JUDGMENT : 1. Heard Mr. Amit Daga, learned counsel for applicant and learned A.G.A. for State. 2. Perused the record. 3. This application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. has been filed challenging order dated 24.03.2021 passed by Chief Judicial Magistrate, Jhansi in Bail Application No.480 of 2021, (CNR No.UPJS04004212021) filed by applicant in Case Crime No.507 of 2020 (State of U.P. Vs. Rajendra Singh Yadav @ Raju Jahreela) under Sections- 302, 307, 504, 506 I.P.C., Police Station-Prem Nagar, District-Jhansi, whereby aforesaid application dated 23.03.2021 filed by applicant seeking his enlargement on bail on account of default, has been rejected. 4. Record shows that in respect of an incident, which is alleged to have occurred on 19.12.2020, a prompt F.I.R. dated 19.12.2020 was lodged by first informant, Sanjay and was registered as Case Crime No.507 of 2020, under Sections-302, 307, 504, 506 I.P.C., Police Station-Prem Nagar, District-Jhansi. In the aforesaid F.I.R., three persons, namely, Rajendra Singh Yadav (applicant herein), Yogendra Singh Yadav and Pinku Parihar were nominated as named accused, whereas one unknown person was also nominated as an accused. 5. Subsequent to afore-mentioned F.I.R. dated 19.12.2020, Investigating Officer took steps for ensuring inquest (panchnama) of deceased. Accordingly, inquest of deceased was conducted on 20.12.2020 and an Inquest Report dated 20.12.2020 was prepared. From perusal of same, copy of which is on record as Annexure-3 to the affidavit, it is apparent that the names of panch-witnesses, place where inquest was conducted, time and duration of inquest are duly mentioned therein. However, the case crime number is conspicuous by its absence. 6. Thereafter, post-mortem of deceased was conducted on 20.12.2020. The doctor, who conducted autopsy on the body of deceased, prepared post-mortem report dated 20.12.2020. Copy of same is on record as Annexure-4 to the affidavit. As per post-mortem report, deceased sustained following ante-mortem injuries:- (a) Entry wound on the back of right thoracic area, 17 cm from right shoulder and 15 cm from thoracic vertebra margin are inverted size 1.5 cm x 1.5 cm. (b) Exit wound 2 cm lateral to the right nipple, margin are everted, sixe 3 cm x 2 cm. (c) Bullet track pathway from back of right thoracic area, fracture 4th thoracic ribs on the side of wound, than piercer to heart and exit from wound and fracture 5th ribs on the side of wound. (b) Exit wound 2 cm lateral to the right nipple, margin are everted, sixe 3 cm x 2 cm. (c) Bullet track pathway from back of right thoracic area, fracture 4th thoracic ribs on the side of wound, than piercer to heart and exit from wound and fracture 5th ribs on the side of wound. (d) Abrasion on right side of scalp 7 cm above from right ear size 7 cm x 6 cm. (e) Abrasion 3 cm lateral to right eye size 4 cm x 2 cm. (f) Abrasion on right shoulder size 2 cm x 1 cm. (g) Abrasion on right knee (front) size 2 cm x 1 cm. (h) Abrasion on medial side of right knee size 2 cm x 2 cm. (i) Abrasion on left knee size 2 cm x 1 cm. 7. In the opinion of doctor, cause of death of deceased was shock and haemorrhage, as a result of fire arm injury. 8. It is apposite to mention here that on 19.12.2020, Investigating Officer collected plain and blood coated pebbles, blood soaked towel, one head of 315 bore cartridges, one right side plastic panel of red colour pertaining to deluxe motor-cycle. He, accordingly prepared recovery memo of same dated 19.12.2020. 9. Investigating Officer continued with the investigation of concerned case crime number and examined various witnesses under Section 161 Cr.P.C. Ultimately, applicant Rajendra Singh Yadav alias Raju Jahreela was arrested on 23.12.2020. On the same day, applicant was produced before concerned Magistrate, who remanded him to judicial custody, vide order dated 23.12.2020. 10. Since even after expiry of a period of 90 days from the date of lodging of F.I.R. dated 19.12.2020 or 23.12.2020 i.e. when applicant was first remanded to judicial custody or from 24.12.2020, i.e., the date subsequent to the order of first judicial remand of applicant, no charge-sheet was submitted within 90 days i.e. on or before 18.03.2021/ 22.03.2021/23.03.2021, hence, applicant filed an application dated 23.03.2021 under Section 167(2) Cr.P.C. before Chief Judicial Magistrate, Jhansi claiming default bail in Case Crime No.507 of 2020, under Sections-302, 307, 504, 506 I.P.C., Police Station-Prem Nagar, District-Jhansi. Same was registered as Bail Application No.480 of 2021 (C.N.R. No.UPJS04004212021). The bail application is on record as Annexure-17 to the affidavit. 11. Same was registered as Bail Application No.480 of 2021 (C.N.R. No.UPJS04004212021). The bail application is on record as Annexure-17 to the affidavit. 11. On the next day, an application dated 24.03.2021 was filed on behalf of accused-applicant before Chief Judicial Magistrate, Jhansi, praying therein that a report be called for from the office as to whether any charge-sheet has been submitted against applicant or not. This application is on record as Annexure-18 to this affidavit. On the aforesaid application, Chief Judicial Magistrate, Jhansi, passed an order dated 24.03.2021 directing the office to submit a report as to whether any charge-sheet has been submitted in concerned case crime number or not. 12. Clerk concerned in the office of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Jhansi, submitted a report dated 24.03.2021 stating therein that no charge-sheet has been received in the office upto 1:25 p.m. of 24.03.2021. It is, thereafter, that charge-sheet dated 24.03.2021 was submitted in the Court of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Jhansi. On the basis of above, Criminal Case No.2757 of 2021 (State Vs. Rajendra Singh Yadav @ Raju Jahreela) under Sections-302, 307, 504, 506 I.P.C., P.S.-Prem Nagar, District-Jhansi came to be registered in the court of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Jhansi. Resultantly, Chief Judicial Magistrate, Jhansi, vide order dated 24.03.2021, took cognizance and posted the matter for 26.03.2021 for supply of documents and committal of case to the Court of Sessions. 13. Ultimately, Chief Judicial Magistrate, Jhansi, vide order dated 24.03.2021, rejected the application dated 23.03.2021, filed by applicant claiming default bail. Perusal of order dated 24.03.2021, passed by Chief Judicial Magistrate, Jhansi will go to show that application for grant of default bail filed by applicant has been rejected primarily on the ground that since charge-sheet has been submitted, therefore, default bail claimed by applicant cannot be granted. In support of aforesaid conclusion, reliance was placed upon Pragyna Singh Thakur Vs. State of Maharashtra (2011) 10 SCC 445 and Constitution Bench judgement in Sanjay Dutt Vs. State through C.B.I. Bombay (II), 1994 (5) SCC 401. Chief Judicial Magistrate, Jhansi, further, concluded that right of applicant to file an application for grant of default bail accrued on 24.03.2021 as period of 90 days expired on 24.03.2021 after excluding the date on which accused-applicant was sent to judicial remand i.e. 23.12.2020, and, therefore, the application for grant of default bail shall be deemed to have been filed on 24.03.2021. Since charge-sheet has been submitted on 24.03.2021, therefore, no case for grant of default bail is made out. 14. Feeling aggrieved by above-order dated 24.03.2021, passed by Chief Judicial Magistrate, Jhansi, applicant, who is a charge-sheeted accused and facing trial in afore-mentioned Sessions Trial, has now approached this Court by means of present application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. 15. Mr. Amit Daga, learned counsel for applicant contends that order impugned dated 24.03.2021, passed by Chief Judicial Magistrate, Jhansi, is manifestly illegal and without jurisdiction. Chief Judicial Magistrate, Jhansi, has rejected the application filed by applicant claiming default bail on irrelevant considerations. Admittedly, the F.I.R. giving rise to the criminal proceedings referred to above was lodged on 19.12.2020, whereas applicant was arrested on 23.12.2020. On the same day, applicant was produced before concerned Magistrate, who remanded applicant to judicial custody, vide order dated 23.12.2020. He, therefore, submits that period of 90 days shall be counted from 23.12.2020 i.e. the date of first judicial remand of applicant. Same shall expire in the mid-night of 22.03.2021. Since no charge-sheet was submitted within a period of 90 days from 23.12.2020, i.e., the date of arrest of applicant and also the date on which applicant was remanded to judicial custody by Chief Judicial Magistrate, Jhansi, for the first time, therefore applicant was clearly entitled to be enlarged on bail on account of default. Reliance placed upon the judgement in Pragyna Singh Thakur Vs. State of Maharashtra (2011) 10 SCC 445 and Constitution Bench judgement in Sanjay Dutt (supra), by Chief Judicial Magistrate, Jhansi, for rejecting the application for default bail filed by applicant is misconceived, inasmuch as, the right to be released on default bail in case the charge-sheet has not been submitted within a period of 90 days, does not get extinguished with the submission of police report under Section 173(2) Cr.P.C., i.e., charge-sheet after expiry of a period of 90 days. He has further relied upon the judgement of a learned Single Judge of Bombay High Court in Deepak Satyavan Kudalkar (supra), in support of his submission that the date of arrest shall be included for calculating the period of 90 days. Reference has also been made by learned counsel for applicant to the judgement of Apex Court in M. Ravindran Vs. Reference has also been made by learned counsel for applicant to the judgement of Apex Court in M. Ravindran Vs. Intelligence Officer, Directorate of Revenue Intelligence, (2021) 2 SCC 485 , to buttress his submission that right to default bail is an indefeasible right. Since no charge-sheet was submitted within a period of 90 days from the date of order of first judicial remand of applicant i.e. 23.12.2020, therefore, applicant is clearly entitled to be admitted to default bail. On the aforesaid premise, learned counsel for applicant submits that impugned order dated 24.03.2021, passed by Chief Judicial Magistrate, Jhansi, cannot be sustained. Same is, therefore, liable to be quashed by this Court and applicant is liable to be released on default bail. 16. Per contra, Mr. Prashant Kumar, learned A.G.A. alongwith Mr. P. K. Sahi, learned brief holder for State has opposed this application. Learned A.G.A. contends that order impugned in present application is perfectly just and legal. Chief Judicial Magistrate, Jhansi, has not committed any illegality in rejecting the application dated 23.03.2021 filed by applicant seeking default bail. Admittedly, in the present case, application dated 23.03.2021 filed by applicant for default bail has been rejected by Chief Judicial Magistrate, Jhansi, primarily on the ground that since charge-sheet has been submitted within 90 days, therefore, no occasion arises to grant default bail to applicant. Aforesaid reasoning recorded by Chief Judicial Magistrate, Jhansi, in the impugned order cannot be said to be illegal, perverse or erroneous. Same is perfectly just and legal. Reliance placed upon judgement in Pragyna Singh Thakur (Supra) and Constitution Bench judgement in Sanjay Dutt (Supra) by Chief Judicial Magistrate, Jhansi is wholly justified, inasmuch as, aforesaid judgements are binding by virtue of Article 141 of the Constitution of India. It is also submitted that findings recorded by Chief Judicial Magistrate, Jhansi, in the impugned order are cogent and definite findings. Same are not liable to be interfered with by this Court, inasmuch as, Chief Judicial Magistrate, Jhansi, has neither committed a jurisdictional error, while exercising jurisdiction under Section 167(2) Cr.P.C. nor has he exercised his jurisdiction with material irregularity. In the present case, charge-sheet was submitted in Court on the 90th day, i.e., 24.03.2021. Consequently, by virtue of above, the pre-requisite for grant of default bail is not satisfied in present case. In the present case, charge-sheet was submitted in Court on the 90th day, i.e., 24.03.2021. Consequently, by virtue of above, the pre-requisite for grant of default bail is not satisfied in present case. It is, thus, urged by learned A.G.A. that no indulgence be granted by this Court in favour of applicant. 