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2021 DIGILAW 1495 (ALL)

Gomti Prasad v. Shiv Murat

2021-12-04

JASPREET SINGH

body2021
JUDGMENT : JASPREET SINGH, J. 1. This is the defendant's second appeal under Section 100 C.P.C. against the judgment and decree dated 20.10.1984 passed by 4th Additional District Judge, Gonda in Civil Appeal No. 148 of 1979 whereby the Lower Appellate Court has reversed the judgment and decree passed by the First Additional Munsif, Gonda in Regular Suit No. 15 of 1974 as a result, the suit of the plaintiff-respondents which was dismissed by the Trial Court has been decreed by the Lower Appellate Court. 2. The defendant being aggrieved against the judgment of reversal has preferred the instant second appeal which was admitted by means of order dated 25.01.1985. Though, at the time of admission, the substantial question of law was not framed, however, the order of admission reads as under: “Admit in view of the substantial question of law relating to jurisdiction of Civil Courts and Revenue Courts which has been referred to a Full Bench in Writ Petition No. 1732 of 1981. The instant appeal shall be listed after decision of the Full Bench.” 3. In view of the aforesaid, the Court required the learned counsel for the appellant to urge on the substantial questions of law involved in the instant second appeal. 4. Sri U.S. Sahai, learned counsel for the appellant has submitted that the substantial questions of law involved in the instant second appeal relates to the jurisdiction of the Civil Court to maintain a suit for cancellation of a sale deed relating to an agricultural property. It is urged that where the plaintiff files a suit for cancellation of a sale deed relating to an agricultural property, and the plaintiff is not the recorded owner in the revenue records, then it necessarily involves declaration of title and such a declaration can only be granted by the Revenue Court. In view thereof the judgment and decree passed by the Lower Appellate Court is without jurisdiction and it is liable to be set aside. 5. In view thereof the judgment and decree passed by the Lower Appellate Court is without jurisdiction and it is liable to be set aside. 5. The other issue raised by the learned counsel for the appellant is that the Lower Appellate Court has reversed the judgment and decree passed by the Trial Court on surmises and conjectures and has not met with the reasons recorded by the Trial Court, hence, the power exercised by the Lower Appellate Court is not in consonance with the powers of the First Appellate Court as conferred under Section 96 read with Order 41 Rule 31 C.P.C. hence, the judgment and decree under challenge suffers from the procedural vice and the findings are perverse, accordingly such a judgment deserves to be set aside. 6. After hearing the learned counsel for the appellant, the Court framed the following substantial questions of law for adjudication: “(I) Whether the suit for cancellation in respect of the agricultural property is maintainable before the Civil Court or the Revenue Court and if so its effect? (II) Whether the powers exercised by the Lower Appellate Court in passing the judgment of reversal is in consonance with the powers of the Lower Appellate Court under Section 96 read with Order 41 Rule 31 CPC?” 7. The Court has heard Sri U.S. Sahai, learned counsel for the appellant on the merits of the appeal and despite due notice to the respondents, none has put in appearance, consequently, the appeal has been heard in absence of the respondents. 8. Before adverting to the substantial questions of law as framed above, certain brief facts giving rise to the instant appeal are being noticed first: 9. Initially Shiv Moorat, Bhanu Pratap and Brahmdev instituted a suit for cancellation of a sale deed dated 15.04.1971 registered on 04.08.1971 before the Sub Registrar, Tarabganj, District Gonda before the Court of Munsif, Tarabganj, Gonda and was registered as Regular Suit No. 50 of 1974. It was specifically pleaded that the property in question belonged to one Sri Baijnath Son of Badrisaran, resident of Village Pure Dadu. Baijnath was the bhumidhar of the said land and he had executed a sale deed 27.05.1975 in favour of the plaintiffs and the defendant no. 3 (Smt. Pyari) and after the execution of the sale deed in favour of the plaintiffs and the defendant nos. Baijnath was the bhumidhar of the said land and he had executed a sale deed 27.05.1975 in favour of the plaintiffs and the defendant no. 3 (Smt. Pyari) and after the execution of the sale deed in favour of the plaintiffs and the defendant nos. 3, the possession of the property was also transferred and as such the plaintiffs and the defendants no. 3 are the bhumidhars of the property in question. 10. It was also urged that the defendant no. 1 is the real Pattidar of the plaintiffs and the defendant no. 3 is none other than the widow of the brother of the seller while the defendant no. 2 is the Pradhan of the village. It was also urged that the erstwhile seller namely Baijnath expired on 21.09.1971. The defendants nos. 1 and 2 in collusion with the defendants no. 3 and taking Baijnath into confidence (the erstwhile owner) falsely got executed another sale deed on 15.04.1971 which though was registered on 04.08.1971. The entire purpose was to get the sale deed executed prior in time in order to usurp and create mischief in respect of the rights of the plaintiffs over the property in question. 11. It was also urged that the plaintiffs became aware of the conspiracy hatched by the defendants and in respect thereto they had also informed the District Judge, Gonda, however, no action was taken. On the very same day, i.e. on 03.08.1971, information was also given to the District Magistrate, Gonda regarding the alleged registration of an instrument in respect of the property which had already been sold out to the plaintiffs. 12. In paragraph 5 of the plaint, grounds had been urged upon which the plaintiffs sought the cancellation of the sale deed dated 15.04.1971 registered on 04.08.1971 amongst the grounds so raised, it was urged that the defendants nos. 1 in collusion with Baijnath and the defendant no. 3 had falsely created an instrument ante-dated and got the same registered on 04.08.1971 only to create a cloud over the right, title and interest of the plaintiffs. 