JUDGMENT : By the Court.-Supplementary-affidavit filed today, is taken on record. 2. Heard Sri T.P. Singh, learned Senior Advocate, assisted by Sri Dhiraj Srivastava, learned counsel for the petitioners, Sri Gagan Mehta, learned counsel for the respondent No. 3 and Ms. Subhas Rathi, learned Chief Standing counsel for the State-respondents. 3. This writ petition has been filed praying for the following relief : (i) Issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of mandamus, declaring that the U.P. Higher Education Services Commission Act, 1980 and rules framed thereunder are unconstitutional, being violative of fundamental rights of the petitioners' as guaranteed under the Constitution of India. (ii) Issue writ, order or direction in the nature of mandamus, commanding and directing the respondents to permit the petitioners' to manage, run, and control the P.P.N. P.G. College, particularly in the matters of selection, appointment and disciplinary action of teachers and principal in accordance with the U.P. State University Act, 1973 and statues framed thereunder by the Chhatrapati Sahu Ji Maharaj University, Kanpur as earlier. Submissions 4. Learned counsel for the petitioners submits as under : (I) The U.P. Higher Education Services Commission Act, 1980 takes away the autonomy of the Committee of Management of the aided non-minority institutions like the petitioners, and thus, it is violative of Articles 14, 19 and 19 (1) (G) of the Constitution of India. (II) In the case of T.M.A. Pai Foundation v. State of Karnataka, (2002) 8 SCC 481 , it is clearly held that the autonomy of the aided private institutions shall not be interfered with in the matter of administering the institution by the Committee of Management which include the regulation for appointment of teachers in such Government aided private institution like the petitioners. 5. Sri T.P. Singh, learned Senior Advocate, learned counsel for the petitioners states that no other submission is being made except the aforequoted two submissions. 6. Learned Standing Counsel and learned Chief Standing Counsel for the State-respondents support the impugned Act, 1980. Facts of the case 7. Briefly stated facts of the present case are that the petitioner's institution is presently affiliated to Kanpur University (now known as Chhatrapati Sahu Ji Maharaj University, Kanpur). It is an aided institution. The salaries and other benefits to entire teachers and staff/employee of the petitioner's institution are paid from the State Exchequer. Facts of the case 7. Briefly stated facts of the present case are that the petitioner's institution is presently affiliated to Kanpur University (now known as Chhatrapati Sahu Ji Maharaj University, Kanpur). It is an aided institution. The salaries and other benefits to entire teachers and staff/employee of the petitioner's institution are paid from the State Exchequer. The validity of the U.P. Higher Education Services Commission Act, 1980 (hereinafter referred to as the ''Act,1980'') has been upheld by the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Committee of Management, D.N. (P.G.) College, Meerut v. State of U.P. and others, 2007(5) ADJ 398 (DB). Now, despite the validity of the Act, 1980 has been upheld, the petitioners have filed the present writ petition challenging the constitutional validity of the Act, 1980. Discussions and Findings 8. The Act, 1980 has been enacted by the State Legislature to establish the Service Commission in the selection and appointment of the teacher to the colleges affiliated or recognised by the University and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto. Section-4 provides composition of the Commission. Section-11 provides powers and duties/function of the Commission, which may include the power to make recommendation to the Management relating the appointment of selected candidates. Section-12 provides procedure for appointment of teacher including responsibility of Management to intimate the existing vacancy and the vacancy likely to be caused during the course of ensuing academic year to the Director at such time and in such manner as may be prescribed. The Director requiring to notify the vacancy to the Commission. The detail procedure has been prescribed under Section 13 of the Act, 1980 for recommendation by the Commission. Section-24 exempts minority institution in the matter of appointment. Section-25 provides punishment in contravention of the provision of the Act. Section-32 empowers the State Government to make rules by notification, for carrying out the purposes of the Act. 9. In the case of T.M.A. Pai Foundation (supra), a Constitution Bench (11 Judges) of Hon'ble Supreme Court clearly held that the autonomy of a private aided institutions would be less than that an un-aided institution and the State Government, in case of such an aided institution, has ample power to regulate the method of selection and appointment of teachers after prescribing requisite qualifications for the same. Relevant para Nos. 71, 72 and 73 are reproduced below : ''71. Relevant para Nos. 71, 72 and 73 are reproduced below : ''71. While giving aid to professional institutions, it would be permissible for the authority giving aid to prescribe by rules or regulations, the conditions on the basis of which admission will be granted to different aided colleges by virtue of merit, coupled with the reservation policy of the state. The merit may be determined either through a common entrance test conducted by the University or the Government followed by counseling, or on the basis of an entrance test conducted by individual institutions - the method to be followed is for the university or the Government to decide. The authority may also device other means to ensure that admission is granted to an aided professional institution on the basis of merit. In the case of such institutions, it will be permissible for the Government or the university to provide that consideration should be shown to the weaker sections of the society. 