17. Having heard Mr. Amit Daga, learned counsel for applicant, learned A.G.A. for State and upon perusal of record, the Court finds that claim raised by applicant for grant of default bail emanates from Section 167(2) Cr.P.C. Accordingly, Section 167 Cr.P.C. is reproduced herein under:- "167. Procedure when investigation cannot be completed in twenty-four hours. (1) Whenever any person is arrested and detained in custody and it appears that the investigation cannot be completed within the period of twenty-four hours fixed by section 57, and there are grounds for believing that the accusation or information is well-founded, the officer in charge of the police station or the police officer making the investigation, if he is not below the rank of sub-inspector, shall forthwith transmit to the nearest Judicial Magistrate a copy of the entries in the diary hereinafter prescribed relating to the case, and shall at the same time forward the accused to such Magistrate. (2) The Magistrate to whom an accused person is forwarded under this section may, whether he has or has not jurisdiction to try the case, from time to time, authorise the detention of the accused in such custody as such Magistrate thinks fit, for a term not exceeding fifteen days in the whole; and if he has no jurisdiction to try the case or commit it for trial, and considers further detention unnecessary, he may order the accused to be forwarded to a Magistrate having such jurisdiction: Provided that- [(a) the Magistrate may authorise the detention of the accused person, otherwise than in the custody of the police, beyond the period of fifteen days; if he is satisfied that adequate grounds exist for doing so, but no Magistrate shall authorise the detention of the accused person in custody under this paragraph for a total period exceeding,- 1. ninety days, where the investigation relates to an offence punishable with death, imprisonment for life or imprisonment for a term of not less than ten years; 2. ninety days, where the investigation relates to an offence punishable with death, imprisonment for life or imprisonment for a term of not less than ten years; 2. sixty days, where the investigation relates to any other offence, and, on the expiry of the said period of ninety days, or sixty days, as the case may be, the accused person shall be released on bail if he is prepared to and does furnish bail, and every person released on bail under this sub-section shall be deemed to be so released under the provisions of Chapter XXXIII for the purposes of that Chapter;] [(b) no Magistrate shall authorise detention in any custody under this section unless the accused is produced before him in person for the first time and subsequently every time till the accused remains in the custody of the police, but the Magistrate may extend further detention in judicial custody on production of the accused either in person or through the medium of electronic video linkage.] (c) no Magistrate of the second class, not specially empowered in this behalf by the High Court, shall authorise detention in the custody of the police. [Explanation I. - For the avoidance of doubts, it is hereby declared that, notwithstanding the expiry of the period specified in paragraph (a), the accused shall be detained in custody so long as he does not furnish bail.] [Explanation II. [Explanation I. - For the avoidance of doubts, it is hereby declared that, notwithstanding the expiry of the period specified in paragraph (a), the accused shall be detained in custody so long as he does not furnish bail.] [Explanation II. - If any question arises whether an accused person was produced before the Magistrate as required under paragraph (b), the production of the accused person may be proved by his signature on the order authorising detention or by the order certified by the Magistrate as to production of the accused person through the medium of electronic video linkage, as the case may be.] [Provided further that in case of a woman under eighteen years of age, the detention shall be authorised to be in the custody of a remand home or recognised social institution.] [(2A) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1) or sub-section (2), the officer in charge of the police station or the police officer making the investigation, if he is not below the rank of a sub-inspector, may, where a Judicial Magistrate is not available, transmit to the nearest Executive Magistrate, on whom the powers of a Judicial Magistrate or Metropolitan Magistrate have been conferred, a copy of the entry in the diary hereinafter prescribed relating to the case, and shall, at the same time, forward the accused to such Executive Magistrate, and thereupon such Executive Magistrate, may, for reasons to be recorded in writing, authorise the detention of the accused person in such custody as he may think fit for a term not exceeding seven days in the aggregate; and, on the expiry of the period of detention so authorised, the accused person shall be released on bail except where an order for further detention of the accused person has been made by a Magistrate competent to make such order; and, where an order for such further detention is made, the period during which the accused person was detained in custody under the orders made by an Executive Magistrate under this sub-section, shall be taken into account in computing the period specified in paragraph (a) of the proviso to sub-section (2): Provided that before the expiry of the period aforesaid, the Executive Magistrate shall transmit to the nearest Judicial Magistrate the records of the case together with a copy of the entries in the diary relating to the case which was transmitted to him by the officer in charge of the police station or the police officer making the investigation, as the case may be.] (3) A Magistrate authorising under this section detention in the custody of the police shall record his reasons for so doing. (4) Any Magistrate other than the Chief Judicial Magistrate making such order shall forward a copy of his order, with his reasons for making it, to the Chief Judicial Magistrate. (5) If in any case triable by a Magistrate as a summons-case, the investigation is not concluded within a period of six months from the date on which the accused was arrested, the Magistrate shall make an order stopping further investigation into the offence unless the officer making the investigation satisfies the Magistrate that for special reasons and in the interest of justice the continuation of the investigation beyond the period of six months is necessary. (6) Where any order stopping further investigation into an offence has been made under sub-section (5), the Sessions Judge may, if he is satisfied, on an application made to him or otherwise, that further investigation into the offence ought to be made, vacate the order made under sub-section (5) and direct further investigation to be made into the offence subject to such directions with regard to bail and other matters as he may specify." 18. Mr. Amit Daga, learned counsel for applicant subsequently filed written submissions and has raised the following points of determination : "Point No.1. Whether the date of first judicial remand of accused be excluded for computing the period of 90 days, as envisaged under Section 167 (2) Cr.P.C.? According to Mr. Amit Daga, learned counsel for applicant the period of 90 days can be calculated in two ways. (I) By including the date on which order of first judicial remand of applicant was made. (II) By excluding the date on which order of first judicial remand of applicant was made. The calculation as per above is extracted herein under:- Including Date of Remand Excluding Date of Remand December-9 Days December-8 Days January-31 Days January-31 Days February-28 Days February-28 Days March-22 Days March-22 Days Total- 90 Days 90 Days of Applicant's Detention in instant criminal case, including 1st date of remand, were completed on 22nd March, 2021 & 23rd March, 2021 was the 91st day of detention. Total- 90 Days 90 Days of Applicant's Detention in instant criminal case, excluding 1st date of remand, were completed on 23rd March, 2021 and 24th March, 2021 was the 91st day of detention. Total- 90 Days 90 Days of Applicant's Detention in instant criminal case, excluding 1st date of remand, were completed on 23rd March, 2021 and 24th March, 2021 was the 91st day of detention. According to learned counsel for applicant, the date of order of first judicial remand of applicant shall be included for calculating the period of 90 days. In support of his submission, he has relied upon judgement rendered by a learned Single Judge of Bombay High Court in Criminal Bail Application No.197 of 2020 (Deepak Satyavan Kudalkar Vs. The State of Maharashtra) and has referred to paragraphs-12, 13, 23, 24, 25, 26, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49 and 50 of aforesaid judgement. Point No.2. Whether the indefeasible right of an accused for grant of statutory/default bail, under Section 167 (2) Cr.P.C. accrues on 91st day of his detention in the crime in question and shall come to an end upon submission of challan/charge-sheet in concerned case crime number on 91st day or thereafter, despite pendency of his application for grant of statutory/default bail under Section 167(2) Cr.P.C.? According to learned counsel for applicant, the right to claim default bail is available only in case the charge-sheet has not been filed within the period of 90 days as contemplated under Section 167(2) Cr.P.C. However, such right can be enforced by an accused immediately upon expiry of period of 90 days provided the charge-sheet has not been submitted. This right cannot be exercised subsequently after the submission of the charge-sheet. In support of above, he has relied upon "Achpal @ Ramswaroop & Another Vs. State of Rajasthan", reported in 2019 (14) SCC 599 and has referred to paragraphs-11, 12, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23 and 24, "Bikramjit Singh Vs. State of Punjab" reported in 2020 (10) SCC 616 and has referred to paragraphs-33, 34, 35, 36, 37 and 38, S. Kasi Vs. State Through The Inspector of Police Samaynallur, Police Station, Madurai District", reported in 2021 (I) JIC 158 and has referred to paragraphs- 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32 and 33, "M. Ravindran Vs. Intelligence Officer, Directorate of Revenue Intelligence" reported in 2021 (II) SCC 485 and has referred to paragraphs-6, 17.1, 17.8, 17.9, 17.10, 17.11, 18.1, 18.3, 18.5, 18.6, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25.3, 25.4 and 26. Intelligence Officer, Directorate of Revenue Intelligence" reported in 2021 (II) SCC 485 and has referred to paragraphs-6, 17.1, 17.8, 17.9, 17.10, 17.11, 18.1, 18.3, 18.5, 18.6, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25.3, 25.4 and 26. He has also referred to the following judgements of this Court, "Firasat Vs. State of U.P. and Another" reported in 2013 (II) JIC 744 and has referred to paragraphs-7, 8, 9 and 11, "Harendra Vs. State of U.P. and Another" reported in 2020 (III) JIC 886 and has referred to paragraphs-9, 10, 11, 12 and 13 and "Chhotu Vs. State of U.P." reported in 2021 Cr.L.J. 712 and has referred to paragraphs- 10,11, 13 and 14. Point No.3. Whether learned Magistrate erred in law in not allowing the application dated 23.03.2021, moved by applicant for grant of statutory/default bail under Section 167(2) Cr.P.C.? Whether the findings recorded by learned Magistrate in the impugned order dated 24.03.2021, rejecting applicant's application for grant of default bail, are incorrect and against the judgements rendered by Hon'ble Apex Court as well as this Hon'ble Court in catena of decisions? In the submission of Mr. Amit Daga, learned counsel for applicant Chief Judicial Magistrate, Jhansi, has erred in law in excluding the date on which the first order of judicial remand was passed. According to learned counsel for applicant, the date on which first order of judicial remand of an accused is passed, has to be included for calculating the period of 90 days. He has again referred to the judgement rendered by a learned Single Judge of Bombay High Court, which has already been referred to above. On the aforesaid premise, it is sought to be contended by learned counsel for applicant that since no charge-sheet was submitted upto 23.03.2021, therefore, the benefit available to an accused under Section 167(2) Cr.P.C. stood clearly attracted. Since right to default bail is now recognised as an indefeasible right, therefore, applicant was clearly entitled to be enlarged on default bail, inasmuch as, the charge-sheet was submitted on 24.03.2021, which is the 91st day from 24.12.2020, i.e., the date subsequent to the order of first judicial remand of applicant. As such, Chief Judicial Magistrate, Jhansi, has erred in law and fact in rejecting the application for default bail of applicant. Point No.4. As such, Chief Judicial Magistrate, Jhansi, has erred in law and fact in rejecting the application for default bail of applicant. Point No.4. Whether the challan/charge sheet submitted by Investigating Agency before Chief Judicial Magistrate, Jhansi, on 24.03.2021 is a charge-sheet within the meaning of Section 173 (2) Cr.P.C.? Learned counsel for applicant has tried to impress upon the Court by submitting that charge-sheet dated 24.03.2021 is not a charge-sheet in the eyes of law, inasmuch as, Investigating Officer, vide parcha no.42 of case diary dated 20.03.2021, has himself observed that investigation was entrusted to him 40 hours ago. It is then submitted that aforesaid charge-sheet has been filed only to create an obstruction in the claim of petitioner for grant of default bail. It is further submitted that since charge-sheet has been submitted after expiry of a period of 90 days and the claim for default bail had already been made by applicant, therefore, same is immaterial. Consequently, applicant could not be denied default bail on the ground that charge-sheet has been submitted. Point No.5. Whether the learned Magistrate has erred in law in placing reliance upon the judgements rendered by Hon'ble Apex Court in Sanjay Dutt Vs. State of U.P. ( reported in 1994) SCC Volume-V, page 410 & Pragyna Singh Thakur Vs. State of Maharashtra (reported in SCC 2011) Volume-10, Page-445?" With reference to the impugned order, learned counsel for applicant submits that applicant has been denied default bail by Chief Judicial Magistrate, Jhansi on the ground that since charge-sheet has been submitted, claim for default bail stands extinguished. In support of aforesaid conclusion, Chief Judicial Magistrate, Jhansi relied upon the Constitution Bench judgement in Sanjay Dutt (supra) and a two Judges Bench judgement in Pragyna Singh Thakur (supra). However, according to learned counsel for applicant, ratio laid down in Constitution Bench judgement in Sanjay Dutt (supra) and judgement rendered in Pragyna Singh Thakur (supra) are not applicable as they now stand diluted by subsequent judgements. 