JUDGMENT : The Union of India has appealed under Section 23 of the Railways Claims Tribunal Act, 1987[for short “the Act”] from a judgment of the Tribunal dated 15.03.2019, awarding compensation to the dependents of the victim of a railway accident. 2. The claimant-respondents Dinesh Kumar and Smt. Prem Lata instituted a claim under Section 16 of the Act against the Union of India, represented by the General Manager, North Central Railway, Allahabad seeking compensation for the death of their son, Laxmikant in a railway accident on 25.02.2012. It is the claimant-respondents' case that the deceased was travelling from Satna to Varanasi on 25.02.2012 on board the Tapti Ganga Express. As the train was moving between the Meja Road and Unchadih Railway Stations, the deceased accidentally fell off the train, sustaining grievous injuries. He succumbed to those injuries. It is the claimants' case that the deceased was travelling on a second class railway ticket from Satna to Varanasi, that was lost from his person, in the course of the accident. 3. The appellants contested the claim, denying the fact that the deceased was a bona fide passenger on board train on the date of the incident or that he died in consequence of an accidental fall from the train while travelling as a bona fide passenger. It was emphasized that no First Information Report was lodged, reporting the loss of belongings and the journey ticket by the claimants. It was pleaded that the deceased was, in fact, run over by the train on the date of accident, where fabricated facts have been pleaded to set up a false claim. It was also pleaded by the appellant that no police panchnamaor autopsy was put in by the claimants in the absence of which, the claimants must be held to have failed in discharging their evidential burden. It was also pleaded that the particulars of the incident set out in Paragraph No. 6 of the claim petition, did not attract the ingredients of Section 123(c)(2) read with Section 124-A of the Act. The Tribunal framed the following issues : (i) Whether the deceased was a bona fide passenger of the train in question? (ii) Whether the incident of death of the deceased falls under the ambit of an untoward incident, as defined under Section 123C(2) read with Section 124A of the Railway Act, 1989? (iii) Who are the dependents of the deceased? The Tribunal framed the following issues : (i) Whether the deceased was a bona fide passenger of the train in question? (ii) Whether the incident of death of the deceased falls under the ambit of an untoward incident, as defined under Section 123C(2) read with Section 124A of the Railway Act, 1989? (iii) Who are the dependents of the deceased? (iv) To what relief? 4. The claimants, in support of their case, relied on the testimony of Dinesh Kumar, who has been described by the Tribunal as AW-1. He testified on affidavit. Another witness was Srinath, AW-2. He too testified on affidavit. Srinath was produced in Court and cross-examined. The claimant-respondents relied for documentary evidence upon copies of the Station Superintendent's memo, inquest report issued by the pradhan, the police report and ration card. The appellants, in support of their case, relied on the Statutory Investigation Report carrying the DRM's report. 5. Issue Nos. 1 and 2 were dealt with by the Tribunal together and it was held that the deceased was a bona fide passenger on board the train in question, and that his death occurred on account of an accident during course of the journey. It falls within the ambit of “untoward incident” under Section 123(c)(2) of the Act read with Section 124-A. On the third issue, it was held that the claimants were dependents of the deceased, being his father and mother. This finding was based on the certified copy of the ration card. The claimant-respondents, while answering Issue No. 4, were held entitled to receive in compensation from the appellant a sum of Rs. 8 lacs. 6. In consequence of the findings on the four issues, the petition was allowed, ordering the appellant to pay a sum of Rs. 8 lacs in compensation to the claimant-respondents. It was further ordered that the aforesaid sum of compensation be paid to the claimants within a period of nintey days of the date of receipt of a certified copy of the judgment, with interest at the rate of 9% perannum from the date of judgment till realisation. There were ancillary directions issued about part disbursement of the awarded compensation, but that is not much material for the purpose of this appeal. 