Judgment Mr. Anil Kshetarpal, J. The defendants (Petitioners herein) assail the correctness of the order passed by the first appellate court dated 02.11.2019 while permitting the plaintiffs (respondents herein) to lead additional evidence during the pendency of Ist appeal. Some facts are required to be noted. 2. The plaintiffs (respondents herein) filed a suit for declaration that the judgment and decree dated 20.12.2008 passed in Civil Suit No.397 of 2008, has been obtained by the defendants fraudulently and it does not affect their proprietary rights. They claim that the property in question is ancestral as well as coparcenary property and hence, they have acquired a vested right since the time of their birth. The defendants contested the suit on various grounds. 3. The learned trial Court dismissed the suit on 08.09.2015. The plaintiffs filed an appeal against the judgment of the trial court. During the pendency of the appeal, they filed an application for permission to lead additional evidence on the ground that when they previously searched for the old revenue record relating to the said property, they could not trace the same despite due diligence on their part as the record was found missing. Now the record has been traced out which proves that the property is coming from Jai Ram Dass who was predecessor-in-interest of the parties. Thereafter, the property fell to the share of Paras Ram, who was having two sons, namely, Radha Krishan and Hans Raj. After the death of Radha Krishan, his two sons Banarsi Dass and Sunder Lal succeeded to his share in the property. When Banarsi Dass died, he left behind three sons, Som Nath, Dharam Parkash @ Pahari and Brij Mohan. Hence, they filed an application for permission to lead additional evidence by producing the following documents:- “a- jamabandi 1887-88 b- jamabandi 1930-31 c- jamabandi 1950-51 d- jamabandi 1958-59 e- jamabandi 1963-64 f- jamabandi 1966-67 g- Besides this there are various Intkals bearing No.753, 1201, 425, 57. h- Khatanu Istemal i- Khatauni Paimaish and j- Naksha Hakdarwar k- jamabandi 1904-1905" They also requested the First Appellate Court to direct the Revenue Officials to prepare an excerpt of the revenue record for its facility. The aforesaid application was opposed by the defendants. 4. h- Khatanu Istemal i- Khatauni Paimaish and j- Naksha Hakdarwar k- jamabandi 1904-1905" They also requested the First Appellate Court to direct the Revenue Officials to prepare an excerpt of the revenue record for its facility. The aforesaid application was opposed by the defendants. 4. The learned first appellate court, on appreciating the evidence available on the record, considered it appropriate to allow the application after noticing that the plaintiffs previously despite due diligence could not trace the old record. The court further found that the documents sought to be produced in additional evidence are public documents and the copies of the jamabandi (the record of right) carry the presumption of truth as to their contents. The defendants have challenged the aforesaid order passed by the first appellate court. 5. This Bench has heard the learned counsel for the parties and with their able assistance perused the paper book. The learned counsel representing the petitioners contends that the plaintiffs had filed two applications before the first appellate court, i.e. an application for permission to amend the plaint which was dismissed, whereas the second application under Order 41 Rule 27 CPC which was allowed. He submits that the first appellate court erred in deciding the application independently without hearing the appeal on merits. He contends that the application for permission to lead additional evidence cannot be decided independently. He, in support thereof, relies upon the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Union of India vs. Ibrahim Uddin and Another, (2012) 8 SCC 148 . The learned counsel heavily relies upon paragraph 52 of the judgment. He further submits that since the plaintiffs were in the knowledge of the documents which are sought to be produced in additional evidence, hence, they cannot be permitted to lead additional evidence, at the stage of the First Appeal. He further contends that since the plaintiffs themselves have closed their evidence before the trial court, therefore, they were debarred from moving an application for permission to lead additional evidence. Per contra, the learned counsel representing the respondents submits that the petitioners have failed to make out a case for interference in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. 6. The first argument of the learned counsel representing the petitioners is with regard to two applications. Per contra, the learned counsel representing the respondents submits that the petitioners have failed to make out a case for interference in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. 6. The first argument of the learned counsel representing the petitioners is with regard to two applications. It may be noted here that the dismissal of an application for permission to amend the plaint does not adversely affect the result of the second application in which the prayer for permission to lead additional evidence has been made. The learned first appellate court, as a matter of fact, has found that the plaintiffs in their plaint have already pleaded that the property is ancestral coparcenary property. In such circumstances, the argument of learned counsel does not deserve acceptance. 