JUDGMENT : M.S. JAWALKAR, J. 1. Heard learned Counsel for the parties. 2. Rule. Rule made returnable forthwith with the consent and at the request of the petitioner appearing in person and learned Advocate General. Learned Additional Government Advocate waives service on behalf of the respondent. 3. Petitioner, who appeared in person, seeks to challenge in this Writ Petition the constitutional validity of Section 13D(e) and 13G read with Section 2(7) and 2(8) of the Goa Public Gambling Act, 1976 (for the sake of brevity ‘the Act’). 4. It is submitted by the petitioner that Section 13A was inserted by way of amendment dated 24.08.1992, thereby empowering the government to permit the conduct of any game of electronic amusement or slot machine in Five Star Hotels. The said Act was further amended on 11.09.1996 and a further clause to Section 13A of the Act was added thereby empowering the government to permit the conduct of such table games and gaming on board in vessels offshore as may be notified. Section 2(A) was added by way of amendment and “Gaming Commissioner” was defined. “Tourist” and “Tourist permit” are defined under Section 2(7) and Section 2(8), respectively. The said Act was further amended on 01.02.2020 and Section 13(G) was inserted in the said Act. This section makes it an offence for any person to enter such a place or area for gaming, designated by the government by notification, without a valid tourist permit. 5. The petitioner contends that these provisions, inserted by way of amendment to the said Act, violate Article 14 of the Constitution as they discriminate between “tourists” and “non-tourists” in terms of the permissibility of entry into places where games, as authorized under Section 13A, are actually conducted and are consequently void as per Article 13(2) of the Constitution of India. 6. The petitioner made it clear that he has not filed any public interest litigation but is agitating his personal rights. Petitioner contends that he is desirous of visiting the casinos whose activities have commenced but is barred from doing so on account of Section 13(G) of the Act, which restricts the entry of any person other than a tourist or the holder of tourist permit. Petitioner contends that he is desirous of visiting the casinos whose activities have commenced but is barred from doing so on account of Section 13(G) of the Act, which restricts the entry of any person other than a tourist or the holder of tourist permit. In other words, any person who is a permanent resident or is domiciled in the State of Goa is barred entry to “casinos” or the places or areas where gaming activities are actually conducted as authorized under Section 13A of the Act. Petitioner does not qualify criteria of ‘tourist’ since he is a permanent resident of Goa. 7. The petitioner submits that the impugned provisions contravene Article 14 of the Constitution of India by prohibiting access of persons, who are permanent residents of Goa. The distinction being made between tourists and non-tourists miserably fails the test of reasonable classification which must be fulfilled by any classification to withstand the rigors of Article 14. He contends that what is good for tourists cannot be bad for the Goans or non-tourists. He submits that the classification is not based on any intelligible differentia and the differentia has no rational nexus with the object sought to be achieved. He submits that the object is itself discriminatory in this case. 8. Petitioner relied on several decisions in support of his contentions and the relevant decisions are proposed to be considered in the course of this judgment and order. 9. Mr. D. Pangam, the learned Advocate General, at the outset, pointed out that the activity of gambling cannot be equated with any trade or commerce to assert any fundamental right to practice any profession or to carry on any occupation, trade, or business under Section 19(1)(g). Even this freedom can be restricted by law, by imposing a reasonable restriction in the interest of the general public. There is no right vested where the business is dangerous or immoral; such a business may be absolutely prohibited or may be required to be licensed. There is no unfettered right to carry on business at any place or at any time and is always subject to reasonable restrictions, which may be imposed in that regard. Being a welfare State, the State must secure to every citizen, man, and woman, the right to adequate means of livelihood. There is no unfettered right to carry on business at any place or at any time and is always subject to reasonable restrictions, which may be imposed in that regard. Being a welfare State, the State must secure to every citizen, man, and woman, the right to adequate means of livelihood. State also must see that youth of the State be protected and do not overindulge or get addicted to such activities involving chance or luck. The restriction on people domiciled in Goa is in the interest of the welfare of society. In the absence of such restrictions, the person domiciled in Goa may suffer poverty, which ultimately will hamper the economic and social development of the State. The families of such persons may also require to suffer financial loss. There is intelligible differentia between the class of persons domiciled in Goa and the class of persons recognized as a tourist or having tourist permit. The tourists come to Goa for a short period and leisure and relaxation and so the opportunity of access is limited. However, if persons domiciled in Goa are allowed, it may have an adverse effect on society. It is further submitted that the classification based on persons domiciled in Goa and the class of persons recognized as tourists having tourist permit is well-founded and does not violate Article 14 of the Constitution. 