JUDGMENT : [Saurabh Lavania, J.] 1.Heard Sri Mudit Agarwal, Advocate assisted by Ms. Shagun Srivastava, learned counsel for the petitioner and Sri Rajesh Tewari, learned Additional Chief Standing Counsel for the State of U.P. In the present petition, a challenge has been made to the order dated 15.12.2004 passed by opposite party No. 3-Additional Commissioner (Judicial), Lucknow Division, Lucknow in Revision No. 123/201-02. A challenge has also been made to the order dated 24.7.2002 passed by the opposite party No. 4-Up Zila Adhikari, Biswan, District Sitapur, in a stamp case No. 1/17/1987. 2. By the order dated 24.7.2002 passed by the opposite party No. 4, in a proceedings initiated under Section 47(A) of the Stamp Act, after holding that the land in issue i.e. Plot/Gata No. 403 area 0.295 has been purchased for industrial and commercial purposes, the petitioner was directed to deposit/remove the deficiency of stamp on the document i.e. registered sale-deed dated 28.10.1999, which was executed in favour of the petitioner by Santosh Kumar, Lalta Prasad and Som Kumar. This order was assailed by the petitioner in the revision No. 1/17/1987, as provided under Section 56 of Stamp Act, which was dismissed by the order impugned herein dated 15.12.2004. 3. Assailing the orders impugned in the present petition, the learned counsel for the petitioner, based upon the pleadings and documents on record, submitted that the petitioner purchased the agricultural land Plot/Gata No. 403 area 0.295 situated in village Jhajhar, Pargana and Tehsil Biswan, District Sitapur, from Santosh Kumar, Lalta Prasad and Som Kumar son of Sri Shiv Dayal. For the purposes of execution and registration of the sale-deed, the requisite stamp duty, as per the circle rate prescribed by the Collector, was paid. The stamp duty which was paid was to the tune of Rs. 9,360/-. 4. It is also stated that land in issue was purchased for agricultural purposes particularly for cultivation of sugar cane, as the petitioner is the sugar factory. The fact that land in issue was purchased for cultivation of sugar cane can also be deduced from page 13 of the sale-deed dated 28.10.1999, as also from the fact that the land in issue is bounded as East- agriculture land of Lav Khush, West- the land of Shanker Dayal, North- Nala & agriculture land of Haresh Bihari and Bipin Bihari and in South- agriculture land of Smt. Geeta Seksaria. 5. 5. It is also submitted that after purchasing the land in issue, the petitioner preferred an application for mutation under Section 34 of U.P. Land Revenue Act, 1901. In this case, an adverse order was passed, as such, the petitioner preferred an appeal and thereafter, in compliance of order dated 29.1.2001 passed in appeal, the name of the petitioner was recorded in the revenue record. Thereafter, a notice dated 25.5.2001 under Section 47(A) of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899 was served on the petitioner and in response to the same, the petitioner submitted an objection dated 7.7.2001. During the pendency of the proceedings, the opposite party No. 4 called for a report from the Nagar Palika Parishad, Biswan. As per the report of Nagar Palika Parishad, Biswan dated 5.9.2001, the land in issue i.e. plot No. 403 is not situated within the boundaries of Nagar Palika Parishad, Biswan. A report was also called from concerned Tehsildar and as per the report of Tehsildar dated 26.6.2002, the land is situated within the limit of Nagar Palika Parishad, Biswan and in this report a specific observation has also been made by the concerned Tehsildar that land has been purchased for industrial/commercial purpose. 6. He further submitted that the observation in the report that the land in issue has been purchased for industrial/commercial purposes is based on presumption/surmises, as the land in issue, as per the boundaries indicated in the sale-deed, is not adjacent to sugar factory in the same vicinity. Further stated that petitioner against the report of Tehsildar dated 26.6.2002 also filed the objection dated 29.6.2002. In this objection the petitioner specifically stated that the land is being used for agricultural purpose and the land is not adjacent to sugar factory. In this objection the facts based upon the report of Nagar Palika Biswa were also stated. Thereafter, opposite party No. 4 Up Zila Adhikari, Biswan, District Sitapur, without considering the objections filed by the petitioner, passed the order dated 24.7.2002. 7. He further submitted that this order is unsustainable in the eyes of law and facts both, as the order is based upon the report of the concerned Tehsildar, which cannot be relied upon as an exemplar. The order dated 24.7.2002 is also unsustainable in law as it is based on the unfounded fact that land in issue is situated adjacent to the sugar factory. The order dated 24.7.2002 is also unsustainable in law as it is based on the unfounded fact that land in issue is situated adjacent to the sugar factory. He further submitted that sugar factory is not the sugar factory of the petitioner. He also submitted that the stamp duty which was paid at the time of registration of sale-deed was proper as the same was based on the circle rate and in the entire order it has not been stated that the stamp duty was not as per the circle rate prevailing on the date of execution and registration of sale-deed. Thus, the order dated 24.7.2002 based on presumption is unsustainable in the eyes of law. It is also stated that for the purpose of stamp duty the use of land on the date of execution of sale-deed has to be looked into. 8. In regard to order dated 15.12.2004 passed in the revision filed by the petitioner, Sri Agarwal submitted that the same is also liable to be interfered as the reasons therein are almost same to the reasons indicated in the order dated 24.7.2002. 