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Allahabad High Court · body

2021 DIGILAW 1397 (ALL)

Yogesh Kumar v. State of U. P.

2021-11-24

JAYANT BANERJI

body2021
ORDER : 1. Heard Sri Arpit Agarwal, learned counsel for the petitioner and Sri Sanjay Goswami, learned Addl. Chief Standing Counsel appearing for the respondents. 2. This writ petition has been filed praying for the following reliefs: “(i) issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of certiorari: (a) whereby quashing the impugned judgment and order dated 19.06.2017 passed by the Collector, Pilibhit (Annexure No. 8 to the writ petition) in Computerized Case No. D-2015125600679 (State Vs. Yogesh Kumar and others). (b) by modifying judgment and order dated 9.3.2018 passed by the Chief Controlling Authority/Deputy Commissioner (Stamp) Bareilly Division, Bareilly/Respondent No. 2 [CCRA] (Annexure-11 to the writ petition) in Revision No. 201712001048 (Yogesh Kumar and others Vs. State) to the extent that part area of building 185.80 Sq mts on the ground floor held as ‘commercial building’ and imposing deficiency, penalty and interest are wrong and it be determined as non ‘commercial building’ and valuation of the entire building is to be determined as non ‘commercial building’. (ii) issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of mandamus commanding/directing the respondent to act according to direction of the Court claimed in para (i)(a) and (b) of the prayer and to complete necessary formalities and send the sale deed dated 05.11.2011 concerning this case to the Sub-Registrar for registration according to law within the time specified by the Court. (iii) issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of mandamus commanding/directing the respondents to return the amount of Rs. 240000.00 which was deposited by the petitioners with interest at the market value within time specified by this Hon’ble Court.” 3. The facts in brief, as appearing in the writ petition, are that the four petitioners jointly purchased the building having a constructed area of 396.22 sq mtr on ground floor, 380.32 sq. mtr at first floor and 13.37 sq mtr stair case room on the second floor, which are situated over a land situated at Mohalla Muria Panai urf Sungarhi alongside the road between railway station to police station in district Pilibhit for a consideration of Rs. 1,24,00,000.00. However, the valuation of the property as per the circle rate for payment of stamp duty it was computed at Rs. 1,37,67,000/- on which stamp duty of Rs. 9,64,000.00 was paid by the petitioners at the time of execution of the sale deed. 1,24,00,000.00. However, the valuation of the property as per the circle rate for payment of stamp duty it was computed at Rs. 1,37,67,000/- on which stamp duty of Rs. 9,64,000.00 was paid by the petitioners at the time of execution of the sale deed. After execution of the sale deed on 5.11.2012, it was presented for registration before the Sub-Registrar, Pilibhit who raised an objection regarding its value on the premise that it is commercial building and the same is to be valued for the purpose of stamp duty on the basis of rent per square meter fixed by the Collector being Rs. 190/- as per provisions of Rule 5(c)(ii) of the Uttar Pradesh Stamp (Valuation of Property) Rules, 1977. [The Rules] 4. The petitioners submitted their reply to the objection raised by the Sub-Registrar that the building did not fall in the category of commercial building as defined in Rule 2(d) of the Rules on the date of execution of the sale deed as it was not being used as a commercial building. Thereafter the Sub-Registrar referred the instrument for determination of the market value of the property in question and the proper duty payable thereon, to the Collector under section 47A(1)(d) of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899. [The Act] The Collector passed an order on 23.5.2013 holding part of the building measuring 185.80 sq mts on ground floor as commercial building and the rest of the building as non-commercial building and accordingly determined the valuation of the property and assessed the deficiency of the stamp duty. The appeal filed by the petitioners against the order of the Collector dated 23.5.2013 resulted in the order of the Collector being set aside and the matter being remanded back to the Collector to pass orders in accordance with the Rules. A writ petition was filed by the petitioners before this Court being numbered as Writ Petition No. 63123 of 2013 (Yogesh Kumar and others Vs. State of UP and others) which was disposed of by judgment dated 22.9.2015 with a direction to the Collector to decide whether the nature of the building on the date of execution of the sale deed is commercial or residential and to what extent, after giving opportunity of hearing to the parties. State of UP and others) which was disposed of by judgment dated 22.9.2015 with a direction to the Collector to decide whether the nature of the building on the date of execution of the sale deed is commercial or residential and to what extent, after giving opportunity of hearing to the parties. A three member committee appointed by the Collector to make a spot inspection, submitted its report and thereafter, a decision was made by the Collector on 19.6.2017 iterating its previous order dated 23.5.2013. A revision filed by the petitioners before the respondent No. 2 against the order of the Collector dated 19.6.2017 met with partial success and the order was modified whereby, though upholding the area of the building earmarked by the Collector as commercial building, its value was considerably reduced and deficiency of stamp duty of Rs. 205840/- was assessed alongwith applicable interest. 