JUDGMENT : GOUTAM BHADURI, J. 1. The challenge in this petition is to the order dated 13.11.2020 (Annexure P-13) passed by the Revenue Board. Pursuant to a petition filed by the respondents No. 1 to 4 the division bench of this court by an order dated 13.09.2017 directed that the lis projected by the respondents No. 1 to 4 be decided by the Revenue Board in accordance with law within a specified time. Subsequently, pursuant to the order, the Revenue Board has passed the impugned order, which is subject of challenge. 2. Learned counsel for the petitioners would submit that Dau Kalyan Singh was holding certain land at Raipur which was subject of ceiling cases and the ceiling cases were terminated after vesting of the excess land in the government. He would submit that after closure of the ceiling case it was never contested by the government. It is stated that Dau Kalyan Singh was having two co-widows namely Smt. Sarjawati Bai and Smt. Janak Nandini both of them died issue less and Sarjawati Bai gave a general power of attorney to one Ram Murty Agrawal in the year 1965 and a WILL was executed by Sarjawati in favour of Ram Murty Agrawal on 8.6.1970 and the registered WILL was executed in his favour. Subsequently, Ram Murty Agrawal executed a WILL in favour of Anup Kumar and Swarup Kumar on 1.1.1992 which was also a registered WILL and thereby the petitioners Anup Kumar and Swarup Kumar became the owner of the different lands. It is further contended that Ram Murty also appointed the petitioners as trustee of the private trust and thereby mutation was made in their favour by the Tehsildar Bhatapara in the year 1995. It is further stated that respondents No. 1 to 4 had filed a PIL before this court bearing number 51/2015 wherein the division bench has ordered for hearing of issue by the Revenue Board in accordance with law and the Revenue Board has instead of deciding the case in accordance with law went into deciding the validity and existence of WILL and the inheritance and held that since the original holder died issue less and WILL can't be taken cognizance therefore the land would vest into State. He would submit that separate MCC was also filed wherein the liberty was given to challenge the order of Revenue Board, therefore the instant petition. 3. He would submit that separate MCC was also filed wherein the liberty was given to challenge the order of Revenue Board, therefore the instant petition. 3. Learned counsel further submits that according to the finding of the Board of Revenue, the ceiling case itself since was closed after death of Janak Nandani, the one widow of Dau Kalyan Singh and the ceiling case was closed. It is stated Janak Nandani since died issue less, the property cannot go into the hands of the State as the property was inherited by other co-widow Sarjawati. He would submit that admittedly the ceiling case having been closed long back the same cannot be re-opened and again the land cannot be vested into the State when the property was bequeathed by way of a WILL. It is further submitted that the Revenue Board exceeded its jurisdiction to decide the inheritance and devolution of the property and the provisions of the Land Revenue Code was given a go bye to pass the order. Therefore, the said order is liable to be set aside. 4. Learned counsel for the respondents would submit that order of the Revenue Board is well merited. He would submit that the petitioner Anup Kumar has relied on a WILL executed by Sarjawati but the WILL was never produced before any court. He would further submit that in respect of the trust property nothing is on record that how the trust property was converted into property of private persons and further the WILL having not been produced according to the statement of the witnesses before the Tehsildar, the Revenue Board has correctly decided the same to confiscate the property in favour of the State. It is also submitted that in respect of part of property a civil suit was filed by petitioner and the finding was against them with respect to ownership of the property. 5. Learned State counsel would submit that the order of the Revenue Board is well merited, however in case interference is made by this court the State should be given liberty to draw the appropriate proceeding in accordance with law. 6. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. 7. 5. Learned State counsel would submit that the order of the Revenue Board is well merited, however in case interference is made by this court the State should be given liberty to draw the appropriate proceeding in accordance with law. 6. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. 