956 and Section 370(A) (2) of IPC; and (2) Crime No. 1075/2020 of Uppal Police Station registered for the offences under Sections 3, 4 and 5 of the Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act, 1956 and Section 370(A)(2) of IPC, the respondent No. 2-Commissioner of Police, Rachakonda, passed the impugned detention order, dated 02.01.2021. According to the respondent No. 2, the detenue is an 'Immoral Traffic Offender' and that she, alongwith her associate, has been organizing prostitution by procuring girls from West Bengal State, Hyderabad and other parts of Telangana State through her agents and organizing prostitution clandestinely by acting as a leader/member of criminal gang to make easy money. With a view to prevent the detenue from indulging in such illegal and dangerous activities which are prejudicial and detrimental to the maintenance of public order, the impugned detention order, dated 02.01.2021, was passed. The detention order was confirmed by the respondent No. 1, by order, dated 17.03.2021. Hence, this writ petition before this Court. 4. With a view to prevent the detenue from indulging in such illegal and dangerous activities which are prejudicial and detrimental to the maintenance of public order, the impugned detention order, dated 02.01.2021, was passed. The detention order was confirmed by the respondent No. 1, by order, dated 17.03.2021. Hence, this writ petition before this Court. 4. Learned Counsel for the petitioners, inter alia, vehemently contended that as on the date of passing of the impugned detention order, dated 02.01.2021, the detenue was pregnant. Neither the detenue nor her mother (petitioner No. 1) were aware of the said fact in order to bring the same to the notice of the detaining authority while passing the impugned detention order. However, the detenue came to know about the same only after her detention by virtue of the impugned detention order. On this sole ground, the impugned detention order is liable to be set aside and the detenue can be released from prison, since an unborn child in the womb of the detenue cannot be punished for the wrongdoings, if any, of the detenue. As per Article 21 of the Constitution of India, nobody is empowered to take away the fundamental right of life and personal liberty of a person, except by the procedure established by law. An unborn child deserves all the fundamental rights and he/she should be granted the 'Right to life' as per Article 21 of the Constitution of India, similar to a normal person, because the unborn child has prepared himself to enjoy the journey of life since the day of conception. Having submitted so, the learned Counsel ultimately prayed to set aside the impugned detention order and the consequential confirmation order and allow the writ petition as prayed for. 5. On the other hand, the learned Assistant Government Pleader for Home appearing for the respondents fairly conceded that the detenue is pregnant, but contended that the said fact was not brought to the notice of the detaining authority while passing the impugned detention order. He further vehemently contended that leaving apart the aspect of pregnancy of the detenue, the detaining authority is legally justified in passing the impugned detention order. The detenue is an 'Immoral Traffic Offender'. She alongwith her associate was organizing prostitution by procuring innocent girls from other States by means of human trafficking through agents. He further vehemently contended that leaving apart the aspect of pregnancy of the detenue, the detaining authority is legally justified in passing the impugned detention order. The detenue is an 'Immoral Traffic Offender'. She alongwith her associate was organizing prostitution by procuring innocent girls from other States by means of human trafficking through agents. Her immoral activities highly endanger the family system and are harmful to inhabitants of the locality. The detenue was organizing prostitution clandestinely by exploiting innocent girls/women deceitfully as a member of the gang and causing wide-spread of contagious and sexually transmitted diseases like HIV, Syphilis, etc., and thereby endangering public health at large. Since the detenue was granted bail by the Courts concerned in both the crimes relied by the detaining authority, there is imminent possibility of the detenue indulging in similar illegal activities again, which are prejudicial and detrimental to the maintenance of public order. Hence, the detaining authority is justified in passing the impugned detention order. The subjective satisfaction recorded by the detaining authority for [preventively detaining the detenue cannot be said to be illegal or tainted on any account. All the constitutional guidelines have been strictly followed by the detaining authority while passing the impugned detention] order. There are no grounds to grant the relief sought by the petitioners and ultimately prayed to dismiss the writ petition. 6. In view of the submissions made by both the sides, the point that arises for determination in this writ petition is : "Whether the detention order, dated 02.01.2021, passed by the respondent No. 2 and the consequential confirmation order, dated 17.03.2021, passed by the Government of Telangana are liable to be set aside?" Point: 7. Before proceeding further, it is the case of the petitioners that the detenue was pregnant as on the date of passing of the impugned detention order. However, no material is placed before this Court by the petitioners to substantiate the said contention. However, the learned Assistant Government Pleader for Home appearing for the respondents fairly conceded that the detenue, who is presently lodged in Special Prison for Women, Chanchalguda, Hyderabad, by virtue of the impugned detention order, is pregnant. Law stipulates that admitted facts need not be proved. However, the learned Assistant Government Pleader for Home appearing for the respondents fairly conceded that the detenue, who is presently lodged in Special Prison for Women, Chanchalguda, Hyderabad, by virtue of the impugned