JUDGMENT Soumen Sen, J. - This revisional application is arising out of an order passed by the learned Additional Civil Judge, Junior Division at Port Blair in connection with an application filed under section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure read with section 11 of Code of Civil Procedure filed by the defendants in Other Suit No. 94 of 2017. 2. Upon consideration of the submissions made by the learned counsel for the parties, the learned Single Judge framed the following preliminary issue regarding maintainability of the present suit:- " Whether the maintainability of the present suit is barred under the provision of the section 11 of CPC r.w.s Order 22 Rule 5 of CPC r.w.s Order 21 Rule 101 of CPC?" 3. The learned trial Court dismissed the suit on the ground that the issue raised in the present suit has been finally and conclusively decided in a previously instituted suit filed by the defendants against the plaintiffs/petitioners and in view of such clear finding in favour of the defendants/opposite parties the continuation of the suit is not permissible. 4. In order to appreciate the finding of the learned trial Court, it is necessary to refer to relevant pleadings in the earlier suit and in the present suit and on consideration of such relevant facts to take a decision as to whether the continuation of the present suit would be an abuse of the process of law. 5. The father of the defendant Nos. 1 and 2 filed a Title Suit bearing TS No. 50 of 2002 before the Civil Court against Kunda Rao (Husband of the plaintiff No. 1 and father of the plaintiff Nos. 2 to 6) for declaration of title and recovery of possession. The said suit was decreed in favour of the plaintiff i.e. the father of the defendant Nos. 1 and 2 by a decree and judgment dated 28th June, 2010. The plaintiffs in the present suit namely the revisionist in this revisional application preferred an appeal before the first appellate court challenging the decree and judgment of the Civil Judge, Junior Division. The first appellate court allowed the appeal by a judgment dated 31st August, 2016 and remanded the matter back to the trial Court. 6. The defendant Nos. 1 and 2 herein filed a second appeal before the Hon'ble High Court bearing FMA No. 001 of 2017. The first appellate court allowed the appeal by a judgment dated 31st August, 2016 and remanded the matter back to the trial Court. 6. The defendant Nos. 1 and 2 herein filed a second appeal before the Hon'ble High Court bearing FMA No. 001 of 2017. The said second appeal was allowed and the first appellate court was directed to dispose of the appeal on merits rather than remanding the matter to the trial Court. The first appellate court on remand by a judgment dated 14th September, 2017 affirmed the order of the trial Court and directed the plaintiffs herein to handover vacant possession of the suit land to the defendant Nos. 1 and 2 within ninety days from the date of passing of the judgment. This order of the first appellate court was challenged by the plaintiffs herein in SAT No. 011 of 2017. The second appeal was not admitted and was dismissed on 06th November, 2017 by reason of the said dismissal the appellate decree became enforceable. The plaintiffs/petitioners realising that dispossession from the property is eminent filed the Other Suit No. 94 of 2017 for setting aside of the judgment/decree dated 28th June, 2010 passed in the Title Suit No. 55 of 2007 having obtain by fraud and misrepresentation by the defendants jointly and severally. 7. By a clever artful drafting the plaintiffs try to create an illusion of cause of action for the present suit in paragraph Nos. 14 and 15 of the plaint which is reproduced below:- "14. That after dismissal of Second Appeal Plaintiffs on 24.10.2017 came to know that defendants No.1 and 2 are not the daughter of the late K.R. Ganesh. They came to know that no "WILL" was ever executed by K.R. Ganesh on this basis whereof in Land record the name of the defendant no. 1 and 2 stands recorded which this considered to be valid piece of evidence to declare ownership of defendant No.1 and 2 over the suit land in Title Suit R.No.55 of 2007. Only on 24.10. 2017 the plaintiffs learnt the act of defendants in playing fraud by procuring the alleged and Purported "WILL" by bringing it on record of Title Suit No. 55 of 2017 by fraudulent means. 15. That cause of action for filing the present suit arose on 24.10.2017 when the plaintiff has come to know that the defendant no. Only on 24.10. 2017 the plaintiffs learnt the act of defendants in playing fraud by procuring the alleged and Purported "WILL" by bringing it on record of Title Suit No. 55 of 2017 by fraudulent means. 15. That cause of action for filing the present suit arose on 24.10.2017 when the plaintiff has come to know that the defendant no. 1 and 2 who are no were related with K.R. Ganesh projected themselves to be legal heir in Title Suit No. 55 of 2007 and committing fraud obtained the judgment/decree dated 28-06-2010. The defendants have also misrepresented the fact and obtained judgement/decree. Further cause of action arose on 24.10. 