7. Prima-facie it appears that on an earlier occasion PIL was filed by the respondents No. 1 to 4 wherein the division bench of this court on 13.09.2017 passed the order, the relevant paras are reproduced herein-below: “8. With the aforesaid materials on record, we notice that the plea of the Petitioner is that the lands which should be identified and treated as Government lands, either on account of ceiling laws or as relatable to the entries in the revenue records, or otherwise, are essentially in the hands of the private Respondents in this writ petition. This is not an issue which can be decided in proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution, having regard to the contrasting contentions of the private parties. However, it is definitely within the domain of the revenue authorities to take a final decision on the issue as to whether the lands in question are Government lands and if so, whether they are required to be secured in terms of the title and/or possession in terms of and in accordance with the relevant laws and following due process. Since the materials on record disclose that the lands involved have large extent and may even have ramifications referable to the title of Ala Rai Bahadur Dau Kalyan Singh @ Mattu Lal Bani, who is stated to have been the then Malguzar of his time and was holding the lands, it is appropriate that the entire records in relation to the case in hand, which are available through the enquiry reports and the materials submitted therewith, are considered by the Board of Revenue and due decision is rendered by the Board of Revenue in accordance with law. Needless to say that such action has to be expeditious. 9. Needless to say that such action has to be expeditious. 9. In the result, this writ petition is ordered directing that Respondents No. 1 and 9 shall ensure that the entire facts and factors relating to this matter and all materials including all the reports upto the report of the 9th Respondent-Commissioner referred to above are placed before the Board of Revenue for consideration within a period of one month from the date of receipt of a copy of this judgment. The Board of Revenue shall thereupon, adverting to and considering all facts, factors and materials, take a final decision on all relevant issues within an outer limit of six months therefrom, after hearing the necessary parties. If the Petitioners desire to avail opportunity of hearing before the Board of Revenue, they may mark their appearance in the office of the Board of Revenue at the earliest and place a request in that regard. 10. The writ petition is ordered accordingly.” 8. On the basis of the said direction the Revenue Board again started a hearing. 9. After hearing, the Revenue Board passed its orders and relevant observation with respect to ceiling case following observations were made: ^^Ádj.k esa Li"V gS fd nkÅ dY;k.k flag ds uke ij pkj lhfyax Ádj.k Øekad 250@c&90¼3½@1963&64] 258@c&90¼3½@1963&64] 261@c&90¼3½@1963&64 ,oa 969@c&90¼3½@1974&75 iathc) Fkk] ftudk fooj.k fuEukuqlkj gS%& ¼v½ ÁŒØŒ 250@c&90¼3½@1963&64 esa fnukad 11-02-1965 ds vkns'kkuqlkj orZeku esa dksbZ Hkwfe 'ks"k ugha gksus ls Ádj.k lekIr fd;k x;kA ¼c½ ÁŒØŒ 258@c&90¼3½@1963&64 i{kdkj 'kklu fo:) tud uafnuh ckbZ esa tud uafnuh dh e`R;q ds i'pkr~ vkns'k fnukad 23-06-1965 ds vuqlkj muds [kkrs esa dksbZ okfjlku ugha gksus ,oa fgLlsnkj ljtkcrh csok nkÅ dY;k.k flag ds laca/k esa ÁŒØŒ 261@c&90¼3½@1963&64 fopkjk/khu gksus ls ÁŒØŒ 258@c&90¼3½@1963&64 dks mDr Ádj.k ds lkFk layXu fd;k x;kA ¼l½ ÁŒØŒ 969@c&90¼3½@1974&75 i{kdkj 'kklu fo:) ljtkorh ckbZ esa ljtkorh dh e`R;q fnukad 02-03-1977 dks gksus ds dkj.k muds okfjlkuksa ds uke ij Ádj.k rS;kj djus ds funsZ'k nsrs gq, Ádj.k uLrhc) fd;k x;kA mDr lhfyax Ádj.kksa esa ikfjr vkns'kkuqlkj fdlh Hkh i{kdkj ds }kjk dksbZ vihy ;k iqujh{k.k is'k ugha fd;k x;kA vFkkZr~ leLr lhfyax Ádj.k esa ikfjr vkns'k vafre gks pqdk gSA** 10. The finding of the Revenue Board therefore affirms the fact that though four ceiling cases were pending in respect of the land but eventually it was closed and no appeal or revision was filed by any of the interested parties including the State. 11. The order of the Revenue Board further purports that the mutation proceeding were carried out under Section 109 and 110 of the Land Revenue Code on the basis of the WILL. The Revenue Board observed that the authenticity of the WILL comes into doubt for the reason that beneficiary of the WILL was not related to the testator. Though the Revenue Board observed that even on the basis of the un-registered WILL the mutation proceeding can be recorded if it is proved but at the same time it is observed that the WILL executed in favour of Ram Murty Agrawal has not been proved before any court and since Ram Murty Agrawal in whose favour the initial WILL was made by Sarjawati Devi was not related, therefore the transfer of ownership could not have been made in favour of Ram Murty Agrawal. This finding appears to be contradictory according to own observation made by the Revenue Board. 