JUDGMENT : 1. Rule. Rule made returnable forthwith and, with the consent of the counsels for the parties, heard finally. 2. This petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India calls in question the legality, propriety and correctness of the orders dated 14th January 2019 and 29th July 2019, passed by the Minister (Revenue) in RTS-2818-P.K. 583/J-4A, whereby the Minister was persuaded to condone the delay in preferring the appeal, by the order dated 14th January 2019, and eventually allow the revision and set aside the orders passed by the Deputy Director, Land Records, Kokan Division, Mumbai-respondent No.2, ordering the modification of the scheme under section 32 of the Maharashtra Prevention of Fragmentation and Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1947 (‘the Consolidation Act, 1947’). 3. Shorn of unnecessary details, the background facts, can be stated as under : (a) Kamlini Liladhar Kelkar, the predecessor-in-title of petitioner No.3-Liladhar Kelkar was the original holder of agriculture land bearing Gat No. 540, old survey No.51, admeasuring 4 H 58 R (‘the subject land’). Out of the said land, the deceased respondent No.23-Inayutulla Jalal purchased an area admeasuring 2H, 2 R from the original holder, in the year 1980. The petitioner No.2 purchased another parcel of land admeasuring 2 H, 2 R from the original holder on 21st September 1980. Still, 54R land remained with the original holder. (b) In the Consolidation Scheme, notified in the year 1979, the old survey No.51 came to be divided into Gat Nos. 529, 530, 538, 540 and 561. Yet, the Tahasildar, Mangaon, by order dated 14th May 1987, granted Non-Agricultural use permission (N.A. permission) in respect of Survey No. 51, upon certain conditions to be complied with, by the holders of the subject land, without verifying the Consolidation Scheme. On the basis of the said N.A. permission, the respondent Nos. 5 to 22 and 24 to 28 purchased the plots, carved out from the subject land. (c) Since, it transpired that the 54R land which remained with the original holder had been encroached upon, and the said portion of land did not find mention in the map of the said survey number. The petitioner No.3 and others made the grievances before the competent authorities. Measurement of the subject land was sought. (c) Since, it transpired that the 54R land which remained with the original holder had been encroached upon, and the said portion of land did not find mention in the map of the said survey number. The petitioner No.3 and others made the grievances before the competent authorities. Measurement of the subject land was sought. As it transpired that there were defects in the Consolidation Scheme, on 23rd August 2012, the petitioner No.2, respondent No.23 and the other land holders, (respondent Nos.29 to 31 in this petition) submitted an application before the Deputy Director, Land Records-respondent No.2 seeking modification in the Consolidation Scheme, pointing out patent errors therein. The respondent No.2 invited objection. A draft notification of modification was published on 21st July 2014. Eventually, by the order dated 18th February 2015, the scheme was modified. (d) Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the order dated 18th February 2015, modifying the Consolidation Scheme, the respondent Nos.5 to 22 and 24 to 28 herein preferred a proceeding, purported to be an appeal, before the State Government. Since there was delay in preferring the appeal, an application for condonation of delay was also preferred. The Minister (Revenue) construed the said proceeding to be a revision under section 257 of the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code, 1966 (‘the Code, 1966’) and allowed the same by quashing and setting aside draft notification of modification, dated 19th December 2014, and the order dated 18th February 2015, whereby and whereunder, the Consolidation Scheme was modified and the consequent orders of correction of the record of rights in respect of the subject land. Resultantly the N.A. permission dated 14th May 1987 and the map settled by the Deputy Superintendent, Mangaon, vide measurement register No. 264, came to be restored. (e) Being aggrieved, the petitioners have invoked the writ jurisdiction of this Court. (f) Initially, the principal challenge, inter-alia, was that the Minister committed a manifest error in law in entertaining the revision without first condoning the delay in fling the said proceeding. The impugned order, thus, suffers from the vice of jurisdictional error. However, when it was pointed out that on 14th January 2018, the Minister had condoned the delay in preferring the said proceeding and posted the matter for hearing on merits, the petitioners challenged the said order of condonation of delay by raising grounds of challenge thereto. 4. The impugned order, thus, suffers from the vice of jurisdictional error. However, when it was pointed out that on 14th January 2018, the Minister had condoned the delay in preferring the said proceeding and posted the matter for hearing on merits, the petitioners challenged the said order of condonation of delay by raising grounds of challenge thereto. 