JUDGMENT : ALEXANDER THOMAS, J. The prayers in the aforecaptioned original petition filed under Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India are as follows;(See page No.8 of the paper book of this OP). “1. To set aside Exhibit P3 impugned order dated 09.01.2020 of the Kerala Administrative Tribunal in O.A.No.83/2019. 2. To issue other reliefs, this Honourable Court may deem fit and proper in the facts and circumstances of this Original Petition (KAT). 2. Heard Sri B.Vinod, learned Senior Government Pleader appearing for the petitioners (State of Kerala, DHS, DMO and another) in the OP/respondents in the OA and Sri V.M.Abdul Salim, learned counsel appearing for the sole respondent in the OP/sole applicant in the OA before the Tribunal. The respondent herein/original applicant has filed Ext.P1 O.A.No.83/2019 before the Kerala Administrative Tribunal, Thiruvananthapuram, with the following prayers; (see page 27 of this paper book). 1. The Honourable Tribunal may be pleased to call for the records and to quash the Annexure A7 and A9 illegal directions denying maternity leave to the applicant and issue appropriate order to the effect that the applicant is eligible for the remaining period of maternity leave with effect from the date of return from LWA on 25.10.2014. 2. To issue direction to the respondents to regularise the period for increments seniority and other service benefits of the applicant. 3. To initiate appropriate action against the respondent at the fault which resulted in abusing the motherhood and brought endless hardship to a women employee. 4. To issue such other directions or orders as this Honourable Tribunal deems fit and proper in the interest of justice and circumstances of the case. 5. To award the costs.” 3. The 1st petitioner herein/1st respondent in the OA has filed Ext.P2 reply statement dated 25.5.2019 in this OA before the Tribunal (see pages 51 to 54 of the paper book). 4. 5. To award the costs.” 3. The 1st petitioner herein/1st respondent in the OA has filed Ext.P2 reply statement dated 25.5.2019 in this OA before the Tribunal (see pages 51 to 54 of the paper book). 4. The Tribunal has passed the impugned Ext.P3 final order dated 09.01.2019 in O.A.No.83/2019, whereby the impugned Annexure A7 order dated 06.01.2015 issued by the Director of Health Services (DHS) and the impugned Annexure A9 order dated 13.07.2015 issued by the State Government in the Health and Family Welfare Department to the extent it rejected the plea of the applicant for grant of maternity leave has been quashed and the 1st respondent in the OA/1st petitioner (competent authority of the State Government in the Health and Family Welfare Department) has been directed to immediately sanction maternity leave to the applicant as applied for in Annexure A5 and further to regularise her subsequent period of service and grant her due increments and other service benefits and that the competent authority of the State Government in the Health and Family Welfare Department shall pass orders on the above aspects within two months, etc. It is this impugned final order at Ext.P3 rendered by the Tribunal, which is under challenge in this original petition. 5. The original applicant is holding the post of Staff Nurse Gr.II in the Health Department of the State Government. She had joined service on 01.09.2005 and her probation has been successfully declared on 14.11.2007. She had taken Leave Without Allowance (LWA) for 5 years under Appendix XIIA of Part I KSR from 23.10.2009 upto 23.10.2014. The applicant had approached the authorities concerned about two months before the expiry of her LWA period, which was to expire on 23.10.2014, for rejoining duty and she was duly allowed to rejoin duty as per order dated 23.10.2014 issued by the District Medical Officer of Health, Kottayam. It is common ground that she had duly reported back and rejoined duty on 24.10.2014 immediately after the expiry of the above said 5 year LWA period which was upto 23.10.2014. It is common ground that she had duly reported back and rejoined duty on 24.10.2014 immediately after the expiry of the above said 5 year LWA period which was upto 23.10.2014. From the pleadings and materials on record, it appears that even before the expiry of the LWA period, the applicant become pregnant and Annexure A3 is the scan report, which would show that she had undergone ultrasound scan on 15.08.2014 and that the expected date of delivery (EDD) of the baby was 24.11.2014 (see page 31 of this paper book). It is also beyond any dispute that on account of the accidental medical emergency, she had given birth to a child prematurely on 21.9.2014 at the Government Medical College Hospital, Kottayam , which was before the expected date of delivery (24.11.2014) and before the expiry of 5 year LWA period (23.10.2014). Annexure A4 is the medical records of the Government Medical College Hospital, Kottayam, which would show that the applicant had given birth to the child on account of “pre-term breech delivery” (See pages 32 to 33 of this paper book). It is pointed out that this was on account of accidental medical emergency. 6. As mentioned hereinabove, the applicant had prematurely delivered the child on 21.9.2014, even though the expected date of delivery was 24.11.2014 and within less than a month, she had got permission to rejoin duty as per order dated 23.10.2014, and she had joined duty on 24.10.2014, immediately after the expiry of 5 year LWA period, which was upto 23.10.2014. Next day, on account of the serious health issues resulting due to the accidental medical emergency and the premature birth of the child, the applicant was constrained to apply for maternity leave for 147 days from the next day onwards, viz, 25.10.2014 as per Annexure A5 application (see page 34 of this paper book). 