JUDGMENT : The appellant in this R.S.A. is the defendant in O.S.No.262/2012 on the file of the Additional Sub Court, Thalassery (hereinafter referred to as 'the trial court') and the appellant in A.S.No.8/2014 on the file of the Additional District Court-I, Thalassery (hereinafter referred to as 'the first appellate court'). The parties are hereinafter referred to as the plaintiff and defendant according to their status in the trial court unless otherwise stated. 2. The suit was filed for realisation of an amount of Rs.2,44,600/-from the defendant in connection with a business dealing with raw cashew nuts. The defendant delivered a written statement contending that no dealing had taken place within the jurisdiction of the trial court and the trial court has no territorial jurisdiction to entertain the suit. The defendant further contended that the quality of nuts received from the plaintiff was substandard. The trial court, on an evaluation of the entire evidence and document held that the trial court had jurisdiction under Section 20(c) of the C.P.C. and further held that the defendant is liable to pay an amount of Rs.2,44,600/-to the plaintiff. Challenging the judgment and decree of the trial court, the defendant filed A.S.No.8/2014 before the Additional District Court-I, Thalassery. The learned District Judge dismissed the appeal, confirming the judgment and decree passed by the trial court. 3. Heard the learned counsel for the appellant. 4. The learned counsel for the appellant contended that the trial court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit. According to the learned counsel, the place of making the contract, the place of its breach or non-performance and the place where money was payable under the contract were all outside the jurisdiction of the court and no part of the cause of action arose within its jurisdiction. Merely the fact that the correspondence which led to the contract was from a place within the jurisdiction of the court as stated by the plaintiff will not give jurisdiction to the trial court. It was contended that the order was placed by the plaintiff telephonically from his place and the same was accepted by the defendant from Mangalore at his place and the amount was paid by the defendant from Mangalore. 5. It was contended that the order was placed by the plaintiff telephonically from his place and the same was accepted by the defendant from Mangalore at his place and the amount was paid by the defendant from Mangalore. 5. The money sought to be recovered by the plaintiff is the money allegedly due from the defendant to the plaintiff towards the value of the goods supplied by the plaintiff to the defendant. The plaintiff claims that he is a hill produce dealer conducting business at Koomanthode and he had sent a consignment of 10,000Kg. of raw cashew nuts to the defendant who was running a cashew factory at Mangalore as per the orders of the defendant for a consideration of Rs.7,30,000/-. It is alleged that the said consignment was sent by the plaintiff on 22.3.2012 and it was delivered over to the defendant on the same day. The defendant has contended that the trial court has no jurisdiction to try the suit as the entire transaction pertaining to the liability had taken place within the jurisdiction of the courts at Mangalore where the defendant permanently resides and carries over his business. The trial court held that actual offer which led to the conclusion of the contract pursuant to the acceptance of the same by the plaintiff came from the defendant who has been running a factory at Mangalore by offering to accept the supply of cashew nuts of the quality as insisted by the plaintiff for a particular price. Resultantly, the plaintiff sent the consignment for the price as agreed by the defendant. Therefore, the trial court was of the view that the contract between the plaintiff and defendant was concluded within the jurisdiction of the trial court. The trial court further held that the place of acceptance of the offer made by the defendant, the place of conclusion of the contract over telephone and the place where the plaintiff has been conducting his hill produce dealership are the same and within the jurisdiction of the trial court. The trial court further held that the place of acceptance of the offer made by the defendant, the place of conclusion of the contract over telephone and the place where the plaintiff has been conducting his hill produce dealership are the same and within the jurisdiction of the trial court. Hence, the cause of action for the suit has arisen partly within the jurisdiction of the trial court as contemplated under Section 20(c) of the C.P.C. Secondly, it was found that the amount of Rs.5,00,000/-paid to the plaintiff by the defendant was made through bank transaction and the payment was received by the plaintiff within the jurisdiction of the trial court and thus the trial court was having jurisdiction to try the suit. 6. Relying on the decisions in Prabhakara Kamath v. C.M.Patel [1961 KHC 188] and Thiruvambadi Rubber Co.Ltd v. Damodaran Nair [ 1984 KLT 586 ], the learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the trial court ought to have returned the plaint to be presented to the court in which the suit should have been instituted as contemplated under Order VII Rule 10 of the C.P.C. 7. In Prabhakara Kamath's case (supra), the trial court has found that the said court has no jurisdiction to try the suit. Accordingly, the plaint is ordered to be returned to be presented to the court in which the suit should have been instituted. The said order was challenged in C.M.A.No.16/1960 before this Court. A Division Bench of this Court upheld the decision of the trial court holding that the place of making the contract, the place of its breach or non-performance and the place where the money was payable under the contract were all outside the jurisdiction of the trial court and no part of cause of action arose within its jurisdiction. In Thiruvambadi Rubber Co. Ltd.'s case (supra) a learned Single Judge of this Court held that the mixed question of law and fact where evidence is necessarily to be recorded need not be tried as a preliminary issue coming under Order 14 Rule 2 of the C.P.C. According to the learned counsel for the appellant, the question of jurisdiction is an issue of law going to the very root of the case affecting the jurisdiction and the decree passed by the court without jurisdiction is a nullity in the eye of law. 8. 