4. In the aforesaid fact-situation, I have heard Mr.Pradeep Dalvi, the learned counsel for the petitioners, Mrs. M.S. Bane, the learned AGP for respondent Nos.1 to 4 and Mr. Surel Shah, the learned counsel for respondent Nos.5 to 22, 24, 27 and 28, at length. With the assistance of the learned counsels for the parties, I have carefully perused the material on record, including the orders passed by the statutory authorities. 5. Mr. Dalvi, the learned counsel for the petitioners advanced a two-pronged submission. First, the Minister did not follow the fundamental principles of judicial process. The petitioners were not provided with the copy of the order whereby the delay in preferring the proceeding against the order passed by the Deputy Director, Land Records, modifying the Consolidation Scheme dated 18th February 2015, was sought to be assailed. Therefore, the petitioners proceeded on the premise that there was no order of condonation of delay, and, accordingly the grounds were raised in the petition. Later on, the State Government made available a copy of the order (Exh.P1, Page 132 A of the petition), whereby and whereunder, the Minister condoned the delay by a single line order. The order is bereft of reasons. Thus, according to Mr. Dalvi, the order of condonation of delay, sans reasons, vitiated the exercise of jurisdiction by the Minister. 6. Second, the very exercise of jurisdiction to interfere with a well reasoned order passed by the Deputy Director, Land Records-respondent No.2, is flawed. In fact, the order passed by the Deputy Director, Land Records was not susceptible to appeal. Consequently, neither the respondent Nos. 5 to 22 and 24 to 28 could have preferred the appeal against the said order. Nor the Minister was at liberty to construe the said appeal as a revision by invoking the provisions contained in section 257 of the Code, 1966. Thus, according to Mr. Dalvi, the impugned order is wholly unsustainable for having been passed in exercise of jurisdiction not vested in the State Government. 7. In opposition to this, Mrs. Nor the Minister was at liberty to construe the said appeal as a revision by invoking the provisions contained in section 257 of the Code, 1966. Thus, according to Mr. Dalvi, the impugned order is wholly unsustainable for having been passed in exercise of jurisdiction not vested in the State Government. 7. In opposition to this, Mrs. Bane, the learned AGP made an endeavour to support the impugned order. Laying emphasis on the fact that the Deputy Director, Land Records had modified the Consolidation Scheme after more than 30 years of its settlement, it was urged that the Minister was justified in correcting the error which the lower authority had fallen into. 8. Mr.Surel Shah, the learned counsel for respondent Nos. 5 to 22, 24, 27 and 28 stoutly submitted that none of the grounds sought to be urged on behalf of the petitioners deserve countenance. The challenge to the impugned order on the premise that the Minister could not have entertained the proceeding without condoning the delay, is not well grounded in facts. The order dated 14th January 2019 explicitly indicates that delay was condoned. Since, the petitioners did not question the legality and correctness of the said order of condonation of delay, at this juncture, according to Mr. Shah, the petitioners cannot be permitted to question the validity thereof. 9. As regards, the jurisdiction of the State to interfere with the order passed by the Deputy Director, Land Records-respondent No.2 modifying the Consolidation Scheme, Mr. Shah strenuously submitted that the petitioners had not at all raised the issue of jurisdiction before the Minister. In any event, according to Mr. Shah, misquoting of a provision of law, while entertaining the proceeding, is of no consequence. What is of paramount significance is the existence of authority. Once source of power is relatable to a provision of law, failure to mention the said provision or mentioning of a wrong provision does not denude the authority of the statutory power, urged Mr. Shah. Lastly, according to Mr. Shah, the illegality of the exercise of modification of the scheme, after a lapse of about 35 years, in the face of well neigh settled legal position that such modification is required to be made within a reasonable time, cannot be lost sight of. As a necessary corollary, the ultimate effect of interfering with the impugned order needs to be kept in view. As a necessary corollary, the ultimate effect of interfering with the impugned order needs to be kept in view. This Court should refuse to exercise the extraordinary jurisdiction if the necessary corollary of interfering with the impugned order is revival of an illegal order, submitted Mr. Shah. 10. The aforesaid submissions now fall for consideration. To begin with, it is imperative to note that there is not much controversy over the fact that the Consolidation Scheme in respect of the subject land was settled in the year 1979. Nor is it in dispute that non-agriculture use was authorised by the Tahasildar, Mangaon by an order dated 14th May 1987. The trigger for modification in the Consolidation Scheme was the application preferred by the petitioner No. 2-Mohammed Mazhar Kazi, respondent No.23-Inaytulla Mulla Jalal, respondent No.29-Rohan Bapu Gawde, respondent No.30-Avinash Ramchandra Rajapurkar, and Jagdish Harishchandra Shirgudi-respondent no.31 on 23rd August 2012. One of the principal grievance therein was that the area shown in the map annexed to the N.A. order did not correspond with the area at site and, thus, it was necessary to correct the Consolidation Scheme and the said map. Eventually, the Consolidation Scheme was corrected by the impugned order dated 18th February 2015. 