JUDGMENT : Rakesh Srivastava, Vivek Varma, JJ. 1. Heard Sri Anu Pratap Singh, learned counsel for the appellants, Sri Amitabh Rai, learned Additional Chief Standing Counsel for respondent nos. 1 and 2, Sri Pawan Kumar Pandey, learned counsel for respondent nos. 3 and 4 and Sri Shashank Pathak, Advocate holding brief of Sri Sharad Pathak, learned counsel for respondent nos. 6 to 18. 2. The present special appeal has been filed seeking to challenge the order dated 1.11.2021 passed by the learned Single Judge in Writ Petition No. 25379 (M/S) of 2021 (Rama Kant Pandey and others v. Principal Secretary. Institutional finance, Lucknow & Ors.). 3. A preliminary objection has been raised by the learned counsel for the respondents with regard to maintainability of the special appeal. It has been contended that the order under challenge in this appeal does not decide the rights of the parties and as such, the same cannot held to be a judgment for the purposes of filing an intra Court appeal. He further submits that the appellant has filed a stay vacation application along with counter affidavit in the present writ petition and the said application is stated to be listed on 6.12.2021. 4. Learned counsel for the appellant by referring to the merits of the case has contended that the present special appeal is maintainable. 5. In order to appreciate the rival contentions, we deem it necessary to set out the impugned order dated 1.11.2021 passed by the learned Single Judge against which the present special appeal has been preferred. The order dated 1.11.2021 reads as under: "The petitioners' names were included in the list of members of the General Body of the Society registered for the year 2017 and 2018 with the office of the Deputy Registrar, Firms Societies and Chits. Now, by the impugned order dated 28.07.2021, the said list that was registered under Section 4B of the Societies Registration Act, has been revised. It has excluded the petitioners names. The list of 2017-18 relates to members of the General Body of the Society known as Shiksha Prachar Tatha Prasar Samiti, Village Babhnan, Post Sugar Mill Babhnan, District Gonda, carrying a total of 78 members, including the petitioners. The list that has now been drawn up and made part of the impugned order dated 28.07.2021, passed by the Deputy Registrar, Firms Societies and Chits, carries 45 names excluding the petitioners. The list that has now been drawn up and made part of the impugned order dated 28.07.2021, passed by the Deputy Registrar, Firms Societies and Chits, carries 45 names excluding the petitioners. The submission of learned counsel for the petitioners is that once a list of members is registered, the name of its members cannot be excluded on any ground whatsoever without hearing the members whose name is proposed to be excluded. It has been asserted in paragraph Nos. 50 and 51 of the writ petition that the impugned orders have been passed by the Deputy Director, Firms Societies and Chits, in collusion with opposite party Nos. 4 and 5, without providing any opportunity of hearing to the petitioners. Mr. Virendra Singh, learned Standing Counsel accepts notice on behalf of respondent Nos.1 and 2. Mr. Pawan Kumar Pandey, accepts notice on behalf of respondent No.5. Learned Standing Counsel and Mr. Pandey, appearing on behalf of the respondents submits that the earlier list was got illegally registered by unauthorized persons on the basis of sham elections and that before passing the impugned order, Kashi Prasad Mishra, Vipin Kumar Mishra, Brij Bihari Mishra and Shalini Mishra, respondent No.5, were heard. Prima facie, the impugned order has been passed without opportunity of hearing. Reliance in this connection has been placed by the learned counsel for the petitioners on the decision of this Court in Shiv Narain Agarwal and Others Vs. State Of U.P. Thru. Prin.Secy. Institutional Finance, Lko. & Ors, Miscellaneous Single No.16656 of 2021 decided on 06.08.2021, where opportunity of hearing before removal of the name of a member of the General Body has been held to be an essential requirement of the exercise of power to amend the list of members of the General Body. Issue notice to respondent Nos.3, 4 and 6. Steps be taken by RPAD, returnable on 09.11.2021. List this petition for admission on 01.12.2021. Order on Civil Misc. Application No.143707 of 2021 Issue notice. Until further orders, operation of the impugned orders dated 28.07.2021 and 26.08.2021, (Annexure Nos. 1 and 2, respectively) passed by the Deputy Director, Firms Societies and Chits, Ayodhya Division Ayodhya shall remain suspended." 6. The question as to whether an intra Court appeal would be available against an interlocutory order or not, has been considered by the Supreme Court in the case of Shah Babulal Khimjiv. 1 and 2, respectively) passed by the Deputy Director, Firms Societies and Chits, Ayodhya Division Ayodhya shall remain suspended." 