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2021 DIGILAW 1552 (BOM)

State of Maharashtra v. Arun Bhimraoji Shelke

2021-11-17

MANISH PITALE

body2021
JUDGMENT Manish Pitale, J. - These Revision Applications arise out of orders passed by the Court of Additional Sessions Judge, Amravati, whereby applications of some of the Accused seeking discharge have been rejected while one application has been partly allowed. Since the incident in the present case concerns all the accused persons and the allegations levelled against them arise out of provisions of the same statutes, all the applications are being disposed of by this common judgment. 2. The First Information Report (FIR) in the present case was registered on 11.04.2013, at the behest of one of the victims of sexual assault at the hands of accused no.1. The victim/informant/Complainant along with other girl students, was resident of Shraddhanand Ladies Hostel, Shivaji Nagar, Amravati, where the Accused no.1 was working as watchman. According to the informant, during Diwali time, in the year 2013, when she made a phone call to her mother from a pay phone in the Hostel, the accused no.1 snatched the receiver of the phone from the informant and sexually assaulted her. The accused threatened the informant that if she told anybody about the incident, he would kill her. It is alleged that on the next day also, the accused no.1 made advances towards the informant but she went away to her hostel room. The informant told her hostel mates about the incident. Thereafter, when the mother of the informant was informed about the incident, she took the informant and other hostel mates to the Superintendent of the Hostel i.e. accused no.2 and the description of the incident was given in writing, whereafter, the informant, her mother and the other girl students of the hostel returned to their rooms. 3. It is then alleged that in December, on a particular day, when a girl student and resident of the hostel went to answer a phone call from her mother, the accused no.1 said that the phone was disconnected and thereafter, he forcibly had sexual intercourse with the minor girl. He threatened her not to inform anybody about the incident. But, when the said minor victim told other girl students in the hostel, they again contacted the accused no. 2-Superintendent of the hostel. The accused no.2, then took 5 to 6 girls in the night to the accused no.3 i.e. the President of the Shivaji Education Society, managing the Educational Institution and the hostel, to narrate the incident. But, when the said minor victim told other girl students in the hostel, they again contacted the accused no. 2-Superintendent of the hostel. The accused no.2, then took 5 to 6 girls in the night to the accused no.3 i.e. the President of the Shivaji Education Society, managing the Educational Institution and the hostel, to narrate the incident. The accused no.3 allegedly did not take the complaint and instead directed that a written complaint be submitted. According to the informant, a written complaint was indeed submitted by her and the other minor girl victims through the accused no.2 i.e. Superintendent of the hostel. It is alleged that thereafter, the examination of the Xth standard took place and the girls left for their homes. 4. It appears that neither accused no.2 i.e. Superintendent of the Hostel nor the President of the said Management i.e. accused no.3, took steps to lodge any police complaint in the matter. The accused no. 4 i.e. Secretary of the said Management, also did not take any steps to lodge the police complaint. Instead, an internal inquiry was conducted and, according to the accused nos. 3 and 4, the accused no.2, Superintendent of the Hostel and the accused no.1, Watchman, were dismissed from service. Since the incident had been reported in the media and a huge controversy was created, the Social Welfare Department directed the accused nos. 3 and 4 to take all necessary steps on behalf of the Management. It seems that pursuant to such directions, on 02.04.2013, the accused no.4 i.e. Secretary of the Management, submitted a written complaint to the concerned Police Station. But it was only when the victim/informant approached the police on 11.04.2013, that the FIR stood registered in the Gadge Nagar Police Station at Amravati, against the accused no. 1 for offences under Section 376 and 506(b) of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) and Sections 3(1)(xii) and 4 of Scheduled Castes & Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (herein after referred to as the Atrocities Act). 5. The Applicant-State initiated the investigation and recorded statements of the victims as well as other witnesses. 1 for offences under Section 376 and 506(b) of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) and Sections 3(1)(xii) and 4 of Scheduled Castes & Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (herein after referred to as the Atrocities Act). 5. The Applicant-State initiated the investigation and recorded statements of the victims as well as other witnesses. Documentary material was also investigated by the Police and eventually chargesheet dated 12.07.2013 came to be filed against six accused persons under Section 376 and 506(b) of the IPC and Sections 3(1) (xii) and 4 of the Atrocities Act and Section 6 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (herein after referred to as POCSO Act). Subsequently, a supplementary chargesheet dated 26.08.2013, was also filed under Sections 202 and 176 of the IPC as also Section 16 of the POCSO Act. Thereafter, when the draft charges were prepared, the Public Prosecutor submitted that although chargesheet was not filed under Sections 21(1) and 21(2) of the POCSO Act, there was sufficient material to proceed against accused nos. 3 and 4 for committing offences under the aforesaid provisions of the POCSO Act, as also for offences under Section 3(2)(vi) of the Atrocities Act and Sections 201 and 202 of the IPC. 6. At this stage, the accused persons, except accused no.1, filed applications for discharge. The applications filed by the accused persons were given different Exhibit numbers. The application for discharge filed by accused no. 3 i.e. the President of the aforesaid Management, was marked as Exhibit 50 and the application moved by the Secretary was marked as Exhibit 76. Both these applications concerning original accused nos. 3 and 4, were taken up for consideration along with application at Exhibit 71 filed by accused no. 2 i.e. Superintendent of the hostel. By order dated 16.10.2014, the Court of Additional Sessions Judge, Amravati, rejected all the three applications for discharge. 