ORDER : Sanjay Dwivedi, J. 1. Since learned counsel for the parties are ready to argue the matter finally in physical hearing, therefore, it is heard finally. 2. By the instant petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner is challenging the legality, validity and propriety of the orders dated 20.04.2015 (Annexure-P/1) passed by respondent No. 3/Sub Divisional Officer, Harda being a Disciplinary Authority, whereby a penalty of dismissal from service upon the petitioner has been inflicted; the order dated 28.09.2016 (Annexure-P/2) passed by respondent No. 2/Collector, District Harda, whereby an appeal preferred by the petitioner against her order of dismissal, has been rejected by the Appellate Authority by affirming the order passed by respondent No. 3/Sub Divisional Officer, Harda and further the order dated 11.09.2017 (Annexure-P/3) passed by the Commissioner, Narmadapuram Division, Hoshangabad, whereby an appeal preferred by the petitioner invoking Rule 29 of the Madhya Pradesh (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1966 (in short the 'Rules, 1966') against the order of respondent No. 2/Collector, District Harda has also been rejected. 3. The relevant facts briefly stated to appreciate the rival legal contentions on behalf of the parties are that while serving as a Patwari in District Harda, the petitioner was served with a show-cause notice dated 20.05.2014 (Annexure-P/4) asking her for an explanation regarding the charges of misconduct and irregularities alleged to have been committed by her. The petitioner was also placed under suspension vide order dated 09.06.2014 (Annexure-P/5). Thereafter, a detailed reply was submitted by the petitioner on 23.05.2014 (Annexure-P/6), despite that the respondents/Authorities served the petitioner with a charge-sheet dated 22.07.2014 (Annexure-P/7) levelling as many as eight charges against her. However, a reply to the charge-sheet was also filed by the petitioner, but being dissatisfied with the same, the Disciplinary Authority appointed an Enquiry Officer. Thereafter, a regular departmental enquiry was conducted against the petitioner and the Enquiry Officer on 16.03.2015 (Annexure-P/9) submitted its report holding the petitioner guilty of misconduct as all the charges levelled against her were found proved. The Disciplinary Authority, in turn, passed an order on 20.04.2015 (Annexure-P/1), whereby the punishment of removal from service had been inflicted upon the petitioner. Thereafter, a regular departmental enquiry was conducted against the petitioner and the Enquiry Officer on 16.03.2015 (Annexure-P/9) submitted its report holding the petitioner guilty of misconduct as all the charges levelled against her were found proved. The Disciplinary Authority, in turn, passed an order on 20.04.2015 (Annexure-P/1), whereby the punishment of removal from service had been inflicted upon the petitioner. Thereafter, an appeal under Rule 27 of the Rules, 1966 was preferred by the petitioner before the Collector, District Harda and the Appellate Authority vide its order dated 28.09.2016 (Annexure-P/2) rejected the same and thereafter, a review application had also been preferred against the order of the Collector, District Harda which was also dismissed by the Commissioner, Narmadapuram Division, Hoshangabad on 11.09.2017 (Annexure-P/3). Hence, this petition. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the impugned orders have been assailed by the petitioner mainly on the ground that despite denying the charges in toto, the Enquiry Officer has erroneously held that the charges levelled against the petitioner have been found proved. He submits that the observation made by the Enquiry Officer was not based upon the evidence produced by the prosecution, on the contrary, the same was based upon the whims and fancies. He submits that the Enquiry Officer has observed that the charges levelled against the petitioner were found proved on the basis of conjectures and surmises which according to him is not permissible in the eyes of law taking the view of the decision of the Supreme Court reported in AIR SC 1964 364 [Union of India Vs. H.C. Goel]. It is also contended by learned counsel for the petitioner that from perusal of the enquiry report, it can easily be gathered that the said report cannot be considered to be an enquiry report in the eyes of law for the reason that the finding given therein by the Enquiry Officer was not in consonance with the evidence adduced and further no reason was assigned by the said Authority as to why the evidence put-forth by the petitioner was not acceptable. He submits that the enquiry report was contrary to the provision of sub rule (23)(i) of Rule 14 of the Rules, 1966. He submits that the enquiry report was contrary to the provision of sub rule (23)(i) of Rule 14 of the Rules, 1966. He also submits that the basic charge levelled against the petitioner was based upon a document i.e. B-1 Register which is alleged to have been manipulated by the petitioner by making entries therein, has not been produced by the prosecution and despite there being a specific demand, the same was not supplied to the petitioner. It is also submitted by learned counsel for the petitioner that in absence of the material and basic evidence, the charge of financial irregularity and manipulation in the Government record cannot be proved. Therefore, he submits that the finding given by the Enquiry Officer is said to have been faulty as the report is contrary to the provision of sub rule (23)(i) of Rule 14 of the Rules, 1966. It is further submitted by learned counsel for the petitioner that it is a case of no evidence and also a case in which the cogent evidence was not produced during the course of enquiry, therefore, the finding based upon the allegation relating to the said document, cannot be approved and in fact not sustainable in the eyes of law. He submits that the respondents/Authorities went wrong in presuming and holding the petitioner guilty on the ground that the amount alleged to have been misappropriated, got deposited by the petitioner in the Government account and that conduct of the petitioner was deemed to be her admission and basically on the said admission, the petitioner has been held guilty and punished with the maximum punishment available to a Government employee i.e. dismissal from service. As per learned counsel for the petitioner, the enquiry conducted by the Enquiry Officer was not in accordance with the requirement of law and as such, the report of the Enquiry Officer was faulty and furthermore the subsequent proceedings based upon the said finding are also illegal and not sustainable in the eyes of law. He submits that the enquiry suffers from violation of principle of natural justice. He submits that the enquiry suffers from violation of principle of natural justice. According to him, not supplying the material document i.e. B-1 Register to the petitioner nor producing the same by the prosecution during trial and in absence of the same holding the petitioner guilty, is nothing but a clear sign of arbitrariness on the part of the Authorities and as such, not only the enquiry but the subsequent proceeding i.e. the order passed by the Authorities can be said to be in violation of principle of natural justice. Therefore, the enquiry report and the punishment order passed by the Disciplinary Authority which has been affirmed by other Authorities should be declared void and illegal. 