11. It would be contextually relevant to note that the Minister was of the view that pursuant to the N.A. order, third party rights were created in favour of the persons who purchased the plots and thus non-compliance with the conditions incorporated in the said N.A. order, by the original holders, could not have furnished a justification for modification in the Consolidation Scheme after about 28 years of the settlement of the scheme. It was further noted that the draft modification did not indicate any error in the area of the land before the settlement of the scheme and after implementation of the scheme. 12. Section 32 of the Consolidation Act, 1947 which empowers the Settlement Commissioner to vary and modify the scheme, reads as under : “32. (1) If after a scheme has come into force it appears to the [Settlement Commissioner] that the scheme is defective on account of an error [(other than that referred to in section 31A)], irregularity or informality the [Settlement Commissioner] shall publish a draft of such variation in the prescribed manner. The draft variation shall state every amendment proposed to be made in the scheme. The draft variation shall state every amendment proposed to be made in the scheme. (2) Within one month of the date of publication of the draft variation any person affected thereby may communicate in writing any objection to such variation to the [Settlement Commissioner]. (3) After receiving the objections under subsection (2) the [Settlement Commissioner] may, after making such enquiry as [he may] think fit, 7* * * * make the variation with or without modification or may not make any variation. [(3A) If the scheme is varied under sub-section (3), a notification stating that the scheme has been varied shall be published in the Official Gazette and the scheme so varied shall be published in the prescribed manner in the village or villages concerned.] (4) From the date of the notification [stating that the scheme has been varied] the variation shall take effect as if it were incorporated in the scheme.” 13. Evidently, the Settlement Commissioner is empowered to vary the scheme, after notifying the draft of the variation, in the prescribed manner, receiving objections thereto and making an appropriate enquiry in that regard, if it appears to the Settlement Commissioner that the scheme is defective on account of an error [other than the clerical and arithmetical mistake which he is otherwise empowered to correct under section 31(A)], irregularity or informality. Pertinently, no time limit is prescribed under section 32 for the Settlement Commissioner to vary the scheme. It, however, does not imply that the authority is free to vary the scheme at any point of time. The legal position has crystallized to the effect that even in the absence of any period prescribed under section 32, the said power can only be exercised within a reasonable period. Undoubtedly, the reasonability of the period for exercise of the power may depend upon the attendant facts of the case. However, where no period of limitation is stipulated, ordinarily, the reasonable time to exercise the power is construed to be of three years. 14. Undoubtedly, the reasonability of the period for exercise of the power may depend upon the attendant facts of the case. However, where no period of limitation is stipulated, ordinarily, the reasonable time to exercise the power is construed to be of three years. 14. A profitable reference, in this context, can be made to a judgment of the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Gulabrao Bhaurao Kakade, (Smt..) since deceased by His Heirs and Legal Representatives deceased vs. Nivrutti Krishna Bhilare & Ors., (200 1) 4 Mh.L.J. 31, wherein, after adverting to the provisions contained in section 32 of the Consolidation Act, 1947, the Division Bench enunciated the position, inter-alia, as under:- “6 The power given to the Settlement Commissioner for variation of the scheme is on account of an error other than that referred to in section 31A, irregularity or informality after following the procedure prescribed. Though there is no time limit prescribed under Section 32(1) for the Settlement Commissioner to vary the scheme which has come into force, but obviously even in the absence of any period prescribed under section 32, the said power can only be exercised within reasonable period in any case. What would be the reasonable period for exercise of power under Section 32(1) by the Settlement Commissioner may depend on facts and circumstances of each case and we do not intend to lay down any specific period for exercise of that power by Settlement Commissioner but ordinarily exercise of such power after three years of finalisation of scheme under section 22 may not be Justified. In the facts and circumstances of the present case, the exercise of power by Settlement Commissioner for variation of scheme which has come into force in the year 1973, by initiating proceedings in the year 1988 cannot be said to be within reasonable time. The fact is and that is not disputed that the earlier scheme