ORDER : Sanjay Dwivedi, J. 1. This petition has been filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India seeking a direction for quashing the order dated 26.12.2011 (Annexure-P/11) whereby distributorship of LPG cylinders granted in the name of M/s. Krishna Gas Agency has been terminated for the reasons mentioned in the impugned order itself. 2. The challenge is founded mainly on the ground that the decision taken by the respondents for terminating the distributorship of the petitioner is illegal, arbitrary and contrary to the principle of natural justice. 3. It is contended on behalf of the petitioner that the irregularities pointed out by the respondents for terminating the distributorship were properly answered by filing a reply, but without any foundation, one-sided decision was taken by the respondents alleging irregularities which are contrary to the Marketing Discipline Guidelines, 2001 (for brevity "MDG 2001"). It is also contended by the petitioner that the explanation given on behalf of the petitioner has been misconstrued by the respondents and treated the same to be an admission of the petitioner and as such the impugned order has been passed. It is further contended by the petitioner that the action has been taken against the petitioner's distributorship with mala fide intention by an Officer of the respondent-Corporation namely Shri I.V. Barapatre with an intention to extend the benefit of allotting the said distributorship to his acquaintance namely Singhai Gas Agency and in that pursuit, he has pointed out minor defects as if it is major irregularity with an intention to terminate the distributorship of the petitioner. It is also contended by the petitioner that the irregularities, although not admitted by the petitioner, but in a counseling conducted, the petitioner was exonerated but finally without considering the fact that the allegations made against the petitioner have been denied; no enquiry to ascertain the allegations made against the petitioner has been conducted and without giving any opportunity to defend, one-sided decision for terminating the distributorship of the petitioner has been taken. It is also contended by the petitioner that the order impugned is also illegal on the ground that same contained the reason which is not related with the respondents that too without considering the fact that on earlier occasion the reconstitution of firm of the petitioner has been approved by the authority and the petitioner was allowed to continue to run the distributorship. As such, the impugned order is sought to be quashed and a direction for the respondents has been sought to allow the petitioner to run the distributorship accepting its reconstitution. 4. To resolve the controversy involved in this case, the necessary facts, in a nutshell, are that the husband of the petitioner Late Manish Yadav was granted the dealership of LPG, Indian Oil Corporation, Gadarwara, District Narsinghpur in the year 1994 under the handicapped category, who breathed his last on 28.08.2007 and thereafter the petitioner took over the charge and started managing the affairs of the firm. After the death of the husband of the petitioner, she applied for reconstitution of firm and submitted a proposal before the respondents. The respondent-authority vide letter dated 12.11.2007 (Annexure-P/3) approved the proposal for reconstitution of firm and asked the petitioner to fulfill the necessary formalities so that agreement could be executed. The respondent/Corporation has also sought NOC from the Chief Explosive Controller, Agra by sending a letter on 20.11.2009 (Annexure-P/2) in which also it was mentioned that the licence of the husband of the petitioner was to be renewed and recommendation has been made in this regard and therefore NOC has been sought from the Chief Explosive Controller. In the meantime, the mother-in-law had also filed a petition claiming herself to be inducted in the firm as legal heir of her son and therefore the petitioner was also asked to get NOC from her mother-in-law and a letter in this regard was given to the petitioner on 15.03.2010 (Annexure-P/4). The said writ petition was registered as W.P. No. 8014/2008, although the said petition was dismissed by this Court by order dated 21.03.2013 (Annexure-P/12). 