JUDGMENT : (1) By way of the present writ petition, the petitioners have challenged the action of the respondents in denying them the reservation available under the category of Ex-Servicemen. (2) The facts relevant for the present purposes, concisely stated are, that the State Government issued a recruitment notification dated 30.12.2015, notifying 178 posts for Driver-cum-Fire Machine Operator, out of which, 22 posts were shown to be earmarked for ex-servicemen. (3) In pursuance of above notification, the petitioners participated in the selection process. According to the petitioners, having cleared written examination, they were called for driving test, but the same was, however, not conducted and the recruitment process was kept in abeyance. (4) The process was re-initiated on 22.11.2019, however, with the following stipulation:- ^^5- blds vfrfjDr dkfeZd ¼d&2½ ds uksfVfQds'ku uEcj F.5(1)(DOP/A-II/2008 fnukad 10-10-2008 ds izko/kkuqlkj HkwriwoZ lSfudks dks okgu pkyd Qk;j in ij vkj{k.k ns; ugha gSA^^ (5) Petitioners being ex-servicemen are aggrieved with the above condition in the notification dated 22.11.2019, as their right/reservation for the post of Driver-cum-Fire Machine Operator has been taken away. (6) Learned counsel for the petitioners argued that when the recruitment was set in motion on 30.12.2015, 22 posts for exservicemen were clearly earmarked, hence the subsequent advertisement, which is nothing but a continuation of the earlier process, cannot do away with the seats reserved for exservicemen and petitioners’ vested rights cannot be taken away. (7) Inviting Court’s attention towards the opening paragraph of the advertisement, learned counsel highlighted that the recruitment in question is governed by the Rajasthan Municipal (Subordinate and Ministerial Staff) Service Rules, 1963 (for short, ‘the Rules of 1963’). He submitted that the respondents have taken these 22 posts out of purview of reservation apparently in light of the amendment brought in various service rules by the notification dated 10.10.2008. He emphatically argued that the amendment in Rajasthan Civil Service (Absorption of Ex- Servicemen) Rules, 1988 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the rules of 1988’) cannot be made applicable to the present recruitment, which is governed by the Rules of 1963. He emphatically argued that the amendment in Rajasthan Civil Service (Absorption of Ex- Servicemen) Rules, 1988 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the rules of 1988’) cannot be made applicable to the present recruitment, which is governed by the Rules of 1963. (8) He emphasized that as a matter of fact the post is “Drivers (Fire)” as prescribed in Clause (H) of Part (A) of the Schedule appended with the Rules of 1963 and hence, firstly the deletion of expression “Driver” by way of notification dated 10.10.2008, issued under the Rules of 1988, does not make any difference as the post in question is “Drivers (Fire)” and not “Drivers” simplicitor. (9) Learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that Rule 6 of the Rules clearly define the services that are governed by the Rules of 1963. He pointed out that paras E and H of Rule 6 under the heading Motor Garage and Fire Fighting separately prescribes “Drivers (Motor Vehicles)” and Drivers (Fire) and thus, the post in question is covered by para ‘(H)’ of Rule 6(1)(A). According to him, the post Drivers (Fire) is nowhere mentioned in the Rules of 1988, hence, the amendment by notification dated 10.10.2008, deleting the post ‘Driver’ shall have no bearing on the reservation at least qua the post of Drivers (Fire). (10) In other words, argument of learned counsel for the petitioner has been that unless Rules of 1963 are suitably amended, the applicability of reservation to the extent of 12.5% to ex-servicemen cannot be done away with, particularly when Rule 9(2) of the Rules of 1963 specifically provides for 12.5% reservation to ex-servicemen. (11) He argued that Rajasthan Municipal (Subordinate Ministerial Service) Rules, 1963 is a special legislation meant for the employees of municipalities, whereas the Rajasthan Civil Services (Absorption of Ex-Servicemen) Rules, 1988 is a general legislation, applicable to almost all the departments of the Government, hence, the provisions contained in the Rules of 1963 will prevail over the Rules of 1988 and regardless of the provisions of Rules of 1988, 12.5% seats have to be kept reserved for ex-servicemen by virtue of Rule 9(2) of the Rules of 1963. (12) Mr. (12) Mr. Sunil Beniwal, learned AAG, admitted that in the recruitment notification/ advertisement