JUDGMENT K.R. Mohapatra, J. - The Petitioner in this CMP calls in question the order dated 5th March, 2021 (Annexure-13) passed by learned District Judge, Mayurbhanj at Baripada in Execution Case No. 1 of 2019, whereby he directed the properties under Schedules 'A' and 'B' kept under attachment to be sold to execute the decree. He further appointed learned Civil Judge (Senior Division), Rairangpur to conduct the sale by putting the attached property in public auction in accordance with law. 2. The averments made in the CMP reveal that the Petitioner (for short 'J.Dr.') is the lessee in respect of Suleipat Iron Ore Mine situated in village Hatisikly under Badampahad Tahasil in the District of Mayurbhanj. In order to set up a steel plant, he executed a Joint Venture Agreement (JVA) with the Opposite Party (for short 'D.Hr.') on 12th April, 2010. On the very same day, a raising contract was also executed between the J.Dr. and D.Hr. permitting later to raise iron ores from the mine as per the terms and conditions stated therein. As per Clause-4.5 of the JVA under Annexure-1, the J.Dr. also executed a registered Power of Attorney in favour of D.Hr. on 12th April, 2010. As the D.Hr. did not set up the steel plant at Rairangpur as agreed upon by the parties, a dispute arose between the J.Dr. and D.Hr. Consequently, the D.Hr. moved this Court in ARBP No. 14 of 2015 under Section 11(6) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (for short 'the Act') for appointment of an Arbitrator. By order dated 7th April, 2016, Hon'ble Justice B.P. Das (Retd.) was appointed as the sole Arbitrator by Hon'ble Chief Justice of this Court. The said order was assailed in SLP (C) Nos.13599, 13803 and 13824 of 2016 before the Hon'ble Supreme Court. While confirming the order for appointment of an Arbitrator, Hon'ble Supreme Court appointed Hon'ble Justice Bikramjit Sen (Retd.) as the sole Arbitrator in place of Justice B.P. Das (Retd.). However, a settlement was arrived at between the parties in the arbitration proceeding and both the parties filed terms of settlement before the Hon'ble Arbitrator on 13th June, 2017. Accordingly, vide order dated 20th January, 2018, Hon'ble Arbitrator disposed of the arbitration proceeding in terms of the said compromise/settlement by passing a Consent Award (Annexure-3). Alleging non-compliance of the terms of settlement, the D.Hr. Accordingly, vide order dated 20th January, 2018, Hon'ble Arbitrator disposed of the arbitration proceeding in terms of the said compromise/settlement by passing a Consent Award (Annexure-3). Alleging non-compliance of the terms of settlement, the D.Hr. initiated execution proceeding before learned District Judge, Mayurbhanj at Baripada with a prayer to direct the D.Hr. to perform his part of the obligation under the Consent Award dated 20th January, 2018 and for attachment of 'A' and 'B' schedule properties of the execution petition and also for detention of the J.Dr. in civil prison, which was registered as Execution Case No.1 of 2019. On 7th February, 2019, learned executing Court passed an order restraining the J.Dr. from operating the mine in any manner. However, on the application of the J.Dr., learned executing Court vide its order dated 2nd April, 2019 recalled the restraint order dated 7th February, 2019 subject to deposit of Rs.5.00 crores by the J.Dr. The D.Hr. being dissatisfied with the order dated 2nd April, 2019 filed W.P.(C) No. 7445 of 2019 before this Court. The J.Dr. also filed W.P.(C) No.7537 of 2019 assailing the said order dated 2nd April, 2019 directing him to deposit Rs.5.00 crores. This Court upon hearing learned counsel for the parties set aside the order dated 2nd April, 2019 passed by learned executing court and restored the order dated 7th February, 2019. Assailing the same, the J.Dr. preferred SLP (C) No. 16647 of 2019 before the Hon'ble Supreme Court, which was dismissed vide order dated 2nd August, 2019. 3. Thereafter, the J.Dr. filed an application before the executing court in the tune of a petition under Section 47 C.P.C. questioning the executability of the Consent Award and jurisdiction of learned executing Court to entertain such an application. By order dated 13th September, 2019, learned executing Court held that the Consent Award is executable and the execution proceeding is maintainable in view of the provisions of Section 36 of the Act read with Order XXI Rule 32 C.P.C. The J.Dr. assailing the said order filed CMP No. 1062 of 2019, which was dismissed vide order dated 7th January, 2020 and a direction was issued to complete the execution proceeding within a period of six weeks. The J.Dr. being dissatisfied with the said order preferred SLP(C) No. 892 of 2020 before the Hon'ble Supreme Court, which was dismissed vide order dated 20th January, 2020. The J.Dr. being dissatisfied with the said order preferred SLP(C) No. 892 of 2020 before the Hon'ble Supreme Court, which was dismissed vide order dated 20th January, 2020. Accordingly, learned executing Court attached 'B' schedule properties vide order dated 24th January, 2020 and physical attachment of 'B' schedule properties was completed on 19th March, 2020. Likewise, 'A' schedule properties was attached on 21st July, 2020 and its physical attachment was completed on 31st July, 2020. Assailing the said attachment of Schedule 'A' property, part of which is the mine, the J.Dr. preferred W.P.