JUDGMENT : SANDEEP SHARMA, J. 1. Being aggrieved and dissatisfied with the order dated 5.8.2020 passed by learned Additional Sessions Judge-II, Una, District Una, Himachal Pradesh, in Cr. Appeal No. 75/2019, whereby appeal under S.29 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (hereinafter, ‘Act’) having been filed by the respondents against order dated 2.11.2019 passed by learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Court No.1, Una, District Una, Himachal Pradesh in CrMA No. 3660 of 2019 filed under S.23 of the Act, has been allowed and interim maintenance of Rs. 2,000/- and Rs.1,000/- awarded in favour of respondents Nos. 1 and 2 respectively by learned trial Court has been enhanced to Rs. 3,000/- and Rs. 2,000/-, petitioner-husband (hereinafter, ‘petitioner’) has approached this Court in the instant proceedings. 2. Precisely, the facts of the case as emerge from the record are that the respondents by way of application under S.23 of the Act prayed for interim maintenance, while averring therein that her marriage with the petitioner was solemnised on 22.6.2018 as per Hindu rites and rituals at Village Lamlehri, Tehsil and District, Una, Himachal Pradesh. Respondent No.1 further averred in the application that prior to initiating proceedings under the Act, she had moved various complaints to the Police qua acts of violence but subsequently, on account of consistent maltreatment, she was compelled to stay with her parents at her parental house. Respondent claimed that she was completely dependent upon her parents for her daily needs and facing great difficulty to maintain herself and her minor daughter. Respondent No.1 submitted before learned trial Court that the petitioner is an able bodied person, having finances from sale, purchase and repair of the mobiles at Village Lamlehri, from which profession, he was earning more than Rs.50,000/- per month. She claimed that she has not been paid a single penny by the petitioner for maintenance as well as for upkeep of her minor daughter and, at present, both had been living at the mercy of her parents and maternal uncle and as such, petitioner be directed to provide her maintenance pendente lite to the tune of Rs.8,000/- per month each and a sum of Rs.25,000/- towards litigation expenses. 3. 3. Petitioner, while refuting aforesaid claim, submitted before learned trial Court by way of reply to the application that at no point of time, he maltreated the respondents or taunted her for not bringing sufficient dowry articles and gifts. He also denied the allegation with regard to beatings allegedly given by him to respondent No.1. Petitioner claimed before learned trial Court that engagement of his younger brother was proposed to be done with the sister of respondent No.1, but she was found to have relations with some other person. Petitioner also alleged that he had caught respondent No.1 red-handed, talking over phone to some unknown person. While denying the claim for interim maintenance, petitioner claimed before learned trial Court that in the month of September, 2018, respondent No.1 of her own, went to her parental house and she being a qualified and able bodied person, earns Rs. 300-400 per day approximately from tailoring, embroidery and beautician, which is sufficient to maintain herself as well as their daughter. Apart from above, petitioner specifically denied that he earns more than Rs.50,000/- per month, rather, claimed that he is unemployed and has no source of income, as such, in the aforesaid background, prayed for dismissal of application filed by respondents under S.23 of the Act, for interim maintenance. 4. Learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, on the basis of pleadings adduced on record, held respondents entitled for interim maintenance of Rs.2,000/- and Rs.1,000/- respectively, from the date of filing of the petition till disposal. Aforesaid order passed by learned trial Court was never laid challenge before appellate court by the petitioner, rather, the respondents filed an appeal under S.29 of the Act, praying therein for enhancement of interim maintenance awarded by learned trial Court. Learned Additional Sessions Judge-II, Una, while accepting the aforesaid appeal filed by the respondents, enhanced the amount of maintenance awarded by learned trial Court to Rs.3,000/- and Rs. 2,000/- respectively. In the aforesaid background, petitioner has approached this Court in the instant proceedings, praying therein for the quashment of order of enhancement passed by learned Court below. 5. Learned Additional Sessions Judge-II, Una, while accepting the aforesaid appeal filed by the respondents, enhanced the amount of maintenance awarded by learned trial Court to Rs.3,000/- and Rs. 2,000/- respectively. In the aforesaid background, petitioner has approached this Court in the instant proceedings, praying therein for the quashment of order of enhancement passed by learned Court below. 5. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the material available on record, vis-à-vis the reasoning assigned by first appellate Court, this Court finds that the precise grouse of the petitioner is that the learned Court below, before awarding/enhancing the amount of interim maintenance, ought to have, prima facie arrived at a conclusion that the petitioner had committed act of domestic violence or there was any likelihood of the petitioner committing such acts. Mr. Y.P. Sood, learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner, while making this Court peruse the orders impugned before this court, vehemently argued that at no point of time, learned Courts below made an effort to conduct some preliminary enquiry in terms of S.23 of the Act, to arrive at a definite conclusion that the petitioner had committed acts of domestic violence. Mr. Sood states that the order of interim maintenance in terms of S.23 of the Act has been passed merely on the basis of pleadings adduced on record by the respondents. Mr. Sood contended that, it is own admission of respondent No.1 that in the month of September, 2018, she of her own went to her parental house and at no point of time, specific incidents of domestic violence, ever came to be pointed out to the Court, enabling it to pass the order of interim maintenance. Lastly, Mr. Sood contended that though in the application, respondents claimed that the petitioner earns Rs.50,000/- per month but learned Courts below on account of lack of evidence have not accepted the aforesaid plea of the respondents but yet merely applying guess work, proceeded to conclude that the monthly income of the petitioner is Rs.8000/-, as such, learned first appellate Court has erred while enhancing the amounts of interim maintenance awarded by learned Court below, which otherwise could not have been awarded, without there being an enquiry conducted under S.23. 6. Per contra, Mr. 6. Per contra, Mr. Karan Singh Parmar, learned counsel for the respondents, supported the impugned orders passed by first appellate Court and contended that since learned Court below was not satisfied with the claim of the respondents that the petitioner earns Rs.50,000/-, it rightly considered monthly income of the petitioner at Rs.8,000/-. 7. Before ascertaining the correctness and genuineness of the submissions/arguments advanced by the petitioner, it would be apt to take note of S.23 of the Act, which provides as under: “23. Power to grant interim and ex parte orders.— (1) In any proceeding before him under this Act, the Magistrate may pass such interim order as he deems just and proper. (2) If the Magistrate is satisfied that an application prima facie discloses that the respondent is committing, or has committed an act of domestic violence or that there is a likelihood that the respondent may commit an act of domestic violence, he may grant an ex parte order on the basis of the affidavit in such form, as may be prescribed, of the aggrieved person under section 18, section 19, section 20, section 21 or, as the case may be, section 22 against the respondent.” 8. Careful perusal of the aforesaid provision of law clearly reveals that a Magistrate, in any proceedings before it under the Act, can pass interim order as it deems just and proper. Sub-section (2) of S.23 requires that prior to passing of an interim order, Magistrate should be satisfied that the application seeking interim maintenance, prima facie, discloses that the respondent had or has committed act of domestic violence or there is likelihood that the respondent may commit the act of domestic violence, but there is no provision to conduct any preliminary enquiry, rather, Magistrate to ascertain, act, if any, of domestic violence is only under obligation to go through the averments/allegations contained in the application for interim maintenance. Though, Mr. Sood vehemently argued that the application nowhere reveals act, if any, of domestic violence allegedly committed by the petitioner but, if the application made by the respondents, which has been taken note in the order impugned in the instant proceedings, is perused in its entirety, it certainly indicates the acts of domestic violence allegedly committed by the petitioner. Though, Mr. Sood vehemently argued that the application nowhere reveals act, if any, of domestic violence allegedly committed by the petitioner but, if the application made by the respondents, which has been taken note in the order impugned in the instant proceedings, is perused in its entirety, it certainly indicates the acts of domestic violence allegedly committed by the petitioner. At this stage, it would be apt to take note of the definition of “domestic violence”, as defined under S.3 of the Act, which provides as under: “3. Definition of domestic violence.—For the purposes of this Act, any act, omission or commission or conduct of the respondent shall constitute domestic violence in case it— (a) harms or injures or endangers the health, safety, life, limb or well-being, whether mental or physical, of the aggrieved person or tends to do so and includes causing physical abuse, sexual abuse, verbal and emotional abuse and economic abuse; or (b) harasses, harms, injures or endangers the aggrieved person with a view to coerce her or any other person related to her to meet any unlawful demand for any dowry or other property or valuable security; or (c) has the effect of threatening the aggrieved person or any person related to her by any conduct mentioned in clause (a) or clause (b); or (d) otherwise injures or causes harm, whether physical or mental, to the aggrieved person. Explanation I.