JUDGMENT : 1. This application for review of judgment and order dated 25.10.2019 passed in Second Appeal No. 383 of 2019 with Civil Application No. 1 of 2019 passed by the late Justice G. R. Udhwani arises from the fact that a lease agreement in respect of the suit property, entered Into between the opponent original plaintiff (for short “landlord”) and the appellant (for short “the tenant”) on 04.04.1979 for a period of 25 years expired on 03.04.2004. According to the learned counsel for the tenant, lease of immovable property was for manufacturing purpose. On the date of the execution of the agreement it was governed by the provisions of the Bombay Rent Act. However, the learned Judge has held that the interse obligations and the rights would be governed by Transfer of Property Act not Rent Act. 2. Justice Udhwani having expired, this review application is placed before me. The appellant challenged judgment and decree dated 30.07.2019 rendered by learned Second Additional District Judge, Chhota-Udepur in Regular Civil Appeal No.37 of 2017 confirming the judgment and decree of eviction rendered by the learned Principal Civil Judge, Chhota-Udepur on 31.12.2012 in Regular Civil Suit No. 36 of 2004 is sought to be assailed in this appeal under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure (for short “CPC”). 3. Heard Mr. Percy C. Kavina, learned Senior Advocate appearing with Mr. Lalji R. Mokaria, learned advocate for the applicants and Mr. Mehul S. Shah, learned Senior Advocate appearing with Mr. A. R. Kadri, learned advocate for the respondents. 4. Mr. Percy C. Kavina, learned Senior Advocate has pointed out the provisions of the Rent Act and has also submitted that the learned Trial Court has firstly accepted the lease agreement and then it was converted into leave and licence agreement. The appellants referred and relied upon the judgment rendered by this Court in the case of Dipak Rasbiharilal Goyel v. Naliniben H Raval, reported in 2012 [2] G.L.H. 44, wherein it is held that the intention of the parties has to be gathered from agreement in question. It is submitted that in the cited decision, the agreement had started in 2007 and notice was issued on 4.10.2008 i.e. after 30.10.2001 being the date of suspension of the Rent Act. But both the Courts below have erred in interpretation of the said judgment. It is submitted that in the cited decision, the agreement had started in 2007 and notice was issued on 4.10.2008 i.e. after 30.10.2001 being the date of suspension of the Rent Act. But both the Courts below have erred in interpretation of the said judgment. He has submitted that this Court has dealt with the provisions of the Rent Act in para 4.2 of the impugned order. It is submitted that there is no any mention of renewal of the contract in the said paragraph. It is submitted that the property in question was not let out after the date of the commencement of the amending Act. 5. The learned Judge having considered the lease agreement and the issues arising there from, decided the appeal and held that the Court was required to examine the matter not on the basis of the Rent Act. The learned Judge also noted the judgment cited in Dipak Rasbiharilal Goyel vs. Naliniben H. Raval reported in 2012(2) GLH 44 . The learned Judge after having examined the matter, ultimately held in paragraph 11 that “In above view of the matter, this court does not find any substantial question of law. The appeal must fail and is dismissed.” 6. The contention of Mr. Kavina is that the learned Judge did not decide the issue of lack of jurisdiction in view of arbitration clause in contract dated 04.04.1979, more particularly reliance is placed on Condition (12) of the contract. This submission has not been raised before the learned Judge and appears to have been given up by the advocate appearing for the appellants. In Ex.21 application applicant has prayed as under: “As the suit of the plaintiffs is barred by the jurisdiction of the Court and as the said fact is against the Condition No.12 of the registered agreement dated 9.4.1979, kindly determine the issue of jurisdiction as preliminary issue under Order 14 Rule 2(A) of CPC and pass the order accordingly.” 7. In support of above submissions Mr. Kavina relied on the decision in the case of Branch Manager, Magma Leasing and Finance Limited and Anr. vs. Potluri Madhavilata and Anr., reported in (2009) 10 SCC 103 . He has relied upon para 18, which states that on fulfillment of condition of Section 8, no option is left to the Court and Court has to refer the parties to arbitration. vs. Potluri Madhavilata and Anr., reported in (2009) 10 SCC 103 . He has relied upon para 18, which states that on fulfillment of condition of Section 8, no option is left to the Court and Court has to refer the parties to arbitration. However, this decision cannot help him because the appellant has not challenged the order rejecting the application Exh.21. 