(C) No.17649 of 2020, which is pending for adjudication. By order dated 28th July, 2020, this Court passed an interim order to the effect that the order of attachment of 'A' schedule properties dated 21st July, 2020 shall be subject to the result of the said writ petition. While the matter stood thus, the D.Hr. filed an application on 2nd February, 2021 for sale of attached 'A' and 'B' schedule properties (Annexure-11). Likewise, the J.Dr. also filed an application on 2nd February, 2021 (Annexure-9) for lifting the attachment of 'A' schedule properties on the ground that statutory period of six months had already expired. The J.Dr. also filed an objection to the application under Annexure-11 stating that he had performed his part of the obligation as per the Consent Award and thus, has satisfied the decree. A specific stand has been taken by the J.Dr. to the effect that since six months has already expired from the date of attachment of the schedule properties, no petition for sale will be maintainable. Learned District Judge (executing Court) considering the rival contentions of the parties held the petition for sale of schedule properties to be maintainable and passed the impugned order. Hence, this CMP has been filed assailing the said order under Annexure-13. 4. Mr. Baug, learned counsel for the Petitioner submitted that the J.Dr. has performed his part of the obligation as per the terms of the Consent Award passed by Hon'ble Arbitrator. Thus, he has satisfied the decree. Referring to the provisions of sub-rules (3) and (4) of Order XXI Rule 32 C.P.C., Mr. Baug, learned counsel submitted that as no application for sale of attached properties was filed before expiry of six months, the attachment ceases and application for sale of attached properties is not maintainable. Thus, he has satisfied the decree. Referring to the provisions of sub-rules (3) and (4) of Order XXI Rule 32 C.P.C., Mr. Baug, learned counsel submitted that as no application for sale of attached properties was filed before expiry of six months, the attachment ceases and application for sale of attached properties is not maintainable. It is his submission that the order of attachment of 'B' schedule properties was passed on 24th January, 2020 and physical attachment was completed on 19th March, 2020. As such, the statutory period of six months expired on 18th September, 2020. Similarly, by order dated 21st July, 2020, 'A' schedule properties were attached and physical attachment of 'A' schedule properties was completed on 31st July, 2020. As such, the statutory period of attachment of 'A' schedule properties expired on 31st January, 2021 (not 1st February, 2021 as observed by learned executing Court). Thus, an application for sale of attached property filed only on 2nd February, 2021 is not maintainable, as no application for sale of attached property was pending at the end of six months from the date of attachment. In support of his case, he relied upon the case law of Bagicha Singh v- Suba Singh and others, (1983) AIR(P&H) 174, para-4 of which reads as follows: "4. Once attachment was effected on 4th July, 1979, under sub-rule (1), the point which now falls for determination would be--when would it cease to operate and what would be its consequence?............It is clear that all through the execution proceedings remained pending and the decree-holder was wanting compliance of the decree by the judgment-debtors, which was not complied with and instead the judgment-debtors resorted to the remedy of revision in this Court and then appeal to the Supreme Court, in which he obtained stay. After they failed in the Supreme Court on 14th April, 1980 in getting the entire order of the executing Court set aside, they had opportunity to comply with the decree and their non-compliance till 15th May, 1980 clearly gave a cause to the decree-holder to move the executing Court for further proceedings with the execution in accordance with law in view of the Supreme Court order. On these facts 'further proceedings in accordance with law' meant that opportunity may be granted to the judgment-debtor through Court to once again comply with the decree and if they failed to do so then to proceed with the matter in accordance with law, namely by selling the attached property and/or by directing the decree-holders to recover possession by issue of warrants or by appointing a local