JUDGMENT : Virender Singh, J. 1. The appellant has preferred this appeal challenging his conviction under Section 302, Indian Penal Code and sentence of Life Imprisonment with fine of Rs. 500/- and in default Rigorous Imprisonment for one month awarded by Additional Sessions Judge, Nowgaon, District Chhatarpur vide judgment dated 30th April, 2011 delivered in Sessions Trial No. 211/2007. 2. The prosecution case, in brief, is that prior to the incident, a theft was committed in Kalimai Temple in the intervening night of 22-23rd October, 2005 wherein silver crown and girdle (Chandi Ka Mukut and Kardhani) were stolen. Siyasharan Choubey (deceased) was a priest of the temple and he lodged F.I.R. No. 1395/2005 under Sections 457 and 380 I.P.C. suspecting Narendra (appellant). He was prosecuted and acquitted vide judgment dated 21.4.2009. 3. On 7.7.2007, at 11:30 a.m. when the deceased was inside his house, the appellant came and started shouting outside the house. He (appellant) challenged him (deceased) to come out of the house. Responding his call when the deceased came out and asked him as to what happened, He alleged that he had implicated him in the case of theft and wielded helm/oar on his head. The deceased fell down on the ground, but the appellant didn't stop and repeated the blows with full force. The deceased sustained severe injuries on the head and started bleeding. When his nephews Umashankar Mishra and Siyasharan Mishra shouted and run towards him, he run away. Siyasharan chased him, but in vain. The deceased died on the spot. Umashankar lodged Dehati Merg and Dehati Nalshi (Ex. P-10). Based on this, the police registered Merg Ex. P-13 and F.I.R. No. 103/2007 at Police Station Garhi Malehra (Ex. P-11) and investigated the case. During the investigation, the police visited the spot, prepared spot map (Ex. P-4) and memo of corpse (Ex. P-5), sent the body for post-mortem (Ex. P-16), arrested the accused on 9.7.2007 (Ex. P-8), recorded his statement (Ex. P-6) and recovered helm along with his blood-stained shirt and pants (Ex. P-7) from his possession, sent the seized articles to the F.S.L. (Ex. P-19) and recorded statements of Gupalli @ Gopal Raikwar, Om Prakash @ Langad, Siyasharan Mishra and Umashankar Mishra. After completing the investigation, the police filed the charge-sheet. 4. The appellant has been charged under Section 302 I.P.C. He denied the charge and claimed for trial. P-7) from his possession, sent the seized articles to the F.S.L. (Ex. P-19) and recorded statements of Gupalli @ Gopal Raikwar, Om Prakash @ Langad, Siyasharan Mishra and Umashankar Mishra. After completing the investigation, the police filed the charge-sheet. 4. The appellant has been charged under Section 302 I.P.C. He denied the charge and claimed for trial. After the trial, he was convicted and sentenced as stated in paragraph 1 above. 5. The appellant has preferred this appeal on the grounds that the judgment and order of the learned trial Court are contrary to the facts and the evidence available on the record. It has not appreciated the evidence properly and has ignored the contradictions and omissions appeared in the statements of the prosecution witnesses. It has drawn unwarranted inferences. It has erred in placing reliance on the statements of Siyasharan Mishra (PW-3) and Umashankar Mishra (PW-5), who are nephews of the deceased and are highly interested witnesses. Neither their statement nor their conduct is trust-worthy as they did not try to save their real uncle and nor they informed the police immediately after the incident. It has wrongly discarded the statement of defence witness Arun Chourasiya (DW-1). Arun has clearly stated that soon-after the incident he reached on the spot but did not see Siyasharan (PW-3) and Umashankar (PW-5) there. After seeing the deceased lying injured, he asked Manoj (DW-2) to inform them (Siyasharan & Umashankar). Manoj went to their village Magron, and informed them about the incident and only thereafter, they both came and lodged the report. The Trial Court has ignored the opinion of Dr. A.K. Sharma (PW-4) that the death of the deceased was accidental and might have caused due to falling on a hard surface. It has ignored the statement of independent witnesses, who has not supported the case of the prosecution. It has erred in convicting the appellant even when the prosecution failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt. Therefore, it is prayed that the appellant is entitled to acquittal. 6. The prosecution has supported the impugned judgment. 7. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties at length and perused the record. 