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2021 DIGILAW 13 (MEG)

Jasper Lee Pakyntein v. Sumarmai Hynniewta

2021-03-04

H.S.THANGKHIEW

body2021
JUDGMENT : H.S. Thangkhiew, J. 1. The facts as set out in brief is that the appellant claims that he was running a hostel in a building belonging to his mother-in-law (respondent) and due to a family dispute, had instituted a Title Suit for declaration and permanent injunction before the District Council Court at Shillong, to declare him as the owner of the hostel under the name and style of 'The North East Girls & Boys Hostel', and that the respondent (defendant), had no right to interfere with the supervision and management of the hostel together with a prayer for permanent injunction to restrain the respondent from interfering with the management of the hostel. The learned trial Court by order dated 25.11.2019, granted ex parte ad-interim injunction in favour of the appellant which however, on an application under Order 39 Rule 4 CPC filed by the respondent, after hearing the parties, vacated the ad-interim injunction vide order dated 16.12.2019. Being aggrieved thereby, the appellant is before this Court by way of this application under Order 6 of Meghalaya (Jurisdiction over District Council Courts) Order, 2014. 2. Mr. H.R. Nath, learned counsel for the appellant submits that the learned lower Court had erred in holding that the appellant was seeking declaration of title over the hostel building when in fact the declaration was sought only over the hostel business and not the building which was undisputedly the property of the respondent. He submits that the learned lower Court on a wrong appreciation of materials had failed to acknowledge the fact that even though there was no written agreement of tenancy or rent receipts, the documents of agreement entered into by the appellant and the hostellers was abundant proof that the appellant was the owner of the business operating from the said building which established a prima facie case in his favour. He further submitted that the learned Court below while applying the ingredients necessary for grant of injunction had miserably failed to consider the competing rights of the parties and the balance of convenience which was squarely in favour of the appellant and also that irreparable loss would be caused if the appellant could not run his hostel business. 3. He further submitted that the learned Court below while applying the ingredients necessary for grant of injunction had miserably failed to consider the competing rights of the parties and the balance of convenience which was squarely in favour of the appellant and also that irreparable loss would be caused if the appellant could not run his hostel business. 3. Learned counsel submits that the vacation of the ex parte ad-interim injunction dated 25.11.2019 by the impugned order is unsustainable in the eye of law and liable to be set aside and quashed. 4. Mr. S. Kumar, learned counsel for the respondent in reply submits that the respondent is the absolute owner in possession of the building in question and that in fact, the hostel was being run and managed by the daughter of the respondent and the appellant herein who happened to be the son-in-law, was only working as a manager. He submits that the appellant by concealing facts had falsely projected himself as the owner of the hostel and obtained the ad-interim injunction dated 25.11.2019. He further submits that the appellant also did not crave leave of the Court to waive the notice under Order 39 Rule 3 CPC nor was any affidavit filed under Order 39 Rule 3(b) to state that copies of the injunction order had been delivered or sent. Apart from the procedural aspect, the learned counsel submits that the appellant was in marital discord with his wife, (the daughter of the respondent) and was not residing in the matrimonial home and in fact FIRs had been filed against him for breaking and entering into the hostel premises. As such, he submits the appellant has got no case whatsoever and the ad-interim injunction order was rightly vacated by the Court below. 5. I have heard learned counsel for the parties, this Court at this juncture has only to examine the legality of the order under challenge within the bounds governing the consideration of grant of injunction and whether the lower Court had exercised its discretionary powers in a justifiable manner. 5. I have heard learned counsel for the parties, this Court at this juncture has only to examine the legality of the order under challenge within the bounds governing the consideration of grant of injunction and whether the lower Court had exercised its discretionary powers in a justifiable manner. It is seen from the materials on records and from the pleadings contained therein that it is an admitted fact that firstly, the respondent is the absolute owner of the building and that secondly, though the appellant claims to be a lessee or tenant of the said premises, no rental or lease agreement nor rent receipt has been produced to substantiate his claim. The only document which had been annexed with the plaint is an agreement executed with the hostellers. Possession of the hostel premises effective or otherwise, therefore cannot be determined on the basis of the materials submitted by the appellant and as such, no prima facie case as far as possession is concerned could be made out. 6. Though, the learned lower Court had incorrectly observed that the appellant had contended that he is the owner of the building, the fact that the same is not so on the pleadings itself, in fact further weakens the case of the appellant, inasmuch as, it cannot be conceived that rightful owners be restrained from entering their own premises, especially when the appellant could not present any materials to show that he was in effective possession, or that he was a tenant, or had taken the premises on rent, or on lease at any point of time. Moreover, it is to be noted that in the absence of materials to establish a prima facie case, at this interlocutory stage, evidence would necessarily have to be led to determine where the rights of the contesting parties lie on their competing claims, in the course of the trial. 7. The balance of convenience in view of the facts and circumstances of the case, especially on the factum of possession, will squarely lie in favour of the respondent, and as rightly held by the learned lower Court, greater inconvenience would be caused to the respondent if the ad-interim injunction was made absolute. 7. The balance of convenience in view of the facts and circumstances of the case, especially on the factum of possession, will squarely lie in favour of the respondent, and as rightly held by the learned lower Court, greater inconvenience would be caused to the respondent if the ad-interim injunction was made absolute. On the question of irreparable loss and injury being caused to the appellant, the entire dispute revolving only around the ownership of the business, it can be safely concluded that the appellant, should he succeed in the trial can be adequately compensated as the loss if any in the business, can be quantified in monetary terms. 8. In view of the aforesaid, it can be concluded that grant of injunction cannot be claimed by a party as a matter of right nor can it be denied by the Court arbitrarily. However, the discretion to be exercised by the Court is guided by the principles discussed above and depends on the facts and circumstances of each case. The party seeking relief not only has to establish a prima facie case but also that irreparable loss would be caused in case of denial to grant relief and that the balance of convenience also lies in his favour. The appellant having failed to make out any case on the principles so applied, this appeal deserves no further consideration and the order dated 16.12.2019, passed by the Additional Judge, District Council Court is upheld. 9. Appeal accordingly stands dismissed. No cost.