commissioner to get the possession of the land in dispute restored to the decree-holder. The executing Court issued notice of the executing to the judgment-debtors who instead of complying with the decree in spite of the dictum of the highest Court, filed objection on 18th August, 1980 to the effect that the attached properties could not be sold as he six months' period had elapsed. This further shows the willful disobedience of the decree in the sense that they did not want to comply with the same in spite failing up to the highest Court. As I have found above only 5 months and 13 days ha done by when the decree-holder moved the executing Court to further proceed with the executing in accordance with law in view of the Supreme Court order. Therefore, it cannot be said either that the six months' period had elapsed or that the decree-holder took no steps to have the attached property sold o to have further steps in getting compliance of his decree. Accordingly, I hold that the Executing Court clearly fell in error in coming to the conclusion that when the decree-holder moved application for execution on 15th May, 1980, the six months' period had elapsed. The period during which the order of the Executing Court remained suspended because of the stay order granted by the Supreme Court, that period has to be excluded in accounting six months' period under Section 15(1) of the Limitation Act. Therefore, it is clear that the judgment-debtors (decree-holder?) moved well within six months and since by the end of six months the judgment-debtors had not obeyed the decree, there was no other option with the Executing Court but to order the sale of the attached properties. Therefore, it is clear that the judgment-debtors (decree-holder?) moved well within six months and since by the end of six months the judgment-debtors had not obeyed the decree, there was no other option with the Executing Court but to order the sale of the attached properties. In view of the above, I hold that the attachment continued till 15th May, 1980, when the decree-holder moved an application for proceeding further with the execution and after setting aside the order of the Court below, order that the attached property of the judgment-debtors be put to sale and from the sale proceeds to pay compensation to the decree-holder equal to the mesne profits which could accrue from the land in dispute from July, 1974 up to the date the possession of the land in dispute is restored to the decree-holder besides costs of the execution proceedings through-out." (emphasis supplied) 5. He further relied upon the case law in the case of Nadhaniyel Samuel and others -v- Madhavan Ponnachan and another,1995 AIHC 2155. "3. ********** The above provisions would indicate that award of compensation is in the discretion of the court where there had been an attachment of the property of the judgment debtor and the decree holder applied for sale of the same during the period the attachment remained in force viz. six months. Where there was no attachment and sale under sub-rule (3), award of compensation even as a measure of damages seems to be impermissible. In other words, outside the provisions of Order XXI Rule 32(1) and (3), award of compensation for the loss sustained by the decree holder at the hands of the violator of the decree would be illegal. The procedural requirements of the above rules will have to be satisfied to sustain the award of compensation. It is clear that the court below had failed to abide by the said provisions and granted the request made on behalf of the decree holder, who rested his claim on the report of the commissioner. The impugned order is clearly in excess of the jurisdiction of the court below, is illegal and is hence set aside. The matter is directed to be disposed of afresh in the light of the above observations and in accordance with law, after giving the parties opportunity to sustain their respective contentions". The impugned order is clearly in excess of the jurisdiction of the court below, is illegal and is hence set aside. The matter is directed to be disposed of afresh in the light of the above observations and in accordance with law, after giving the parties opportunity to sustain their respective contentions". (emphasis supplied) He, therefore, submitted that the impugned order for sale under Annexure11 is not sustainable and prays for setting aside the same. 6. Mr. Mishra, learned Senior Advocate appearing on behalf of D.Hr. refuting the submission of Mr. Baug, learned counsel for J.Dr. submitted that neither the J.Dr. obeyed the order of injunction dated 7th February, 2019 nor he obeyed the order dated 13th September, 2019 even if granted ample opportunity for which learned executing Court vide its order dated 21st July, 2020 attached the leasehold interest in 'A' schedule properties in terms of Order XXI Rule 32 (1) C.P.C. The order of