JUDGMENT : 1. Heard Sri Nirmal Singh Yadav, learned counsel for the petitioner. 2. This writ petition has been filed praying inter alia the following relief:- (i) issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of mandamus commanding the opposite parties to consider the representation of the petitioner and lodge the criminal case against the opposite party no. 5-Pradhan after investigate the matter and seize the powers of the opposite party no. 5 on the basis of submitting false and forged paper and concealment of fact by him in election process. 3. Kishan Pal, respondent no. 5 herein, is the Pradhan of Village Bachgawan, P.O. Bankagaon, Block and P.S. Pasgaon, Tehsil Mohamdi, District Lakhimpur Kheri. The petitioner, it is alleged, is simple, gentle and law abiding person and voter of the said Gram Panchayat. On 20.10.2021 the petitioner lodged a complaint before the State Election Commission, UP, Lucknow to the effect that the respondent no. 5 is not the resident of the village and as such his election to the post of Gram Pradhan was illegal. It was prayed that action be taken against him. 4. The question is as to whether the petitioner has the locus to invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India in this case. 5. It is well settled that in order to have the locus standi to invoke certiorari jurisdiction, the petitioner should be an "aggrieved person". If the petitioner does not fall in this category, and is a "stranger", the Court will deny him this extraordinary remedy, save in very special circumstances wherein it may exercise its discretion in favour of the petitioner. 6. In Jasbhai Motibhai Desai v. Roshan Kumar, Haji Bashir Ahmed, (1976)1 SCC 671 , the Apex Court considered the question as to who can be considered as a "person aggrieved" in order to have the locus to invoke certiorari jurisdiction of a writ court and held as under: "37. It will be seen that in the context of locus standi to apply for a writ of certiorari, an applicant may ordinarily fall in any of these categories: (i) "person aggrieved"; (ii) "stranger"; (iii) busybody or meddlesome interloper. Persons in the last category are easily distinguishable from those coming under the first two categories. Such persons interfere in things which do not concern them. They masquerade as crusaders for justice. Persons in the last category are easily distinguishable from those coming under the first two categories. Such persons interfere in things which do not concern them. They masquerade as crusaders for justice. They pretend to act in the name of pro bono publico, though they have no interest of the public or even of their own to protect. They indulge in the pastime of meddling with the judicial process either by force of habit or from improper motives. Often, they are actuated by a desire to win notoriety or cheap popularity; while the ulterior intent of some applicants in this category, may be no more than spoking the wheels of administration. The High Court should do well to reject the applications of such busybodies at the threshold. 38. The distinction between the first and second categories of applicants, though real, is not always well-demarcated. The first category has, as it were, two concentric zones; a solid central zone of certainty, and a grey outer circle of lessening certainty in a sliding centrifugal scale, with an outermost nebulous fringe of uncertainty. Applicants falling within the central zone are those whose legal rights have been infringed. Such applicants undoubtedly stand in the category of "persons aggrieved". In the grey outer circle the bounds which separate the first category from the second, intermix, interfuse and overlap increasingly in a centrifugal direction. All persons in this outer zone may not be "persons aggrieved". 39. To distinguish such applicants from "strangers", among them, some broad tests may be deduced from the conspectus made above. These tests are not absolute and ultimate. Their efficacy varies according to the circumstances of the case, including the statutory context in which the matter falls to be considered. These are: Whether the applicant is a person whose legal right has been infringed? Has he suffered a legal wrong or injury, in the sense, that his interest, recognised by law, has been prejudicially and directly affected by the act or omission of the authority, complained of ? Is he a person who has suffered a legal grievance, a person "against whom a decision has been pronounced which has wrongfully deprived him of something or wrongfully refused him something, or wrongfully affected his title to something?" Has he a special and substantial grievance of his own beyond some grievance or inconvenience suffered by him in common with the rest of the public? Was he entitled to object and be heard by the authority before it took the impugned action? If so, was he prejudicially affected in the exercise of that right by the act of usurpation of jurisdiction on the part of the authority? Is the statute, in the context of which the scope of the words "person aggrieved" is being considered, a social welfare measure designed to lay down ethical or professional standards of conduct for the community? Or is it a statute dealing with private rights of particular individuals ? * * * 49. It is true that in the ultimate analysis, the jurisdiction under Article 