7. The second argument of the learned counsel representing the petitioners requires detailed examination of the judgment passed by the Supreme Court in Ibrahim Uddin’s case (supra). Before that, let’s examine the provisions of Section 107 and Order 41 Rule 27 of the Code of Civil Procedure,1908 which reads as under:- Section 107 :- (1) Subject to such conditions and limitations as may be prescribed, an Appellate Court shall have power- (a) to determine a case finally; (b) to remand a case; (c) to frame issues and refer them for trial; (d) to take additional evidence or to require such evidence to be taken. (2) Subject as aforesaid, the Appellate Court shall have the same powers and shall perform as nearly as may be the same duties as are conferred and imposed by this Code on Courts of original jurisdiction in respect of suits instituted therein. “Order XLI Rule 27- PRODUCTION OF ADDITIONAL EVIDENCE IN APPELLATE COURT. (2) Subject as aforesaid, the Appellate Court shall have the same powers and shall perform as nearly as may be the same duties as are conferred and imposed by this Code on Courts of original jurisdiction in respect of suits instituted therein. “Order XLI Rule 27- PRODUCTION OF ADDITIONAL EVIDENCE IN APPELLATE COURT. (1) The parties to an appeal shall not be entitled to produce additional evidence, whether oral or documentary, in the Appellate Court, But if- (a) the Court from whose decree the appeal is preferred has refused to admit evidence which ought to have been admitted, or (aa) the party seeking to produce additional evidence, establishes that notwithstanding the exercise of due diligence, such evidence was not within his knowledge or could not, after the exercise of due diligence, be produced by him at the time when the decree appealed against was passed, or (b) the Appellate Court requires any document to be produced or any witness to be examined to enable it to pronounce judgment, or for any other substantial cause, the Appellate Court may allow such evidence or document to be produced, or witness to be examined. (2) Wherever additional evidence is allowed to be produced by an Appellate Court, the Court shall record the reason for its admission.” It is apparent that Rule 27 is divided in 3 parts which are independent of each other. In other words, Rule 27 permits a party to the appeal to seek permission to lead additional evidence on 3 different and separate grounds which are not inter-se dependent. In fact clauses (aa) and (b) can be further sub divided into two parts each. The legislature has segregated each part with the punctuation mark “or” which itself leads the court to the conclusion that every clause is not only separate but also independent of each other. Clause (a) permits a party to seek permission of the court to lead additional evidence if the court from whose decree the appeal has been filed had refused to admit the evidence which ought to have been admitted. Clause (a) is not dependent on the fulfilment of the requirements of the remaining clauses. On scanning of Clause (aa), it is apparent that it is further provides for two situations. The first part is with regard to a situation where due to lack of knowledge despite due diligence the evidence could not be produced. Clause (a) is not dependent on the fulfilment of the requirements of the remaining clauses. On scanning of Clause (aa), it is apparent that it is further provides for two situations. The first part is with regard to a situation where due to lack of knowledge despite due diligence the evidence could not be produced. Whereas the second part covers a situation where the party could not, after searching with due diligence fails to produce it in evidence before the trial Court and prays for permission to produce in additional evidence before the appellate Court. On careful reading of the aforesaid clause, it is apparent that after the first part, the Parliament uses ‘or’ to distinguish between the first part and the second part. The second part can be read in the following manner:- “The party seeking to produce additional evidence could not after due diligence, produce the evidence when the decree appealed against was passed.” Clause (b) of Order 41 Rule 27 CPC is again in two parts. The First part of Clause (b) enables the appellate court to allow any document or any witness to be examined which is likely to enable the court to pronounce the judgment. This clause confers suo moto jurisdiction on the appellate court to direct production of any evidence which is likely to help the court in pronouncing judgment. Whereas the second part thereof enables the appellate court to allow the production of additional evidence for any other substantial cause. The ultimate aim of the courts is to do substantive justice. If, in facts of a particular case, the appellate court forms an opinion that to sub-serve the cause of justice, some evidence (Documentary or oral evidence or both) is required to be produced, it can suo-moto direct the party to produce the evidence while exercising its enabling power under clause (b). While discussing the difference between different clauses of Order 41 Rule 27, the Supreme Court in K.R. Mohan Reddy Vs. M/s Net Work Inc Rep. Tr. M.D., (2007) 14 SCC 257 , has held as under: “(15) The High Court, in