5. The contention of the counsel for the petitioners is that both the Collector as well as the respondent No. 2 have misdirected themselves in holding usage of a part of the building in question as commercial building. Learned counsel made a pointed reference to the definition of ‘commercial building’ as it appears in Section 2(d) of the Rules. It is contended that commercial building as defined in the Rules has to be read in view of the definition of commercial establishment or shop that is provided in Clause 4 and 16 of Section 2 of the UP Dookan Aur Vanijya Adhishthan Adhiniyam, 1962. [Act 1962] It is stated that definition of ‘commercial establishment’ and a ‘shop’ as appearing in the aforesaid Act, 1962, pertains to premises that are being used as such as a commercial establishment or shop in praesenti. It is contended that though revisional authority has taken a considered view in the matter with regard to the usage of the property in question, however, the rationale adopted by the authority runs contrary to the factual situation in view of the definition of a commercial establishment and shop as defined in the Act, 1962. The learned counsel has further stated that a perusal of the sale deed itself reveals that the building in question was vacant and was not being used for commercial purpose, which is in conformance with the provisions of Rule 3 of the Rules. The learned counsel has further stated that a perusal of the sale deed itself reveals that the building in question was vacant and was not being used for commercial purpose, which is in conformance with the provisions of Rule 3 of the Rules. It is his contention that the Act being a taxing statute will have to be strictly interpreted and, therefore, the definition of commercial building in the Rules will have to be interpreted strictly, that is to say, whether the building in question was being used at the time of execution of the sale deed as a commercial building or otherwise. Learned counsel has referred to the order passed by the respondent No. 2 to demonstrate that there has been no proper consideration of this aspect of the matter. The judgments relied upon on behalf of the petitioners are: State of U.P. and others Vs. Ambrish Tandon and others, 2012 (5) SCC 566 , P. Kasilingam Vs. P.S.G. College of Technology and others, 1995 Supp. (2) SCC 348, Ramesh Chandra Srivastava Vs. State of U.P. AIR 2007 All. 39 , Orissa State Warehousing Corporation Vs. Commissioner of Income Tax, (1999) 4 SCC 197 , Hahakikat Rai Malhotra Vs. The Commissioner, Agra Division, Agra and others, Writ Petition No. 34355 of 2006 decided on 4.4.2014, Chief Commissioner, Delhi and others Vs. FICCI, New Delhi and others, 1975 (13) SCC 64 and an Executive Instruction dated 4.4.2005 bearing No. 6063 (6133) Stamp - 77/2005-05 and a format under Rule 6 of the Rules. 6. Sri Sanjay Goswami, learned Addl. CSC has strongly opposed the writ petition and said that the authorities were justified in holding that the building was liable to be considered as partly being used for commercial purpose in view of the fact that for the past several years the building was being used, firstly, by an Insurance Company, and, thereafter, by a nationalized Bank till 17 days prior to the execution of the sale deed on 5.11.2012. It is his contention that the sale deed having been executed merely 17 days after vacation of the premises by a commercial establishment, will not make the building lose its character as a partly commercial building. 7. Learned counsel has referred the three Judge Bench decision of this Court in the case of Smt. Pushpa Sareen Vs. It is his contention that the sale deed having been executed merely 17 days after vacation of the premises by a commercial establishment, will not make the building lose its character as a partly commercial building. 7. Learned counsel has referred the three Judge Bench decision of this Court in the case of Smt. Pushpa Sareen Vs. State of U.P. 2015 (3) ADJ 136 and the judgment of Smt. Vijaya Jain Vs. State of U.P. and others dated 1.9.2015 passed in Special Appeal Defective No. 598 of 2015. 8. I have considered the contentions advanced by the learned counsel for the parties as well as the record of the petition. The issue being raised by the learned counsel for the petitioners is that whether the property that is the subject matter of the instrument in question, cannot be said to be a commercial building merely in view of the fact that till 17 days prior to the execution of instrument in question, it was being used for commercial purpose, to determine the valuation thereof on the basis of commercial rates. Repeated emphasis was placed by the learned counsel for the petitioners on the definition of word ‘commercial building’ appearing in clause (d) of Rule 2 of the Rules. 9. Rule 2(d) of the Rules read as under: “2(d) ‘Commercial building’ means commercial establishment or shop as defined respectively in clause (4) and clause (16) of Section 2 Uttar Pradesh Dookan Aur Vanijya Abhisthan Adhiniyam, 1962.” 