attachment can only come to an end after satisfaction of the decree. As the J.Dr. failed to satisfy the decree at the end of six months, the D.Hr. filed an application for sale of attached property. The J.Dr. instead of complying with the direction, as aforesaid, also filed an application under Order XXI Rule 32(4) read with Section 151 C.P.C for de-attachment of the schedule properties. The application filed by the D.Hr. for sale of attached properties vide Annexure-11 was well within the time in view of the order dated 8th March, 2021 passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Cognizance for Extension of Limitation, reported in MANU/SC/0158/2021, in which it is held as follows: "1. This Court has taken suo motu cognizance of the situation arising out of the challenge faced by the counter on account of COVID-19 Virus and resultant difficulties that may be faced by litigants across the country in filing their petitions/ applications/ suits/ appeal/all other proceedings within the period of limitation prescribed under the general law of limitation or under special laws (both Central and/or State). 2. 2. To obviate such difficulties and to ensure that lawyers/litigants do not have to come physically to file such proceedings in respective courts/tribunals across the counter including this Court, it is hereby ordered that a period of limitation in all such proceedings, irrespective of the limitation prescribed under the general law or special laws whether condonable or not shall stand extended w.e.f. 15.3.2020 till further order(s) to be passed by this Court in present proceedings. 3. We are exercising this power under Article 142 read with Article 141 of the Constitution of India and declare that this order is a binding order within the meaning of Article 141 on all courts/tribunals and authorities. 4. This order may be brought to the notice of all High Courts for being communicated to all subordinate courts/tribunals within their respective jurisdiction. 5. Issue notice to all the Registrars General of the High Courts returnable in four weeks." 7. Hence, he submitted that the D.Hr. is entitled to exclusion of period from 15th March, 2020 till 14th March, 2021 for filing of application for sale under Annexure-11. It is his submission that despite rejection of all his objections, the J.Dr. has adopted every ploy not to perform his part of obligation under the Consent Arbitral Award by filing frivolous applications in order to kill time and thereby making all efforts to frustrate the Consent Arbitral Award itself, which has become a decree of the Civil Court. The decree for specific performance of contract has not been obeyed by the J.Dr. even though ample opportunity was afforded to him by learned executing Court. It is his submission that as per the Consent Arbitral Award, all agreements have been revived and the D.Hr. has the exclusive right to act as a raising contractor and should have been allowed by the J.Dr. to work. On the contrary, the J.Dr. had commenced mining operation and despatched substantial quantity of iron ores from schedule 'A' mining for which learned executing Court was constrained to attach the leasehold interest and existing stock of the iron ore. In spite of the order of attachment, the J.Dr. has not made any attempt to comply with the order passed by learned executing Court for implementation of the Consent Arbitral Award. In spite of the order of attachment, the J.Dr. has not made any attempt to comply with the order passed by learned executing Court for implementation of the Consent Arbitral Award. Sub-rule (5) of Rule 32 of Order XXI C.P.C. makes it abundantly clear that the Court is empowered to direct that the act required to be done may be done so far as practicable by the D.Hr. or some other person appointed by the Court, at the cost of J.Dr. and upon the act being done, the expenses incurred may be ascertained in such manner as the Court may direct and may be recovered as if they were included in the decree. The said power can be exercised by learned executing Court in lieu of or in addition to the procedure laid down under Order XXI Rules 32(1) to (4) C.P.C. where the J.Dr. fails to obey the decree for specific performance of contract or for an injunction. Thus, it is a fit case where learned executing Court can also take assistance of sub-rule (5) of Rule 32 of Order XXI C.P.C. for execution of the decree. 8. It is his submission that learned executing Court passed the impugned order for sale of the minerals extracted from Schedule 'A' properties as well as 'B' schedule properties which were under attachment in exercise of power conferred under sub-rule (3) read with sub-rule (5) of Rule 32 of Order XXI C.P.C. so as to compel the J.Dr. to perform his part of the contract for implementation of the Consent Arbitral Award. 