72. Once aid is granted to a private professional educational institution, the Government or the state agency, as a condition of the grant of aid, can put fetters on the freedom in the matter of administration and management of the institution. The state, which gives aid to an educational institution, can impose such conditions as are necessary for the proper maintenance of the high standards of education as the financial burden is shared by the state. The state would also be under an obligation to protect the interest of the teaching and non-teaching staff. In many states, there are various statutory provisions to regulate the functioning of such educational institutions where the States give, as a grant or aid, a substantial proportion of the revenue expenditure including salary, pay and allowances of teaching and non-teaching staff. It would be its responsibility to ensure that the teachers working in those institutions are governed by proper service conditions. The state, in the case of such aided institutions, has ample power to regulate the method of selection and appointment of teachers after prescribing requisite qualifications for the same. Ever since In Re The Kerala Education Bill, 1957 [(1959) SCR 995], this Court has upheld, in the case of aided institutions, those regulations that served the interests of students and teachers. Ever since In Re The Kerala Education Bill, 1957 [(1959) SCR 995], this Court has upheld, in the case of aided institutions, those regulations that served the interests of students and teachers. Checks on the administration may be necessary in order to ensure that the administration is efficient and sound and will serve the academic needs of the institutions. In other words, rules and regulations that promote good administration and prevent mal-administration can be formulated so as to promote the efficiency of teachers, discipline and fairness in administration and to preserve harmony among affiliated institutions. At the same time it has to be ensured that even an aided institution does not become a Government-owned and controlled institution. Normally, the aid that is granted is relatable to the pay and allowances of the teaching staff. In addition, the Management of the private aided institutions has to incur revenue and capital expenses. Such aided institutions cannot obtain that extent of autonomy in relation to management and administration as would be available to a private unaided institution, but at the same time, it cannot also be treated as an educational institution departmentally run by Government or as a wholly owned and controlled Government institution and interfere with Constitution of the governing bodies or thrusting the staff without reference to Management. Other Aided Institutions 73. There are a large number of educational institutions, like schools and non-professional colleges, which cannot operate without the support of aid from the state. Although these institutions may have been established by philanthropists or other public-spirited persons, it becomes necessary, in order to provide inexpensive education to the students, to seek aid from the state. In such cases, as those of the professional aided institutions referred to hereinabove, the Government would be entitled to make regulations relating to the terms and conditions of employment of the teaching and non-teaching staff whenever the aid for the posts is given by the State as well as admission procedures. Such rules and regulations can also provide for the reasons and the manner in which a teacher or any other member of the staff can be removed. in other words, the autonomy of a private aided institution would be less than that of an unaided institution. 10. Such rules and regulations can also provide for the reasons and the manner in which a teacher or any other member of the staff can be removed. in other words, the autonomy of a private aided institution would be less than that of an unaided institution. 10. In the case of Committee of Management, D.N. (P.G.) College, Meerut v. State of U.P. and others (supra), Division Bench of this Court considered the challenge to the validity of the Act, 1980 and held as under : 8. The West Bengal Higher Education Commission Act (the WB Commission Act) is similar to the Commission Act and the appointments there are also made on the recommendations of the West Bengal Higher Education Commission. Brahmo Samaj Educational Society was claiming itself to be a minority in West Bengal and challenged the vires of the WB Commission Act. This matter was dealt in Brahmo Samaj Educational Society and others v. State of West Bengal and others, (2004) 6 SCC 224 (the Brahmo Samaj case). In this case, the Supreme Court neither decided the issue of minority/denominational status of Brahmo Samaj, nor declared the WB Commission Act as ultravires. The Court disposed it off with the direction to the State to reconsider the matter in the light of paragraphs No. 71 to 73 of the TMA Pai case. The counsel for the petitioners, relying upon the Brahmo Samaj case and paragraph 71 to 73 of the TMA Pai case submit that the Commission Act is ultravires the Constitution. Does the Commission Act as it stands today imposes unreasonable restrictions?. 