5. By another letter dated 17.09.2009 (Annexure-P/6), the petitioner was again asked that since proposal for reconstitution of distributorship is pending and therefore NOC of mother-in-law was also required and further asked to provide relevant documents and to arrange for the required infrastructure for catering to the needs of the consumers providing them benefit of home delivery and if they take refill from the godown, then arrangement of rebate of Rs. 8/- also be made. 6. On 01.07.2010, the petitioner was intimated about the irregularities found during the course of refill audit of the petitioner's distributorship conducted on 11/12.06.2010 and was also asked to submit explanation within a period of 15 days. 8/- also be made. 6. On 01.07.2010, the petitioner was intimated about the irregularities found during the course of refill audit of the petitioner's distributorship conducted on 11/12.06.2010 and was also asked to submit explanation within a period of 15 days. Again on 08.09.2010, the petitioner was issued a notice pointing out the irregularities committed by the petitioner-agency and asking her to submit an explanation. Thereafter, on 06.10.2010 (Annexure-P/9) and 08.10.2010 (Annexure-P/10) the petitioner submitted explanation thereby denying the allegations made and also doubted the said enquiry in which irregularities were found and were pointed out against the petitioner. It is also mentioned in the reply that the irregularities pointed out cannot be considered to be so grave in nature as have been projected by the respondents. It is also stated in the reply/explanation that the allegations were false. The respondents thereafter issued the order dated 26.12.2011 (Annexure-P/11) holding that the irregularities pointed out are considered to be major irregularities as per the provisions of MDG 2001 and thereafter penal action for termination of distributorship was taken. In the order, it is also mentioned that the distributorship was being run by the petitioner without a valid agreement as it could not be executed because the petitioner failed to reach any consensus with other family members, therefore, the distributorship has been terminated and the said order has been assailed by the petitioner by the instant petition. 7. A reply has been filed by the respondents taking stand therein that despite granting sufficient opportunity to get NOC from her mother-in-law, the same could not be submitted by the petitioner, therefore, the petitioner was not entitled to get the licence renewed and as such it is stated by the respondents that for challenging the order of termination of distributorship, the petitioner has no locus and the petition is not maintainable as such. It is also stated that the order impugned contained as to what irregularities were found during the course of inspection and as per MDG 2001, Clauses 7 and 14 have been violated which resulted into termination of the agency. It is stated in the reply that on 22.11.2008 refill audit was conducted in which it was found that 30 domestic cylinders have been converted into non-domestic use and benefit of cash and carry rebate facilities were not extended to the consumers who were not provided home delivery. It is stated in the reply that on 22.11.2008 refill audit was conducted in which it was found that 30 domestic cylinders have been converted into non-domestic use and benefit of cash and carry rebate facilities were not extended to the consumers who were not provided home delivery. It is also stated that the explanation submitted by the petitioner was not found acceptable and the petitioner was found guilty of three major irregularities within a span of 2 years and under the MDG 2001 which has binding effect, termination of distributorship agency was proposed and as such by the order impugned the said punishment was imposed. 8. The learned counsel for the respondents has also submitted that there was no privity of contract between the petitioner and the respondents and therefore challenging the order impugned by the petitioner is not proper and as such the petition is not maintainable. It is also stated by the respondents that the petitioner failed to submit any NOC from her mother-in-law who is also a legal heir of the deceased licencee Manish Yadav and in absence of her NOC, the petitioner cannot claim herself to be a valid licence holder and further in absence of consent of mother-in-law, the proposal of reconstitution of firm cannot be approved. 9. Considering the rival contentions urged by the counsel on behalf of both the parties, the issue involved in this case is being answered hereinbelow. 10. As far as the issue regarding submitting the NOC of mother-in-law of the petitioner is concerned, I am of the opinion that in the facts and circumstances of the case as have been discussed here-in-below, that aspect is not material and would not affect the rights of the petitioner adversely. The petition preferred by the mother-in-law was dismissed vide order dated 21.03.2013 but thereafter, she has not challenged the order of termination of distributorship agency of her son which was being run by the present petitioner after the death of her husband. The mother-in-law has not assailed the order and also not claimed restoration of her petition. The respondents cannot refuse to renew the licence of distributorship firm merely because the petitioner failed to submit any NOC from her