7. Heard Mr. Prashant Kumar Srivastava, learned Counsel for the appellant and Mr. Manish Kumar Srivastava, learned Counsel appearing for the claimant-respondents. 8. There were ancillary directions issued about part disbursement of the awarded compensation, but that is not much material for the purpose of this appeal. 7. Heard Mr. Prashant Kumar Srivastava, learned Counsel for the appellant and Mr. Manish Kumar Srivastava, learned Counsel appearing for the claimant-respondents. 8. It was argued with much emphasis by Mr. Prashant Kumar Srivastava that the entire accident was a ploy to extort compensation from the appellant, whereas the deceased was not at all a bona fide passenger on board train. It is emphasized that the deceased was a native of Village Soraon, Post Office Meja Road, Police Station Meja, Prayagraj and was allegedly proceeding to Varanasi, when he fell off the train in the vicinity of his village. It is urged that the facts show that he was not at all a bona fide passenger, but a wanderer on the tracks, who was crushed under the wheels of the train. It is argued that the entire evidence does not suggest it to be an “untoward incident” covered under Section 123(c)(2) read with Section 124-A of the Act. It is emphasized by learned Counsel for the appellant that AW-1 Dinesh Kumar has said in his affidavit that neither the deceased purchased the railway ticket in his presence nor was he travelling with him on board train, when the deceased fell off on the date of accident. It is urged by learned Counsel for the appellant that the evidence of AW-1 is, therefore, of no worth. So far as AW-2 Srinath is concerned, it is argued that he has testified that the deceased purchased the railway ticket on 25.02.2012 in his presence, but the claimants have not produced any platform ticket or other evidence to show the truth of this witness's statement. It is argued that this witness has not said that he has seen the accident. There are fine contradictions pointed out by learned Counsel for the appellant to indicate unreliability of AW-2. 9. On the other hand, Mr. Manish Kumar Srivastava, learned Counsel for the claimant-respondents, has argued that there is convincing evidence to show that the deceased was a bona fide passenger on board the train in question and met with an accident while travelling as such. 9. On the other hand, Mr. Manish Kumar Srivastava, learned Counsel for the claimant-respondents, has argued that there is convincing evidence to show that the deceased was a bona fide passenger on board the train in question and met with an accident while travelling as such. He submits that because the accident occurred close-by the deceased's native village, is no reason to disbelieve the otherwise cogent and convincing evidence that establish both the status of the deceased as a bona fide passenger on board train as well as the factum of his death in an untoward incident, while journeying on the train. He has invited the attention of the Court to the evidence of the witnesses and the documentary evidence, to which allusion would be made a little later. 10. This Court has carefully considered the submissions made by the learned Counsel appearing on both sides and perused the record. So far as the issue about the deceased being a bonafide passenger on board the train in question is concerned, there is a clear statement in the affidavit of AW-2 Srinath, that on 25.02.2012, the deceased, in the presence of the witness, purchased a railway ticket at Satna Railway Station, booking his passage to Varanasi. It is clearly said in the affidavit that after purchasing the railway ticket, the deceased boarded the Tapti Ganga Express at Satna for destination Varanasi. In the cross-examination, the credit of this witness has been sought to be shaken, with words elicited to the effect that he had come to testify because he was a native of the same village as the deceased, and that the deceased's aunt was the Village Pradhan. There are some other words also elicited from the witness in his cross-examination, which show that he came to know of the incident after the deceased had been cremated. He has also said that the facts detailed in the affidavit had not been shared by him with anyone earlier. It is also noticed that under the grill of cross-examination, the witness has said that the place of incident is a kilometer away from the site, where it is shown. 11. It is on the edifice of these seemingly shaky utterances of the witness that the learned Counsel for the appellant much depends to impeach his credit. It is also noticed that under the grill of cross-examination, the witness has said that the place of incident is a kilometer away from the site, where it is shown. 