12. The finding therefore that Ram Murty being not related to Sarjawati Devi cannot inherit the property by WILL is only on presumption. The mutation of name of petitioner and their predecessor was recorded on the basis of WILL way back in the year 1995 after series of mutation proceeding so virtually the mutation made in favour of petitioner were nullified by present order in the year 2020. The order also records the past history that on 24.02.1984 in a revenue case it was observed that certain diverted land at village Avrathi and village Patpar were recorded in the name of Janak Nandani and Sarjawati both widow of Dau Kalyan Singh and for last many years the land revenue was not deposited as such it was directed to be confiscated in favour of State under Section 177 of the Land Revenue Code. The order of vesting in favour of State was passed in the revenue case on 24.02.1984 in respect of the lands of village Avrathi and village Patpar. The vesting in favour of the government was ordered by virtue of Section 29 of the Indian Succession Act, 1956. The order of vesting in favour of State was passed in the revenue case on 24.02.1984 in respect of the lands of village Avrathi and village Patpar. The vesting in favour of the government was ordered by virtue of Section 29 of the Indian Succession Act, 1956. The order also records that the said vesting of land was sought to be reviewed at the instance of Ram Murty Agrawal through whom the petitioner claims. Against vesting of land in the order of Revenue Board it is observed that the permission to review was obtained under Section 51 of the Land Revenue Code. Subsequently by order dated 1.9.1985 on the basis of WILL in a mutation case No. 330 and 400 name of Ram Murty Agrawal was recorded as bhoomi swami thereby earlier order of vesting of land with State was set aside and Ram Murty Agrawal was recorded as owner of lands. 13. The Revenue Board's order records that since original WILL was not produced, therefore name of Ram Murty Agrawal should not have been recorded. It also went to observe the question of inheritance and gave a finding that according to the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 by holding that Sarjawati do not have any legal heir as such the property would devolve on the State according to Section 29 of the Act of 1956. By such finding in the present order, the Revenue Board in 2020 gave a finding that order passed by the Tahsildar in the year 1985 was wrong. The Supreme Court in the case of Suraj Bhan and Others vs. Financial Commissioner and Others, (2007) 6 SCC 186 observed that the entry which has been made in the revenue record by the Tehsildar if it is on the basis of any WILL, the devolution of the property cannot be decided by the revenue authority. The entry in the khasra and revenue record do not convey the title, it is only for the purpose of paying the land revenue and has nothing to do with the ownership. This proposition has been laid down in Municipal Corporation, Gwalior vs. Puran Singh alias Puran Chand and Others, AIR 2014 SC 2665 . 14. This court in the Misc. This proposition has been laid down in Municipal Corporation, Gwalior vs. Puran Singh alias Puran Chand and Others, AIR 2014 SC 2665 . 14. This court in the Misc. Appeal No. 6 of 2006 between Awadesh Pratap Singh vs. Ashok Upadhyay and Another decided on 16.09.2016 has held that in order to prove the authenticity of the WILL it is the probate court which will decide the validity of it and any other person who is legally entitled to the properties will have to be decided by the competent civil court when the matter is raised before it. Admittedly no such dispute was raised before the civil court whereby the WILL was put to a question. 