dated 30.12.2015, a stipulation was made that 22 posts will be reserved for exservicemen, however, when the respondents realized that by virtue of the notification dated 10.10.2008 (Annex.R/2), the reservation applicable for the post of Drivers, which also applies to Driver-cum-Fire Machine Operators, has been withdrawn, an amended advertisement dated 22.11.2019 came to be issued with the contentious condition, providing that reservation to exservicemen would not be available. (13) Inviting Court’s attention towards the notification dated 10.10.2008, Mr. Beniwal, learned Additional Advocate General submitted that there was inherent discrepancy or irregularity in the recruitment notification dated 30.12.2015, providing 22 posts for the ex-servicemen ignoring the fact that provision for reservation to ex-servicemen on the post of Driver stood deleted in 2008. He argued that Note No.5 of the advertisement dated 22.11.2019 challenged in the writ petition is perfectly valid and in accordance with law. (14) It was argued that reservation cannot be claimed as a matter of right, unless the relevant statute or provision provides for reservation for a particular post. Learned counsel relied upon a coordinate Bench decision dated 26.02.2018 in the case of Mahendra Singh Vs. State of Rajasthan (SBCWP No.7399/2016) and submitted that petitioners’ claim of reservation is baseless and untenable in light of Mahendra Singh’s judgment, as it has been categorically held that reservation to ex-servicemen on the post of Driver is not available. (15) Mr. Hanuman Singh Choudhary, learned counsel for the petitioners, in rejoinder, argued that the judgment of this Court in the case of Mahendra Singh (supra) is not applicable to the facts of the present case. He submitted that the controversy in the case of Mahendra Singh (supra) was entirely different as the petitioners involved in the case of Mahendra Singh (supra) were claiming reservation on the posts of Executive Officer (IV), Revenue Officer (II), Revenue Inspector etc. (16) In order to bring the difference to fore, he explained that the petitioner Mahendra Singh claimed that since the reservation has been given to the posts mentioned in S.No.15, i.e. Driver-cum- Fire Machine Operator, the same be given to the post on which the petitioners intended to apply. And it was in that context, the Coordinate Bench had observed that after deletion of expression “Driver”, the reservation granted to Driver-cum-Fire Machine Operator was not in accordance with law. And it was in that context, the Coordinate Bench had observed that after deletion of expression “Driver”, the reservation granted to Driver-cum-Fire Machine Operator was not in accordance with law. (17) Attention of the Court was drawn towards the amendment brought in the Rules of 1988 by way of the notification dated 17.04.2018, whereby the Schedule to the Rules of 1988 has been omitted and simultaneously a provision has been made that 12.5% reservation will be available on all ministerial posts. On the basis of the amended Rules of 1988, a half-hearted argument was advanced that since the recruitment notification was issued on 22.11.2019, reservation to the tune of 12.5% on the post in question is available to the ex-servicemen. (18) Mr. R.S. Choudhary, learned counsel appearing for the applicant-respondents – the selected candidate, submitted that petitioners’ argument is fallacious. He invited Court’s attention towards Rule 2 of the Rules of 1988 and argued that these Rules are having over-riding effect and after promulgation of these Rules, reservation to ex-servicemen is governed by the Rules of 1988 and not by any other provision governing reservation to exservicemen in the relevant Rules, including the Rules of 1963. (19) Heard. (20) Before adverting to the rival contentions, it would be appropriate to first decide as to whether reservation of exservicemen shall be governed by Rule 9 of the Rules of 1963 or by the Rules of 1988. (21) Rule 2 of the Rules of 1988 reads thus:- “2. Scope.