detention order, is pregnant. Law stipulates that admitted facts need not be proved. Section 58 of Indian Evidence Act provides that no fact need to be proved in any proceeding, which the parties thereto, or their agents, agree to admit at the hearing, unless the Court believes that the said fact needs to be proved. If a submission made by a Counsel is fairly conceded by the other side Counsel, asking the Counsel who made such submission to prove the same would be waste of time and effort. Under these circumstances, the Court would be well within its jurisdiction to take judicial notice of the said fact and proceed with the case. Judicial notice is taken upon the request of a party that submits the fact. Relevant facts that are admitted under judicial notice are accepted by the Court even without producing a witness to prove such fact. This rule is often used for the simplest and obvious facts that are considered to be common sense and need not be proved. Under these circumstances, this Court deems it appropriate to take judicial notice of the fact that the detenue is pregnant. 8. In view of the fact that the detenue is pregnant, our anxious consideration is with regard to the constitutional safeguards with regard to the welfare of the fetus in the womb of the detenue vis-a-vis detention of the detenue, and the effect of detention on the unborn child. Thus, we deem it appropriate to lay emphasis on the said aspect at the first instance. 9. A child is considered to be a gift of god to human beings. A child is also known as another form of God. Though it is legal to abort a child in our country, it is debatable whether a child should be granted Right to life guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution of India, when it is a fetus. Apart from the definition of 'fetus' as per medical terminology, we may say that fetus is a 'human organism in development until birth'. Though it is legal to abort a child in our country, it is debatable whether a child should be granted Right to life guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution of India, when it is a fetus. Apart from the definition of 'fetus' as per medical terminology, we may say that fetus is a 'human organism in development until birth'. A child's heart starts beating between the second and third week of pregnancy, which means a human being has already started to develop in the metra of mother. However, a fetus is not covered under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. It follows that the fetus will not be provided with the benefit of Article 21, until it comes into existence, which may happen when the child comes out of the metra of the mother alive. However, it does not mean that the fetus is not subject to receive any of the rights guaranteed by the Constitution of India. A child in its mother's womb, for many purposes, is regarded by a legal fiction as already born, according to the maxim 'Nasciturus pro iam nato habetur quotiens de commodis eius agitur', which means that 'an unborn child is considered born, when his interests are taken into account'. Even the unborn ones should be protected from any sort of harm and hardship. Laws should be stringent to make sure that a person can be held liable for causing harm to a person, who, at the time of the injury, is not born. 10. Article 21 of the Constitution of India mandates that no person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty, except according to procedure established by law. In this context, firstly it has to be examined as to whether a fetus in the womb of mother can be termed as a "person", so as to confer on him/her, the benefit of Article 21 of the Constitution. In fact, in an article named Liberty of Born v. Life of Unborn, case not available : (1985) 2 SCC (Jour) 10, written by Justice A.M. Bhattacharjee, the then Chief Justice of Calcutta and Bombay High Courts, His Lordship was of the opinion that a fetus in the womb of the mother is a non-natural, but legal person. In fact, in an article named Liberty of Born v. Life of Unborn, case not available : (1985) 2 SCC (Jour) 10, written by Justice A.M. Bhattacharjee, the then Chief Justice of Calcutta and Bombay High Courts, His Lordship was of the opinion that a fetus in the womb of the mother is a non-natural, but legal person. In the said article, His Lordship observed as follows: "There should be no doubt that a foetus or a child in the mother's womb is not a natural person; but it is said that there should equally be no doubt that it is a juristic or juridical person. It is said that in all jurisprudential jurisdictions, a child en ventre sa mere is recognized as a legal person, capable of inheriting or otherwise acquiring and holding property and also other rights. In India, under the Hindu Law, a son is entitled to have reopened the partition of the ancestral property taking place while he was in the mother's womb without keeping any share reserved for him. In the Law of Wills both in India and in England, a child in the mother's womb is considered to be in existence and Section 99(i) of the Indian Succession Act, 1925, clearly provides that "all words expressive of relationship apply to a child in the womb who is afterwards born alive". The distinction made in Sections 312 to 316 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, between a woman with child and a woman quick with child and between an unborn child and a quick unborn child goes to show, as was pointed out in a century old Madras Division Bench decision Queen-Empress v. Ademma, (1886) ILR 9 Mad. 369, that under the Indian Criminal Law, a woman is with child during the entire period of her pregnancy and lexically and as well as legally, a child is a person having life. The English expression 'pregnant' means to be with child and the Indian equivalent 'antaswatta' unmistakably means to have life within. But granting that a child in the womb is not a natural but only a legal person, is a non-natural but legal person not entitled to the protection of the life/liberty/property clauses? The English expression 'pregnant' means