15. The order of Revenue Board would reflect that the order of 1.9.1985 passed on review for mutation of name of Ram Murty Agrawal was subject of challenge before the SDO. The SDO by its order dated 9.3.1989 had set aside the order which is filed by the respondent as Annexure R-11. The said order was subject of revision before the Additional Commissioner and the Additional Commissioner by order dated 7th July, 1992 has affirmed the order of the SDO, however remanded the case by setting aside the all earlier orders i.e. 1.9.1985, 26.2.1987, 24.2.1984 and 20.11.1986, which all pertains to mutation and remanded the case to the Tehsildar, Bhatapara that the name of the parties be recorded prior to the period was existing on 24.2.1984 i.e. prior to order of vesting of the land in the State was made. Same is filed as Annexure R-10. In the order it was directed that there after giving all the necessary interested parties a chance of hearing a fresh orders be passed. Such direction given by Addl. Commissioner was not challenged by any of the parties. 16. The Revenue Board's order records that after remand was made the Tehsildar Bhatapara by an order dated 28.12.1995 directed the name of Anup Kumar, Swarup Kumar and Bharat Kumar be recorded, who are the petitioners herein. Their names were directed to be recorded as owners of the lands in exercise of power under section 110 of the Land Revenue Code. The Revenue Board has observed that by such mutation of the name the petitioner would not become the owner as the Ram Murty itself did not have any right to hold the land. Their names were directed to be recorded as owners of the lands in exercise of power under section 110 of the Land Revenue Code. The Revenue Board has observed that by such mutation of the name the petitioner would not become the owner as the Ram Murty itself did not have any right to hold the land. In any case when eventual remand was made by the Commissioner on 7th July, 1992 whereby all the order of the vesting of the land in the State, mutation of the name of Ram Murty Agrawal was annulled and thereafter on a fresh proceeding when name of the petitioners were recorded in the year 1995 whether the same could have been set aside by shelving the provisions of Section 51 of the Land Revenue Code by the Revenue Board? The answer would be with section 51 and 53 of C.G. Land Revenue Code which is power of review. 17. In order to exercise the power of review section 51 of the Land Revenue Code is the relevant section, which reads as under:- “51. Review of Orders - (1) The Board and every Revenue Officer may, either on its/his own motion or on the application of any party interested review any order passed by itself/himself or by any of its/his predecessors in office and pass such order in reference thereto as it/he thinks fit: Provided that: (i) if the Commissioner, Settlement Commissioner, Collector or Settlement Officer thinks it necessary to review any order which he has not himself passed, he shall first obtain the sanction of the Board, and if an officer subordinate to a Collector or Settlement Officer proposes to review any order, whether passed by himself or by any predecessor, he shall first obtain the sanction in writing of the authority to whom he is immediately subordinate. (i-a) no order shall be varied or reversed unless notice has been given to the parties interested to appear and be heard in support of such order. (ii) no order from which an appeal has been made, or which is the subject of any revision proceedings shall, so long as such appeal or proceedings are pending be reviewed. (i-a) no order shall be varied or reversed unless notice has been given to the parties interested to appear and be heard in support of such order. (ii) no order from which an appeal has been made, or which is the subject of any revision proceedings shall, so long as such appeal or proceedings are pending be reviewed. (iii) no order affecting any question of right between private persons shall be reviewed except on the application of a party to the proceedings, and no application for the review of such order shall be entertained unless it is made within ninety days from the passing of the order. (2) No order shall be reviewed except on the grounds provided for in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908). (3) For the purposes of this section the Collector shall be deemed to be the successor in office of any Revenue Officer who has left the district or who has ceased to exercise powers as a Revenue Officer and to whom there is no successor in the district. (4) An order which has been dealt with in appeal or on revision shall not be reviewed by any Revenue Officer subordinate to the appellate or revisional authority.” 18. Section 53 of the Land Revenue Code prescribes the limitation to exercise the power of review which reads as under:- “53. Application of Limitation Act.