11. It is on the edifice of these seemingly shaky utterances of the witness that the learned Counsel for the appellant much depends to impeach his credit. For one, the utterances of the witnesses during the cross-examination, in their nature, are not wholesome, from which any conclusion, either way, can be drawn. The reason is that the words in the cross-examination are inextricably connected to the questions, in reply to which, those words have been said. Bereft of the question, the answers do not make much sense either way. 12. The other aspect of the matter is that AW-1 is not a witness of the incident. He is a witness of the factum of purchase of the railway ticket by the deceased at Satna. There is hardly anything elicited from this witness, discrediting his categorical assertion in the affidavit, that the deceased purchased the railway ticket in the presence of this witness at Satna for destination Varanasi. Rather, in answer to a general question, impeaching him as an untrustful witness, AW-2 has clearly said that it is incorrect to say that he had come forward to testify falsely. Therefore, this Court is in agreement with the Tribunal, that the testimony of AW-2 Srinath to the effect that the deceased had boarded the train at Satna, after purchasing a ticket to Varanasi, remains unshaken. The Tribunal has rightly believed the evidence about the deceased being a bonafide passenger on board the train in question. 13. At this stage, reference may be made to the law in Union of India v. Rina Devi, (2019) 3 SCC 572 . In Rina Devi (supra)the law relating to burden of proof regarding the victim being a bonafide passenger was laid down by the Supreme Court thus : 29. We thus hold that mere presence of a body on the railway premises will not be conclusive to hold that injured or deceased was a bona fide passenger for which claim for compensation could be maintained. However, mere absence of ticket with such injured or deceased will not negative the claim that he was a bona fide passenger. We thus hold that mere presence of a body on the railway premises will not be conclusive to hold that injured or deceased was a bona fide passenger for which claim for compensation could be maintained. However, mere absence of ticket with such injured or deceased will not negative the claim that he was a bona fide passenger. Initial burden will be on the claimant which can be discharged by filing an affidavit of the relevant facts and burden will then shift on the Railways and the issue can be decided on the facts shown or the attending circumstances. This will have to be dealt with from case to case on the basis of facts found. The legal position in this regard will stand explained accordingly. (Emphasis by Court) 14. It would, thus, appear that once it is asserted on affidavit by the claimant that the deceased was travelling on a valid ticket, the burden would shift on the Railways, and the issue has to be decided on the basis of attending circumstances. The facts here show that the railway ticket sanctifying the deceased's journey was not recovered from his person. 15. No other evidence has been led by the Railways to show that the deceased was not a bona fide passenger. This Court cannot ignore the fact that there is a solitary witness, that is to say, AW-2 Srinath, about the factum of purchase of the railway ticket by the deceased at Satna, but in the cross-examination, no question has been put to from him about that fact, which he has categorically testified to in his examination-in-chief on affidavit. Once this witness has not been confronted about the assertion in his affidavit that the deceased had purchased a railway journey ticket from Satna to Varanasi, it must be held that his assertion in the affidavit/examination-in-chief goes unchallenged. The mere fact that there was no recovery of the railway ticket would not lead to the conclusion that the deceased was not a bona fide passenger, as held in Rina Devi (supra). 16. This Court, therefore, records its agreement with the Tribunal on the point that the deceased was indeed a bona fide passenger on board the train in question on the fateful day. 17. 