10. Since this provision has incorporated the definition of the terms ‘commercial establishment’ and ‘shop’ as defined respectively in clause (4) and clause (16) of Section 2 of the Act, 1962. The aforesaid provision of the Act 1962, are quoted below: “(4) ‘Commercial establishment’ means any premises, not being the premises of a factory, or a shop, wherein any trade, business, manufacture, or any work in connection with, or incidental or ancillary thereto, is carried on for profit and includes a premises wherein, journalistic or printing work, business of banking, insurance, stocks and shares, brokerage or produce exchange is carried on, or which is used as theatre, cinema, for any other public amusement or entertainment or where the clerical and other establishment of a factory, to whom the provisions of the Factories Act, 1948, do not apply, work. (16) ‘shop’ means any premises where any wholesale or retail trade or business is carried on, or where services are rendered to customers, and includes, all offices, godowns or warehouses whether in the same premises, or not, which are used in connection with such trade or business.” 11. Much emphasis has been placed by the learned counsel for the petitioner on the usage of word “is” as mentioned in sub-sections (4) and (16) of Section 2 of the Act, 1962. What is required to be considered is that whether the word “is” as used in the aforesaid two provisions of the Act 1962 denotes the usage of the premises in praesenti, that is to say, on the date of execution of the instrument in question, or it would indicate the usage of premises proximate to the date of execution of instrument whether in the past or in future. 12. First, the cases cited by the learned counsel for the petitioners need to be considered. 13. In the case of State of U.P. Vs. Ambrish Tandon (supra), the judgment of the High Court was impugned before the Supreme Court in which the order dated 27.9.2004, passed by the Additional Collector (Financial and Revenue), Lucknow, by means of which, deficiency of stamp duty and penalty were imposed, was quashed. The Supreme Court noticed that the nature of user of building being residential on the date of purchase was not seriously disputed before the High Court. The Supreme Court held that merely because the property is being used for commercial purpose at the later point of time may not be a relevant criterion for assessing the value for the purpose of stamp duty. It was held that nature of user is relatable to the date of purchase and it is relevant for the purpose of calculation of stamp duty. Under the circumstances, the Supreme Court refused to interfere in the judgment passed by the High Court. 14. The judgment in the case of P. Kasilingam and others (supra) has been relied upon by the learned counsel to assert the usage of the word “means” appearing in the definition of term “commercial building” in section 2(d) of the Rules. 15. Under the circumstances, the Supreme Court refused to interfere in the judgment passed by the High Court. 14. The judgment in the case of P. Kasilingam and others (supra) has been relied upon by the learned counsel to assert the usage of the word “means” appearing in the definition of term “commercial building” in section 2(d) of the Rules. 15. The opinion of this Court in Ramesh Chandra Srivastava (supra) was in an answer to a reference made by the Chief Controlling Revenue Authority, Allahabad under Section 57(1) of the Act for determination to this Court. The questions referred were as follows: Q. No. 1. Whether the stamp duty is chargeable according to the amount mentioned in the civil Court decree or on the basis of market valuation of property conveyed by this instrument of conveyance. Q. No. 2. If stamp duty is to be charged on the basis of market value of the property what should be the date with reference to which the market value of the property forming the subject matter of the instrument is to be determined? What should be the date with reference to which the market value of the property forming the subject matter of this sale deed is to be determined? In this matter prima facie three dates appear, first is 23.5.1960 when the earnest money was accepted in part performance of the agreement by vendor, the second date is 14.5.1984 when the vendees case of specific performance was decreed by the Court of Civil Judge First Kanpur and third is 3.1.1985 when the Court executed the sale deed in question on behalf of the vendors. 16. While answering question No. 1, this Court held as follows: “22. We, therefore, hold that the stamp duty is chargeable on the basis of market value of the property conveyed by the instrument of conveyance and the fact that in the instrument executed by Civil Court is of no relevance for the purposes of invoking power under Section 47A of the Act. The question No. 1 is answered accordingly.” 17. While answering question No. 2, this Court held as follows: “64. The question No. 1 is answered accordingly.” 17. While answering question No. 2, this Court held as follows: “64. In view of the above discussion we answer the second question by holding that the relevant date for determining the market value of the property for being subject-matter of the sale deed is the third i.e. January 3, 1985 when the Court executed the sale deed in question on behalf of the vendors.” 18. It is pertinent to mention here that in Ramesh Chandra Srivastava (Supra), no question was referred regarding usage of the property at the time of execution of the instrument and the instrument in question therein was executed by the Court after a decree of specific performance. The facts therein, strictly speaking, being different, the judgment would not be applicable given the facts in the present case. 19. In the case of Hahakikat Rai Malhotra (supra), the District Magistrate had determined the market value of accommodation treating it to be a commercial building on the basis of a report submitted by the Sub-Registrar that says that it appears that two godowns have been constructed with commercial point of view. The Court held that the commercial building can be treated to be a commercial building but it must satisfy the requirement of Rule 2(d) of the Rules. Therefore, the aforesaid judgment is axiomatic and needs no elaboration. 