JUDGMENT 1. The petitioner has filed the instant application under Section 439 of Cr.P.C seeking bail in connection with Borigumma P.S. Case No.144 of 2019 dated 07.10.2019 corresponding to T.R. Case No.10 of 2020 (G.R. Case No. 846 of 2019) pending in the Court of the learned Additional Sessions Judge-cum-Special Judge, Jeypore, Koraput. The petitioner herein is the accused in connection with alleged commission of offences punishable under Sections 376(2)(n), 376(3) and 417 of I.P.C. read with Section 6 of the POCSO Act, 2012. 2. The case of the prosecution is that complainant (Nanda Harijan) has accused the petitioner of sexually assaulting the former's daughter. The victim is a 14 years-old minor girl studying in Standard-IX at Kasturba Gandhi Vidyalaya. When the petitioner was staying in the house of Purusottam Harijan, the victim was sexually assaulted by the petitioner several times by false assurance of marriage and by giving temptation of monetary offer. As a result of such misconduct, the victim girl impregnated by the petitioner. When she realised that her condition has become vulnerable and an assault on her honourable reputation, thereafter, the complainant decided to lodge an FIR before the IIC, Borigumma Police Station, in the district of Koraput on 07.10.2019 and submitted a written report regarding the same. 3. Heard Mr. Sibo Sankar Mishra, learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner, Mr. S. S. Kanungo, learned Additional Government Advocate for the State and Mr. A.P. Bose, learned counsel for the informant and perused the case records. 4. Learned Counsel for the petitioner, Mr. Mishra has submitted that the petitioner is an innocent person and has been falsely implicated in this case by the Police. The petitioner has never committed the alleged offences and has no role to play in it. Learned Counsel has further submitted that the FIR has been lodged against the petitioner by the complainant with a false accusation and vindictiveness. Learned Court below has observed that the alleged act was not forceful but was on consent. Further, on 20.08.2020, the victim was present personally in the Court below where she was heard by the learned trial court Judge in his Chamber separately. At the time the victim has stated that she has no objection if the petitioner be released on bail. Further, the victim girl is staying in the house of the petitioner. The victim has also delivered a child. At the time the victim has stated that she has no objection if the petitioner be released on bail. Further, the victim girl is staying in the house of the petitioner. The victim has also delivered a child. The parents of the petitioner are taking care of both the mother and child. Moreover, there is no direct evidence against the petitioner. The petitioner is a young boy of 21 years and has a long future. Hence, the petitioner deserves to be enlarged on bail. 5. It is well settled that the minor girl cannot give a meaningful consent to sexual activity. The injury suffered by the minor victim of a sexual abuse is deeply physical, psychological and emotional. Further, the rigid sex-role stereotypes that are very much present in an society requires condemnation. In a given case, if the Court finds it difficult to accept the version of the victim, on its own, the Court would be justified in searching for evidence, direct or circumstantial, which lends assurance to her testimony. Such assurance, short of corroboration, is sufficient. Even the so-called consent defense by the petitioner is a no-defense as she is a minor. There cannot be any compromise in cases where the crime is against the body of a woman that too a child of 14 years old. 6. The Supreme Court in the case of State of M.P. vs. Madanlal, (2015) 7 SCC 681 has held as under: '18. The aforesaid view was expressed while dealing with the imposition of sentence. We would like to clearly state that in a case of rape or attempt to rape, the conception of compromise under no circumstances can really be thought of. These are crimes against the body of a woman which is her own temple. These are the offences which suffocate the breath of life and sully the reputation. And reputation, needless to emphasise, is the richest jewel one can conceive of in life. No one would allow it to be extinguished. When a human frame is defiled, the 'purest treasure', is lost. Dignity of a woman is a part of her non-perishable and immortal self and no one should ever think of painting it in clay. There cannot be a compromise or settlement as it would be against her honour which matters the most. It is sacrosanct. When a human frame is defiled, the 'purest treasure', is lost. Dignity of a woman is a part of her non-perishable and immortal self and no one should ever think of painting it in clay. There cannot be a compromise or settlement as it would be against her honour which matters the most. It is sacrosanct. Sometimes solace is given that the perpetrator of the crime has acceded to enter into wedlock with her which is nothing but putting pressure in an adroit manner; and we say with emphasis that the courts are to remain absolutely away from this subterfuge to adopt a soft approach to the case, for any kind of liberal approach has to be put in the compartment of spectacular error. Or to put it differently, it would be in the realm of a sanctuary of error. 