8. The appellant has questioned the nature of the death of the deceased and has claimed that his death was accidental and was due to sudden accidental fall from the terrace. 6. The prosecution has supported the impugned judgment. 7. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties at length and perused the record. 8. The appellant has questioned the nature of the death of the deceased and has claimed that his death was accidental and was due to sudden accidental fall from the terrace. The learned counsel for the appellant referred to the statement of Dr Sharma (PW-4), who conducted post-mortem and opined that the death appeared to be caused due to falling on a hard and dusty surface. Reference to the opinion of Dr Sharma in its original would be useful, which is as under: "Cause of death is severe damage to brain. Mode of death is impact of hard & blunt object or surface on head. Duration of death is 12-36 hours. Nature of death is accidental most probably due to fall on hard, blunt & dust surface in my opinion." 9. Contrary to this, eye-witnesses Siyasharan and Umashankar (PW-3 & 5) have deposed before the trial Court the death was due to the injuries caused by the appellant and was homicidal. 10. The law in this regard says that when there is a conflict between the expert's opinion and the ocular evidence, the narration of the witnesses, who have seen the incident with their own eyes would be given weightage until and unless expert's opinion completely rules out the truthfulness of their version. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has laid down the law to be followed in such a situation in catena of cases. Here we would like to refer para 32 to 40 of the judgment rendered in the case of Abdul Sayeed Vs. State of M.P., (2010) 10 SCC 259 : (2010) 3 SCC (Cri) 1262 at page 272) wherein after discussing the several judgments on the subject, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that: Medical evidence versus ocular evidence 32. In Ram Narain Singh v. State of Punjab [ (1975) 4 SCC 497 : 1975 SCC (Cri) 571 : AIR 1975 SC 1727 ] this Court held that where the evidence of the witnesses for the prosecution is totally inconsistent with the medical evidence or the evidence of the ballistics expert, it amounts to a fundamental defect in the prosecution case and unless reasonably explained it is sufficient to discredit the entire case. 33. 33. In State of Haryana v. Bhagirath [ (1999) 5 SCC 96 : 1999 SCC (Cri) 658] it was held as follows: (SCC p. 101, para 15) "15. The opinion given by a medical witness need not be the last word on the subject. Such an opinion shall be tested by the court. If the opinion is bereft of logic or objectivity, the court is not obliged to go by that opinion. After all opinion is what is formed in the mind of a person regarding a fact situation. If one doctor forms one opinion and another doctor forms a different opinion on the same facts it is open to the Judge to adopt the view which is more objective or probable. Similarly if the opinion given by one doctor is not consistent with probability the court has no liability to go by that opinion merely because it is said by the doctor. Of course, due weight must be given to opinions given by persons who are experts in the particular subject." (emphasis added) 34. Drawing on Bhagirath case [ (1999) 5 SCC 96 : 1999 SCC (Cri) 658], this Court has held that where the medical evidence is at variance with ocular evidence, "it has to be noted that it would be erroneous to accord undue primacy to the hypothetical answers of medical witnesses to exclude the eyewitnesses' account which had to be tested independently and not treated as the 'variable' keeping the medical evidence as the 'constant'". 35. Where the eyewitnesses' account is found credible and trustworthy, a medical opinion pointing to alternative possibilities cannot be accepted as conclusive. The eyewitnesses' account requires a careful independent assessment and evaluation for its credibility, which should not be adversely prejudged on the basis of any other evidence, including medical evidence, as the sole touchstone for the test of such credibility. "21. ... The evidence must be tested for its inherent consistency and the inherent probability of the story; consistency with the account of other witnesses held to be creditworthy; consistency with the undisputed facts, the 'credit' of the witnesses; their performance in the witness box; their power of observation, etc. "21. ... The evidence must be tested for its inherent consistency and the inherent probability of the story; consistency with the account of other witnesses held to be creditworthy; consistency with the undisputed facts, the 'credit' of the witnesses; their performance in the witness box; their power of observation, etc. Then the probative value of such evidence becomes eligible to be put into the scales for a cumulative evaluation." [Vide Thaman Kumar v. State (UT of Chandigarh) [ (2003) 6 SCC 380 : 2003 SCC (Cri) 1362] and Krishnan v. State [ (2003) 7 SCC 56 : 2003 SCC (Cri) 1577] at SCC pp. 62-63, para 21.] 