5. Per contra, learned Panel Lawyer relies upon their reply and submits that the scope of interference in the matter of disciplinary proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is very limited. He submits that the Court cannot act as an Appellate Authority to re-appreciate the evidence. It is also contended by him that the provision of sub rule (23)(i) of Rule 14 of the Rules, 1966 is a directive and not mandatory and if any irregularity has been committed by the Enquiry Officer, the same does not vitiate the enquiry report. He submits that the petitioner after coming to know about the charges levelled against her, deposited the amount alleged to have been misappropriated by her in the Government account which itself indicates that she has accepted her guilt, therefore, the finding given by the Disciplinary Authority which was further approved the Appellate Authority holding that it is an admission on the part of the petitioner, cannot be said to be perverse. Therefore, the petitioner has rightly been dismissed from service. In support of his contention, learned Panel Lawyer has placed reliance upon various judgments reported in (1995) 6 SCC 749 [B.C. Chaturvedi Vs. Union of India and others]; (2008) 5 SCC 569 [Chairman & Managing Director, V.S.P. and others Vs. Goparaju Sri Prabhakar Hari Babu]; (2009) 15 SCC 620 [Chairman-Cum-Managing Director, Coal India Limited and another Vs. Mukul Kumar Choudhari and others] and (2010) 11 SCC 233 [General Manager (P), Punjab & Sindh Bank and others Vs. Daya Singh]. Union of India and others]; (2008) 5 SCC 569 [Chairman & Managing Director, V.S.P. and others Vs. Goparaju Sri Prabhakar Hari Babu]; (2009) 15 SCC 620 [Chairman-Cum-Managing Director, Coal India Limited and another Vs. Mukul Kumar Choudhari and others] and (2010) 11 SCC 233 [General Manager (P), Punjab & Sindh Bank and others Vs. Daya Singh]. He submits that there was no illegality committed by the Enquiry Officer during the course of enquiry as the same was conducted after following the principle of natural justice as the petitioner was afforded ample opportunity of hearing to defend herself at every level, therefore, interference in such a situation is not permissible unless any procedural flaw is found. 6. I have heard the arguments advanced by learned counsel for the parties and perused the record meticulously. 7. As per the stand taken by the respondents and as argued by learned Panel Lawyer that interference in the matter of disciplinary proceeding by the High Court exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is warranted only when there is violation of principle of natural justice or of statutory rules or the decision of the Authorities is so arbitrary or capricious that no reasonable person would have arrived at such a conclusion. As per the stand of the respondents, the interference with the finding is permissible only when it is shown to be perverse or based on no evidence. As per the respondents, it is not open to the High Court to examine the finding recorded by the Enquiry Officer as a Court of appeal and reach its conclusion in this regard. 8. Accordingly, this Court has to examine whether the submission made by learned counsel for the petitioner that the enquiry has not been conducted strictly in accordance with the requirement of sub rule (23)(i) of Rule 14 of the Rules, 1966 so also there is violation of principle of natural justice. Therefore, it is to be seen whether the case in hand is a case of no evidence and further what would be the impact of not producing the material document i.e. B-1 Register as all the charges are based upon the said document. Therefore, it is to be seen whether the case in hand is a case of no evidence and further what would be the impact of not producing the material document i.e. B-1 Register as all the charges are based upon the said document. It is further to be seen whether the admission made by the petitioner for not supplying the material document and despite that neither the same was supplied nor produced during the course of enquiry and under such a situation, what prejudice would it cause to the petitioner and also whether such a situation is enough for holding the enquiry report faulty and in furtherance to the same, the subsequent proceeding based upon the said enquiry report would fall or stand? 9. The show-case notice dated 20.05.2014 (Annexure-P/4) was issued to the petitioner levelling charges therein asking her explanation, which was replied by her vide Annexure-P/6 denying the charges levelled especially the charge regarding pasting of note in the B-1 Register enhancing area of compensation in lieu of damage caused to the crops. It was also replied by the petitioner that the area of land of her family members had been enhanced and pursuant thereto, the amount of compensation got deposited in the account of her family members and also given explanation therein that the land was being cultivated by her family members by taking the land from the original owners on 'adhiya' and with the consent of original owners, the compensation got deposited in the account of her family members. It was also explained in the reply that as to why, the amount alleged to have been misappropriated, was deposited by the petitioner in the Government account. From perusal of the reply, it can be seen that the petitioner by giving explanation has taken a defence and denied the charges levelled. It is apposite to mention here that the basic charge of financial irregularity levelled against the petitioner was charge No. 1, which is as under:- ^^vkjksi i= Øekad 1%& ;g gS fd vkids }kjk /kuxkao] ,sMkcsMk] uhexkao] fetkZiqj] uhyx So far as charge Nos. It is apposite to mention here that the basic charge of financial irregularity levelled against the petitioner was charge No. 1, which is as under:- ^^vkjksi i= Øekad 1%& ;g gS fd vkids }kjk /kuxkao] ,sMkcsMk] uhexkao] fetkZiqj] uhyx So far as charge Nos. 2 to 5 are concerned they co-relate with charge No. 1 and based upon the manipulation alleged to have been done by the petitioner in B-1 Register and charge No. 6 relates to depositing the amount alleged to have been misappropriated by the petitioner