9. In support of his case, Mr. Mishra, learned Senior Advocate relied upon paragraphs-5 and 6 of Bagicha Singh (supra), which are as follows; "5. The facts of the case are so vocal that it is a fit case in which sub-rule (5) should also be resorted to. After the judgment-debtors failed in the Supreme Court in avoiding execution of the decree by any mode other than the detention in civil prison, they should have moved the executing Court for surrendering possession to it for being restored to the decree-holder. Instead of doing so, they filed objections to avoid/delay the execution of the decree which again has taken over two years since the Supreme Court decision. Instead of doing so, they filed objections to avoid/delay the execution of the decree which again has taken over two years since the Supreme Court decision. Therefore, I am of the view that the mere sale of the attached property of the judgment-debtors and payment of compensation in lieu of mesne profits, would not meet the ends of justice, until possession of the land in dispute is also restored to the decree-holder. 6. Courts do not grant decrees either for the fun of it or for being violated in the manner it has been violated in this case. Violation has continued for almost for about eight years by now, because the decree-holder was dispossessed in July, 1974. Sub-rule (5) clearly provides for this eventuality. Accordingly, I am of the opinion that the executing Court should appoint in an Advocate as Local commissioner for taking over possession of the land in dispute and for delivering the same to the decree-holder. The expenses and costs of the same shall also be borne by the judgment-debtors. If these expenses are not paid by the judgment-debtors in Court, then the same would also be recoverable from the sale proceeds of the attached property, as it they were also included in the decree." 10. He, therefore, submitted that learned executing Court can't be a mute spectator to the Consent Arbitral Award being violated and disrespected. The impugned order is reasoned one and has been passed following due procedure of law. As such, the same needs no interference and prayed for dismissal of the CMP. 11. Mr. Baug, learned counsel for the J.Dr in response to submission of Mr. Mishra, learned Senior Advocate also advanced his argument on the applicability of the direction in Cognizance for Extension of Limitation case (supra). It is his submission that D.Hr. is not entitled to the benefit of extension of limitation granted in Cognizance for Extension of Limitation case (supra). Law of limitation find its root in two Latin Maxims; one of which is Vigilantibus et non dormientibus jura subveniunt, which means the law will assist only those who are vigilant about their rights and not those who sleep over the same. The D.Hr. all throughout during the period of Pandemic of COVID-19, even when the restrictions were imposed, participated in the proceeding along with the J.Dr. In the Petition filed by the D.Hr. The D.Hr. all throughout during the period of Pandemic of COVID-19, even when the restrictions were imposed, participated in the proceeding along with the J.Dr. In the Petition filed by the D.Hr. under Order XXI Rule 32 (4)CPC, the Opposite Party had never taken a stand that due to restriction imposed due to Pandemic of COVID-19, he could not file the Petition for sale within the statutory period. The schedules 'A and 'B' properties were attached on the application made by the D.Hr. and it pressed hard for attachment of the property before learned executing Court. Once the property was attached by the Court, the period of six months automatically starts to run. Thus, on expiry of the period of six months, the attachment automatically ceases if any of the pre-conditions of sub-rule (4) Rule 32 Order XXI CPC is satisfied. The order of attachment was never suspended by any competent Court of law. Thus, the period of attachment automatically comes to an end (cease) on expiry of the period of six months from the date of attachment and the petition for sale of the attached property filed beyond the period of six months is not maintainable. In support of his case, he relied upon the case of Sagufa Ahmed and others v- Uper Assam Plywood Products Private Limited and others, (2021) 2 SCC 317 , in which the Hon'ble Supreme Court has elaborated the meaning of the period of limitation prescribed under the General Law of Limitation or under Special law (both Central and/or State). Para-16 onwards of the said case law is relevant for the purpose of our discussion, which are reproduced hereunder:- "16. To get over their failure to file an appeal on or before 18.03.2020, the appellants rely upon the order of this Court dated 23.03.2020 in Cognizance for Extension of Limitation, In re3. I reads as follows: (SCC paras 1- 5) 17. But we do not think that the appellants can take refuge under the above order in cognizance for Extension of Limitation, In