9. In support of his submission, Sri Agarwal placed reliance on the judgment passed by a Coordinate Bench of this Court in the case of The Institute of the Franciscan Clarist Sisters v. State of U.P. and others, 2020(3) ADJ 514 and based upon the same, submitted that after relying upon the judgment passed in the case of Surendra Singh and another v. State of U.P. and others, 2009(2) ADJ 560 and Ram Khelawan @ Bachha v. State of U.P., 2005 RD 511 , this Court has observed that the report of the Tehsildar may be a relevant factor for initiation of proceedings under Section 47A of the Act, but it cannot be relied upon to pass an order under Section 47A and cannot form itself the basis of the order passed under Section 47A of the Act. It is also stated that in this case reliance was also placed on the judgment passed in the cases of Vijai Kumar v. Commissioner, Meerut Division, Meerut, 2008(7) ADJ 293 (para 17), where the ambit and scope of Section 47-A of the Act was considered in some depth after taking into consideration the Division Bench judgment of this Court in Kaka Singh v. Additional Collector and District Magistrate (Finance and Revenue), 1986 ALJ 49; Kishore Chandra Agrawal v. State of U.P. and others, 2007(10) ADJ 607 (DB) (LB) and various other cases, wherein, it was held that under Section 4-A (3) of the Act, the burden lay upon the Collector to prove that the market value is more than minimum as prescribed by the Collector under the Rules. The report of the Sub-registrar and Tehsildar itself is not sufficient to discharge that burden. The Sub-registrar, therefore, could not legally form basis of the impugned order. The relevant para referred on reproduction reads as under : ''17. The next case cited is Surendra Singh (Supra), wherein this Court held as under : ''8. In M/s Maya Food and Vanaspati Ltd. Co. v. Chief Controlling Revenue Authority (Board of Revenue) Allahabad,1990 90 RevDec 57, the Court held that the market value of the land could not be determined with reference to the use of the land to which the buyer intends to put in use. The Court held that a buyer may intend to establish an industrial undertaking thereon and that another buyer may intend to use it for agricultural purposes and a third person may intend to dedicate it for charitable purposes and that these different intentions of individual buyers may affect the price of each of them would be willing to pay for the property but the market value would not depend upon what each individual would offer for the property in question and that the market value would be that which a general buyer would offer and what the owner reasonably accepts for that property, the Court held that in determining the market value, the potential of the land as on the date of sale alone could be taken into account in determining the market value and that the potential value of the land that could be put in use in future could not to be taken into consideration. 13. 13. None of the authorities below besides the report of the Sub-registrar has referred any other material in support of their orders. In Ram Khelawan @ Bachha v. State of U.P. through Collector, Hamirpur and another, (2005) 98 RevDec 511, it has been held that the report of the Tehsildar may be a relevant factor for initiation of the proceedings under Section 4-A of the Act, but it cannot be relied upon to pass an order under the aforesaid section. In other words, the said report cannot form itself basis of the order passed under Section 47-A of the Act. In the case of Vijai Kumar v. Commissioner, Meerut Division, Meerut, 2008(7) ADJ 293 (para 17), the ambit and scope of Section 47-A of the Act has been considered with some depth. Taking into consideration the Division Bench judgment of this Court in Kaka Singh v. Additional Collector and District Magistrate (Finance and Revenue), (1986) AllLJ 49; Kishore Chandra Agrawal v. State of U.P. and others, 2008 104 RevDec 253 and various other cases it has been held that under Section 4-A (3) of the Act, the burden lay upon the Collector to prove that the market value is more than minimum as prescribed by the Collector under the Rules. The report of the Sub-registrar and Tehsildar itself is not sufficient to discharge that burden. 14. Viewed as above, it is, thus, evident that the report of the Sub-registrar could not legally form basis of the impugned order. There is no material in possession of the respondents to show that on the date of the execution of the sale-deed, the land in dispute was not agricultural land. The laying of foundation subsequent to the sale-deed is of little consequence so far as it relates to the determination of the payment of stamp duty under Section 47-A of the Act is concerned. Additionally, the learned counsel for the petitioners submits that still the land in dispute is being used for agricultural purposes. In this connection, he has placed reliance upon the extract of Khasra of 1414 Fasli. In the said Khasra it is mentioned that cattle fodder has been sown on the spot. However, in the Khasra under heading category in column 18 of the said Khasra the entry is ''Abadi/Shamil Jot''. In this connection, he has placed reliance upon the extract of Khasra of 1414 Fasli. In the said Khasra it is mentioned that cattle fodder has been sown on the spot. However, in the Khasra under heading category in column 18 of the said Khasra the entry is ''Abadi/Shamil Jot''. The use of words Sha Ja have been explained by the counsel for the parties as ''Shamil Jot'' which means joint cultivation. At this stage, the learned Standing Counsel submits that entry of '' Abadi'' reflects that the property in dispute is not agricultural property. Alongwith the counter-affidavit the revenue extract (Khasra) of 1412 Fasli which corresponds to the year 2007 has been annexed. From this Khasra it is evident that crop of Urd was sown in Kharif season in the land in question. However, there is an entry of ''Abadi/Shamil Jot'' under the column 18. The said document does not relate to the date of the execution of the sale-deed nor appears to have been filed before the authorities below and as such is liable to the ignored. Besides above, the fact that the crop was sown and factum of joint cultivation mentioned in the said document are also liable to be taken into consideration and cannot be ignored. The fact remains that there is no cogent or convincing material on the record to show that the land on the date of execution of the sale-deed was other than the agricultural land, at least.'' 