ORDER Paul, J. -- 1. The interesting conundrum in this petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution is whether the benefit of exemption of entertainment tax is available only to the owner of a multiplex or it can be extended to a lessee as well ? 2. Draped in brevity, the relevant facts are that petitioner is a Limited Company duly registered under the provisions of Companies Act, 1956 and is engaged in the business of exhibiting feature films on commercial basis in its various cinema complexes all over the country including at Indore. The multiplexes are situated at C-21 Mall, A.B. Road, Indore. The petitioner company is duly registered under the M.P. Vat Act, 2002 with effect from 12.11.2009. 3. The Government of Madhya Pradesh introduced a policy on Integrated Family Entertainment Centres (Multiplex Complexes) with an object of improving the quality and facility of cinema halls in the State. The said policy came into being with effect from 25.10.2001 which provides for establishment of multiplex complexes within 10 kilometer of municipal limits of four major cities of Madhya Pradesh including Indore. Certain tax exemption and other concessions have been given to encourage the establishment and growth of said multiplexes. The petitioner has filed copy of said policy (Annexure P/1). 4. Shri Sumit Nema, learned Sr. Counsel for the petitioner urged that the government passed entertainment tax exemption policy to attract investment in the multiplex with a view to promote the opening of fully developed multiplexes. 5. The Department of Commercial Tax (Department of Excise), Government of M.P introduced the promotional scheme as per notification dated 7.10.2008 (hereinafter called ‘exemption notification’) (Annexure P/2). The said notification grants exemption for five years to multiplexes from the date of first exhibition of a movie subject to certain conditions mentioned therein. It is argued that said notification was issued in exercise of power conferred on the government u/S.7 of the M.P. Entertainment Duty and Advertisement Tax Act, 1936 (hereinafter referred to as “the Act of 1936”) which was repealed and replaced by the M.P. Vilasita, Manoranjan, Amod Evam Vigyapan Kar Adhiniyam, 2011 (Act of 2011) thereby exempting Integrated Family Entertainment Centres/multiplex complexes from payment of entertainment duty. Learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner submits that Sec.3 of the Repealed Act of 1936 is the charging section whereas section 7 gives power of general exemption. Learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner submits that Sec.3 of the Repealed Act of 1936 is the charging section whereas section 7 gives power of general exemption. It is averred that petitioner established five cinema auditoriums at C-21 Mall, Indore and duly received registration certificate dated 24.11.2009 (Annexure P/3) under M.P. (Regulations) Act 1952 as a cinema operator by the competent authority. 6. The petitioner preferred an application dated 8.4.2010 (Annexure P/4) seeking entertainment tax exemption. In addition, petitioner applied for grant of permission for printing of computerised tickets (Annexure P/5). In due course, the permission was granted by District Collector on 24.12.2009 (Annexure P/6). Every ticket, duly contains a remark ‘entertainment tax exempted’. 7. The Assistant Commissioner of Excise, Indore wrote a letter dated 8.7.2011 to Divisional Commissioner (Revenue), Indore informing him that the Act of 1936 stood repealed with effect from 1.4.2011. The Divisional Commissioner was accordingly requested that further action in the petitioner’s application needs to be taken by the Department of Commercial Tax. The District Collector (Excise) also wrote a letter to the Divisional Commissioner (Revenue) on 3.2.2011 for the same purpose. The Act of 2011 came into force on its publication in the official gazette on 31.3.2011. The petitioner’s application was processed and Dy. Commissioner, Commercial Tax, Indore