7. A reading of Annexure A5 application would make it clear that she had sought maternity leave with effect from 25.10.2014. Annexure A5(2) (see page 35 of this paper book) is the medical certificate issued by the Gynecologist concerned that the applicant had undergone pre-term breech delivery on 21.9.2014 and that the said certificate has been issued by the Department of Obstetrics and Gynecology of the Government Medical College Hospital, Kottayam for consideration of the applicant's request for leave for absence from duty for 180 days (6 months), viz, maternity leave. Annexure A5 application for grant of maternity leave had been refused by the petitioners herein as per the impugned Annexure A7 order dated 06.01.2015 issued by the DHS and the impugned Annexure A9 order dated 13.07.2015 was issued by the competent authority of the State Government in the Health and Family Welfare Department. A reading of the impugned Annexure A7 rejection order dated 06.01.2015 issued by the DHS would show that the main ground of rejection cited therein is that as per the provisions contained in Rule 3 of Appendix XIIA of Part I KSR, leave without allowance cannot combined with any other type of leave and that since the applicant was on LWA, there is no question of she being permitted to enter into maternity leave, which is another type of leave, in view of the provisions contained in Rule 3 of Appendix XIIA of Part I KSR. The ground of rejection cited by the competent authority of the State Government in the Health and Family Welfare Department as per the impugned Annexure A9 rejection order dated 13.7.2015 is that for securing the benefit of maternity leave the lady incumbent concerned should be eligible for leave as on the date of delivery of the child and that an incumbent who has already been sanctioned leave without allowances in terms of Appendix XIIA or XIIB or XIIC cannot be permitted to combine any other type of leave while the incumbent is on such leave without allowance in terms of Appendix XIIA, XIIB and XIIC. Hence the premise of rejection in both Annexure A7 issued by the DHS and Annexure A9 issued by the State Government in the Health and Family Welfare Department is that since the applicant was then on LWA under Appendix XIIA of Part I KSR, she cannot be granted maternity leave as it would amount to violating the prohibition contained in Rule 3 Appendix XIIA of Part I KSR, which stipulates that the leave without allowance covered by that Appendix cannot be combined with any other type of leave. The further ground of rejection is that a lady incumbent can be said to be entitled for consideration of grant of maternity leave only if she was otherwise eligible for leave, as on the day of delivery of the child. The further ground of rejection is that a lady incumbent can be said to be entitled for consideration of grant of maternity leave only if she was otherwise eligible for leave, as on the day of delivery of the child. For that purpose, to decide the legality or otherwise of the above rejection order, it may be pertinent to refer to some of the provisions in Kerala Service Rules (KSR). Rule 88 of Part I KSR deals with leave without allowances and Exception (2) of clause (ii) of Rule 88 deals with the applicability of Appendix XIIA, Appendix XIIB and Appendix XIIC. Rule 110B deals with leave for taking up employment abroad or within India and it stipulates that rules for grant of leave without allowance for taking up employment abroad or within India are given in Appendix XIIA. Rule 3 of Appendix XIIA of part I KSR mandates that no other kind of leave will be sanctioned in combination with or in continuation of, the leave under these rules, except leave under Appendix XIIC. Rule 3 of Appendix XIIA reads as follows: “Rule 3. No other kind of leave will be sanctioned in combination with or in continuation of, the leave under these rules, except leave under Appendix XII C.” Section IX of Part I KSR deals with maternity leave and Rule 100 appended under Section IX of Part I KSR stipulates that a competent authority may grant to a female officer, maternity leave on full pay for a period of 180 days from the date of its commencement. Note 2 appended under Rule 100 has been deleted from the Statute Book with effect from 29.7.1980. Rule 100 and Notes 1, 3, 4 and 5 appended thereunder read as follows:(Note 6 and Note 7 under Rule 100 may not be relevant for the present case.) “Rule 100. A competent authority may grant to a female officer, maternity leave on full pay for a period of 180 days from the date of its commencement. Note 1.-Maternity leave is also admissible to temporary female officers under this rule. Note 3.-The female candidates undergoing pre-appointment stipendiary training may be allowed “leave for maternity purpose” to the extent envisaged under this rule on “full rate of stipend admissible”. The benefit of this leave may also be granted in the case of miscarriage/abortion subject to the same conditions as laid in Rule 101 below. Note 3.-The female candidates undergoing pre-appointment stipendiary training may be allowed “leave for maternity purpose” to the extent envisaged under this rule on “full rate of stipend admissible”. The benefit of this leave may also be granted in the case of miscarriage/abortion subject to the same conditions as laid in Rule 101 below. Note 4.- Maternity leave under this rule and Rule 101 shall be admissible to provisional female recruits continuing in service in a single department beyond one year provided they would continue in service but for proceeding on such leave. Note 5.-Female recruits through Public Service Commission who join duty within 180 days from their date of delivery (otherwise than on account of miscarriage shall, on joining, be granted from the next day the balance portion of maternity leave admissible as on the date of joining duty, subject to the following conditions: (a) Holidays/Vacation falling immediately after the date of joining service cannot be prefixed to the leave. (b) A certificate from the medical officer who attended the delivery showing the date of delivery along with the medical certificate of health as prescribed in Rule 13, par I of Kerala Service Rules should be produced.” 