16. This Court, therefore, records its agreement with the Tribunal on the point that the deceased was indeed a bona fide passenger on board the train in question on the fateful day. 17. About the other issue, whether the victim fell off the train and sustained such injuries, that led to his death, entitling the claimants to recover, the testimony of AW-1 Dinesh Kumar is not of much relevance. He is not an eye-witness of the accident and was also not a co-passenger with the deceased. No inference, therefore, about the accident, can be drawn on the basis of testimony of AW-1. What cannot be ignored, however, is the certificate of the Station Superintendent, Meja Road, dated 10.02.2013, which this Court has perused. It reads : izekf.kr fd;k tkrk gS fd y{eh dkar 'kqDy iq= fnus'k dqekj 'kqDy dh e`R;q fnuakd 28@02@2012 dks jsy nq?kZVuk esa xkMh uaŒMkmu rkIrh xaxk ,Dlizsl ls jsy ;k=k ds nkSjku estk jksM jsy LVs'ku ds ikl lqcg 8 cts Vsªu ls fxjus ls gks x;h FkhA ds,e uaŒ Mh,u785@26 ;s 785@24 ds chp estk jksM ls vkjŒvkjŒ ds chp Mkmu ,Mokal flXuy ds ckgj xkMZ rkIrh xaxk ,Dlizsl us crk;kA ,l-vk- estk dks Hkh eseks Hkstk x;k FkkA 18. In the opinion of this Court, this certificate is enough to establish the accident, which occurred during the course of a journey on board the train in question, where the deceased was a bona fide passenger. The report of the DRM dated 17.04.2015 about the accident is absolutely conjectural. It reads : ------e`rd fdlh Fkzw xkM+h vFkkZr estk LVs'ku ij fcuk LVkist okyh xkM+h ij cSBdj ;k=k dj jgk gksxk rFkk Loa; dh ykijokgh ls pyrk xkMh ls mrjus dk iz;kl fd;k gksxk ftlls fxjdj e`R;q gks xbZA ;fn e`rd fu/kkZfjr LFkku ij cSBdj ;k=k djrk rks mDr ?kVuk ?kfVu ugha gksrhA 19. There is absolutely no evidence to infer that the deceased tried to deboard the running train at Meja Road. Rather, the unchallenged testimony of AW-2, that the deceased had purchased a ticket from Satna to Varanasi, would go to show that he did not intend to detrain at Meja Road. There is absolutely no evidence to infer that the deceased tried to deboard the running train at Meja Road. Rather, the unchallenged testimony of AW-2, that the deceased had purchased a ticket from Satna to Varanasi, would go to show that he did not intend to detrain at Meja Road. If the appellant wished to prove the case that the deceased met with the accident while deboarding the train at Meja Road that was running through, it was the appellant's burden to establish it by suitable evidence, say, an eye-witness account, about the incident. To the contrary, the memo of the Station Superintendent, Meja Road dated 10.02.2013 extracted hereinabove, does not suggest, in the least, that the deceased was attempting to deboard the train, while it was running through. The Station Superintendent, who is an officer of the Railway Establishment, with much experience and training, would have certainly mentioned in his memo the deceased's indiscretion of the kind that the DRM's report conjectures. The Station Superintendent would know well the consequences of not recording the fact about the deceased's indiscretion in attempting to deboard a running train. The tenor of the memo dated 10.02.2013 shows that the deceased fell off the train during movement, from which, the only reasonable inference is that it was a case of an accidental fall during the journey; not the result of a misadventure to deboard a train running through. Thus, in the opinion of the Court, the findings of the Tribunal on Issue Nos. 1 and 2 are unassailable, though for added reasons. 20. The other point that has been argued by Mr. Prashant Kumar Srivastava is that the accident occurred on 25.02.2012, whereas the prescribed amount of compensation in the schedule to the Railway Accidents and Untoward Incidents (Compensation) Rules, 1990[for short “the Rules of 1990”] has been amended w.e.f. 01.01.2017 by a notification dated 22.12.2016. It is urged that the Tribunal, therefore, erred in awarding compensation in the sum of Rs. 8 lacs, which is the prescribed compensation under the amended schedule to the Rules of 1990. He submits that compensation in the higher sum can be awarded with regard to post-amendment accidents, and not for pre-amendment accidents. Here, the compensation has to be awarded, going by the unamended rules, which cannot be more than a figure of Rs. 4 lacs of substantive compensation. Mr. He submits that compensation in the higher sum can be awarded with regard to post-amendment accidents, and not for pre-amendment accidents. Here, the compensation has to be awarded, going by the unamended rules, which cannot be more than a figure of Rs. 4 lacs of substantive compensation. Mr. Prashant Kumar Srivastava's submissions on this score have been opposed by Mr. Manish Kumar Srivastava, who says that even in case of pre-amendment accidents, compensation in the sum of Rs. 8 lacs has to be awarded, where the decision is rendered on a date after the coming into force of the amendment. 