10. Sri Agwarwal also placed reliance on the judgment passed by the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Sumati Nath Jain v. State of U.P. and another, 2016(2) ADJ 533 (DB). The relevant observations by the division bench of this Court are as under : ''We may note that on the date of execution of the instrument the land was admittedly recorded as agricultural. In fact the Khasra of the property remained unchanged throughout and continued to represent the land as recorded for agricultural purposes. The respondents were in our opinion wholly unjustified in initiating proceedings based on an unsubstantiated assumption that the property in future was likely to be put to non-agricultural use. The perceived or presumed use to which a buyer may put the property in the future can never be the basis for adjudging its value or determining the stamp duty payable. The respondents were in our opinion wholly unjustified in initiating proceedings based on an unsubstantiated assumption that the property in future was likely to be put to non-agricultural use. The perceived or presumed use to which a buyer may put the property in the future can never be the basis for adjudging its value or determining the stamp duty payable. The Act, we may note is a fiscal statute. The taxable event with which it concerns itself is the execution of an instrument which is chargeable to duty. The levy under the statute gets attracted the moment an instrument is executed. These propositions clearly flow from a plain reading of the definition of the words ''chargeable'', ''executed'' and ''instrument'' as carried in the Act. In the case of an instrument which creates rights in respect of property and upon which duty is payable on the market value of the property comprised therein, since the tax liability gets fastened immediately upon execution it must necessarily be quantified on the date of execution. The levy of tax or its quantum cannot he left to depend upon hypothetical or imponderable facets or factors. The value of the property comprised in an instrument has to be adjudged bearing in mind its character and potentiality as on the date of execution of the instrument. For all the aforesaid reasons we fail to find the existence of the essential jurisdictional facts which may have warranted the invocation of the powers conferred by Section 474 (3). We are therefore of the firm opinion that the initiation of proceedings as well as the impugned order based upon a presumed future use of the property for residential purposes was wholly without jurisdiction and clearly unsustainable. Dealing with this aspect of the matter and after noticing the consistent line of precedent on the subject the Division Bench in Smt Vijaya Jain observed : ''This Court on more than one occasion has held that the market value of the land is not liable to be determined with reference to the use to which a buyer intends to put it in future. The market value of the property is to be determined with reference to its character on the date of execution of the instrument and its potentiality as on that date.'' The above principles of law enunciated in the aforementioned judgments have been consistently followed by this Court. The market value of the property is to be determined with reference to its character on the date of execution of the instrument and its potentiality as on that date.'' The above principles of law enunciated in the aforementioned judgments have been consistently followed by this Court. We however find that the order of the Collector relies upon no evidence which would support imposition of residential rates on a property which was stated to be agricultural on the date of execution of the instrument.'' 11. On the issue under consideration, Sri Agarwal also placed reliance on the judgment passed by the Full Bench of this Court in the case of Pushpa Sareen v. State of U.P., 2015(3) ADJ 136 (FB). In Para 30 and 31, the Full Bench of this Court has observed as under : ''30. Undoubtedly, the collector is not permitted to launch upon a speculative inquiry about the prospective use to which a land may be put to use at an uncertain future date. The market value of the property has to be determined with reference to the use to which the land is capable reasonably of being put to immediately or in the proximate future. The possibility of the land becoming available in the immediate or near future for better use and enjoyment reflects upon the potentiality of the land. This potential has to be assessed with reference to the date of the execution of the instrument. In other words, the power of the Collector cannot be unduly circumscribed by ruling out the potential to which the land can be advantageously deployed at the time of the execution of the instrument or a period reasonably proximate thereto. Again the use to which land in the area had been put is a material consideration. If the land surrounding the property in question has been put to commercial use, it would be improper to hold that this is a circumstance which should not weigh with the Collector as a factor which influences the market value of the land. 31. The fact that the land was put to a particular use, say for instance a commercial purpose at a later point in time, may not be a relevant criterion for deciding the value for the purpose of stamp duty, as held by the Supreme Court in State of U.P. and others v. Ambrish Tandon and another11. 31. The fact that the land was put to a particular use, say for instance a commercial purpose at a later point in time, may not be a relevant criterion for deciding the value for the purpose of stamp duty, as held by the Supreme Court in State of U.P. and others v. Ambrish Tandon and another11. This is because the nature of the user is relateable to the date of purchase which is relevant for the purpose of computing the stamp duty. Where, however, the potential of the land can be assessed on the date of the execution of the instrument itself, that is clearly a circumstance which is relevant and germane to the determination of the true market value. At the same time, the exercise before the Collector has to be based on adequate material and cannot be a matter of hypothesis or surmise. The Collector must have material on the record to the effect that there has been a change of use or other contemporaneous sale-deeds in respect of the adjacent areas that would have a bearing on the market value of the property which is under consideration. The Collector, therefore, would be within jurisdiction in referring to exemplars or comparable sale instances which have a bearing on the true market value of the property which is required to be assessed. If the sale instances are comparable, they would also reflect the potentiality of the land which would be taken into consideration in a price agreed upon between a vendor and a purchaser.'' 