8. Rule 100A stipulates that maternity leave under Rule 100 may also be granted to female employees who are genetic mothers of children born on surrogacy from the date of delivery, on production of medical certificate from the authorised Medical Officer. Rule 101A, Rule 102 and the explanation thereunder read as follows; “Rule 101A. Leave under Rule 100 may also be granted to female officers in cases of hysterectomy subject to the condition that the leave does not exceed 45 days and application for the leave is supported by a certificate from the Medical Attendant. Rule 102. Maternity leave may be combined with leave of any other kind but leave applied for in continuation of the former may be granted only if the request be supported by a medical certificate: Provided that no medical certificate shall be necessary for grant of any leave for a period not exceeding sixty days in continuation of maternity leave. Note.-Regular leave in continuation of maternity leave may also be granted to a female officer on her producing a medical certificate to the effect that the new born baby requires personal attention of the mother and her presence by the side of the baby is absolutely necessary. Note.-Regular leave in continuation of maternity leave may also be granted to a female officer on her producing a medical certificate to the effect that the new born baby requires personal attention of the mother and her presence by the side of the baby is absolutely necessary. Explanation: The kinds of leave coming under regular leave mentioned in the Note are Earned Leave, Half Pay Leave, Leave Not Due and Leave Without Allowances only.” 9. A reading of Rule 102 of Part I KSR would make it clear that the rule making authority has statutorily mandated that maternity leave may be combined with leave of any other kind only if the leave is supported by a medical officer by a medical certificate. The proviso thereto stipulates that no medical certificate shall be necessary for grant of any leave not exceeding 60 days in continuation of maternity leave. The note appended under Rule 102 would make it clear that regular leave in continuation may also be granted to female officer on her producing a medical certificate to the effect that the new born requires personal attention of the mother and her presence by the side of the baby is absolutely necessary. The explanation appended under Rule 102 stipulates that the kinds of leave mentioned in the Note are earned leave, half pay leave, leave not due and leave without allowance vide GO(P) No.118/1972/Fin. dated 29.4.1972. Thus a mere reading of Rule 102 and the Note and the explanation thereunder would make it clear like the day light that the rule making authority has mandated in clear unequivocal terms that maternity leave can be combined with leave of any other kind, including maternity leave. Appendix XIIA is not a substantive provision, and is an Appendix in Part I KSR as envisaged in Rule 110B of Part I KSR and exception No.2 to clause (iii) of Rule 88. Hence we are of the firm view that the prohibition contained in Rule 3 of Appendix XIIA against combination of any other kind of leave along with leave without allowances, will not apply in the case of maternity leave, in view of the specific mandate contained in the substantive provisions made by the rule making authority in Rule 102 and the note and the explanation thereunder. Hence the first ground of rejection in Annexure A7 and Annexure A9 that maternity leave applied for by the applicant cannot be granted as the applicant was already then on leave without allowance which cannot be combined with any other type of leave going by the prescriptions in Rule 3 of Appendix XIIA is against the basic statutory provisions contained in Part I KSR, more particularly, Rule 102, the note and the explanation thereunder. Hence the so called understanding of the Rule made out in the impugned Annexure A7 and Annexure A9 orders purportedly made on the basis of Rule 3 of Appendix XIIA of Part I KSR would fall to the ground. That apart, the factual premise made by both the DHS and Government in Annexures A7 and A9 as if the applicant was then on leave without allowance at the time she had made the maternity leave and that therefore, the prohibition in Rule 3 of Appendix XIIA against combination of any other leave, is absolutely and factually wrong and incorrect. There is no dispute that the applicant was sanctioned LWA for 5 year period from 23.10.2009 to 23.10.2014. Even prior to the expiry of the leave period she wanted to rejoin duty for which permission was granted by the DMO as per order dated 23.10.2014. The 5 years LWA period was to expire on 23.10.2014 and consequent to the permission, she had duly reported and rejoined duty after the expiry of the LWA period on 24.10.2014. It is only on the next day, viz, 25.10.2014, that the applicant has submitted Annexure A5 application for grant of ML for 147 days under Rule 100 of Part I KSR supported by Annexure A5(2) medical certificate. Hence, as on the day when the applicant had submitted Annexure A5 application for grant of maternity leave on 25.10.2014, she had already rejoined duty on 24.10.2014, after the expiry of her LWA period. So, it is crystal clear that the applicant was not on maternity leave at the time she had submitted Annexure A5 application for grant of maternity leave on 25.10.2014. So, the basic factual premise made out in the impugned Annexure A7 and A9 rejection orders as if the applicant was already enjoying leave without allowance on the day she had submitted Annexure A5 application for grant of maternity leave, etc. is absolutely faulty and against the basic factual situation. So, the basic factual premise made out in the impugned Annexure A7 and A9 rejection orders as if the applicant was already enjoying leave without allowance on the day she had submitted Annexure A5 application for grant of maternity leave, etc. is absolutely faulty and against the basic factual situation. Hence the entire grounds of rejection made out in Annexures A7 and A9 are legally and factually faulty and cannot have any independent existence even for a moment. 