in the Government account and as such, the same was treated to be an admission on the part of the petitioner for proving her guilt. For ready reference charge No. 6 is reproduced hereinbelow:- ^^vkjksi i= Øekad 6%& ;g gS fd rglhynkj gafM;k }kjk vkids }kjk dh xÃ vkfFkZd vfu;ferrk dh tkap dh tk jgh gS dh tkudkjh izkIr gksus ij vkius pkyku ls #i;s 14]82]000@& ¼pksng yk[k cS;klh gtkj #i;s½ dh jkf'k tek djkÃ tkdj pkyku dh izfr rglhynkj gafM;k dks izLrqr dh gSA ftlls vki ij vf/kjksfir vkjksi Øa- 1 ls 5 dh iqf"V gksrh gSA** Further, the enquiry report dated 16.03.2015 (Annexure-P/9) nowhere deals with the defence taken by the petitioner. The material document i.e. B-1 Register was not produced before the Enquiry Officer and further the charge of enhancing the area of land where crop got damaged and compensation paid for the enhanced area, was specifically denied by the petitioner in her reply submitted to the show-cause notice as also to the charge-sheet, but no documentary evidence was produced by the prosecution to prove the said aspect. Neither the Enquiry Officer nor the Disciplinary Authority has taken note of this aspect that when the material document was not available then as to on what basis, it was determined that the petitioner has committed such an irregularity. However, if the observation made by the Enquiry Officer is seen, then it can be easily presumed that even in absence of any evidence, the petitioner was found guilty as she has deposited the amount alleged to have been misappropriated by her. However, if the observation made by the Enquiry Officer is seen, then it can be easily presumed that even in absence of any evidence, the petitioner was found guilty as she has deposited the amount alleged to have been misappropriated by her. For the purpose of convenience, the final observation made by the Enquiry Officer is reproduced hereinunder:- ^^ijh{k.k mijkUr ;g ik;k tkrk gS fd vipkjh deZpkjh Jhefr T;ksfr nqcs iVokjh ij vkjksfir vkjksi Øekad 01 ls 08 iw.kZ #i ls fl} gksdj izekf.kr ik;s tkrs gSA muds vfHkys[k esa gsjkQsjh] vkfFkZd lgk;rk izdj.kksa esa jdck c dj dwVjfpr d`R; djrs gq, Lo;a ds vkfFkZd ykHk ds fy;s fHkUu O;fDr;ksa ds [kkrs esa jdck c<+k dj eqvkotk jkf'k tek djkÃ xÃ tks foRrh; vfu;ferrk dh Js.kh esa vkrk gS tks xcu ,oa xaHkhj dnkpkj gSA** As such, the Disciplinary Authority has also gone with the same manner and held the petitioner guilty as she had deposited the amount alleged to have been misappropriated. Further, the observation made by the Disciplinary Authority is being reproduced hereinbelow:- ^^e-iz- 'kklu }kjk e-iz- jktLo iqLrd ifji= 6¼4½ ds izko/kkuksa ds vuq#i vfro`f"V] vfro"kkZ ,oa vU; izdkj dh izkd`frd vkink ls vkgr d`"kd] xzkeh.k vketu dks Rofjr vkfFkZd lgk;rk iznku djus laca/kh tufgr ds dk;Z esa gsjkQsjh dj xcu dj jkf'k #i;s 2304028&00 ¼#i;s rsbl yk[k pkj gtkj vBkÃl ek=½ dks vius ,oa vius ifjokj ;k fudVorhZ ds cSad [kkrksa esa tek djkuk rFkk iz'kklu ds laKku esa vkus ij foHkkxh; ,oa vkijkf/kd dk;Zokgh lqfuf'pr djus ds fu.kZ; dh tkudkjh feyus ij lh/ks vius Lrj ij pkyku }kjk 'kklu ds [kkrs es tek djkÃ tkus ls mu ij vkjksfir vkjksi fl} ik;s tkrs gS] bl izdkj ds d`R; ls 'kklu dks vkfFkZd uqdlku gqvkA** The Collector, District Harda/Appellate Authority in its order has observed as under:- ^^vihykFkhZ }kjk fnukad 11-11-2014 dks vius }kjk mijksDr izLrqr tokc larks'ktud ugha ik;s tkus ds dkj.k foHkkx }kjk vuq'kklukRed dk;Zokgh dh xÃ gSA fu;qfDrdrkZ vf/kdkjh }kjk vuq'kklukRed dk;Zokgh ds ifjis{; esa vkns'k fnukad 20-06-14 }kjk vihykFkhZ ds fo#} lafLFkr dh xÃ gSA bl dM+h esa ;g crkuk vko';d gS fd lEiw.kZ tkap ds nkSjku tks nLrkost ftlds vk/kkj ij vuq'kklukRed dk;Zokgh dh xÃ gS] ftlds vk/kkj ij vkjksi i= r; fd;k x;k gS] dh izfr;ka miyC/k ugha djkÃ xÃ gS dÃ fuosnu ,oa le{k esa ekax djus ds mijkUr Hkh mDr nLrkost miyC/k ugha djk;k x;k gSA vihykFkhZ dks ekSf[kd #i ls voxr djk;k gS fd nLrkost iqfyl vf/kdkfj;ksa }kjk tIr fd;s x;s gS ftlls nLrkost miyC/k ugha djk;s tk ldrsA ewy nLrkost ch&1 jftLVj ek= gh okLrfod #i fookfnr gsjkQsjh dh fLFkfr dks lkeus yk;k tk ldrk gSA tkapdrkZ vf/kdkjh ds }kjk Hkh mDr ewy ch&1 dks tkap esa ugha fy;k x;k gSA tks tkap esa 'kkfey fd;k tkuk vko';d FkkA** x x x 3& ;gka ij fo'ks"k #i ls ;g lgh gS fd tkapdrkZ vf/kdkjh us ;g ugha ns[kk fd vkosnd }kjk fuf'pr gh viuh xyrh nqHkkZouko'k ugha gqÃ gS blfy;s tkapdrkZ vf/kdkjh us crk;k fd ;g xyrh vfu;ferrk dh Js.kh esa gS] ijUrq fu;e fo#} ugha gSA vkpkj lafgrk esa vkpj.k fu;e dks bl izdkj 'kkldh; deZpkjh ds vkpj.k ds laca/k esa ifjHkkf"kr fd;k x;k gS fd vkpj.k ,d 'kkldh; lsod lnL; ds fy;s ykxw gSA 'kkldh; lsod }kjk vius vkpj.k ls fdlh xyr dk;Z djrk gS tks dnkpj.k dh Js.kh esa ekuk x;k gSA ;fn fdlh lsod }kjk vius dk;Zdky esa Ãekunkjh ls dk;Z djrs gq, dksÃ =qfV gks tkrh gS rks mls dnkpj.k dh Js.kh esa ugha ekuk tk ldrkA fdlh vfuok;Z ifjfLFkfr;ksa esa fdlh ckr dks ugha ekuuk Hkh dnkpj.k dh Js.kh esa ekuk x;k gSA eku- mPp U;k;ky; }kjk crk;k x;k gS fd dnkpj.k mnklhurk] ykijokgh] =qfViw.kZ fu.kZ; ls gqÃ xyrh] vFkok fcuk tkucw>dj gqÃ =qfV dks nqO;Zgkj ugha ekuk tk ldrk gSA x x x ----------- ;gka ;g fo'ks"k #i ls mYys[kuh; gS fd lacaf/kr c[kkZLr iVokjh Jhefr nqcs }kjk ;fn fjdkMZ esa dksÃ gsjkQsjh ;k tkylkth foRrh; vfu;ferrk xcu ,oa xaHkhj dnkpkj dj rsÃl yk[k pkj gtkj vV~BkÃl #i;s xyr rjhds ls Lohd`r djkdj /kks[kk/kM+h dj 'kklu dks vkfFkZd gkfu ugha igqapkÃ xÃ Fkh rks mls bl vkjksi dk MVdj eqdkcyk djuk pkfg;s Fkk mlds laKku esa ;fn ;g rF; vk x;s Fks fd mDr vijk/k mlds }kjk ugha fd;k x;k gS rks blesa tks Hkh nks"kh Fkk ;k fjdkWMZ esa dksÃ tkylkth dh xÃ Fkh rks ml laca/k lacaf/kr ds fo#} oLrqfLFkfr ls lacaf/kr vf/kdkjh dks rRdky voxr djkuk pkfg;s Fkk ,slk u dj Jhefr nqcs }kjk vius Lofoosd ls cxSj vius vf/kdkfj;ksa ds laKku esa yk;s xcu gh xÃ jkf'k dks cSad esa tek djkuk Loeso fl} gks tkrk gSA vr% gsjkQsjh dj xcu dj jkf'k #i;s 2304028&00 ¼#i;s rsbl yk[k pkj gtkj vBkÃl ek=½ dks vius ,oa vius ifjokj ;k fudVorhZ ds cSad [kkrksa esa tek djkuk rFkk iz'kklu ds laKku esa vkus ij foHkkxh; ,oa vkijkf/kd dk;Zokgh lqfuf'pr djus ds fu.kZ; dh tkudkjh feyus ij lh/ks vius Lrj ij pkyku }kjk 'kklu ds [kkrs esa tek djkuk blls ;g fl} gqvk fd mDr d`R; Jhefr nqcs }kjk tkucw>j fd;k gS vkSj blds fy;s og iw.kZ#is.k nks"kh gSA** As per the petitioner, the Appellate Authority had not discharged its obligation as he has been obliged under Rule 27 of the Rules, 1966. In the appeal i.e. Annexure-P/10, the petitioner had taken a specific ground that the pivotal document i.e. B-1 Register could bring the clear picture regarding alleged manipulation committed by the petitioner but the same was neither brought on record nor at the floor of disciplinary proceeding, on the contrary, the same was required to be called for to draw a clear image, despite that the Appellate Authority had not discussed the said aspect and not answered that non production of the pivotal document would not cause any prejudice to the petitioner. The Appellate Authority reiterated the whole story, the report of Enquiry Officer, the order of the Disciplinary Authority but not given his own finding to meet out the grounds raised by the petitioner in her appeal. 