7. Aggrieved by the same, the accused nos. 3 and 4 i.e. the President and Secretary of the Management, filed Criminal Application (APL) No. 118/2015, inter alia, contending that the Counsel representing them had relied upon as many as fifteen judgments of various Courts including the Honble Supreme Court, which were not discussed by the Sessions Court while passing the order dated 16.10.2014, rejecting their applications. 3 and 4 i.e. the President and Secretary of the Management, filed Criminal Application (APL) No. 118/2015, inter alia, contending that the Counsel representing them had relied upon as many as fifteen judgments of various Courts including the Honble Supreme Court, which were not discussed by the Sessions Court while passing the order dated 16.10.2014, rejecting their applications. This contention was appreciated by this Court and, accordingly, by order dated 07.09.2015, the aforesaid Criminal Application (APL) No.118/2015, was partly allowed. The order dated 16.10.2014 of the Sessions Court to the extent that it rejected the applications for discharge filed by the aforesaid accused nos. 3 and 4, was set aside and the matter was remanded to the Sessions Court for reconsideration of Exhibits 50 and 76, in the light of the observations made in the order dated 07.09.2015. It is upon remand that the Sessions Court disposed of the applications for discharge filed by aforesaid accused nos. 3 and 4 by Order dated 07.02.2015. By the said order, the Sessions Court partly allowed the applications filed by accused nos. 3 and 4, holding that while they deserved to be discharged for offences under Section 201 of the IPC, Section 3(2)(xii) of the Atrocities Act and Section 16 of the POCSO Act, their prayer for discharge in respect of offences under Section 21(1) and 21(2) of the POCSO Act and Section 202 of the IPC, deserved to be rejected. 8. Three Revision Applications have been filed before this Court, against the said order dated 07.02.2015. Criminal Revision Application No. 16 of 2016 is filed by the State challenging discharge of the accused nos. 3 and 4 for the aforementioned offences. Criminal Application (APL) No.53 of 2016, is filed by the accused nos. 3 and 4, aggrieved by the rejection of their prayer for discharge regarding offences under Sections 21(1) and 21(2) of the POCSO Act and Section 202 of the IPC. Criminal Application (APL) No. 175/2016, is filed by the original informant/complainant, being aggrieved by discharge of the Accused nos. 3 and 4 for the aforesaid offences by the Order dated 07.02.2015. These three applications will be considered together in the present Judgment. 9. Criminal Application (APL) No. 797 of 2014, is an application filed by original accused no. Criminal Application (APL) No. 175/2016, is filed by the original informant/complainant, being aggrieved by discharge of the Accused nos. 3 and 4 for the aforesaid offences by the Order dated 07.02.2015. These three applications will be considered together in the present Judgment. 9. Criminal Application (APL) No. 797 of 2014, is an application filed by original accused no. 2 i.e. the Superintendent of the hostel, against the above mentioned order dated 16.10.2014 passed by the Sessions Court, whereby her discharge application was rejected. Criminal Revision Application No. 151 of 2015 and Criminal Application (APL) No. 40 of 2016, have been filed by the original accused nos. 5 and 6 against order dated 13.02.2016 passed by the Sessions Court rejecting their discharge applications. These accused nos. 5 and 6 are employees of the Management and the allegation against them also is that despite being informed and having gained knowledge about commission of offences under the POCSO Act, they failed to take necessary steps to approach the police for registration of offences. 10. A perusal of the draft charges prepared against the Accused indicates that the accused no.1 i.e. the Watchman, is sought to be charged for various offences under the IPC, Atrocities Act and the POCSO Act, including offences of rape and destruction of evidence. As against the accused nos. 2 to 6, the allegation appears to be that they failed to take necessary steps as expected under Section 19 of the POCSO Act to inform the concerned Police Officials about the commission of the offences under the POCSO Act, despite having gained knowledge about commission of such offences. On the basis of such allegations, offence under Section 202 of the IPC for intentional omission in giving information of offences and offences under sections 21(1) and (2) of the POCSO Act, are said to have been committed by the said Accused persons. Since such allegations were made in the draft charges, the learned Counsel appearing for the Applicants in these applications have made submissions in respect of Sections 19 and 21 of the POCSO Act, as also Section 202 of the IPC. Since such allegations were made in the draft charges, the learned Counsel appearing for the Applicants in these applications have made submissions in respect of Sections 19 and 21 of the POCSO Act, as also Section 202 of the IPC. The learned Additional Public Prosecutor appearing for the State and the learned Counsel appearing for the informant/complainant, have also made submissions in connection with offences under the Atrocities Act and some provisions of the POCSO Act, which according to them, were also attracted against the Accused/Applicants before this Court in these revision applications. 