19. When the case in hand is examined in the light of facts and law as noted above as well as arguments raised by learned counsel for applicant the following issues emerge for determination. 19. When the case in hand is examined in the light of facts and law as noted above as well as arguments raised by learned counsel for applicant the following issues emerge for determination. (a) Whether the period of 90 days has to be counted from the date of F.I.R. or arrest, or from the date of first judicial remand of accused or by excluding the date on which, order of first judicial remand was made? (b) Whether the right to claim default bail ceases with the submission of the police report in terms of Section 173(2) Cr.P.C., i.e., charge-sheet, irrespective of the fact that same was submitted after expiry of a period of 90 days and, therefore, an indefeasible right to claim default bail accrued in favour of applicant? (c) Whether in the facts and circumstances of the case, the period of 90 days expired in the mid-night of 22.03.2021 or 23.03.2021 i.e. from the date of first order of judicial remand of applicant dated 23.12.2020 or from the date subsequent to above in case the date on which the first order of judicial remand of applicant was passed is excluded and, therefore, the charge-sheet filed on 24.03.2021 was filed beyond the period of 90 days? 20. The aim, object and scope of Section 167 (2) Cr.P.C. has been examined by the Supreme Court time and again. The entire chronology of same is not being reproduced. Only two judgements prior to the Constitution Bench Judgement in Sanjay Dutt (supra) and the subsequent important judgements as mentioned herein under, which have been referred, to find answers to the issues involved herein:- I. Chaganti Satyanarayana and others Vs. State of Andhra Pradesh, (1986) 3 SCC 141 . II. Hitendra Vishnu Thakur and others Vs. State of Maharashtra and others (1994) 4 SCC 602 . III. Sanjay Dutt Vs. State Through C. B. I. Bombay (II), (1994) 5 SCC 410 , (Constitution Bench. IV. Dr. Bipin Shantilal PanchalVs. State of Gujarat, (1996) 1 SCC 718 , (3 Judges Bench) V. Mohamed Iqbal Madar Sheikh and others Vs. State of Maharashtra, (1996) 1 SCC 722 , (3 Judges Bench) VI. Central Bureau of Investigation Vs. Nazir Ahmed Sheikh (1996) 2 SCC 367 VII. Uday Mohanlal Acharya Vs. State of Maharashtra, (2001) 5 SCC 453 , (3 Judges Bench) VIII. Mustaq Ahmed Mohammed Isak and others Vs. State of Maharashtra, (1996) 1 SCC 722 , (3 Judges Bench) VI. Central Bureau of Investigation Vs. Nazir Ahmed Sheikh (1996) 2 SCC 367 VII. Uday Mohanlal Acharya Vs. State of Maharashtra, (2001) 5 SCC 453 , (3 Judges Bench) VIII. Mustaq Ahmed Mohammed Isak and others Vs. State of Maharashtra, (2009) 7 SCC 480 IX. Pragyna Singh Thakur Vs. State of Maharashtra (2011) 10 SCC 445 X. Sayed Mohd. Ahmad Kazmi Vs. State (Government of NCT of Delhi) and other, (2012) 12 SCC 1 (3 Judges Bench). XI. Vipul Shital Prasad Agrawal Vs. State of Gujarat and another (2013) 1 SCC 197 (3 Judges Bench). XII. Suresh Kumar Bhikamchand Jain Vs. State of Maharashtra and another (2013) 3 SCC 77 (3 Judges Bench). XIII. Union of India Through Central Bureau of Investigation Vs. Nirala Yadav Alias Raja Ram Yadav Alias Deepak Yadav (2014) 9 SCC 457 XIV. Abdul Basit Alias Raju and others Vs. Mohd. Abdul Kadir Chaudhary and another (2014) 10 SCC 754 XV. Narendre Kumar Amin Vs. Central Bureau of Investigation (2015) 3 SCC 417 XVI. Rakesh Kumar Paul Vs. State of Assam, (2017) 15 SCC 67 (3 Judges Bench). XVII. Union of India Vs. Mubarak Alias Muhammed Mubarak (2019) 6 SCC 252 XVIII. Rambeer Shokeen Vs. State (NCT of Delhi) (2018) 4 SCC 405 (3 Judges Bench). XIX. Achpal Alias Ramswaroop and another Vs. State of Jajasthan, (2019) 14 SCC 599 XX. S. Kasi Vs. State Through the Inspector of Police Samaynallur Police Station Madurai, District..) 2020 SCC Online SC 529. (3 Judges Bench). XXI. Saravanan Vs. State Represented by the Inspector of Police, (2020) 9 SCC 101 . XXII. Bikramjit Singh Vs. State of Punjab, (2020) 10 SCC 616 . (3 Judges Bench). XXIII. M. Ravindran Vs. Intelligence Officer, Directorate of Revenue Intelligence (2021) 2 SCC 485 . (3 Judges Bench) XXIV. Fakhrey Alam Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh 2021 SCC Online SC 532. XXV. Naser Bin Abu Bakr Yafai Vs. State of Maharashtra and another, 2021 SCC Online SC 950. (3 Judges Bench). 21. Issue no.1- How the period of 90 days shall be calculated for the purpose of Section 167(2) Cr.P.C. is no longer shrouded in obscurity. Fakhrey Alam Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh 2021 SCC Online SC 532. XXV. Naser Bin Abu Bakr Yafai Vs. State of Maharashtra and another, 2021 SCC Online SC 950. (3 Judges Bench). 21. Issue no.1- How the period of 90 days shall be calculated for the purpose of Section 167(2) Cr.P.C. is no longer shrouded in obscurity. A two Judges Bench of Supreme Court in Chaganti Satyanarayana and others (supra) considered this issue and held that the period of 90 days or 60 days as the case may be, shall begin to run only from the date of first order of judicial remand. Following was observed by the Bench in paragraphs-20, 23, 24 and 25 of the judgement. "20. The words used in proviso (a) are "no Magistrate shall authorise the detention of the accused person in custody", "under this paragraph", "for a total period exceeding i.e. 90 days/60 days". Detention can be authorised by the Magistrate only from the time the order of remand is passed. The earlier period when the accused is in the custody of a police officer in exercise of his powers under Section 57 cannot constitute detention pursuant to an authorisation issued by the Magistrate. It, therefore, stands to reason that the total period of 90 days or 60 days can begin to run only from the date of order of remand. 23. The Legislature has consciously referred to the date of arrest in Section 167 (5) but has made no such reference in Section 167(2) or proviso (a) thereto. If it was the intention of the Legislature that the period of remand of 15 days in the whole envisaged in sub-section (2) or the total period of 90 days/60 days prescribed in proviso (a) should be calculated from the date of arrest then the Legislature would have expressly said so as it had done under Section 167(5). 24. Turning now to the alternate argument of Mr. Ram Reddy, the contention is that even if there is scope for contending that the total period of detention should be reckoned from the date of arrest there is no room at all for any such contention being raised after the amendment of the proviso by Act 45 of 1978. We have already referred to the fact that the amending Act has substituted the words "under this paragraph" for the words "under this section" in proviso (a). We have already referred to the fact that the amending Act has substituted the words "under this paragraph" for the words "under this section" in proviso (a). We have also adverted to Explanation 1 and sub-section (2A) which also refer to "the period specified in paragraph (a)". The change of wording in the proviso has to be given its due significance because the Legislature would not have effected the change without any purpose or objective. We must bear in mind that significant changes have been made in Section 167 as well as to the proviso by Act 45 of 1978 such as increasing the period for investigation in grave cases from 60 to 90 days, conferring of powers of remand on Executive Magistrates in certain situations etc. Therefore, it can be legitimately contended that the words occurring in proviso (a) should be construed within the frame work of the proviso itself without any reference to Section 167(2). If such a construction is made, it may be seen that the proviso forbids the extension of remands only beyond a total period of 90 days under clause (I) and beyond a total period of 60 days under clause (ii). Thus if proviso (a) is treated as a separate paragraph it necessarily follows that the period of 90 days or 60 days as the case may be, will commence running only from the date of remand and not from any anterior date in spite of the fact that the accused may have been taken into custody earlier by a police officer and deprived of his liberty. 25. Thus in any view of the matter i.e. construing proviso (a) either in conjunction with sub-section (2) of Section 167 or as an independent paragraph, we find that the total period of 90 days under clause (i) and the total period of 60 days under clause (ii) has to be calculated only from the date of remand and not from the date of arrest." 22. Subsequently, in M. Ravindran (supra), a three Judges Bench of Supreme Court again considered this question and observed that while computing the period of 90 days under Section 167(2) Cr.P.C., the day on which accused was remanded to judicial custody has to be excluded and the date on which charge-sheet is submitted has to be included. Subsequently, in M. Ravindran (supra), a three Judges Bench of Supreme Court again considered this question and observed that while computing the period of 90 days under Section 167(2) Cr.P.C., the day on which accused was remanded to judicial custody has to be excluded and the date on which charge-sheet is submitted has to be included. Aforesaid observation was made by placing reliance upon judgement rendered by a Bench of two Judges in Ravi Prakash Singh Vs. State of Bihar, 2015 (8) SCC 340 . For ready reference paragraph-8 of above-mentioned judgement, wherein aforesaid has been observed, is reproduced herein under:- "8. This Court in a catena of judgments including Ravi Prakash Singh vs. State of Bihar, has ruled that while computing the period under Section 167(2), the day on which accused was remanded to judicial custody has to be excluded and the day on which challan/charge-sheet is filed in the court has to be included." 23. Therefore, what is discernable from above is not what has been argued by learned counsel for applicant but the fact that period of 90 days or 60 days, as the case may be, shall commence from the date subsequent to the date on which accused was remanded to judicial custody by way of judicial remand. As a result, Chief Judicial Magistrate, Jhansi has not committed any error in observing that the date of order of first judicial remand of applicant has to be excluded for calculating the period of 90 days in relation to section 167(2) Cr.P.C. 24. In the present case, applicant was arrested on 23.12.2020 as has been categorically pleaded in paragraph-11 of the affidavit filed in support of the application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. It has also been pleaded that applicant was produced before Magistrate on same date and was remanded to judicial custody on 23.12.2020 itself. A categorical averment to that affect has been made in paragraph-12 of the affidavit. 25. Thus, what logically follows from above, is that the period of 90 days in case of applicant, shall commence from 24.12.2020, i.e., the date subsequent to the first order of judicial remand of applicant passed by Magistrate concerned and shall come to an end in the midnight of 23.03.2021. It is an undisputed fact that the charge-sheet was submitted on 24.03.2021. It is an undisputed fact that the charge-sheet was submitted on 24.03.2021. Applying the ratio laid down in Ravi Prakash Singh (supra), the charge-sheet was submitted after expiry of a period of 90 days from the date subsequent to the order of first judicial remand of applicant, i.e., 23.12.2020. Thus, Chief Judicial Magistrate, Jhansi erred in arriving at the conclusion that the period of 90 days shall expire on 24.03.2021. 