mother-in-law. The mother-in-law has not assailed the order and also not claimed restoration of her petition. The respondents cannot refuse to renew the licence of distributorship firm merely because the petitioner failed to submit any NOC from her mother-in-law. In the existing circumstances, it appears that the mother-in-law has no interest in the matter and even otherwise if she has any share in the firm, she could claim the same before the competent forum. The respondents-Corporation is not proper forum to consider the entitlement of mother-in-law especially under the circumstance when they have already recommended the proposal of renewal of agency forwarded by the petitioner as is clear from the letter dated 20.11.2009 in which respondent/authority itself has mentioned, which is reproduced as under:- ^^vkids }kjk ÁnRr yk;lsal ua- th@lh-lh-@,e-ih-@06@595@th 11363 ftldh oS/krk 30-09-2009 rd gS] mldk] d`".kk xSl ,tsalh] xkMjokjk }kjk uohuhdj.k dh ÁfØ;k iwjh djus ds i'pkr~ buds yk;lsal dk uohuhdj.k iqu% fd;k tkuk vuq'kaflr gSA** and also in letter dated 12.11.2007, they have admitted that the proposal for reconstitution of the firm has been approved by the respondents. The relevant portion of the said letter is reproduced here-in-below :- ^^fo"k;kUrxZ vkidks lwfpr fd;k tkrk gS fd vkids ifr Jh euh"k ;kno] Áksijk;Vj & esllZ d`".kk xSl ,tsalh] xkMjokM+k dh e`R;q ds mijkUr] vkids }kjk esllZ d`".kk xSl ,tsalh] xkMjokM+k ds iquxZBu ÁLrko ds lEcU/k esa fn;s x;s leLr nLrkostksa dh tkap ds mijkUr gekjs fof/k foHkkx e-Á-jkT; dk;kZy; Hkksiky ,oa v/kksgLrk{kjdrkZ }kjk vkids iquxZBu ÁLrko dh Lohd`r Ánku dh xbZ gS bl lEcU/k esa ge vkidks funsZ'k ns jgs fd vkids }kjk fn;s x;s 'kiFk&i= ,oa ?kks"k.kk i= dks mfpr ewY; ds LVkWEi isij ij uksVjkbZTM djkdj ,oa mldh ewyÁfr bl dk;kZy; esa ;Fkk'kh?kz tek djsa] blds mijkUr vkids ,oa bafM;u vkW;y dkisZjs'ku ds e/; bdjkj ukesa ij gLrk{kj fd;s tk;saxs ftlds fy;s vkidks 3 ikliksVZ lkbZt ds QksVks ,oa lhy ysdj bl dk;kZy; esa mifLFkr gksuk gksxkA** Once the authority itself has accepted the proposal and approved the same for reconstitution of firm after the death of the husband of the petitioner showing that the said agency is the only source of her livelihood and said proposal was accepted by the respondents. Thereafter if any objection is raised by her mother-in-law and even thereafter the petitioner was allowed to run the agency by the respondents till its termination, the denial of renewal of licence on the ground of non-submission of the NOC from mother-in-law does not appear to be justified and reasonable. The letter dated 08.09.2010 (Annexure-P/8) contained the following;- "After the said demise of Shri Manish Kumar Yadav, on 28.08.07, both Smt. Kirti Yadav w/o. Late Shri Manish Kumar Yadav & Smt. Heera Devi Yadav Mother of Late Shri Manish Kumar Yadav have given an application for keeping the supplies to distributorship running. On humanitarian ground Corporation allowed the distributorship to run." The aforesaid makes it clear that the respondent/Corporation has allowed the petitioner to run the distributorship firm which was initially allotted to her husband namely Manish Yadav. Accordingly, the stand taken by the respondents that in absence of NOC of her mother-in-law, the petitioner is not entitled to claim renewal of licence and the petition challenging the order of termination of distributorship of the agency is not tenable as is without any substance in view of the facts and circumstances discussed hereinabove, therefore rejected. 11. Coming to the irregularities pointed out by the respondent/Corporation and even after submitting the explanation denying the allegations made in the notice issued on 08.09.2010 (Annexure-P/8), observing that the explanation was not found satisfactory and passing the order of termination, seems to be improper for the reason that the Corporation has taken the decision arbitrarily. When in the explanation dated 08.10.2010 (Annexure-P/10) it is very categorically denied by the petitioner regarding conversion of 30 domestic cylinders into non-domestic use and further denied the enquiry regarding not refunding the delivery charges then principle of natural justice demands to provide an opportunity to the petitioner for cross-examining the consumers in whose name, the allegations were levelled against them but nothing was done. Under the facts and circumstances when the allegations about irregularities made against the petitioner have been denied, the same should have been proved by the respondents after giving proper opportunity of hearing to the petitioner and after giving her opportunity to examine the witnesses in whose name complaints were made, the decision for terminating the licence could have been taken. Under the facts and circumstances when the allegations about irregularities made against the petitioner have been denied, the