19. We are compelled to say so as such an attitude reflects lack of sensibility towards the dignity, the elan vital, of a woman. Any kind of liberal approach or thought of mediation in this regard is thoroughly and completely sans legal permissibility. It has to be kept in mind, as has been held in Shyam Narain v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2013) 7 SCC 77 that: 27. Respect for reputation of women in the society shows the basic civility of a civilised society. No member of society can afford to conceive the idea that he can create a hollow in the honour of a woman. Such thinking is not only lamentable but also deplorable. It would not be an exaggeration to say that the thought of sullying the physical frame of a woman is the demolition of the accepted civilised norm i.e. 'physical morality'. In such a sphere, impetuosity has no room. The youthful excitement has no place. It should be paramount in everyone's mind that, on the one hand, society as a whole cannot preach from the pulpit about social, economic and political equality of the sexes and, on the other, some perverted members of the same society dehumanise the woman by attacking her body and ruining her chastity. It is an assault on the individuality and inherent dignity of a woman with the mindset that she should be elegantly servile to men." 7. It is a well settled principle that consent cannot be used as a defence when the victim is a minor. It is an assault on the individuality and inherent dignity of a woman with the mindset that she should be elegantly servile to men." 7. It is a well settled principle that consent cannot be used as a defence when the victim is a minor. The age of consent for sexual intercourse is definitively 18 years and there is no dispute about this. Therefore, under no circumstance can a child below 18 years of age give consent, express or implied, for sexual intercourse. The age of consent has not been specifically reduced by any statute and unless there is such a specific reduction, we must proceed on the basis that the age of consent and willingness to sexual intercourse remains at 18 years of age. The Supreme Court in the case of Satish Kumar Jayanti Lal Dabgar Vs. State of Gujarat, (2015) 7 SCC 359 has held as under:- '9. The questions formulated at Sl. Nos.(1) to (4) above were decided in the affirmative. The discussion in the judgment reveals that it was an admitted case that the victim and the accused were from the same community and they both had gone out of station together. It was also established on record that there was physical relationship between them at different places and at different times and marriage was also performed on 93-2003 at Unza which was duly registered in the Office of the Marriage Registrar. However, the primary defence of the appellant was that the prosecutrix was major; she accompanied the appellant willingly and entered into physical relationship as well as matrimonial alliance out of her free will, desire and consent. Therefore, the most important question before the trial court, on which the fate of the case hinged, was the age of the victim from which it could be discerned as to whether she was major on the date of the incident or not. 15. The legislature has introduced the aforesaid provision with sound rationale and there is an important objective behind such a provision. It is considered that a minor is incapable of thinking rationally and giving any consent. For this reason, whether it is civil law or criminal law, the consent of a minor is not treated as valid consent. Here the provision is concerning a girl child who is not only minor but less than 16 years of age. It is considered that a minor is incapable of thinking rationally and giving any consent. For this reason, whether it is civil law or criminal law, the consent of a minor is not treated as valid consent. Here the provision is concerning a girl child who is not only minor but less than 16 years of age. A minor girl can be easily lured into giving consent for such an act without understanding the implications thereof. Such a consent, therefore, is treated as not an informed consent given after understanding the pros and cons as well as consequences of the intended action. Therefore, as a necessary corollary, duty is cast on the other person in not taking advantage of the so-called consent given by a girl who is less than 16 years of age. Even when there is a consent of a girl below 16 years, the other partner in the sexual act is treated as criminal who has committed the offence of rape. The law leaves no choice to him and he cannot plead that the act was consensual. A fortiori, the so-called consent of the prosecutrix below 16 years of age cannot be treated as mitigating circumstance.' Similarly, the Supreme Court in the case of Independent Thought vs. Union of India and another, AIR 2017 SC 4904 iterated that: '77. There is no doubt that pro-child statutes are intended to and do consider the best interest of the child. These statutes have been enacted in the recent past though not effectively implemented. Given this situation, we are of opinion that a few facts need to be acknowledged and accepted. Firstly, a child is and remains a child regardless of the description or nomenclature given to the child. It is universally accepted in almost all relevant statutes in our country that a child is a person below 18 years of age. Therefore, a child remains a child whether she is described as a street child or a surrendered child or an abandoned child or an adopted child. Similarly, a child remains a child whether she is a married child or an unmarried child or a divorced child or a separated