12. Based upon the judgment in the case of Pushpa Sareen (supra), he submitted that no doubt that Collector for the purposes of ascertaining the value of land for the purpose of payment of stamp duty can consider the nature of use of land situated adjacent to the property but for this purpose, the Collector has to consider the exemplar. However, in this case the order is not based upon the exemplars, as a perusal of the order impugned would show that while ascertaining the value of the land, the opposite party No. 4 has not considered the sale-deed(s) of the plot(s) situated adjacent to the plot of the petitioner and on the other hand, it is also evident that only based upon the report of concerned Tehsildar, the stamp duty has been imposed upon the petitioner. 13. 13. He also stated that in the case of Reena Gupta v. State of UP and others, 2020(2) ADJ 162 this Court after considering the relevant judgments on the issue observed that the burden of proving that the market value of the property is more than that disclosed in the sale-deed is to be discharged by the state and thereafter, this Court was pleased to set aside the impugned order as the same was based upon the view that the land in question had the potential to be used as commercial land. Paras 7 & 8 are quoted below : ''Further there is no document in the form of comparable sale-deed of any property in the vicinity. It is well-settled that the burden of proving that the market value of the property is more than that disclosed in the sale-deed is to be discharged by the State, which the State has failed to discharge. Considering and following the ratio of the judgments in the cases of Sarvoday Babu Uddeshiya Vikas Samiti (Supra) and M/s Prosperous Buildcon Pvt. Ltd. v. State of U.P. and others, I have no hesitation in holding that the order dated 20th July, 2009 deserves to be aside, as the same is based upon the view that the land in question has the potential to be used as a commercial land. Consequently, the appellate order dated 14.6.2010 also quashed. The amount deposited by the petitioner in terms of the order passed by this Court shall be refunded to the petitioner, alongwith interest at the rate of 8% per annum, within a period of four months from the date when an application is filed for refund of the same alongwith a certified copy of this order.'' 14. He further submitted that in the case of Rajbala v. State of U.P., (2019) SCC Online All 5496, this Court after considering the facts, which are almost similar to the facts of he present case, quahsed the impugned order therein. The para on which reliance has been placed on reproduction reads as under : ''11. In the present case too, there is no dispute on the point that at the time of registration of sale-deed dated 18.10.2008 and spot inspection report of Nayab Tehsildar dated 12.6.2009, the land in question was an agricultural land. The para on which reliance has been placed on reproduction reads as under : ''11. In the present case too, there is no dispute on the point that at the time of registration of sale-deed dated 18.10.2008 and spot inspection report of Nayab Tehsildar dated 12.6.2009, the land in question was an agricultural land. Proceedings under Section 47-4 of the Act, 1899 was initiated only on the ground of report of Sub-Registrar dated 28.11.2008 which says that near the land in dispute residential plotting and activities are going on. Thereafter, impugned orders have been passed imposing the additional stamp duty as well as penalty treating it to be the residential land based on assumption that the land in dispute is in close proximity to the residential land, which cannot be accepted in the light of provisions of Act, 1899 as well as law laid down by the Apex Court and by this Court. Accordingly, the impugned orders dated 27.11.2009 parsed by Additional Collector (Finance & Revenue, Moradabad and 23.8.2010 passed by Additional Commissioner, Moradabad Mandal, Moradabad are quashed.'' 15. He further submitted that in a similar manner, in the case of Chhotey Lal v. State of U.P. and others (Writ C No. 42628 of 2010; decided on 8.7.2020) while dealing with the question as to whether levy of stamp duty can be justified on the basis of land not being used for the purposes for which it has been purchased and whether stamp duty can be levied on the ground that in the vicinity, lands are being used for residential purposes, this Court observed that the valuation of the property has to be done on the date of execution of the sale-deed and not on the grounds of its potential use subsequently for a different purpose i.e. on mere hypothesis and surmises. Relevant portion reads as under : ''This Court while considering the similar question in the case of M/s Prosperous Buildcon Pvt. Ltd. v. State of U.P. and others, recorded as under : ''A Division Bench of this Court in Smt. Vijaya Jain v. State of U.P. and others, 2015(9) ADJ 503 , has held in paragraphs 20 and 23 which read as under: ''20. Having extracted the relevant statutory provisions above, the following principles emerge therefrom. Having extracted the relevant statutory provisions above, the following principles emerge therefrom. Sub-section (1) (a) of Section 47-A of the Act empowers the registering officer to call upon the person who has presented an instrument for registration to pay deficit stamp duty. This power is exercisable by the registering officer immediately after presentation of an instrument and before accepting it for registration and taking any action under Section 52 of the Act. This power is liable to be exercised in a situation where the market value of the property as set forth in the instrument is less than even the minimum value fixed by the Collector in accordance with the rules made under the Act. In distinction to the above, the power