11. As mentioned above, this Court is considering applications Criminal Rev. Application No. 16 of 2016, Criminal Application (APL) No. 53 of 2016 and Criminal Application (APL) No. 175 of 2016, together because the Order impugned in all the three applications is the order dated 07.02.2015, passed by the Sessions Court, partly allowing the applications for discharge filed by the accused nos. 3 and 4 bearing Exhibit nos. 50 and 76. 12. Shri Harish Dangre, the learned Counsel appearing for the Applicants i.e. original accused nos. 3 and 4 in Criminal Application (APL) 53 of 2016, submitted that the Sessions Court in the present case committed a grave error in interpreting Sections 19 and 21 of the POCSO Act to hold that the Applicants were not entitled for discharge for offences under Section 21(1) and 21(2) of the POCSO Act, as also Section 202 of the IPC. By referring to the aforesaid provisions, the learned Counsel appearing for the Applicants submitted that the accused no. 3 as President of the aforesaid Management and accused no. 4 as Secretary thereof, could not be covered under Section 21(2) to be persons in charge of the Institution where the incident in the present case had taken place. According to the learned Counsel appearing for the Applicants, since the incident took place, admittedly in Shraddhanand Ladies Hostel, only the accused no. 2, as the Superintendent of the hostel, could be said to be in charge of the Institution and could be covered under Section 21(2) of the POCSO Act. Much emphasis was placed on the assertion that the aforesaid Management i.e. Shivaji Education Society, was administering large number of Educational Institutions including Colleges and Schools, employing hundreds and thousands of employees. 2, as the Superintendent of the hostel, could be said to be in charge of the Institution and could be covered under Section 21(2) of the POCSO Act. Much emphasis was placed on the assertion that the aforesaid Management i.e. Shivaji Education Society, was administering large number of Educational Institutions including Colleges and Schools, employing hundreds and thousands of employees. It is submitted that for any such unfortunate incident that might take place in any of the Schools/Colleges or Hostels attached to the aforesaid Management, the accused no. 3-the President and accused no.4-Secretary, could not be hauled up as being covered under Section 21(2) of the POCSO Act. 13. The learned Counsel further submitted that if the aforesaid contention was accepted, the accused nos. 3 and 4 could not be charged with any offence under the POCSO Act, for the reason that Section 21(1) of the said Act could not be applied to them. It was submitted that if the contention raised on behalf of the State and accepted by the Sessions Court in the impugned order was to be sustained, Section 21(1) of the POCSO Act would be stretched to absurd limits. It was submitted that Sections 21(1) and 21(2) of the POCSO Act operated in completely distinct and separate spheres and overlapping of the two as done by the Sessions Court in the impugned Order, would lead to absurd consequences. It was submitted that if the logic applied by the Sessions Court was to be accepted, the expression "any person" in Section 21(1) of the POCSO Act would mean "every person", which would amount to reading something not contemplated in the said provision. It was submitted that this would lead to each and every person who would be informed about the commission of offence under the POCSO Act to be hauled up as an accused for failure to report the matter as required under Section 19(1) of the POCSO Act. On this basis, it was submitted that the Sessions Court erred in refusing to discharge the aforesaid Applicants for offences under Section 21 of the POCSO Act and Section 202 of the IPC. Reliance was placed on the Judgment of Kerala High Court in the case of Dr. Letha J & Ors. On this basis, it was submitted that the Sessions Court erred in refusing to discharge the aforesaid Applicants for offences under Section 21 of the POCSO Act and Section 202 of the IPC. Reliance was placed on the Judgment of Kerala High Court in the case of Dr. Letha J & Ors. vs. State of Kerala & Ors (2015) 1 KLT 231 and judgment of the Chhattisgarh High Court in the case of Kamal Prasad Patade vs. State of Chhattisgarh & anr. 2016 SCC OnLine Chh 719. 14. On the other hand, Mr. Sirpurkar, learned Additional Public Prosecutor appearing on behalf of the State in Criminal Revision Application No. 16 of 2016 and Mr. Bhandakar, learned Counsel appearing for the informant/complainant in Criminal Application (APL) No. 175 of 2016, submitted that the contentions raised on behalf of the accused nos. 3 and 4 deserved to be rejected. Much emphasis was placed on the objects and reasons of the POCSO Act while contending that commission of an offence under the Act was necessarily required to be promptly reported to the Special Juvenile Police Unit or the local police under Section 19(1) of the POCSO Act, so that immediate action could be taken in the matter and swift investigation followed by expedited prosecution would lead to either acquittal or conviction in such cases, thereby helping to reduce the instances of offences under the POCSO Act and also cases of false implication. The learned Additional Public Prosecutor and the learned Counsel appearing for the informant/complainant relied upon judgment of this Court in the case of Balasaheb @ Suryakant Yashwantrao Mane vs. The State of Maharashtra 2017 SCC OnLine Bom 1772, to contend that application filed on behalf of the accused nos. 3 and 4 deserved to be dismissed. It was highlighted that this Court in the aforesaid Judgment had specifically taken a different view from that of the Chhattisgarh High Court in the case of Kamat Prasad Patade vs. State of Chhattisgarh & anr. (supra). 