13. It was further urged that once the erstwhile owner namely Baijnath had executed a registered sale deed in favour of the plaintiffs on 27.05.1971, he was left with no rights to have executed a sale deed and get the same registered subsequently on 04.08.1971. 13. It was further urged that once the erstwhile owner namely Baijnath had executed a registered sale deed in favour of the plaintiffs on 27.05.1971, he was left with no rights to have executed a sale deed and get the same registered subsequently on 04.08.1971. It was also urged that the stamp paper on which the sale deed dated 15.04.1971 was drawn was also procured by a fraud, inasmuch as, the stamp vendor from whom the said stamp duty is said to have been purchased was not authorized to sell the stamp duty. It is in this view of the matter that the sale deed dated 15.04.1971 was sought to be cancelled. 14. The defendants filed their written statement and contested the suit. The defendants nos. 1 and 2 filed a separate written statement whereas the defendant no. 3 also filed a separate written statement, though, the contentions of both the set of defendants was primarily one and the same. 15. The main ground of defence was that the defendants nos. 1 and 2 had purchased the property for a valuable sale consideration of Rs. 2,000/-It was stated that the sale deed was executed on 15.04.1971, however, the same could not be registered as the erstwhile owner namely Baijnath had fallen sick. He was not in position to leave Tarabganj and appear before the Sub-Registrar for registration of the deed. It is in this view of the matter that the deed was registered on 04.08.1971 after Baijnath had regained his health. It was urged that since the sale deed of the defendants nos. 1 and 2 was prior in terms of time and even though registered subsequently, the date of registration would relate back to the date of execution of the sale deed and thus the deed in favour of the plaintiffs being subsequent in time would not confer any rights on the plaintiffs and as such their suit was liable to be dismissed. It was also urged that the suit as filed by the plaintiffs was not maintainable as neither the plaintiffs had any right over the property nor they were in possession. 16. As already noticed above, the defendant no. 3, though, filed a separate written statement but the same was also in line with the defence raised by the defendants nos. 1 and 2. Another additional plea taken in the written statement of the defendant no. 16. As already noticed above, the defendant no. 3, though, filed a separate written statement but the same was also in line with the defence raised by the defendants nos. 1 and 2. Another additional plea taken in the written statement of the defendant no. 3 was that Baijnath only wanted to execute the sale deed in favour of the plaintiffs and the defendant nos. 3 in respect of the house, however, the plaintiffs and the defendant no. 3 included the disputed land in the sale deed which was in collusion and as such the deed in favour of the plaintiffs was nothing but a fraudulent document and in the aforesaid fashion, the plaintiffs were attempting not only to take over the house of the erstwhile owner Baijnath but also his land and thus the sale deed would not confer any benefits to the plaintiffs. 17. On the basis of the pleadings delivered by the parties, the Trial Court framed 6 issues. The first issue was in respect of the sale deed of the plaintiffs as to whether the plaintiffs and the defendant no. 3 got executed a sale deed regarding the land, the subject matter of the suit by Baijnath Son of Badri Saran on 27.05.1971. The second issue was in respect of the sale deed said to have been executed by Baijnath in favour of defendants nos. (i) and (ii) and whether the same was ante-dated and was not executed on 15.04.1971 as alleged. The issue no. three was whether the sale deed dated 15.04.1971 was ineffective and liable to be cancelled for the reasons given in para 5 of the plaint. The issue no. four was whether the plaintiffs have no right to sue as alleged in para 18 of the written statement. Issue no. five was whether the suit is not maintainable and issue no. six was the general issue as to what relief is the plaintiff entitled to. 18. The parties led their respective evidence. Thereafter the Trial Court noticing the relevant evidence decided issue no. (i) to the effect that Baijnath had only executed the sale deed in respect of the house and not in respect of the land in question. While deciding issue no. (ii) it found that the sale deed of the defendant nos. 18. The parties led their respective evidence. Thereafter the Trial Court noticing the relevant evidence decided issue no. (i) to the effect that Baijnath had only executed the sale deed in respect of the house and not in respect of the land in question. While deciding issue no. (ii) it found that the sale deed of the defendant nos. 1 and 2 was not ante-dated and was not liable to be cancelled in light of the grounds raised in paragraph 5 of the plaint. While deciding issue no. (v) regarding maintainability of the suit it was decided against the defendant. In so far as the issue no. (iv) and (vi) is concerned, it found that in light of the findings given on issue nos. (i), (ii) and (iii), the suit of the plaintiff could not be decreed and thus by means of judgment and decree dated 03.05.1976, the suit of the plaintiff was dismissed. 