ORDER : I.A. No. 1/2020 1. In the present appeal disposed off on 8th May, 2018, the present application - I.A. No. 1/2020 accompanied by the memorandum of facts is filed under the provisions of Section 482 Cr.P.C. by the learned Counsel for the appellants-accused seeking to alter the sentence dated 7.7.2012 imposed in S.C. No. 40/2008 by the learned District and Sessions Judge at Kodagu, Madikeri to run concurrently instead of consecutively in the interest of justice. 2. In the application, it is submitted that the trial Court convicted the appellants-accused and sentenced them to undergo imprisonment for life with fine of Rs. 10,000/- for the offence punishable under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code (for short, hereinafter referred to as ‘IPC’) and rigorous imprisonment for two years with fine of Rs. 3,000/- for the offence punishable under Section 201 of IPC with default clauses. Aggrieved by the said judgment of conviction and order of sentence, the accused-appellants preferred this criminal appeal which was dismissed on 8.5.2018 as being devoid of merits. 3. It is further contended in the application, that the appellants-accused are in prison since 2007 and they are in custody for more than 12 years. They are now listed for release on their good conduct and hence, the jail authorities have sought for clarification from the District Court as to how the sentence part is to be considered for which the Principal District and Sessions Court by its orders dated 13.11.2020 and 15.6.2020 has given a clarification stating that the sentences have to be treated as consecutively instead of concurrently. 4. It is further contended that in view of the provisions of Section 427 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (in short, hereinafter referred to as Cr.P.C.) when a person is already undergoing a sentence of imprisonment for life, the subsequent sentence shall have to run concurrently. It is further contended that the clarification/order passed by the trial Court is perverse and requires interference by this Court as there was no order in the operative portion whether the sentences imposed on the appellants-accused have to be run concurrently or consecutively. Therefore, the appellants-accused were under the impression that the sentences will have to run concurrently. However, by the later order/clarification, it was made clear that the sentences shall have to run consecutively which is against the law. Therefore, the appellants-accused were under the impression that the sentences will have to run concurrently. However, by the later order/clarification, it was made clear that the sentences shall have to run consecutively which is against the law. Therefore, the present application is filed by the accused-appellants. 5. The respondent-State has filed objections contending that the present application filed by the appellants-accused seeking modification of the judgment passed by this Court to the extent of running the sentences concurrently is not maintainable either in law or on facts in view of the provisions of Section 362 of the Cr.P.C. that when the judgment or final order is signed disposing of a case, no Court shall alter or review the same except to correct a clerical or arithmetical error. 6. Further the State has also relied upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Atul Shukla vs. State of Madhya Pradesh and Another, (2019) 17 SCC 299 wherein it is held that once the matter is disposed off, the subsequent application for modification or review of its earlier order having regard to specific bar contained in Section 362 of the Cr.P.C. is impermissible. Therefore, he sought to dismiss the application. 7. We have heard the learned Counsel for the appellants-accused and the learned High Court Government Pleader on the application. 8. Sri. K.C. Pratheep, learned Counsel for the appellants-accused reiterating the grounds urged in the application contended that the trial Court convicted the accused and were sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for life and to pay fine of Rs. 10,000/- for the offence punishable under the Section 302 of IPC and rigorous imprisonment for two years and to pay fine of Rs. 3,000/- for the offence punishable under Section 201 of IPC with default sentences, but there was no order as to whether the sentences have to run concurrently or consecutively. He further contended that this Court while confirming the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence passed by the trial Court by the judgment dated 8th May, 2018 dismissed the appeal as being devoid of merits, but has not clarified whether the sentences have to run concurrently or consecutively. The appellants are in custody for more than 12 years. He further contended that this Court while confirming the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence passed by the trial Court by the judgment dated 8th May, 2018 dismissed the appeal as being devoid of merits, but has not clarified whether the sentences have to run concurrently or consecutively. The appellants are in custody for more than 12 years. When the Jail Authorities included the names of the appellants in the list to be released on their good conduct, they have sought for clarification from District Court. The District Court by its orders dated 13.11.2020 and 15.6.2020 has clarified that the sentences in respect of both the appellants-accused have to be treated as consecutively instead of concurrently. 