under sub-section (3) of Section 47-A is exercised by the Collector either suo motu or on a reference from any Court or from the Commissioner of Stamps or an Additional Commissioner of Stamps, Deputy Commissioner of Stamps, an Assistant Commissioner of Stamps or any officer authorized in that behalf by the State Government. This power confers jurisdiction and authority on the Collector to call for and examine any instrument for the purpose of satisfying himself as to the correctness of the market value of the property which forms the subject-matter of the instrument and if upon such examination, he has reason to believe that the market value of such property has not been truly set forth in such instrument, he may proceed to determine the market value of such property and the duty payable thereon. The first distinguishing feature of sub-section (3) is that it is available to be exercised even after the instrument has been registered. Secondly the Collector proceeds under sub-section (3) upon finding that the ''market value'' of the property has not been truly set forth in the instrument as distinct from the ''minimum value fixed by the Collector in accordance with the rules made under the Act'' which is the benchmark for initiation of action under sub-section (1). 23. From the provisions extracted above, it is apparent that the Collector proceeds under sub-section (3) of Section 47-A read with Rule 7 when he has reason to believe that the market value of the property comprised in the instrument has not been truly set forth and that in the opinion of the Collector, circumstances exist warranting him to undertake the enquiry contemplated under Rule 7. What we however find from the notice dated 09 September 2013 is that the Collector has proceeded to record, albeit prima facie, that the instrument in question has been insufficiently stamped to the extent of Rs. 8,89,000/-. The notice apart from referring to a note dated 20 May 2013, received from the Assistant Inspector General of Registration neither carries nor discloses any basis upon which the Collector came to the prima facie conclusion that the appellant was liable to pay Rs. 8,89,000/ as deficit stamp duty. In our opinion a notice of this nature must necessarily disclose to the person concerned the basis and the reasons upon which the Collector has come to form an opinion that the market value of the property has not been truly set forth. In the absence of a disclosure of even rudimentary details on the basis of which the Collector came to form this opinion, the person concerned has no inkling of the case that he has to meet. A notice in order to be legally valid and be in compliance with the principles of natural justice must necessarily disclose, though not in great detail, the case and the basis on which action is proposed to be taken against the person concerned. Not only this and as is evident from a bare reading of rule 7, at the stage of issuance of notice, the Collector has to proceed on the basis of material which may tend to indicate that the market value of the property has not been truly and faithfully disclosed in the instrument. The stage of computation of market value comes only after the provisions of sub rules (2) (3) and (4) of rule 7 come into play. At the stage of issuance of notices, the Collector calls upon the person concerned to show-cause ''as to why the market value of the property.... be not determined by him''. There is another aspect of the matter, which ought not to go un-mentioned, namely, the notice under Section 47-A (2) of the Act, 1899 refers to the potential value of the land as being more than the rates prescribed by the Collector for residential land. be not determined by him''. There is another aspect of the matter, which ought not to go un-mentioned, namely, the notice under Section 47-A (2) of the Act, 1899 refers to the potential value of the land as being more than the rates prescribed by the Collector for residential land. It is not denied by the authorities that the land in question was agricultural land but the authorities have proceeded for determining the stamp duty on a presumption that the said land has a potential of future user for residential purposes because the Village Shahpur Bamhaita, Pargana Dasna, District Ghaziabad has been declared as Hi-tech City and Integrated City. The Supreme Court and this Court have time and again held that the potential user of the property cannot be the determining factor for computing its market value or the consequent stamp duty payable thereon. In State of U.P. v. Ambrish Tandon and others, (2012) 5 SCC 566 , the Supreme Court has held that merely because the property is being used for commercial purposes at the later point of time may not be a relevant criterian for assessing the value for the purpose of the nature of user is relatable to the date of purchase and it is relevant for the purpose of calculation of stamp duty. The judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Ambrish Tandon (supra) has been followed by the Full Bench of this Court in Smt. Pushpa Sareen v. State of U.P., 2015(3) ADJ 136 , wherein the Full Bench has also held that the nature of the user is relatabe to the date of purchase which is relevant for the purposes of computing the stamp duty. Where however the potential of the land can be assessed on the date of execution of the instrument itself by referring to exemplar or comparable sale instances that is clearly a circumstances which is relevant and germane to determine the true market value. Paragraph 27 of the said judgement reads as under: ''27.The fact that the land was put to a particular use, say for instance a commercial purpose at a later point in time, may not be a relevant criterion for deciding the value for the purpose of stamp duty, as held by the Supreme Court in State of U.P. and others v. 23 Ambrish Tandon and another, 2012 (5) SCC 566 . This is because the nature of the user is relatable to the date of purchase which is relevant for the purpose of computing the stamp duty. Where, however, the potential of the land can be assessed on the date of the execution of the instrument itself, that is clearly a circumstance which is relevant and germane to the determination of the true market value. At