wrote a letter dated 22.10.2011 to Divisional Commissioner (Revenue), Indore apprising him about joint inspection needs to be carried out at petitioner’s premises by a team consisting of Superintendent of Police, Additional Collector, Dy. Commissioner of Municipal Corporation and others. After the inspection, an inspection report dated 22.10.2011 (Annexure P/10) was submitted to Divisional Commissioner (Revenue), Indore. The said authority convened a divisional level meeting by issuing the letter dated 24.12.2011 (Annexure P/11). The meeting was ultimately convened on 4.1.2012 in the office of Dy. Commissioner (Revenue), Indore in the Chairmanship of the Divisional Commissioner (Revenue), Indore. In furtherance of decision taken by the said Divisional Level Committee, the order dated 16.3.2012 (Annexure P/12) was passed whereby exemption was granted to the petitioner from payment of entertainment tax and electricity fee for a period of five years commencing from 24.12.2009. The stand of petitioner is that the problem arose when a letter dated 5.8.2013 (Annexure P/13) was written by learned Commissioner, Commercial Tax. The stand of petitioner is that the problem arose when a letter dated 5.8.2013 (Annexure P/13) was written by learned Commissioner, Commercial Tax. For the first time, in this letter it is stated that it is not clear whether a multiplex cinema operator who operates such cinema in the premises of mall should be the rightful beneficiary of exemption from payment of entertainment tax. The clarification/guidance is sought for from Additional Chief Secretary, Department of Commercial Tax, Government of M.P. 8. The Additional Chief Secretary aforesaid never issued any clarification and doubt so raised in the communication dated 5th August, 2013 (Annexure P/13) remained unanswered. 9. Shri Nema, learned Sr. Counsel submits that the application of petitioner seeking exemption dated 8.4.2010 shows that it was preferred on behalf of Satyam Cineplexes Limited and signed by its owner/Managing Director. A Divisional Level Committee which is much higher in status than the Commercial Tax Officer found the petitioner eligible for grant of entertainment tax exemption. The impugned order dated 5.5.2014 (Annexure P/14) came as a bolt from blue to the petitioner whereby entertainment tax exemption was declined on the ground that there exists no tax exemption certificate in the name of M/s. Satyam Cineplexes Limited TIN No. 80949000242. Consequently, the tax, interest and penalty is decided to be imposed on the petitioner. 10. Learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner criticised the impugned order dated 5.5.2014 by contending - (i) exemption notification is applicable qua ‘entertainment’ and not ‘owner’ Otherwise, the very purpose for which exemption is decided to be given will be frustrated, (ii) section 2(f) defines ‘proprietor’. The definition shows that it is very wide and includes any person responsible for or for the time being incharge of management of any ‘entertainment’, (iii) the policy of entertainment tax is an executive instruction/policy guideline which must be read in conformity with the parent statute, (iv) in the event of any ambiguity or contradiction between the parent Act and the policy/guidelines, the parent Act being a statutory provision must prevail, (v) the investment made by the petitioner was for multiplexes and entertainment tax is also paid by the lessee. To bolster the aforesaid submission, learned Senior Counsel placed reliance on a division bench judgment of Chhattisgarh High Court passed in WPT No.47/2016 (M/s. PVR Ltd. v. State of C.G decided on 16.11.2018). To bolster the aforesaid submission, learned Senior Counsel placed reliance on a division bench judgment of Chhattisgarh High Court passed in WPT No.47/2016 (M/s. PVR Ltd. v. State of C.G decided on 16.11.2018). It is urged that in State of Chhattisgarh, Rules of 1982 were applicable. No definition of ‘owner’ (swami) finds place in the said Rules. The question cropped up before the Division Bench was whether ‘swami’ means only actual owner or it covers the occupier/licensee of multiplexes also. The Division Bench opined that as per the scheme and object of Act of 1936 and Rules of 1982 the occupier/licensee is also covered and is entitled to get the subsidy. 