re. What was extended by the above order of this Court was only "the period of limitation" and not the period up to which delay can be condoned in exercise of discretion conferred by the statute. But we do not think that the appellants can take refuge under the above order in cognizance for Extension of Limitation, In re. What was extended by the above order of this Court was only "the period of limitation" and not the period up to which delay can be condoned in exercise of discretion conferred by the statute. The above order passed by this Court was intended to benefit vigilant litigants who were prevented due to the pandemic and the lockdown, from initiating proceedings within the period of limitation prescribed by general or special law. It is needless to point out that the law of limitation finds its root in two Latin maxims, one of which is vigilantibus et non dormientibus jura subveniunt which means that the law will assist only those who are vigilant about their rights and not those who sleep over them." (emphasis supplied) 12. In view of the above, he submitted that Court can extend or enlarge time, when it has power to do so. Since the Court exercising power under sub-rule (4) of Rule 32 of Order XXI C.P.C. has no power to enlarge the period provided therein, the benefit of Cognizance for Extension of Limitation case (supra) cannot be extended to J.Dr. 13. Mr. Mishra, learned Senior Advocate, of course, refuted the same and submitted that the provisions made by the Hon'ble Supreme Court at para -2 of the said decision has a universal application and the same is squarely applicable to the case of the D.Hr. 14. Heard learned counsel for the parties at length and scrutinized the materials placed before this Court along with the case law. 15. Rule 32 Order XXI C.P.C. provides the procedures to be followed by the executing Court while executing the decree for specific performance, for restitution of conjugal right or for injunction. Sub-rule (1) of Rule 32 provides that where a party against whom a decree, as aforesaid, has been passed and he having an opportunity of obeying the same has willfully failed to obey, such decree can be enforced by attachment of the property or by detention of the J.Dr. in the civil prison or by both. Sub-rule (2) is not relevant for the purpose of our discussion in this case. in the civil prison or by both. Sub-rule (2) is not relevant for the purpose of our discussion in this case. Sub-rules (3) and (4) are relevant for our discussion, which are reproduced hereunder: "(3) Where any attachment under sub-rule (1) or sub-rule (2) has remained in force for six months if the judgment-debtor has not obeyed the decree and the decree-holder has applied to have the attached property sold, such property may be sold, and out of the proceeds the Court may award to the decree-holder such compensation as it thinks fit, and shall pay the balance (if any) to the judgment-debtor on his application. (4) Where the judgment-debtor has obeyed the decree and paid all costs of executing the same which he is bound to pay, or where, at the end of six months from the date of the attachment, no application to have the property-sold has been made, or if made has been refused, the attachment shall cease." 16. A careful reading of sub-rule (3) makes it clear that where any attachment has remained in force for six months and the decree as aforesaid has not been obeyed by the J.Dr., the property so attached may be sold, provided any application for sale of such property has been made by the decree holder. It further provides that the Court may award compensation as it thinks fit to the decree holder from the sale proceeds of the said property and the balance, if any, to be returned to the J.Dr. on his application. Sub- rule (4) of the said Rule provides that at the end of six months from the date of attachment, if the J.Dr. has obeyed the decree and paid all costs of executing the same, which he is bound to pay or where no application to have the property sold has been made or if made, has been refused, the attachment shall cease. The language and tenor of sub-rule (4) makes it clear that the attachment will cease on expiry of the period of six months on any of the eventualities as follows: (i) the J.Dr. The language and tenor of sub-rule (4) makes it clear that the attachment will cease on expiry of the period of six months on any of the eventualities as follows: (i) the J.Dr. has obeyed the decree and paid all costs of executing the same which is bound to pay; or (ii) where no application for sale of the property so attached, has been made within the said period of six months; or, (iii) If such an application is made, the same has been refused. 