2017 when the Plaintiffs came to know about defendant No. 1 and 2 procuring land record relating to suit land from the revenue department for fabricating the alleged and Purported "WILL" to make wrongful gain." 8. The defendants entered appearance into the suit and filed written statement, thereafter the defendants filed the application for dismissal of the suit. 9. The plaintiffs in the second suit has alleged that in the earlier suit the defendants herein averred that late Kunda Rao's father N. Murthy was a domestic servant under K. R. Ganesh and as such the said Kunda Rao has no right to claim and remain in possession of the suit property as his possession ripening permissive possession. The plaintiffs alleged, the fact of Kunda Rao's father to be a domestic servant under the said K. R. Ganesh, was a clear misrepresentation in the said suit for which the said decree obtained in the earlier suit is nullity. 10. The plaintiffs submitted that it would be evident from the notice dated 14th September, 2000 issued by K. R. Ganesh through his learned advocate which was marked as exhibit-3 in the said suit that K. R. Ganesh admitted the fact that Kunda Rao was neither a servant nor a tenant in respect of the suit property and this fact was misrepresented before the Court resulting in the judgment and decree to be passed in favour of the defendants/opposite parties. 11. 11. The learned trial Court on the basis of the documents exhibited in the earlier proceeding mainly exhibit-2, exhibit-3, exhibit-4 and exhibit-5 and the deposition of the parties recorded in the said proceeding held that all the points which are raised in the instant suit were raised and conclusively decided in the previously instituted suit namely in Title Suit No. 55 of 2007 and accordingly continuation of the second suit is not permissible and maintainable. 12. Mr. Jayapal, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the applicants/petitioners submitted that in deciding an application for rejection of plaint on the grounds urged by the opposite parties/defendants, the Court is precluded from looking into any other material save and except the averments made in the plaint and in view of the categorical statements made by the plaintiffs in paragraph Nos. 14 and 15 as alluded above, the plaint could not be dismissed summarily without a trial. The plaintiffs should have been given opportunity to prove and establish that there has been a misrepresentation and fraud committed by the defendants/opposite parties in the previously instituted suit which the plaintiffs were not aware of during trail and disposal of the earlier proceeding between the parties. Res judicata is a mixed question of law and fact and unless issues are framed and evidence are allowed to be adduced by the parties on such issues the Court cannot in a summary manner decide the maintainability point at this stage. 13. It is submitted that if a decree is obtained by fraud or misrepresentation, it is nonest in the eye of law and it is the duty of Court to recall and set aside such decree obtained by fraud. This opportunity however, as not being given to the plaintiffs thereby causing serious miscarriage of justice. 14. Mr. Jayapal has submitted that the issue raised by the plaintiffs in the present suit has to be factually examined on the basis of the evidence and the relevancy of the earlier judgement has to be decided after the parties are allowed to adduce evidence both oral and documentary. 15. Per Contra, Mrs. Anjili Nag, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the opposite parties/defendants submits that by a clever drafting the plaintiffs have now try to create an illusion of a cause of action. 15. Per Contra, Mrs. Anjili Nag, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the opposite parties/defendants submits that by a clever drafting the plaintiffs have now try to create an illusion of a cause of action. The opposite parties/defendants after a protracted litigation got a decree for eviction and it is no more open to the plaintiffs now to plead fraud or misrepresentation as the documents on which reliance has been placed by the plaintiffs have been duly considered by the trial court, the first appellate court and the second appellate court and once the decree has attained finality the defendants should not be dragged to another round of litigation. It is submitted that the instant suit is vexatious, frivolous and an abuse of the process of law and the court has the inherent jurisdiction irrespective of the nomenclature under which an application is filed to dismiss the suit. It is submitted on a wholesome reading of the plaint filed by the plaintiffs it would be glaring that it is an abuse of the process of law and the only purpose for filing the suit is to circumvent the decree and order passed in the earlier proceedings between the parties and such proceedings should be nipped in the bud. 16. The merits of the instant application are required to be decided within the four corners of the Code of Civil Procedure. The Court has power to reject a plaint under Order 7 Rule 11 and also under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Even if the application does not bear the nomenclature