11. The next reliance is on a Kerala High Court judgment reported in 1986 SCC Online KER 345 (Deputy Commissioner v. Raghavan) it is urged that the exemption was given by assigning a wide meaning to the provision and owner and lessee were found entitled to get the benefit of exemption. (1997) 5 SCC 482 is relied upon to contend that in the context the word ‘owner’ is used, it must be given a wide meaning and must include a lessee. Lastly (2005)6 SCC 292 is relied upon to contend that the Court can go behind the notification to examine the real purpose of the provision. 12. Shri Pushyamitra Bhargav, learned Addl. Advocate General contended that petitioner has an efficacious alternative remedy against the impugned order. The petitioner may be relegated to avail the said remedy. Apart from this, learned AAG submits that pursuant to the Notification dated 7.10.2008 (issued as per Act of 1936), on the same date a policy was introduced. The policy dated 7.10.2008 is placed on record as Annexure P/2. Great emphasis is laid on the language employed on the subject of covering letter dated 7.10.2008 wherein the Commercial Tax Department mentioned that the policy is meant for construction/establishment of multiplexes in the State of M.P. Shri Bhargav by taking this Court to Clause–1.5.1 of policy submits that applicant is entitled to get exemption from entertainment tax on constructing a multiplex. For the same purpose, reliance is placed on Clause 1.6, 1.6.2, and 1.6.4 of this policy. The ‘owner’ is treated as ‘applicant’ and lessee, by no stretch of imagination can get the benefit of exemption of entertainment tax. For the same purpose, reliance is placed on Clause 1.6, 1.6.2, and 1.6.4 of this policy. The ‘owner’ is treated as ‘applicant’ and lessee, by no stretch of imagination can get the benefit of exemption of entertainment tax. By placing heavy reliance on a Constitution Bench judgment in the matter of Commissioner of Customs (Import), Mumbai v. Dilip Kumar and Company & Ors. reported in (2018) 9 SCC Page 1, Shri Bhargav urged that an exemption Notification should be interpreted strictly. It is for the assessee to show that his case comes within the parameters of exemption clause/exemption notification. If there exists an ambiguity in exemption notification, it must be subject to strict interpretation. The benefit of ambiguity cannot be claimed by the subject/assessee and it must be interpreted in favour of revenue. In view of this authoritative pronouncement by Constitution Bench, Shri Bhargav urged that curtains are finally drawn on the aspect of interpretation of an exemption clause. A conjoint reading of the Notification dated 7.10.2008 and the policy of same date makes it clear that exemption is available to the “owner” or the ‘applicant’, who has taken permission to construct the multiplex and not to the lessee. 13. No other point is pressed by learned counsel for the parties. 14. We have bestowed our anxious consideration on rival contentions and perused the record. 15. Before dealing with rival contentions on merits, it is apposite to decide the question of availability of alternative remedy. Indisputably, an alternative remedy is available to the petitioner against the impugned order. However, it is noteworthy that this petition despite availability of that remedy was entertained by this Court way back on 28.7.2014. The question involved in the present matter is legal in nature and no factual inquiry is required. In our opinion, after almost six years from the date present petition was entertained, it will not be proper to relegate the petitioner to avail the alternative remedy. We find support in our view from the judgment of this Court