17. In the case of Bagicha Singh (supra), the Full Bench of Punjab and Haryana High Court on discussion of the facts held that since five months and thirteen days had passed when the decree holder moved the executing Court for sale, it cannot be said either that six months period had already elapsed or that the decree holder took no step to have the attached property sold within six months. In the case of Nadhaniyel Samuel and others (supra), the Kerala High Court in clear terms held that the award of compensation under sub-rule (4) is in the discretion of the Court where there has been an attachment of the property of the J.Dr. and the D.Hr. applied for sale of the same during the period the attachment remained in force, i.e., six months. From the discussion made above as well as the case law (supra) there remains no iota of doubt that an application for sale of the attached property has to be made by the D.Hr. during the period the attachment remained in force. The sub-rules (3) and (4) make it abundantly clear that an order of attachment made under sub-rule (1) can remain in force for a maximum period of six months, provided the same is not varied by a higher Court or any of the eventualities under sub-rule (4), as aforesaid, has taken place. In the case at hand, neither the order of attachment has been varied by any competent Court of law nor any of the eventualities of sub-rule (4), as aforesaid, has taken place. Thus, it will remain valid for a maximum period of six months and not beyond that. 18. However, a question arose with regard to computation of the period of six months of attachment. Thus, it will remain valid for a maximum period of six months and not beyond that. 18. However, a question arose with regard to computation of the period of six months of attachment. From the language employed in sub-rules (3) and (4), it can be safely inferred that the 'attachment' remains in force for a maximum period of six months. In fact, the attachment seldom takes place on the date the order of attachment is passed. It may take some time for physical attachment of the property in question by the executing Court depending upon the circumstances. Thus, computing the period of attachment from the date of the order will not serve the purpose and object of the provisions made therein, which necessarly infers that computation of six months should be from the date of attachment and not from the date of order of attachment. 19. In the instant case, the physical attachment of 'B' schedule properties was made on 19th March, 2020 and that of 'A' schedule properties was made on 31st July, 2020. Thus, the application for sale of 'B' schedule properties by the D.Hr. ought to have been made within six months from the respective dates of physical attachment. Admittedly, the petition for sale of 'A' and 'B' schedule properties was made on 2nd February, 2021, which is beyond the period of six months from the dates of attachment of both 'A' and 'B' schedule a property. 20. Mr. Mishra, learned Senior Advocate for the Opposite Party relying upon the provisions made in Cognizance of Extension of Limitation, In-re (supra) submitted that the period of limitation for any suit, appeal, application or proceeding stands extended by the aforesaid order irrespective of the fact that the period of limitation had expired during 15th March, 2020 to 14th March, 2021. Wherever the limitation expired during the period between 15th March, 2020 till 14th March, 2021, notwithstanding the actual balance period of limitation remaining, all persons shall have a limitation period of 90 days from 15th March, 2021 to lodge any suit, appeal, application or proceeding or any longer period, if the balance period of limitation remaining beyond 15.03.2021 is more than 90 days. Thus, the limitation for filing of petition under Sub-rule (4) (Annexure-11) has not yet expired and petition under Annexure-11 is well within the time. Thus, the limitation for filing of petition under Sub-rule (4) (Annexure-11) has not yet expired and petition under Annexure-11 is well within the time. However, the direction for sale made by learned executing Court shall remain suspended for the aforesaid period of 90 days, subject to compliance of the part of obligation by the J.Dr. The case law in Sagufa Ahmed and others (supra) has no application to the case at hand as the subject matter of dispute was under the provisions of the Companies Act, 2013 and the context in which the law has been laid down is also different. 21. This Court is not in a position to fathom the argument advanced by Mr. Mishra, learned, Senior Advocate in view of the fact that by filing an application for sale under Annexure-11 under sub-rule (4), the D.Hr. has set the process of attachment in motion. Considering the rival contentions of the parties, learned executing Court passed an order of attachment in respect of 'B' schedule properties on 24th January, 2020 and that of schedule 'A' properties was passed on 21st July, 2020. The physical attachment of 'B' schedule properties was made on 19th March, 2020 and that of 'A' schedule properties was made on 31st July, 2020. Assailing the order of attachment dated 21st July, 2020, the J.Dr. preferred W.P.