20. The executive instructions relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioners dated 4.4.2005 is merely an iteration of the norm that the actual details of the property on the date of execution of an instrument would determine the stamp duty payable thereon. 21. The judgment in Orissa State Warehousing Corporation (Supra), has been relied upon by the petitioner to contend that in a taxing statute, there is no concept of equity and the provisions have to be strictly interpreted. 22. In the case of Kashi Nath Upadhyaya Vs. 21. The judgment in Orissa State Warehousing Corporation (Supra), has been relied upon by the petitioner to contend that in a taxing statute, there is no concept of equity and the provisions have to be strictly interpreted. 22. In the case of Kashi Nath Upadhyaya Vs. Commissioner, Varanasi Division and others, 2015 (2) AWC 1758 , which judgment, though cited, was not relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner, a coordinate Bench of this Court considered an order passed by the Collector whereby the Collector had assessed deficiency of stamp duty and held that since the property in question was earlier used for commercial purpose of tractor company, merely because the company had shut down the agency way back in 1998-99, would have no bearing regarding potentiality of the property and, accordingly, the property was valued at commercial rate. The Court noticed that earlier the order passed by the Collector as well as the order passed by the appellate authority was subject matter of challenge before this Court which remitted the matter to the Collector to examine whether or not a commercial building was existing on the site in question on the relevant date and whether it could be called commercial activity at all or not. However, the Collector had merely reiterated and reaffirmed its earlier order after consideration of term “commercial building” appearing in rule 2(d) of the Rules. This Court held that sine qua non for invoking provisions of Section 47A(3) of the Act is the Collector had reason to believe that the value had not been properly set forth in the instrument as per market value of the property, and once the instrument is registered and the stamp duty as prescribed by the Collector was paid, the burden to prove that the market value was more than the minimum prescribed rate by the Collector under the Rules, was upon the Collector. The Court noted that the instrument that was subject matter of the writ petition was executed on 6.2.2004; that the report of Sub-Registrar after spot inspection was of 24.2.2004 pertaining to the land admeasuring 0.135 hectare over which approximately 2000 square ft. tin shed was standing on pillars, and that the property in question was surrounded by residential houses and hence it was reported that the property was of commercial potential. tin shed was standing on pillars, and that the property in question was surrounded by residential houses and hence it was reported that the property was of commercial potential. A further report called by the Collector was made by the Tehsildar on 11.12.2008 after more than four years. The Court held as under: “30..........Evidence of comparable bona fide sales of land situated near about land, possessing same or similar advantageous feature would furnish basis for determining the market value. Merely because the property at some point of time was put to non-agricultural use would not mean that the market value of the property could be valued at commercial rate. The Collector has not referred to a single exemplar to indicate that similar property in the vicinity is being sold and purchased at commercial rate. The Tehsildar’s report on the contrary is indicative of the fact that property in question is surrounded by residential houses, suggesting that there has been a change of land use from agricultural to an urban agglomeration predominantly being of residential use............. 32. Having due regard to the provisions of the Rules and the law referred to, I am of the opinion that the Collector was in error in determining the value of the property merely for the reason that the property was put to non-agricultural use ten years back. The reason becomes untenable as it falls to subscribe to the parameters for determining the market value as detailed in the Rules. The impugned orders on that court cannot be sustained.” 23. Now, coming to the usage of the word “is” appearing in the definition of the terms “commercial establishment” and “shop” in the Act, 1962, the Supreme Court in the case of P. Anand Gajapathi Raju and others Vs. P.V.G. Raju (Dead) and others, (2000) 4 SCC 539 , considered the question whether in appeal, it can refer the parties to arbitration under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. In that case, during the pendency of the appeal before the Supreme Court, all the parties had entered into an arbitration agreement whereby they agreed to refer the dispute in that appeal and others to a retired Judge of the Supreme Court as the sole arbitrator. The arbitration agreement met the requirements of Section 7 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. The arbitration agreement met the requirements of Section 7 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. The Court observed that the Arbitration Act, 1940 expressly provided for the parties to a suit to apply for an order of reference of the subject matter of the suit, and, that under the 1940 Act, with reference to the dispute, suit itself may stand disposed