—For the purposes of this section,— (i) “physical abuse” means any act or conduct which is of such a nature as to cause bodily pain, harm, or danger to life, limb, or health or impair the health or development of the aggrieved person and includes assault, criminal intimidation and criminal force; (ii) “sexual abuse” includes any conduct of a sexual nature that abuses, humiliates, degrades or otherwise violates the dignity of woman; (iii) “verbal and emotional abuse” includes— (a) insults, ridicule, humiliation, name calling and insults or ridicule specially with regard to not having a child or a male child; and (b) repeated threats to cause physical pain to any person in whom the aggrieved person is interested; (iv) “economic abuse” includes— (a) deprivation of all or any economic or financial resources to which the aggrieved person is entitled under any law or custom whether payable under an order of a court or otherwise or which the aggrieved person requires out of necessity including, but not limited to, house hold necessities for the aggrieved person and her children, if any, stridhan, property, jointly or separately owned by the aggrieved person, payment of rental related to the shared house hold and maintenance; (b) disposal of household effects, any alienation of assets whether movable or immovable, valuables, shares, securities, bonds and the like or other property in which the aggrieved person has an interest or is entitled to use by virtue of the domestic relationship or which may be reasonably required by the aggrieved person or her children or her stridhan or any other property jointly or separately held by the aggrieved person; and (c) prohibition or restriction to continued access to resources or facilities which the aggrieved person is entitled to use or enjoy by virtue of the domestic relationship including access to the shared household. Explanation II.—For the purpose of determining whether any act, omission, commission or conduct of the respondent constitutes “domestic violence” under this section, the overall facts and circumstances of the case shall be taken into consideration.” 9. Verbal, emotional abuse or economic abuse have been termed to be ‘domestic violence’. Apart from above, any action which injures or causes harm whether physical or mental, to the aggrieved person also falls under the definition of ‘domestic violence’. Verbal, emotional abuse or economic abuse have been termed to be ‘domestic violence’. Apart from above, any action which injures or causes harm whether physical or mental, to the aggrieved person also falls under the definition of ‘domestic violence’. In the case at hand, petitioner, by way of filing reply to the application has himself stated that he had caught respondent No.1 red-handed talking to some other person, which clearly indicates act of domestic violence allegedly committed by him against respondent No.1-wife. Aforesaid allegation is itself sufficient to constitute mental agony and emotional abuse, as provided under the definition of domestic violence. Apart from above, petitioner has nowhere disputed that no money was offered by him to the respondent No.1-wife enabling her to sustain herself as well as her child, which act of the petitioner also falls under the definition of ‘domestic violence’, i.e. economic abuse. Reply filed by the petitioner to the application also indicates another act of emotional abuse, whereby he has claimed that there was a proposal of engagement inter se his brother and sister of the respondent No.1, but she had relations with some other person. 10. If aforesaid averments contained in the reply to the application are read juxtaposing the allegations contained in the application under S.23 of the Act filed by the respondents, it cannot be said that the learned Courts below erred while awarding interim maintenance under S.23 of the Act, since, the averments contained in the application disclose prima facie acts of domestic violence allegedly committed by the petitioner, no fault, if any, can be said to have been committed by learned Courts below, while entertaining application under S.23 of the Act. 11. Material available no record reveals that though the respondent No.1/wife claimed that the petitioner earns Rs. 50,000/- on account of sale/purchase/repair of mobiles but since she failed to place on record evidence, if any, with regard to her aforesaid claim, learned Courts below rightly assessed the income of the petitioner at Rs. 8,000/- considering him to be a labourer. 11. Material available no record reveals that though the respondent No.1/wife claimed that the petitioner earns Rs. 50,000/- on account of sale/purchase/repair of mobiles but since she failed to place on record evidence, if any, with regard to her aforesaid claim, learned Courts below rightly assessed the income of the petitioner at Rs. 8,000/- considering him to be a labourer. It is not in dispute that as of today, a sum of Rs.300/- per day is payable to the persons working on daily wages under MNREGA and if income is calculated /assessed on the aforesaid basis, no fault, if any can be found with the order of learned trial Court inasmuch as it proceeded to assess income of the petitioner at Rs.8,000/-. Allegations with regard to non-payment of any money by the petitioner on account of maintenance otherwise stand duly substantiated by the stand taken by the petitioner in his reply, wherein he has stated that the respondent No.1 being qualified, competent and able-bodied lady, earns Rs.300/400 per day