10. In the instant case, there is no dispute as is medically and scientifically made out as per Annexure A3 scan report issued by the qualified Gynecologist and Obstetrician that the applicant's expected date of delivery (EDD) of the child was on 24.11.2014. Annexure A4 medical records issued by the competent Gynecology and Obstetrics Department of the Government Medical College Hospital, Kottayam as well as Annexure A5(2) medical certificate issued by the said Department of Obstetrics and Gynecology would show unequivocally that the applicant had to suffer a “pre-term breech delivery” which appears to be on the basis of an accidental medical emergency on 21.09.2014. The expected date of delivery (EDD) was on 24.11.2014. The accidental medical emergency could not have been reasonably foreseen by even a qualified medical specialist in the field. The other ground of rejection made out in Annexures A7 and A9 that the lady incumbent officer in order to be entitled for grant of maternity leave should be otherewise eligible for leave as on the date of delivery of the child is a specious ground which does not find any justification in any of the above said Rules. Such a provision is not engrafted in any of the statutory provisions made out in Rule 100, 101 and 102 of Part I KSR. That apart, the said ground of rejection is even otherwise arbitrary and capricious inasmuch as no lady or even a medical specialist could have foreseen in the instant case that though the expected date of delivery of the child was on 24.11.2014, that the lady incumbent officer could have suffered a “pre-term breech delivery'' prematurely on 21.9.2014. That apart, the said ground of rejection is even otherwise arbitrary and capricious inasmuch as no lady or even a medical specialist could have foreseen in the instant case that though the expected date of delivery of the child was on 24.11.2014, that the lady incumbent officer could have suffered a “pre-term breech delivery'' prematurely on 21.9.2014. Therefore, though the actual premature date of delivery of the child in this case was on 21.9.2014 and the said date happened to be a day when the incumbent was then on leave without allowance till 23.10.2014, it would be really arbitrary and capricious to insist that the lady should necessarily be eligible for leave as on the date of delivery of the child. The date of delivery of the child cannot be fixed as on a certain date, though in vast majority of the cases the delivery of the child takes place in and around the expected date of delivery calculated in terms of the medical principles flowing out from the medical science of the Obstetrics and Gynecology. It is also a matter of common knowledge and one need not be a specialist or superspecialist in medical sciences to be aware of the basic human condition that actual delivery of the child by the mother could be premature or may even be after the expected date of delivery and the medical emergency or accidental medical emergency may also give rise to premature delivery. Therefore, in vast majority of cases, to say that the lady officer should know for sure what exactly is the date of delivery and should necessarily be eligible and entitled for leave as on the date of delivery, is a highly capricious and specious ground which cannot be countenanced in law. To uphold the said ground of rejection in Annexures A7 and A9 would amount to upholding a per se capricious and arbitrary stand of the authorities concerned and we reject the said ground of rejection made out in Annexures A7 and A9 orders. 11. To uphold the said ground of rejection in Annexures A7 and A9 would amount to upholding a per se capricious and arbitrary stand of the authorities concerned and we reject the said ground of rejection made out in Annexures A7 and A9 orders. 11. After hearing both sides, it appears that since the stand of the authorities was that the prohibition contained in Rule 3 of Appendix XIIA against combination of leave without allowance without any type of leave would also include within its prohibitory scope, maternity leave, the applicant would have thought that it is better not to apply for maternity leave immediately after the delivery of the child on 21.09.2014, as her LWA period was upto 23.10.2014. The said stand of the applicant cannot be faulted, since the authorities have been taking hypertechnical objections based on the so called applicability of the so called imaginary prohibition flowing out from Rule 3 of Appendix XIIA, without understanding the import of Rule 102, the Note and the explanation thereunder. Hence in order to ensure that unnecessary bureaucratic resistance is avoided, the applicant would have thought it more prudent not to immediately seek for maternity leave after the premature delivery of the child on 21.09.2014 and hence she cannot be blamed for having made Annexure A5 application for grant of maternity leave only on 25.10.2014, after she had rejoined duty on 24.10.2014, pursuant to the permission she obtained as per order dated 23.10.2014 issued by the DMO as her LWA period was upto 23.10.2014. In view of the stiff resistance citing hypertechnical and unnecessary objections by the officials concerned, the applicant cannot be faulted to be prudent in order to ensure that bureaucratic resistance is avoided at any costs and for having chosen to make the application as per Annexure A5 application for maternity leave on 25.10.2014, even though she had prematurely given birth to the child on 21.09.2014. At any rate, the authorities concerned have not raised any objections either in Annexures A7 and A9 rejection orders or in Ext.P2 reply statement filed before the Tribunal or in the pleadings in this original petition that the applicant cannot be granted maternity leave as per Annexure A5 application submitted on 25.10.2014, as the actual premature delivery of the child occurred in this case is on 21.9.2014. 