- Notwithstanding the provisions contained in any existing rules, regulation the recruitment and promotion of persons in various services of the State or in the rules that may be framed hereinafter, the ex-servicemen shall be eligible for recruitment and appointment to the posts in all the Departments of the State Government as specified in Schedule I : Provided that- (1) Such appointment shall not exceed – (a) 12 1/2% of the posts in Ministerial and Subordinate Services; and (b) 15% of the posts in Class IV service to be filled in a year by direct recruitment. XXX XXX XXX” (22) In the considered opinion of this Court, the Rules of 1988 which begins with non-obstante clause by using expression “Notwithstanding the provision contained in any existing Rules...”, shall have supremacy and over-riding effect over all other Rules governing reservation to ex-servicemen. XXX XXX XXX” (22) In the considered opinion of this Court, the Rules of 1988 which begins with non-obstante clause by using expression “Notwithstanding the provision contained in any existing Rules...”, shall have supremacy and over-riding effect over all other Rules governing reservation to ex-servicemen. (23) The reservation is available to the extent of the percentage and departments mentioned in Schedule-I, appended to the Rules of 1988. Though, the Schedule-I appended to the Rules of 1988 does not specifically make reference of the Rules of 1963, however, Entry No.33 thereof, makes the Schedule applicable to all departments for the posts mentioned therein. Entry No.33, prior to 10.10.2008 read thus:- “(1) Stenographer (2) L.D.Cs. (3) Telephone/Telex Operator. (4) Drivers (5) Mechanics (6) Class IV Employees & Ors.” (24) It is noteworthy that by virtue of notification dated 10.10.2008 (Annex.R/2) – Rajasthan Civil Services (Absorption of Ex-Servicemen) (Amendment) Rules, 2008, the Rajasthan Civil Services (Absorption of Ex-Servicemen) Rules, 1988 came to be amended and as a consequence of Rule 2(vii) thereof, the expression “Driver” in column No.3 against S.No.33 has been deleted. (25) Upon publication of Rules of 1988, 12.5% reservation has been provided in all departments so far as the post of Driver is concerned. It is pertinent to note that after amendment vide notification dated 10.10.2008, expression “Driver” in S.No.33 of the Schedule has been deleted. As the post of “Driver” has been deleted, the very reservation to the post of Driver stood obliterated. (26) True it is, that the post in question is Drivers (Fire), but then, it is to be noted that as per Entry No.33 of the Schedule-I to Rules of 1988, the reservation to ex-servicemen has been confined to six posts mentioned in Entry No.33, so far as the remaining departments not separately mentioned in the Schedule are concerned. The logical fall-out of Entry No.33 of the Schedule-I is, that prior to amendment in 2008, the State was required to provide 12.5% reservation to ex-servicemen at the time of recruiting ‘Driver’. (27) As a matter of fact, since the reservation to ex-servicemen was only for the post of Driver, the respondents could not have provided reservation for the post of ‘Driver-cum-Fire Machine Operator’. Be that as it may. Any reservation provided contrary to the Rules, was void ab initio. (27) As a matter of fact, since the reservation to ex-servicemen was only for the post of Driver, the respondents could not have provided reservation for the post of ‘Driver-cum-Fire Machine Operator’. Be that as it may. Any reservation provided contrary to the Rules, was void ab initio. On that count or otherwise, upon realizing their mistake, if the respondents have rectified the same by way of appending condition No.5 in the recruitment notification dated 22.11.2019, no fault can be found in their action. (28) Petitioners’ contention that the State having earmarked 22 posts of Driver-cum-Fire Machine Operator for ex-servicemen cannot roll back the reservation, which was granted by recruitment notification dated 30.12.2015, is not tenable. Even if it is assumed that by virtue of entry “Driver” in Entry No.33, 12.5% reservation was available to ex-servicemen, then, in the face of notification dated 10.10.2008 (Annex.R/2), whereby reservation to driver has been taken away, the stipulation regarding reservation of 22 posts for ex-servicemen on the post of Driver-cum-Fire Machine Operator itself became non-est. (29) Petitioners’ contention so zealously made that the reservation provided to ex-servicemen under the Rules of 1963 by virtue of sub-rule (2) of Rule 9 of the Rules of 1963 operated even till 10.12.2015, as the Rules of 1963 were not amended, appears to be attractive at the first flush but turns out to be hollow, when the same is examined carefully. Before adverting to the same, it will be apt to peruse sub-rule (1) so also sub-rule (2) of Rule 9, which have been quoted hereunder:- “9. Reservation of vacancies for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. – (1) Reservation of vacancies for Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribes shall be in accordance with the order of the Government for such reservation in force at the time of recruitment. (2) Similar/Similarly for ex-servicemen 12 ½% of the total