same should have been proved by the respondents after giving proper opportunity of hearing to the petitioner and after giving her opportunity to examine the witnesses in whose name complaints were made, the decision for terminating the licence could have been taken. The Supreme Court on so many occasions has very categorically laid down that even in absence of making a specific provision for following the principle of natural justice, the basic rule of law of natural justice has to be followed in a case in which any order is passed carrying civil consequences. Here in this case, it is clear that after the death of the husband of the petitioner, the petitioner and her family had no other earning source except the LPG Agency and from the allegations made against the petitioner and decision taken by the respondent/Corporation, it is clear that they reached the conclusion deciding on their own that the alleged irregularities have been committed by the petitioner, ignoring the fact that those have been denied by the petitioner in her explanation submitted on 08.10.2010. The minimum requirement of principle of natural justice demands at-least those consumers who have not been granted refund of delivery charges or they have carried refilled cylinders from the godown of agency itself, have to be produced before the petitioner so that they could be examined before determining as to whether they have alleged against the petitioner correctly or falsely. 12. Since there is no appeal provided against the decision taken by the authority, this Court while dealing with the issue determining the validity of the impugned order, can also examine the conduct of the respondents to ascertain whether they have acted fairly or not. The manner in which alleged irregularities are found proved cannot be given seal of approval by this Court and those irregularities do not show as heinous in nature culminating into termination of the distributorship, which is the sole source of livelihood of the petitioner and her family members. It appears that a one-sided decision has been taken by the respondents which is contrary to basic principle of law that if any order carrying civil consequences is passed, the person affected should be given proper opportunity to be heard. 13. It appears that a one-sided decision has been taken by the respondents which is contrary to basic principle of law that if any order carrying civil consequences is passed, the person affected should be given proper opportunity to be heard. 13. The Supreme Court in the case of State of Orissa v. Dr. (Miss) Binapani Dei and others, AIR 1967 SC 1269 has observed as under:- "12. It is true that some preliminary enquiry was made by Dr. S. Mitra. But the report of that Enquiry Officer was never disclosed to the first respondent. Thereafter the first respondent was required to show cause why April 16, 1907, should not be accepted as the date of birth and without recording any evidence the order was passed. We think that such an enquiry and decision were contrary to the basic concept of justice and cannot have any value. It is true that the order is administrative in character, but even an administrative order which involves civil consequences, as already stated, must be made consistently with the rules of natural justice after informing the first respondent of the case of the State, the evidence in support thereof and after giving an opportunity to the first respondent of being heard and meeting or explaining the evidence. No such steps were admittedly taken, the High Court was, in our judgment, right in setting side the order of the State." 14. Further, the Supreme Court in case of Canara Bank v. V.K. Awasthy (2005) 6 SCC 321 has observed as under:- "14. Concept of natural justice has undergone a great deal of change in recent years. Rules of natural justice are not rules embodied always expressly in a statute or in rules framed thereunder. They may be implied from the nature of the duty to be performed under a statute. What particular rule of natural justice should be implied and what its context should be in a given case must depend to a great extent on the fact and circumstances of that case, the framework of the statute under which the enquiry is held. The old distinction between a judicial act and an administrative act has withered away. Even an administrative order which involves civil consequences must be consistent with the rules of natural justice. The old distinction between a judicial act and an administrative act has withered away. Even an administrative order which involves civil consequences must be consistent with the rules of natural justice. The expression "civil consequences" encompasses infraction of not merely property or personal rights but of civil liberties, material deprivations and non-pecuniary damages. In its wide umbrella comes