26. This leads to the second question as to whether the right of present applicant to claim default bail comes to an end upon submission of charge-sheet. Chief Judicial Magistrate, Jhansi, by placing reliance upon Constitution Bench judgement in Sanjay Dutt (supra) and a two Judges Bench Judgement in Pragyna Singh Thakur (Supra) came to the conclusion that right of an accused, i.e., applicant herein to claim default bail comes to an end immediately upon submission of charge-sheet. It is, therefore, necessary to first reproduce the ratio laid down in aforesaid judgements and then find out as to whether they hold the field or not. The conclusion drawn by Chief Judicial Magistrate, Jhansi, shall ultimately abide by the answer to aforesaid. 27. In Pragyna Singh Thakur (supra), a two Judges Bench of Supreme Court was dealing with the right of an accused to claim default bail in the light of provisions contained in Section 167(2) Cr.P.C. as well as the provisions of Special Acts applicable to the case. Upon consideration of same, the Bench has observed as follows in paragraphs-13, 14, 15, 48 and 49. "13. According to the appellant she was under detention from October 10, 2008 and though the 90th day was to expire on January 09, 2009 the charge-sheet was filed on January 20, 2009. Therefore, the appellant filed an application for bail before the learned Special Judge under Section 167(2) Cr.P.C. and 21(4) MCOCA and also under Section 439 Cr.P.C. Subsequently, according to the appellant, opening part of the application was amended to read as an application for grant of Bail under Section 21(2)(b) of MCOCA. Therefore, the appellant filed an application for bail before the learned Special Judge under Section 167(2) Cr.P.C. and 21(4) MCOCA and also under Section 439 Cr.P.C. Subsequently, according to the appellant, opening part of the application was amended to read as an application for grant of Bail under Section 21(2)(b) of MCOCA. It is relevant to note that the above application was not an application for bail on merits, but on the plea that charge sheet was required to be filed within 90 days from the date of arrest and as no charge sheet was filed within 90 days, she was entitled to bail under Section 21(2)(b) of MCOCA /Section 167(2) Cr.P.C. 14. The case of the respondent is that the charge sheet was filed on January 20, 2009 which was 89th day from the date of first remand order i.e. October 24, 2008. The respondent had filed reply to the above application on 05.05.2009. The learned Special Judge rejected the said Bail Application by order dated July 09, 2009. Thereupon, the appellant filed Criminal Application No. 3878 of 2009 in the High Court of Mumbai. This was a petition under Sections 401 and 439 Cr.P.C against the order of the learned Special Judge. Prayer (b) was to set aside the order dated July 09, 2009 and, therefore, it was essentially a Revision Petition. 15. The main ground on which bail was sought was that charge sheet was required to be filed within 90 days from the date of her arrest but it was filed beyond 90 days from the date of arrest which was on October 10, 2008. Most of the other grounds pleaded were challenging the correctness of the findings of the learned Special Judge. The application filed in the High Court was rejected by judgment dated March 12, 2010 which has given rise to the present appeal. 48. So far as merits of the case are concerned under the Criminal Procedure Code, bail has to be only on consideration of merits, except default bail which is under Section 167(2). Section 21 of the MCOC Act is to the effect that unless the Court is satisfied that the accused is not guilty of the offence alleged, bail shall not be granted, which is similar to Section 37 of the NDPS Act. Section 21 of the MCOC Act is to the effect that unless the Court is satisfied that the accused is not guilty of the offence alleged, bail shall not be granted, which is similar to Section 37 of the NDPS Act. Considerations for grant of bail at the stage of investigation and after the charge sheet is filed are different. In the present case, charge sheet has been filed on January 20, 2009 and the application for bail before the High Court, if it is to be treated as not merely a revision from the order of the learned Special Judge declining bail but also as a fresh application, is an application dated August 24, 2009, after the filing of the charge sheet on January 20, 2009 and therefore filed after right, if any, under Section 167(2) is lost and having regard to the provisions of Section 21 of the MCOC Act the appellant is not entitled to grant of bail, apart from the fact that no argument had been addressed on the merits of the case and only technical pleas under Section 167(2) of the Criminal Procedure Code and Article 22(2) of the Constitution have been taken. 49. As far as Section 167(2) of the Criminal Procedure Code is concerned this Court is of the firm opinion that no case for grant of bail has been made out under the said provision as charge sheet was filed before the expiry of 90 days from the date of first remand. In any event, right in this regard of default bail is lost once charge sheet is filed. This Court finds that there is no violation of Article 22(2)of the Constitution, because on being arrested on October 23, 2008, the appellant was produced before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Nasik on October 24, 2008 and subsequent detention in custody is pursuant to order of remand by the Court, which orders are not being challenged, apart from the fact that Article 22(2) is not available against a Court i.e. detention pursuant to an order passed by the Court." 28. Subsequently, a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in Sanjay Dutt (supra) considered the issue regarding grant of default bail to an accused in terms of Section 167(2) Cr.P.C. as well as Section 20(4)(bb) of TADA Act. Subsequently, a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in Sanjay Dutt (supra) considered the issue regarding grant of default bail to an accused in terms of Section 167(2) Cr.P.C. as well as Section 20(4)(bb) of TADA Act. It was in the light of above that Court delineated its views as follows in paragraphs-46, 47, 48, 49, and 53-2(b). 46. On the other aspect, Shri Kapil Sibal conceded that the indefeasible right for grant of bail on expiry of the initial period of 180 days for completing the investigation or the extended period prescribed bySection 20(4)(bb) as held in Hitendra Vishnu Thakur is a right of the accused which is enforceable only upto the filing of the challan and does not survive for enforcement on the challan being filed in the court against him. Shri Sibal submitted that the decision of the Division Bench in Hitendra Vishnu Thakur cannot be read to confer on the accused an indefeasible right to be released on bail under this provision once the challan has been filed if the accused continues in custody. He stated unequivocally that on filing of the challan, such a right which accrued prior to filing of the challan has no significance and the question of grant of bail to an accused in custody on filing of the challan has to be considered and decided only with reference to the provisions relating to grant of bail applicable after filing of the challan, since Section 167 Cr.P.C. has relevance only to the period of investigation. 47. Learned Additional Solicitor general, in reply, agreed entirety with the above submission of Shri Sibal and submitted that principle enunciated by then Division Bench in Hitendra Vishnu Thakur must be so read. However, the grievance of the learned Additional Solicitor General is that the direction for grant of bail by the Division Bench in Hitendra Vishnu Thakur,on the facts of that case, is not in consonance with such reading of that decision and indicates that the indefeasible right of the accused to be released on bail on expiry of the time allowed for completing the investigation survives and is enforceable even after the challan has been filed, without reference to the merits of the case or the material produced in the court with the challan. He further submitted that it should be clarified that the direction to grant bail under this provision on this ground alone in Hitendra Vishnu Thakur after the challan had been filed was incorrect. Such a clarification, he urged, is necessary because the decision in Hitendra Vishnu Thakur is being construed by the Designated Courts to mean that the right of the accused to be released on bail in such a situation is indefeasible in the sense that it survives and remains enforceable, without reference to the facts of the case, even after the challan has been filed and the court has no jurisdiction to deny the bail to the accused at any time if there has been a default in completing the investigation within the time allowed. Bail is being claimed by every accused under the TADA Act for this reason alone in all such cases. This is the occasion for seeking a fresh decision of this question by a larger Bench. 48. We have no doubt that the common stance before us of the nature of indefeasible right of the accused to be released on bail by virtue of Section 20(4)(bb) is based on a correct reading of the principle indicated in that decision. The indefeasible right accruing to the accused in such a situation is enforceable only prior to the filing of the challan and it does not survive or remain enforceable on the challan being filed, if already not availed of. Once the challan has been filed, the question of grant of bail has to be considered and decided only with reference to the merits of the case under the provisions relating to grant of bail to an accused after the filing of the challan. The custody of the accused after the challan has been filed is not governed by Section 167 but different provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure. If that right had accrued to the accused but it remained unenforced till the filing of the challan, then there is no question of its enforcement thereafter since it is extinguished the moment challan is filed because Section 167 Cr. P.C. ceases to apply. If that right had accrued to the accused but it remained unenforced till the filing of the challan, then there is no question of its enforcement thereafter since it is extinguished the moment challan is filed because Section 167 Cr. P.C. ceases to apply. The Division Bench also indicated that if there be such an application of the accused for release on bail and also a prayer for extension of time to complete the investigation according to the proviso in section 20(4)(bb), both of them should be considered together. It is obvious that no bail can be given of the even in such a case unless the prayer for extension of the period is rejected. In short, the grant of bail in such a situation is also subject to refusal of the prayer for extension of time, if such a prayer is made. If the accused applies for bail under this provisions on expiry of the period of 180 days or the extended period, as the case may be, then he has to be released on bail forthwith. The accused, so released on bail may be arrested and committed to custody according to the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure. It is settled by Constitution Bench decisions that a petition seeking the writ of habeas corpus on the ground of absence of a valid order of remand or detention of the accused, has to be dismissed, if on the date of return of the rule, the custody or detention is on the basis of a valid order. (See Naranjan Singh Nathawan v. The State of Punjab, [1952] SCR 395; Ram Narayan Singh v. The State of Delhi and Others, [1953] SCR 652 and A.K. Gopalan v. The Government of India, [1966] 2 SCR 427). 49. This is the nature and extent of the right of the accused to be released on bail under Section 20(4)(bb) of the TADA Act read with Section 167 Cr.P.C. in such a situation. We clarify the decision of the Division Bench in Hitendra Vishnu Thakur, accordingly, and if it gives a different indication because of the final order made therein, we regret our inability to subscribes to that view. 53. We clarify the decision of the Division Bench in Hitendra Vishnu Thakur, accordingly, and if it gives a different indication because of the final order made therein, we regret our inability to subscribes to that view. 53. (2)(b) The 'indefeasible right' of the accused to be released on bail in accordance with Section 20(4)(bb) of the TADA Act read with Section 167(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure in default of completion of the investigation and filing of the challan within the time allowed, as held in Hitendra Vishnu Thakur is a right which ensures to, and is enforceable by the accused only from the time of default till the filing of the challan and it does not survive or remain enforceable on the challan being filed. If the accused applies for bail under this provision on expiry of the period of 180 days or the extended period, as the case may be, then he has to be released on bail forthwith. The accused, so released on bail may be arrested and committed to custody according to-the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The right of the accused to be released on bail after filing on the challan, notwithstanding the default in filing it within the time allowed, as governed from the time of filing of the challan only by the provisions relating to the grant of bail applicable at the stage." 