(C) No. 16749 of 2020, which is pending before this Court for adjudication. However, an interim order was passed by this Court to the effect that the attachment made shall be subject to the result of the writ petition. Thus, the attachment of both 'A' and 'B' schedule properties was never kept in abeyance by any competent Court of law. Once the attachment has been made, it will automatically come to an end after six months unless it is varied/suspended or any of the eventualities of sub-rule (4) has taken place. No eventualities, as aforesaid, having taken place in the meantime, the order of attachment will automatically come to an end (cease) on expiry of the period of six months from the date of attachment. No eventualities, as aforesaid, having taken place in the meantime, the order of attachment will automatically come to an end (cease) on expiry of the period of six months from the date of attachment. The order passed in Cognizance of Extension of Limitation, In-re (supra) has been passed keeping the difficulties that might have been faced by the litigants across the country in filing the applications/suits/appeals/all other proceedings within the period of limitation prescribed under the General Law of Limitation or any Special Laws (both Central and State) due to pandemic of COVID-19 or due to restrictions imposed for the same. In the case at hand, none of the parties appears to have faced any difficulty in moving the learned executing Court in asserting their rights. In fact, both the parties have contested the case diligently either appearing through virtual mode or physically. Further, on a close reading of the petition for sale under Annexure-11, it appears that pandemic of COVID-19 was not, at all, a constraint on the D.Hr. to file the petition under Annexure-11. In fact, the D.Hr. had filed the petition under Annexure-11 on 2nd February, 2021 on the plea that in spite of the order of attachment, the J.Dr. failed to perform his part of obligation as per the Consent Arbitral Award within six months. There is also no whisper in the petition under Annexure-11 to the effect that due to pandemic of COVID-19, filing of the petition under Annexure-11 was delayed. Thus, when neither the pandemic of COVID-19 nor restrictions imposed during 15th March, 2020 to 14th March, 2021 had in any way prevented the D.Hr. from filing the petition under Annexure-11 within six months from the date of attachment of schedule 'A' and 'B' properties, the benefit of Cognizance of Extension of Limitation, In-re (supra) is not applicable to its case. Further, as held in Sagufa Ahmed and others (supra), when the D.Hr. himself was not vigilant about its right and slept over the same, he is not entitled to any extension of time to file the petition under Annexure-11, in view of principle 'Vigilantibus et non dormientibus jura subveniunt, more so when he had not prayed for extension of time before learned executing Court to file the petition and contested the said petition in spite of specific objection of J.Dr. to the effect that the petition is barred by time. 22. Mr. to the effect that the petition is barred by time. 22. Mr. Mishra, learned Senior Advocate also raised a plea that learned executing Court has ample jurisdiction under sub-rule (5) of Rule 32 of Order XXI CPC to get the Consent Arbitral Award executed, which can be exercised either in lieu of or in addition to the procedure laid down under sub-rules (1) to (4). Thus, in any case, the impugned order should not be interfered with. In the case at hand, neither any prayer was made by the D.Hr. to exercise power under sub-rule (5) before learned executing Court nor learned executing Court has exercised the power thereunder to pass the impugned order. Thus, it will not be proper to make any observation on the same. 23. Learned District Judge, thus, has committed an error of law in holding that sub-rule (4) does not envisage that the petition for sale should be filed before expiry of the period of six months from the date of attachment. By misreading the provisions under sub-rule (3), learned District Judge held that the occasion to file a petition for sale would arise where the properties have remained in force for a period of six months and J.Dr. has not obeyed the decree. 24. In view of the discussions made above, such an observation is contrary to law and is not sustainable. Accordingly, the direction to sell the materials available in schedule 'A' properties as well as schedule 'B' properties by public auction is held to be not sustainable in the eyes of law and order under Annexure-13 to that effect is set aside. Resultantly, the CMP is allowed to the aforesaid extent. But, in the circumstances, there shall be no order as to cost.