of Order 7 Rule 11 and Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the Court on a meaningful reading of the plaint is required to find out if the grounds stated in the plaint calls for dismissal of the suit. Apart from the aforesaid provision, the Court can also exercise its power in striking out pleadings if it appears to the Court that any part of the pleading is unnecessary, frivolous, vexatious or which is otherwise an abuse of the process of the Court. The instance of an abuse of the process of Court would cover matters where there is a suppression of material fact as on the date of institution of the proceeding or in a case where a party is relitigating the same issue which has been tried and decided earlier against him. The instance of an abuse of the process of Court would cover matters where there is a suppression of material fact as on the date of institution of the proceeding or in a case where a party is relitigating the same issue which has been tried and decided earlier against him. The re-agitation may or may not be barred under res judicata. But if the same issue is sought to be re-agitated, it also amounts to an abuse of the process of the Court. A proceeding being filed for a collateral purpose, or a spurious claim being made in litigation may also in a given set of facts amount to an abuse of the process of the Court. Frivolous or vexatious proceedings may also amount to an abuse of the process of the Court especially where the proceedings are absolutely groundless. The Court then has the power to stop such proceedings summarily and prevent the time of the public and the Court from being wasted. This principle has been enunciated in K.K. Modi vs. K.N. Modi & Ors., (1998) 3 SCC 573 . However, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has sounded a note of caution by observing that it is a matter of Court's discretion whether such proceedings should be stopped or not and this discretion has to be exercised with circumspection. It is a jurisdiction which should be sparingly exercised, and exercised only in special cases. The Court should also be satisfied that there is no chance of the suit succeeding. 17. The Court has the power at the stage of admitting the plaint to reject if it does not disclose any cause of action or barred by law. The Court is not required to wait for an application to be filed for rejection of plaint. In respect of selfcontained statutes, there are provisions, which oust the jurisdiction of Civil Court to deal with matters that are covered under such statutes, for example, the RDB Act and SARFAESI Act. 18. In considering the issues with regard to misrepresentation and or fraud the learned trial Judge has relied upon exhibit 3 in the earlier suit in order to find out whether the issue raised in the instant suit has already been decided in the earlier proceeding. It is not in dispute that exhibit 3 namely the notice issued by K.R. Ganesh was admitted in evidence. It is not in dispute that exhibit 3 namely the notice issued by K.R. Ganesh was admitted in evidence. In the said notice it was stated that the father of Kunda Rao namely N. Murthy was a domestic servant of K.R. Ganesh for many years. In the said notice it was also stated that the said N. Murthy was never inducted either as a tenant or servant/lessee on the suit property in any manner whatsoever. In the said proceeding the plaintiffs took a plea that that K.R. Ganesh gifted the suit property orally to late Kunda Rao since his father used to look after him during his stay at Port Blair. This contention of the plaintiffs herein was rejected by the trial court as well as the first appellate court. Both the courts discussed the implication of exhibit 3 and the first appellate court in particular has observed that:- "regarding this matter the legal notice issued by the respondents of this appeal who are the plaintiffs of TS. No. 55 of 2007 to Kunda Rao which is marked as Ext.3 is very important. It is also mentionworthy that the said legal notice has been received by the Kunda Rao. This matter is clearly indicating that the predecessor of the plaintiff as well as the present plaintiff have challenged and denied the peaceful occupation of Kunda Rao" The Trial Court while passing Judgement on 28-06- 2010 was pleased to observed that "by the said notice (Ext.3) the plaintiff alleged that the defendant was a trespasser. He tried to make unauthorised construction and he was asked to vacate the suit premises. The entire allegation and claim in the said notice stands uncontroverted in as much as the defendant preferred not to reply the said notice." 