approximately from the work of tailoring, embroidery and beautician, which is sufficient to maintain her and her daughter. Claim of the petitioner that he is unemployed and has no source of income has no relevance because the petitioner, being husband of the respondent No.1 and father of respondent No.2, is otherwise under obligation to maintain them. It is well settled by now that if husband is able bodied and is in a position to support himself, he is under legal obligation to support and maintain his wife, who is entitled to receive maintenance under S.23 of the Act, which qualifies as an absolute right. Reliance is placed upon judgment the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Shamima Farooqui vs. Shahid Khan JT 2015 (3) SC 576, wherein it has been held as follows:- “15. ………Sometimes, a plea is advanced by the husband that he does not have the means to pay, for he does not have a job or his business is not doing well. These are only bald excuses and, in fact, they have no acceptability in law. If the husband is healthy, able bodied and is in a position to support himself, he is under the legal obligation to support his wife, for wife’s right to receive maintenance under Section 125 CrPC, unless disqualified, is an absolute right. These are only bald excuses and, in fact, they have no acceptability in law. If the husband is healthy, able bodied and is in a position to support himself, he is under the legal obligation to support his wife, for wife’s right to receive maintenance under Section 125 CrPC, unless disqualified, is an absolute right. While determining the quantum of maintenance, this Court in Jabsir Kaur Sehgal v. District Judge Dehradun & Ors. [JT 1997 (7) SC 531: 1997 (7) SCC 7 ] has held as follows:- “The court has to consider the status of the parties, their respective needs, the capacity of the husband to pay having regard to his reasonable expenses for his own maintenance and of those he is obliged under the law and statutory but involuntary payments or deductions. The amount of maintenance fixed for the wife should be such as she can live in reasonable comfort considering her status and the mode of life she was used to when she lived with her husband and also that she does not feel handicapped in the prosecution of her case. At the same time, the amount so fixed cannot be excessive or extortionate.” 16. Grant of maintenance to wife has been perceived as a measure of social justice by this Court. In Chaturbhuj v. Sita Bai [JT 2008 (1) SC 78 : 2008 (2) SCC 316 ], it has been ruled that:- “Section 125 CrPC is a measure of social justice and is specially enacted to protect women and children and as noted by this Court in Captain Ramesh Chander Kaushal v. Veena Kaushal [ 1978 (4) SCC 70 ] falls within constitutional sweep of Article 15(3) reinforced by Article 39 of the Constitution of India. It is meant to achieve a social purpose. The object is to prevent vagrancy and destitution. It provides a speedy remedy for the supply of food, clothing and shelter to the deserted wife. It gives effect to fundamental rights and natural duties of a man to maintain his wife, children and parents when they are unable to maintain themselves. The aforesaid position was highlighted in Savitaben Somabhai Bhatiya v. State of Gujarat [JT 2005 (3) SC 164]”. 16.1. This being the position in law, it is the obligation of the husband to maintain his wife. The aforesaid position was highlighted in Savitaben Somabhai Bhatiya v. State of Gujarat [JT 2005 (3) SC 164]”. 16.1. This being the position in law, it is the obligation of the husband to maintain his wife. He cannot be permitted to plead that he is unable to maintain the wife due to financial constraints as long as he is capable of earning. 17. In this context, we may profitably quote a passage from the judgment rendered by the High Court of Delhi in Chander Prakash Bodhraj v. Shila Rani Chander Prakash [AIR 1968 Delhi 174] wherein it has been opined thus:- “An able-bodied young man has to be presumed to be capable of earning sufficient money so as to be able reasonably to maintain his wife and child and he cannot be heard to say that he is not in a position to earn enough to be able to maintain them according to the family standard. It is for such able-bodies person to show to the Court cogent grounds for holding that he is unable to reasons beyond his control, to earn enough to discharge his legal obligation of maintaining his wife and child. When the husband does not disclose to the Court the exact amount of his income, the presumption will be easily permissible against him.” 12. It is quite apparent from the aforesaid enunciation of law that once husband is an able bodied person he cannot simply deny his legal obligation to maintain his wife. Taking into consideration aforesaid facts coupled with the price index and high cost of living, impugned order passed by learned first appellate Court enhancing the maintenance amounts as observed above, can, in no manner be, said to be excessive and thus calls for no interference. 13. In result of the aforesaid discussion, I find no merit in the petition and the same is dismissed. Judgment passed by learned first appellate Court is upheld. Parties are left to bear their own costs. All pending applications stand disposed of. Interim directions, if any, also stand vacated. Record, if called, be sent back forthwith.