of. While referring to the provisions of Section 8 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, the Court observed as follows: “5. The conditions which are required to be satisfied under sub-sections (1) and (2) of Section 8 before the court can exercise its powers are: (1) there is an arbitration agreement. (2) a party to the agreement brings an action in the court against the other party. (3) subject-matter of the action is the same as the subject-matter of the arbitration agreement. (4) the other party moves the court for referring the parties to arbitration before it submits his first statement on the substance of the dispute. This last provision creates a right in the person bringing the action to have the dispute adjudicated by the court, once the other party has submitted his first statement of defence. But if the party, who wants the matter to be referred to arbitration applies to the court after submission of his statement and the party who has brought the action does not object, as is the case before us, there is no bar on the court referring the parties to arbitration. 6. In our view, the phrase “which is the subject of an arbitration agreement” does not, in the context, necessarily require that the agreement must be already in existence before the action is brought in the court. The phrase also connotes an arbitration agreement being brought into existence while the action is pending. Black’s Law Dictionary has defined the word “is” as follows: “This word, although normally referring to the present, often has a future meaning, but is not synonymous with ‘shall have been’. It may have, however, a past signification, as in the sense of has been.” 24. Therefore, the Supreme Court observed that usage of the word “is” does not in the context necessarily require that the agreement must be already in existence before the action is brought in the court. It may have, however, a past signification, as in the sense of has been.” 24. Therefore, the Supreme Court observed that usage of the word “is” does not in the context necessarily require that the agreement must be already in existence before the action is brought in the court. The phrase “which is the subject matter of an arbitration agreement” also connotes an arbitration agreement being brought into existence while the action is pending. The definition of the word “is” appearing in Black’s Law Dictionary was considered by the Supreme Court and that definition is also pertinent and germane to consider the usage of the word “is” appearing in the definition of the terms “commercial establishment” and “shop”, appearing in the Act, 1962. 25. It is pertinent to mention here that the instrument in question in the present petition was referred by the Sub-Registrar to Collector pursuant to the provision of Clause (d) of sub-section (1) of Section 47-A of the Act. 26. The Collector in its order impugned dated 23.5.2013 while noticing that the property was being used for commercial purpose, noticed that in the record of Nagar Palika Parishad till the year 2012, it was being reflected under the tenancy of a commercial establishment. It was also noticed that in the master plan made in respect of development of the area, the property in question was shown as commercial. It was, therefore, held that merely on the ground that on the date of transfer, the building in question was vacant, it was not correct to make valuation of that property as noncommercial but as commercial. 27. Under the circumstances, the judgment of this Court in Kashi Nath Upadhyaya (supra) is distinguishable from the facts of the present case, inasmuch as the property in question in Kashi Nath Upadhyay was put to non-agricultural usage more than 10 years prior to execution of the deed. In that case, no exemplars of any similar property was placed before the Collector to show that the predominant use in the vicinity of the property is agricultural and not non-agricultural. The Court, having due regard to the material available on record held that the predominant land use appeared to be residential as the property was surrounded by residential building and there was no reference of any economic activity in the vicinity of the property. 28. The Court, having due regard to the material available on record held that the predominant land use appeared to be residential as the property was surrounded by residential building and there was no reference of any economic activity in the vicinity of the property. 28. In the present case, the Collector has relied upon the municipal record as well as the fact that merely 17 days prior to execution of the instrument in question, the property was being used for commercial purpose. 29. In the judgment of Smt. Pushpa Sareen (supra) relied upon by the learned counsel for the respondent, the judgment of Supreme Court in State of U.P. Vs. Ambrish Tandon (supra) was also considered. The three judge Bench of this Court, accordingly observed as follows: “26. The true test for determination by the Collector is the market value of the property on the date of the instrument because, under the provisions of the Act, every instrument is required to be stamped before or at the time of execution. In making that determination, the Collector has to be mindful of the fact that the market value of the property may vary from location to location and is dependent upon a large number of circumstances having a bearing on the comparative advantages or disadvantages of the land as well as the use to which the land can be put on the date of the execution of the instrument. 