the same time, the exercise before the Collector has to be based on adequate material and cannot be a matter of hypothesis or surmise. The Collector must have material on the record to the effect that there has been a change of use or other contemporaneous sale-deeds in respect of the adjacent areas that would have a bearing on the market value of the property which is under consideration. The Collector, therefore, would be within jurisdiction in referring to exemplars or comparable sale instances which have a bearing on the true market value of the property which is required to be assessed. If the sale instances are comparable, they would also reflect the potentiality of the land which would be taken into consideration in a price agreed upon between a vendor and a purchaser.'' A Division Bench of this Court in Sumati Nath Jain v. State of U.P. and another, 2016(2) ADJ 533 (DB), has held in paragraphs 18 and 19 as under: ''18. We may note that on the date of execution of the instrument the land was admittedly recorded as agricultural. In fact the Khasra of the property remained unchanged throughout and continued to represent the land as recorded for agricultural purposes. The respondents were in our opinion wholly unjustified in initiating proceedings based on an unsubstantiated assumption that the property in future was likely to be put to non-agricultural use. 19. The perceived or presumed use to which a buyer may put the property in the future can never be the basis for adjudging its value or determining the stamp duty payable. The Act, we may note is a fiscal statute. The taxable event with which it concerns itself is the execution of an instrument which is chargeable to duty. The levy under the statute gets attracted the moment an instrument is executed. These propositions clearly flow from a plain reading of the definition of the words ''chargeable'', ''executed'' and ''instrument'' as carried in the Act. The taxable event with which it concerns itself is the execution of an instrument which is chargeable to duty. The levy under the statute gets attracted the moment an instrument is executed. These propositions clearly flow from a plain reading of the definition of the words ''chargeable'', ''executed'' and ''instrument'' as carried in the Act. In the case of an instrument which creates rights in respect of property and upon which duty is payable on the market value of the property comprised therein, since the tax liability gets fastened immediately upon execution it must necessarily be quantified on the date of execution. The levy of tax or its quantum cannot be left to depend upon hypothetical or imponderable facets or factors. The value of the property comprised in an instrument has to be adjudged bearing in mind its character and potentiality as on the date of execution of the instrument. For all the aforesaid reasons we fail to find the existence of the essential jurisdictional facts which may have warranted the invocation of the powers conferred by Section 47A (3). We are therefore of the firm opinion that the initiation of proceedings as well as the impugned order based upon a presumed future use of the property for residential purposes was wholly without jurisdiction and clearly unsustainable. Dealing with this aspect of the matter and after noticing the consistent line of precedent on the subject the Division Bench in Smt Vijaya Jain observed : ''This Court on more than one occasion has held that the market value of the land is not liable to be determined with reference to the use to which a buyer intends to put it in future. The market value of the property is to be determined with reference to its character on the date of execution of the instrument and its potentiality as on that date. xxx xxx xxx The above principles of law enunciated in the aforementioned judgments have been consistently followed by this Court. The market value of the property is to be determined with reference to its character on the date of execution of the instrument and its potentiality as on that date. xxx xxx xxx The above principles of law enunciated in the aforementioned judgments have been consistently followed by this Court. We however find that the order of the Collector relies upon no evidence which would support imposition of residential rates on a property which was stated to be agricultural on the date of execution of the instrument.'' On the basis of the submissions made, the short question that arises are as to whether levy of stamp duty can be justified on the basis of land not being used for the purposes for which it was purchased and whether stamp duty can be levied on the ground that in the vicinity, lands are being used for residential purposes, the above two referred judgments give a clear answer to the questions raised in the present writ petition. These aspects have been duly considered by this Court. Even otherwise in the Rules provided for valuation of the property, it is clear that the valuation has to be done on the date of execution of the sale-deed and not on the grounds of its potential use subsequently for a different purpose. There is nothing on record to demonstrate that on the date of the execution of the sale-deed, the land was not agricultural property referred in the revenue records. There is further nothing on record to demonstrate that the land in question was declared fit for residential use under Section 143 of the U.P. Z.A. & L.R. Act. That being the case, it is a simple case of improper exercise of jurisdiction vested in the A.D.M. and an improper exercise of jurisdiction vested in the Revisional Court. Considering the facts that the law applicable thereto, both the said orders cannot be sustained and as such the orders dated 18.12.2004 and 4.1.2010 are set aside. The writ petition is allowed. The amounts deposited by the petitioner in pursuance to the orders passed by this Court on 23.7.2010 shall be refunded to the petitioner by the respondent No. 3 on his moving an application before the said authority. The refund shall be made within a period of three months from the date of production of certified copy of this order.'' 