-Subject to any express provision contained in this Code the provision of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908 (IX of 1908) shall apply to all appeals and applications for review under this Code.” 19. The section 53 of the Land Revenue Code made the application of Indian Limitation Act applicable for the purpose of review. Article 124 of the Limitation Act, 1963 prescribes the time limit for a review. According to the article thirty days time is prescribed for exercise of power of review. 20. The order of division bench on which the Revenue Board started adjudicating the issue would show that the order was a qualified one which directed the Board of Revenue to take a decision in accordance with law. Here in the instant case the Board of Revenue appears to have exercised its power of review to set aside the eventual order of mutation which was made on 28.12.1995. Here in the instant case the Board of Revenue appears to have exercised its power of review to set aside the eventual order of mutation which was made on 28.12.1995. The said order of mutation under section 110 of the Land Revenue Code whereby the name of the petitioners were recorded was passed after all earlier orders were set aside by the Additional Commissioner by its order dated 7th July, 1992 and mutation proceeding were remanded for a fresh hearing. When there was a qualified order by the division bench to decide the case in accordance with law, in order to interfere with the last mutation of 28.12.1995 whether the Revenue Board could have exercised the jurisdiction otherwise than which is prescribed in law shelving the provisions of section 51 and 53 of Land Revenue Code. The said ratio has been decided by the Supreme Court in case of A.R. Antulay vs. R.S. Nayak and Another, (1988) 2 SCC 602 by the seven Judges Bench wherein the Supreme Court has held that the jurisdiction comes solely from the law of the land and cannot be exercised otherwise. It further observed that in this country jurisdiction can be exercised only when provided for either in the Constitution or in the laws made by the Legislature. It further observed that the jurisdiction to try case could only be conferred by law enacted by the legislature and even the court cannot confer a jurisdiction if it does not exist in law. 21. The Supreme Court in the judgment at Para 91, 110, 112 and 141 held as under:- “91. It is the settled position in law that jurisdiction of courts comes solely from the law of the land and cannot be exercised otherwise. So far as the position in this country is concerned conferment of jurisdiction is possible either by the provisions of the Constitution or by specific laws enacted by the Legislature. For instance, Article 129 confers all the powers of a court of record on the Supreme Court including the power to punish for contempt of itself. Articles 131, 132, 133, 134, 135, 137, 138 and 139 confer different jurisdictions on the Supreme Court while Articles 225, 226, 227, 228 and 230 deal with conferment of jurisdiction on the High Courts. Instances of conferment of jurisdiction by specific law are very common. Articles 131, 132, 133, 134, 135, 137, 138 and 139 confer different jurisdictions on the Supreme Court while Articles 225, 226, 227, 228 and 230 deal with conferment of jurisdiction on the High Courts. Instances of conferment of jurisdiction by specific law are very common. The laws of procedure both criminal and civil confer jurisdiction on different courts. Special jurisdiction is conferred by special statute. It is thus clear that jurisdiction can be exercised only when provided for either in the Constitution or in the laws made by the Legislature. Jurisdiction is thus the authority or power of the court to deal with a matter and make an order carrying binding force in the facts. In support of judicial opinion for this view reference may be made to the permanent edition of ‘Words and Phrases Vol. 23-A’ at page 164. It would be appropriate to refer to two small passages occurring at pages 174 and 175 of the Volume. At page 174, referring to the decision in Carlile vs. National Oil and Development Co. it has been stated: “Jurisdiction is the authority to hear and determine, and in order that it may exist the following are essential: (1) A court created by law, organized and sitting; (2) authority given to it by law to hear and determine causes of the kind in question; (3) power given to it by law to render a judgment such as it assumes to render; (4) authority over the parties to the case if the judgment is to bind them personally as a judgment in personam, which is acquired over the plaintiff by his appearance and submission of the matter to the court, and is acquired over the defendant by his voluntary appearance, or by service of process on him; (5) authority over the thing adjudicated upon its being located within the courts territory, and by actually seizing it if liable to be carried away; (6) authority to decide the question involved, which is acquired by the question being submitted to it by the parties for decision.” 