29. From the perusal of above, it is explicitly clear that the Constitution Bench in Sanjay Dutt (supra) was basically dealing with the right of an accused to be enlarged on default bail in a case relating to Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987. From the perusal of above, it is explicitly clear that the Constitution Bench in Sanjay Dutt (supra) was basically dealing with the right of an accused to be enlarged on default bail in a case relating to Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987. Thus, observations made by the Constitution Bench in Sanjay Dutt (supra) do not lay down a ratio which is applicable to all cases of default bail but is relevant only for such cases where the question of default bail is to be considered in the light of Section 20(4)(bb) of TADA Act read with Section 167(2) Cr.P.C. The observations made in two Judges Bench judgement in Pragyna Singh Thakur (supra) are no longer a binding precedent as observations made in aforesaid judgement regarding the right of an accused to default bail now stands diluted by the subsequent three Judges judgement in Bikramjit Singh (supra), wherein the Bench has dealt with the observations made in Pragyna Singh Thakur (supra) in paragraph-45 of the judgement. 30. A three Judges Bench of Supreme Court in Bikramjit Singh Vs. State of Punjab, 2020 (10) SCC 616 after considering almost the entire gamut of case law on the point including Sanjay Dutt (supra) has observed as follows in paragraphs-27 to 36. "27. The second vexed question which arises on the facts of this case is the question of grant of default bail. It has already been seen that once the maximum period for investigation of an offence is over, under the first proviso (a) to Section 167(2), the accused shall be released on bail, this being an indefeasible right granted by the Code. The extent of this indefeasible right has been the subject matter of a number of judgements. A beginning may be made with the judgment in Hitendra Vishnu Thakur v. State of Maharashtra (1994) 4 SCC 602 , which spoke of "default bail" under the provisions of the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987 (hereinafter referred to as "TADA") read with Section 167 of the Code as follows: "19. A beginning may be made with the judgment in Hitendra Vishnu Thakur v. State of Maharashtra (1994) 4 SCC 602 , which spoke of "default bail" under the provisions of the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987 (hereinafter referred to as "TADA") read with Section 167 of the Code as follows: "19. Section 20(4) of TADA makes Section 167 of Cr.P.C. applicable in relation to case involving an offence punishable under TADA, subject to the modifications specified therein...while clause (b) provided that reference in sub-section (2) of Section 167 to ''15 days', ''90 days' and ''60 days' wherever they occur shall be construed as reference to ''60 days', ''one year' and ''one year' respectively. This section was amended in 1993 by the Amendment Act 43 of 1993 with effect from 22-5-1993 and the period of ''one year' and ''one year' in clause (b) was reduced to ''180 days' and ''180 days' respectively, by modification of sub-section (2) of Section 167. After clause (b) of sub-section (4) of Section 20 of TADA, another clause (bb) was inserted which reads: "20. (4)(bb) in sub-section (2), after the proviso, the following proviso shall be inserted, namely:-- ''Provided further that, if it is not possible to complete the investigation within the said period of one hundred and eighty days, the Designated Court shall extend the said period up to one year, on the report of the Public Prosecutor indicating the progress of the investigation and the specific reasons for the detention of the accused beyond the said period of one hundred and eighty days; and"' 20. ... Sub-section (2) Section 167 of the Code lays down that the Magistrate to whom the accused is forwarded may authorise his detention in such custody, as he may think fit, for a term specified in that section. ... Sub-section (2) Section 167 of the Code lays down that the Magistrate to whom the accused is forwarded may authorise his detention in such custody, as he may think fit, for a term specified in that section. The proviso to sub-section (2) fixes the outer limit within which the investigation must be completed and in case the same is not completed within the said prescribed period, the accused would acquire a right to seek to be released on bail and if he is prepared to and does furnish bail, the Magistrate shall release him on bail and such release shall be deemed to be grant of bail under Chapter XXXIII of the Code of Criminal Procedure...Section 167 read with Section 20(4) of TADA, thus, strictly speaking is not a provision for "grant of bail" but deals with the maximum period during which a person accused of an offence may be kept in custody and detention to enable the investigating agency to complete the investigation and file the charge-sheet, if necessary, in the court. The proviso to Section 167(2) of the Code read with Section 20(4)(b) of TADA, therefore, creates an indefeasible right in an accused person on account of the ''default' by the investigating agency in the completion of the investigation within the maximum period prescribed or extended, as the case may be, to seek an order for his release on bail. It is for this reason that an order for release on bail under proviso (a) of Section 167(2) of the Code read with Section 20(4) of TADA is generally termed as an "order-on-default" as it is granted on account of the default of the prosecution to complete the investigation and file the challan within the prescribed period. As a consequence of the amendment, an accused after the expiry of 180 days from the date of his arrest becomes entitled to bail irrespective of the nature of the offence with which he is charged where the prosecution fails to put up challan against him on completion of the investigation. As a consequence of the amendment, an accused after the expiry of 180 days from the date of his arrest becomes entitled to bail irrespective of the nature of the offence with which he is charged where the prosecution fails to put up challan against him on completion of the investigation. With the amendment of clause (b) of sub-section (4) of Section 20 read with the proviso to sub-section (2) of Section 167 of CrPC an indefeasible right to be enlarged on bail accrues in favour of the accused if the police fails to complete the investigation and put up a challan against him in accordance with law under Section 173 CrPC. An obligation, in such a case, is cast upon the court, when after the expiry of the maximum period during which an accused could be kept in custody, to decline the police request for further remand except in cases governed by clause (bb) of Section 20(4). There is yet another obligation also which is cast on the court and that is to inform the accused of his right of being released on bail and enable him to make an application in that behalf. (Hussainara Khatoon case. This legal position has been very ably stated in Aslam Babalal Desai v. State of Maharashtra where speaking for the majority, Ahmadi, J. referred with approval to the law laid down in Rajnikant Jivanlal Patel v. Intelligence Officer, Narcotic Control Bureau, New Delhi wherein it was held that : '9. ... "13. ... The right to bail under Section 167(2) proviso (a) thereto is absolute. It is a legislative command and not court's discretion. If the investigating agency fails to file charge-sheet before the expiry of 90/60 days, as the case may be, the accused in custody should be released on bail. But at that stage, merits of the case are not to be examined. Not at all. In fact, the Magistrate has no power to remand a person beyond the stipulated period of 90/60 days. He must pass an order of bail and communicate the same to the accused to furnish the requisite bail bonds." 21. But at that stage, merits of the case are not to be examined. Not at all. In fact, the Magistrate has no power to remand a person beyond the stipulated period of 90/60 days. He must pass an order of bail and communicate the same to the accused to furnish the requisite bail bonds." 21. Thus, we find that once the period for filing the charge-sheet has expired and either no extension under clause (bb) has been granted by the Designated Court or the period of extension has also expired, the accused person would be entitled to move an application for being admitted to bail under sub-section (4) of Section 20 TADA read with Section 167 of the Code and the Designated Court shall release him on bail, if the accused seeks to be so released and furnishes the requisite bail. We are not impressed with the argument of the learned counsel for the appellant that on the expiry of the period during which investigation is required to be completed under Section 20(4) TADA read with Section 167 of the Code, the court must release the accused on bail on its own motion even without any application from an accused person on his offering to furnish bail. In our opinion an accused is required to make an application if he wishes to be released on bail on account of the ''default' of the investigating/prosecuting agency and once such an application is made, the court should issue a notice to the public prosecutor who may either show that the prosecution has obtained the order for extension for completion of investigation from the court under clause (bb) or that the challan has been filed in the Designated Court before the expiry of the prescribed period or even that the prescribed period has actually not expired and thus resist the grant of bail on the alleged ground of ''default'. The issuance of notice would avoid the possibility of an accused obtaining an order of bail under the ''default' clause by either deliberately or inadvertently concealing certain facts and would avoid multiplicity of proceedings. It would, therefore, serve the ends of justice if both sides are heard on a petition for grant of bail on account of the prosecution's ''default'... No other condition like the gravity of the case, seriousness of the offence or character of the offender etc. It would, therefore, serve the ends of justice if both sides are heard on a petition for grant of bail on account of the prosecution's ''default'... No other condition like the gravity of the case, seriousness of the offence or character of the offender etc. can weigh with the court at that stage to refuse the grant of bail to an accused under sub-section (4) of Section 20 TADA on account of the ''default' of the prosecution." 28. In the Constitution Bench judgement in Sanjay Dutt v. State through CBI (1994) 5 SCC 410 , one of the questions to be decided by the Constitution Bench was the correct interpretation of Section 20(4)(bb) of TADA indicating the nature of right of an accused to be released on default bail. The enigmatic expression "if already not availed of" is contained in paragraphs 48 of the aforesaid judgment as follows: "48. We have no doubt that the common stance before us of the nature of indefeasible right of the accused to be released on bail by virtue of Section 20(4)(bb) is based on a correct reading of the principle indicated in that decision. The indefeasible right accruing to the accused in such a situation is enforceable only prior to the filing of the challan and it does not survive or remain enforceable on the challan being filed, if already not availed of. Once the challan has been filed, the question of grant of bail has to be considered and decided only with reference to the merits of the case under the provisions relating to grant of bail to an accused after the filing of the challan. The custody of the accused after the challan has been filed is not governed by Section 167 but different provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure. If that right had accrued to the accused but it remained unenforced till the filing of the challan, then there is no question of its enforcement thereafter since it is extinguished the moment challan is filed because Section 167CrPC ceases to apply. The Division Bench also indicated that if there be such an application of the accused for release on bail and also a prayer for extension of time to complete the investigation according to the proviso in Section 20(4)(bb), both of them should be considered together. The Division Bench also indicated that if there be such an application of the accused for release on bail and also a prayer for extension of time to complete the investigation according to the proviso in Section 20(4)(bb), both of them should be considered together. It is obvious that no bail can be given even in such a case unless the prayer for extension of the period is rejected. In short, the grant of bail in such a situation is also subject to refusal of the prayer for extension of time, if such a prayer is made. If the accused applies for bail under this provision on expiry of the period of 180 days or the extended period, as the case may be, then he has to be released on bail forthwith. The accused, so released on bail may be arrested and committed to custody according to the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure. It is settled by Constitution Bench decisions that a petition seeking the writ of habeas corpus on the ground of absence of a valid order of remand or detention of the accused, has to be dismissed, if on the date of return of the rule, the custody or detention is on the basis of a valid order. 