10. The rival contentions now fall for our determination. 11. The petitioner relied on Budhan Chaudhary vs. State of Bihar, AIR 1955 SC 191 wherein the Apex Court has held that: “(i) The classification must be founded on an intelligible differentia, which distinguishes persons or things that are grouped together from others left out of the group. (ii) That the differentia must have a rational relation to the object sought to be achieved by the statute in question.” 12. The petitioner submits that Statement of Object and Reasons contained in the bill. “The Bill seeks to empower the State Government to permit only tourists to casinos”. The very object itself discriminates between tourists and non-tourists. (ii) That the differentia must have a rational relation to the object sought to be achieved by the statute in question.” 12. The petitioner submits that Statement of Object and Reasons contained in the bill. “The Bill seeks to empower the State Government to permit only tourists to casinos”. The very object itself discriminates between tourists and non-tourists. A constitution bench of Apex Court in Subramanian Swamy vs. Director, CBI, 2014) 8 SCC 682 held that “if the object itself is discriminatory, then the explanation that classification is reasonable having rational relation to the object sought to be achieved is immaterial.” He also relied on Nagpur Improvement Trust vs. Vithal Rao, (1973) 1 SCC 500 and Deepak Sibal vs. Punjab University, (1989) 2 SCC 145 in support of his above contention. The classification between tourists and non-tourists is sought to be made, inter alia, on the ground of permanent residence in and outside the State of Goa. 13. Petitioner placed reliance on Sarbananda Sonowal vs. Union of India, 2005 (5) SCC 655 and Rajendran vs. State of Madras, AIR 1968 SC 1012 and asserted that mere geographical classification which has no rational nexus to the object sought to be achieved cannot be upheld. Petitioner also placed reliance on State of U.P. vs. Pradip Tandon, 1975 (1) SCC 267 , Kailash Chand Sharma vs. State of Rajasthan, 2002 (6) SCC 562 and Harshendra Choubisa vs. State of Rajasthan, 2002 (6) SCC 393 in support of his contention that there cannot be any classification based on region or residence. 14. Petitioner submits that India is one country and there cannot be any preferential treatment or prohibition based on permanent residence. It is impermissible having regard to Article 14 of the Constitution of India to discriminate between the residents and non-residents of a particular State unless there is a valid reason for doing so. 15. In support of this contention, he relied on Lakshman vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, 1983 (3) SCC 275 wherein Hon’ble Apex Court dealing with the rules issued by the government of Madhya Pradesh by which the government wants to inhibit the influx of cattle of other States by the method of charging higher grazing rates in their case than in the case of cattle belonging to the residents of Madhya Pradesh. The Hon’ble Apex Court held that: “We are unable to see any rational basis for the distinction made between owners of cattle belonging to Madhya Pradesh and owners of cattle belonging to other States (described as owners of ‘foreign cattle’) and the levy of prohibited grazing rates on owners of the so called ‘foreign cattle’. Forests of Madhya Pradesh are not grazing grounds reserved for cattle belonging to residents of Madhya Pradesh only even as the towns and villages of Madhya Pradesh cannot be reserved for the residents of the original residents of Madhya Pradesh only. Accidents of birth and geography cannot furnish the credentials for such discrimination and authorize prejudicial treatment in matters of this nature....” 16. We do not understand how the petitioner is placing reliance on this judgment claiming his right to enter into casinos, which activity is nothing but playing for money (gambling). Gambling is totally prohibited but by way of some exceptions, a certain class of places and people are exempted from such prohibition. The object of the State is naturally to prevent the person domiciled in Goa to be lured into such chance games and to suffer poverty and mental trauma for their families. Such classification grouping person domiciled in Goa and on the other hand tourist having tourist permit is well-founded. The classification between tourists who come to Goa for a few days to entertain themselves and locals domiciled in Goa is based on an intelligible differentia. Section 2(7) defines tourists quite clearly and excludes persons domiciled or permanently residing in Goa. The classification is founded with the object of preventing the spread of gambling and transforming the exception into a rule. The locals will have much greater opportunities