everything that affects a citizen in his civil life. 15. Natural justice has been variously defined by different Judges. A few instances will suffice. In Drew v. Drew and Leburn [(1855) 2 Macq 1: 25 LTOS 282 (HL)] (Macq at p. 8) Lord Cranworth defined it as "universal justice". In James Dunber Smith v. R. [(1878) 3 AC 614 (PC)] (AC at p. 623) Sir Robert P. Collier, speaking for the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, used the phrase "the requirements of substantial justice", while in Arthur John Spackman v. Plumstead Distt. Board of Works [(1885) 10 AC 229: 54 LJMC 81: 53 LT 151] (AC at p. 240), the Earl of Selbourne, S.C. preferred the phrase "the substantial requirement of justice". In Vionet v. Barrett [(1885) 55 LJRD 39] (LJRD at p. 41), Lord Esher, M.R. defined natural justice as "the natural sense of what is right and wrong". While, however, deciding Hopkins v. Smethwick Local Board of Health [(1890) 24 QBD 712: 59 LJQB 250: 62 LT 783 (CA)] Lord Fasher, M.R. instead of using the definition given earlier by him in Vionet case [(1885) 55 LJRD 39] chose to define natural justice as "fundamental justice". In Ridge v. Baldwin [ (1963) 1 QB 539 : (1962) 1 All ER 834: (1962) 2 WLR 716 (CA)] (QB at p. 578), Harman, L.J., in the Court of Appeal countered natural justice with "fair play in action", a phrase favoured by Bhagwati, J. in Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India [ (1978) 1 SCC 248 : (1978) 2 SCR 621 ]. In HK (an infant), In re [(1967) 2 QB 617: (1967) 2 WLR 962: (1967) 1 All ER 226] (QB at p. 530), Lord Parker, C.J., preferred to describe natural justice as "a duty to act fairly". In Fairmount Investments Ltd. v. Secy. In HK (an infant), In re [(1967) 2 QB 617: (1967) 2 WLR 962: (1967) 1 All ER 226] (QB at p. 530), Lord Parker, C.J., preferred to describe natural justice as "a duty to act fairly". In Fairmount Investments Ltd. v. Secy. of State for Environment [ (1976) 1 WLR 1255 : (1976) 2 All ER 865 (HL)] Lord Russell of Willowan somewhat picturesquely described natural justice as "a fair crack of the whip" while Geoffrey Lane, L.J. in R. v. Secy. of State for Home Affairs, ex p Hosenball [ (1977) 1 WLR 766 : (1977) 3 All ER 452] preferred the homely phrase "common fairness". 16. How then have the principles of natural justice been interpreted in the courts and within what limits are they to be confined? Over the years by a process of judicial interpretation two rules have been evolved as representing the principles of natural justice in judicial process, including therein quasi-judicial and administrative process. They constitute the basic elements of a fair hearing, having their roots in the innate sense of man for fair play and justice which is not the preserve of any particular race or country but is shared in common by all men. The first rule is "nemo judex in causa sua" or "nemo debet esse judex in propria causa sua" as stated in (1605) 12 Co. Rep. 114 [Earl of Derby's case, (1605) 12 Co Rep 114 : 77 ER 1390] that is, "no man shall be a judge in his own cause". Coke used the form "aliquis non debet esse judex in propria causa, quia non potest esse judex et pars" (Co. Litt. 1418), that is, "no man ought to be a judge in his own case, because he cannot act as judge and at the same time be a party". The form "nemo potest esse simul actor et judex", that is, "no one can be at once suitor and judge" is also at times used. The second rule is "audi alteram partem", that is, "hear the other side". At times and particularly in continental countries, the form "audietur at altera pars" is used, meaning very much the same thing. The form "nemo potest esse simul actor et judex", that is, "no one can be at once suitor and judge" is also at times used. The second rule is "audi alteram partem", that is, "hear the other side". At times and particularly in continental countries, the form "audietur at altera pars" is used, meaning very much the same thing. A corollary has been deduced from the above two rules and particularly the audi alteram partem rule, namely "qui aliquid statuerit parte inaudita altera, aequum licet dixerit, haud aequum fecerit" that is, "he who shall decide anything without the other side having been heard, although he may have said what is right, will not have been what is right" (see Bosewell case [(1605) 6 Co Rep 48-b, 52-a]) or in other words, as it is now expressed, "justice should not only be done but should manifestly be seen to be done". Whenever an order is struck down as invalid being in violation of principles of natural justice, there is no final decision of the case and fresh proceedings are left open. All that is done is to vacate the order assailed by virtue of its inherent defect, but the proceedings are not terminated." 