19. The plaintiffs thereafter preferred a Regular Civil Appeal before the District Judge, Gonda registered as Regular Civil Appeal No. 148 of 1979. The said appeal was transferred to the Court of 4th Additional District Judge, Gonda who after hearing the parties concerned by means of judgment and decree 20.10.1984 allowed the appeal, set aside the judgment and decree passed by the Trial Court, as a result the suit which was dismissed by the Trial Court was decreed by the Lower Appellate Court and it ordered the cancellation of the sale deed dated 15.04.1971 said to have been registered on 04.08.1971. It is in the aforesaid backdrop that the instant second appeal has been preferred and has been heard on the two substantial questions of law framed hereinabove first: 20. As far as the law regarding the maintainability of a suit in respect of cancellation of a sale deed relating to an agricultural property is concerned, the same has been well settled by the Apex Court in the case of Sri Ram and Another vs. 1st Additional District Judge and Others, 2001 (3) SCC 24 so also in the case of Kamla Prasad and Others vs. Krishna Kant Pathak and Others, 2007 (4) SCC 213 . The Apex Court while considering the aforesaid issue has noticed the relevant law and the same has also been considered by this Court in the case of Jai Prakash Singh vs. Bachchu Lal and Others, 2019 SCC Online All 3522 and thereafter succinctly it can be noticed, as under, that where a suit for cancellation of a sale deed in respect of an agricultural property does not require any declaration of rights, the same is cognizable by the Civil Court but where the cancellation would involve, the declaration of rights, then such a suit for cancellation would not be maintainable and the parties must necessarily first get their rights declared from the Revenue Court. The relevant portion of the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Kamla Prasad (Supra) is being reproduced herein for ready reference: “..............14. In this connection, the learned counsel for the appellant rightly relied upon a decision of this Court in Shri Ram v. Ist ADJ, (2001) 3 SCC 24 . In Shri Ram (2001) 3 SCC 24 A, the original owner of the land sold it to B by a registered sale deed and also delivered possession and the name of the purchaser was entered into revenue records after mutation. According to the plaintiff, sale deed was forged and was liable to be cancelled. In the light of the above fact, this Court held that it was only a civil court which could entertain, try and decide such suit. The Court, after considering relevant case-law on the point, held that where a recorded tenure-holder having a title and in possession of property files a suit in civil court for cancellation of sale deed obtained by fraud or impersonation could not be directed to institute such suit for declaration in Revenue Court, the reason being that in such a case, prima facie, the title of the recorded tenure-holder is not under cloud. He does not require declaration of his title to the land. 15. The Court, however, proceeded to observe: (Shri Ram Case (2001) 3 SCC 24 , SCC p. 28, Para 7) “The position would be different where a person not being a recorded tenure-holder seeks cancellation of sale deed by filing a suit in the civil court on the ground of fraud or impersonation. 15. The Court, however, proceeded to observe: (Shri Ram Case (2001) 3 SCC 24 , SCC p. 28, Para 7) “The position would be different where a person not being a recorded tenure-holder seeks cancellation of sale deed by filing a suit in the civil court on the ground of fraud or impersonation. There necessarily the plaintiff is required to seek a declaration of his title and, therefore, he may be directed to approach the Revenue Court, as the sale deed being void has to be ignored for giving him relief for declaration and possession.” 21. Applying the principles to the present case at hand, it would first and foremost be noted that the defendants in their written statement had raised the question regarding the maintainability of the suit, however, a specific issue was framed by the Trial Court. Issue no. (v) has been decided by the Trial Court against the defendants by recording that the defendants had led no evidence in respect of the aforesaid issue. It is also to be noticed that while the plaintiffs preferred the Regular Civil Appeal, the defendants did not file any cross appeal or raise any objections regarding the issue no. (v) decided by the Trial Court against the defendants. 22. Thus, it would be seen that where the defendants did not escalate the issue no. 5 having been decided against them and led no evidence. Moreover even at the stage of first appeal, they did not file any cross appeal or cross objections assailing the findings on issue no. 5, hence, at this stage, it will not be open for the defendants to raise the issue of jurisdiction especially when the issue of jurisdiction regarding maintainability of the suit would be a mixed question of law and fact. 23. Noticing the dictum of the Apex Court in the case of Kamla Prasad (Supra), it would reveal that the distinction made by the Apex Court is that if on the date of the institution of the suit, the name of the plaintiff is recorded in the revenue record, then he is entitled to maintain the suit for cancellation before the Civil Court. In the instant case, neither there are proper pleadings in the written statement of the defendant nor any evidence was led by the defendant to indicate that on the date of the institution of the suit, the plaintiff was not recorded owner, hence, in absence of such material particulars and evidence, this Court is of the view that the aforesaid question which, though, has been raised by the appellants cannot be decided merely on the asking of the defendant that the Civil Court did not have the jurisdiction as it was incumbent upon the defendants to have not only raised the issue in its pleadings but also ought to have led evidence which they have failed to do so. 24. Thus, in view of the law discussed hereinabove as well as in view of the failure of the defendant to prove the said issue, it cannot be said that the suit for cancellation of a sale deed was not maintainable before the Civil Court, thus, the issue no. 1 stands answered. 25. In so far as the second substantial question of law is concerned as to whether the Lower Appellate Court has passed the judgment of reversal on the basis of surmises and conjectures and has not met the reasons recorded by the Trial Court and has not given its finding as required by the First Appellate Court in light of the powers conferred under Section 96 C.P.C. 26. Before answering the aforesaid question, it would be worthwhile to notice the powers of the First Appellate Court. The same has been noticed by the Apex Court in Sudarsan Puhan vs. Jayanta Ku. Mohanty and Others, 2018 (10) SCC Online 552 and it is now consistently clear that the manner in which the First Appellate Court is required to deal with an appeal before it. The relevant paragraphs of the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Sudarshan Puhan (Supra) is being reproduced for ready reference: “........21. The powers of the first appellate court while deciding the first appeal are indeed well defined by various judicial pronouncements of this Court and are, therefore, no more res integra. 