for easy access to the casinos as compared to the tourists that visit the State for a limited period. Therefore there is nothing arbitrary or discriminatory in the object or the classification. The petitioner does not challenge the entry of tourists in casinos but insists for permitting him to enter in. Since the Petitioner and the tourists belong to separate classes, no case of breach of Article 14 is made out. 17. The judgments of Hon’ble Apex Court in Raghunathrao Ganpatrao vs. Union of India, 1994 Supp. (1) SCC 191 and Dr. The petitioner does not challenge the entry of tourists in casinos but insists for permitting him to enter in. Since the Petitioner and the tourists belong to separate classes, no case of breach of Article 14 is made out. 17. The judgments of Hon’ble Apex Court in Raghunathrao Ganpatrao vs. Union of India, 1994 Supp. (1) SCC 191 and Dr. Pradeep Jain vs. Union of India, 1984 (3) SCC 654 are distinguishable because the Court was concerned with the right to pursue a trade, occupation, or business protected by Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution or the right to pursue higher education. Gambling does not have similar protection. Gambling is res extra commercium. The observations about one domicile or one citizenship in these judgments have to be construed in this context. 18. Yogesh Bhagdwaj vs. State of U.P. 1990 (3) SCC 355 is also distinguishable. True it is that ordinarily there should not be any region-wise discrimination, however, it does not mean to say that territorial classification is always bad under all circumstances. Such classification may be violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India, if such classification on geographical lines, has absolutely no nexus to the object sought to be achieved. 19. The petitioner also relied on State of Maharashtra vs. Indian Hotel and Restaurant Association, 2013 (8) SCC 519 wherein the Hon’ble Apex Court held that: “....the classification made by the respondents between four star and five star hotels as one group and the other star hotels and other restaurants as other group is not a reasonable classification as in both the cases the permission relate to only music, singing and dancing. The action of the respondents would amount to selective discrimination offending the provisions of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. The classification is not well founded on an intelligible differentia and there is no rational relation to the object sought to be achieved by the policy decision under challenge.” 20. In the said matter, the discontinuance of bar dancing in establishments below the rank of three-star establishments has led to the closure of a large number of establishments which had resulted in a loss of employment for about 75 thousand women employed in the dance bars in various capacities. Many of these unfortunate women were forced into prostitution, merely to survive, as they had no other means of survival. Many of these unfortunate women were forced into prostitution, merely to survive, as they had no other means of survival. It was observed by the Hon’ble Apex Court from the material placed before it that many of the bar dancers have no other option as they have no other skills with which they could earn a living. No such issue arises in the present case. Moreover, the Court was concerned with an occupation or profession that was protected under Article 19 of the Constitution. No such considerations arise in the present case. For the same reason the judgment in Big Way Bar and Restaurant vs. Commissioner of Police, 2003 Cri. L.J. 1360 is also distinguishable. 21. Reliance is also placed by the petitioner on Khoday Distilleries vs. State of Karnataka, (1995) 1 SCC 574 . It was observed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in this matter that Article 19(1)(g) confers only a qualified, not absolute right. A citizen has no fundamental right to trade or business in liquor as a beverage. Activities which are res extra commercium cannot be carried on by any citizen. State can prohibit completely trade or business in potable liquor since trade or business in liquor as a business in res extra commercium. State may also create a monopoly in itself for trade or business in such liquor. It was held by the Hon’ble Apex Court as under: “The right to practise any profession or to carry on any occupation, trade or business does not extend to practising a profession or carrying on an occupation, trade or business which is inherently vicious and pernicious and is condemned by all civilised societies. It does not entitle citizens to carry on trade or business in activities which are immoral and criminal and in articles or goods which are obnoxious and injurious to health, safety and welfare of the general public, i.e. res extra commercium, (outside commerce). There cannot be business in crime.” 22. Even in Meher Distilleries vs. State of Maharashtra, 2002 (3) Mh. L.J. 36 the petitioner’s contention therein was that dissimilar producers were being treated similarly and that a concessional rate ought to be always given when it comes to excise duty on the liquor manufacturing, was rejected. The Court held that Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution is not available to trade of intoxicants. State Government has the power to revise rates of taxation. The Court held that Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution is not available to trade of intoxicants. State Government has the power to revise rates of taxation. The action of the State is not arbitrary or without any basis merely because the cost of production of the liquor with mhowra as the base is higher and the classification was valid. 