36. In Solanki Chimanbhai Ukabhai v. State of Gujarat [ (1983) 2 SCC 174 : 1983 SCC (Cri) 379 : AIR 1983 SC 484 ] this Court observed: (SCC p. 180, para 13) "13. Ordinarily, the value of medical evidence is only corroborative. It proves that the injuries could have been caused in the manner alleged and nothing more. The use which the defence can make of the medical evidence is to prove that the injuries could not possibly have been caused in the manner alleged and thereby discredit the eyewitnesses. Unless, however the medical evidence in its turn goes so far that it completely rules out all possibilities whatsoever of injuries taking place in the manner alleged by eyewitnesses, the testimony of the eyewitnesses cannot be thrown out on the ground of alleged inconsistency between it and the medical evidence." (emphasis added) 37. A similar view has been taken in Mani Ram v. State of U.P. [1994 Supp (2) SCC 289 : 1994 SCC (Cri) 1242], Khambam Raja Reddy v. Public Prosecutor [ (2006) 11 SCC 239 : (2007) 1 SCC (Cri) 431] and State of U.P. v. Dinesh [ (2009) 11 SCC 566 : (2009) 3 SCC (Cri) 1484]. 38. In State of U.P. v. Hari Chand [ (2009) 13 SCC 542 : (2010) 1 SCC (Cri) 1112] this Court reiterated the aforementioned position of law and stated that: (SCC p. 545, para 13) "13. ... In any event unless the oral evidence is totally irreconcilable with the medical evidence, it has primacy." 39. 38. In State of U.P. v. Hari Chand [ (2009) 13 SCC 542 : (2010) 1 SCC (Cri) 1112] this Court reiterated the aforementioned position of law and stated that: (SCC p. 545, para 13) "13. ... In any event unless the oral evidence is totally irreconcilable with the medical evidence, it has primacy." 39. Thus, the position of law in cases where there is a contradiction between medical evidence and ocular evidence can be crystallised to the effect that though the ocular testimony of a witness has greater evidentiary value vis-à-vis medical evidence, when medical evidence makes the ocular testimony improbable, that becomes a relevant factor in the process of the evaluation of evidence. However, where the medical evidence goes so far that it completely rules out all possibility of the ocular evidence being true, the ocular evidence may be disbelieved. (emphasis supplied) 40. In the instant case as referred to hereinabove, a very large number of assailants attacked one person, thus the witnesses cannot be able to state as how many injuries and in what manner the same had been caused by the accused. In such a fact situation, discrepancy in medical evidence and ocular evidence is bound to occur. However, it cannot tilt the balance in favour of the appellants. 11. This principle has been reiterated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in CBI v. Mohd. Parvez Abdul Kayuum, (2019) 12 SCC 1 : (2019) 4 SCC (Cri) 32 at page 61. The Court made it clear again that where there is a contradiction between ocular and medical evidence, ocular evidence has greater evidentiary value and only in a case where medical evidence makes the ocular evidence completely improbable, such ocular evidence has to be discarded, but not otherwise. 12. Thus, the law is clear that in cases where there is a conflict between medical and ocular evidence, the testimony of a witness has greater evidentiary value vis-à-vis medical evidence, but when medical evidence makes the ocular testimony improbable, opinion of the expert or the doctor can be taken into account to discard the testimony of the eye witness. 13. The present case is not a case where medical evidence completely improbabilises the ocular evidence. The doctor has suggested only an alternate mode of death. He only expressed a possibility that 'most probably' the death had been caused due to falling on a hard, blunt & dusty surface. 13. The present case is not a case where medical evidence completely improbabilises the ocular evidence. The doctor has suggested only an alternate mode of death. He only expressed a possibility that 'most probably' the death had been caused due to falling on a hard, blunt & dusty surface. The eye-witnesses have firmly and unambiguously stated that the deceased was beaten up by a hard and blunt object. Therefore, in the circumstances, certainly, it is not a case where the ocular evidence has to be discarded. 