vacancies in a year shall be reserved.” (30) Sub-rule (2) begins with the expression “similarly”. Use of such expression shows that it is not 12.5% reservation simplicitor. Expression “similarly” indicates that 12.5% reservation to exservicemen shall be given as is given in the case of sub-rule (1), which provides that reservation of vacancies for scheduled castes and scheduled tribes shall be in accordance with the order of the Government for such reservation in force at the time of recruitment. Expression “similarly” indicates that 12.5% reservation to exservicemen shall be given as is given in the case of sub-rule (1), which provides that reservation of vacancies for scheduled castes and scheduled tribes shall be in accordance with the order of the Government for such reservation in force at the time of recruitment. Hence, a conjoint reading of sub-rules (1) and (2) of Rule 9 clearly suggests that 12.5% reservation to ex-servicemen is available in line with the orders/Rules of the Government. (31) Hence, obliteration of reservation to ex-servicemen on the post of Drivers by way of notification dated 10.10.2008 mutatis mutandis applies to reservation of Drivers or Driver-cum-Fire Machine Operators, may be the recruitment is seemingly under the Rules of 1963. (32) Adverting to the argument of Mr. Hanuman Singh Choudhary, based on the notification dated 17.04.2018, that Rules of 1988 have been amended and the reservation, which has come into force should be given effect to; this Court is of the firm view that the same has come into being, w.e.f. 17.04.2018, whereas the advertisement in question was issued on 30.12.2015. Admittedly, on 30.12.2015, the reservation to the post of Driver was deleted under the Rules of 1988. Merely because the process, which remained in hibernation, has been set in motion again on 22.11.2019, the petitioners cannot claim that the amendment made in April, 2018 be made applicable to the recruitment in question and appointment be given to ex-servicemen on 22 posts. (33) Mr. Hanuman Singh Choudhary, learned counsel for the petitioners had contended that the Rules of 1963, which are meant for employees of municipalities, are special in nature and thus, they should prevail over the general law, namely, the Exservicemen Absorption Rules of 1988. (34) On the other hand, Mr. Beniwal, learned Additional Advocate General, had argued that Ex-Servicemen Absorption Rules of 1988 are special law as the same have been brought by the Rule making Authority with a view to extensively deal with the reservation on various posts for ex-servicemen in all Government departments and the posts mentioned therein, whereas the Rules of 1963, which deal with general provision governing service conditions of the employees governed by these Rules are general in nature. Learned Additional Advocate General thus, argued that the Rules of 1988, being special law, will have supremacy. (35) Mr. Hanuman Singh, learned counsel for the petitioners, so also Mr. Learned Additional Advocate General thus, argued that the Rules of 1988, being special law, will have supremacy. (35) Mr. Hanuman Singh, learned counsel for the petitioners, so also Mr. Beniwal, learned Additional Advocate General, relied upon the judgment of Hon’ble the Supreme Court rendered in the case of Chief Information Commissioner Vs. High Court of Gujarat, (2020) 4 SCC 702 . (36) The principle, generalia specialibus non derogant, is a well recognized principle of interpretation, which means general provision will not abrogate special provisions or in other words “the special laws should prevail over the general laws”. In the present case, the question, which is to be determined is, which Rules out of the Rules of 1963 and Rules of 1988 are general and which are special. (37) A gainful reference of the judgment of Hon’ble the Supreme Court in the case of Life Insurance Corporation Vs. D.J. Bahadur, (1981) 1 SCC 315 can be made here. In the said judgment, Hon’ble the Supreme Court held that since the core issue was an employer-employee dispute notwithstanding the provision of redressal of grievance in the LIC Act, the provisions of Industrial Disputes Act, being special law, shall prevail. Relevant para of the judgment needs reproduction, which I hereby do:- “52. In determing whether a statute is a special or a general one, the focus must be on the principal subject-matter plus the particular perspective. For certain purposes, an Act may be general and for certain other purposes it may be special and we cannot blur distinctions when dealing with finer points of law. In law, we have a cosmos of relativity, not absolutes – so too in life. The ID Act is a special statute devoted wholly to investigation and settlement of industrial disputes which provides definitionally for the nature of industrial disputes coming within its ambit. It creates an infrastructure for investigation into, solution of and adjudication upon industrial disputes. It also provides the necessary machinery for enforcement of awards and settlements. From alpha to omega the ID Act has one special mission – the resolution of industrial disputes through specialised agencies according to specialised procedures and with special reference to the weaker categories of employees coming within the definition of workmen. It also provides the necessary machinery for enforcement of awards and settlements. From alpha to omega the ID Act has one special mission – the resolution of industrial disputes through specialised agencies according to specialised procedures and with special reference to the weaker categories of employees coming within the definition of workmen. Therefore, with reference to industrial disputes between employers and workmen, the ID Act is a special statute, and the LIC Act does not speak at all with specific reference to workmen. On the other hand, its powers relate to the general aspects of nationalisation, of management when private businesses are nationalised and a plurality of problems which, incidentally, involve transfer of service of existing employees of insurers. The workmen qua workmen and industrial disputes between workmen and the employer as such, are beyond the orbit of and have no specific or special place in the scheme of the LIC Act. And whenever there was a dispute between workmen and management the ID Act mechanism was resorted to. 53. What are we confronted with in the present case, so that I may determine as between the two enactments which is the special? The only subject which has led to this litigation and which is the bone of contention between the parties is an industrial dispute between the Corporation and its workman qua workmen. If we refuse to be obfuscated by legal abracadabra and see plainly what is so obvious, the conclusion that flows, in the wake of the study I have made, is that vis-a-vis ‘industrial disputes’ at the termination of the settlement as between the workmen and the Corporation the ID Act is a special legislation and the LIC Act a general legislation. Likewise, when compensation on natialisation is the question, the LIC Act is the special statute. Likewise, when compensation on natialisation is the question, the LIC Act is the special statute. An application of the generalia maxim as expounded by English textbooks and decisions leaves us in no doubt that the ID Act being special law, prevails over the LIC Act which is but general law.” (38) In the opinion of this Court, since the issue at hand is concerning reservation to ex-servicemen, the Rules of 1988, which have been incorporated with a view to extensively deal with and governing reservation to ex-servicemen, the categories of services, in which reservation shall be granted and the percentage thereof, is a special legislation whereas Rules of 1963, which are essentially meant to codify service conditions of the employees mentioned in Rule 6 is a general legislation, though these Rules incidentally contain a separate provision in the form of Rule 9(2) to deal with the reservation to ex-servicemen. (39) Such being the position, in the considered opinion of this Court, the Rules of 1988, being special law, will have supremacy over the Rules of 1963. (40) Hon’ble the Supreme Court, in the case of Ajoy Kumar Banerjee Vs. Union of India, (1984) 3 SCC 127 , has culled out a principle, which if applied in the present case, clinches the issue. Accordingly, even if the Rules of 1963 are treated to be special in nature, in light of para No.38 of the judgment aforesaid, the Rules of 1988, which have been introduced later in point of time, shall prevail by virtue of the principle of interpretation- “leges posteriores priores contrarias abrogant”. The twin conditions mentioned in para No.38 are duly satisfied in the present set of facts and, therefore, in the opinion of this Court, the Rules of 1963 will have to yield to the Rules of 1988. Thus, the reservation to ex-servicemen shall be governed by the Rules of 1988. Para No.38 of the aforesaid judgment reads thus:- “38. Wrongful dismissal, other disciplinary proceedings, unfair labour practices, victimization etc. would still remain unaffected by any scheme or any provision of the Act. Thus, the reservation to ex-servicemen shall be governed by the Rules of 1988. Para