22. The relevant paragraphs of the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Sudarshan Puhan (Supra) is being reproduced for ready reference: “........21. The powers of the first appellate court while deciding the first appeal are indeed well defined by various judicial pronouncements of this Court and are, therefore, no more res integra. 22. As far back in 1969, the learned Judge - V.R. Krishna Iyer, J. (as his Lordship then was the Judge of the Kerala High Court) while deciding the first appeal under Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (hereinafter referred to as “the Code”) in Kurian Chacko vs. Varkey Ouseph, 1968 SCC Online Ker 101 : AIR 1969 Ker 316 , reminded the first appellate court of its duty to decide the first appeal. In his distinctive style of writing with subtle power of expression, the learned Judge held as under: (SCC Online Ker Paras 1-3) “1. The plaintiff, unsuccessful in two courts, has come up here aggrieved by the dismissal of his suit which was one for declaration of title and recovery of possession. The defendant disputed the plaintiff's title to the property as also his possession and claimed both in himself. The learned Munsif, who tried the suit, recorded findings against the plaintiff both on title and possession. But, in appeal, the learned Subordinate Judge disposed of the whole matter glibly and briefly, in a few sentences. 2. An appellate court is the final court of fact ordinarily and therefore a litigant is entitled to a full and fair and independent consideration of the evidence at the appellate stage. Anything less than this is unjust to him and I have no doubt that in the present case the learned Subordinate Judge has fallen far short of what is expected of him as an appellate court. 3. Although there is furious contest between the counsel for the appellant and for the respondent, they appear to agree with me in this observation.” (Emphasis supplied) 23. This Court also in various cases reiterated the aforesaid principle and laid down the powers of the appellate court under Section 96 of the Code while deciding the first appeal. 24. We consider it apposite to refer to some of the decisions. 25. In Santosh Hazari vs. Purushottam Tiwari, (2001) 3 SCC 179 , this Court held as under: (SCC pp. 24. We consider it apposite to refer to some of the decisions. 25. In Santosh Hazari vs. Purushottam Tiwari, (2001) 3 SCC 179 , this Court held as under: (SCC pp. 188-89, Para 15) “15........The appellate court has jurisdiction to reverse or affirm the findings of the trial court. First appeal is a valuable right of the parties and unless restricted by law, the whole case is therein open for rehearing both on questions of fact and law. The judgment of the appellate court must, therefore, reflect its conscious application of mind and record findings supported by reasons, on all the issues arising along with the contentions put forth, and pressed by the parties for decision of the appellate court. … while reversing a finding of fact the appellate court must come into close quarters with the reasoning assigned by the trial court and then assign its own reasons for arriving at a different finding. This would satisfy the court hearing a further appeal that the first appellate court had discharged the duty expected of it.” 26. The above view was followed by a three-Judge Bench of this Court in Madhukar vs. Sangram, (2001) 4 SCC 756 , wherein it was reiterated that sitting as a court of first appeal, it is the duty of the High Court to deal with all the issues and the evidence led by the parties before recording its findings. 27. In H.K.N. Swami vs. Irshad Basith, (2005) 10 SCC 243 , this Court stated as under: (SCC p. 244, Para 3) “3. The first appeal has to be decided on facts as well as on law. In the first appeal parties have the right to be heard both on questions of law as also on facts and the first appellate court is required to address itself to all issues and decide the case by giving reasons. Unfortunately, the High Court, in the present case has not recorded any finding either on facts or on law. Sitting as the first appellate court it was the duty of the High Court to deal with all the issues and the evidence led by the parties before recording the finding regarding title.” 28. Again in Jagannath vs. Arulappa, (2005) 12 SCC 303 , while considering the scope of Section 96 of the Code, this Court observed as follows: (SCC p. 303, Para 2) “2. Again in Jagannath vs. Arulappa, (2005) 12 SCC 303 , while considering the scope of Section 96 of the Code, this Court observed as follows: (SCC p. 303, Para 2) “2. A court of first appeal can re-appreciate the entire evidence and come to a different conclusion.” 29. Again in B.V. Nagesh vs. H.V. Sreenivasa Murthy, (2010) 13 SCC 530 : (2010) 4 SCC (Civ) 808, this Court taking note of all the earlier judgments of this Court reiterated the aforementioned principle with these words: (SCC pp. 530-31, Paras 3-5) “3. How the regular first appeal is to be disposed of by the appellate court/High Court has been considered by this Court in various decisions. Order 41 CPC deals with appeals from original decrees. Among the various rules, Rule 31 mandates that the judgment of the appellate court shall state: (a) the points for determination. (b) the decision thereon. (c) the reasons for the decision. (d) where the decree appealed from is reversed or varied, the relief to which the appellant is entitled. 