JUDGMENT M.S.SONAK,J. 1. Heard Mr. Amit S. Kinkhede, learned counsel for the applicant, and Mr. S.S. Doifode, Additional Public Prosecutor for Nonapplicant Nos.1 and 2, and Mr. Pankaj v. Navlani, Advocate for Nonapplicant No.3. 2. Rule. The rule is made returnable forthwith at the request of and with the consent of learned counsel for the parties. 3. By this application under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code, the applicant invokes the inherent powers of this Court and seeks to quash of First Information Report No.3468/2011, dated 26.5.2011 and the consequent charge-sheet No.770/2011 dated 3.10.2011. 4. The allegation in the impugned F.I.R. and the charge-sheet is that the applicant has committed offenses punishable under Sections 66A and 66C of the Information and Technology Act, 2000 (in short, "I.T. Act "). 5. Mr. S.S. Doifode, learned Additional Public Prosecutor for non-applicant Nos.1 and 2 and Shri Pankaj Navlani, learned counsel for non-applicant No.3 submit that the present application may not be entertained because the applicant has already applied for discharge before the competent Court where the impugned charge-sheet has been filed. 6. According to us, this objection cannot be upheld having regard to the law laid down by the Hon 'ble Apex Court in G. Sagar Suri and another vs. State of U.P. and others (2000) 2 SCC 636 . In this case, the Hon 'ble Supreme Court has held that the jurisdiction of the High Court for quashing a criminal proceeding under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code can be exercised even when the application for discharge of the accused is pending before the trial Judge. A similar view is adopted in Keki Hormusji Gharda and others Vs. Mehervan Rustom Irani and another (2009) 6 SCC 475 . 7. Mr. S.S. Doifode and Mr. Pankaj Navlani then submitted that a similar application was filed by the present applicant which was disposed of by this Court by its judgment and order dated 26th June 2014 and, therefore, the present application is not maintainable. 8. Again, upon perusal of the order dated 26th June 2014 made in Criminal Application No.332/2013 we find that this Court had made it clear that it was not interfering at the relevant stage, but liberty was granted to the applicant to renew his grievance again if he finds that his persecution continues. 8. Again, upon perusal of the order dated 26th June 2014 made in Criminal Application No.332/2013 we find that this Court had made it clear that it was not interfering at the relevant stage, but liberty was granted to the applicant to renew his grievance again if he finds that his persecution continues. Besides, this order was passed at a stage when Section 66A of the I.T. Act was on the statute book. Subsequently, in the case of Shreya Singhal Vs. Union of India (2015) 5 SCC 1 , this provision has been struck down as violative of Article 19(1) (a) of the Constitution. Therefore, we are satisfied that the order dated 24.6.2014 cannot disable the applicant from maintaining the present proceeding. 9. As noted earlier, the applicant is alleged to have committed an offense under Section 66A of the I.T. Act. However, in the case of Shreya Singhal (supra), the Hon 'ble Supreme Court has struck down the provisions of Section 66A of the I.T. Act as ultra vires and unconstitutional. Obviously, therefore, no prosecution is maintainable under Section 66A of the I.T. Act and the F.I.R. and the consequent charge-sheet to the extent it invokes Section 66A of the I.T. Act will have to be quashed and set aside. The F.I.R. is also registered under Section 66(C) of the I.T. Act. 10. Section 66C of the I.T. Act reads as follows : "Punishment for identity theft. -Whoever, fraudulently or dishonestly make use of the electronic signature, password or any other unique identification feature of any other person, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three years and shall also be liable to fine which may extend to rupees one lakh. " 11. In this case we have read the complaint, F.I.R., and the charge-sheet and from the reading and analysis of the same, we are unable to find any allegations whatsoever about the applicant having fraudulently or dishonestly making use of any electronic signature, password, or any other unique identification feature of any other person. In the absence of any such allegations, we fail to understand how any prosecution can lie under Section 66C of the I.T. Act. 12. In the absence of any such allegations, we fail to understand how any prosecution can lie under Section 66C of the I.T. Act. 12. From the perusal of the complaint/F.I.R./charge-sheet it is apparent that only the allegations against the applicant were that on 18.11.2010 through his E-mail I.D. alert aa@redoffmail.com the applicant sent certain E-mails to the official as also to various offices in India of NSSO (FOD) and that the contents of such E-mails were objectionable. In all probabilities, these allegations were made to attract the provisions of Section 66A of the I.T. Act, which was then on the statute book. However, in the entire complaint/F.I.R./charge-sheet, there are no allegations about any use of electronic signature, password, or any other unique identification feature of another person. In the absence of any such allegations, there was no question registering F.I.R. under Section 66C of the I.T. Act. 13. This is therefore a matter where the F.I.R. and the consequent charge-sheet are required to be quashed because the allegations in the F.I.R. do not disclose the commission of any offense under Section 66C of the I.T. Act. This is also a case where the F.I.R. and the charge-sheet based thereon is required to be quashed because even if we take the allegations therein as correct, they do not constitute any offense or make out any case against the applicant of having committed an offense under Section 66C of the I.T. Act. 14. Mr. S.S. Doifode submitted that at the stage of framing of charge, the trial Court can always vary the provisions and frame charges accordingly. He submitted that the allegations, in this case, might make out a case under Section 67 of the I.T. Act. On this ground, Mr. Doifode submits that the F.I.R. and the consequent charge sheet may not be quashed. 15. In this case, the F.I.R. was filed on 26.5.2011 and the charge-sheet was filed in 2012. The allegations therein do not make out any case of an offense under Section 66C of the I.T. Act. Section 66A is already struck down and therefore, cannot be invoked. The F.I.R. and the charge sheet, in such circumstances, will have to be quashed. In this case, the F.I.R. was filed on 26.5.2011 and the charge-sheet was filed in 2012. The allegations therein do not make out any case of an offense under Section 66C of the I.T. Act. Section 66A is already struck down and therefore, cannot be invoked. The F.I.R. and the charge sheet, in such circumstances, will have to be quashed. If in terms of the law, the Investigating Authorities have the powers to take action in terms of Section 67 or any other Section of the I.T. Act, it is for them to consider such issue in accord with the law. Mr. Kinkhede learned counsel for the applicant submits that such further action is impermissible in law. At this stage, we express no opinion on such rival contentions because, according to us, such an issue does not arise before us at this stage. The limited issue before us is whether any case is made to quash the F.I.R. and the consequent charge-sheet as it stands and on this issue, we are with the applicant. 16. For the aforesaid reasons, we make the rule absolute in this application and quash and set aside the impugned F.I.R. No.3468/2011, dated 26.5.2011, and the charge-sheet No.770/2011 dated 3.10.2011 filed before 21st Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Nagpur. There shall be no order for costs.