15. The learned Additional Public Prosecutor and the learned Counsel appearing for the informant/complainant further submitted that the Sessions Court erred in partly allowing the application for discharge filed by the accused nos. 3 and 4 for offences under Section 3(2) of the Atrocities Act, Section 201 of the IPC and Section 16 of the POCSO Act. It was submitted that while discharging the accused nos. 3 and 4 for offences under Section 3(2) of the Atrocities Act, Section 201 of the IPC and Section 16 of the POCSO Act. It was submitted that while discharging the accused nos. 3 and 4 for the said offences, the Sessions Court committed an error in holding that, not a single ground was made out for proceeding against the said accused persons for having neglected in performing the duties under the provisions of the Atrocities Act; that they had not caused destruction of evidence to attract Section 201 of the IPC; and that, no ground was made out to proceed against them under Section 16 of the POCSO Act. On this basis, it was submitted that the applications filed by the State and the informant/complainant deserved to be allowed and the application for discharge filed on behalf of the accused nos. 3 and 4 deserved to be dismissed in its entirety. 16. Having heard the learned Counsel appearing for accused nos. 3 and 4, the learned Additional Public Prosecutor for the State and the learned Counsel appearing for the informant/complainant, it would be necessary, not only to consider the contents of the impugned order but also the chargesheet and its accompaniments to examine as to whether the impugned order can be said to be sustainable. 17. In the present case, the Sessions Court has categorically held that the ingredients of Section 3(1)(xii) of the Atrocities Act, are not made out. A perusal of Section 3(1)(xii) of the Atrocities Act would show that a person can be punished when he commits an offence by exploiting his position to dominate the will of a woman belonging to the Schedule Caste or Schedule Tribe category to exploit her sexually to which she would not have otherwise agreed. The accused nos. 3 and 4 in the present case, being the President and the Secretary of the Management, are not facing any allegation of sexually exploiting the victim. The main allegation against them appears to be that they failed to promptly inform the police about the commission of offence under the POCSO Act, despite having gained knowledge about the same. Therefore, the ingredients of the said offence are not made out on the face of the material filed along with the charge sheet. To that extent, no error can be attributed to the Sessions Court in having discharged the accused nos. Therefore, the ingredients of the said offence are not made out on the face of the material filed along with the charge sheet. To that extent, no error can be attributed to the Sessions Court in having discharged the accused nos. 3 and 4 for offence under Section 3(1)(xii) of the Atrocities Act. 18. Insofar as Section 16 of the POCSO Act is concerned, it pertains to abetment of an offence. A perusal of the said provision demonstrates that an offence under the said provision would be committed when a person either instigates or conspires or intentionally aids by any act or illegal omission for committing an offence and the explanations given in the said provision demonstrate that it would apply to a person who facilitates commission of offence or aids in harbouring or transporting minor children to facilitate commission of offences under the POCSO Act. A perusal of the chargesheet and the supplementary chargesheet along with the material brought on record, does not show any ingredients of the aforesaid offence insofar as accused nos. 3 and 4 are concerned. There is no allegation against the accused no. 3 as the President of the Management and the accused no. 4 as the Secretary of the Management, to have in any manner, either instigated, conspired or aided, much less facilitated the commission of the offence under the POCSO Act. Therefore, this Court agrees with the Sessions Court regarding discharge of accused nos. 3 and 4 in respect of the said offence. 19. By the impugned order, the Sessions Court has also discharged the accused nos. 3 and 4 for offences under Section 201 of the IPC. The said offence concerns causing disappearance of evidence or giving false evidence to screen offender. This Court has considered the material on record and the allegation does not appear to be that the aforesaid accused persons intentionally caused disappearance of evidence of the offence or that they gave false information to screen the offender. Therefore, the Sessions Court was justified in discharging accused nos. 3 and 4 of offences under Section 201 of the IPC. 20. In view of the above, the Criminal Revision Application No. 16 of 2016, filed by the State and Criminal Application (APL) No. 175 of 2016 filed by the informant/complainant challenging the impugned order to the extent that it discharged the accused nos. 3 and 4 of offences under Section 201 of the IPC. 20. In view of the above, the Criminal Revision Application No. 16 of 2016, filed by the State and Criminal Application (APL) No. 175 of 2016 filed by the informant/complainant challenging the impugned order to the extent that it discharged the accused nos. 3 and 4 for offences under Section 3(1)(xii) of the Atrocities Act, Section 201 of he IPC and Section 16 of the POCSO Act, are found to be without any merit and, accordingly, they deserve to be dismissed. 21. Insofar as Criminal Application (APL) No. 53 of 2016 is concerned, it needs to be examined as to whether accused nos. 3 and 4 are justified in contending that there are no ingredients of even the offences under Section 21(1) and 21(2) of the POCSO Act and Section 202 of the IPC, for the matter to proceed to trial against them. In order to examine as to whether the ingredients of the aforesaid offences are made out against accused nos. 3 and 4, it would be appropriate to reproduce the said provisions. 