8. The question that arises for consideration is whether a defendant, having himself subjected to the jurisdiction of the court which passed a decree, can be permitted to challenge the jurisdiction of the trial court on the ground that the trial court had no territorial jurisdiction. In Thiruvambadi Rubber Co.Ltd's case (supra), the interim order of the trial court was challenged before the High Court in revision. In Prabhakara Kamath's case (supra) the order returning the plaint was challenged before this Court in Civil Miscellaneous Appeal. In the case on hand, concurrent findings of facts on merits are sought to be set aside in second appeal. 9. Section 21 of the C.P.C. deals with objection in regard to territorial jurisdiction. Section 21 of the C.P.C. is extracted below:- “21. Objections to jurisdiction .-[(1)] No objection as to the place of suing shall be allowed by any Appellate or Revisional Court unless such objection was taken in the Court of first instance at the earliest possible opportunity and in all cases where issues are settled at or before such settlement, and unless there has been a consequent failure of justice. [(2) No objection as to the competence of a Court with reference to the pecuniary limits of its jurisdiction shall be allowed by any Appellate or Revisional Court unless such objection was taken in the Court of first instance at the earliest possible opportunity, and, in all cases where issues are settled, at or before such settlement, and unless there has been a consequent failure of justice. (3) No objection as to the competence of the executing Court with reference to the local limits of its jurisdiction shall be allowed by any Appellate or Revisional Court unless such objection was taken in the executing Court at the earliest possible opportunity, and unless there has been a consequent failure of justice.]” 10. (3) No objection as to the competence of the executing Court with reference to the local limits of its jurisdiction shall be allowed by any Appellate or Revisional Court unless such objection was taken in the executing Court at the earliest possible opportunity, and unless there has been a consequent failure of justice.]” 10. In order to examine whether such interference is necessary, it would be fruitful to have a look at Section 99 of the C.P.C. which reads as follows:- “No decree to be reversed or modified for error or irregularity not affecting merits or jurisdiction.-No decree shall be reversed or substantially varied, nor shall any case be remanded, in appeal on account of any misjoinder or non-joinder of parties or causes of action or any error, defect or irregularity in any proceedings in the suit, not affecting the merits of the case or the jurisdiction of the Court.” 11. Section 99 of the C.P.C. put a guard on the power of the court to interfere with the judgment appealed against to the effect that if the error banked upon by the appellant committed by the appellate court while delivering the impugned judgment does not affect the merits of the case, such judgment need not be interfered. 12. In Kiran Singh and Others v. Chaman Paswan and Others [ AIR 1954 SC 340 ], the Apex Court while dealing with Sections 21 and 99 of the C.P.C. has stated the law as follows:- “The policy underlying Sections 21 and 99 of the Civil Procedure Code and Section 11 of the Suits Valuation Act is the same, namely, that when a case had been tried by a Court on the merits and judgment rendered, it should not be liable to be reversed purely on technical grounds, unless it had resulted in failure of justice, and the policy of the Legislature has been to treat objections to jurisdiction both territorial and pecuniary as technical and not open to consideration by an appellate Court, unless there has been a prejudice on the merits.” 13. The jurisdiction of a court may be classified into several categories. The important categories are, i) territorial or local jurisdiction; ii) pecuniary jurisdiction; and iii) jurisdiction over the subject matter. 14. The jurisdiction of a court may be classified into several categories. The important categories are, i) territorial or local jurisdiction; ii) pecuniary jurisdiction; and iii) jurisdiction over the subject matter. 14. So far as the territorial and pecuniary jurisdictions are concerned; objection to such jurisdiction has to be taken at the earliest possible opportunity and in any case at or before settlement of issues. The law is well settled on the point that if such objection is not taken at the earliest, it cannot be allowed to be taken at a subsequent stage. The policy underlying Sections 21 and 99 of the C.PC. is that when a case had been tried by the court on the merits and the judgment rendered, it should not be liable to be reversed purely on technical grounds, unless it had resulted in failure of justice. The question is now concluded by the decision of the Apex Court in Hiralal v. Kalinath [ AIR 1962 SC 199 ]. In the said case, a suit was filed on the original side of the High Court of Bombay after obtaining leave under Clause 12 of the Letters Patent on the allegation that part of the cause of action arose in Bombay. The suit was then referred to arbitration and an award was passed in favour of the plaintiff. When the award was put in execution, the judgment debtor resisted it on the ground that no part of the cause of action had arisen in Bombay, and therefore, the High Court had no jurisdiction to try the cause and that the decree was a nullity. In rejecting the above contention, the Supreme Court held in paragraph 4 of the judgment as follows:- “It is well settled that the objection as to local jurisdiction of a court