10. The Supreme Court in a case reported in (1999) 8 SCC 582 [Hardwari Lal Vs. State of U.P. and others] has observed the impact of non production of material evidence and also observed that if the same caused prejudice to the delinquent, then it would be treated to be the violation of principle of natural justice. Further, in a case reported in reported in (2002) 7 SCC 142 [Sher Bahadur Vs. Union of India and others] the Supreme Court has dealt with the expression 'Sufficiency of evidence' and observed that 'Evidence which is neither relevant in a broad sense nor establishes any nexus between the alleged misconduct with the delinquent, is no evidence in law'. The Supreme Court has further observed that a case of finding the delinquent guilty of the charge without having any evidence to link him with the alleged misconduct, the order of the Disciplinary Authority cannot be sustained. Here, in this case, the material evidence i.e. B-1 Register which is the foundation of alleged misconduct, neither produced during the course of enquiry nor shown to the delinquent, but as has been discussed hereinabove, the punishment is mainly based upon drawing the inference that depositing the amount by the delinquent alleged to have been misappropriated, amounts to her admission. In view of the decision of the Karnataka High Court in Writ Petition No.788/2018 [Vice President & Secretary, Hitachi Koki India Ltd. Vs. Sri K.M. Devaiah], observing as under: "14. In view of the decision of the Karnataka High Court in Writ Petition No.788/2018 [Vice President & Secretary, Hitachi Koki India Ltd. Vs. Sri K.M. Devaiah], observing as under: "14. Since the petitioner has not examined the star witnesses, since the petitioner has failed to establish the fact that the alleged incident had actually taken place, the learned Labour Court was also justified in drawing an adverse inference, as material witnesses had been withheld. Therefore, the learned Labour Court was justified in setting aside the dismissal order." it indicates that the respondents/Authorities proceeded on presumption that depositing the amount is sufficient proof to infer the admission of guilt, but in my opinion, the same is not the sufficient evidence to proof the charge of misconduct against the delinquent. 11. Rule 27 of the Rules, 1966 casts an obligation upon the Appellate Authority and contemplates as to in what manner, the appeal has to be decided. For the purpose of convenience, Rule 27 of the Rules, 1966 is reproduced hereinbelow:- "27. 11. Rule 27 of the Rules, 1966 casts an obligation upon the Appellate Authority and contemplates as to in what manner, the appeal has to be decided. For the purpose of convenience, Rule 27 of the Rules, 1966 is reproduced hereinbelow:- "27. Consideration of appeal.-[(1) In the case of an appeal against an order of suspension, the appellate authority shall consider whether in the light of the provisions of Rule 9 and having regard to the circumstances of the case, the order of suspension is justified or not and confirm or revoke the order accordingly.] [(2)] In the case of an appeal against an order imposing any of the penalties specified in Rule 10 or enhancing any penalty imposed under the said rule, the appellate authority shall consider:- (a) whether the procedure laid down in these rules has been complied with and if not, whether such non-compliance has resulted in the violation of any provisions of the Constitution of India or in the failure of justice; (b) whether the findings of the disciplinary authority are warranted by the evidence on the records; and (c) whether the penalty or the enhanced penalty imposed is adequate, inadequate or severe, and pass orders- (i) confirming, enhancing, reducing or setting aside the penalty; or (ii) remitting the case to the authority which imposed or enhanced the penalty or to any other authority with such direction as it may deem fit in the circumstances of the case: Provided that- (i) the Commission shall be consulted in all cases where such consultation is necessary; [(ii) if the enhanced penalty which the appellate authority proposes to impose is one of the penalties specified in clauses (v) to (ix) of Rule 10 and an inquiry under Rule 14 has not already been held in the case, the appellate authority shall, subject to the provisions of Rule 19, itself hold such inquiry or direct that such inquiry be held in accordance with the provisions of Rule 14 and thereafter on consideration of the proceedings of such inquiry, make such orders as it may deem fit. (iii) if the enhanced penalty which the appellate authority proposes to impose is one of the penalties specified in clauses (v) to (ix) of Rule 10 and an inquiry under Rule 14 has already been held in the case the appellate authority shall, after giving the appellant a reasonable opportunity of making representation against the penalty proposed, make such order as it may deem fit]. (iv) no order imposing an enhanced penalty shall be made in any other case unless the appellant has been given a reasonable opportunity, as far as may be, in accordance with the provisions of Rule 16, of making a representation against such enhanced penalty." The Supreme Court in the case reported in (1985) 3 SCC 378 [Anil Kumar Vs. Presiding Officer and others] has observed as under:- "5. We have extracted the charges framed against the appellant. We have also pointed out in clear terms the report of the enquiry officer. It is well-settled that a disciplinary enquiry has to be a quasi-judicial enquiry held according to the principles of natural justice and the enquiry officer has a duty to act judicially. The enquiry officer did not apply his mind to the evidence. Save setting out the names of the witnesses, he did not discuss the evidence. He merely recorded his ipse dixit that the charges are proved. He did not assign a single reason why the evidence produced by the appellant did not appeal to him or was considered not creditworthy. He did not permit a peep into his mind as to why the evidence produced by the management appealed to him in preference to the evidence produced by the appellant. An enquiry report in a quasi-judicial enquiry must show the reasons for the conclusion. It cannot be an ipse dixit of the enquiry officer. It has to be a speaking order in the sense that the conclusion is supported by reasons. This is too well settled to be supported by a precedent. In Madhya Pradesh Industries Ltd. v. Union of India [ AIR 1966 SC 671 : (1966) 1 SCR 466 : (1966) 1 SCJ 204 ] this Court observed that a speaking order will at best be a reasonable