9. The objects and reasons of the Commission Act (Appendix-1) show that this Act was enacted on the recommendation of the Vice Chancellors and was to apply to the affiliated and associated colleges only. This has been done on the ground that - The selection committees of the individual colleges were expensive; - Often selection meetings were postponed because a common date did not normally suit the members of the selection committee. - There were complaints of favourtism. 10. The Commission Act as originally enacted was very comprehensive. The word appointment is defined under Section 2(a) of the Commission Act. (see Appendix-2). It provided an inclusive definition and included all appointments except the appointment under Section 31(3) of the State Universities Act. - There were complaints of favourtism. 10. The Commission Act as originally enacted was very comprehensive. The word appointment is defined under Section 2(a) of the Commission Act. (see Appendix-2). It provided an inclusive definition and included all appointments except the appointment under Section 31(3) of the State Universities Act. Section 2(c) of the Commission Act (see Appendix-2) defines the word college and it included all colleges to whom affiliation or recognition has been granted by the University. Section 24 of the Act provided some exemption to the minority institution but even here the minority institution was required to take approval before making appointments. Thus, the Commission Act as originally enacted had very wide application but now it has been curtailed. 11. The Commission Act has been amended by the UP Act No. 30 of 2004. It has amended the definition of word appointment and college as well as Section 24 of the Commission Act (see Appendix-2). The appointment is no longer as wide as it used to be. The appointment is now confined only to the posts described under Section 60-E of the State Universities Act. Section 60-E of the State Universities Act (Appendix-3) is titled as Liability in respect of salary. Under this section, the State Government is liable for payment of salary against certain posts mentioned therein. Amended Section 2(a) read alongwith Section 60-E of the State Universities Act clarify that now the Commission can only make appointments in respect of the posts for which the State Government has undertaken liability to pay the salary. 12. Section 2(c) which defines the word college has also been amended. Section 24 has also been suitably amended. The net result of the amendment of these two in the definition is that the Commission neither makes any appointment in any minority institution, nor any approval of the commission is required by the minority institution before making any appointment. 13. The Commission Act as it stands has been altered. Earlier the Commission was not making any appointment in the minority institution but its approval was required. Now the approval of the Commission is no longer required in the minority institutions. Earlier the word appointment provided inclusive definition. Now it has been confined to the word appointment for which the State Government is liable to pay the salary. Earlier the Commission was not making any appointment in the minority institution but its approval was required. Now the approval of the Commission is no longer required in the minority institutions. Earlier the word appointment provided inclusive definition. Now it has been confined to the word appointment for which the State Government is liable to pay the salary. The Commission Act was enacted in order to reduce expenses, wastage of time and eradicate complaints of favouritism in the selection of the candidate and now the Commission is only required to make appointment in respect to those posts for which it is liable to pay salary. These appointments can only be made by the Commission if the candidate fulfils the minimum qualification prescribed by the statutes of the different universities. It would have been better if the State had left the appointments to the Committee of management but in case it does not do so then it cannot be said that the State has imposed unreasonable restriction by entrusting right to make the appointment to the Commission. In our opinion it is reasonable restriction within the meaning of Article 19(6) as well as Article 26(a) of the Constitution. CONCLUSION 14. Our conclusion is that the UP Higher Education Commission Act, 1980 as it stands today is intra-vires the constitution. The writ petitions have no merit and are dismissed. 11. From the facts and legal position as well as looking into the provision of the Act, 1980, we are of the considered view that the Act, 1980 regulates the method of selection and appointment of teachers in private aided institution covered by it, including the petitioner's institution. It has neither been argued nor disputed before us that the State Legislature has ample power to legislate on the subject, dealt with by the Act, 1980. Thus, there is no lack of legislative competence to enact Act, 1980. 