226 in general, and certiorari in particular is discretionary. But in a country like India where writ petitions are instituted in the High Courts by the thousand, many of them frivolous, a strict ascertainment, at the outset, of the standing of the petitioner to invoke this extraordinary jurisdiction, must be insisted upon. The broad guidelines indicated by us, coupled with other well-established self-devised rules of practice, such as the availability of an alternative remedy, the conduct of the petitioner etc. can go a long way to help the courts in weeding out a large number of writ petitions at the initial stage with consequent saving of public time and money." (emphasis supplied) 7. In paragraph 5 of the present writ petition, the petitioner has stated his cause of action as follows : "5. That the petitioner is running pillar to post for his grievance which are also in the large interest of Gram Panchayat as the public fund is utilizing by the wrong person who is not residing in the village Gram Panchayat Bachgawan, Pasgaon Kheri and he is residing at Maholi-Mathura District since last 20-25 years even then the opposite parties are not considering the complaints of the petitioner which is wrong, arbitrary and illegal." 8. As is evident from the facts narrated above, no legal right of the petitioner has been infringed. He is at the most a complainant. 9. In Ravi Yashwant Bhoir v. Collector, (2012) 4 SCC 407 , the Apex Court has held that a complainant cannot claim the status of an adversarial litigant and become a party to the lis in the following words: "58. Shri Chintaman Raghunath Gharat, ex-President was the complainant, thus, at the most, he could lead evidence as a witness. 9. In Ravi Yashwant Bhoir v. Collector, (2012) 4 SCC 407 , the Apex Court has held that a complainant cannot claim the status of an adversarial litigant and become a party to the lis in the following words: "58. Shri Chintaman Raghunath Gharat, ex-President was the complainant, thus, at the most, he could lead evidence as a witness. He could not claim the status of an adversarial litigant. The complainant cannot be the party to the lis. A legal right is an averment of entitlement arising out of law. In fact, it is a benefit conferred upon a person by the rule of law. Thus, a person who suffers from legal injury can only challenge the act or omission. There may be some harm or loss that may not be wrongful in the eye of the law because it may not result in injury to a legal right or legally protected interest of the complainant but juridically harm of this description is called damnum sine injuria. 59. The complainant has to establish that he has been deprived of or denied of a legal right and he has sustained injury to any legally protected interest. In case he has no legal peg for a justiciable claim to hang on, he cannot be heard as a party in a lis. A fanciful or sentimental grievance may not be sufficient to confer a locus standi to sue upon the individual. There must be injuria or a legal grievance which can be appreciated and not a stat pro ratione voluntas reasons i.e. a claim devoid of reasons. 60. Under the garb of being a necessary party, a person cannot be permitted to make a case as that of general public interest. A person having a remote interest cannot be permitted to become a party in the lis, as the person who wants to become a party in a case, has to establish that he has a proprietary right which has been or is threatened to be violated, for the reason that a legal injury creates a remedial right in the injured person. A person cannot be heard as a party unless he answers the description of aggrieved party." (emphasis supplied) 10. A person cannot be heard as a party unless he answers the description of aggrieved party." (emphasis supplied) 10. In Ayaaubkhan Noorkhan Pathan v.State of Maharashtra, (2013) 4 SCC 465 , the Apex Court has enumerated some of the exceptional circumstances wherein a third person, having no concern with the case, can be heard. Paragraph 23 of the said report being relevant is extracted below: "23. Thus, from the above it is evident that under ordinary circumstances, a third person, having no concern with the case at hand, cannot claim to have any locus standi to raise any grievance whatsoever. However, in exceptional circumstances as referred to above, if the actual persons aggrieved, because of ignorance, illiteracy, inarticulation or poverty, are unable to approach the court, and a person, who has no personal agenda, or object, in relation to which, he can grind his own axe, approaches the court, then the court may examine the issue and in exceptional circumstances, even if his bona fides are doubted, but the issue raised by him, in the opinion of the court, requires consideration, the court may proceed suo motu, in such respect." (emphasis supplied) 11. The petitioner is admittedly espousing the cause of Gaon Sabha. By no stretch of imagination, can it be said that the Gaon Sabha is unable to approach this Court because of the exceptional circumstances mentioned in the case of Ayaaubkhan Noorkhan Pathan (supra). 12. For the foregoing reasons, the petitioner has no locus to invoke the extraordinary writ jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. Accordingly, without entering into the merits of the case, this writ petition is dismissed. No order as to cost.