22. Sections 19, 20 and 21 of the POCSO Act, read as follows: "19. Reporting of offences. (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974) any person (including the child), who has apprehension that an offence under this Act is likely to be committed or has knowledge that such an offence has been committed, he shall provide such information to,-- (a) the Special Juvenile Police Unit; or (b) the local police. (2) Every report given under sub-section (1) shall be-- (a) ascribed an entry number and recorded in writing; (b) be read over to the informant; (c) shall be entered in a book to be kept by the Police Unit. (3) Where the report under sub-section (1) is given by a child, the same shall be recorded under subsection (2) in a simple language so that the child understands contents being recorded. (4) In case contents are being recorded in the language not understood by the child or wherever it is deemed necessary, a translator or an interpreter, having such qualifications, experience and on payment of such fees as may be prescribed, shall be provided to the child if he fails to understand the same. (4) In case contents are being recorded in the language not understood by the child or wherever it is deemed necessary, a translator or an interpreter, having such qualifications, experience and on payment of such fees as may be prescribed, shall be provided to the child if he fails to understand the same. (5) Where the Special Juvenile Police Unit or local police is satisfied that the child against whom an offence has been committed is in need of care and protection, then, it shall, after recording the reasons in writing, make immediate arrangement to give him such care and protection including admitting the child into shelter home or to the nearest hospital within twenty-four hours of the report, as may be prescribed. (6) The Special Juvenile Police Unit or local police shall, without unnecessary delay but within a period of twenty-four hours, report the matter to the Child Welfare Committee and the Special Court or where no Special Court has been designated, to the Court of Session, including need of the child for care and protection and steps taken in this regard. (7) No person shall incur any liability, whether civil or criminal, for giving the information in good faith for the purpose of sub-section (1). 20. Obligation of media, studio and photographic facilities to report cases. Any personnel of the media or hotel or lodge or hospital or club or studio or photographic facilities, by whatever name called, irrespective of the number of persons employed therein, shall, on coming across any material or object which is sexually exploitative of the child (including pornographic, sexually-related or making obscene representation of a child or children) through the use of any medium, shall provide such information to the Special Juvenile Police Unit, or to the local police, as the case may be. 21. Punishment for failure to report or record a case. (1) Any person, who fails to report the commission of an offence under sub-section (1) of section 19 or section 20 or who fails to record such offence under sub-section (2) of section 19 shall be punished with imprisonment of either description which may extend to six months or with fine or with both. (1) Any person, who fails to report the commission of an offence under sub-section (1) of section 19 or section 20 or who fails to record such offence under sub-section (2) of section 19 shall be punished with imprisonment of either description which may extend to six months or with fine or with both. (2) Any person, being in-charge of any company or an institution (by whatever name called) who fails to report the commission of an offence under sub-section (1) of section 19 in respect of a subordinate under his control, shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to one year and with fine. (3) The provisions of sub-section (1) shall not apply to a child under this Act. 23. Section 202 of IPC reads as follows: "202. Intentional omission to give information of offence by person bound to inform. Whoever, knowing or having reason to believe that an offence has been committed, intentionally omits to give any information respecting that offence which he is legally bound to give, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to six months, or with fine, or with both." 24. The principal contention raised on behalf of accused nos. 3 and 4 is that Sections 21(1) and 21(2) of the POCSO Act operate in distinct and separate spheres and there can never be an overlapping of the two. Thereupon, it is submitted on behalf of the said accused persons that they could not be said to be in charge of the Institution where the incident in the present case took place. According to them, the incident took place in Shraddhanand Ladies Hostel, of which the accused no. 2, as Superintendent of the hostel, was in charge and therefore, they could not be charged under Section 21 of the POCSO Act, for having committed offence under Section 19(1) of the POCSO Act. It was further contended that once the person in charge of the Hostel i.e. the accused no.2 could be held responsible under Section 21(2) of the POCSO Act, Section 21(1) thereof could not apply at all and that, therefore, the accused nos. 3 and 4 deserved to be discharged. 25. It was further contended that once the person in charge of the Hostel i.e. the accused no.2 could be held responsible under Section 21(2) of the POCSO Act, Section 21(1) thereof could not apply at all and that, therefore, the accused nos. 3 and 4 deserved to be discharged. 25. A perusal of Section 21 of the POCSO Act quoted above, would show that failure to report an offence committed under the POCSO Act to the Special Juvenile Police Unit or the local police, despite having knowledge that such an offence had been committed, would lead to conviction and imposition of sentence, which may extend to six months or with fine or with both. Under Section 21(2) of the POCSO Act, such failure on the part of a person in charge of an Institution, would lead to conviction and imposition of sentence of imprisonment for a term which may extend to one year and with fine. The extent of sentence provided under Section 21(2) is harsher than the sentence provided under Section 21(1) of the POCSO Act. But, can it be said that for this reason alone, the two would operate in distinct and separate spheres and that if a person associated with an Institution is not covered under Section 21(2) of the POCSO Act, he/she cannot be covered under Section 21(1) thereof. In other words, when an offence under the POCSO Act is committed, in an Institution or a Company, only the person in charge can be proceeded against under Section 21(2) of the POCSO Act and no other person associated with the Institution or Company wherein an offence is committed under the POCSO Act, can be proceeded against, despite the fact that such a person has knowledge about commission of an offence under the POCSO Act, but fails to report the same as required under Section 19(1). 