does not stand on the same footing as an objection to the competence of a court to try a case. Competence of a court to try a case goes to the very root of the jurisdiction, and where it is lacking, it is a case of inherent lack of jurisdiction. On the other hand, an objection as to the local jurisdiction of a court can be waived and this principle has been given a statutory recognition by enactments like Section 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure.” 15. On the other hand, an objection as to the local jurisdiction of a court can be waived and this principle has been given a statutory recognition by enactments like Section 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure.” 15. In view of the above decision, the question of territorial jurisdiction is different from inherent jurisdiction to try the suit. The mere circumstance of there being an error, defect or irregularity in any proceeding in a suit, is no ground for reversing or varying a decree in appeal. Where an irregularity is one which affects the merits of a case or the jurisdiction of a court, it is said to be a material irregularity. An objection as to territorial jurisdiction of a court which has passed the decree on merits and where no prejudice has been caused, is held to be of a technical nature to which Section 99 of the C.P.C. would apply. Thus, when a suit has been decided after going to its merits and the judgment delivered concurrently by the trial court and first appellate court, this Court would not entertain a Regular Second Appeal as to jurisdiction unless it has resulted in failure of justice. When the suit is one within the cognizance of one of the sub courts within the jurisdiction of the State of Kerala and the want of territorial jurisdiction is the only issue as its local venue under Sections 15-20 of the C.P.C., the defect, if any, is not a ground to re-agitate the matter in second appeal as a substantial question of law. Sections 21 and 99 of the C.P.C. are statutory recognition of the principles that the defect as to the places under Sections 15-20 may not be treated as a case of failure of justice. On merits also, the trial court and the first appellate court entered a finding that the part of cause of action has arisen within the jurisdiction of the trial court. In the instant case, there was no inherent lack of jurisdiction. On merits also, the trial court and the first appellate court entered a finding that the part of cause of action has arisen within the jurisdiction of the trial court. In the instant case, there was no inherent lack of jurisdiction. The validity of the decree can be challenged in execution proceedings only on the ground that the court which passed the decree is lacking in inherent jurisdiction in the sense that the subject matter was wholly foreign to its jurisdiction or that the defendant was dead at the time of the suit or decree passed or some other grounds which could have effect of rendering the court entirely lacking in jurisdiction in respect of the subject matter of the suit or over the parties to it. There was no such inherent lack of jurisdiction in this case. The appellant has also failed to make out any case of prejudice being caused to him by the suit having been tried by the trial court or of any failure of justice as a result thereof. The decisions rendered in Prabhakara Kamath's case (supra) and Thiruvambadi Rubber Co. Ltd's case (supra) are not applicable in this case. 16. A second appeal is not a matter of right. The right of appeal is conferred by statute. A second appeal only lies on a substantial question of law. If statute confers a limited right of appeal, the Court cannot expand the scope of the appeal. It was not open to the defendant to re-agitate the facts or to call upon the High Court to re-analyse or re-appreciate evidence on record in a second appeal. In the case on hand, both the trial court and appellate court relied on the oral evidence of PW1 and Exts.A1 to A5 to grant a decree for recovery of money. 17. On behalf of the appellant, it has strenuously been contended with considerable force that the trial court has no territorial jurisdiction to entertain the suit and the decree passed against the defendant is a nullity. However, there is no contra evidence adduced by the defendant to prove a probable case that the alleged error, defect, or irregularity pleaded by the plaintiff affected the merits of the case or inherent jurisdiction of the court for reversing or varying the decree. However, there is no contra evidence adduced by the defendant to prove a probable case that the alleged error, defect, or irregularity pleaded by the plaintiff affected the merits of the case or inherent jurisdiction of the court for reversing or varying the decree. To be “substantial”, a question of law must be debatable, not previously settled by the law of the land or any binding precedent, and must have a material bearing on the decision of the case and/or the rights of the parties before it, if answered either way. As stated earlier, in a second appeal, the jurisdiction of the High Court being confined to substantial question of law, a finding of fact that the amount due to the plaintiff from the defendant is recoverable is not open to challenge in second appeal, even if the appreciation of evidence is wrong. There is no debatable issue before this Court which is not covered by settled principles of law or precedents. Further, no prejudice has been caused to the defendant and the contention of territorial jurisdiction is technical in nature. 18. The trial court and the first appellate court examined the evidence on record at length and arrived at a reasoned conclusion that the plaintiff is entitled to recover the plaint amount with interests and costs from the defendant and all his assets. The concurrent findings of facts of the trial court and the first appellate court do not warrant interference in a second appeal. For the reasons discussed above, the R.S.A. is dismissed. There will be no order as to costs. Pending applications, if any, stand disposed of.