reported in 1995 MPLJ 969 (Chambal Ghati Shiksha Prasar Samiti v. State of M.P.). In our opinion, after almost six years from the date present petition was entertained, it will not be proper to relegate the petitioner to avail the alternative remedy. We find support in our view from the judgment of this Court reported in 1995 MPLJ 969 (Chambal Ghati Shiksha Prasar Samiti v. State of M.P.). After considering the judgment of Supreme Court reported in 1970 (2) SCC 355 (Hriday Narain v. ITO Bareilly), this Court came to hold as under : “There is no dispute with the proposition that when an alternate remedy is available then normally aggrieved party should be relegated to his ordinary remedy provided under the statute. But there is another well known principle of law enunciated by the Supreme Court. In Hirday Narain v. Income Tax Officer, Bareilly [ (1970) 2 SCC 355 : AIR 1971 SC 33 ], the Supreme Court has held in categoric terms that if a petition is entertained and during the pendency of the petition the remedy for seeking alternate remedy expires then the petitioner should be heard on merits and the parties should not be relegated to remedies under the statute.” (Emphasis Supplied) In this view of the matter, we are not inclined to relegate the petitioner to avail the alternative remedy. 16. The parties during the course of arguments placed reliance on certain provisions of the Act of 1936. The relevant provisions read as under : 2(f) “proprietor” in relation to any entertainment, includes any person responsible for or for the time being incharge of the management thereof; 3 Entertainment Duty payable by proprietor of an entertainment.— (1) Every proprietor of an entertainment other than proprietor of an entertainment by Video Cassette Recorder (hereinafter referred to as V.C.R.) or Video Cassette Player (hereinafter referred to as V.C.P.) or a Cable Operator, shall in respect of every payment for admission to the entertainment pay to the State Government a duty at the rate (as prescribed by the State Government not exceeding seventy five percentum thereof:) (2) They duty payable under sub -section (1) shall be paid to or collected or released by such officer or authority and in such manner as ma y be prescribed. (3) Where the payment for admission to an entertainment is made by means of a lump sum paid as a subscription or contribution to any person, or for a season ticket or for the right of admission to a series of entertainments or to any entertainment during a certain period of time, or for any privilege, right, facility or thing combined with the right of admission without further payment or at a reduced charge, the entertainments duty shall be paid on the amount of such lump sum : Provided that where the State Government is of opinion that the payment of a lump sum represents payment for other privileges, rights, or purposes besides the admission to an entertainment, or covers admission to the entertainment during any period for which the duty has not been in operation, the duty shall be charged on such an amount as papers to the State Government to represent the right of admission to entertainment in respect of which the entertainment duty is payable. (4) In calculating the entertainments duty payable under subsection (1)— (i) where the duty payable is less than fifty paise, the duty shall be rounded off to nearest lower multiple of five paise; and (ii) where the duty payable is more than fifty paise, the duty shall be rounded off to nearest higher multiple of five paise. (4) In calculating the entertainments duty payable under subsection (1)— (i) where the duty payable is less than fifty paise, the duty shall be rounded off to nearest lower multiple of five paise; and (ii) where the duty payable is more than fifty paise, the duty shall be rounded off to nearest higher multiple of five paise. 7 Power of general exemption.