16. The amounts deposited by the petitioner in pursuance to the orders passed by this Court on 23.7.2010 shall be refunded to the petitioner by the respondent No. 3 on his moving an application before the said authority. The refund shall be made within a period of three months from the date of production of certified copy of this order.'' 16. Based upon the specific averments made in para 5-(C) of rejoinder-affidavit dated 29.9.2021, to which, no reply has been filed by the State, Sri Mudit Agarwal, learned counsel for the petitioner lastly submitted that at the time of execution of sale-deed and even subsequently, the land in issue was being used for agricultural purposes. 17. At the cost of repetition also stated that at the time of execution of sale-deed the land was being used for agricultural purposes and in the revenue records the same was recorded as agricultural land. On the deed of sale, stamp duty was also paid as per circle rate prescribed for the agricultural land of the vicinity. 18. In nutshell, he submitted that the stamp duty was rightly paid on the document in issue i.e. sale-deed dated 28.10.1999 and the orders impugned have been passed on the basis of presumption and taking note of potential value of the land as also the report of the concerned Revenue Official, which as per law settled cannot be fixed. Prayer is to allow present petition for the relief sought. 19. Learned Additional C.S.C., Sri Rajesh Kumar Tiwari, opposing the present petition for the relief sought, on the basis of assertions made in the counter-affidavit, submitted that the land in issue was having potential value for being used other than the agricultural purposes including the industrial purposes as reflects from the report of Tehsildar, wherein, it has been mentioned that the land is near to sugar factory and the report of the Tehsildar has not been disputed by the petitioner. He, based upon the averments made in para 14 of the counter-affidavit, further submitted that at present the land in question is being utilized by the petitioner for the Industrial purposes to put industrial waste thereat. 20. It is further stated by him that the law, on the issue, has already been settled by Full Bench of this Court and the authority concerned are empowered to ascertain the potential value of the land in issue. 20. It is further stated by him that the law, on the issue, has already been settled by Full Bench of this Court and the authority concerned are empowered to ascertain the potential value of the land in issue. In continuation, it is stated that if the land surrounding to the property in issue has been put to commercial use then this fact can be considered to weigh the value of the property in issue and based upon the same, Collector can fix the stamp duty. He submitted that in the present case, Collector, Biswan, Sitapur, after considering the report of the Tehsildar, wherein it has been specifically stated that in the vicinity a sugar factory is situated, fixed the value of the property and accordingly, fixed the stamp duty to be paid by the petitioner. In this way, the impugned order is just and proper and not liable to be interfered with. 21. He further submitted that nature of ''user'' is liable to be considered for fixing the value of the land and for the purposes of computing the stamp duty. In support of his submission, he also relied upon the judgment of the Full Bench of this Court in the case of Pushpa Sareen (supra). In rebuttal, Sri Mudit Agarwal, submitted that the argument advanced by the learned Additional C.S.C., based upon para 14 of the counter-affidavit, in fact, is in favour of the petitioner as in this paragraph it has not been stated that the land was never used for agricultural purposes rather in this affidavit, sworned on 5.12.2006, it has been stated that the land is being used for industrial purposes, as such, it can be deduced therefrom that the land was used for years for agricultural purposes since the date of purchase i.e. 28.10.1999 and being so, the determination of stamp duty on the basis of existence of sugar factory in the vicinity and potential value of the property is not justified. Sri Agarwal further submitted that from the contention of the counsel for the State that one of the factors for determining the Stamp duty would depend upon who the ''user'' of the land is, as observed in the case of Pushpa Sareen (supra) and Ambrish Tandon (supra) is liable to be rejected. Sri Agarwal further submitted that from the contention of the counsel for the State that one of the factors for determining the Stamp duty would depend upon who the ''user'' of the land is, as observed in the case of Pushpa Sareen (supra) and Ambrish Tandon (supra) is liable to be rejected. Elaborating on this issue, he submitted that by a bare reading of observations of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the judgment passed in the case of State of U.P. and others v. Ambrish Tandon, (2012) 5 SCC 566 , would show that the word ''user'' refers use of land and not owner land. The relevant portion on reproduction reads as under : ''It is also demonstrated that at the time of execution of the sale-deed, the house in question was used for residential purpose and it is asserted shat the stamp duty was paid based on the position and user of the building on the date of the purchase. The impugned order of the High Court shows that it was not seriously disputed about the nature and user of the building, namely, residential purpose on the date of the purchase.'' 22. From the above quoted relevant portion, this Court is of the view that the word ''user'' has been used by the Apex Court in reference to the land and not the purchaser. It is the nature of the land and the purpose for which it is used that is to be considered for the determination of stamp duty, and not the nature of the person/owner of the land. Thus, the submissions of learned counsel for the State in this regard is unsustainable. Hence, rejected at this stage. 23. Considered the submissions made by the learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. 24. For the purposes of adjudication of the present petition, it would be appropriate to quote the relevant portion of the impugned order dated 24.7.2002 passed in Case No. 01/17/87, under Section 47A of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899. Hence, rejected at this stage. 