9. In support of his contentions, the learned Counsel for the accused relied upon the following judgments: (i) Mahadevasetty @ Ballu vs. State of Karnataka in Criminal Appeal No. 662/2009 dated 5th June, 2018. (ii) State of Karnataka vs. Swamygowda and Another in Criminal Appeal No. 815/2004, C/W No. 816/2004, dated 16th August, 2016. (iii) New India Assurance Co. Ltd. vs. Krishna Kumar Pandey, (2015) 2 SCC 783 . Therefore, he sought to allow the application. 10. Per contra, Sri. S. Rachaiah, learned High Court Government Pleader contended with vehemence that the very application filed by the appellants-accused for modification of the sentence under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure in the disposed off appeal is not maintainable. He would further contend that cause of action for filing the present application on the clarification issued by the Principal District and Sessions Court on the request of the Jail Superintendent by the letter dated 29th May, 2020, would not arise and the appellants-accused cannot take the said cause of action in the present application. The present application filed is for modification of the order of sentence passed by the trial Court and affirmed by this Court which is not maintainable in view of the fact that once the matter is disposed off, it is ceased and it become functus officio and in the disposed off matter, this Court cannot modify or clarify except, if there is any arithmetical or clerical error under the provisions of Section 362 Cr.P.C. Therefore, he sought to reject the application. 11. 11. In support of his contentions, the learned HCGP relied upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Atul Shukla vs. State of Madhya Pradesh and Another, (2019) 17 SCC 299 particularly paragraphs 2 to 7. 12. In view of the aforesaid rival contentions urged by the learned Counsel for the parties, the only point that arise for consideration is: “Whether the present application, filed by the accused under the provisions of Section 482 Code of Criminal Procedure to alter the sentence dated 7.7.2018 passed in S.C. No. 40/2008 to run concurrently instead of consecutively in the disposed of Criminal Appeal No. 663/2013 by the Co-ordinate Bench of this Court, is maintainable in the facts and circumstances of the present case?” 13. We have given our anxious consideration to the arguments advanced by the learned Counsel for the parties and perused the entire material on record carefully. 14. It is an undisputed fact that the charge sheet came to be filed by the Circle Inspector of Police, Kushalanagara against the accused for the offences punishable under Sections 302, 397 and 201 r/w 34 of IPC. After contest, the trial Court by the judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 7.7.2012 found the accused guilty of the offences punishable under Sections 302 and 201 of IPC and acquitted them for the offence punishable under Section 307 IPC. Accordingly, the accused were sentenced to undergo life imprisonment and to pay fine of Rs. 10,000/- for the offence punishable under Section 302 of IPC and rigorous imprisonment for 2 years and to pay fine of Rs. 3,000/- for the offence punishable under Section 201 of IPC with default sentences. 15. Being aggrieved by the said judgment of conviction and order of sentence, both the accused persons preferred an appeal before this Court i.e. the present criminal appeal. Co-ordinate Bench of this Court by the order dated 8th May, 2018 dismissed the criminal appeal holding that there is no perversity or illegality in the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence passed by the trial Court and accordingly, affirmed the judgment of conviction and order of sentence passed by the trial Court. 16. Co-ordinate Bench of this Court by the order dated 8th May, 2018 dismissed the criminal appeal holding that there is no perversity or illegality in the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence passed by the trial Court and accordingly, affirmed the judgment of conviction and order of sentence passed by the trial Court. 16. It is not in dispute that in view of the judgment of conviction and order of sentence passed by the trial Court and affirmed by this Court stated supra, the appellants have been convicted and sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life and rigorous imprisonment for two years for the offences punishable under the provisions of Sections 302 and 201 of IPC. In view of the fact that life imprisonment means imprisonment for full and complete span of life, the question of consecutive sentences in case of conviction for several offences at one trial does not arise. Therefore, in case a person is sentenced for conviction of several offences including one that of life imprisonment, the proviso to Section 31(2) of Cr.P.C. shall come into force and no consecutive sentence can be imposed. Unfortunately, the Jail Authorities have sought clarification by their letter dated 29.5.2020 to the Principal District and Sessions Court, Kodagu with regard to punishment imposed by the trial Court. The learned Principal District and Sessions Court ought not to have given opinion or clarified in an disposed off matter as the matter is ceased and the trial Court has no power to clarify in a ceased matter as it becomes functus officio. Inspite of the same, the learned Principal District and Sessions Court, Kodagu, Madikeri, has clarified that the order of sentence imposed on the accused has to be treated as consecutively. Based on the said clarifications dated 13.11.2020 and 15th June, 2020, the present application is filed. 