12. 12. That apart, a reading of Note 1 under Rule 100 would make it clear that maternity leave is admissible even to temporary female officers and Note 3 would stipulate that female officers undergoing pre-appointment stipendiary training may be allowed leave for maternity purposes to the extent envisaged under Rule 100 on full rate of stipend admissible and that the benefit of that leave should also be granted in the case of miscarriage/abortion subject to the same conditions as in Rule 101. Note 4 under Rule 100 would further mandate that maternity leave under Rule 101 will be admissible to provisional female recruits continuing in service in a single department beyond one year, provided they would continue in service but for proceeding on such leave. Note 5 under Rule 100 would further stipulate that female recruits through Public Service Commission who join duty within 180 days from the date of delivery, otherwise than on account of miscarriage, shall on joining, be granted from the next day the balance portion of maternity leave admissible as on the date of joining duty, subject to the conditions mentioned therein. Note 6 under Rule 100 further stipulates that female officers on maternity leave who get appointment in another Department or in the same Department by direct recruitment or by transfer or by promotion shall be allowed to avail the balance portion of maternity leave from the next day of her joining duty in the new post or department subject to the conditions mentioned thereunder. Note 7 appended under Rule 100 would also stipulate that female officer transferred from one station to another within the same department while on maternity leave shall be allowed to avail the balance portion of the maternity leave from the next day of her joining duty in the new station, subject to the conditions prescribed in Note 6 supra. Even surrogate mothers are entitled for maternity leave in view of the new provision made as per Rule 100A of Part I KSR made effective from 08.12.2016. Rule 101 would stipulate that leave under Rule 100 may also be granted to female officer in case of miscarriage including abortion subject to the condition that leave does not exceed six weeks and application for the leave is supported by a certificate from the Medical Attendant. Rule 101 would stipulate that leave under Rule 100 may also be granted to female officer in case of miscarriage including abortion subject to the condition that leave does not exceed six weeks and application for the leave is supported by a certificate from the Medical Attendant. Rule 101 would also disclose that maternity leave may also be granted to female officers in case of hysterectomy subject to the condition that leave does not exceed 45 days and application for the leave is supported by a medical certificate. The provisions contained in Rule 102 has already been discussed hereinabove. The above said provisions made by the rule making authority including Rules 100, 100A, 101 and 102, which would make it clear that the rule making authority has now engrafted a liberalised legal machinery in order to ensure that rights of the pregnant mother and also the rights of the entire community at large is duly protected so that the health of the mother is duly taken care of and the rights and interests of the child are also fully protected in order to ensure that the child gets the utmost love and affection of the mother. 13. It is a matter of common knowledge that new born child has to be fed with breast milk for the first six months and if the mother is compelled to go to work, the child has to go for other substitute milk, which is not considered good for the health of the new born. The entire community and nation at large is concerned with the health of the new generation. It may also be pertinent to refer some of the provisions contained in Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948 (UDHR), International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 1966 and Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, 1979. 14. Article 25(2) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948 (UDHR) state as follows: “Article 25(2). Motherhood and childhood are entitled to special care and assistance. All children, whether born in or out of wedlock, shall enjoy the same social protection.” 15. Article 10(2) of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 1966 provides as follows; “Article 10(2). Special protection should be accorded to mothers during a reasonable period before and after child birth. Motherhood and childhood are entitled to special care and assistance. All children, whether born in or out of wedlock, shall enjoy the same social protection.” 15. Article 10(2) of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 1966 provides as follows; “Article 10(2). Special protection should be accorded to mothers during a reasonable period before and after child birth. During such period working mothers should be accorded paid leave or leave with adequate social security benefits.” 16. Article 11(2)(b) of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, 1979 provides as follows; “Article 11(2). In order to prevent discrimination against women on the grounds of marriage or maternity and to ensure their effective right to work, States Parties shall take appropriate measures. (a) xxxx xxxx xxxx xxxx (b) To introduce maternity leave with pay or with comparable social benefits without loss of former employment, seniority or social allowances.” 