— The State Government may, by general or special order, except— (i) any entertainment or class of entertainments from the operation of section 3; (ii) any advertisement or class of advertisements from the operation of section 3-A” (Emphasis Supplied) Shri Bhargava placed reliance on following clauses of the policy: ^^1-3 Hkwfe dh vko’;drk & u;s ,dhÑr ikfjokfjd vkeksn&Áeksn ds cgqvk;keh euksjatu dsUæ dh LFkkiuk ds fy, vkokl ,oa i;kZoj.k@uxj rFkk xzke fuos’k lapkyuky; }kjk fuèkkZfjr ekin.Mksa ,oa Hkou fuekZ.k mifof/k;ksa ds vuqlkj vko’;d Hkwfe vkosnd ds ikl gksuk pkfg;sA 1-4 eYVhIysDl fuekZ.k gsrq vko’;d 'krsZ%& 1-4-1 vkosnd dks vkokl ,oa i;kZoj.k@uxj ,oa xzke fuos’k foHkkx }kjk fu/kkZfjr 'krksZ dk ikyu djuk gksxkA vkosnd dks uxj rFkk xzke fuos’k vf/kfu;e ,oa mlds varxZr cus fu;eksa dks ikyu djuk gksxkA Hkwfe mi;ksx gsrq Áeq[k 'krsZ ifjf’k"V&,d ij nh xbZ gSA buesa jkT; 'kklu }kjk le;≤ ij vko’;d ifjorZu fd, tk ldsaxsA 1-4-2 vkosnd dks uxj rFkk xzke fuos’k dk;kZy; ls fodkl dh vuqKk ,oa LFkkuh; laLFkkvksa ;Fkk&uxj fuxe@uxj ikfydk@uxj iapk;r@xzke iapk;r ls Hkou fuekZ.k dh vuqKk ds laca/k esa leLr vko’;d Lohd`fr;ka ÁkIr djuh gksxhA 1-5-1 euksjatu 'kqYd ls NwV & vkosnd }kjk leLr 'krksZ dh iwfrZ djrs gq, eYVhIysDl dk fuekZ.k djus ij mls eYVhIysDl dkWEiysDl esa fLFkr fdlh Hkh Nfox`g esa fQYe dk ÁFke Án’kZu ÁkjaHk gksus ds fnukad ls euksjatu 'kqYd ls fuEukuqlkj NwV nh tk ldsxh%& Øekad vof/k euksjatu 'kqYd ls NwV 1 ÁFke f}rh; ,oa r`rh; ¼rhu o"kZ½ 100 Áfr'kr 2 prqFkZ o"kZ 75 Áfr'kr 3 Ikkapok o"kZ 50 Áfr'kr 1-6 NwV ds ckjs esa 'krsZ %& 1-6-4 euksjatu 'kqYd esa ns; NwV dk ykHk] lEifRr ds Lokeh dks gh ns; gksxkA NwV dh vof/k dh lekfIr ds i’pkr eYVhIysDl dks mDr leLr lqfo/kkvksa lfgr 5 o"kksZ rd vfuok;Z :i ls pykuk gksxkA ;fn bl 'krZ dk mYy?kau fd;k tkrk gS rks lacaf/kr laifRr ds Lokeh ls mls Ánku dh x;h] djks dh NwV dh lEiw.kZ jkf’k mlds tek gksus ds fnukad rd ds fy;s 12 Áfr’kr okf"kZd lk/kkj.k C;kt lfgr tek djkbZ tk,xh rFkk mlds }kjk tek ugha djus ij Hkw&jktLo ds cdk;k dh Hkkafr olwy dh tk;sxhA** (Emphasis Supplied) The bone of contention of learned Additional Advocate General was that in view of Constitution Bench judgment of Supreme Court in the case of Dilip Kumar and Company (supra), exemption notification must be interpreted strictly. In the event of any ambiguity in exemption notification, the benefit of ambiguity cannot be claimed by the subject. It must be interpreted in favour of the revenue. Thus, the pivotal question is as to what is the nature of exemption notification/provision and whether it gives benefit of exemption of Entertainment Tax to a ‘lessee’. 17. The notification dated 7.10.2008 was issued in exercise of powers conferred by section 7 of the Act of 1936. On the same date, an executive instruction in the shape of policy (Annexure P/2) was issued clauses of which were heavily relied upon by Shri Bhargava. Indisputably, neither the notification dated 7.10.2008 nor the policy which is issued as executive fiat contains any definition of ‘proprietor’ (Lokeh). Thus, to ascertain the meaning and definition of proprietor, the Court needs to look into the definition clause contained in the Act of 1936 namely; section 2(f), reproduced hereinabove. In the considered opinion of this Court, if present petitioner is covered by definition of 2(f), he can certainly claim the benefit of exemption. This will not be out of place to mention here that in the Act of 1936 (Hindi version), the proprietor is defined as ‘Swami’. The relevant portion reads as under: ^^Lokeh esa] fdlh euksjatu ds lEcU/k esa] lekfo"V ls mlds ÁcU/k ds fy, mRrjnk;h vFkok mlds ÁcU/k dk RkRle; ÁHkkjh dksbZ Hkh O;fDrA** (Emphasis Supplied) This will not be out of place to mention here that after enactment of M.P. Official Language Act, 1957, the Hindi version published must be relied upon in case of any doubt. In the present case, although there exits no doubt, the Hindi version of (Proprietor) makes it further clear that the Legislative intent was to treat the ‘proprietor’ as ‘Swami’. A Full Bench of this Court in Mangilal v. Board of Revenue [1983 RN 205 (FB) = 1983 MPLJ FB 254] took the said view regarding prevailing of Hindi version in case of doubt. Same principle is followed in 2018(2) JLJ 210 = 2018 (3) MPLJ 588 (C.M.O. v. Hindustan Copper Ltd.). 