17. It is very strange that the accused being convicted for imprisonment of life and rigorous imprisonment for two years with fine and default sentences for the offences punishable under Sections 302 and 201 of IPC, the Jail Authorities sought clarification which is nothing but review. 17. It is very strange that the accused being convicted for imprisonment of life and rigorous imprisonment for two years with fine and default sentences for the offences punishable under Sections 302 and 201 of IPC, the Jail Authorities sought clarification which is nothing but review. It is for the Jail Authorities to recommend or for the State to take necessary steps under the provisions of Section 432 Cr.P.C. Once the matter is disposed off convicting the accused and is confirmed by this Court, the learned Principal District and Sessions Judge ought not to have clarified and that is not a ground or cause of action for the accused to file the present application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and seeking an order on sentence to run concurrently instead of consecutively as held by the trial Court by the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 7th July, 2012 passed in S.C. No. 40/2008 is nothing, but modification of the order of sentence passed by the trial Court and affirmed by this Court, without there being any valid ground for modification of the judgment passed by this Court. The fact that the appellants seeking modification of the sentence dated 7th July, 2012 to run concurrently instead of consecutively in S.C. No. 40/2008 is nothing but review of the judgment passed by this Court and without recalling the judgment dated 8th May, 2018 passed by the Co-ordinate Bench of this Court dismissing the present appeal on merits and confirming the impugned judgment and order of conviction passed by the trial Court, the present application filed by the accused-appellants is not maintainable. Even assuming that the application is filed for recalling of the earlier judgment dated 8th May, 2018 passed by this Court, it is nothing but review of the earlier judgment, which is impermissible, in view of the provisions of Section 362 of Cr.P.C. which reads as under: “362. Court not to after judgment: Save as otherwise provided by this Code or by any other law for the time being in force, no Court, when it has signed its judgment or final order disposing of a case, shall alter or review the same except to correct a clerical or arithmetical error.” 18. Court not to after judgment: Save as otherwise provided by this Code or by any other law for the time being in force, no Court, when it has signed its judgment or final order disposing of a case, shall alter or review the same except to correct a clerical or arithmetical error.” 18. A careful reading of the said provision makes it clear that no Court, when it has signed its judgment or final order disposing of a case, shall alter or review the same except to correct a clerical or arithmetical error. In the instant case, it is not the case of the appellants that they have filed the present application under Section 362 Cr.P.C. to correct the clerical or arithmetical error in the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence passed by the trial Court and confirmed by this Court. The present application is in the form of review and hence, the same is not maintainable and is also impermissible under law. 19. Our view is fortified by the dictum of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Atul Shukla vs. State of Madhya Pradesh and Another, (2019) 17 SCC 299 wherein at paragraphs 2 to 7 it is held as under: “2. A first information report being FIR No. 575/2016 was registered at Police Station Kolgawan, District Satna, Madhya Pradesh for the offences under Sections 364 and 323 read with Section 34 of the Penal Code, 1860. Upon investigation, a charge-sheet was filed on 8-9-2016. 3. A petition under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Cr.P.C.) was filed by the second respondent for quashing of the FIR. In the meantime, charges were framed on 24-4-2017. On 20-7-2018, Surendra Singh vs. State of M.P. 2018 SCC Online MP 1425, the High Court dismissed the petition under Section 482 in the following terms: (Surendra Singh vs. State of M.P. 2018 SCC Online MP 1425, Paras 6-7) “6. Considering the circumstances, this petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. has no merit. The petitioner may challenge the framing of charge under appropriate provisions. 