27. Undoubtedly, the Collector is not permitted to launch upon a speculative inquiry about the prospective use to which a land may be put to use at an uncertain future date. The market value of the property has to be determined with reference to the use to which the land is capable reasonably of being put to immediately or in the proximate future. The possibility of the land becoming available in the immediate or near future for better use and enjoyment reflects upon the potentiality of the land. This potential has to be assessed with reference to the date of the execution of the instrument. In other words, the power of the Collector cannot be unduly circumscribed by ruling out the potential to which the land can be advantageously deployed at the time of the execution of the instrument or a period reasonably proximate thereto. Again the use to which land in the area had been put is a material consideration. In other words, the power of the Collector cannot be unduly circumscribed by ruling out the potential to which the land can be advantageously deployed at the time of the execution of the instrument or a period reasonably proximate thereto. Again the use to which land in the area had been put is a material consideration. If the land surrounding the property in question has been put to commercial use, it would be improper to hold that this is a circumstance which should not weigh with the Collector as a factor which influences the market value of the land. 28. The fact that the land was put to a particular use, say for instance a commercial purpose at a later point in time, may not be a relevant criterion for deciding the value for the purpose of stamp duty, as held by the Supreme Court in State of U.P. and others v. Ambrish Tandon and another, (2012) 5 SCC 566 . This is because the nature of the user is relateable to the date of purchase which is relevant for the purpose of computing the stamp duty. Where, however, the potential of the land can be assessed on the date of the execution of the instrument itself, that is clearly a circumstance which is relevant and germane to the determination of the true market value. At the same time, the exercise before the Collector has to be based on adequate material and cannot be a matter of hypothesis or surmise. The Collector must have material on the record to the effect that there has been a change of use or other contemporaneous sale-deeds in respect of the adjacent areas that would have a bearing on the market value of the property which is under consideration. The Collector, therefore, would be within jurisdiction in referring to exemplars or comparable sale instances which have a bearing on the true market value of the property which is required to be assessed. If the sale instances are comparable, they would also reflect the potentiality of the land which would be taken into consideration in a price agreed upon between a vendor and a purchaser.” (Emphasis supplies) 30. If the sale instances are comparable, they would also reflect the potentiality of the land which would be taken into consideration in a price agreed upon between a vendor and a purchaser.” (Emphasis supplies) 30. This Court, therefore, in Pushpa Sareen, held that where the potential of land can be assessed on the date of execution of instrument itself, that is clearly a circumstance which is relevant and germane to determination of true market value. It was held that the usage of land and its valuation has to be ascertained on the basis of its proximate future potential. 31. Therefore, merely because the property in question was vacant on the date of execution of the sale deed, though admittedly merely 17 days back it was being used for commercial purpose, it cannot be held that the property in question was not being used as a commercial building. The decision of the authorities in this regard cannot be faulted. Both the Collector as well as the CCRA in the orders impugned have held that a part of the building in question was being used for commercial purposes. In view of the discussion aforesaid, the orders impugned, so far as this aspect of the matter is concerned, are upheld. 32. However, an important fact that needs to be taken into account is the calculation that has been done by the Collector on the basis of the minimum rates prescribed. Since the reference was made by the Sub-Registrar to the Collector under Section 47A(1)(d) of the Act, the Collector is enjoined to make the assessment and valuation of the property on the basis of its market value. As indicated in the judgment of Smt. Pushpa Sareen (supra), which judgment had also considered the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Ramesh Chand Bansal vs. District Magistrate/Collector, (1999) 5 SCC 62 and was passed on a reference made by the CCRA under Section 57 of the Act, the process for determination of market value of a property requires reference to exemplars and comparable sale instances which have a bearing on the market value of the property in question, which apparently has not been done in the present case. Therefore, the order dated 19.6.2017 passed by the Collector, Pilibhit and the order dated 9.3.2018 passed by the CCRA, insofar as they apply minimum rates for calculation of market value, cannot be sustained and are hereby quashed to that extent. However, the finding of the authorities that a part of the building in question is a commercial building, the same is correct in view of the discussion above. 33. This petition is, accordingly, partly allowed to the extent mentioned above, and the matter is remanded to the Collector, Pilibhit to make a fresh valuation of the property in question on the basis of market value in view of the directions made above.