53. As a result of the above discussion, our answers to the three questions of law referred for our decision are as under: (2)(b) The "indefeasible right" of the accused to be released on bail in accordance with Section 20(4)(bb) of the TADA Act read with Section 167(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure in default of completion of the investigation and filing of the challan within the time allowed, as held in Hitendra Vishnu Thakur is a right which enures to, and is enforceable by the accused only from the time of default till the filing of the challan and it does not survive or remain enforceable on the challan being filed. If the accused applies for bail under this provision on expiry of the period of 180 days or the extended period, as the case may be, then he has to be released on bail forthwith. The accused, so released on bail may be arrested and committed to custody according to the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure. If the accused applies for bail under this provision on expiry of the period of 180 days or the extended period, as the case may be, then he has to be released on bail forthwith. The accused, so released on bail may be arrested and committed to custody according to the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The right of the accused to be released on bail after filing of the challan, notwithstanding the default in filing it within the time allowed, is governed from the time of filing of the challan only by the provisions relating to the grant of bail applicable at that stage." 29. The question as to whether default bail can be granted once a charge sheet is filed was authoritatively dealt with in a decision of a three-Judge Bench of this Court in Uday Mohanlal Acharya v. State of Maharashtra (2001) 5 SCC 453 . The majority judgment of G.B. Pattanaik, J. reviewed the decisions of this Court and in particular the enigmatic expression "if already not availed of" in Sanjay Dutt. The Court then held : "13....The crucial question that arises for consideration, therefore, is what is the true meaning of the expression "if already not availed of"? Does it mean that an accused files an application for bail and offers his willingness for being released on bail or does it mean that a bail order must be passed, the accused must furnish the bail and get him released on bail? In our considered opinion it would be more in consonance with the legislative mandate to hold that an accused must be held to have availed of his indefeasible right, the moment he files an application for being released on bail and offers to abide by the terms and conditions of bail. To interpret the expression "availed of" to mean actually being released on bail after furnishing the necessary bail required would cause great injustice to the accused and would defeat the very purpose of the proviso to Section 167(2) of the Criminal Procedure Code and further would make an illegal custody to be legal, inasmuch as after the expiry of the stipulated period the Magistrate had no further jurisdiction to remand and such custody of the accused is without any valid order of remand. That apart, when an accused files an application for bail indicating his right to be released as no challan had been filed within the specified period, there is no discretion left in the Magistrate and the only thing he is required to find out is whether the specified period under the statute has elapsed or not, and whether a challan has been filed or not. If the expression "availed of" is interpreted to mean that the accused must factually be released on bail, then in a given case where the Magistrate illegally refuses to pass an order notwithstanding the maximum period stipulated in Section 167 had expired, and yet no challan had been filed then the accused could only move to the higher forum and while the matter remains pending in the higher forum for consideration, if the prosecution files a charge-sheet then also the so-called right accruing to the accused because of inaction on the part of the investigating agency would get frustrated. Since the legislature has given its mandate it would be the bounden duty of the court to enforce the same and it would not be in the interest of justice to negate the same by interpreting the expression "if not availed of" in a manner which is capable of being abused by the prosecution. A two-Judge Bench decision of this Court in State of M.P. v. Rustam setting aside the order of grant of bail by the High Court on a conclusion that on the date of the order the prosecution had already submitted a police report and, therefore, the right stood extinguished, in our considered opinion, does not express the correct position in law of the expression "if already not availed of", used by the Constitution Bench in Sanjay Dutt. In the aforesaid premises, we are of the considered opinion that an accused must be held to have availed of his right flowing from the legislative mandate engrafted in the proviso to sub-section (2) of Section 167 of the Code if he has filed an application after the expiry of the stipulated period alleging that no challan has been filed and he is prepared to offer the bail that is ordered, and it is found as a fact that no challan has been filed within the period prescribed from the date of the arrest of the accused. In our view, such interpretation would subserve the purpose and the object for which the provision in question was brought on to the statute-book. In such a case, therefore, even if the application for consideration of an order of being released on bail is posted before the court after some length of time, or even if the Magistrate refuses the application erroneously and the accused moves the higher forum for getting a formal order of being released on bail in enforcement of his indefeasible right, then filing of challan at that stage will not take away the right of the accused. Personal liberty is one of the cherished objects of the Indian Constitution and deprivation of the same can only be in accordance with law and in conformity with the provisions thereof, as stipulated under Article 21 of the Constitution. When the law provides that the Magistrate could authorise the detention of the accused in custody up to a maximum period as indicated in the proviso to sub-section (2) of Section 167, any further detention beyond the period without filing of a challan by the investigating agency would be a subterfuge and would not be in accordance with law and in conformity with the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code, and as such, could be violative of Article 21 of the Constitution. There is no provision in the Criminal Procedure Code authorising detention of an accused in custody after the expiry of the period indicated in proviso to sub-section (2) of Section 167 excepting the contingency indicated in Explanation I, namely, if the accused does not furnish the bail...But so long as the accused files an application and indicates in the application to offer bail on being released by appropriate orders of the court then the right of the accused on being released on bail cannot be frustrated on the off chance of the Magistrate not being available and the matter not being moved, or that the Magistrate erroneously refuses to pass an order and the matter is moved to the higher forum and a challan is filed in interregnum. This is the only way how a balance can be struck between the so-called indefeasible right of the accused on failure on the part of the prosecution to file a challan within the specified period and the interest of the society, at large, in lawfully preventing an accused from being released on bail on account of inaction on the part of the prosecuting agency. On the aforesaid premises, we would record our conclusions as follows: 3. On the expiry of the said period of 90 days or 60 days, as the case may be, an indefeasible right accrues in favour of the accused for being released on bail on account of default by the investigating agency in the completion of the investigation within the period prescribed and the accused is entitled to be released on bail, if he is prepared to and furnishes the bail as directed by the Magistrate. 6. The expression "if not already availed of" used by this Court in Sanjay Dutt case [ (1994) 5 SCC 410 : 1994 SCC (Cri) 1433] must be understood to mean when the accused files an application and is prepared to offer bail on being directed. In other words, on expiry of the period specified in para (a) of the proviso to sub-section (2) of Section 167 if the accused files an application for bail and offers also to furnish the bail on being directed, then it has to be held that the accused has availed of his indefeasible right even though the court has not considered the said application and has not indicated the terms and conditions of bail, and the accused has not furnished the same." 30. B.N. Agrawala, J. dissented, holding: "29. My learned brother has referred to the expression "if not already availed of" referred to in the judgment in Sanjay Dutt case [ (1994) 5 SCC 410 : 1994 SCC (Cri) 1433] for arriving at Conclusion 6. According to me, the expression "availed of" does not mean mere filing of application for bail expressing therein willingness of the accused to furnish the bail bond. According to me, the expression "availed of" does not mean mere filing of application for bail expressing therein willingness of the accused to furnish the bail bond. What will happen if on the 61st day an application for bail is filed for being released on bail on the ground of default by not filing the challan by the 60th day and on the 61st day the challan is also filed by the time the Magistrate is called upon to apply his mind to the challan as well as the petition for grant of bail? In view of the several decisions referred to above and the requirements prescribed by clause (a)(ii) of the proviso read with Explanation I to Section 167(2) of the Code, as no bail bond has been furnished, such an application for bail has to be dismissed because the stage of proviso to Section 167(2) is over, as such right is extinguished the moment the challan is filed. 30. In this background, the expression "availed of" does not mean mere filing of the application for bail expressing thereunder willingness to furnish bail bond, but the stage for actual furnishing of bail bond must reach. If the challan is filed before that, then there is no question of enforcing the right, howsoever valuable or indefeasible it may be, after filing of the challan because thereafter the right under default clause cannot be exercised." 31. The law laid down by the majority judgment in this case was however not followed in Pragya Singh Thakur v. State of Maharashtra. This hiccup in the law was then cleared by the judgment in Union of India v. Nirala Yadav, which exhaustively discussed the entire case law on the subject. In this judgment, a Two-Judge Bench of this Court referred to all the relevant authorities on the subject including the majority judgment of Uday Mohanlal Acharya (supra) and then concluded: "44. At this juncture, it is absolutely essential to delve into what were the precise principles stated in Uday Mohanlal Acharya case and how the two-Judge Bench has understood the same in Pragyna Singh Thakur. We have already reproduced the paragraphs in extenso from Uday Mohanlal Acharya case and the relevant paragraphs from Pragyna Singh Thakur. At this juncture, it is absolutely essential to delve into what were the precise principles stated in Uday Mohanlal Acharya case and how the two-Judge Bench has understood the same in Pragyna Singh Thakur. We have already reproduced the paragraphs in extenso from Uday Mohanlal Acharya case and the relevant paragraphs from Pragyna Singh Thakur. Pragyna Singh Thakur has drawn support from Rustam case to buttress the principle it has laid down though in Uday Mohanlal Acharya case the said decision has been held not to have stated the correct position of law and, therefore, the same could not have been placed reliance upon. The Division Bench in para 56 which has been reproduced hereinabove, has referred to para 13 and the conclusions of Uday Mohanlal Acharya case. We have already quoted from para 13 and the conclusions. 45. The opinion expressed in paras 54 and 58 in Pragyna Singh Thakur which we have emphasised, as it seems to us, runs counter to the principles stated in Uday Mohanlal Acharya which has been followed in Hassan Ali Khan and Sayed Mohd. Ahmad Kazmi. The decision in Sayed Mohd. Ahmad Kazmi case has been rendered by a three-Judge Bench. We may hasten to state, though in Pragyna Singh Thakur case the learned Judges have referred to Uday Mohanlal Acharya case but have stated the principle that even if an application for bail is filed on the ground that the charge-sheet was not filed within 90 days, but before the consideration of the same and before being released on bail, if the charge-sheet is filed the said right to be enlarged on bail is lost. This opinion is contrary to the earlier larger Bench decisions and also runs counter to the subsequent three-Judge Bench decision in Mustaq Ahmed Mohammed Isak case. We are disposed to think so, as the two-Judge Bench has used the words "before consideration of the same and before being released on bail", the said principle specifically strikes a discordant note with the proposition stated in the decisions rendered by the larger Benches. 