15. The Supreme Court in the cases of Gorkha Security Services Vs. Government (NCT of Delhi) and Others reported in (2014) 9 SCC 105 , has very clearly observed as under:- "The "Prejudice" Argument 32. It was sought to be argued by Mr. Maninder Singh, learned Additional Solicitor General appearing for the respondent, that even if it is accepted that the show-cause notice should have contained the proposed action of blacklisting, no prejudice was caused to the appellant in as much as all necessary details mentioning defaults/prejudices committed by the appellant were given in the show-cause notice and the appellant had even given its reply thereto. According to him, even if the action of blacklisting was not proposed in the show cause notice, the reply of the appellant would have remained the same. On this premise, the learned Additional Solicitor General has argued that there is no prejudice caused to the appellant by non-mentioning of the proposed action of blacklisting. He argued that unless the appellant was able to show that non-mentioning of blacklisting as the proposed penalty has caused prejudice and has resulted in miscarriage of justice, the impugned action cannot be nullified. He argued that unless the appellant was able to show that non-mentioning of blacklisting as the proposed penalty has caused prejudice and has resulted in miscarriage of justice, the impugned action cannot be nullified. For this proposition he referred to the judgment of this Court in Haryana Financial Corpn. v. Kailash Chandra Ahuja : (SCC pp. 38, 40-41 & 44, paras 21, 31, 36 & 44) "21. From the ratio laid down in B. Karunakar11 it is explicitly clear that the doctrine of natural justice requires supply of a copy of the inquiry officer's report to the delinquent if such inquiry officer is other than the disciplinary authority. It is also clear that non-supply of report of the inquiry officer is in the breach of natural justice. But it is equally clear that failure to supply a report of the inquiry officer to the delinquent employee would not ipso facto result in the proceedings being declared null and void and the order of punishment non est and ineffective. It is for the delinquent employee to plead and prove that non-supply of such report had caused prejudice and resulted in miscarriage of justice. If he is unable to satisfy the court on that point, the order of punishment cannot automatically be set aside. *** 31. At the same time, however, effect of violation of the rule of audi alteram partem has to be considered. Even if hearing is not afforded to the person who is sought to be affected or penalised, can it not be argued that 'notice would have served no purpose' or 'hearing could not have made difference' or 'the person could not have offered any defence whatsoever'. In this connection, it is interesting to note that under the English law, it was held few years before that non-compliance with principles of natural justice would make the order null and void and no further inquiry was necessary. *** 36. The recent trend, however, is of 'prejudice'. Even in those cases where procedural requirements have not been complied with, the action has not been held ipso facto illegal, unlawful or void unless it is shown that non-observance had prejudicially affected the applicant. *** 44. *** 36. The recent trend, however, is of 'prejudice'. Even in those cases where procedural requirements have not been complied with, the action has not been held ipso facto illegal, unlawful or void unless it is shown that non-observance had prejudicially affected the applicant. *** 44. From the aforesaid decisions, it is clear that though supply of report of the inquiry officer is part and parcel of natural justice and must be furnished to the delinquent employee, failure to do so would not automatically result in quashing or setting aside of the order or the order being declared null and void. For that, the delinquent employee has to show 'prejudice'. Unless he is able to show that non-supply of report of the inquiry officer has resulted in prejudice or miscarriage of justice, an order of punishment cannot be held to be vitiated. And whether prejudice had been caused to the delinquent employee depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case and no rule of universal application can be laid down." 33. When we apply the ratio of the aforesaid judgment to the facts of the present case, it becomes difficult to accept the argument of the learned Additional Solicitor General. In the first instance, we may point out that no such case was set up by the respondents that by omitting to state the proposed action of blacklisting, the appellant in the show-cause notice has not caused any prejudice to the appellant. Moreover, had the action of black listing being specifically proposed in the show cause notice, the appellant could have mentioned as to why such extreme penalty is not justified. It could have come out with extenuating circumstances defending such an action even if the defaults were there and the Department was not satisfied with the explanation qua the defaults. It could have even pleaded with the Department not to blacklist the appellant or do it for a lesser period in case the Department still wanted to black list the appellant. Therefore, it is not at all acceptable that non-mentioning of proposed blacklisting in the show-cause notice has not caused any prejudice to the appellant. This apart, the extreme nature of such a harsh penalty like blacklisting with severe consequences, would itself amount to causing prejudice to the appellant. 