14. To examine the credibility of the defence taken by the appellant that the death of the deceased was due to accidental fall from the terrace, we would like to begin with a note that the appellant had not taken this defence before the trial Court. He has examined two witnesses in defence, claiming that they were among the persons who reached on the spot immediately after the incident, but none of them has stated that the deceased had fallen from the terrace, rather Arun Chaurasiya (DW-1) has stated that immediately after the incident, Matadeen came to him and informed that "pujari ji ko kisi ne maar diya hai aur ve ghar ke darwaje per pade hai." That is to say that 'someone has killed the priest and his body is lying in front of his door.' He has further stated that after receiving the information, he rushed to the spot, called Sarpanch Virendra Chaurasiya on phone from the spot, who came and intimated the police on phone. Virendra Chaurasiya (PW-9) has stated that on the day of the incident someone had called him and intimated that the priest has been 'murdered' and he intimated the police accordingly (mere mobile par phone aaya that ki pujari ji ka murder ho gaya hai to maine police ko suchna de di thi). 15. Further, close scrutiny of the evidence produced during the trial shows that no such defence was taken in the beginning of the trial during the cross-examination of Omprakash (PW-1). In the cross-examination of second witness Brijesh Chaurasiya (PW-2), it has been suggested that the death was due to some accident, which as appears to us, was a reference to some motor accident. (jab mai mouke par pahucha us samay Virendra Chaurasiya Nagar Panchayat Upadhyaksh, Arum Chaurasiya mouke par the. In the cross-examination of second witness Brijesh Chaurasiya (PW-2), it has been suggested that the death was due to some accident, which as appears to us, was a reference to some motor accident. (jab mai mouke par pahucha us samay Virendra Chaurasiya Nagar Panchayat Upadhyaksh, Arum Chaurasiya mouke par the. Kafi Bheed thi aur do ghante tak isi baat ki charcha hoti rahi ki sai maharaj ka accident ho gaya hai). There is no indication or suggestion that the deceased had fallen from the terrace. Till the time of examination of eye-witnesses Siyasharan Mishra (PW-3), the appellant himself was not sure about the cause of the death. It was suggested in the cross-examination of this witness that the death may be due to fall or might have occurred due to some motor accident (Yeh kahna galat hai ki mere mama ji ko girne se ya kisi vahan se accident ho jane ke karan chote aai thi (Para-12). First time; this defence has been taken firmly only after the examination of Dr Sharma (PW-4), when the prosecution examined the complainant Umashankar Mishra (PW-5). In his cross-examination in para-12, it is suggested that the deceased died due to an accidental fall from the terrace of his house. (yeh kahna galat hai ki mere mama ji makan ki chhat se gir gaye the aur sar me chot aa gai thi aur unka dehant ho gaya tha). There is no other evidence to support the defence of the appellant or even to show that the deceased was having a pakka house with terrace. No such fact is mentioned in the spot map Ex. P/4 and no such suggestion has been given to any of the prosecution witnesses. Therefore, the defence taken by the appellant is not trust-worthy. 16. The testimony of Siyasharan Mishra (PW-3) and Umashankar Mishra (P.W.-5) has been challenged by the appellant on the grounds that being nephews of the deceased, they are highly interested, partisan and bias witnesses and that at the time of the incident they were not present on the spot and were called by Arun Chourasiya and Manoj Chourasiya (DW-1 and DW-2). The learned counsel for the appellant also referred to merg intimation (Ex. P/13). 17. Both Arun Chourasiya and Manoj Chourasiya have stated before the Court that at the time of the incident Arun was at his home. Matadeen informed him that someone has killed the deceased. The learned counsel for the appellant also referred to merg intimation (Ex. P/13). 17. Both Arun Chourasiya and Manoj Chourasiya have stated before the Court that at the time of the incident Arun was at his home. Matadeen informed him that someone has killed the deceased. He went to the spot. Ghasiram Chourasiya, Gopal Chourasiya, Mohanlal Raikwar, Butan Raiwar were present there. He called Sarpanch Virendra on phone. He came on the spot and intimated the police. The police reached on the spot and started inquiry/investigation. He further stated that the deceased was staying alone at his house. His nephews were residing in village Bagron (U.P.). He asked Manoj Chourasiya to call them. Manoj Chourasiya has stated that on the request of Arun he went to the village of nephews of the deceased by motorcycle, informed them and thereafter they both came on the spot by their Car. But, the Trial Court has rightly rejected their version observing that immediately after receiving the information the police rushed to the spot and recorded Dehati Nalshi (Ex. P-10) at 11:30 am, prepared memo of corpse (Ex. P-5) and spot map (Ex. P-4) both at 12:05 p.m. at the instance of Umashankar (P.W.