46. At this juncture, it will be appropriate to refer to the dissenting opinion by B.N. Agarwal, J. in Uday Mohanlal Acharya case. The learned Judge dissented with the majority as far as interpretation of the expression "if not already availed of" by stating so: "29. 46. At this juncture, it will be appropriate to refer to the dissenting opinion by B.N. Agarwal, J. in Uday Mohanlal Acharya case. The learned Judge dissented with the majority as far as interpretation of the expression "if not already availed of" by stating so: "29. My learned Brother has referred to the expression ''if not already availed of' referred to in the judgment in Sanjay Dutt case for arriving at Conclusion 6. According to me, the expression ''availed of' does not mean mere filing of application for bail expressing therein willingness of the accused to furnish the bail bond. What will happen if on the 61st day an application for bail is filed for being released on bail on the ground of default by not filing the challan by the 60th day and on the 61st day the challan is also filed by the time the Magistrate is called upon to apply his mind to the challan as well as the petition for grant of bail? In view of the several decisions referred to above and the requirements prescribed by clause (a)(ii) of the proviso read with Explanation I to Section 167(2) of the Code, as no bail bond has been furnished, such an application for bail has to be dismissed because the stage of proviso to Section 167(2) is over, as such right is extinguished the moment the challan is filed. 30. In this background, the expression ''availed of' does not mean mere filing of the application for bail expressing thereunder willingness to furnish bail bond, but the stage for actual furnishing of bail bond must reach. If the challan is filed before that, then there is no question of enforcing the right, howsoever valuable or indefeasible it may be, after filing of the challan because thereafter the right under default clause cannot be exercised." On a careful reading of the aforesaid two paragraphs, we think, the two-Judge Bench in Pragyna Singh Thakur case has somewhat in a similar matter stated the same. As long as the majority view occupies the field it is a binding precedent. That apart, it has been followed by a three-Judge Bench in Sayed Mohd. Ahmad Kazmi case. Keeping in view the principle stated in Sayed Mohd. As long as the majority view occupies the field it is a binding precedent. That apart, it has been followed by a three-Judge Bench in Sayed Mohd. Ahmad Kazmi case. Keeping in view the principle stated in Sayed Mohd. Ahmad Kazmi case which is based on three-Judge Bench decision in Uday Mohanlal Acharya case, we are obliged to conclude and hold that the principle laid down in paras 54 and 58 of Pragyna Singh Thakur case (which has been emphasised by us: see paras 42 and 43 above) does not state the correct principle of law. It can clearly be stated that in view of the subsequent decision of a larger Bench that cannot be treated to be good law. Our view finds support from the decision in Union of India v. Arviva Industries India Ltd. 32. Also, in Syed Mohd. Ahmad Kazmi v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi), Section 43-D of the UAPA came up for consideration before the Court, in particular the proviso which extends the period for investigation beyond 90 days up to a period of 180 days. An application for default bail had been made on 17.07.2012, as no charge sheet was filed within a period of 90 days of the appellant's custody. The charge sheet in the aforesaid case was filed thereafter on 31.07.2012. Despite the fact that this application was not taken up for hearing before the filing of the charge sheet, this Court held that this since an application for default bail had been filed prior to the filing of the charge sheet the "indefeasible right" spoken of earlier had sprung into action, as a result of which default bail had to be granted. The Court held : "25. Having carefully considered the submissions made on behalf of the respective parties, the relevant provisions of law and the decision cited, we are unable to accept the submissions advanced on behalf of the State by the learned Additional Solicitor General Mr Raval. There is no denying the fact that on 17-7-2012, when CR No. 86 of 2012 was allowed by the Additional Sessions Judge and the custody of the appellant was held to be illegal and an application under Section 167(2) CrPC was made on behalf of the appellant for grant of statutory bail which was listed for hearing. There is no denying the fact that on 17-7-2012, when CR No. 86 of 2012 was allowed by the Additional Sessions Judge and the custody of the appellant was held to be illegal and an application under Section 167(2) CrPC was made on behalf of the appellant for grant of statutory bail which was listed for hearing. Instead of hearing the application, the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate adjourned the same till the next day when the Public Prosecutor filed an application for extension of the period of custody and investigation and on 20-7-2012 extended the time of investigation and the custody of the appellant for a further period of 90 days with retrospective effect from 2-6-2012. Not only is the retrospectivity of the order of the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate untenable, it could not also defeat the statutory right which had accrued to the appellant on the expiry of 90 days from the date when the appellant was taken into custody. Such right, as has been commented upon by this Court in Sanjay Dutt [ (1994) 5 SCC 410 : 1994 SCC (Cri) 1433] and the other cases cited by the learned Additional Solicitor General, could only be distinguished (sic extinguished) once the charge-sheet had been filed in the case and no application has been made prior thereto for grant of statutory bail. It is well-established that if an accused does not exercise his right to grant of statutory bail before the charge-sheet is filed, he loses his right to such benefit once such charge-sheet is filed and can, thereafter, only apply for regular bail. 26. The circumstances in this case, however, are different in that the appellant had exercised his right to statutory bail on the very same day on which his custody was held to be illegal and such an application was left undecided by the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate till after the application filed by the prosecution for extension of time to complete investigation was taken up and orders were passed thereupon. 27. 27. We are unable to appreciate the procedure adopted by the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, which has been endorsed by the High Court and we are of the view that the appellant acquired the right for grant of statutory bail on 17-7-2012, when his custody was held to be illegal by the Additional Sessions Judge since his application for statutory bail was pending at the time when the application for extension of time for continuing the investigation was filed by the prosecution. In our view, the right of the appellant to grant of statutory bail remained unaffected by the subsequent application and both the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate and the High Court erred in holding otherwise." 33. In a fairly recent judgment reported as Rakesh Kumar Paul v. State of Assam, a Three-Judge Bench of this Court referred to the earlier decisions of this Court and went one step further. It was held by the majority judgment of Madan B. Lokur, J. and Deepak Gupta, J. that even an oral application for grant of default bail would suffice, and so long as such application is made before the charge sheet is filed by the police, default bail must be granted. This was stated in Lokur, J.'s judgment as follows: "37. This Court had occasion to review the entire case law on the subject in Union of India v. Nirala Yadav. In that decision, reference was made to Uday Mohanlal Acharya v. State of Maharashtra and the conclusions arrived at in that decision. We are concerned with Conclusion (3) which reads as follows: '24. ...."13. (3) On the expiry of the said period of 90 days or 60 days, as the case may be, an indefeasible right accrues in favour of the accused for being released on bail on account of default by the investigating agency in the completion of the investigation within the period prescribed and the accused is entitled to be released on bail, if he is prepared to and furnishes the bail as directed by the Magistrate."' 38. This Court also dealt with the decision rendered in Sanjay Dutt and noted that the principle laid down by the Constitution Bench is to the effect that if the charge-sheet is not filed and the right for "default bail" has ripened into the status of indefeasibility, it cannot be frustrated by the prosecution on any pretext. This Court also dealt with the decision rendered in Sanjay Dutt and noted that the principle laid down by the Constitution Bench is to the effect that if the charge-sheet is not filed and the right for "default bail" has ripened into the status of indefeasibility, it cannot be frustrated by the prosecution on any pretext. The accused can avail his liberty by filing an application stating that the statutory period for filing the charge-sheet or challan has expired and the same has not yet been filed and therefore the indefeasible right has accrued in his or her favour and further the accused is prepared to furnish the bail bond. 39. This Court also noted that apart from the possibility of the prosecution frustrating the indefeasible right, there are occasions when even the court frustrates the indefeasible right. Reference was made to Mohd. Iqbal Madar Sheikh v. State of Maharashtra wherein it was observed that some courts keep the application for "default bail" pending for some days so that in the meantime a charge-sheet is submitted. While such a practice both on the part of the prosecution as well as some courts must be very strongly and vehemently discouraged, we reiterate that no subterfuge should be resorted to, to defeat the indefeasible right of the accused for "default bail" during the interregnum when the statutory period for filing the charge-sheet or challan expires and the submission of the charge-sheet or challan in court. Procedure for obtaining default bail 40. In the present case, it was also argued by the learned counsel for the State that the petitioner did not apply for "default bail" on or after 4-1-2017 till 24-1-2017 on which date his indefeasible right got extinguished on the filing of the charge-sheet. Strictly speaking, this is correct since the petitioner applied for regular bail on 11-1-2017 in the Gauhati High Court -- he made no specific application for grant of "default bail". However, the application for regular bail filed by the accused on 11-1-2017 did advert to the statutory period for filing a charge-sheet having expired and that perhaps no charge-sheet had in fact being filed. In any event, this issue was argued by the learned counsel for the petitioner in the High Court and it was considered but not accepted by the High Court. In any event, this issue was argued by the learned counsel for the petitioner in the High Court and it was considered but not accepted by the High Court. The High Court did not reject the submission on the ground of maintainability but on merits. Therefore it is not as if the petitioner did not make any application for default bail -- such an application was definitely made (if not in writing) then at least orally before the High Court. In our opinion, in matters of personal liberty, we cannot and should not be too technical and must lean in favour of personal liberty. Consequently, whether the accused makes a written application for "default bail" or an oral application for "default bail" is of no consequence. The court concerned must deal with such an application by considering the statutory requirements, namely, whether the statutory period for filing a charge-sheet or challan has expired, whether the charge-sheet or challan has been filed and whether the accused is prepared to and does furnish bail. 41. We take this view keeping in mind that in matters of personal liberty and Article 21 of the Constitution, it is not always advisable to be formalistic or technical. The history of the personal liberty jurisprudence of this Court and other constitutional courts includes petitions for a writ of habeas corpus and for other writs being entertained even on the basis of a letter addressed to the Chief Justice or the Court. Application of the law to the petitioner 45. On 11-1-2017 [Rakesh Kumar Paul v. State of Assam, 2017 SCC OnLine Gau 573] when the High Court dismissed the application for bail filed by the petitioner, he had an indefeasible right to the grant of "default bail" since the statutory period of 60 days for filing a charge-sheet had expired, no charge-sheet or challan had been filed against him (it was filed only on 24-1-2017) and the petitioner orally applied for "default bail". Under these circumstances, the only course open to the High Court on 11-1-2017 was to enquire from the petitioner whether he was prepared to furnish bail and if so then to grant him "default bail" on reasonable conditions. Unfortunately, this was completely overlooked by the High Court. 