6. The question as to whether an intra Court appeal would be available against an interlocutory order or not, has been considered by the Supreme Court in the case of Shah Babulal Khimjiv. Jayaben D. Kania and another, (1981) 4 SCC 8 , and it was held that interlocutory orders which finally decide a question or issue in controversy in the main case or which finally decide a collateral issue or a question which is not the subject matter of the main case, are "judgments" for the purpose of filing appeals under the relevant rules of the High Court. The law laid down by the Supreme Court in Shah BabulalKhimji(supra)is to the effect that orders passed by the Court which are of a routine nature would not be "judgments" even if they cause some inconvenience to the parties. 7. In Midnapore Peoples Coop. Bank Ltd. and others v. Chunilal Nanda and others, (2006) 5 SCC 399 , the Supreme Court again emphasised that routine orders which are passed to facilitate the progress of the case till its culmination in the final judgment are not to be held as "judgments" for the purposes of filing intra-court appeals. It was also held that orders which may cause some inconvenience or some prejudice to a party but which do not finally determine the rights and obligations of the parties, would not amount to "judgments". 8. The view taken by the Apex Court in the case of Shah Babulal Khimji (Supra) was followed by the Division Bench of this Court in Usha Devi and others vs. State of U.P. and others (Special Appeal Defective No.1124 of 2007). The Court said as under : "However, in our view, this appeal is not maintainable. The Hon'ble Single Judge while permitting the respondents to file counter affidavit has granted an interim order till the next date of listing. Neither the rights of the parties have been adjudicated finally nor any issue has been decided. When an order can be construed as a "judgment" whereagainst a special appeal under Chapter-VIII Rule 5 is maintainable has been considered repeatedly in catena of cases by this Court time and again. Neither the rights of the parties have been adjudicated finally nor any issue has been decided. When an order can be construed as a "judgment" whereagainst a special appeal under Chapter-VIII Rule 5 is maintainable has been considered repeatedly in catena of cases by this Court time and again. Earlier while Letters Patent appeal under Clause 15 was maintainable against the judgment of the Hon'ble Single Judge, the question as to when an "order" would be a "judgment" came up for consideration before a full Bench in the case of Shital Din and others Vs. Anant Ram, 1993 A.L.J. 127 (FB) and it held as under:- ".......on a reading of several clauses of the Letters Patent of the High Court we have come to the conclusion that a final decision, which effectually disposes of the appeal before the High Court, should amount to a judgment, whether it amounts to a decree or not." The Apex Court in the case of Shah Babulal Khimji Vs. Jayaban D. Kania and another, AIR 1981 SC, 1786 while dealing with an appeal from a suit for specific performance of a contract considered the question as to whether under clause 15 of the Letters Patent, special appeal would be maintainable. In the said case the plaintiff sought an interim relief of appointment of a Receiver on the suit property during the pendency of the suit. The learned Single Judge dismissed the application seeking interim relief. The plaintiff filed special appeal under clause-15 of the Letter Patent, which was dismissed as not maintainable. The Apex Court while reversing the judgment of the appellate court, classified judgments in three categories:- a) Final judgment b) Preliminary judgment c) Intermediary or interlocutory judgment. It was also held by the Apex Court where a proceeding finally terminates after adjudication of all the issues or some of the issues the adjudication is a judgment. The adjudication is also a judgment, even though it does not result in termination of proceedings, if it possesses the characteristics and trappings of a judgment. An order may possess such characteristics and trappings when the order adversely affects a valuable right of the party by deciding an important aspect of the trial in an ancillary proceeding. The adjudication is also a judgment, even though it does not result in termination of proceedings, if it possesses the characteristics and trappings of a judgment. An order may possess such characteristics and trappings when the order adversely affects a valuable right of the party by deciding an important aspect of the trial in an ancillary proceeding. The Apex Court in para-119 at page-1817 also held as under: "(1 ) That the trial Judge being a senior court with vast experience of various branches of law occupying a very high status should be trusted to pass discretionary or interlocutory orders with due regard to the well settled principles of civil justice. Thus, any discretion