19. The issue now sought to be raised in the present suit by the plaintiffs ought to have been raised in the previously instituted suit. Section 11 sub section 4 of the Civil Procedure Code constructive res judicata which means that a matter which might and ought to have been made a ground of attack or defence is a matter which is constructively issue and if a party omitted to raise such issue although he ought to have raised the issue such party would be precluded from raising such issue in a subsequent proceeding. In other words it means that though it has not been an issue directly and substantially it would be regarded as having been an issue directly and substantially. The plaintiffs herein had an opportunity of attacking the said notice or taking a defence which are now being raised although it had enough opportunity to do so as nothing significantly had happened during this period which could be perceived as an event nor or could be under the contemplation of the plaintiffs. It was a legal defence that was available to the plaintiffs in the earlier suit. Moreover, it was decided and adjudicated by the trial court and first appellate court in the earlier suit that the possession of Kunda Rao over the suit property is nothing but a permissive possession. A person holding premises in capacity as caretaker does not acquire any right and interest in the property. The right of a caretaker to hold on to the property has been discussed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in a fairly recent judgement A. Shanmugam vs. Ariya Kshatriya Rajakula Vamsathu Madalaya Nandhavana Paripalanai Sangam and others, (2012) 6 SCC 430 . In the said judgement the law has been summarised in paragraphs 43.6, 43.7 and 43.8 which states: "43.6. The watchman, caretaker or a servant employed to look after the property can never acquire interest in the property irrespective of his long possession. The watchman, caretaker or a servant is under an obligation to hand over the possession forthwith on demand. According to the principles of justice, equity and good conscience, the courts are not justified in protecting the possession of a watchman, caretaker or servant who was only allowed to live into the premises to look after the same. 43.7. The watchman, caretaker or agent holds the property of the principal only on behalf of the principal. He acquires no right or interest whatsoever in such property irrespective of his long stay or possession. 43.8. The protection of the court can be granted or extended to the person who has a valid subsisting rent agreement, lease agreement or licence agreement in his favour." 20. In the earlier proceeding it has been conclusively established that Kunda Rao acquired no right, title or interest whatsoever in the property in question irrespective of his alleged long stay or possession. 21. In the earlier proceeding it has been conclusively established that Kunda Rao acquired no right, title or interest whatsoever in the property in question irrespective of his alleged long stay or possession. 21. The second issue raised by the plaintiffs is to the effect that the defendant no. 1 and 2 are not the successor interest of the late K.R. Ganesh as such they had no right to represent the suit. By misrepresenting and playing fraud upon the court the defendants obtained the judgement/decree. The plaintiffs further contended that the defendant no. 1 and 2 also brought on record certain manipulated record such as record or right and WILL. The trial court in the earlier proceeding while passing the impugned judgement relied upon exhibit 5 (a WILL) to hold that the defendant no. 1 and 2 being the daughter of K.R. Ganesh are entitle for mutation. It is submitted that exhibit 2 (ROR) were prepared on the basis of the allege WILL. 22. The materials on record however, suggest that in the previous suit the plaintiffs herein admitted that the defendant nos. 1 and 2 are the daughters of K.R.Ganesh. The plaintiff no.1 namely Smti. Manickam deposed in T.S 55/2007 as D.W 01. She deposed that he knows that there are two daughters of K.R. Ganesh who reside in Delhi and they used to come to Port Blair. D.W 02 namely M. Lingamaiya deposed that there are two daughters of K.R. Ganesh namely Ragini Ganesh and Kalyani Ganesh. D.W 03 deposed that K.R. Ganesh has two daughters namely Ragini and Kalyani. On being satisfied regarding the fact that Ragini and Kalyani are the daughters of K.R. Ganesh the Ld. Trial Court and the first appellate court in that suit was pleased to declare the title in their favour. The appellate court was pleased to hold that the documents which have been marked as Ext. 2, Ext. 4 and Ext. 5 collectively are clearly depicting that original plaintiff K.R. Ganesh had the right over the suit property and after his demise the present plaintiff i.e. Ragini and Kalyani inherited the right in respect of suit property. 23. The appellate court was pleased to hold that the documents which have been marked as Ext. 2, Ext. 4 and Ext. 5 collectively are clearly depicting that original plaintiff K.R. Ganesh had the right over the suit property and after his demise the present plaintiff i.e. Ragini and Kalyani inherited the right in respect of suit property. 