21. The law laid down in Rina Devi (supra) propounds a rule that in case of pre-amendment accidents, the substantive compensation would be that which obtains on the date of accident. It would be Rs. 4 lacs. However, where the award is made after coming into force of the amendment, the entitlement to compensation is to be worked out in the manner for a pre-amendment accident, that Rs. 4 lacs would be substantive compensation and such interest accrued thereon is to be added, as considered reasonable from time to time. If the resultant figure is higher than the compensation payable on the date of award, that is the sum payable; the higher of the two sums of money is to be awarded. In this regard, in Rina Devi, it has been held : 19. Accordingly, we conclude that compensation will be payable as applicable on the date of the accident with interest as may be considered reasonable from time to time on the same pattern as in accident claim cases. If the amount so calculated is less than the amount prescribed as on the date of the award of the Tribunal, the claimant will be entitled to higher of the two amounts. This order will not affect the awards which have already become final and where limitation for challenging such awards has expired, this order will not by itself be a ground for condonation of delay. Seeming conflict in Rathi Menon [Rathi Menon v. Union of India, (2001) 3 SCC 714 , para 30 : 2001 SCC (Cri) 1311] and Kalandi Charan Sahoo [Kalandi Charan Sahoo v. South-East Central Railways, (2019) 12 SCC 387 : 2017 SCC OnLine SC 1638] stands explained accordingly. Seeming conflict in Rathi Menon [Rathi Menon v. Union of India, (2001) 3 SCC 714 , para 30 : 2001 SCC (Cri) 1311] and Kalandi Charan Sahoo [Kalandi Charan Sahoo v. South-East Central Railways, (2019) 12 SCC 387 : 2017 SCC OnLine SC 1638] stands explained accordingly. The four-Judge Bench judgment in Pratap Narain Singh Deo [Pratap Narain Singh Deo v. Srinivas Sabata, (1976) 1 SCC 289 : 1976 SCC (L&S) 52] holds the field on the subject and squarely applies to the present situation. Compensation as applicable on the date of the accident has to be given with reasonable interest and to give effect to the mandate of beneficial legislation, if compensation as provided on the date of award of the Tribunal is higher than unrevised amount with interest, the higher of the two amounts has to be given. 22. In the aforesaid perspective of the law, the impugned award being one made on 15.03.2019, that is post-amendment, the compensation in the sum of Rs. 8 lacs cannot be disputed by the appellants. Though, it must be remarked that the Tribunal has not shown a comparison of the two compensations post and pre-amendment, but in either case, it would not lead to a different result for the appellant. The compensation cannot be less than Rs. 8 lacs. 23. Now, there is a further question that has been agitated by learned Counsel for the appellant, and that is about reckoning of interest at the rate of 9% perannum from the date of award till realisation. He submits that going by the principal in Rina Devi, nothing beyond Rs. 8 lacs is payable. No doubt the Tribunal has directed payment of interest at the rate of 9% perannumon the compensation awarded, reckoned from the date of judgment until realisation, without providing for a waiting period after expiry whereof and persistent default by the appellant, interest would be payable over and above the sum of Rs. 8 lacs. The principle in Rina Devi is not to be understood in the manner that the appellant can pay the awarded compensation whenever they like and yet not be liable to pay interest. The question whether over and above the sum of Rs. 8 lacs. The principle in Rina Devi is not to be understood in the manner that the appellant can pay the awarded compensation whenever they like and yet not be liable to pay interest. The question whether over and above the sum of Rs. 8 lacs, interest can be granted, and if payable, what would be the date from which it would be reckoned, was considered by a Division Bench of this Court in Union of India through General Manager, Northern Railway v. Smt. Gayatri Devi, First Appeal From Order No. 166 of 2018, decided on 14.08.2018. In Gayatri Devi (supra), it was held: In Rina Devi's case [supra] while dealing with grant of interest on compensation amount (issue no.4), the Apex Court held that interest can be awarded from the