34. Therefore, it is not at all acceptable that non-mentioning of proposed blacklisting in the show-cause notice has not caused any prejudice to the appellant. This apart, the extreme nature of such a harsh penalty like blacklisting with severe consequences, would itself amount to causing prejudice to the appellant. 34. For the aforesaid reasons, we are of the view that the impugned judgment3 of the High Court does not decide the issue in correct prospective. The impugned Order dated 11.9.2013 passed by the respondents blacklisting the appellant without giving the appellant notice thereto, is contrary to the principles of natural justice as it was not specifically proposed and, therefore, there was no show-cause notice given to this effect before taking action of blacklisting against the appellant. We, therefore, set aside and quash the impugned action of blacklisting the appellant. The appeals are allowed to this extent. However, we make it clear that it would be open to the respondents to take any action in this behalf after complying with the necessary procedural formalities delineated above. No costs." In the aforesaid case, the Supreme Court further held as under :- "No doubt, rules of natural justice are not embodied rules nor can they be lifted to the position of fundamental rights. However, their aim is to secure justice and to prevent miscarriage of justice. It is now well-established proposition of law that unless a statutory provision either specifically or by necessary implication excludes the application of any rules of natural justice, any exercise of power prejudicially affecting another must be in conformity with the rules of natural justice. When it comes to the action of blacklisting which is termed as "civil death" it would be difficult to accept the proposition that without even putting the noticee to such a contemplated action and giving him a chance to show cause as to why such an action be not taken, final order can be passed blacklisting such a person only on the premise that this is one of the actions so stated in provisions of NIT." (emphasis supplied) 16. The similar view has been taken by Supreme Court in case of Dharmpal Satyapal Limited Vs. Deputy Commissioner reported in (2015) 8 SCC 519 . 17. The similar view has been taken by Supreme Court in case of Dharmpal Satyapal Limited Vs. Deputy Commissioner reported in (2015) 8 SCC 519 . 17. This Court vide order dated 28.10.2013 granted interim protection directing the parties to maintain status quo and the application for vacating the interim order was also filed by the respondents, meaning thereby, after terminating the distributorship of the agency originally allotted to the husband of the petitioner, has not been allotted to anyone. 18. In view of the above discussion and specifying that respondents/Corporation virtually has taken a decision and given approval to the reconstitution of firm, the order impugned is not sustainable and therefore is hereby set aside. The respondents are directed to carry out the necessary formalities for executing the agreement required before renewal of licence in favour of the petitioner as has already been discussed hereinabove that since the respondents have already taken decision and approved the proposal for reconstitution of firm, they may not insist the petitioner to submit the NOC of her mother-in-law because here in this case, the petitioner has challenged the order of termination of agency which was being run by the petitioner and if at all her mother-in-law is still interested to get her share in the agency, she has different forum to claim her entitlement but the respondents are not the authority to determine her entitlement especially under the circumstances as discussed hereinabove. 19. In view of the above analysis, I have no hesitation to say that the decision making process adopted by the respondents suffers from violation of the principle of natural justice. Since no appeal is provided against the order impugned, this Court can hold the impugned order not sustainable, therefore, it is set aside. 20. With the aforesaid directions, the petition filed by the petitioner is allowed. In the facts and circumstances, the parties shall bear their own costs.