7. With the above observation, this petition is dismissed.” 4. Considering the circumstances, this petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. has no merit. The petitioner may challenge the framing of charge under appropriate provisions. 7. With the above observation, this petition is dismissed.” 4. After the above order, the second respondent filed another petition under Section 482 in which the following relief was sought: “It is therefore, prayed that this Hon'ble Court may kindly review, recall and modify the order dated 20-7-2018, Surendra Singh vs. State of M.P. 2018 SCC Online MP 1425, in the interest of justice.” It is on the second petition that the High Court passed its impugned order dated 20-8-2018 Surendra Singh vs. State of M.P. 2018 SCC Online MP 1424 allowing the petition and recalling its earlier order dated 20-7-2018, Surendra Singh vs. State of M.P. 2018 SCC Online MP 1425. 5. The submission which has been urged on behalf of the appellant is that the High Court could not have entertained the subsequent petition under Section 482 for review or, as the case may be, for modification of its earlier order having regard to the specific bar contained in Section 362 Cr.P.C. Section 362 provides as follows: “362. Court not to alter judgment - Save as otherwise provided by this Code or by any other law for the time being in force, no court, when it has signed its judgment or final order disposing of a case, shall alter or review the same except to correct a clerical or arithmetical error.” 6. The State of Madhya Pradesh represented by the learned Standing Counsel has filed a counter-affidavit supporting the contention of the appellant. The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the second respondent has urged that in the order dated 20-7-2018, Surendra Singh vs. State of M.P. 2018 SCC Online MP 1425, the High Court had recorded the submission that no offence under Section 364 was made out. 7. The High Court while dismissing the petition under Section 482 observed that it would be open to the second respondent to pursue his remedies after framing of the charge. In view of the specific bar which is contained in Section 362, we are of the view that the impugned order Surendra Singh vs. State of M.P. 2018 SCC Online MP 1424, of the High Court is unsustainable. Such an application for review or modification could not have been entertained.” 20. In view of the specific bar which is contained in Section 362, we are of the view that the impugned order Surendra Singh vs. State of M.P. 2018 SCC Online MP 1424, of the High Court is unsustainable. Such an application for review or modification could not have been entertained.” 20. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Duryodhan Rout vs. State of Orissa, (2015) 2 SCC 783 wherein at Paragraph 29, has held as under: 29. Section 31 Cr.P.C. relates to sentence in cases of conviction of several offences at one trial. The proviso to sub-section (2) to Section 31 lays down the embargo whether the aggregate punishment of prisoner is for a period longer than 14 years. In view of the fact that life imprisonment means imprisonment for full and complete span of life, the question of consecutive sentences in case of conviction for several offences at one trial does not arise. Therefore, in case a person is sentenced for conviction of several offences, including one that of life imprisonment, the proviso to Section 31(2) shall come into play and no consecutive sentence can be imposed. 21. In the instant case, the accused-appellants have been convicted and sentenced for more than one offence i.e. imprisonment for life with fine of Rs. 10,000/- for the offence punishable under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code and rigorous imprisonment for two years with fine of Rs. 3,000/- for the offence punishable under Section 201 of IPC with default sentences. It is well settled that sentence of life imprisonment implies imprisonment till the end of normal life of convict and it cannot be directed to run consecutively. Our view is fortified by the dictum of the Constitutional Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Muthuramalingam and Others vs. State Represented by Inspector of Police, AIR 2016 SC 3340 wherein at Paragraphs 17, 20, 21 and 31, it is held as under: “17. The legal position is, thus, fairly well settled that imprisonment for life is a sentence for the remainder of the life of the offender unless of course the remaining sentence is commuted or remitted by the competent authority. The legal position is, thus, fairly well settled that imprisonment for life is a sentence for the remainder of the life of the offender unless of course the remaining sentence is commuted or remitted by the competent authority. That being so, the provisions of Section 31 under Cr.P.C. must be so interpreted as to be consistent with the basic tenet that a life sentence requires the prisoner to spend the rest of his life in prison. Any direction that requires the offender to undergo imprisonment for life twice over would be anomalous and irrational for it will disregard the fact that humans like all other living beings have but one life to live. So understood Section 31(1) would permit consecutive running of sentences only if such sentences do not happen to be life sentences. That is, in our opinion, the only way one can avoid an obvious impossibility of a prisoner serving two consecutive life sentences. 