12. Once it has been settled by a Constitutional Bench (11 Judges) in the case of T.M.A. Pai Foundation (supra) that the autonomy for a private aided institutions would be less than that an un-aided institution and the State Government, in case of such an aided institution, has ample power to regulate method of selection and appointment of the teachers. 12. Once it has been settled by a Constitutional Bench (11 Judges) in the case of T.M.A. Pai Foundation (supra) that the autonomy for a private aided institutions would be less than that an un-aided institution and the State Government, in case of such an aided institution, has ample power to regulate method of selection and appointment of the teachers. There is no question of infringing any fundamental right of the petitioner's institution by the impugned Act, 1980, particularly when the learned counsel for the petitioners has neither disputed nor argued before us that the impugned Act, 1980 regulates the method of selection and appointment of the teacher. The Act, 1980 does not infringe the fundamental right of the petitioners referable to Article 19 (I)(g) of the Constitution of India. 13. We requested the learned counsel for the petitioners to point out any specific provision of the Act, 1980, which according to him is unconstitutional, but he could not point out any specific provision of the Act, 1980 which according to him is ultra-vires to the Constitution of India. 14. In the case of Anant Mills v. State of Gujarat, AIR 1975 SC 1234 para 20, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that : ''20. There is a presumption of the constitutional validity of a statutory provision. In case any party assails the validity of any provision on the ground that it is violative of Article 14 of the Constitution, it is for that party to make the necessary averments and adduce material to show discrimination violative of Article 14. No averments were made in the petitions before the High Court by the petitioners that the assessments before the coming into force of Ordinance 6 of 1969 bad been made by taking into account the rent restriction provisions of the Bombay Rent Act. Paragraph 2B and some other paragraphs of petition No. 233 of 1970 before the High Court, to which our attention was invited by Mr. Tarkunde, also do not contain that averment. No material on this factual aspect was in the circumstances produced either on behalf of the petitioners or the Corporation. The High Court, as already observed, decided the matter merely on the basis of a presumption. Tarkunde, also do not contain that averment. No material on this factual aspect was in the circumstances produced either on behalf of the petitioners or the Corporation. The High Court, as already observed, decided the matter merely on the basis of a presumption. It is, in our opinion, extremely hazardous to decide the question of the constitutional validity of a provision on the basis of the supposed existence of certain facts by raising a presumption. The facts about the supposed existence of which presumption was raised by the High Court were of such a nature that a definite averment could have been made in respect of them and concrete material could have been produced in support of their existence or non-existence. Presumptions are resorted to when the matter does not admit of direct proof or when there is some practical difficulty to produce evidence to prove a particular fact. When, however, the fact to be established is of such a nature that direct evidence about its existence or non-existence would be available, the proper course is to have the direct evidence rather than to decide the matter by resort to presumption. A pronouncement about the constitutional validity of a statutory provision affects not only the parties before the Court, but all other parties who may be affected by the impugned provision. There would, therefore, be inherent risk in striking down an impugned provision without having the complete factual data and full material before the Court. It was therefore, in our opinion, essential for the High Court to ascertain and field out the correct factual position before recording a finding that the impugned provision is violative of Article 14. The fact that the High Court acted on an incorrect assumption is also borne out by the material which has been adduced before us in the writ petitions filed under Article 32 of the Constitution.'' 15. In the case of Charanjit Lal Choudhary v. Union of India and others, AIR 1951 SC 41 para 10, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that there is presumption that the legislature understands and correctly appreciates the need of its people. In the case of Union of India v. Elphinstone Spinning and weaving Co. Ltd. and others, AIR 2001 SC 724 para 9, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has laid down the law that the legislature does not exceed its jurisdiction. In the case of Union of India v. Elphinstone Spinning and weaving Co. Ltd. and others, AIR 2001 SC 724 para 9, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has laid down the law that the legislature does not exceed its jurisdiction. In the case of State of Bihar and others v. Smt. Charusila Dasi, AIR 1959 SC 1002 para 14, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has laid down the law that there is presumption that the legislature does not intend to exceed its jurisdiction. In the case of Kedar Nath Singh v. State of Bihar, AIR 1962 SC 955 para 26 the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that provision should be construed in the manner as will uphold its constitutionality. In the case of Corporation of Calcutta