8. Mr. Mehul S. Shah, learned Senior Advocate for the respondents has submitted that the said second appeal came to be dismissed summarily at the admission stage, recording all the submission canvassed by learned counsel appearing in the matter, holding that no substantial question of law is involved in the matter. 9. Mr. Shah for the respondent submitted that the petitioner appellant having not framed any question of law for reference to the arbitration, the learned Judge was right in law in dismissing the appeal. The applicant cannot take up such contention in review. He refers to the decision reported in the case of Modh. Akram Ansari V/s Chief Election Officer, reported in 2008 (2) SCC 95 . 10. He has submitted that the issue raised by applicant in their review application of nonconsideration of points raised in their memo has not been argued before the Court and now raising such issues in view do not render the order passed by the Court erroneous and subject to review. 10. He has submitted that the issue raised by applicant in their review application of nonconsideration of points raised in their memo has not been argued before the Court and now raising such issues in view do not render the order passed by the Court erroneous and subject to review. He has further relied on the provision of Order 47 Rule 1 of Civil Procedure Code which is extracted herein below : “Rule 1 Order XLVII of Code of Civil Procedure 1908 "Application for review of judgment" (1) Any person considering himself aggrieved (a) by a decree or order from which an appeal is allowed, but from no appeal has been preferred, (b) by a decree or order from which no appeal is allowed, or (c) by a decision on a reference from a Court of Small Causes, and who, from the discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence was not within his knowledge or could not be produced by him at the time when the decree was passed or order made, or on account of some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record or for any other sufficient reason, desires to obtain a review of the decree passed or order made against him, may apply for a review of judgment to the Court which passed the decree or made the order. The opponents submits that when the points are not raised by applicant before the Court to deal with then it cannot become a point to be raised in review. The three conditions raised in Order 47 Rule 1, wherein the (1) discovery of new and important evidence, after exercising due diligence could not be produced at the time hearing. The said condition is not raised by applicant in their review application, therefore condition No.1 does not apply to the present application. (2) Error and mistake apparent on the face of record. The said condition is not raised by applicant in their review application, therefore condition No.1 does not apply to the present application. (2) Error and mistake apparent on the face of record. The opponent submits that the second condition also does not apply and satisfied in the present case because there is no question of error apparent on the face of record because there is no question of order of the Court being solicited, and therefore when order of the Court itself is not solicited then there is no question of apparent error on face of record and hence the second condition also does not apply in the present application for review. And lastly the (3) or any other sufficient reason desires to obtain review of order. The said is interpreted by catena of decisions wherein it is to be construed as “Edjusdem Generis”, that means it must take its meaning from its earlier two clauses, not something absolutely novel. If it fall in these two grounds then review is maintainable. Therefore considering the grounds of review provided in the above mentioned provision, the present application does not fall under the said three grounds and therefore it requires to be rejected. 11. Mr. Mehul Shah, learned Senior Advocate has also relied on the following decisions: (a) Kamlesh Verma Vs. Mayawati, reported in AIR 2013 SC 3301 . (b) Cama Hotels Limited Vs. Ingersoll Rand Climate Solutions Pvt. Ltd., rendered in the matter being Special Civil Application No.11038 of 2019. (c) Asharfi Devi (D) Vs. State of U. P., reported in 2019 (5) SCC 86 . (d) Marwadi Sarees and Finance Pvt. Ltd., Vs. Kishorekumar Nagjibhai Mavani , 2009 (2) GLR 938 . He has further reiterated that the application for review is required to be dismissed devoid of merit. 12. I have heard learned advocates for the respective parties. I have gone through the order for review. I have also gone through the evidence led before the trial Court as well as the Ex.21 application. I have also gone through the judgments and orders passed by both the Courts below. 