17. It is based on the above said aspects, the Tribunal has passed a well considered verdict at Annexure A12 dated 14.05.2015 in O.A.No.1130/2013 and para.4 of Annexure A12 final order rendered by the Tribunal in O.A.No.1130/2013 reads as follows; “4. A Government servant is entitled to get six months' Maternity Leave. Whether the same can be denied on the ground that under the compelling circumstances, the applicant was constrained to join duty for one day during the leave period? In this case, since the appointing authority did not extend the time for joining, if she does not join duty, the vacancy would be reported as vacancy to the PSC. Even if extension is granted, she may lose seniority also in the post from the date of advice. So, she was constrained to join duty and thereafter again went on leave. She was working under the Government from 1-3-2007 in the Ayurveda College and from 14-7-2009 in the Department of VHSE. If the applicant from the beginning was working in the latter department, she would have been eligible for Maternity Leave. If she continued in the Ayurveda College, she would have enjoyed the full stretch of Maternity Leave. The point to be considered is whether she could be denied leave on the ground that she got relieved from the Ayurveda Department and joined in the VHSE department. We think, the stand of the respondents is plainly irrational and arbitrary. If she continued in the Ayurveda College, she would have enjoyed the full stretch of Maternity Leave. The point to be considered is whether she could be denied leave on the ground that she got relieved from the Ayurveda Department and joined in the VHSE department. We think, the stand of the respondents is plainly irrational and arbitrary. We think, we should look at the substance of the Rule and not its form. Persons working in Government service and even in private establishments are entitled to get Maternity Leave. The same cannot be rejected on technical grounds, as was done in this case. The rules or orders issued by the Government should be interpreted in consonance with the object of them. It is also one of the settled principles of interpretation that the Municipal laws have to be interpreted in the light of the International Covenants adopted by United Nations and accepted by our country.(See the decision in Jolly George Varghese v. Bank of Cochin (1980)2 SCC 360 ). The right to get Maternity Leave is one of the basic human rights. The same cannot be denied on such technical grounds stating that Annexure-A1 does not have retrospective effect.” 18. There is also another aspect which would show that the intention of the legislature was to liberalise the scheme regarding grant of maternity leave. Initially, Rule 100 was much more rigorous in its operation. Prior to 1981, the rule stood as under; “Rule 100:-A competent authority may grant to a female officer maternity leave on full pay for a period which may extend up to the end of three months from the date of its commencement or to the end of eight weeks from the date of confinement, whichever be earlier. Note 1:-Maternity leave is also admissible to temporary female officers under this rule. Note 2:-The grant of Maternity leave is provisional in the first instance and will be regularised only after ascertaining the date of confinement as furnished by the Government servant herself. In case the leave availed of is in excess of what is admissible under this rule, such excess will be regularised by the grant of eligible leave under the provisions of rule 102.” (emphasis supplied) 19. Going by the above provisions, the maternity leave from whichever date it commenced has to end by the end of 8 weeks from the date of confinement. Going by the above provisions, the maternity leave from whichever date it commenced has to end by the end of 8 weeks from the date of confinement. As such, the last date is already fixed by the Rule. The rule also provides that the officer can avail of three months leave which would necessarily mean that the officer may avail leave even before the date of confinement. Note 2 further emphasised that the maternity leave will be regularised only after ascertaining the date of confinement. A reading of the rule would thus show that undue importance was given to the date of confinement. The rule was amended as per GO(P)No.96/81/Fin. dated 05.02.1981 with effect from 29th July, 1980. The rule making authority decided to omit Note No.2 and to replace the original Rule 100 as follows; “Rule 100. A Competent Authority may grant to a female officer maternity leave on full pay for a period of of 90 days from the date of its commencement.” 20. Notes 3 and 4 which were also introduced in 1981 have already been extracted earlier. It can thus be seen that the rule making authority no longer wanted to give importance to the date of confinement as was done earlier. Thus, the female officer got the option to decide when she wanted to avail of the leave. Such an option was required since the physical condition of different female officers during confinement may require that such leave is availed during different periods of their confinement. To fix the ending date of the leave as eight weeks from confinement was possibly found by the rule making authority as highly unjust. However, the amendment to the rule in 1981 also did not take care of the entire problem regarding the granting and availing of maternity leave. 21. A learned Single Judge in Radha v. Secretary to Government reported in [ 1988 (1) KLT 71 ] considered the amended Rule 100. Dealing with the contention that after the amendment the maternity leave has lost any connection with confinement and that the Government servant is not obliged to disclose the date of confinement, the learned Judge in para.4 observed thus; “4. The argument is attractive. But, it appears to me, that the position taken up by the respondents cannot be considered as altogether illegal, unjust or unreasonable. The argument is attractive. But, it appears to me, that the position taken up by the respondents cannot be considered as altogether illegal, unjust or unreasonable. What is granted under R.100 of the Kerala Service Rules is maternity leave. It is not a reward for maternity, but a leave in connection with and to facilitate maternity. In that event, it must have some reasonable connection to maternity, and the date of confinement. It cannot be sought or granted long after the date of confinement and unconnected with the maternity. That is at least a reasonable alternative interpretation of R.100.” 