26. If the interpretation insisted upon by the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of accused nos. 3 and 4 is to be accepted, all persons associated with an Institution or a Company wherein an offence under the POCSO Act is committed, would be absolved of the responsibility of immediately reporting commission of an offence under the said Act and they could never be hauled up under Section 19(1) thereof. 3 and 4 is to be accepted, all persons associated with an Institution or a Company wherein an offence under the POCSO Act is committed, would be absolved of the responsibility of immediately reporting commission of an offence under the said Act and they could never be hauled up under Section 19(1) thereof. This would be distinct from a situation where an offence under the POCSO Act is committed neither in an Institution nor a Company. This Court is of the opinion that such an interpretation would be absurd and it would go against the very objects and reasons for enactment of the POCSO Act. At this stage, it would be appropriate to refer to the objects and reasons for which the POCSO Act was enacted in the year 2012, which read as follows: "Statement of Objects and Reasons Article 15 of the Constitution, inter alia, confers upon the State powers to make special provision for children. Further, Article 39, inter alia provides that the State shall in particular direct its policy towards securing that the tender age of children are not abused and their childhood and youth are protected against exploitation and they are given facilities to develop in a healthy manner and in conditions of freedom and dignity. 2. The United Nations Convention on the Rights of Children, ratified by India on 11th December, 1992, requires the State Parties to undertake all appropriate national, bilateral and multilateral measures to prevent (a) the inducement of coercion of a child to engage in any unlawful sexual activity; (b) the exploitative use of children in prostitution or other unlawful sexual practices; and (c) the exploitative use of children in pornographic performances and materials. 3. The data collected by the National Crime Records Bureau shows that there has been increase in cases of sexual offences against children. This is corroborated by the "Study on Child Abuse: India 2007" conducted by the Ministry of Women and Child Development. Moreover, sexual offences against children are not adequately addressed by the extant laws. A large number of such offences are neither specifically provided for nor are they adequately penalised. The interests of the child, both as a victim as well as a witness, need to be protected. It is felt that offences against children need to be defined explicitly and countered through commensurate penalties as an effective deterrence. 4. A large number of such offences are neither specifically provided for nor are they adequately penalised. The interests of the child, both as a victim as well as a witness, need to be protected. It is felt that offences against children need to be defined explicitly and countered through commensurate penalties as an effective deterrence. 4. It is, therefore, proposed to enact a self contained comprehensive legislation inter alia to provide for protection of children from the offences of sexual assault, sexual harassment and pornography with due regard for safeguarding the interest and well being of the child at every stage of the judicial process, incorporating child-friendly procedures for reporting, recording of evidence, investigation and trial of offences and provision for establishment of Special Courts for speedy trial of such offences. 5. The Bill would contribute to enforcement of the right of all children to safety, security and protection from sexual abuse and exploitation. 6. The Notes on Clauses explain in detail the various provisions contained in the Bill. 7. The Bill seeks to achieve the above objectives." 27. A perusal of the above quoted statement of objects and reasons would show that if the interpretation insisted upon by the learned Counsel appearing for the accused nos. 3 and 4 is accepted, it would foist a meaning on Section 21 of the POCSO Act, which would run counter to the very objects and reasons for which the POCSO Act was enacted. The whole purpose of engrafting Sections 19, 20 and 21 in the POCSO Act, was to ensure that any person who gained knowledge of commission of offence under the POCSO Act, would be obliged to inform the Special Juvenile Police Unit or the local police immediately, so that follow up action of swift investigation and immediate prosecution would be undertaken. The whole purpose of the said provision is to ensure that none of such offences go unreported and that they are reported immediately, so that swift follow up action is facilitated. It is for this purpose that in Section 20 of the POCSO Act, even the personnel associated with media, hotel, lodges, hostel, clubs, studios and photographic facilities are required to provide information to the Special Juvenile Police Unit or to the local police, if they come across any material or object which is sexually exploitative of children. It is for this purpose that in Section 20 of the POCSO Act, even the personnel associated with media, hotel, lodges, hostel, clubs, studios and photographic facilities are required to provide information to the Special Juvenile Police Unit or to the local police, if they come across any material or object which is sexually exploitative of children. Section 22 of the POCSO Act equally provides for punishment to be imposed on a person who makes a false complaint or provides false information against any person regarding commission of an offence under the POCSO Act. Therefore, the whole idea behind including Sections 19 to 22 in the POCSO Act is to ensure that genuine cases of sexual exploitation of children are reported immediately to the police so that swift remedial follow up action is facilitated. 