13. As regards the scope of review, in AIR 2006 SC 1634 In case of Haridas Das vs. Smt. Usha Rani Banik and ors., the Apex Court has laid down the principles which are required to be applied while deciding the application for review. I have also gone through the judgments and orders passed by both the Courts below. 13. As regards the scope of review, in AIR 2006 SC 1634 In case of Haridas Das vs. Smt. Usha Rani Banik and ors., the Apex Court has laid down the principles which are required to be applied while deciding the application for review. The Apex Court in paragraph 13 extracting AIR 1964 SC 1372 has observed as under: “13. In order to appreciate the scope of a review, Section 114 of the CPC has to be read, but this section does not even adumbrate the ambit of interference expected of the Court since it merely states that it "may make such order thereon as it thinks fit." The parameters are prescribed in Order XLVII of the CPC and for the purposes of this lis, permit the defendant to press for a rehearing "on account of some mistake or error apparent on the face of the records or for any other sufficient reason". The former part of the rule deals with a situation attributable to the applicant, and the latter to a jural action which is manifestly incorrect or on which two conclusions are not possible. Neither of them postulates a rehearing of the dispute because a party had not highlighted all the aspects of the case or could perhaps have argued them more forcefully and/or cited binding precedents to the Court and thereby enjoyed a favourable verdict. This is amply evident from the explanation in Rule 1 of the Order XLVII which states that the fact that the decision on a question of law on which the judgment of the Court is based has been reversed or modified by the subsequent decision of a superior Court in any other case, shall not be a ground for the review of such judgment. Where the order in question is appealable the aggrieved party has adequate and efficacious remedy and the Court should exercise the power to review its order with the greatest circumspection. Where the order in question is appealable the aggrieved party has adequate and efficacious remedy and the Court should exercise the power to review its order with the greatest circumspection. This Court in M/s. Thungabhadra Industries Ltd. (in all the Appeals) v. The Government of Andhra Pradesh represented by the Deputy Commissioner of Commercial Taxes, Anantapur, [AIR 1964 1372] held as follows: "There Is a distinction which Is real, though It might not always be capable of exposition, between a mere erroneous decision and a decision which could be characterized as vitiated by “error apparent". A review is by no means an appeal in disguise whereby an erroneous decision is reheard and corrected, but lies only for patent error. Where without any elaborate argument one could point to the error and say here is a substantial point of law which states one in the face and there could reasonably be no two opinions entertained about it, a clear case of error apparent on the face of the record would be made out." 14. Review proceedings are not by way of appeal and review powers cannot be exercised on the ground that the decision was erroneous on merit. That would be in the province of a court of appeal. A power of review is not to be confused with appellate power which may enable an appellate Court to correct all manner of error committed by the subordinate court. 15. The learned Judge has given a reasoned decision for dismissal of appeal and it cannot be said that the judgment and order of the learned Judge suffers from error apparent on the face of the record. It is not possible to accede to the argument that there is an error apparent on the face of the record in deciding the appeal. The learned Judge has dealt with the arguments canvassed before him and now to suggest that the same are not considered by the learned Judge cannot be accepted. At the best, any error can only be corrected by the appellate Court. 16. The question of arbitration has not been argued and therefore, the judgment cannot be faulted with in review petition. 17. In the light of above discussion, this Court does not find any legal infirmity in the order dated 25.10.2019 passed by the Court (Corum : G. R. Udhwani, J, as he then was) warranting interference. 18. 16. The question of arbitration has not been argued and therefore, the judgment cannot be faulted with in review petition. 17. In the light of above discussion, this Court does not find any legal infirmity in the order dated 25.10.2019 passed by the Court (Corum : G. R. Udhwani, J, as he then was) warranting interference. 18. For the foregoing reasons, the application fails and is accordingly dismissed with no order as to costs.