to be with child and the Indian equivalent 'antaswatta' unmistakably means to have life within. But granting that a child in the womb is not a natural but only a legal person, is a non-natural but legal person not entitled to the protection of the life/liberty/property clauses? A non-natural but legal person, like a statutory corporation or a company, has all along been treated as person within the meaning and protection of the equality clauses of the Constitution guaranteeing to every person, equality before the law and equal protection of the laws. A non-natural but legal person, being thus undoubtedly a person within the meaning and protection of the life/liberty/property and the equality clauses of the Constitution, no such person, it has been argued, can be deprived of life, if it has any, without due process. Since a foetus or child in the mother's womb, even though a non-natural person, would nevertheless be a person within the meaning of the Article 21 of the Indian Constitution, it cannot be deprived of its life, if it has one, without due, i.e., reasonable, right, just and fair process." (Emphasis supplied) 11. While life beyond death might still be a philosophical enigma, life before birth in the mother's womb is a physiological phenomenon. Various legislations in India recognized the rights of an unborn child. Section 6 of the Limitation Act recognizes an infant in the womb of mother as a minor. As per Section 2(e) of the Indian Succession Act, a minor is anyone who is below the age of eighteen, which include fetus. As per Sections 312 to 316(8) of the Indian Penal Code, anyone who will prevent a child being born alive, or for causing the death of a quick unborn child will be punished depending on the case type. Section 316 of Indian Penal Code further goes to the extent of saying that causing death of quick unborn child amounts to culpable homicide. Section 20 of the Hindu Succession Act recognizes the right of the child in the metra of the mother. It treats the unborn child in the womb of the mother in the same way as a bom child for the purpose of inheritance of intestate of a dead person. Section 13 of Transfer of Property Act, 1882, characterizes an unborn infant as a child or an infant in its mother's metra. It treats the unborn child in the womb of the mother in the same way as a bom child for the purpose of inheritance of intestate of a dead person. Section 13 of Transfer of Property Act, 1882, characterizes an unborn infant as a child or an infant in its mother's metra. An individual yet to born doesn't have any presence and is not considered a living individual but still, the property can be transferred to the baby. Section 416 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, prescribes that the High Court shall order the execution of sentence to be postponed, if the woman who is imposed death penalty, found to be pregnant and may, if it thinks correct, commute the sentence to imprisonment for life. Thus, it is clear that law has given utmost importance to the unborn child. Further, it is clear that an unborn infant deserves equal and identical rights which a normal person has, for the simple reason that an unborn child also exists physically in the metra of the mother. The unborn child starts to develop himself since the day of conception and starts getting himself ready to ride the journey of life. Various legislations, as indicated above, recognizes and protects the interest of an unborn child. Thus, we are of the view that the unborn child deserves the Right to life enshrined in Article 21 of the Constitution, inasmuch as the unborn child has prepared himself to enjoy the journey of life since the day of conception. 12. Courts have been mindful of the fact that the unborn child is innocent of all wrongdoing and ought not to be subjected to the distressful conditions that inhere in detention. While several prescriptions exist in health related documents for the care and well being of the fetus in the womb of the mother, the issue requires particular attention in the context of the confinement of the mother in a custodial institution like prison. The dominant principle seems to be that imprisonment should be the last resort. While several prescriptions exist in health related documents for the care and well being of the fetus in the womb of the mother, the issue requires particular attention in the context of the confinement of the mother in a custodial institution like prison. The dominant principle seems to be that imprisonment should be the last resort. In R.D. Upadhyaya v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 2006 (1) ALD (Crl.) 777 (SC) : AIR 2006 SC 1946 , the Hon'ble Apex Court, while dealing with the condition of children who are in jail because of their mothers' imprisonment and after referring to the Draft Prison Manual framed by the 'National Expert Committee on Women Prisoners', headed by Justice Krishna Iyer, issued guidelines at Para 45, inter alia, directing as follows: "childbirth in prison should be avoided as far as possible and measures of temporary release/parole including suspended sentence should be made to enable expectant prisoner to have her delivery outside prison." 13. Further, the Gujarat High Court, in the case between State of Gujarat v. Jadav @ Jatin Bhagvanbhai Prajapati, Criminal Appeal No. 652 of 2008, decided on 01.02.2016, speaking through Justice M.R. Shah (as His Lordship then was), even while convicting and sentencing a pregnant woman to seven years imprisonment for a dowry death, simultaneously suspended her sentence for about ten months on account of her pregnancy. 