28. Keeping this in mind, when we look at Section 21(1) and 21(2) of the POCSO Act, it becomes clear that the two sub-sections are like concentric circles, where the larger circle is sub-section (1) of Section 21, which obliges any person to report commission of an offence under the POCSO Act to the Special Juvenile Police Unit or the local police and the smaller circle is sub-section (2) of Section 21, which obliges a person in charge of a Company or an Institution to report commission of an offence under the POCSO Act in respect of a subordinate under his control. The punishment specified under Section 21(2) of the POCSO Act for a person who is in charge of a Company or Institution who fails to report commission of such an offence, is higher for the reason that the responsibility of this person is not just as a lay person having knowledge of commission of such an offence but, his responsibility as in charge of a Company or an Institution in respect of such an offence committed by a sub-ordinate, is much higher and, therefore, the prescribed punishment is harsher. By no stretch of imagination, can it be said that Sections 21(1) and 21(2) of the POCSO Act would operate in distinct spheres and that if a person is identified as in charge of a Company or Institution under Section 21(2) of POCSO Act, all the other persons having gained knowledge about commission of an offence under the POCSO Act, would be absolved of the responsibility to report the same or that once a person is identified as an accused under Section 21(2) of the POCSO Act, no other person having knowledge of the offence but having failed to report the same, could be arrayed as an Accused under Section 21(1) of the said Act. 29. The contention raised on behalf of the accused nos. 3 and 4 that the Sessions Court in the present case has stretched the provision of Section 21(1) of the POCSO Act to limits of absurdity, cannot be accepted. This Court is of the opinion that the distinction sought to be made in this regard on behalf of accused nos. 3 and 4, does not fit into the overall scheme of the POCSO Act, when appreciated in the backdrop of the above quoted statement of objects and reasons for enactment of the POCSO Act. 30. As regards the contention that only accused no. 2 can be held responsible under Section 21(2) of the POCSO Act, as the Superintendent of the concerned hostel, this Court is of the opinion, that the hostel, as a unit, was under the management and control of the aforesaid Management i.e. Shivaji Education Society and, therefore, it would be matter for trial as to which of the accused persons could be held responsible for offence under Section 21(2) of the POCSO Act. Even otherwise, accused nos. 3 and 4 gained knowledge of commission of the aforesaid offence by accused no.1 and they failed to immediately report the same to the Police and this is evident from the fact that the FIR ultimately came to be registered at the behest of the informant/complainant i.e. one of the victims in the present case. It is for this reason that the Court below is found to be justified in refusing to discharge the said applicants under Section 21(1) and 21(2) of the POCSO Act. It is for this reason that the Court below is found to be justified in refusing to discharge the said applicants under Section 21(1) and 21(2) of the POCSO Act. Therefore, it is found that there is no substance in the contentions raised on behalf of the Applicants in Criminal Application (APL) No. 53 of 2016. 31. Insofar as the Judgments on which reliance is placed on behalf of the Applicants, it is found that even otherwise, the judgments of the Kerala High Court and the Chhattisgarh High Court are at best of persuasive value. In the case of Dr. Letha J & Ors. vs. State of Kerala (supra), it was found on facts that the concerned accused persons could not be said to be in charge of the institution where the incident had taken place. The judgment of the Chhattisgarh High Court in the case of Kamal Prasad Patade vs. State of Chhattisgarh (supra), is not found to be of any assistance to the Applicants for the reason that it is already held in the case of Balasaheb @ Suryakant Yashwantrao Mane vs. The State of Maharashtra (supra) by this Court, that the view of the Chhattisgarh High Court could not be endorsed. A perusal of the Judgment in the case of Balasaheb @ Suryakant Yashwantrao Mane vs. The State of Maharashtra (supra) shows that cogent reasons have been stated as to why the view of the Chhattisgarh High Court is not endorsed. This Court does not find any reason to disagree with the reasoning of this Court in the Judgment in the case of Balasaheb @ Suryakant Yashwantrao Mane vs. The State of Maharashtra (supra). In fact, this Court is convinced that the reasons given in the Judgment in the case of Balasaheb @ Suryakant Yashwantrao Mane vs. The State of Maharashtra (supra), are based upon appreciation of the relevant provisions of the POCSO Act. 32. Insofar as Section 202 of IPC is concerned, the same has been quoted hereinabove. It pertains to offence when a person intentionally omits to give information of an offence when he is bound to give such information. This Court has already held why Applicant-Accused persons before this Court stand prima facie covered under Section 21 of the POCSO Act. 32. Insofar as Section 202 of IPC is concerned, the same has been quoted hereinabove. It pertains to offence when a person intentionally omits to give information of an offence when he is bound to give such information. This Court has already held why Applicant-Accused persons before this Court stand prima facie covered under Section 21 of the POCSO Act. When, prima facie, ingredients of offence under Section 21 of the POCSO Act are made out, it follows that ingredients of the offence under Section 201 of IPC are also, prima facie, made out. This is clear from a conjoint reading of Sections 19 and 21 of the POCSO Act, which demonstrates that the accused persons in the present case were bound to report the commission of the offence by the accused no. 1 and having failed to do so, prima facie they did commit an offence under Section 202 of the IPC also. Therefore, to that extent, the view of the Sessions Court deserves to be endorsed. Hence, it is found that the Criminal Application (APL) No. 53 of 2016 filed on behalf of accused nos. 3 and 4, deserves to be dismissed. 