date of accident itself when the liability of the Railway arises upto the date of payment without any difference in the stages. The relevant paragraph reads as under:- "As already observed, though this Court in Thazhathe Purayil Sarabi (supra) held that rate of interest has to be at the rate of 6% from the date of application till the date of the award and 9% thereafter and 9% rate of interest was awarded from the date of application in Mohamadi (supra), rate of interest has to be reasonable rate at par with accident claim cases. We are of the view that in absence of any specific statutory provision, interest can be awarded from the date of accident itself when the liability of the Railways arises upto the date of payment, without any difference in the stages. Legal position in this regard is at par with the cases of accident claims under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. Conflicting views stand resolved in this manner." As far as the case at hand is concerned, in view of the proposition of law as propounded in Rina Devi's [supra] it is necessary to calculate the total amount i.e. amount of compensation plus interest to ascertain whether the amount so calculated is less than the amount prescribed as on the date of the award. In the event the amount of compensation with interest was less than the amount prescribed on the date of award, then the amount which is higher is to be paid to the claimants. In the event the amount of compensation with interest was less than the amount prescribed on the date of award, then the amount which is higher is to be paid to the claimants. For the reasons aforesaid, we are of the view that the ends of justice will be secured by awarding Rs. Eight lac in all as compensation to the claimants. It may be added that provisions for compensating monetarily either under the Railways Act or Motor Vehicles Act is a beneficial piece of legislation and the purpose for award of interest is to put pressure on the relevant person not to delay in making the payment. In other words, when any amount is due to a creditor and the same is not paid by the debtor over a certain period, the creditor is deprived of the use of the said amount for the period during which the amount remains unpaid for which he is entitled to be compensated by way of payment of interest. Therefore, in the event the appellants fails to pay the aforesaid amount of Rs. Eight lacs within a period of 90 days, then interest @ 9% shall be payable till the date of actual payment. (Emphasis by Court) 24. In view of the principle laid down in Gayatri Devi, the direction to pay interest on the compensation awarded ought to be modified by ordering interest to be payable at the rate of 9% perannumpost expiry of a period of ninety days from the date of judgment till realisation. 25. In the result, this appeal succeeds and stands allowed in part. The impugned judgment is modified to the extent that on the sum of compensation ordered to be paid by the Tribunal, interest shall be payable at the rate of 9% perannum after expiry of a period of ninety days from the date of judgment passed by the Tribunal till realization, if within the aforesaid period of time, the awarded compensation is not paid to the claimant or deposited with the Tribunal. 26. There shall be no order as to costs. ORDER : 1. The Court is convened via video conferencing. 2. This is an application, seeking to correct the date mentioned on the judgment and order passed in the present appeal, by substituting the date "December the 14th, 2021" with "November the 25th, 2021". 3. 26. There shall be no order as to costs. ORDER : 1. The Court is convened via video conferencing. 2. This is an application, seeking to correct the date mentioned on the judgment and order passed in the present appeal, by substituting the date "December the 14th, 2021" with "November the 25th, 2021". 3. A perusal of the record, particularly, the Case Status Report from the Bench Secretary's records, shows that judgment in this case was passed on 25.11.2021, but, by typographical error, the date on the judgment is shown as December the 14th, 2021. 4. The application is allowed. 5. In my judgment and order passed in this First Appeal from Order, at the foot of the judgment, for the date "December the 14th, 2021", the date "November the 25th, 2021" shall be read. 6. The order passed in this appeal stands corrected accordingly. 7. In any report of this judgment, the date "November the 25th, 2021" shall be shown as the date of decision and not the December, the 14th, 2021.