child or a widowed child. At this stage we are reminded of Shakespeare's eternal view that a rose by any other name would smell as sweet-so also with the status of a child, despite any prefix. Similarly, a child remains a child whether she is a married child or an unmarried child or a divorced child or a separated child or a widowed child. At this stage we are reminded of Shakespeare's eternal view that a rose by any other name would smell as sweet-so also with the status of a child, despite any prefix. Secondly, the age of consent for sexual intercourse is definitively 18 years and there is no dispute about this. Therefore, under no circumstance can a child below 18 years of age give consent, express or implied, for sexual intercourse. The age of consent has not been specifically reduced by any statute and unless there is such a specific reduction, we must proceed on the basis that the age of consent and willingness to sexual intercourse remains at 18 years of age. Thirdly, Exception 2 to Section 375 of the IPC creates an artificial distinction between a married girl child and an unmarried girl child with no real rationale and thereby does away with consent for sexual intercourse by a husband with his wife who is a girl child between 15 and 18 years of age. Such an unnecessary and artificial distinction if accepted can again be introduced for other occasions for divorced children or separated children or widowed children.' 8. The factum of Section 6 of the POCSO Act does not deserve judicial tolerance. The fact that the victim is a 14 year old who herself is a child and she has delivered a baby. The question of her welfare and that of the tiny tots is in jeopardy. Upon reading of the FIR and the charge sheet as a whole, it is not possible to come to the conclusion that these facts do not make out even a prima facie case against the Petitioner for the offences in question. Of course, the final truth will be deciphered from the trial. Even if the informant's counsel states that the petitioner shall look after the well being of the child, the fact of her minor status does not allow her to stay in the house of the predator. The concept of protective patriarch is totally not permissible in cases under Section 6 of the POCSO Act. In fact, this is not a solid ground to enlarge the petitioner on bail. The concept of protective patriarch is totally not permissible in cases under Section 6 of the POCSO Act. In fact, this is not a solid ground to enlarge the petitioner on bail. Moreover, learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the length of detention and the factum of changed circumstances could be considered as grounds for releasing him on bail. In fact the 'changed circumstances' does not have a specific definition nor does it have specific parameters. However, this Court is of the opinion that the following circumstances, though no straight jacket formula is available, could constitute the factum of changed circumstances. (a) The investigating agency has received sufficient time for custodial interrogation of the Accused. (b) When the investigation stands completed and the complicity of the involvement in the offence is one which has to be established in trial. (c) There has been a change in status of bail or protection given to co-accused (parity). (d) The health of the accused has been deteriorating since the previous bail application. (e) The availability of the accused for further investigation, interrogation or to face trial is shown not to be compromised. (f) The accused has proven that he is not a flight risk. (g) The accused can show that there is no possibility of tampering with the witness, as opposed his previous bail application. (h) It is shown that the trial is getting indeterminably prolonged; the accused having to stay longer than the period of detention, had he been convicted. (i) The investigation having been completed; the charge sheet having been filed and the presence of the accused in custody not being necessary for further investigation. (j) The accused having been in custody for a considerable amount of time without the trial commencing. (k) The investigating agency is unable to produce sufficient evidence to show a prima facie case against the accused despite passage of considerable time. (l) A family emergency which makes the presence of the accused with the family inevitable, necessitating grant of a conditional bail. But the present case is a peculiar one since Section 6 of the POCSO Act has been invoked and the age of the child is only 14 years. She has become a mother when she herself is a child. In fact, there is no changed circumstance after the rejection of bail prayer on the last occasion. 9. But the present case is a peculiar one since Section 6 of the POCSO Act has been invoked and the age of the child is only 14 years. She has become a mother when she herself is a child. In fact, there is no changed circumstance after the rejection of bail prayer on the last occasion. 9. In view of the above, I am not inclined to enlarge the petitioner on bail. The Bail Application is accordingly dismissed. However, the petitioner will be at liberty to raise all the points, already raised in this petition, at the time of framing of the charge, which will be considered by the trial court concerned by passing a reasoned order. It is further made clear that any of the observations made in this judgment shall not come in the way of a fair trial of the case, nor shall the trial Court be influenced by these observations.