v. Libery Cinema, AIR 1965 SC 1107 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court has laid down the law that the provision should be read in the manner as will make it valid. Similar view has been expressed by the Constitution Bench of Supreme Court in the case of Anandji Haridas and Co. (P) Ltd. v. S.P. Kasture and others, AIR 1968 SC 565 , para 32. In the case of Sunil Batra v. Delhi Administration and others, AIR 1978 SC 1675 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that the legislature expresses wisdom of community. In the case of State of Bihar v. Bihar Distilleries, AIR 1997 SC 1511 , para 18, the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that an Act made by legislature represents the will of people and cannot be lightly interfered with. In the case of Zameer Ahmad Latifur Rehman Sheikh v. State of Maharashtra and others, JT 2010 (4) SC 256 para 34, the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that every legally possible effort should be made to uphold the validity. In the case of Greater Bombay Co-operative Bank Ltd. v. United Yarn Tex (P) Ltd. and others, (2007) 6 SCC 236 para 82 to 85 the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed as under : ''82 The constitutional validity of an Act can be challenged only on two grounds, viz. (i) lack of legislative competence; and (ii) violation of any of the Fundamental Rights guaranteed in Part III of the Constitution or of any other constitutional provision. In State of A. P. and others v. McDowell & Co. (i) lack of legislative competence; and (ii) violation of any of the Fundamental Rights guaranteed in Part III of the Constitution or of any other constitutional provision. In State of A. P. and others v. McDowell & Co. and others [ (1996) 3 SCC 709 ], this Court has opined that except the above two grounds, there is no third ground on the basis of which the law made by the competent legislature can be invalidated and that the ground of invalidation must necessarily fall within the four corners of the afore-mentioned two grounds. 83. Power to enact a law is derived by the State Assembly from List II of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution. Entry 32 confers upon a State Legislature the power to constitute cooperative societies. The State of Maharashtra and the State of Andhra Pradesh both had enacted the MCS Act 1960 and the APCS Act, 1964 in exercise of the power vested in them by Entry 32 of List II of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution. Power to the enact would include the power to re-enact or validate any provision of law in the State Legislature, provided the same falls in an entry of List II of Seventh Schedule of the Constitution with the restriction that such enactment should not nullify a judgment of a competent Court of law. In the appeals/SLPs/petitions filed against the judgment of the Andhra Pradesh High Court, the legislative competence of the State is involved for consideration. Judicial system has an important role to play in our body politic and has a solemn obligation to fulfil. In such circumstances, it is imperative upon the Courts while examining the scope of legislative action to be conscious to start with the presumption regarding the constitutional validity of the legislation. The burden of proof is upon the shoulders of the incumbent who challenges it. It is true that it is the duty of the constitutional Courts under our Constitution to declare a law enacted by Parliament or the State Legislature as unconstitutional when Parliament or the State Legislature had assumed to enact a law which is void, either for want of constitutional power to enact it or because the constitutional forms or conditions have not been observed or where the law infringes the fundamental rights enshrined and guaranteed in Part III of the Constitution. 84. 84. As observed by this Court in CST v. Radhakrishnan in considering the validity of a Statute the presumption is always in favour of constitutionality and the burden is upon the person who attacks it to show that there has been transgression of constitutional principles. For sustaining the constitutionality of an Act, a Court may take into consideration matters of common knowledge, reports, preamble, history of the times, objection of the legislation and all other facts which are relevant. It must always be presumed that the legislature understands and correctly appreciates the need of its own people and that discrimination, if any, is based on adequate grounds and considerations. It is also well-settled that the Courts will be justified in giving a liberal interpretation in order to avoid constitutional invalidity. A provision conferring very wide and expansive powers on authority can be construed in conformity with legislative intent of exercise of power within constitutional limitations. Where a Statute is silent or is inarticulate, the Court would attempt to transmutate the inarticulate and adopt a construction which would lean towards constitutionality albeit without departing from the material of which the law is woven. These principles have given rise to rule of ''reading down'' the provisions if it becomes necessary to uphold the validity of the law. 85. In State of Bihar and others v. Bihar Distillery Ltd. and others [ (1997) 2 SCC 453 ], this Court indicated the approach which the Court should adopt while examining the validity/constitutionality of a legislation. It would be useful to remind ourselves of the