46. Under these circumstances, the only course open to the High Court on 11-1-2017 was to enquire from the petitioner whether he was prepared to furnish bail and if so then to grant him "default bail" on reasonable conditions. Unfortunately, this was completely overlooked by the High Court. 46. It was ubmitted that as of today, a charge-sheet having been filed against the petitioner, he is not entitled to "default bail" but must apply for regular bail -- the "default bail" chapter being now closed. We cannot agree for the simple reason that we are concerned with the interregnum between 4-1-2017 and 24-1-2017 when no charge-sheet had been filed, during which period he had availed of his indefeasible right of "default bail". It would have been another matter altogether if the petitioner had not applied for "default bail" for whatever reason during this interregnum. There could be a situation (however rare) where an accused is not prepared to be bailed out perhaps for his personal security since he or she might be facing some threat outside the correction home or for any other reason. But then in such an event, the accused voluntarily gives up the indefeasible right for default bail and having forfeited that right the accused cannot, after the charge-sheet or challan has been filed, claim a resuscitation of the indefeasible right. But that is not the case insofar as the petitioner is concerned, since he did not give up his indefeasible right for "default bail" during the interregnum between 4-1-2017 and 24-1-2017 as is evident from the decision of the High Court rendered on 11-1-2017. On the contrary, he had availed of his right to "default bail" which could not have been defeated on 11-1-2017 and which we are today compelled to acknowledge and enforce. 47. Consequently, we are of the opinion that the petitioner had satisfied all the requirements of obtaining "default bail" which is that on 11-1-2017 he had put in more than 60 days in custody pending investigations into an alleged offence not punishable with imprisonment for a minimum period of 10 years, no charge-sheet had been filed against him and he was prepared to furnish bail for his release, as such, he ought to have been released by the High Court on reasonable terms and conditions of bail. Conclusion 49. Conclusion 49. The petitioner is held entitled to the grant of "default bail" on the facts and in the circumstances of this case. The trial Judge should release the petitioner on "default bail" on such terms and conditions as may be reasonable. However, we make it clear that this does not prohibit or otherwise prevent the arrest or re-arrest of the petitioner on cogent grounds in respect of the subject charge and upon arrest or re-arrest, the petitioner is entitled to petition for grant of regular bail which application should be considered on its own merit. We also make it clear that this will not impact on the arrest of the petitioner in any other case." 34. Deepak Gupta, J. in his concurring opinion agreed with Lokur, J. as follows: "82. The right to get "default bail" is a very important right. Ours is a country where millions of our countrymen are totally illiterate and not aware of their rights. A Constitution Bench of this Court in Sanjay Dutt [Sanjay Dutt v. State, (1994) 5 SCC 410 : 1994 SCC (Cri) 1433] has held that the accused must apply for grant of "default bail". As far as Section 167 of the Code is concerned, Explanation I to Section 167 provides that notwithstanding the expiry of the period specified (i.e. 60 days or 90 days, as the case may be), the accused can be detained in custody so long as he does not furnish bail. Explanation I to Section 167 of the Code reads as follows: "Explanation I.--For the avoidance of doubts, it is hereby declared that, notwithstanding the expiry of the period specified in para (a), the accused shall be detained in custody so long as he does not furnish bail." This would, in my opinion, mean that even though the period had expired, the accused would be deemed to be in legal custody till he does not furnish bail. The requirement is of furnishing of bail. The accused does not have to make out any grounds for grant of bail. He does not have to file a detailed application. All he has to aver in the application is that since 60/90 days have expired and charge-sheet has not been filed, he is entitled to bail and is willing to furnish bail. This indefeasible right cannot be defeated by filing the charge-sheet after the accused has offered to furnish bail. He does not have to file a detailed application. All he has to aver in the application is that since 60/90 days have expired and charge-sheet has not been filed, he is entitled to bail and is willing to furnish bail. This indefeasible right cannot be defeated by filing the charge-sheet after the accused has offered to furnish bail. 86. I agree and concur with the conclusions drawn and directions given by learned Brother Lokur, J. in paras 49 to 51 of his judgment." 35. P.C. Pant, J., however, dissented holding: (Rakesh Kumar Paul case, SCC p. 123, para-113) "113. The law laid down as above shows that the requirement of an application claiming the statutory right under Section 167(2) of the Code is a prerequisite for the grant of bail on default. In my opinion, such application has to be made before the Magistrate for enforcement of the statutory right. In the cases under the Prevention of Corruption Act or other Acts where Special Courts are constituted by excluding the jurisdiction of the Magistrate, it has to be made before such Special Court. In the present case, for the reasons discussed, since the appellant never sought default bail before the court concerned, as such is not entitled to the same." 36. A conspectus of the aforesaid decisions would show that so long as an application for grant of default bail is made on expiry of the period of 90 days (which application need not even be in writing) before a charge sheet is filed, the right to default bail becomes complete. It is of no moment that the Criminal Court in question either does not dispose of such application before the charge sheet is filed or disposes of such application wrongly before such charge sheet is filed. So long as an application has been made for default bail on expiry of the stated period before time is further extended to the maximum period of 180 days, default bail, being an indefeasible right of the accused under the first proviso to Section 167(2), kicks in and must be granted. 31. Thus, what follows from above is that right to default bail is now recognised as valuable right of accused. However, in order to claim the benefit of Section 167(2) Cr.P.C., the accused must pray or file an application at the first opportunity. 31. Thus, what follows from above is that right to default bail is now recognised as valuable right of accused. However, in order to claim the benefit of Section 167(2) Cr.P.C., the accused must pray or file an application at the first opportunity. In case, this is done, then the right to claim default bail upon expiry of a period of 60 days or 90 days in case the charge-sheet is not filed within aforesaid period accrues to the accused. This right of an accused to be enlarged on default bail is now recognised as an indefeasible right which will not get defeated upon submission of charge-sheet after expiry of relevant period. Judgement rendered in Bikramjit Singh (supra) has been followed in the subsequent three Judges Bench judgement in M. Ravindran (supra). Observations made in paragraphs-25.1 to 25.4 of the judgement in M. Ravindran (supra) may be referred to at this stage. "25.1 Once the accused files an application for bail under the Proviso to Section 167(2) he is deemed to have ''availed of' or enforced his right to be released on default bail, accruing after expiry of the stipulated time limit for investigation. Thus, if the accused applies for bail under Section 167(2), CrPCread with Section 36A(4), NDPS Act upon expiry of 180 days or the extended period, as the case may be, the Court must release him on bail forthwith without any unnecessary delay after getting necessary information from the public prosecutor, as mentioned supra. Such prompt action will restrict the prosecution from frustrating the legislative mandate to release the accused on bail in case of default by the investigative agency. 25.2 The right to be released on default bail continues to remain enforceable if the accused has applied for such bail, notwithstanding pendency of the bail application; or subsequent filing of the charge-sheet or a report seeking extension of time by the prosecution before the Court; or filing of the charge-sheet during the interregnum when challenge to the rejection of the bail application is pending before a higher Court. 25.3 However, where the accused fails to apply for default bail when the right accrues to him, and subsequently a charge-sheet, additional complaint or a report seeking extension of time is preferred before the Magistrate, the right to default bail would be extinguished. 25.3 However, where the accused fails to apply for default bail when the right accrues to him, and subsequently a charge-sheet, additional complaint or a report seeking extension of time is preferred before the Magistrate, the right to default bail would be extinguished. The Magistrate would be at liberty to take cognizance of the case or grant further time for completion of the investigation, as the case may be, though the accused may still be released on bail under other provisions of the CrPC. 25.4 Notwithstanding the order of default bail passed by the Court, by virtue of Explanation I to Section 167(2), the actual release of the accused from custody is contingent on the directions passed by the competent Court granting bail. If the accused fails to furnish bail and/or comply with the terms and conditions of the bail order within the time stipulated by the Court, his continued detention in custody is valid." 32. Aforesaid judgements, i.e., Bikramjit Singh (supra) and M. Ravindran (supra) have been re-affirmed subsequently by another three Judges Bench in Nasir Bin Abu Bakr Yafai (supra) in paragraphs-50 and 51 of the judgement. 33. In view of above, present application succeeds and is liable to be allowed. Accordingly, impugned order dated 24.03.2021 passed by Chief Judicial Magistrate, Jhansi (Annexure-19 to the affidavit) is hereby quashed. Application for default bail filed by applicant shall stand allowed. Accordingly, applicant shall be released on bail on his furnishing a personal bond and two sureties of like amount to the satisfaction of court concerned. However, in the interest of justice following conditions are also imposed. (i) The applicant shall file an undertaking to the effect that he shall not seek any adjournment on the date fixed for evidence when the witnesses are present in court. In case of default of this condition, it shall be open for the trial court to treat it as abuse of liberty of bail and pass orders in accordance with law. (ii) The applicant shall remain present before the trial court on each date fixed, either personally or through his counsel. In case of his absence, without sufficient cause, the trial court may proceed against him under section 229-A I.P.C.. (ii) The applicant shall remain present before the trial court on each date fixed, either personally or through his counsel. In case of his absence, without sufficient cause, the trial court may proceed against him under section 229-A I.P.C.. (iii) In case, the applicant misuses the liberty of bail during trial and in order to secure his presence proclamation under section 82 Cr.P.C., may be issued and if applicant fails to appear before the court on the date fixed in such proclamation, then, the trial court shall initiate proceedings against him, in accordance with law, under section 174-A I.P.C. (iv) The applicant shall remain present, in person, before the trial court on dates fixed for (1) opening of the case, (2) framing of charge and (3) recording of statement under section 313 Cr.P.C. If in the opinion of the trial court absence of the applicant is deliberate or without sufficient cause, then it shall be open for the trial court to treat such default as abuse of liberty of bail and proceed against him in accordance with law. (v) The trial court may make all possible efforts/endeavour and try to conclude the trial within a period of one year after the release of the applicant. 34. Application is, accordingly, allowed. 35. Cost made easy.