and at its worst be at least a plausible one. The public should not be deprived of this only safeguard. In Madhya Pradesh Industries Ltd. v. Union of India [ AIR 1966 SC 671 : (1966) 1 SCR 466 : (1966) 1 SCJ 204 ] this Court observed that a speaking order will at best be a reasonable and at its worst be at least a plausible one. The public should not be deprived of this only safeguard. Similarly in Mahabir Prasad Santosh Kumar v. State of U.P. [ AIR 1966 SC 671 : (1971) 1 SCR 201 ] this Court reiterated that satisfactory decision of a disputed claim may be reached only if it be supported by the most cogent reasons that appealed to the authority. It should all the more be so where the quasi-judicial enquiry may result in deprivation of livelihood or attach a stigma to the character. In this case the enquiry report is an order sheet which merely produces the stage through which the enquiry passed. It clearly disclosed a total non-application of mind and it is this report on which the General Manager acted in terminating the service of the appellant. There could not have been a more gross case of non-application of mind and it is such an enquiry which has found favour with the Labour Court and the High Court. 6. Where a disciplinary enquiry affects the livelihood and is likely to cast a stigma and it has to be held in accordance with the principles of natural justice, the minimum expectation is that the report must be a reasoned one. The Court then may not enter into the adequacy or sufficiency of evidence. But where the evidence is annexed to an order sheet and no correlation is established between the two showing application of mind, we are constrained to observe that it is not an enquiry report at all. Therefore, there was no enquiry in this case worth the name and the order of termination based on such proceeding disclosing non-application of mind would be unsustainable. x x x 8. Accordingly, this appeal is allowed and the order terminating the service of the appellant is quashed and set aside and it is hereby declared that the appellant continues to be in service and shall be reinducted in the post where he was working and from where he was removed. He must be paid Rs. 15,000 as and by way of back wages. He must be paid Rs. 15,000 as and by way of back wages. The appeal is allowed to that extent with no order as to costs." Further, in the case of reported in (2009) 2 SCC 570 [Roop Singh Negi Vs. Punjab National Bank and others], the Supreme Court has observed as under:- "23. Furthermore, the order of the disciplinary authority as also the appellate authority are not supported by any reason. As the orders passed by them have severe civil consequences, appropriate reasons should have been assigned. If the enquiry officer had relied upon the confession made by the appellant, there was no reason as to why the order of discharge passed by the criminal court on the basis of selfsame evidence should not have been taken into consideration. The materials brought on record pointing out the guilt are required to be proved. A decision must be arrived at on some evidence, which is legally admissible. The provisions of the Evidence Act may not be applicable in a departmental proceeding but the principles of natural justice are. As the report of the enquiry officer was based on merely ipse dixit as also surmises and conjectures, the same could not have been sustained. The inferences drawn by the enquiry officer apparently were not supported by any evidence. Suspicion, as is well known, however high may be, can under no circumstances be held to be a substitute for legal proof." In the case [Swami Prasad Yadav Vs. State of M.P. and others], the Supreme Court has observed as under:- "13. If the report of the Enquiry Officer-in the present case is analyzed in the backdrop of aforesaid principle laid-down by the Supreme Court, it would be clear that the Enquiry Officer has not given any reason either for accepting the evidence of the prosecution or for rejection or discarding the defense of the petitioner. The Enquiry Officer while conducting an enquiry and recording a finding with regard to charges is under statute duty bound to record reason for his finding. The reason has to be supported by material that has come in the enquiry and enquiry report should show application of mind, assessment of evidence and reasons for either accepting or rejecting the particular piece of evidence. The reason has to be supported by material that has come in the enquiry and enquiry report should show application of mind, assessment of evidence and reasons for either accepting or rejecting the particular piece of evidence. In the absence of aforesaid formalities being complied with the report of the enquiry officer is nothing but a "perverse report showing non-application of mind and based on the ipse dixit of an enquiry officer and on the basis of such enquiry report, no action can be taken against the delinquent employee, which does not show application of mind or analyze of evidence and record of evidence for holding the charges to be proved is perverse and any action taken on the basis of perverse report is unsustainable. That being so, I find much force in the third ground urged by Shri K.C. Ghildyal to the effect that report of the Enquiry Officer is perverse, is not a reasoned report and therefore, entire action on the basis of such a report is perverse. That apart, even if the Enquiry Report was perverse as indicated hereinabove, atleast the disciplinary authority and the Appellate Authority could have rectify the mistake by analyzing the prosecution case, the defense of the petitioner and thereafter recording the finding with regard to charges levelled against him. The Disciplinary Authority and the Appellate Authority have followed suit and have simply accepted the report of the enquiry officer without analyzing the evidence and material that came on record and without recording any finding as to how and on what basis the allegation are said to be proved....." Similarly, in the case reported in (2011) 5 SCC 142 [Chairman-cum-Managing Director, Coal India Limited and others Vs. Ananta Saha and others], the Supreme Court has observed as under:- "31. This Court has repeatedly held that an order of dismissal from service passed against a delinquent employee after holding him guilty of misconduct may be an administrative order, nevertheless proceedings held against such a public servant under the statutory rules to determine whether he is guilty of the charges framed against him are in the nature of quasi-judicial proceedings. The authority has to give some reason, which may be very brief, for initiation of the enquiry and conclusion thereof. It has to pass a speaking order and cannot be an ipse dixit either of the enquiry officer or the authority. The authority has to give some reason, which may be very brief, for initiation of the enquiry and conclusion thereof. It has to pass a speaking order and cannot be an ipse dixit either of the enquiry officer or the authority. (Vide Bachhittar Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1963 SC 395 , Union of India v. H.C. Goel, AIR 1964 SC 364 , Anil Kumar v. Presiding Officer, (1985) 3 SCC 378 : 1985 SCC (L&S) 815 : AIR 1985 SC 1121 and Union of India v. Prakash Kumar Tandon, (2009) 2 SCC 541 : (2009) 1 SCC (L&S) 394.) Thus, the abovereferred order could not be sufficient to initiate any disciplinary proceedings. 