22. The judgment of the learned Single Judge was challenged in appeal and a Division Bench of this Court in Radha v. Secretary to Government reported in [ 1990 (2) KLT 914 ] confirmed the view expressed by the learned Single Judge. The Division Bench in para.4 held thus; “4. It was submitted that a female government servant could have obtained maternity leave for a period of 90 days either from the date of commencement or till the end of eight weeks from the date of commencement whichever is earlier. This would suggest that the maternity leave could have been obtained under the old rule from a point anterior to the date of actual confinement. As the present rule is substantially in terms of the first part of the old rule it was contended that even under the present rule maternity leave can be obtained from a date anterior to the date of actual confinement or delivery. We are inclined to agree with this interpretation of the present rule. A female government servant can ask for leave for a period of 90 days with effect from a date anterior to the date of actual confinement. But, as the nature of the leave contemplated by R.100 is maternity leave, it is obvious that maternity leave can be granted only in the context of confinement. R.100 provides for grant of maternity leave for a female government servant; having regard to the difficulties that she may have in performing her duties for a reasonable period before confinement and after confinement. That being the position, no maternity leave can be granted which is a date far remote from the actual date of confinement. R.100 provides for grant of maternity leave for a female government servant; having regard to the difficulties that she may have in performing her duties for a reasonable period before confinement and after confinement. That being the position, no maternity leave can be granted which is a date far remote from the actual date of confinement. The date of confinement is the central point in maternity leave, which could extend for a period anterior to the date of confinement and posterior to the said date. As that is how we should construe R.100, it is difficult to accede to the contention of counsel for the appellant that she could claim maternity leave with effect from a date far remote from the date of delivery. As already stated, the delivery took place on the 28th of May 1984 and she seeks maternity leave with effect from the 2nd July 1984. By this process she would not be asking for any leave actually on the date of confinement. The rule did not certainly conceive of such a situation. The authorities were therefore, justified in modifying the maternity leave and granting the same for a period of 90 days from the 28th of May 1984. The impugned order is therefore, did not suffer from any infirmity calling for interference.” 23. We do not think that the dictum laid down in Radha supra [ 1990 (2) KLT 914 ] can be made applicable in the present scenario. The concept of maternity leave has undergone a sea change. When the above said decision was being considered, the maximum period of leave which could have been availed was 90 days which will be a little lesser than one-third of the total period of confinement. As the rule presently stands, maternity leave can be availed of for 180 days, which amounts to about 2/3rd of the period of confinement. The number of days having been increased to 180 days, it will no longer be possible to define specifically as to what is the reasonable period before or after the confinement that can be availed of as leave. On the facts of the case, that was before the Division Bench, the delivery had taken place on 28.05.1984 and maternity leave was sought for from 02.07.1984, which was more than one month after the delivery. On the facts of the case, that was before the Division Bench, the delivery had taken place on 28.05.1984 and maternity leave was sought for from 02.07.1984, which was more than one month after the delivery. That is to say no maternity leave was requested for during the entire period of confinement till after delivery. It is in the said situation that this Court had interpreted the rule to mean that the availing of the maternity leave should be related to the date of confinement. We have no doubt in our mind that this Court was fully justified in adopting such an interpretation on the facts of the case that was decided. However, we do not think it will any longer be proper to understand the rule in such a manner that the leave should be from a date reasonably close to the date of actual confinement, having regard to the fact that the total number of days which can be availed of has increased from 90 to 180 and the fact that the maternity leave can be combined with other leave. 24. After hearing both sides, we are of the considered view that the conclusions arrived at by the Tribunal as per the impugned Ext.P3 final order dated 09.01.2020 in O.A.No.83/2020 is well justified and beyond any challenge. At any rate, we are not in a position to hold that Ext.P3 order is legally faulty so as to warrant judicial intervention at the hands of this Court in exercise of the extraordinary, discretionary, and constitutional powers invested under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India. The Tribunal has rightly quashed the impugned Annexure A7 and Annexure A9 orders and issued the directions in para.10 thereof, which reads as follows; “10. Under the above circumstances, we find that the applicant is entitled to succeed. Annexures-A7 and A9 orders are therefore set aside. There will be a direction to the first respondent to sanction maternity leave to the applicant as applied for in Annexure-A5. There will also be a direction to regularise her subsequent period of service and grant her due increments and other service benefits. The first respondent shall pass appropriate orders on the above, within a period of two months from date of receipt of a certified copy of this order.” 