exercised or routine orders passed by the trial Judge in the course of the suit which may cause some inconvenience or, to some extent, prejudice one party or the other cannot be treated as a judgment otherwise the appellate court (Division Bench) will be flooded with appeals from all kinds of orders passed by the trial Judge. The courts must give sufficient allowance to the trial Judge and raise a presumption that any discretionary order, which he passes, must be presumed to be correct unless it is ex facie legally erroneous or causes grave and substantial injustice. (2) That the interlocutory order in order to be a judgment must contain the traits and trappings of finality either when the order decides the questions in controversy in an ancillary proceeding or in the suit itself or in a part of the proceedings." 9. The said view was followed by another Division Bench in the case of State of U.P Vs. The said view was followed by another Division Bench in the case of State of U.P Vs. Kumari Renu Tiwari, 1993(2) UPLBEC,1325 and the following propositions were laid down: "(1) When the term "judgment" is used in a Statute or rule linked with the term "decree" as defined in the Code of Civil Procedure, it will have a restricted and narrow meaning but when it is not so linked, it will have a wider connotation; (2) ordinarily for an adjudication to be a "judgment" it should bring about termination of the proceeding in which the adjudication is made; and (3) an order passed on an application for interim relief is ordinarily not a "judgment" but it will qualify to be called ''judgment' if it affects valuable right of the party or decides an important aspect of the trial and the effect of the order on the party concerned is direct and immediate rather than indirect and remote" The same view was taken by the Division Bench in Special Appeal No. 1247 of 2005 (Musafir Singh vs. Shiv Ram Yadav and others) decided on 20.10.2005. We have also followed and taken the same view in Special Appeal No. 1247 of 2005, Musafir Singh Vs. Shiv Ram Yadav and others decided on 20.10.2005. A similar contention has also been dispelled by this Court in Special Appeal No. 1288 of 2006 Rajendra Singh Bhadauriya Vs. Committee of Management & others decided on 6.11.2006. Moreover, after perusing the relief sought by petitioner-respondent no. 5, we are not convinced that the interim order passed by the Hon'ble Single Judge can be treated to have granted any final relief to the petitioner-respondent no. 5." 10. Similar controversy came up before a Full Bench of this Court in the case of Ashutosh Shrotriya and others v. Vicc-Chance or, Dr. B.R. Ambedkar University and others, 2015(8) ADJ 248 , wherein the matter was considered in detail and the law was finally laid down to the effect that an order of a learned Single Judge upon a petition under Articles 226 or 227 of the Constitution only calling for counter and rejoinder affidavits is merely a procedural order in aid of the progression of the case. An order of this nature which is purely of a procedural nature in aid of the progression of the case and to enable the Court to form a considered view after a counter affidavit and a rejoinder are filed would not be amenable to a special appeal under Chapter VIII Rule 5. Such an order does not decide anything nor does it have the trappings of finality. If a party to the proceedings seeks to press an application for ad interim relief of a protective nature even before a counter affidavit is filed, on the ground that a situation of irretrievable injustice may result or that its substantive rights would be adversely affected in the meantime, such an argument must be addressed before the Single Judge. If such an argument is urged, it would be dealt with however briefly, consistent with the stage of the case, by the Single Judge. It is for the Division Bench hearing the special appeal to consider whether the order decides matters of moment or is of such a nature that would affect the vital and valuable rights of the parties and causes serious injustice to the concerned party. 11. In the facts of the present case the order dated 1.11.2021, against which the present appeal has been preferred, is merely of a procedural nature and cannot in any manner be said to touch the merits of the controversy or the dispute between the parties so as to be deemed to have been issued in exercise of powers conferred under Article 226 of the Constitution. It is open to the appellant to raise his grievance before the Single Judge before whom the matter is to be taken up as per the direction of the learned Single Judge. 12. In view of the aforementioned facts and circumstances, the preliminary objection raised with regard to maintainability of the special appeal under the provisions of Chapter VIII Rule 5 of the Allahabad High Court Rules, 1952, is sustained. The special appeal is held to be not maintainable and is accordingly dismissed.