32. It is a settled legal proposition that if initial action is not in consonance with law, subsequent proceedings would not sanctify the same. In such a fact situation, the legal maxim sublato fundamento cadit opus is applicable, meaning thereby, in case a foundation is removed, the superstructure falls. 33. In Badrinath v. Govt. of T.N. [ (2000) 8 SCC 395 : 2001 SCC (L&S) 13 : AIR 2000 SC 3243 ] this Court observed that once the basis of a proceeding is gone, all consequential acts, actions, orders would fall to the ground automatically and this principle of consequential order which is applicable to judicial and quasi-judicial proceedings is equally applicable to administrative orders. (See also State of Kerala v. Puthenkavu N.S.S. Karayogam [ (2001) 10 SCC 191 ] and Kalabharati Advertising v. Hemant Vimalnath Narichania [ (2010) 9 SCC 437 : (2010) 3 SCC (Civ) 808 : AIR 2010 SC 3745 ].) 34. As in the instant case, there had been no proper initiation of disciplinary proceedings after the first round of litigation, all other consequential proceedings stood vitiated and on that count no fault can be found with the impugned judgment and order of the High Court." The Supreme Court in the case reported in (2006) 4 SCC 713 [Narinder Mohan Arya Vs. United India Insurance Co. Ltd. and others] while dealing with the duty of the Appellate Authority and the manner in which the appeal has to be decided by the said Authority, has observed as under:- "33. United India Insurance Co. Ltd. and others] while dealing with the duty of the Appellate Authority and the manner in which the appeal has to be decided by the said Authority, has observed as under:- "33. An appellate order if it is in agreement with that of the disciplinary authority may not be a speaking order but the authority passing the same must show that there had been proper application of mind on his part as regards the compliance with the requirements of law while exercising his jurisdiction under Rule 37 of the Rules. 34. In Apparel Export Promotion Council v. A.K. Chopra [ (1999) 1 SCC 759 : 1999 SCC (L&S) 405] which has heavily been relied upon by Mr. Gupta, this Court stated: (SCC p. 770, para 16) "16. The High Court appears to have overlooked the settled position that in departmental proceedings, the disciplinary authority is the sole judge of facts and in case an appeal is presented to the Appellate Authority, the Appellate Authority has also the power/and jurisdiction to re-appreciate the evidence and come to its own conclusion, on facts, being the sole fact-finding authorities." (emphasis supplied) 35. The Appellate Authority, therefore, could not ignore to exercise the said power. 36. The order of the Appellate Authority demonstrates total non-application of mind. The Appellate Authority, when the Rules require application of mind on several factors and serious contentions have been raised, was bound to assign reasons so as to enable the writ court to ascertain as to whether he had applied his mind to the relevant factors which the statute requires him to do. The expression "consider" is of some significance. In the context of the Rules, the Appellate Authority was required to see as to whether (i) the procedure laid down in the Rules was complied with; (ii) the enquiry officer was justified in arriving at the finding that the delinquent officer was guilty of the misconduct alleged against him; and (iii) whether penalty imposed by the disciplinary authority was excessive. 37. In R.P. Bhatt v. Union of India [ (1986) 2 SCC 651 : 1986 SCC (L&S) 330 : (1986) 1 ATC 37] this Court opined: (SCC p. 654, paras 4-5) "4. The word 'consider' in Rule 27(2) implies 'due application of mind'. 37. In R.P. Bhatt v. Union of India [ (1986) 2 SCC 651 : 1986 SCC (L&S) 330 : (1986) 1 ATC 37] this Court opined: (SCC p. 654, paras 4-5) "4. The word 'consider' in Rule 27(2) implies 'due application of mind'. It is clear upon the terms of Rule 27(2) that the Appellate Authority is required to consider (1) whether the procedure laid down in the Rules has been complied with; and if not, whether such non-compliance has resulted in violation of any provisions of the Constitution or in failure of justice; (2) whether the findings of the disciplinary authority are warranted by the evidence on record; and (3) whether the penalty imposed is adequate; and thereafter pass orders confirming, enhancing, etc. the penalty, or may remit back the case to the authority which imposed the same. Rule 27(2) casts a duty on the Appellate Authority to consider the relevant factors set forth in clauses (a), (b) and (c) thereof." "5. There is no indication in the impugned order that the Director General was satisfied as to whether the procedure laid down in the Rules had been complied with; and if not, whether such non-compliance had resulted in violation of any of the provisions of the Constitution or in failure of justice. We regret to find that the Director General has also not given any finding on the crucial question as to whether the findings of the disciplinary authority were warranted by the evidence on record. It seems that he only applied his mind to the requirement of clause (c) of Rule 27(2) viz. whether the penalty imposed was adequate or justified in the facts and circumstances of the present case. It seems that he only applied his mind to the requirement of clause (c) of Rule 27(2) viz. whether the penalty imposed was adequate or justified in the facts and circumstances of the present case. There being non-compliance with the requirements of Rule 27(2) of the Rules, the impugned order passed by the Director General is liable to be set aside."" In view of the aforesaid, the stand taken by the respondents/State that in the matter of disciplinary proceeding, the scope of interference by the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is very limited, does not mean that when the case of disciplinary proceeding that too of a punishment like dismissal from service on the basis of serious charges of corruption proved in a manner like the present case, the Court cannot shut its eyes to give a seal of approval to the enquiry report, the orders of Disciplinary Authority as also the Appellate Authority as the basic charge against the petitioner was financial irregularity committed by making manipulation in the entries of B-1 Register and the said charge was specifically denied by the petitioner, but still the said document was not produced by the prosecution then it can easily be gathered that in absence of those material entries alleged to have been manipulated, the findings of the Enquiry Officer or of Disciplinary Authority are nothing but just a presumption and are based upon conjectures and surmises. 