4. The appellate court has jurisdiction to reverse or affirm the findings of the trial court. The first appeal is a valuable right of the parties and unless restricted by law, the whole case is therein open for rehearing both on questions of fact and law. The judgment of the appellate court must, therefore, reflect its conscious application of mind and record findings supported by reasons, on all the issues arising along with the contentions put forth, and pressed by the parties for decision of the appellate court. Sitting as a court of first appeal, it was the duty of the High Court to deal with all the issues and the evidence led by the parties before recording its findings. The first appeal is a valuable right and the parties have a right to be heard both on questions of law and on facts and the judgment in the first appeal must address itself to all the issues of law and fact and decide it by giving reasons in support of the findings. (Vide Santosh Hazari vs. Purushottam Tiwari, (2001) 3 SCC 179 and Madhukar vs. Sangram, (2001) 4 SCC 756 ) 5. In view of the above salutary principles, on going through the impugned judgment, we feel that the High Court has failed to discharge the obligation placed on it as a first appellate court. (Vide Santosh Hazari vs. Purushottam Tiwari, (2001) 3 SCC 179 and Madhukar vs. Sangram, (2001) 4 SCC 756 ) 5. In view of the above salutary principles, on going through the impugned judgment, we feel that the High Court has failed to discharge the obligation placed on it as a first appellate court. In our view, the judgment under appeal is cryptic and none of the relevant aspects have even been noticed. The appeal has been decided in an unsatisfactory manner. Our careful perusal of the judgment in the regular first appeal shows that it falls short of considerations which are expected from the court of first appeal. Accordingly, without going into the merits of the claim of both parties, we set aside the impugned judgment and decree of the High Court and remand the regular first appeal to the High Court for its fresh disposal in accordance with law.” 27. Similarly, in Malluru Mallappa (D) through LRs. vs. Kuruvathappa and Others, 2020 (4) SCC 313 , the powers of the First Appellate Court have been considered and in paras 10 to 19 of the said report and it has noticed as under: “.....10. Section 96 CPC provides for filing of an appeal from the decree passed by any court exercising original jurisdiction to the court authorised to hear the appeals from the decisions of such courts. In the instant case, the appeal from the decree passed by the trial court lies to the High Court. The expression “appeal” has not been defined in CPC. Black's Law Dictionary (7th Edn.) defines an appeal as “a proceeding undertaken to have a decision reconsidered by bringing it to a higher authority”. It is a judicial examination of the decision by a higher court of the decision of a subordinate court to rectify any possible error in the order under appeal. The law provides the remedy of an appeal because of the recognition that those manning the judicial tiers too commit errors. 11. In Hari Shankar vs. Rao Girdhari Lal Chowdhury, AIR 1963 SC 698 it was held that a right of appeal carries with it a right of rehearing on law as well as on fact, unless the statute conferring a right of appeal limits the rehearing in some way as has been done in second appeal arising under CPC. 12. 11. In Hari Shankar vs. Rao Girdhari Lal Chowdhury, AIR 1963 SC 698 it was held that a right of appeal carries with it a right of rehearing on law as well as on fact, unless the statute conferring a right of appeal limits the rehearing in some way as has been done in second appeal arising under CPC. 12. In Shankar Ramchandra Abhyankar vs. Krishnaji Dattatreya Bapat, (1969) 2 SCC 74 it was held thus: (SCC pp. 77-78, Para 5) “5......In the well-known work of Story on Constitution (of United States), Vol. 2, Article 1761, it is stated that the essential criterion of appellate jurisdiction is that it revises and corrects the proceedings in a cause already instituted and does not create that cause. The appellate jurisdiction may be exercised in a variety of forms and, indeed, in any form in which the legislature may choose to prescribe. According to Article 1762, the most usual modes of exercising appellate jurisdiction, at least those which are most known in the United States, are by a writ of error, or by an appeal, or by some process of removal of a suit from an inferior tribunal. An appeal is a process of civil law origin and removes a cause, entirely subjecting the fact as well as the law, to a review and a retrial.” 13. It is a settled position of law that an appeal is a continuation of the proceedings of the original court. Ordinarily, the appellate jurisdiction involves a rehearing on law as well as on fact and is invoked by an aggrieved person. The first appeal is a valuable right of the appellant and therein all questions of fact and law decided by the trial court are open for reconsideration. Therefore, the first appellate court is require to address itself to all the issues and decide the case by giving reasons. The court of first appeal must record its findings only after dealing with all issues of law as well as fact and with the evidence, oral as well as documentary, led by the parties. Therefore, the first appellate court is require to address itself to all the issues and decide the case by giving reasons. The court of first appeal must record its findings only after dealing with all issues of law as well as fact and with the evidence, oral as well as documentary, led by the parties. The judgment of the first appellate court must display conscious application of mind and record findings supported by reasons on all issues and contentions [See: Santosh Hazari vs. Purushottam Tiwari, (2001) 3 SCC 179 , Madhukar vs. Sangram, (2001) 4 SCC 756 , B.M. Narayana Gowda vs. Shanthamma, (2011) 15 SCC 476 : (2014) 2 SCC (Civ) 619, H.K.N. Swami vs. Irshad Basith, (2005) 10 SCC 243 and Sri Raja Lakshmi Dyeing Works vs. Rangaswamy Chettiar, (1980) 4 SCC 259]. 14. A first appeal under Section 96 CPC is entirely different from a second appeal under Section 100. Section 100 expressly bars second appeal unless a question of law is involved in a case and the question of law so involved is substantial in nature. 15. Order 41 Rule 31 CPC provides the guidelines for the appellate court to decide the matter. For ready reference Order 41 Rule 31 CPC is as under: “31. Contents, date and signature of judgment - The judgment of the appellate court shall be in writing and shall state: (a) the points for determination. (b) the decision thereon; (c) the reasons for the decision. (d) where the decree appealed from is reversed or varied, the relief to which the appellant is entitled and shall at the time that it is pronounced be signed and dated by the Judge or by the Judges concurring therein.” 