18. The definition of ‘proprietor’ became subject matter of consideration in 1980 MPLJ 221 (State of M.P. v. Narendrasingh Mannalal. The relevant portion reads as under : “8. Same principle is followed in 2018(2) JLJ 210 = 2018 (3) MPLJ 588 (C.M.O. v. Hindustan Copper Ltd.). 18. The definition of ‘proprietor’ became subject matter of consideration in 1980 MPLJ 221 (State of M.P. v. Narendrasingh Mannalal. The relevant portion reads as under : “8. Section 2(f) provides : “Proprietor in relation to any entertainment includes any person responsible for or for the time being in charge of the management thereof.” This definition is inclusive and speaks of a person responsible for the time being in charge of the management thereof. This terminology implied in this definition clearly goes to show that those who are in charge of or responsible for the management of the cinema house whether they are strictly proprietors or not shall be included in the definition of the term proprietor . (Emphasis Supplied) This pronouncement makes it clear that definition of ‘proprietor’ is wide enough to include a person who is incharge of or responsible for management of cinema house. 19. It is noteworthy that in the case of M/s PVR Ltd. (supra), before the Division Bench of CG High Court, the Rules of 1982 were subject matter of consideration. In those Rules, there was no definition of ‘Swami’ but an explanation was appended to Rule 5 which reads as under: ^^Li"Vhdj.k & ^^Lokeh** 'kCn dk rkRi;Z] fdlh O;fDr fo’ks"k O;fDr;ksa ds lewg fdlh QeZ ;k lkslkbVh ;k la;qDr iwath daiuh ls tks flusekx`g ;k ¼eYVhIysDl flusek?kj½ dk ekfyd gks] ls gSA** 20. The CG High Court opined that since ‘Swami’ is not defined in the Rules of 1982, the definition is to be traced from the Act of 1936. After considering the said definition, the Court opined that it is broader kind of definition and includes a ‘lessee’. It was poignantly held that the word ‘Swami’ would not only include the actual owner but also the ‘occupier’ or the ‘lessee’ of the Cinema-hall or the Multiplex. In view of this finding, order impugned was set aside and the matter was remitted back to the respondents to take a fresh decision in the light of the judgment. 21. The Explanation to Rule 5 which was subject matter of consideration before CG High Court was still pregnant with some description regarding ‘Swami’ whereas administrative instruction/policy in the instant case is silent on this aspect. 21. The Explanation to Rule 5 which was subject matter of consideration before CG High Court was still pregnant with some description regarding ‘Swami’ whereas administrative instruction/policy in the instant case is silent on this aspect. In this backdrop, we are of the view that ‘definition’ contained in the Parent Act of 1936 must be the basis for determining whether petitioner is entitled to get the benefit of exemption. 22. In our country, the hierarchy of laws is as follows : (1) The Constitution of India. (2) The Statutory Law which may be either Parliamentary Law or Law made by the State Legislature. (3) Delegated or subordinate legislation, which may be in the form of Rules made under the Act, Regulations made under the Act, etc. (4) Administrative orders or Executive Instructions without any statutory backing. See 2006 (12) SCC 583 (Ispat Industries Ltd. v. Commissioner of Customs). This is equally settled that if there exists any conflict between the provisions of the Act and the provisions of Rules or Executive Instructions, the former will prevail. In the instant case, in absence of any definition of ‘proprietor/swami’ in the executive instructions/policy, the definition must be traced from the main enactment. Even if there would have been a definition of ‘Swami’ in the Executive Instructions, the same was required to be read as per the definition given in the Parent Act of 1936. No Executive Instructions can prevail or assign a different meaning than the meaning provided in the Parent Act. Thus, we respectfully agree with the view taken by the CG High Court in the case of M/s PVR Ltd. (supra). 