33. Insofar as Criminal Application (APL) No. 797 of 2014, filed by original accused no.2 is concerned, the impugned order therein is dated 16.10.2014. Accused No. 2, at the relevant time, was the Superintendent of the hostel where the accused no. 1 is alleged to have committed the offences under the POCSO Act. A perusal of the supplementary charge sheet shows that Accused No.1 is alleged to have committed offences under Sections 376 and 506(b) of the IPC and Section 3(1)(xii) of the Atrocities Act, while Accused Nos. 2 to 6 are alleged to have committed offences under Section 4 of the Atrocities Act, Sections 6 and 16 of the POCSO Act and Sections 176, 201 and 202 of the IPC. As the first person concerned with the hostel who was informed about the said incident by the victims and their parents, it was incumbent upon the accused no. 2 to have immediately informed the concerned police officials. The accused no. 2 admittedly failed to do so. Instead, she took the victims as also the parents and other girl students of the hostel to the accused no.3, who further failed to take immediate action in the matter. 2 to have immediately informed the concerned police officials. The accused no. 2 admittedly failed to do so. Instead, she took the victims as also the parents and other girl students of the hostel to the accused no.3, who further failed to take immediate action in the matter. The interpretation to Sections 19 and 21 has been elaborately discussed hereinabove, while considering the application filed by the original accused nos. 3 and 4 and the same applies to the Applicant in the present application i.e. original accused no. 2 also. As to whether the Accused no.2 could be said to be in charge of the institution as contemplated under Section 21(2) of the POCSO Act, would be a matter for trial. In any case, she was in the know of the incidents in question and therefore, she was obliged to inform the Police as contemplated under Section 21(1) of the POCSO Act. For the reasons stated hereinabove, while discussing the contentions raised on behalf of Accused Nos. 3 and 4, prima facie case under Section 202 of the IPC is also made out against the Accused No.2. 34. But, taking into consideration the material on record it cannot be said that even a prima facie case is made out against the Accused No.2 under Section 201 of the IPC, for having caused disappearance of evidence of offence or for giving false information to screen offender. Section 6 of the POCSO Act is wholly inapplicable to Accused No. 2, even if the material brought on record is to be accepted. Section 16 of the POCSO Act pertains to abetment of offence. The same is also not made out even prima facie, for the reasons stated hereinabove while discussing this issue in the context of Accused Nos. 3 and 4. Section 4 of the Atrocities Act is also found to be inapplicable to Accused No.2 on the basis of material brought on record. Therefore, the aforesaid application filed by Accused No.2 deserves to be partly allowed. 35. Similarly, it is also found in Criminal Revision Application No.151 of 2015 and Criminal Application (APL) No. 40 of 2016, concerning original accused nos. 5 and 6, that the said accused persons were employees of the aforesaid Management and they had inquired into the matter on the direction of the original accused nos. 3 and 4. 35. Similarly, it is also found in Criminal Revision Application No.151 of 2015 and Criminal Application (APL) No. 40 of 2016, concerning original accused nos. 5 and 6, that the said accused persons were employees of the aforesaid Management and they had inquired into the matter on the direction of the original accused nos. 3 and 4. Therefore, there is substance in the contention raised on their behalf that they could not be charged with offences under Section 4 of the Atrocities Act, Sections 6 and 16 of the POCSO Act and Sections 176 and 201 of the IPC. It is found on the basis of the material on record that the Sessions Court could not have rejected the application for discharge filed on behalf of the original accused nos. 5 and 6 in its entirety. 36. For the reasons stated above, the Applicants in these applications i.e., accused nos. 5 and 6, deserve to be discharged with respect to all offences under various Sections of the IPC, Atrocities Act and POCSO Act except Section 202 of the IPC and Section 21(1) of the POCSO Act. Although they cannot, even prima facie, be held to be in charge of the Institution concerned, they appear to be prima facie covered under Section 21(1) of the POCSO Act. Therefore, their application deserves to be partly allowed, on the same lines on which the application of the original accused nos. 3 and 4 was allowed by the Sessions Court. 37. In view of the above, Criminal Revision Application No. 16 of 2016, Criminal Application (APL) No. 53 of 2016 and Criminal Application (APL) No. 175 of 2016 are dismissed. Criminal Application (APL) No.797 of 2014 is partly allowed by discharging the Applicant original accused no. 2 of all offences alleged against her except for offences under Section 21(1) and 21(2) of the POCSO Act and Section 202 of the IPC. Criminal Revision Application No. 151 of 2015 and Criminal Application (APL) No. 40 of 2016 are partly allowed by discharging the Applicants i.e. original accused nos. 5 and 6 of all offences alleged against them except for offences under Section 21(1) of the POCSO Act and Section 202 of the IPC. The record and proceedings be sent back to the trial court immediately.