25. There will also be a direction to regularise her subsequent period of service and grant her due increments and other service benefits. The first respondent shall pass appropriate orders on the above, within a period of two months from date of receipt of a certified copy of this order.” 25. Sri B.Vinod, learned Senior Government Pleader would point out that it is averred in Ground E of this original petition that the applicant had availed leave without allowance for 5 years from 23.10.2009 as per Appendix XIIA of Part I KSR for taking better job abroad and while on LWA she was enjoying the benefits from a foreign employer under whom she was working during the leave period and that respondent herein (original applicant) has availed maternity leave including leave from the foreign employer, during the period she has given birth to her child and that the respondent herein (original applicant) has not disclosed any of these aspects in the OA. Sri V.M.Abdul Salim, learned counsel appearing for the respondent/original applicant would submit that the aforesaid factual allegations made out in Ground E of the original petition is absolutely false and wrong and has been made without any factual foundation and such factual pleadings have never been made by the petitioners herein either while they had filed Ext.P2 reply statement before the Tribunal or at the time of raising oral arguments before the Tribunal which culminated in the Ext.P3 final order. Further, it is pointed out by Sri V.M.Abdul Salim, learned counsel appearing for the original applicant that the original applicant had proceeded on leave without allowance for 5 years from 23.10.2009, as she wanted to take employment as Nurse in Ireland. Further, it is pointed out by Sri V.M.Abdul Salim, learned counsel appearing for the original applicant that the original applicant had proceeded on leave without allowance for 5 years from 23.10.2009, as she wanted to take employment as Nurse in Ireland. Further that, well before the expiry of the 5 years LWA period, the applicant was advised that it may be better for her to return back to her home country in view of the pregnancy and other health related complications and accordingly she had come back to Kerala much before the expiry of the 5 year LWA period and the medical scan report as per Annexure A3 dated 15.08.2014 was done in Sabine Hospital & Research Centre, Muvattupuzha in the State of Kerala and Annexure A4 medical record is issued by the Department of Obstetrics and Gynecology of the Government Medical College Hospital, Kottayam and Annexure A5(2) is the medical certificate issued by the Government Medical College Hospital, Kottayam, stating about her premature “pre-term breech delivery” on 21.09.2014 and that all throughout the above said period, she was in Kerala from the time prior to Annexure A3 scan report dated 05.08.2014 and thereafter and after the premature delivery on 21.09.2014, she has not gone back to Ireland at any point of time and she has continued to remain in Kerala. Hence it is pointed out by Sri V.M.Abdul Salim learned counsel appearing for the original applicant that it is indeed uncharitable that the petitioners herein would raise such allegations without any factual foundation and without making any enquiry in that regard and without ascertaining the correct factual aspects in the matter and that since the original applicant was all throughout in Kerala at the relevant time, there is no question of the original applicant seeking maternity leave application before the foreign employer in Ireland. 26. After hearing both sides, it appears that the above said factual submissions have been made by Sri V.M.Abdul Salim, learned counsel appearing for the original applicant, on the basis of the objective documents like Annexure A3 scan report, which has been issued by a hospital in Kerala on 15.08.2014, Annexure A4 medical records issued by none other than the Government Medical College Hospital, Kottayam and Annexure A5(2) medical certificate issued by the Department of Obstetrics and Gynecology in the Government Medical College Hospital, Kottayam, appear to be correct and tenable. Hence, there is no necessity to get into any of those issues at this long distance of time. 27. The impugned Ext.P3 final order has been rendered by the Tribunal as early as on 09.01.2020 and the present OP(KAT) has been filed before this Court on 01.02.2021. The time limit for compliance with the directions issued in para.10 of Ext.P3 order of the Tribunal dated 09.01.2020 was two months therefrom, which has expired long ago. Taking note of the above said factual aspects, it is ordered that the petitioners will immediately comply with the directions issued by the Tribunal in Ext.P3 without any further delay, at any rate within an outer time limit of six weeks from the date of production of a certified copy of this judgment. The counsel for the original applicant may ensure that certified copies of the judgment are produced before the Principal Secretary/Additional Chief Secretary to Government in the Health and Family Welfare Department as well as the Director of Health Service, Thiruvananthapuram, for necessary information and immediate compliance. The time of six weeks would be counted from the date of receipt of the copies of the judgment by the aforesaid officials concerned. With these observations and directions, the above OP(KAT) will stand dismissed.