No.38 of the aforesaid judgment reads thus:- “38. Wrongful dismissal, other disciplinary proceedings, unfair labour practices, victimization etc. would still remain unaffected by any scheme or any provision of the Act. The only relevant and material question that would have arisen, is, whether in case where a statutory ceiling which one of the counsel for the petitioners tried to describe as “statutory gherao on rise of increase in emoluments and other benefits with the rise in the cost of index of prices (sic)” affected the position under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. It may be noted as we have noted before that this is not a case where any dispute was pending before any tribunal or before any authority under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 between the workmen concerned and the insurance companies. Though there was conciliation proceedings, the conciliation proceedings could not reach to any successful solution and the Conciliation Officer has made a report of failure of conciliation. The Government had the report. Thereafter the Government has not referred the dispute to any industrial tribunal but has framed a scheme which is the subject matter of challenge before us. It cannot, in our opinion, be said that conciliation proceedings or any proceedings under the Industrial Disputes Act were pending and therefore in the middle of the proceedings under the Industrial Disputes Act, the Government had acted and framed the scheme and as such the same was bad and illegal. There were no proceedings pending under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. With the finding of the Conciliation Officer, the Government had two options, either reaching a settlement or framing a scheme on the one hand or to make a reference to the tribunal of the dispute regarding the points mentioned in the demands of the workmen. There is one factual dispute which, in our opinion, is not very material. According to the petitioners, the Government had not acknowledged the receipt of the failure report of the Conciliation Officer. According to the respondents, the receipt was acknowledged; the failure of the conciliation proceedings, however, is admitted. No further steps or proceedings were required as such. The Government had to assess on the failure of the conciliation proceedings either to refer the matter to the tribunal or to take such steps as it considered necessary. According to the respondents, the receipt was acknowledged; the failure of the conciliation proceedings, however, is admitted. No further steps or proceedings were required as such. The Government had to assess on the failure of the conciliation proceedings either to refer the matter to the tribunal or to take such steps as it considered necessary. If the Government had not taken any of the steps, then it was open, if the employees concerned were in any way aggrieved, to take appropriate proceedings against the Government for doing so. As mentioned hereinbefore if the scheme was held to be valid, then the question what is the general law and what is the special law and which law in case of conflict would prevail would have arisen and that would have necessitated the application of the principle “Generalia specialibus non derogant”. The general rule to be followed in case of conflict between two statutes is that the later abrogates the earlier one. In other words, a prior special law would yield to a later general law, if either of the two following conditions is satisfied : (i) The two are inconsistent with each other. (ii) There is some express reference in the later to the earlier enactment. If either of these two conditions is fulfilled, the later law, even though general, would prevail.” (41) The general laws on matters covered by special laws are required to be by-passed. The provision contained in Rule 9(2) of the Rules of 1963 relating to reservation to ex-servicemen will be pushed out of its province because of the Rules of 1988, on the basis of the following principle propounded by the Apex court in Shriram Mandir Sansthan Vs. Vatsalabai & Ors., AIR 1999 SC 520 , at p.524. “Special subsequent legislation which is a code in itself excludes the general law on the subject.” (40) As an upshot of the discussion foregoing, this Court does not find any substance and merit in the present writ petition. The same is, therefore, dismissed. (42) Needless to observe that as a natural corollary of dismissal of the writ petition, the interim order passed by this Court on 08.01.2020, modified on 22.07.2020, stands vacated. The stay application stands dismissed accordingly.