-5). Admittedly, the village of Umashankar and Siyasharan, viz., Bagron is situated in district Mahoba in Uttar Pradesh and is 150 km away from the place of incident. It was not possible for them to come on the spot just within half an hour if they would not have already been present there. Thus, this ground taken by the appellant does not withstand the scrutiny of the Court. 18. The law is well settled that the testimony of the relative or the interested witness cannot be thrown away at the threshold solely on the ground of their relation. The only thing required in such a situation is that their depositions have to be scrutinized cautiously and carefully to rule out the possibility of false implication of any innocent. In this regard we can usefully refer Nagappan v. State, (2013) 15 SCC 252 : (2014) 3 SCC (Cri) 660 at page 255. Para 10 of this judgment is relevant, which reads as under: 10. In this regard we can usefully refer Nagappan v. State, (2013) 15 SCC 252 : (2014) 3 SCC (Cri) 660 at page 255. Para 10 of this judgment is relevant, which reads as under: 10. As regards the first contention about the admissibility of the evidence of PW 1 and PW 3 being closely related to each other and the deceased, first of all, there is no bar in considering the evidence of relatives. It is true that in the case on hand, other witnesses turned hostile and have not supported the case of the prosecution. The prosecution heavily relied on the evidence of PW 1, PW 3 and PW 10. The trial court and the High Court, in view of their relationship, closely analysed their statements and ultimately found that their evidence is clear, cogent and without considerable contradiction as claimed by their counsel. This Court, in a series of decisions, has held that where the evidence of "interested witnesses" is consistent and duly corroborated by medical evidence, it is not possible to discard the same merely on the ground that they were interested witnesses. In other words, relationship is not a factor to affect the credibility of a witness. This Court, in a series of decisions, has held that where the evidence of "interested witnesses" is consistent and duly corroborated by medical evidence, it is not possible to discard the same merely on the ground that they were interested witnesses. In other words, relationship is not a factor to affect the credibility of a witness. (Vide Dalip Singh v. State of Punjab [ AIR 1953 SC 364 : 1953 Cri LJ 1465], Guli Chand v. State of Rajasthan [ (1974) 3 SCC 698 : 1974 SCC (Cri) 222], Vadivelu Thevar v. State of Madras [ AIR 1957 SC 614 : 1957 Cri LJ 1000], Masalti v. State of U.P. [ AIR 1965 SC 202 : (1965) 1 Cri LJ 226], State of Punjab v. Jagir Singh [ (1974) 3 SCC 277 : 1973 SCC (Cri) 886: AIR 1973 SC 2407 ], Lehna v. State of Haryana [ (2002) 3 SCC 76 : 2002 SCC (Cri) 526], Sucha Singh v. State of Punjab [ (2003) 7 SCC 643 : 2003 SCC (Cri) 1697], Israr v. State of U.P. [ (2005) 9 SCC 616 : 2005 SCC (Cri) 1260], S. Sudershan Reddy v. State of A.P. [(2006) 10 SCC 163 : (2006) 3 SCC (Cri) 503], Abdul Rashid Abdul Rahiman Patel v. State of Maharashtra [ (2007) 9 SCC 1 : (2007) 3 SCC (Cri) 323], Waman v. State of Maharashtra [ (2011) 7 SCC 295 : (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 83], State of Haryana v. Shakuntla [ (2012) 5 SCC 171 : (2012) 2 SCC (Cri) 566], Raju v. State of T.N. [ (2012) 12 SCC 701 : (2012) 11 Scale 357 ] and Subal Ghorai v. State of W.B. [ (2013) 4 SCC 607 : (2013) 2 SCC (Cri) 530]). 19. An attempt has been made by the learned counsel for the appellant to dislodge the prosecution case on the ground that independent witnesses have not supported the case of the prosecution but this is a very common fact that no one wants to indulge in the problems of others. But in the criminal jurisprudence, it is the quality of the evidence available on record and not the hostility of some witnesses which is a deciding factor. But in the criminal jurisprudence, it is the quality of the evidence available on record and not the hostility of some witnesses which is a deciding factor. (Rizwan Khan v. State of Chhattisgarh, (2020) 9 SCC 627 ), Periyasami v. State, (2014) 6 SCC 59 : (2014) 5 SCC (Cri) 289 at page 67 Parveen v. State of Haryana, (1996) 11 SCC 365 : 1997 SCC (Cri) 63 at page 367, Baskaran v. State of T.N., (2014) 5 SCC 765 : (2014) 3 SCC (Cri) 629 at page 767, Prem Ballab v. State (Delhi Admn.), (1977) 1 SCC 173 : 1977 SCC (Cri) 78. 