16. In Vinod Kumar vs. Gangadhar, (2015) 1 SCC 391 : (2015) 1 SCC (Civ) 521 this Court has reiterated the principles to be borne in mind while disposing of a first appeal, as under : (SCC p. 395, Para 15) “15. Again in B.V. Nagesh vs. H.V. Sreenivasa Murthy, (2010) 13 SCC 530 : (2010) 4 SCC (Civ) 808, this Court taking note of all the earlier judgments of this Court reiterated the aforementioned principle with these words : (SCC pp. 530-31, Paras 3-4) ‘3. How the regular first appeal is to be disposed of by the appellate court/High Court has been considered by this Court in various decisions. 530-31, Paras 3-4) ‘3. How the regular first appeal is to be disposed of by the appellate court/High Court has been considered by this Court in various decisions. Order 41 CPC deals with appeals from original decrees. Among the various rules, Rule 31 mandates that the judgment of the appellate court shall state: (a) the points for determination. (b) the decision thereon. (c) the reasons for the decision. (d) where the decree appealed from is reversed or varied, the relief to which the appellant is entitled. 4. The appellate court has jurisdiction to reverse or affirm the findings of the trial court. The first appeal is a valuable right of the parties and unless restricted by law, the whole case is therein open for rehearing both on questions of fact and law. The judgment of the appellate court must, therefore, reflect its conscious application of mind and record findings supported by reasons, on all the issues arising along with the contentions put forth, and pressed by the parties for decision of the appellate court. Sitting as a court of first appeal, it was the duty of the High Court [H.V. Sreenivasa Murthy vs. B.V. Nagesha, 2008 SCC Online Kar 837] to deal with all the issues and the evidence led by the parties before recording its findings. The first appeal is a valuable right and the parties have a right to be heard both on questions of law and on facts and the judgment in the first appeal must address itself to all the issues of law and fact and decide it by giving reasons in support of the findings. (Vide Santosh Hazari vs. Purushottam Tiwari, (2001) 3 SCC 179 and Madhukar vs. Sangram, (2001) 4 SCC 756 ).” 17. In Shasidhar vs. Ashwini Uma Mathad, (2015) 11 SCC 269 , it was held as under: (SCC p. 277, Para 21) “21. Being the first appellate court, it was, therefore, the duty of the High Court [Shasidhar vs. Ashwini Uma Mathad, 2012 SCC Online Kar 8774] to decide the first appeal keeping in view the scope and powers conferred on it under Section 96 read with Order 41 Rule 31 of the Code mentioned above. Being the first appellate court, it was, therefore, the duty of the High Court [Shasidhar vs. Ashwini Uma Mathad, 2012 SCC Online Kar 8774] to decide the first appeal keeping in view the scope and powers conferred on it under Section 96 read with Order 41 Rule 31 of the Code mentioned above. It was unfortunately not done, thereby, causing prejudice to the appellants whose valuable right to prosecute the first appeal on facts and law was adversely affected which, in turn, deprived them of a hearing in the appeal in accordance with law.” 18. It is clear from the above provisions and the decisions of this Court that the judgment of the first appellate court has to set out points for determination, record the decision thereon and give its own reasons. Even when the first appellate court affirms the judgment of the trial court, it is required to comply with the requirement of Order 41 Rule 31 and non-observance of this requirement leads to infirmity in the judgment of the first appellate court. No doubt, when the appellate court agrees with the views of the trial court on evidence, it need not restate effect of evidence or reiterate reasons given by the trial court. Expression of a general agreement with the reasons given by the trial court would ordinarily suffice. 19. Keeping in mind the above principles, let us examine the present case. As stated above, the issue relating to readiness and willingness of the plaintiff to perform his part of the contract and issue relating to limitation were held against the plaintiff and the suit was accordingly dismissed. The appeal before the High Court involved both disputed questions of law and fact. The High Court without examination of any of these aspects has dismissed the appeal by a cryptic order. The court below has neither re-appreciated the evidence of the parties, nor it has passed a reasoned order. The High Court has failed to follow the provisions of Order 41 Rule 31 CPC while deciding the appeal. Mr. Bhat has argued that the suit was well within time under Article 54 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act. Even this question has not been examined in its proper perspective.” 28. The High Court has failed to follow the provisions of Order 41 Rule 31 CPC while deciding the appeal. Mr. Bhat has argued that the suit was well within time under Article 54 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act. Even this question has not been examined in its proper perspective.” 28. Yet again in Karuppuraj vs. M. Ganesan, 2021 SCC Online SC 857, the Apex Court in Para 22 to 26 of the said report has held as under: “.............22. It also appears that the High Court has disposed of the appeal preferred under Order XLI CPC read with Section 96 in a most casual and perfunctory manner. Apart from the fact that the High Court has not framed the points for determination as required under Order XLI Rule 31 CPC, it appears that even the High Court has not exercised the powers vested in it as a First Appellate Court. As observed above, the High Court has neither re-appreciated the entire evidence on record nor has given any specific findings on the issues which were even raised before the learned Trial Court. 23. In the case of B.V. Nagesh (supra), this Court has observed and held that without framing points for determination and considering both facts and law; without proper discussion and assigning the reasons, the First Appellate Court cannot dispose of the first appeal under Section 96 CPC and that too without raising the points for determination as provided under Order XLI Rule 31 CPC. In paragraphs 3 and 4, it is observed and held as under: “3. How the regular first appeal is to be disposed of by the appellate court/High Court has been considered by this Court in various decisions. Order 41 CPC deals with appeals from original decrees. Among the various rules, Rule 31 mandates that the judgment of the appellate court shall state: (a) the points for determination. (b) the decision thereon. (c) the reasons for the decision. (d) where the decree appealed from is reversed or varied, the relief to which the appellant is entitled. 