110. It is clear from the opinions of learned brothers Justice Mukharji and Justice Misra that the jurisdiction to try a case could only be conferred by law enacted by the legislature and this Court could not confer jurisdiction if it does not exist in law and it is this error which is sought to be corrected. It is clear from the opinions of learned brothers Justice Mukharji and Justice Misra that the jurisdiction to try a case could only be conferred by law enacted by the legislature and this Court could not confer jurisdiction if it does not exist in law and it is this error which is sought to be corrected. Although it is unfortunate that it is being corrected after long lapse of time. I agree with the opinion prepared by Justice Mukharji and also the additional opinion prepared by Justice Misra. 112. In both the judgments it has been clearly observed that judicial order of this court is not amenable to a writ of certiorari for correcting any error in the judgment. It has also been observed that the jurisdiction or power to try and decide a cause is conferred on the courts by the Law of the Lands enacted by the Legislature or by the provisions of the Constitution. It has also been highlighted that the court cannot confer a jurisdiction on itself which is not provided in the law. It has also been observed that the act of the court does not injure any of the suitors. It is for this reason that the error in question is sought to be corrected after a lapse of more than three years. I agree with the opinion expressed by Justice Mukharji in the judgment as well as the additional opinion given by Justice Misra in his separate judgment. 141. In the course of arguments we were treated to a wide ranging, and no less interesting, submissions on the concept of “jurisdiction” and “nullity” in relation to judicial orders. Appellant contends that the earlier bench had no jurisdiction to issue the impugned directions which were without any visible legal support, that they are “void” as violative of the constitutional-rights of the appellant, and, also as violating the Rules of natural justice. Notwithstanding these appeal to high-sounding and emotive appellations; I have serious reservations about both the permissibility-in these proceedings-of an examination of the merits of these challenges. Shri Rao's appeal to the principle of “nullity” and reliance on a collateral challenge in aid thereof suffers from a basic fallacy as to the very concept of the jurisdiction of superior courts. In relation to the powers of superior courts, the familiar distinction between jurisdictional issues and adjudicatory issues-appropriate to Tribunals of limited jurisdiction,-has no place. Shri Rao's appeal to the principle of “nullity” and reliance on a collateral challenge in aid thereof suffers from a basic fallacy as to the very concept of the jurisdiction of superior courts. In relation to the powers of superior courts, the familiar distinction between jurisdictional issues and adjudicatory issues-appropriate to Tribunals of limited jurisdiction,-has no place. Before a superior court there is no distinction in the quality of the decision-making-process respecting jurisdictional questions on the one hand and adjudicatory issues or issues pertaining to the merits, on the other.” 22. Applying the aforesaid analogy in the instant case, it would show that the Revenue Board though exercised the jurisdiction of review but provisions of section 51 and 53 of the Land Revenue Code, 1959 were shelved and given a go bye. The jurisdiction cannot be conferred by the court dehors the statute. The Division Bench of the court in conformity to such law had directed the Revenue Board to decide the case in accordance with law. However the Revenue Board without proper interpretation of law tried to usurp it's jurisdiction on the basis of order of court, which was faulty. The Revenue Board should have addressed issue on section 51 and 53 of the Land Revenue Code. Therefore applying the aforesaid analogy the order dated 13.11.2020 (Annexure P-13) of the Revenue Board cannot be sustained and accordingly it is set aside. 23. Consequently, the petition stands allowed. It is observed that State would be at liberty to follow the procedure and the legislative mandate contained in the Land Revenue Code to hear the case in accordance with the provision of the Land Revenue Code, if so advised.