20. Motive of the offence has also not been challenged by the appellant. Both the prime witnesses, viz., Siyasharan and Umashankar Mishra have stated that prior to the incident, theft was committed in the temple where the deceased was the priest. He lodged the F.I.R. and the appellant was implicated in that case wherein though he was acquitted yet developed grudges in his mind and was having malice in his heart. On the date of the incident also he shouted as to why the deceased had implicated him in the case of theft and this fact has also not been challenged in the cross-examination of the witnesses. 21. Both the prime witnesses Siyasharan Mishra (P.W.-3) and Umashankar Mishra (P.W.-5) have deposed before the trial Court that at the time of the incident, they were at the house of the deceased. After having food, when they all were sitting in the house at about 11:00 am, the accused came and shouted outside the house. He challenged the deceased to come out of the house and when he went outside, he shouted that he had implicated him in the case of theft committed in his temple and wielded helm on his head repeatedly. He fell down on the floor and died. They rushed to the spot, chased the accused but he successfully ran-away towards hill with the helm. They both have clearly stated that the deceased died due to the injuries caused by the appellant. Cross-examination could not corrode their credibility. 22. The incident was intimated to the police by Virendra Chourasiya, the police reached on the spot, where Umashankar lodged Dehati Nalshi clearly narrating the incident and naming the accused. The police prepared the spot map, memo of corpse, sent the body for postmortem, Dr. Cross-examination could not corrode their credibility. 22. The incident was intimated to the police by Virendra Chourasiya, the police reached on the spot, where Umashankar lodged Dehati Nalshi clearly narrating the incident and naming the accused. The police prepared the spot map, memo of corpse, sent the body for postmortem, Dr. A.K. Sharma conducted post-mortem and submitted a report observing several injuries on the head of the deceased. The police seized an oar, blood-stained shirt and pants from his possession and sent all the articles for F.S.L. examination which confirmed the presence of Group "B" human blood on the pants of the appellant. It is not the case of the appellant that his blood group is "B". Dr. A.K. Sharma (P.W.4), Investigating Officer Rajesh Singh Banjare (PW-12), Scientist FSL Sagar Nilesh Yadav (PW-13), H.C. Ramfal Sharma (PW-6), Constable Ghappulal (PW-8), Virendra Kumar Chourasiya (PW-9), Inspector Hari Singh Raghuvanshi (PW-10) have proved all these facts in their statements and this entire evidence is well supported by requisition for merg inquiry (Ex. P/2), memo of corpse (Ex. P/3), spot map (Ex. P/4), seizure memo (Ex. P/5), memorandum (Ex. P/6), seizure of articles from the accused (Ex. P/7), arrest memo (Ex. P/8), requisition for postmortem (Ex. P/16), postmortem report (Ex. P/9), Dehati Nalshi (Ex. P/10), F.I.R. (Ex. P/11), merg intimation (Ex. P/13), Rojnamcha entry (Ex. P/17 & P/18) and F.S.L. report (Ex. P/19). Nothing contrary is available on the record to disbelieve the witnesses examined or the documents proved by them. The appellant has not come with any specific defence and has only pleaded ignorance in his statement recorded under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. The trial Court has appreciated this entire evidence and has rightly held that the prosecution has successfully established that the death of the deceased was homicidal in nature and that the death was caused by the appellant. 23. In the present case sterling quality evidence is available on record in the form of the statement of eye-witnesses supported by the statement of procedural witnesses and the other evidence collected during evidence which leaves no doubt to arrive at a definite conclusion that it was the appellant who caused the death of the deceased. 24. After careful scrutiny of the entire evidence produced by the prosecution before the Trial Court, we do not find any merits in the submission made by the appellant. 24. After careful scrutiny of the entire evidence produced by the prosecution before the Trial Court, we do not find any merits in the submission made by the appellant. The judgment recorded by the Trial Court is well merited, leaves no scope for interference. The appeal preferred by the appellant is sans merits, deserves to be and is dismissed accordingly. 25. The order of the learned Trial Court regarding disposal of the case property, is hereby confirmed.