4. The appellate court has jurisdiction to reverse or affirm the findings of the trial court. The first appeal is a valuable right of the parties and unless restricted by law, the whole case is therein open for rehearing both on questions of fact and law. 4. The appellate court has jurisdiction to reverse or affirm the findings of the trial court. The first appeal is a valuable right of the parties and unless restricted by law, the whole case is therein open for rehearing both on questions of fact and law. The judgment of the appellate court must, therefore, reflect its conscious application of mind and record findings supported by reasons, on all the issues arising along with the contentions put forth, and pressed by the parties for decision of the appellate court. Sitting as a court of first appeal, it was the duty of the High Court to deal with all the issues and the evidence led by the parties before recording its findings. The first appeal is a valuable right and the parties have a right to be heard both on questions of law and on facts and the judgment in the first appeal must address itself to all the issues of law and fact and decide it by giving reasons in support of the findings. (Vide Santosh Hazari vs. Purushottam Tiwari, (2001) 3 SCC 179 and Madhukar vs. Sangram, (2001) 4 SCC 756 ).” 24. In the case of Emmsons International Limited (supra) while considering the scope and ambit of exercise of powers under Section 96 of CPC by the Appellate Court and after considering the decisions of this Court in the cases of Madhukar vs. Sangram, (2001) 4 SCC 756 , H.K.N. Swami vs. Irshad Basith (Dead) by LRs. (2005) 10 SCC 243 and Jagannath vs. Arulappa, (2005) 12 SCC 303 , it is held that sitting as a Court of First Appeal, it is the duty of the Appellate Court to deal with all the issues and the evidence led by the parties before recording its findings. 25. In the case of H. Siddiqui (Dead) by LRs. (supra), it is observed and held in paragraph 21 as under: “21. The said provisions provide guidelines for the appellate court as to how the court has to proceed and decide the case. The provisions should be read in such a way as to require that the various particulars mentioned therein should be taken into consideration. Thus, it must be evident from the judgment of the appellate court that the court has properly appreciated the facts/evidence, applied its mind and decided the case considering the material on record. The provisions should be read in such a way as to require that the various particulars mentioned therein should be taken into consideration. Thus, it must be evident from the judgment of the appellate court that the court has properly appreciated the facts/evidence, applied its mind and decided the case considering the material on record. It would amount to substantial compliance with the said provisions if the appellate court's judgment is based on the independent assessment of the relevant evidence on all important aspects of the matter and the findings of the appellate court are well founded and quite convincing. It is mandatory for the appellate court to independently assess the evidence of the parties and consider the relevant points which arise for adjudication and the bearing of the evidence on those points. Being the final court of fact, the first appellate court must not record mere general expression of concurrence with the trial court judgment rather it must give reasons for its decision on each point independently to that of the trial court. Thus, the entire evidence must be considered and discussed in detail. Such exercise should be done after formulating the points for consideration in terms of the said provisions and the court must proceed in adherence to the requirements of the said statutory provisions. (Vide Sukhpal Singh vs. Kalyan Singh, AIR 1963 SC 146 , Girijanandini Devi vs. Bijendra Narain Choudhary, AIR 1967 SC 1124 , G. Amalorpavam vs. R.C. Diocese of Madurai, (2006) 3 SCC 224 , Shiv Kumar Sharma vs. Santosh Kumari, (2007) 8 SCC 600 and Gannmani Anasuya vs. Parvatini Amarendra Chowdhary, (2007) 10 SCC 296 : AIR 2007 SC 2380 ).” 26. Applying the law laid down by this Court in the aforesaid decisions, if the impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court is considered, in that case, there is a total non-compliance of the provisions of the Order XLI Rule 31 CPC. The High Court has failed to exercise the jurisdiction vested in it as a First Appellate Court; the High Court has not at all re-appreciated the entire evidence on record; and not even considered the reasoning given by the learned Trial Court, in particular, on findings recorded by the learned Trial Court on the issue of willingness. The High Court has failed to exercise the jurisdiction vested in it as a First Appellate Court; the High Court has not at all re-appreciated the entire evidence on record; and not even considered the reasoning given by the learned Trial Court, in particular, on findings recorded by the learned Trial Court on the issue of willingness. Therefore, as such, the impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court is unsustainable and in normal circumstances we would have accepted the request of the learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent to remand the matter to the High Court for fresh consideration of appeal. However, even on other points also, the impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court is not sustainable. We refrain from remanding the matter to the High Court and we decide the appeal on merits.” 29. Having noticed the powers and the manner in which the First Appellate Court is required to deal with an appeal under Section 96 C.P.C. on the aforesaid touchstone if the judgment of the Lower Appellate Court is seen, it would indicate that it has clearly noticed the pleadings of the parties. It has also met with the reasons recorded by the Trial Court. The Lower Appellate Court is the final court of facts and also law. 30. In the aforesaid backdrop, the Lower Appellate Court while recording its reasons and reversing the finding of the Trial Court has noticed that the sale deed executed in favour of the defendant nos. 1 and 2 appears to be ante-dated. While arriving at the aforesaid conclusion, it has also noticed that the grounds as raised in the written statement primarily by defendant nos. 1 and 2 was that the sale deed dated 15.04.1971 was executed by Baijnath in favour of the defendant nos. 1 and 2 but he was not well and thus the registration of the sale deed could not be done which was ultimately registered on 04.08.1971 when Baijnath regained his health. 