20. Ranjit Singh vs. UT of Chandigarh, (1991) 4 SCC 304 : 1991 SCC (Cri) 965, was no doubt dealing with a fact situation different from the one with which we are dealing in the present case, inasmuch as Ranjit Singh vs. UT of Chandigarh, (1991) 4 SCC 304 : 1991 SCC (Cri) 965, was covered by Section 427 Cr.P.C. as the prisoner in that case was already undergoing a sentence of life imprisonment when he committed a second offence of murder that led to his conviction and award of a second sentence of life imprisonment. In the cases at hand, the appellants were not convicts undergoing life sentence at the time of commission of multiple murders by them. Their cases, therefore, fall more appropriately under Section 31 of the Code which deals with conviction of several offences at one trial. Section 31(1) deals with and empowers the court to award, subject to the provisions of Section 71 IPC, several punishments prescribed for such offences and mandates that such punishments when consisting of imprisonment shall commence one after the expiration of the other in such order as the court may direct unless the court directs such punishments shall run concurrently. The power to award suitable sentences for several offences committed by the offenders is not and cannot be disputed. The order in which such sentences shall run can also be stipulated by the court awarding such sentences. The power to award suitable sentences for several offences committed by the offenders is not and cannot be disputed. The order in which such sentences shall run can also be stipulated by the court awarding such sentences. So also the court is competent in its discretion to direct that punishment awarded shall run concurrently not consecutively. The question, however, is whether the provision admits of more than one life sentences running consecutively. That question can be answered on a logical basis only if one accepts the truism that humans have one life and the sentence of life imprisonment once awarded would require the prisoner to spend the remainder of his life in jail unless the sentence is commuted or remitted by the competent authority. That, in our opinion, happens to be the logic behind Section 427(2) Cr.P.C. mandating that if a prisoner already undergoing life sentence is sentenced to another imprisonment for life for a subsequent offence committed by him, the two sentences so awarded shall run concurrently and not consecutively. Section 427(2) in that way carves out an exception to the general rule recognised in Section 427(1) that sentences awarded upon conviction for a subsequent offence shall run consecutively. 21. We may now turn to the conflict noticed in the reference order between the decisions of this Court in O.M. Cherian vs. State of Kerala, (2015) 2 SCC 501 : (2015) 2 SCC (Cri) 123 and Duryodhan Rout vs. State of Orissa, (2015) 2 SCC 783 : (2015) 2 SCC (Cri) 306, cases on the one hand and Kamalanantha vs. State of Tamil Nadu, (2005) 5 SCC 194 : 2005 SCC (Cri) 1121 and Sanaullah Khan vs. State of Bihar, (2013) 3 SCC 52 : (2013) 2 SCC (Cri) 34, cases on the other. 31. In conclusion our answer to the question is in the negative. We hold that while multiple sentences for imprisonment for life can be awarded for multiple murders or other offences punishable with imprisonment for life, the life sentences so awarded cannot be directed to run consecutively. Such sentences would, however, be superimposed over each other so that any remission or commutation granted by the competent authority in one does not ipso facto result in remission of the sentence awarded to the prisoner for the other.” 22. Such sentences would, however, be superimposed over each other so that any remission or commutation granted by the competent authority in one does not ipso facto result in remission of the sentence awarded to the prisoner for the other.” 22. The dictums relied upon by the learned Counsel for the appellants have no application to the facts and circumstances in the present application to alter the sentences imposed in the disposed off matter long ago. 23. For the reasons stated above, the point raised while considering the present application, is answered in the negative holding that the application filed by the accused under the provisions of Section 482 Cr.P.C. to alter that the sentences imposed on the accused shall run concurrently instead of consecutively in S.C. No. 40/2008 in the order dated 7th July, 2012 passed by the Principal District and Sessions Judge, Kodagu, Madikeri is not maintainable in the facts and circumstances of the present case. 24. In view of the above, I.A. No. 1/2020 filed by the accused-appellants is dismissed as being devoid of merits. 25. A copy of this order shall be sent to the concerned learned District and Sessions Judge, Kodagu, Madikeri forthwith.