our opinion, failed to apply the provisions of Order 41 Rule 27 of CPC in its correct perspective. Clauses (a), (aa) and (b) of Sub-rule (1) of Rule 27 of Order XLI refer to three different situations. Power of the appellate court to pass any order thereunder is limited. Clauses (a), (aa) and (b) of Sub-rule (1) of Rule 27 of Order XLI refer to three different situations. Power of the appellate court to pass any order thereunder is limited. For exercising its jurisdiction thereunder, the appellate Court must arrive at a finding that one or the other conditions enumerated thereunder is satisfied. A good reason must also be shown as to why the evidence was not produced in the trial Court. (18) It is now a trite law that the conditions precedent for application of clause (aa) of Sub-rule (1) of Rule 27 of Order XLI is different from that of clause (b). In the event the former is to be applied, it would be for the applicant to show that the ingredients or conditions precedent mentioned therein are satisfied. On the other hand clause(b) to Sub-rule (1) of Rule 27 of Order XLI of CPC is to be taken recourse to, the appellate Court was bound to consider the entire evidences on record and come to an independent finding for arriving at a just decision; adduction of additional evidence as has been prayed by the appellant was necessary.” In Ibrahim Uddin’s case (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court, while considering the aspect of the stage at which the application for permission to lead additional evidence is required to be considered, held that it has to be considered at the stage when the arguments have been heard in the main case. It may be noted here that on a careful reading of paragraphs 50 and 51, in which the Hon’ble Supreme Court referred to certain precedents, the court examined the cases in the context of the enabling power under Order 41 Rule 27(1)(b) CPC. Even in paragraph 52, the Court propounded that in a situation when the court, itself, requires the document to enable it to pronounce the judgment, the appropriate stage would be at the time of hearing of the appeal. Thus, essentially, the court with reference to consideration in the context of enabling powers under Clause (b) of Rule 41 Rule 27(1) CPC propounded the theory of the appropriate stage. Hence, the judgment relied upon by the learned counsel representing the petitioners, with highest respect, is not applicable. In the present case, the appellate court has allowed the application for permission to lead additional evidence under Clause (aa) of Order 41 Rule 27 (1) CPC. Hence, the judgment relied upon by the learned counsel representing the petitioners, with highest respect, is not applicable. In the present case, the appellate court has allowed the application for permission to lead additional evidence under Clause (aa) of Order 41 Rule 27 (1) CPC. Under Clause (aa), the party seeking permission to produce the additional evidence is required to establish that despite the exercise of due diligence, he could not produce the evidence at the time when the decree under appeal was passed. Clauses (a), (aa) and (b) operate in different situations and eventualities. The requirements of the aforesaid clauses are independent and each clause stands on a separate footing. A 5 Judge Bench of the Supreme Court in K. Venkataramiah Vs. Setharama Reddy AIR 1963 SC 1526 , after examining the provisions of Order 41 Rule 27 CPC, held that all these clauses furnish independent grounds to the party to apply for permission to lead additional evidence. It is significant to note that clause (aa) came to be added, subsequently, with effect from 01.02.1977. A Division Bench of the Himachal Pardesh High Court in Himanshu Vs. Bishnu Dutt and others, 2006 (39) AIC 755 while examining the identical contention, held as under:- “8. The judgments in cases of State of Rajasthan vs. T.N. Sahani, 2001(10) SCC 619 , Arjan Singh vs. Kartar Singh and Ors, AIR 1951 SC 193 , Parsotim Thakur and Ors vs. Lal Mohar Thakur and Ors, AIR 1931 PC 143, make it abundantly clear that all these cases related to the exercise of jurisdiction by the appeal Court under Clause (b) and none of these cases related to the exercise of jurisdiction by the appeal Court under Clause (a) or under Clause (aa). Undoubtedly, a bare reading of the three clauses in Rule 27 of Order 41 clearly suggests to us that in so far as Clause (a) and Clause (aa) are concerned, the initiative has to come from the party seeking to lead additional evidence either because the party feels that despite efforts by it the trial Court had refused to admit the evidence which ought to have been admitted (refer to Clause (a)), or despite exercise of due diligence, the evidence not being in the knowledge of the party in the trial Court, it could not produce the same during the trial. In so far as the situations relatable to Clauses (a) and (aa) are concerned, in our considered opinion, application for production of additional evidence can be filed by the party at any stage of the appeal, even before the stage of final hearing of the appeal. In coming to this view, we have in our minds cogent reasons. The main reason is that the party knows that either with respect to the situation under Clause (a) or with respect to a situation under Clause (aa), the trial Court erred in not allowing the additional evidence and unless the additional evidence