23. The apex Court in Mysore Mineral Ltd. (supra), considered the term ‘owned’ occurring in section 32 of the IT Act, 1961 and held that it must be given a wider meaning. Any one in possession of property in his own title exercising such dominion over the property as would enable others being excluded therefrom and having the right to use and occupy the property and/or to enjoy its usufruct in his own right would be the owner of buildings though a formal and legal deed of title may not have been executed. In Vadilal Chemicals Ltd (supra), the apex Court held that in absence of any statutory definition of the word ‘manufacture’, object of Government Order needs to be taken into consideration for interpretation. In Vadilal Chemicals Ltd (supra), the apex Court held that in absence of any statutory definition of the word ‘manufacture’, object of Government Order needs to be taken into consideration for interpretation. The Kerala High Court in the case of Raghwan (supra), considered the question of exemption for ‘New Industrial Unit’. It was held that exemption is extended to all goods produced and sold by the unit. The person running the industrial unit, whether his ‘owner’ or ‘lessee’ or even a lessee having completed control over the unit is entitled to exemption so long as goods are produced in the unit and sold by him. In our opinion, the broad definition of ‘proprietor’ as per Act of 1936 covers a person responsible for the time being or an incharge of the management of the entertainment even if strict interpretation is applied. Hence, the judgment of Apex Court in Dilip Kumar (supra), is of no assistance to the department. section 7 of the Act of 1936, the enabling provision which empowers the government to exercise power of exemption is related to ‘any entertainment’ or ‘clause of entertainment’. The enabling provision is not aimed towards the ‘owner’ or the ‘applicant’ who preferred an application for construction of shopping malls or multiplex. For this reason also, we find substance in the argument of Shri Nema that benefit of exemption must be extended in favour of a lessee. Moreso, when indisputably the Entertainment Tax is paid by the lessee only. 24. As per the policy of exemption, the application of exemption needs to be examined by a Committee of high ranking officers. The application dated 8.4.2010 is signed by Shri Gurjeet Singh Chhabra. Moreso, when indisputably the Entertainment Tax is paid by the lessee only. 24. As per the policy of exemption, the application of exemption needs to be examined by a Committee of high ranking officers. The application dated 8.4.2010 is signed by Shri Gurjeet Singh Chhabra. However, the opening sentence of application shows that it is preferred on behalf of C-21 Mall, Satyam Cineplexes Ltd. Shri Chhabra signed the application as a Proprietor/Managing Director of Satyam Cineplexes Ltd. The Committee constituted as per the policy, examined the various facets and opined as under: ^^Okf.kfT;d dj foHkkxh; dh Vhi & laHkkxh; mik;qDr Jh OghŒ ,lŒ HknkSfj;k ¼iwoZ laHkkxh; mik;qDr½ okf.kfT;d dj bUnkSj laHkkx&1 ds Kkiu Øekad mik&1@okd@euksjatu dj@11@9125 bUnkSj fnukad 22-10-2011 }kjk lR;e flusIysDlsl fyfeVsM dks euksjatu dj ls eqfDr gsrq vg Árhr gksdj vuq’kalk dh xbZ gSA** In view of the recommendations, the following decision was taken on 16.3.2012 (Annexure P/12): ^^vr% uohu ikfjokfjd veksn&Áeksn ds cgqvk;keh euksjatu dsUæksa ds fuekZ.k ds laca/k esa ÁksRlkgu uhfr dh df.Mdk 1-9 ds vuqlkj xfBr laHkkx Lrj ij laHkkxh; vk;qDr ¼jktLo½ dh v/;{krk okyh lfefr }kjk Jh xqjthrflag firk Jh Hkxrflag NkcMk ,oa Jherh ÁHktksr dksj ifr Jh xqjthr flag NkcMk eSusftax MkjsDVj lh&21 lR;e flusIysDl fyfeVsV IykWV uaŒ 94 ls 104 ,oa 300 ls 303 ihŒ;wŒ&4 Ldhe uaŒ 54 ,ŒchŒ jksM bUnkSj dks euksjatu ’kqYd ,oa fo|qr 'kqYd ls ÁksRlkgu uhfr dh dafMdk 1-5-1 ,oa 1-5-2 ds vuqlkj leLr 5 Nfox`gksa esa fQYe ds ÁFke Án’kZu ÁkjaHk gksus ds fnukad 24-12-2009 ls 5 o"kZ dh vof/k ds fy;s fuEu 'krksZ ds v/;/khu NwV Ánku dh tkrh gSA** A conjoint reading of the recommendations and the consequential order dated 16.3.2012 (Annexure P/12) makes it crystal clear that the exemption was decided to be given to Satyam Cineplexes Ltd. Putting it differently, the exemption order specifically contains the name of Cineplex i.e. Satyam Cineplexes in whose favour the decision to grant exemption was taken. 