was finalised in the year 1973 under the Act of 1947 to the knowledge of all the parties concerned. Nobody was aggrieved by the said scheme finalised under the Act of 1947 and the scheme came into force under section 22. The fact is and that is not disputed that the earlier scheme was finalised in the year 1973 under the Act of 1947 to the knowledge of all the parties concerned. Nobody was aggrieved by the said scheme finalised under the Act of 1947 and the scheme came into force under section 22. The said scheme which had been finalised in accordance with law and came into force and continued to be in force, could not have been unsettled by initiating the proceedings for variation under section 32 on the purported ground of error, irregularity or informality after a lapse of about 15 years. Thus, the exercise of power by Settlement Commissioner under section 32 for variation of the scheme in the facts and circumstances of the present case is grossly unjustified.” 15. A profitable reference can also be made to the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Santoshkumar Shivgonda Patil & Ors. Vs. Balasaheb Shevale & Ors., (2009) 9 SCC 352 , wherein it was enunciated that when a statute does not prescribe a particular period of limitation, ordinarily a period of three years is required to be read into such a statute. The observations in Para Nos. 11 and 12 are instructive and hence, extracted below : “11. It seems to be fairly settled that if a statue does not prescribe the time limit for exercise of revisional power, it does not mean that such power can be exercised at any time; rather it should be exercised within a reasonable time. It is so because the law does not expect a settled thing to be unsettled after a long lapse of time. Where the legislature does not provide for any length of time within which the power of revision is to be exercised by the authority, suo motu or otherwise, it is plain that exercise of such power within reasonable time is inherent therein. 12 Ordinarily, the reasonable period within which power of revision may be exercised would be three years under Section 257 of the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code subject, of course, to the exceptional circumstances in a given case, but surely exercise of revisional power after a lapse of 17 years is not a reasonable time. 12 Ordinarily, the reasonable period within which power of revision may be exercised would be three years under Section 257 of the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code subject, of course, to the exceptional circumstances in a given case, but surely exercise of revisional power after a lapse of 17 years is not a reasonable time. Invocation of revisional power by the Sub-Divisional Officer under Section 257 of the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code is plainly an abuse of process in the facts and circumstances of the case assuming that the order of Tehsildar passed on March 30, 1976 is flawed and legally not correct.” 16. A Division Bench of this Court in the case of Suresh Bapu Sankanna & Ors. Vs. State of Maharashtra & Ors., 2018(4) Mh.L.J. 331 , after adverting to the aforesaid pronouncements, expounded the legal position to the effect that even if there is no specific period prescribed in Section 32 of the Consolidation Act, 1947, as regards limitation, an application for modification or correction of finalised consolidation scheme can be made only within three years of such finalisation of the scheme. 17. In the backdrop of the aforesaid enunciation of law, reverting to the facts of the case, it becomes evident that the petitioner No.2, respondent No. 23 and others had preferred the application seeking modification in the Consolidation Scheme well after 32 years of the settlement of the scheme in the year 1979. What accentuates the situation is the fact that that the foundational premise of the application was that the area indicated in the map annexed to the N.A. order was at variance with the actual area on the spot. In the circumstances, the Minister (Revenue) does not seem to have committed an error in holding that there was no patent error in the Consolidation Scheme which warranted rectification after a lapse of 35 years. It is a common ground that, post N.A. order, the subject land was sub-divided into numerous plots. The Consolidation Scheme was fully implemented and land changed hands. In this background, the exercise of the power after lapse of 35 years of the settlement of the scheme, entailed the consequence of unsettling the settled claims. The material on record does not indicate that resort to the power to vary the Consolidation Scheme was justified. 18. This propels me to the consideration of submissions canvassed by Mr. Dalvi. In this background, the exercise of the power after lapse of 35 years of the settlement of the scheme, entailed the consequence of unsettling the settled claims. The material on record does not indicate that resort to the power to vary the Consolidation Scheme was justified. 