23. Considered the submissions made by the learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. 24. For the purposes of adjudication of the present petition, it would be appropriate to quote the relevant portion of the impugned order dated 24.7.2002 passed in Case No. 01/17/87, under Section 47A of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899. ^^eSus i=koyh ij miyC/k leLr lk{;ksa ds fof/kor voyksdu fd;k ,oa mHk; i{kksa ds fo}ku vf/koDrk dh cgl lquhA i=koyh ij miyC/k vf/k'kklh vf/kdkjh uxjikfydk fclok dh fjiksVZ fnukad 4-9-01 ls ;g Li"V gS fd xkVk la0 403@0-275 gs0 uxjikfyrk lhek ds ckgj fLFkr gS fdUrq mDr xkVk la[;k uxjikfyrk lhek dh 2 fdeh dh ifjf/k esa gS tgka rd foi{kh ds fo|oku vf/koDrk dk ;g rdZ gS fd mDr xkVk la[;k d`f"k dk;Z ds iz;kstu ls fy;k x;k gS ;g rdZ fo'oluh; izrhr ugha gksrk gSA D;ksafd mDr Hkw[k.M 'kqxj QSDVªh fcloka ds fcYdqy ihNs muds ty izokg uked la;= ls yxk gqvk gS ,slh fLFkfr esa vkS|ksfxd Hkwfe ls lVs gq, fdlh NksVs Hkw[k.M dk 'kqxj QSDVªh }kjk d`f"k dk;Z ds iz;kstu ls dz; fd;k tkuk fo'oluh; izrhr ugha gksrk gSA ,slh fLFkfr esa rglhynkj fcloka dh vk[;k fnukad 26-6-02 esa of.kZr ;g rF; fd fookfnr Hkwfe xkVk la[;k 40 3@0-275 gs0 O;olkf;d ,oa vkS|ksfxd mn~ns'; ls dz; fd;k x;k gSA vkSfpR;iw.kZ izrhr gksrk gS rnuqlkj rglhynkj fclok dh vk[;k fnukad 26-6-02 ls lger gksrs gq, vUrfjr Hkwfe dh dqy ekfy;r 2]82]000@& fu/kkZfjr dh tkrh gS ftl ij deh LVkEi eq0 17]760@& vkjksfir fd;k tkrk gSA foi{kh vkns'k ikfjr gksus ds ,d lIrkg ds Hkhrj mDr /ku U;k;ky; esa tek djuk lqfuf'pr djasA bl lEcU/k esa ;g Hkh mYys[kuh; gS fd vkns'k ikfjr gksus ds fnukad ls foi{kh }kjk - - - izfr'kr ekfld C;kt Hkh ns; gksxkA^^ 25. It would also be relevant to point out that the Revisional Authority almost on the same reasoning which has been given in the order dated 24.7.2002, has passed the order dated 15.12.2004 and a perusal thereof, would show that : (i) The land in issue i.e. Gata No. 403 area 0.275 Hectare is situated outside the limit of Nagar Palika Parishad, Biswan, however, the same is within two kms. of radius from the limit of Nagar Palika Parishad, Biswan. of radius from the limit of Nagar Palika Parishad, Biswan. (ii) The authority concerned on the basis of presumption rejected the contention of the petitioner that the land in issue was purchased for agricultural purposes. (iii) While passing the impugned order, the concerned Authorities failed to consider the boundaries of the land in issue and purpose to purchase the land, indicated in the sale-deed itself. (iv) While ascertaining the value of the property in issue the concerned authority has considered the report of the Tehsildar of the area, according to which, the land in issue is situated in the vicinity where a sugar factory is situated. (iv) The impugned orders are not based upon exemplar. (v) The Authorities concerned have not mentioned any reason as to why the circle rates prescribed for the area in issue were not proper. This observation is based upon the principles related to fixing of circle rates. 26. On the basis of submissions made by the learned counsel for the parties, the question(s), in the instant case, to be considered are that (i) as to whether the levy of Stamp Duty can be justified on the basis of land not being used at relevant time for the purpose for which it was purchased. (ii) Whether the Stamp Duty can be levied on the ground that in the vicinity, the land is being used by sugar factory and (iii) Whether the Stamp Duty can be imposed on sole basis of report of Tehsildar of the area concerned. Before coming to issues involved, as indicated hereinabove, this Court apt to point out that while determining the value of the land in issue, the concerned Authorities failed to record the reasons, as required under the law, on the facts as placed before it by the petitioner by means objections filed in the proceedings initiated under Section 47(A) of the Stamp Act as also the grounds raised in the revision. Further, the Authorities based upon the report of Tehsildar concerned, presumed that the land has not been purchased for agricultural purposes. The concerned have also not considered the fact related to boundaries of the land while passing the orders impugned in the instant petition. Moreover, the concerned Authorities have also not mentioned any reason in the impugned orders as to why the circle rate prescribed for the area in issue were not proper. The concerned have also not considered the fact related to boundaries of the land while passing the orders impugned in the instant petition. Moreover, the concerned Authorities have also not mentioned any reason in the impugned orders as to why the circle rate prescribed for the area in issue were not proper. In the impugned orders for the purposes of fixing the value of the property, no exemplar has been considered by the Authorities, who have passed the impugned orders. 27. Now, coming to the issues aforesaid, this Court finds that the issues, under consideration, have already been answered by this Court in the judgments relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner. As per the judgment passed in the case of Institute of the Franciscan Clarist Sisters (supra), the report of Tehsildar concerned cannot be relied upon for passing the order under Section 47(A) of the Stamp Act. The judgment of Full Bench says that the value of the land can be assessed, if the land(s) surrounding the property in question has been put to commercial use, whereas, in the instant case, as appears from the boundaries given in the sale-deed, the land in issue is in fact is surrounded by the agricultural land as also Nala. Further, in the judgments referred hereinabove, it has been held that the potential value of the land cannot be considered for levying the Stamp Duty. 28. Thus, for the reasons aforesaid, this Court is of the view that opposite party No. 4/Up Zila Adhikari, Biswan, District-Sitapur has wrongly exercised the jurisdiction vested in it so is the case of Revisional Authority. 29. Considering the facts and reasons recorded hereinabove as also the law applicable in the instant case, the impugned orders dated 24.7.2002 and 15.12.2004 are unsustainable in the eye of law. Accordingly, the same are set-aside. The petition is allowed. No order as to costs.