23. The petitioner also relied on the Full Bench decision of the High Court of Nagpur in the case of Sheoshankar vs. State Govt. of Madhya Pradesh and Others, 1951 Cri. L.J. 1140. In the said matter, rule enabling any person who satisfies the appropriate authority that “his social, economic status and habits” warrant granting to him to obtain a permit for the consumption of intoxicating liquor not as a medicine but for enjoyment as a beverage. The question was whether this amounts to discrimination. Where a law prevents the people in general from drinking intoxicating liquor, presumably on the ground that it is not desirable for anyone to do so, what justification is there to put in one class men of certain social and economic status and habits and allow them to drink? The Court held that there is no real or substantial difference as amongst persons who are used to drink which has a reasonable relation to the subject of the Act, namely prohibition. Classification of such persons on the basis of wealth or special position clearly amounts to invidious discrimination and is the very thing which the 14th Article of our Constitution forbids. 24. However, in the said decision, the Nagpur High Court held that the limitation of permits to the consumption of foreign liquors and the exclusion of country liquor, in its considered opinion, is not discriminatory as the classification of objects can be properly made on the ground that one is more harmful than the other and the rule under challenge does not contravene Article 14 of the Constitution. 25. The learned Advocate General relied on State of Bombay vs. R.M.D. Chamarbaugwala and Another, AIR 1957 SC 699 . 25. The learned Advocate General relied on State of Bombay vs. R.M.D. Chamarbaugwala and Another, AIR 1957 SC 699 . In the said matter, the appellant was State of Bombay, which challenged the judgment of the High Court of Bombay, by which, State of Bombay was forebear from enforcing or taking any steps in enforcement, implementation, furtherance or pursuance of any of the provisions of the Bombay Lotteries and Prize Competition Control and Tax (Amendment) Act (Bombay 30 of 1952), which amended the provisions of 1948 Act. The State of Bombay was also restrained from demanding, collecting or recovering any tax as provided under the Act and Rules. This decision was reversed and the reasoning assists the case of the State in this matter. 26. The Apex Court in the above matter after considering the judgments of various countries on this issue observed that: “It will be abundantly clear from the foregoing observations that the activities which have been condemned in this country from ancient times appear to have been equally discouraged and looked upon with disfavour in England, Scotland, the United States of America and in Australia in the cases referred to above. We find it difficult to accept the contention that those activities which encourage a spirit of reckless propensity for making easy gain by lot or chance, which lead to the loss of the hard earned money of the undiscerning and improvident common man and thereby lower his standard of living and drive him into a chronic state of indebtedness and eventually disrupt the peace and happiness of his humble home could possibly have been intended by our Constitution makers to be raised to the status of trade, commerce or intercourse and to be made the subject-matter of’ a fundamental right guaranteed by Art. 19(1) (g). We find it difficult to persuade ourselves that gambling was ever intended to form any part of this ancient country’s trade, commerce or intercourse to be declared as free under Art. 301. It is not our purpose nor is it necessary for us in deciding this case to attempt an exhaustive definition of the word “trade”, “business”, or “intercourse”. We are, however, clearly of opinion that whatever else may or may not be regarded as falling within the meaning of these words, gambling cannot certainly be taken as one of them. It is not our purpose nor is it necessary for us in deciding this case to attempt an exhaustive definition of the word “trade”, “business”, or “intercourse”. We are, however, clearly of opinion that whatever else may or may not be regarded as falling within the meaning of these words, gambling cannot certainly be taken as one of them. We are convinced and satisfied that the real purpose of Arts. 19(1) (g) and 301 could not possibly have been to guarantee or declare the freedom of gambling. Gambling activities from their very nature and in essence are extra-commercium although the external forms, formalities and instruments of trade may be employed and they are not protected either by Art. 19 (1) (g) or Art. 301 of our Constitution.” 