23. The plaintiffs herein did not invite the trial court in the earlier suit to decide as to whether the present defendants are not the legal representatives of K.R. Ganesh since deceased and there has been no change of circumstances which could require the court to decide the said issue now. The said exhibits were taken on record and the evidentiary value of all such exhibits were considered by the trial court and the first appellate court. The second appeal was dismissed as not admitted. The plaintiffs herein neither before the trial court nor before the appellate court raised the question as to whether the defendant no. 1 and 2 herein are not the legal heirs of deceased K.R. Ganesh. Moreover, it is not the case of the plaintiffs herein that after passing of the judgement dated 20th June, 2010 they came to know that the defendant no. 1 and 2 herein are not the legal heirs of the deceased K.R. Ganesh, rather in the previous suit they admitted that the defendant no. 1 and 2 herein are the daughters of the deceased K.R. Ganesh. It was on the conspectus of the aforesaid facts it is clear that the second suit is an abuse of the process of law and was rightly nipped in the bud by the learned trial court in a well-considered judgement. There cannot be any doubt that on a true and meaningful reading of the plaint alongwith with the pleadings, evidence and judgements in the previously instituted suit it can be safely concluded that the petitioners are guilty of deliberately introducing irrelevant and untenable pleas responsible for creating unnecessary confusion by introducing such documents and pleas. It is a common experience that our courts are usually short of time because of huge pendency of cases and at times the courts arrived at an erroneous conclusion because of false claims, defences and irrelevant facts. It is a duty of the court to effectively discourage fraudulent and dishonest litigants. It is a common experience that our courts are usually short of time because of huge pendency of cases and at times the courts arrived at an erroneous conclusion because of false claims, defences and irrelevant facts. It is a duty of the court to effectively discourage fraudulent and dishonest litigants. The case of plaintiffs is one of falsehood distortion and confusion in pleadings. It is one of those cases where the court is obliged to impose exemplary cost. 24. A Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court has held that repeated and successive proceedings which were frivolous, vexatious and highly prejudicial and oppressive against a party are clear instances of abuse of process of court amounting to criminal contempt ( Hastings Mills Ltd. vs. Hira Singh,1978 CalHN 64 ). Anil Kr. Sen, J. admirably summarised this aspect of the law in the following passage: Section 2(c) of the Act has defined criminal contempt to mean doing of any act which either prejudices, or interferences or tends to interfere with the due course of any judicial proceedings or interferes or tends to interfere with, or obstructs or rends to obstructs, the administration of justice in any other manner. In the case of Baradakanta Mishra v. The Registrar, Orissa High Courts, the Supreme Court pointed out that the terminology used in the definition is borrowed from the English Law of Contempt and embodies in India and they have to be understood in the sense in which they have necessary. Under the English Law any act which is likely to interfere with the course of justice will amount to contempt. Acts which are likely to interfere with the course of justice may be classified into four categories, namely, (1) acts which interfere with persons having duties to discharge in a court of justice. Under the English Law any act which is likely to interfere with the course of justice will amount to contempt. Acts which are likely to interfere with the course of justice may be classified into four categories, namely, (1) acts which interfere with persons having duties to discharge in a court of justice. (2) acts which amount to a breach of duty committed by persons officially connected with the court or its process, (3) acts which interfere with persons over whom the court exercise special jurisdiction, and (4) acts which amount to an abuse of the court's processes, Abusing the court's process may mean different types of acts but generally the term connotes some misuse of the court's process, the most serious example of which is an act which is intended to deceive the court, for example, by the deliberate suppression of facts or by the presentation of falsehood, but the some terms also includes bringing of frivolous and vexatious proceedings. Therefore, an act of misleading the court by deliberate suppression of facts or by the presentation of false3hod is as much abuse of the court's process as the act of bringing frivolous and vexatious and oppressive proceedings. In Wright v. Bennet, and Stephenson v. Garnett, it has been held taking of successive action covering the same ground and litigating over again the same question is clearly as act of abuse of the process of court. Such acts are necessarily frivolous and vexatious apart from being oppressive to the defendant. 25. A Division Bench of the Kerala High Court in A.K.Prakash, (1995) CriLJ 1663 (DB) has also held the successive applications on the same cause of action amounted to abuse of the process and constituted contempt as they were calculated to interfere with due administration of justice. 26. For the reasons mentioned above this application is dismissed with cost assessed at Rs. 20,000/- to be paid by the petitioners to SLSA, Port Blair within a period of four weeks from date.