18. This propels me to the consideration of submissions canvassed by Mr. Dalvi. Though, Mr.Dalvi, the learned counsel for the petitioners was justified in advancing criticism against the order passed by the Minister condoning the delay, by a stroke of pen, yet the substance of the matter cannot be lost sight of. Indisputably, the record indicates that the delay was condoned by order dated 14th January 2018. The claim of the petitioners that the petitioners were unaware of the delay condonation order, is belied by the application (Exh. ‘R’, page 133 of the petition) preferred by the petitioner No.1 herein (Respondent No.4 before the Minister) seeking certified copy of the order dated 14th January 2019, whereby the Minister condoned the delay. There might be some substance in the grievance on behalf of the petitioners that the certified copy of the said order condoning the delay was not furnished expeditiously. However, the fact remains that the petitioners were aware of the order condoning the delay, having been passed on 14th January 2019. Thus, at this stage, having regard to the core issue of the justifiability of the modification of the Consolidation Scheme, after a period of 35 years, the fact that the delay was condoned by a non-speaking order pales in significance. 19. On the aspect of the exercise of the revisional jurisdiction by the Minister, Mr. Dalvi laid emphasis on the fact that an order passed by the Settlement Commissioner under section 32 of the Consolidation Act, 1947 is neither appealable nor revisable. Attention of the Court was invited to the provisions contained in sections 35 and 36 of the Consolidation Act, 1947. Dalvi laid emphasis on the fact that an order passed by the Settlement Commissioner under section 32 of the Consolidation Act, 1947 is neither appealable nor revisable. Attention of the Court was invited to the provisions contained in sections 35 and 36 of the Consolidation Act, 1947. They read as under : “35 The [State] Government [*or the Commissioner in respect of such matters as the State Government may be general or special order specify in this behalf] may at any time for the purpose of satisfying itself 103[or himself as the case may be] as to the legality or propriety of any order passed by any officer under this Act call for and examine the record of any case pending before or disposed of by such officer and may pass such order in reference thereto as it 103[ or he, as the case may be, ] think fit : [Provided that no order shall be varied or revised until the parties interested have been given a reasonable opportunity of showing cause against the proposed variation of revision of the order.] 36. Except as provided in this Act, no appeal or revision application shall lie from any order passed under Chapter II, III or IV of this Act. 20. Mr. Dalvi would urge that though the State Government is vested with the power to examine the legality and propriety of any order passed under the Consolidation Act, 1947, under section 35 of the Act, yet, in the instant case, the Minister did not resort to the said power. Instead, the Minister misdirected himself in exercising the power under section 257 of the Code, 1966. 21. The aforesaid submission appears alluring at the first blush. However, on a close scrutiny, it does not advance the cause of the petitioners. It is not the case that the State Government is not vested with the power to call for and examine the proceeding pending before or decided by the authority under the Consolidation Act, 1947. Evidently, the power under section 35 can be exercised either on an application or sou-moto. Thus, the existence of the power to revise an order can hardly be questioned. 22. From aforesaid standpoint, I find considerable substance in the submission of Mr. Shah that non-mention of section 35 in the impugned order, is of no consequence. Evidently, the power under section 35 can be exercised either on an application or sou-moto. Thus, the existence of the power to revise an order can hardly be questioned. 22. From aforesaid standpoint, I find considerable substance in the submission of Mr. Shah that non-mention of section 35 in the impugned order, is of no consequence. In the light of the provisions contained in section 35 of the Consolidation Act, 1947, the source of power to revise the order can hardly be gainsaid. Reliance placed by Mr. Shah on the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of J. Kumaradasan Nair and Anr. Vs. Iric Sohan & Ors., (2009) 12 SCC 175 appears well founded. In the said case, in the context of exercise of the powers to condone the delay, the Supreme Court observed as under : “18 It is also now a well-settled principle of law that mentioning of a wrong provision or non-mentioning of any provision of law would, by itself, be not sufficient to take away the jurisdiction of a court if it is otherwise vested in it in law. Wile exercising its power, the court will merely consider whether it has the source to exercise such power or not. ……………...” (emphasis supplied) 23. In view of the aforesaid exposition of law, in the face of clear and explicit empowerment in law to revise the order, passed by the authorities, under section 35 of the Consolidation Act, 1947, I find it rather difficult to accede to the submission on behalf of the petitioners that the Minister fell in error in entertaining the revision and interfering with the orders passed by the Deputy Director, Land Records, in exercise of revisional jurisdiction. 