27. Learned Advocate General also relied on Lalit Sehgal vs. State of Goa and Others, 1996 (1) Mh. L.J. 447 wherein the validity of Section 13A of the said Act was under challenge. By this Section, the State of Goa placed restrictions on the operation of electronic amusement slot machines in five-star hotels only. The object, as indicated by the State, is to restrict the game to foreigners and high-income group people. This Court held that such restriction cannot at all be termed as arbitrary or irrational to be violative of Article 14. The said restriction is based on a valid foundation and it is not permissible to question the legislative wisdom in imposing such restriction which has a nexus with the object of the said Act, which was enacted to prohibit gambling in the first place. 28. This Court relying on the State of Bombay vs. R.M.D. Chamarbaugwala and Another (supra) held that the words “trade” or “business” or “commerce” should not be read in their widest amplitude to exclude gambling for there are certain activities, which can under no circumstance be regarded as trade or business or commerce although the usual forms and instruments are employed therein. 29. Learned Advocate General also placed reliance on B.R. Enterprises vs. State of U.P. and Others, (1999) 9 SCC 700 wherein Hon’ble Apex Court examined what is “lottery” and what would be the ingredient in the sale of lottery tickets and whether it can be equated with other forms of contract pertaining to trade and commerce. 29. Learned Advocate General also placed reliance on B.R. Enterprises vs. State of U.P. and Others, (1999) 9 SCC 700 wherein Hon’ble Apex Court examined what is “lottery” and what would be the ingredient in the sale of lottery tickets and whether it can be equated with other forms of contract pertaining to trade and commerce. Court held that it found three ingredients in the sale of a lottery ticket namely: (i) prize (ii) chance and (iii) consideration. So, when one purchases a lottery ticket, he purchases for a prize, which is by chance and the consideration is the price of the ticket. It is gambling in nature. Merely because a lottery transaction is run by the State itself will not change its character as res extra commercium. It is held that in “trade” and “commerce” there is no element or ingredient of chance. This element of chance makes the lottery gambling. In the trade, it is for the exchange of something for consideration where chance is absent and inherently with an element of skill. 30. The Hon’ble Apex Court held that ban by any State on the sale of lotteries of other States within its territories, therefore, does not violate Article 301 and 303. When State lotteries cannot be construed to be trade and commerce within the meaning of Article 301, held, there cannot be any question of discrimination or violation of Article 303. No discrimination can also be alleged under Article 14 when as per provision the State could only exercise its discretion in case it decides to prohibit sale of lottery tickets of every other State and no discretion is left on the State to choose as to which State it likes to prohibit. 31. Given the principles laid down in the above decisions, the game activities on casinos are like gambling and cannot be termed as trade or business activity. Though the petitioner claimed that he is not challenging the said Act as violative of Section 19(1)(g), the challenge is that it is violative of Article 14. So far as the restriction on entry into casinos to the persons domiciled or permanent residents of Goa as against the permitting entry to tourists and tourist permit holders, is justifiable for the reasons advanced by the State of Goa. So far as the restriction on entry into casinos to the persons domiciled or permanent residents of Goa as against the permitting entry to tourists and tourist permit holders, is justifiable for the reasons advanced by the State of Goa. Based on such reasons a valid classification has been made and such classification has rational nexus with the object that the law seeks to achieve. 32. The principle as laid down in B.R. Enterprises (supra), the activity of casinos cannot be construed to be a trade and commerce nor classification can be said to be unreasonable for having no nexus with the object to be achieved by such legislation. As such, the impugned provisions are not violative of Article 14. It is the discretion of the State to take a policy decision to restrict the entry of Goan domiciled or permanent residents to the casino. It is in the public interest of residents of Goa so also in the interest of State for the justifiable reasons. Thus, the decision to prohibit entry for the persons other than the tourist which excludes persons domiciled or permanent residents of Goa is a conscious decision of the State, considering its evil consequences on its subject. When there is no such element of unreasonable arbitrary classification and there is proper nexus between the objective to be achieved and the restrictions imposed no case is made out to strike down the impugned provisions. 33. In the circumstances, since we have held that the impugned legislation does not suffer from any vice as alleged by the petitioner, the petition must fail and the same is accordingly dismissed. The rule stands discharged. 34. As we have heard the petitioner at length, the relief in the review petition stands worked out. The review petition is disposed of accordingly. There shall be no order for costs.