is produced the party’s case cannot be properly put across. There is no reason for such a party to wait for the final hearing of the appeal because that would be a sheer wastage of time and the party would be well advised in such a situation to file an application for leading the additional evidence at the initial, rather earliest stage of the appeal itself. There can also be situations where the party understands its case very well and finds that unless the additional evidence is brought on the record the appeal cannot be effectively adjudicated upon. There can be numerous other reasons why a party would genuinely feel convinced about the imperative need of leading additional evidence at the very initial stage of the appeal because the party would be genuinely convinced that unless additional evidence was produced, the appeal by itself, based on the record of the trial Court would be imperfect or incomplete causing prejudice to the interests of the party. 9. In contradistinction to Clauses (a) and (aa), as far as Clause (b) is concerned, its ambit and scope is quite distinct because the expression “to enable it to pronounce the judgment” occurring in Clause (b) clearly suggests that only when the appellate Court has started hearing of the appeal and in the course of the hearing of the appeal feels that it requires any additional document to be produced or any additional witness to be examined, it may call for additional evidence. Their might be actually situations and cases where even though the appeal Court finds that it would be able to pronounce the judgment on the basis of the record of the trial Court as it was, it might still consider that in the interests of justice something which remained obscure should be filled up so that it can pronounce the judgment in a more satisfactory manner. The requirement has to be of the Court and the requirement is always to enable the Court to pronounce the judgment for any substantial cause. In either case the requirement has to be of the Court. This is the plain meaning and clear interpretation of Clause (b) and based on such interpretation, in our considered view, the legitimate occasion for the exercise of this jurisdiction is not any stage prior to the hearing of the appeal but the stage of the final hearing of the appeal when on examining the evidence as it stands some inherent lacuna or defect became apparent to the Appeal Court. There might be situations where the Appeal Court in the process of examining the evidence while hearing the appeal finds that some omission needs to be supplied and in such a situation it can ask for additional evidence to supply such an omission with a view to enabling it to pronounce the judgment.” Still further, it is apparent that the petitioners did not take up this objection when the application was taken up for consideration by the First Appellate Court. The petitioners have also failed to show any prejudice caused to them in considering the application at this stage. Still further, even if for the sake of argument, the contention of the learned counsel is to be accepted, still, at the most, it can be said to be a procedural irregularity which does not affect the merits of the case. It is already well settled law that the rules of procedure are framed to sub-serve the cause of justice rather than hampering its flow. In the given circumstances, in the considered opinion of this Bench, there is no substance in the argument of learned counsel for the petitioners. With reference to the next argument, it may be noted that the respondents do not claim that they were not in the knowledge of the documents. In the given circumstances, in the considered opinion of this Bench, there is no substance in the argument of learned counsel for the petitioners. With reference to the next argument, it may be noted that the respondents do not claim that they were not in the knowledge of the documents. In the application, they have specifically stated that they had made sincere efforts to search the old revenue record relating to the said property but had failed to trace the same despite exercising due diligence. Thus, the respondents sought permission of the court to lead additional evidence under Part-II of the Clause (aa) and not under Ist part of clause (aa). Keeping in view the aforesaid facts, the argument of learned counsel cannot be accepted. The last argument of the learned counsel representing the petitioners also does not deserve acceptance. The learned counsel has failed to draw the attention of the Court to any bar/prohibition on the party to file an application for permission to lead additional evidence in the first appellate court after having closed the evidence by making a statement to that affect in the trial Court. In normal practice, the party to the suit after leading its evidence closes it by making a formal statement, however, such statement does not debar such party to file an application for permission to lead additional evidence either before the trial court or before the appellate court. Still further, in the facts of the present case, this Bench find that the petitioners have failed to make out a case for exercising the supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India which is required to be exercised only in rare and exceptional cases in order to advance the cause of justice. Hence, the revision petition is ordered to be dismissed.