principles laid down, which read: (SCC p.466, para 17): ''The approach of the Court, while examining the challenge to the constitutionality of an enactment, is to start with the presumption of constitutionality. The Court should try to sustain its validity to the extent possible. It should strike down the enactment only when it is not possible to sustain it. The Court should not approach the enactment with a view to pick holes or to search for defects of drafting, much less inexactitude of language employed. Indeed, any such defects of drafting should be ignored out as part of the attempt to sustain the validity/constitutionality of the enactment. After all, an Act made by the legislature represents the will of the people and that cannot be lightly interfered with. Indeed, any such defects of drafting should be ignored out as part of the attempt to sustain the validity/constitutionality of the enactment. After all, an Act made by the legislature represents the will of the people and that cannot be lightly interfered with. The unconstitutionality must be plainly and clearly established before an enactment is declared as void. The same approach holds good while ascertaining the intent and purpose of an enactment or its scope and application.'' In the same para, this Court further observed as follows: ''The Court must recognize the fundamental nature and importance of legislative process and accord due regard and deference to it, just as the legislature and the executive are expected to show due regard and deference to the judiciary. It cannot also be forgotten that our Constitution recognizes and gives effect to the concept of equality between the three wings of the State and the concept of ''checks and balances'' inherent in such scheme.'' 16. In the case of Promoters and Builders Association v. Pune Municipal Corporation, (2007) 6 SCC 143 para 9, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has laid down the law that while exercising legislative function, unless unreasonableness and arbitrariness is pointed out it is not open for the Court to interfere. 17. The constitutional validity of an Act can be challenged only on two grounds, viz. (i) lack of legislative competence; and (ii) violation of any of the Fundamental Rights guaranteed in Part III of the Constitution or of any other constitutional provision. Except the above two grounds, there is no third ground on the basis of which the law made by a competent legislature can be invalidated. The ground of invalidation must necessarily fall within the four corners of the aforementioned two grounds. In considering the validity of a Statute the presumption is always in favour of constitutionality and the burden is upon the person who attacks it to show that there has been transgression of constitutional principles. For sustaining the constitutionality of an Act, a Court may take into consideration matters of common knowledge, reports, preamble, history of the times, object of the legislation and all the other facts which are relevant. It must always be presumed that the legislature understands and correctly appreciates the need of its own people and that discrimination, if any, is based on adequate grounds and considerations. It must always be presumed that the legislature understands and correctly appreciates the need of its own people and that discrimination, if any, is based on adequate grounds and considerations. The Courts will be justified in giving a liberal interpretation in order to avoid constitutional invalidity. Where a Statute is silent or is inarticulate, the Court would attempt to transmutate the inarticulate and adopt a construction which would lean towards constitutionality albeit without departing from the material of which the law is woven. These principles give rise to rule of ''reading down'' the provisions if it becomes necessary to uphold the validity of the law. While examining the challenge to the constitutionality of an enactment, the Court is to start with the presumption of constitutionality and try to sustain its validity to the extent possible. The Court cannot approach the enactment with a view to pick holes or to search for defects of drafting, much less inexactitude of language employed. An act made by the legislature represents the will of the people and that cannot be lightly interfered with. It is presumed that the legislature expresses wisdom of the community, does not intend to exceed its jurisdiction and correctly appreciates the need of its own people. 18. When these settled principles are applied on the facts of the present case and the submissions made by the parties, we find that the petitioners have completely failed to rebut the presumption of constitutional validity of the impugned Act, 1980. 19. Once petitioners are not disputing the legislative competence of the State Legislature to enact the Act, 1980 and the field of legislation to regulate method of appointment of teacher in private aided institution, the question of breach of any fundamental right of the petitioner's institution including Article 19 (1) (g) of the Constitution of India, do not arise at all, particularly in view of law laid down by Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of T.M.A. Pai Foundation (supra). 20. For all the reasons aforequoted, we do not find any unconstitutionality in the impugned Act, 1980. The writ petition is wholly devoid of merit and is frivolous, which deserves to be dismissed. Consequently, the writ petition is dismissed.