12. I do not dispute that the departmental enquiry does not mean the strict rule of evidence as is required to prove the criminal charge against the accused, but the punishment in a disciplinary proceeding is based upon preponderance of probabilities. The Supreme Court says that a serious charge of corruption requires to be proved to the hilt as it being civil and criminal consequences upon the employee concerned. The charge of corruption requires to be proved beyond the shadow of doubt and to the hilt and it cannot be proved on mere probabilities. In the case reported in (2009) 12 SCC 78 [Union of India and others Vs. Gyan Chand Chattar], the Supreme Court has observed as under:- "21. Such a serious charge of corruption requires to be proved to the hilt as it brings civil and criminal consequences upon the employee concerned. In the case reported in (2009) 12 SCC 78 [Union of India and others Vs. Gyan Chand Chattar], the Supreme Court has observed as under:- "21. Such a serious charge of corruption requires to be proved to the hilt as it brings civil and criminal consequences upon the employee concerned. He would be liable to be prosecuted and would also be liable to suffer severest penalty awardable in such cases. Therefore, such a grave charge of quasi-criminal nature was required to be proved beyond any shadow of doubt and to the hilt. It cannot be proved on mere probabilities." Further in the case reported in (2006) 5 SCC 88 [M.V. Bijlani Vs. Union of India and others], the Supreme Court while dealing with the power of judicial review of the High Court and has observed as under:- "25. It is true that the jurisdiction of the court in judicial review is limited. Disciplinary proceedings, however, being quasi-criminal in nature, there should be some evidence to prove the charge. Although the charges in a departmental proceeding are not required to be proved like a criminal trial i.e. beyond all reasonable doubt, we cannot lose sight of the fact that the enquiry officer performs a quasi-judicial function, who upon analysing the documents must arrive at a conclusion that there had been a preponderance of probability to prove the charges on the basis of materials on record. While doing so, he cannot take into consideration any irrelevant fact. He cannot refuse to consider the relevant facts......" In view of aforesaid, I have no hesitation to say that the minimum requirement for the Authorities in a matter of disciplinary proceeding was to consider the defence taken by the delinquent and meet out the same atleast by giving reasons why the said defence is not acceptable. He cannot refuse to consider the relevant facts......" In view of aforesaid, I have no hesitation to say that the minimum requirement for the Authorities in a matter of disciplinary proceeding was to consider the defence taken by the delinquent and meet out the same atleast by giving reasons why the said defence is not acceptable. In the present case when from very inception, the basic charge of manipulation in the Government record i.e. B-1 Register has been denied by the petitioner, therefore, the said Register had to be produced by the respondents and if that was not done, the Enquiry Officer and other Authorities i.e. the Disciplinary Authority as also the Appellate Authority could very well say by giving reason that non production of the said material document would not cause any prejudice to the petitioner, but from the impugned orders or from the enquiry report, nowhere it is mentioned that the material evidence not produced, would not cause any prejudice to the petitioner. 13. I am surprised to see that none of the Authorities had observed that the document demanded and in fact was required to be produced, neither supplied to the petitioner nor produced in the departmental enquiry, then what was the material to reach a conclusion that the petitioner had committed guilt though the only reason assigned by the Enquiry Officer and approved by the Disciplinary Authority and also by the Appellate Authority that the petitioner has deposited the amount alleged to have been misappropriated and as such admitted her guilt. Needless to mention here that for a Government employee, the punishment of dismissal from service is apparently a capital punishment and if a person facing the departmental enquiry with a charge of misappropriation of Government fund and is apprehending the capital punishment of dismissal from service, then it is not unexpected from the employee to make every attempt to make himself/herself discharged from such charge and in the process of such exercise, the first attempt would be to clear the said deficit so as to say that the Government has not suffered any loss, but it does not mean that the employee has admitted the charge levelled. Enquiry is conducted to prove the charges levelled and undisputedly, in a matter of disciplinary proceeding, charges are proved on the principle of preponderance of probabilities, but that does not give liberty to the prosecution to hold the petitioner guilty without proving the charges levelled even applying the principle of preponderance of probabilities. The minimum required expectation from the employer is to prove the charge after complying the principle of natural justice, but if that is also not done, the stand taken by the respondents that the scope of interference in the matter of disciplinary proceeding is very limited and the High Court cannot act as an Appellate Authority exercising the jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, cannot be accepted. 