14. The underlying principle behind the above said rulings and guidelines is the welfare and safety of the fetus. The concern is that the fetus should receive the healthiest possible environment to develop and born alive, and thereafter, receive the best possible nurture and care, integral to which is the mother's mental and physical health. It is not a mere concern for the mother's health. The predominant concern is thus for the unborn child, which is innocent of all wrongdoings, and ought not to be subjected to the distressful conditions that inhere in detention. The safety, security and personhood of the fetus is secondary only to the interest of the mother and her health, depending upon the stage of pregnancy. However, the subordination of the fetus, even to the mother's interest, is not absolute. Further, jeopardizing the fetus can never be the State's interest. The life, health and safety of the fetus, far from being in thrall to any act, decision or policy of the State, require protection from the State. However, the subordination of the fetus, even to the mother's interest, is not absolute. Further, jeopardizing the fetus can never be the State's interest. The life, health and safety of the fetus, far from being in thrall to any act, decision or policy of the State, require protection from the State. The State's power with regard to the childbirth should be accumulated to protect and enhance life, but not to threaten. 15. Further, we may say that incarceration of the mother would certainly amount to de facto detention of her unborn child, who is immune of all wrongdoings. Indisputably, an unborn child in the womb of the mother cannot be punished for the wrongdoings of mother. Women subjected to restraint during childbirth may report severe mental distress, depression, anguish and trauma. Further, some pregnancies require utmost medical attention, both pre-natal and post-natal, and advanced medical technology. Prisons may not be equipped with such medical staff and advanced medical technology and may not meet the needs of a woman who develop critical illness in labour or ensure safe delivery of a baby. Further, a woman during pregnancy needs extra care and attention and a nutritious diet. She should be free from stress. For the proper care of the unborn child, the mother should be provided a stress free environment, unlike a prison. Further, pregnant women need unique healthcare needs. These needs are often not addressed by most correctional institutions like prisons, which may put these women at risk. There is also a risk of a pregnant prisoner experiencing physical and emotional abuse, mental health issues and untreated sexually transmitted infections. 16. Though the dead possess no legal personality, it is otherwise in the case of an unborn. It may not be out of place to mention that special and specific provisions have been made in Parts-III and IV of the Constitution of India, besides other provisions, for care, welfare and development of the children. The best interest of the child has been regarded as a primary consideration in our Constitution. Article 15 prohibits discrimination on grounds of religion, race, caste, sex or place of birth. Article 15(3) provides that this shall not prevent the State from making any special provision for women and children. The best interest of the child has been regarded as a primary consideration in our Constitution. Article 15 prohibits discrimination on grounds of religion, race, caste, sex or place of birth. Article 15(3) provides that this shall not prevent the State from making any special provision for women and children. Article 14 provides that the State shall not deny to any person, equality before the law or the equal protection of the laws within the territory of India. Article 21 provides that no person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to procedure established by law. Article 39(f) directs the State to ensure that children are given opportunities and facilities to develop in a healthy manner and in conditions of freedom and dignity and that childhood and youth are protected against exploitation and against moral and material abandonment. 17. A life that affects the physical and mental health of a pregnant woman, which in turn affects the health of the unborn child in the womb of mother, is not a proper life at all. The right of an unborn child, when balanced against the rights of a woman bearing the child, the scale would certainly tilt in favour of the woman. The life and liberty of the mother cannot be extricated from that of an unborn child, as there is no life for a fetus separated from that of its mother. Thus, protection of health and well-being of an incarcerated pregnant woman is a matter that certainly requires greater attention by the Courts of law and other law enforcing agencies. In the instant case, the fact remains that the detenue is right now eight months pregnant. The detenu was not aware of her pregnancy when the detention order was passed. She discovered it during the period of detention, which has not been disputed by the respondents. Had this fact been brought to the notice of the detaining authority, the detaining authority might have taken a different view. 18. For the foregoing reasons, without expressing any opinion on the other merits of the matter, we deem it appropriate to set aside the impugned detention order, dated 2.1.2021, and the consequential confirmation order, dated 17.03.2021, on the ground of pregnancy of the detenue alone. 19. In the result, the writ petition is allowed. 18. For the foregoing reasons, without expressing any opinion on the other merits of the matter, we deem it appropriate to set aside the impugned detention order, dated 2.1.2021, and the consequential confirmation order, dated 17.03.2021, on the ground of pregnancy of the detenue alone. 19. In the result, the writ petition is allowed. The impugned detention order Vide No. 01/PD CELL/CCRB/RCKD/2021, dated 02.01.2021, passed by the respondent No. 2-Commissioner of Police, Rachakonda, and the consequential confirmation order vide G.O. Rt. No. 607, General Administration (Spl. (Law & Order)) Department, Government of Telangana, dated 17.03.2021, are hereby set aside. The respondents are directed to set the detenu, namely Majji Rajeshwari @ Madhu @ Tamina Rajeshwari, D/o. Srinivas Rao, at liberty forthwith, if she is no longer required in any other criminal case. 20. Miscellaneous petitions, if any, pending in this writ petition shall stand closed. There shall be no order as to costs.