24. The second limb of the submission of Mr.Shah that the consequences of exercising writ jurisdiction are required to be kept in view, and the Court would be justified in declining to exercise the jurisdiction in a case where interference would revive an illegal order also appears to be well merited. As indicated above, the order passed by the Deputy Director, Land Records to modify the Consolidation Scheme, after a lapse of about 35 years, did not appear in consonance with law. If the order impugned herein is interfered with, it may revive the said order which is vulnerable for being in teeth of the law laid down by this Court. 25. If the order impugned herein is interfered with, it may revive the said order which is vulnerable for being in teeth of the law laid down by this Court. 25. Should the Court interfere with an order which, in effect, revives an illegal order ? The pronouncement of the Supreme Court in the case of Raj Kumar Soni & Anr. Vs. State of U.P. & Anr., (2007) 10 SCC 635 illuminates the path. In the said case, the order of the Sub-Divisional Officer, upon which the whole claim of the appellants therein rested, being invalid and improper, could have been set aside by the High Court, and thus, it was held, even if there was any technical violation of the rules of natural justice, that was not a ground for interference, as such interference would result in resurrection of an illegal, nay, void order. While arriving at the said conclusion, the Supreme Court adverted to its previous pronouncements in the cases of Gadde Venkateswara Rao vs Government Of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1966 SC 828 and M.C.Mehta v. Union of India, (1999) 6 SCC 237 and observed as under : “16. In Gadde Venkateswara Rao v. Government of A.P., a Primary Health Centre was formerly inaugurated at a particular village subject to certain conditions. Since those conditions are not satisfied, the Panchayat Samithi resolved to shift it to another village. The Government, in exercise of its review jurisdiction, interfered with the resolution so passed by the Panchayat Samithi without providing any opportunity whatsoever to the Panchayat Samithi. The government's order was challenged in a proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The A.P. High Court held, the order passed by the Government on the review to be bad, but did not interfere on merits. The Supreme Court, while confirming the order of the High Court observed that: "if the High Court had quashed the said order, it would have restored an illegal order; it would have given the Health Centre to a village, contrary to the valid resolutions passed by the Panchay at Samithi." The Supreme Court opined that the High Court was right in refusing to exercise its extraordinary discretionary power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 17. 17. In M.C.Mehta v. Union of India , this Court, relying upon Venkateshwara Rao observed : (SCC p. 244,para17) "The above case is clear authority for the proposition that it is not always necessary for the Court to strike down an order merely because the order has been passed against the petitioner in breach of natural justice. The Court can under Article 32 of Article 226 refuse to exercise its discretion of striking down the order if such striking down will result in restoration of another order passed earlier in favour of the petitioner and against the opposite party, in violation of principles of natural justice or is otherwise not in accordance with law." 18. In our view, on the admitted and indisputable facts set out above, any interference with the impugned order of the District Collector would result in restoration of orders passed earlier in favour of the appellants which are otherwise not in accordance with law.” 26. On the aforesaid touchstone, re-adverting to the facts of the case, the situation which thus obtains is that the order passed by the Deputy Director, Land Records, being the outcome of an improper exercise of the power under section 32 of the Consolidation Act, 1947, is legally unsustainable. In the circumstances, interference with the impugned order on the premise that revisional jurisdiction was not properly exercised by the Minister, (which contention is otherwise not found to be well merited) would inevitably lead to the restoration of the order passed by the Deputy Director, Land Records, which this Court finds to be legally unsustainable. Thus, it may not be expedient to exercise the extra-ordinary writ jurisdiction. 27. The conspectus of the aforesaid discussion is that no interference is warranted in the impugned order passed by the Minister. 28. The material on record also indicates that a suit is subjudice at the instance of petitioner No.1, being RCS No. 95 of 2018 for removal of encroachment and the consequential relief’s. It would, thus, be suffice to observe that the contentions of all the parties as regards the encroachment and/or proprietary title on the particular parcels of subject land are kept open for agitation before the competent forums. However, it is imperative to clarify that this Court may not be understood to have delved into the disputed questions as regards the alleged encroachment over the portions of lands which form part of the original survey No. 51. 29. With the aforesaid clarification, the petition deserves to be dismissed. 30. Hence, the following order : ORDER The petition stands dismissed, subject to the clarification in paragraph no. 28. No costs. Rule discharged.