14. In view of the above discussion, it is apparent that the Authorities held the petitioner guilty mainly on the ground that she had deposited the amount after coming to know about the charge of misappropriation of fund that too without taking prior permission from her Higher Authorities. The said charge has also been levelled against the petitioner, but such admission cannot be made the ground for holding the petitioner guilty under the circumstances. In the similar circumstances, the Division Bench of the Gauhati High Court in the case reported in (2017) 2 Gauhati Law Reports 357 [Upendra Nath Misra Vs. Union of India and Ors.] has held that the scope of judicial review on departmental action is very limited. It is also observed by the Division Bench that it is necessary to examine whether the principle of natural justice has been complied with by the Disciplinary Authority or not. It is further observed that the Court is also entitled to consider whether the relevant evidence had been taken into account and that inference is drawn based upon such relevant evidence and whether the preponderance would justify the conclusion reached against the delinquent. It is further observed that the Court is also entitled to consider whether the relevant evidence had been taken into account and that inference is drawn based upon such relevant evidence and whether the preponderance would justify the conclusion reached against the delinquent. While facing the charge of preparing fictitious muster rolls of those persons who were not at all engaged for and also prepared muster rolls for much longer period of those porters who were engaged for much shorter period and claimed false contingent bills on account of wages of those porters on various occasions, the penalty of reduction of pay by three stages in the time scale of pay for the period of three years imposed upon the employee and the said order of penalty was challenged by the employee before the Central Administrative Tribunal and the Tribunal dismissed the application filed by the employee. Thereafter, the said order of Tribunal was assailed before the High Court and the Division Bench in its order has observed as under:- "19. It cannot also be overlooked that the delinquent was a recent recruit and was on probation during the concerned period of 5 (five) months, when he was deployed for the survey work in Lohit district of Arunachal Pradesh. He explained the circumstance under which he arranged for refund of Rs. 79,126/- alleged to have been misappropriated through maintenance of incorrect muster roll records. But the possibility of an inexperienced employee being forced to make good the loss at the nascent stage of his career on being prompted by the seniors in the organization, was totally ignored. Instead this act of refund of the amount was found to be an act of admission of guilt by the delinquent. In a disciplinary proceeding, it is the obligation of the authorities to prove the guilt by presenting cogent evidence on the principle of preponderance of probability and in the absence of any evidence to show that the delinquent had manipulated the muster rolls, an adverse finding cannot be given against the Charge No. I on the basis of inference drawn on account of the deposit of the money by the delinquent. If the acquaintance roll and the muster roll (Exhibit-52) maintained by the 8 (eight) verifiers reflect that extra labours were engaged as was corroborated by the oral evidence of the witnesses, it is not logical to conclude that the delinquent had produced fictitious records to show payment of wages to non-existence porters. In fact no reasonable evidence is seen here to connect the delinquent with the allegation under Charge No. I." 15. Considering the aforesaid, I have no hesitation to say that the charge of corruption against the petitioner has not been proved in a proper manner and the Authorities went with a presumption that the amount has been deposited by the petitioner is nothing, but an admission for accepting her guilt. The said decision cannot be held proper and in fact not sustainable in the eyes of law. The High Court while exercising the power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India in a matter of disciplinary proceeding can consider the fact whether the finding given by the Disciplinary Authority is based upon some evidence or not and if it is found that there is some perversity in the finding then interference can be made. The Court can also see whether the finding given by the Authorities inflicting the punishment like dismissal from service is based upon proper reasoning or not. It can also be seen whether the defence taken by the delinquent has been taken note of or not. Giving reasonable opportunity of hearing does not mean that the opportunity to participate in the enquiry is given, but the fact is that the stand taken by the delinquent was not considered whereas the same ought to have been taken note of. Here in this case, if the reply to the show-cause notice and also to the charge-sheet is seen and further the report submitted by the Enquiry Officer, the order passed by the Disciplinary Authority and also by the Appellate Authority are compared then nowhere it is found that the respondents/Authorities have considered the defence taken by the delinquent. Here in this case, if the reply to the show-cause notice and also to the charge-sheet is seen and further the report submitted by the Enquiry Officer, the order passed by the Disciplinary Authority and also by the Appellate Authority are compared then nowhere it is found that the respondents/Authorities have considered the defence taken by the delinquent. This minimum requirement showing application of the mind by the Authorities is a very foundation of complying the principle of natural justice, but in this case that is completely misplaced and the Authorities based upon their finding, held the petitioner guilty on the basis of fact that the petitioner had deposited the amount in the Government account which was alleged to have been misappropriated and that was treated to be an admission of guilt, but as per the discussion made hereinabove, I am not convinced that the conduct of the petitioner was enough at-all to hold her guilty that too for the charge of corruption resulting dismissal from service. 16. Accordingly, in my opinion, the impugned orders since passed by the Disciplinary Authority and the Appellate Authorities are based upon the enquiry report which is held improper for the reason that Enquiry Officer has not given any specific reason for not accepting the defence taken by the petitioner, therefore, the same are not acceptable. It is a settled principle as has been observed hereinabove that if initial action is not in consonance with law, the subsequent proceeding would not sanctify the same. 17. Thus, the impugned orders dated 20.04.2015 (Annexure-P/1) passed by respondent No.3/Sub Divisional Officer, Harda, 28.09.2016 (Annexure-P/2) passed by respondent No.2/Collector, District Harda and 11.09.2017 (Annexure-P/3) passed by the Commissioner, Narmadapuram Division, Hoshangabad are hereby set aside and the respondents are directed to reinstate the petitioner in service with all her consequential benefits. Accordingly, the petition filed by the petitioner stands allowed. However, the respondents/Authorities are at liberty to initiate disciplinary proceeding against the petitioner, if they so desire but after following the principle of natural justice in accordance with the other statutory requirements.

Jyoti Dubey v. State of Madhya Pradesh