31. There is nothing on record nor any evidence was led by the defendant to clearly establish the execution of the deed on 15.04.1971. Since it was the case of the defendant that the sale deed was executed on 15.04.1971, hence, the burden was on the defendants to have clearly led evidence to establish execution of the sale deed on 15.04.1971. There is nothing on record nor any evidence was led by the defendant to clearly establish the execution of the deed on 15.04.1971. Since it was the case of the defendant that the sale deed was executed on 15.04.1971, hence, the burden was on the defendants to have clearly led evidence to establish execution of the sale deed on 15.04.1971. The defendant has not brought on record any witness of the alleged sale deed before whom the said execution of the deed dated 15.04.1971 took place. Even otherwise the Lower Appellate Court noticed that the defendants had raised a plea that Baijnath was not well and was unable to get the deed registered right after its execution on 15.04.1971 till 03.08.1971 i.e. when the sale deed came to be registered. The ground of illness raised by the defendant was also not established as there was no evidence either documentary or otherwise to indicate the nature of illness as to whether on account of illness of Baijnath, he was unable to move and he remained ill continuously from 15.04.191 till 04.08.1971. 32. On the contrary, it is the admitted case of both the parties that a sale deed was executed by Baijnath on 25.07.1971. Thus, it would be clear that Baijnath was quite well that he went to the Registrar's office on 25.07.1971 in order to execute the sale deed in favour of the plaintiffs. Had Baijnath executed the sale deed on 15.04.1971 and was unable to get the same registered on account of his illness, there was no occasion for Baijnath to hold himself back till August and in the meantime he voluntarily would go before the Sub-Registrar's office on 25.07.1971 and execute a sale deed in favour of the plaintiffs and defendant nos. 3. Though, from the evidence on record, it could not be clearly established that the stamp duty procured by the defendants nos. 1 and 2 was ante-dated but nevertheless the evidence gives a suggestive finding that the stamp duty which was purchased from the Stamp Vendor who had not maintained proper entries in its register. 33. It is also another fact noticed by the Lower Appellate Court that in case if the sale deed was executed in favour of the plaintiffs and the defendant no. 33. It is also another fact noticed by the Lower Appellate Court that in case if the sale deed was executed in favour of the plaintiffs and the defendant no. 3 by resorting to fraud and not only the house but the land was also included in the sale deed of the plaintiff, then there was nothing on record to suggest that what prevented the defendants including its predecessor namely Baijnath to have instituted a suit for cancellation of the sale deed of the plaintiffs. 34. During his lifetime Baijnath did not question the sale deed of the plaintiffs. In the aforesaid circumstance, even the defendant knowing fully well that the plaintiff had instituted a suit for cancellation of the sale deeds of the defendant no. 1, yet the defendants did not choose to file any suit or seek a counter claim seeking cancellation of the sale deed of the plaintiff. 35. Considering and noticing of the aforesaid facts including the evidence, the Lower Appellate Court found that the findings recorded by the Trial Court was not justified. The manner in which certain witnesses were discredited rather their testimony were discarded also does not reflect the cogent ground on which the Trial Court dismissed the suit. Thus, it cannot be said that the findings recorded by the Lower Appellate Court are beyond the evidence available on record. As a First Appellate Court, it has the right to either affirm the findings of the Trial Court or to reverse the same. 36. From the perusal of the record, it appears that the Lower Appellate Court has re-appraised the evidence and recorded its own findings by reversing the findings of the Trial Court. It cannot be said that the view taken by the Lower Appellate Court is perverse or no reasonable person could have arrived at the aforesaid conclusion. As already noticed above, the defendants did not lead any evidence to prove the due execution of the sale deed dated 15.04.1971. 37. This Court taking a holistic view of the matters is of the considered opinion that the findings recorded by the Lower Appellate Court are based on the evidence available on record and cannot be said to be perverse in the sense that it is based on material which is not available on record or is based on inadmissible evidence. 37. This Court taking a holistic view of the matters is of the considered opinion that the findings recorded by the Lower Appellate Court are based on the evidence available on record and cannot be said to be perverse in the sense that it is based on material which is not available on record or is based on inadmissible evidence. The findings of the Lower Appellate Court being pure findings of fact do not raise any substantial question as urged by the learned counsel for the appellant. 38. In the facts and circumstances, the Lower Appellate Court has rightly exercised its power as conferred under Section 96 C.P.C. and as noticed by the Apex Court in the case of Sudarsan Puhan (Supra) as well as in Malluru Mallappa (Supra). 39. In light of the aforesaid discussions, this Court is of the view that the appeal has no merit, accordingly, the same is dismissed. The judgment and decree passed by the Lower Appellate Court dated 20.10.1984 in Civil Appeal No. 148 of 1979 is affirmed. In the facts and circumstances, there shall be no order as to costs. The record of the Trial Court shall be remitted to the Court concerned within a period of two weeks.