25. The matter may be viewed from another angle. 25. The matter may be viewed from another angle. In the impugned order dated 5.5.2014, the reason for not giving benefit of exemption is mentioned as under: ^^O;olk;h }kjk eŒÁŒ foykflrk] euksjatu] vkeksn ,oa foKkiu dj vfèkfu;e 2011 dh /kkjk 15 esa fd;s x;s fjfiy ,.M lsfoax ds Áko/kkuksa ds varxZr iwoZ vfèkfu;e dh /kkjk 3 ds ÁorZu ls vf/klwpuk Øekad 76&ch&5&10&2007&2 fnukad 7-10-2007 ds rgr fQYe ds ÁFke O;olkf;d Án’kZu fnukad 24-12-2009 ls ÁFke rhu o"kZ gsrq ¼24-12-2012 rd½ 100 Áfr’kr] prqFkZ o"kZ gsrq ¼25-12-2012 ls 24-12-2013½ 75 Áfr’kr ,oa ikapos o"kZ gsrq 50 Áfr’kr euksjatu 'kqYd ls NwV lEcUèkh vkns’k ds rgr fnukad 1-4-2012 ls 24-12-2012 rd dh euksjatu ls lEcfU/kr ÁkfIr;ksa ij 100 Áfr’kr dh NwV pkgh xbZ gS ,oa fnukad 25-12-2012 ls 31-03-2012 rd dh euksjatu ls lacaf/kr ÁkfIr;ksa ij 75 Áfr’kr dh NwV pkgh xbZ gSA ijUrq djeqfDr ik=rk Áek.k i= Jh xqjftr flga firk Jh Hkxr flag NkcM+k ,oa Jherh ÁHktksr dkSj ifr Jh xqjftr NkcM+k] eSusftax Mk;jsDVj lh&21 ekWy] lR;e flusIysDl fyfeVsM IykWV uaŒ 94&104 ,oa 300&303 ihŒ;wŒ 4 Ldhe uaŒ 5 ,ŒchŒ jksM bankSj dks ÁkIr gSA eSa] lR;e~ flusIysDl fyfeVsM fVu Øekad 80949000242 ds uke ls dksbZ djeqfDr ik=rk Áek.k i= ugha gSA vr% djnkrk }kjk pkgh xbZ NwV vekU; dh tkrh gSA bl Ádkj fnukad 1-4-2011 ls 31-3-2013 rd dh euksjatu ,oa foKkiu ls lEcfU/kr leLr dj;ksX; ÁkfIr;k¡ :i;s 7258&8400@& fu/kkZfjr dh tkrh gSA** (Emphasis Supplied) The reason for depriving the petitioner from the benefit of exemption is that in the exemption order, the name of M/s Satyam Cineplexes does not find place or the exemption certificate is not a certificate in favour of M/s Satyam Cineplexes Ltd. This finding, in our view, is factually incorrect. The relevant portion of exemption order dated 16.3.2012 Annexure P/12 reproduced hereinabove leaves no room for any doubt that exemption was indeed issued in favour of M/s Satyam Cineplexes Ltd. Pertinently, the impugned order dated 5.5.2014 does not contain any opinion of the Commercial Tax Officer that petitioner being a ‘lessee’ is not entitled to get exemption and such benefit is confined to ‘proprietor/swami’ only. The only reason assigned is that the exemption notification/certificate was not issued in favour of M/s Satyam Cineplexes Ltd. This is trite law that validity of an order of a statutory authority must be judged on the basis of grounds mentioned therein and it cannot be supported by assigning different reasons in the Court by filing counter affidavit. See 1978 (1) SCC 405 (Mohinder Singh Gill and another v. Chief Election Commissioner, New Delhi and others. The apex Court opined that public orders, publicly made, in exercise of a statutory authority cannot be construed in the light of explanations subsequently given by the officer making the order of what he meant, or of what was in his mind, or what he intended to do. Public orders made by public authorities are meant to have public effect and are intended to affect the actings and conduct of those to whom they are addressed and must be construed objectively with reference to the language used in the order itself. Orders are not like old wine becoming better as they grow older. 26. For the aforementioned reasons, the impugned order cannot sustain judicial scrutiny. In view of foregoing analysis, the impugned order dated 5.5.2014 is set aside. The petitioner/lessee is entitled to get the benefit of exemption of Entertainment Tax as per law. The petition is allowed.